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THE STRUGGLE IN THE POLISH LEADERSHIP
AND THE REVOLT OF THE APPARAT

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MEMORANDUM TO RECIPIENTS:

This staff study analyzes the dynamics of the 1968 struggle in the Polish leadership, defines the nature of the forces that caused the struggle, and concludes that the events of 1968 may prove to be a prelude to further internal strife.

Intelligence reporting and analysis during the events of 1968 emphasized anti-Semitism and a classic factional power struggle as the main elements in the conflict. Although both elements were present, this analysis finds that the primary forces stimulating conflict were a widespread dissatisfaction with the status quoism of the Gomulka establishment, a desire for internal stability in the face of events in Czechoslovakia, and the frustrated ambitions of younger party and government functionaries. These primary forces, though eased, are still at work and could lead to renewed party upheaval.

The research analyst was James V. Ogle; the study was coordinated with ONE and OCI.

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A purge of key members of the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP) began following the Mideast War of 1967 and greatly intensified following student protests in March 1968. Leadership statements concerning the dangers of revisionism and Zionism, the mounting hysteria of much of the Polish press, and the international atmosphere generated by the concurrent Czechoslovak crisis seemd to justify predictions of a major restructuring of the balance of power in Poland not excluding the fall of First Secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka himself. A PUWP functionary quoted in a Borba, Belgrade, dispatch from Warsaw, 9 April 1968, said "The events of March were only one step from bloodshed, and only half a step from smashing the Party." Although order was restored following the Fifth Congress of the PUWP in November 1968 and Gomulka and the Gomulka system survived, there is a general consensus as of mid-1969 that the forces at work in 1968 retain their potential for drastic change. The problem is to define the nature of these forces.

Analysis at the time concentrated on evidence of a classical factional struggle involving three elements--the Gomulka establishment, the "Partisan" faction of Minister of Interior Mieczyslaw Moczar, and the "Technocrat" faction of Politburo Member and Provincial First Secretary Edward Gierek. In the event, however, these categories seem to lose their predictive value. Neither Moczar nor Gierek appear to have profited from the roles they played in 1968, the "Partisans" and "Technocrats" proved to be largely overlapping, and the threat to the Gomulka establishment came not so much from leadership factions as from a virtual revolt of the apparat, a

thrust from below by middle level functionaries frustrated by long years of stagnation.

This revolt was made possible by a temporary paralysis of the top leadership which in turn was caused by a number of "accidents"--fear of student and intellectual dissidence, preoccupation with the Czechoslovak crisis, and a shared desire for restructuring of the system (Gomulka desiring the elimination of anti-Soviet elements, the Partisans desiring the elimination of Jewish elements blocking their own promotions, and the Technocrats desiring an end to the sabotaging of economic reform). The revolt took place within legal Party frameworks which pitted the disciplinary rights of basic Party organizations against the appointment rights of higher Party organs as formulated in nomenklatura lists. Although the revolt was precipitated by Moczar, who made use of his control of security forces and non-Party mass media, it soon ran out of control and prompted a reunification of the leadership, including the Politburo and the provincial first secretaries, in defense of their prerogatives.

Viewed in the West as hard-line and essentially anti-Semitic, the 1968 purge which was the public manifestation of this revolt was often viewed by its victims as a "Red Guard" phenomenon and, paradoxically, it generated considerable "liberal" support. The Polish "Red Guards" were not, as in China, an extra-Party instrument of the central leader; they were members of basic Party organizations revolting against the central leader. But, as in China, local authorities were being "struggled" and Party authority was being undermined. The victims of the purge were not only Jews but often also liberals in the Western and revisionist sense. Indeed, the last of the 1956 revisionists fell in this purge. But many men, inside and outside the Party, with liberal aspirations applauded the resulting changes. Many of the new men who came to the fore are better qualified professionally than their sluggish predecessors and the final test of their "liberalism" would be what they did to make things work, what they would do when they had the gun. This is a test they have not yet faced.

The new young men admitted to the Politburo and Secretariat at the Fifth Congress seem to represent a new type of apparatchik, men of talent compared to the old guard but men of little imagination compared to the revisionists now so fully excluded. They may represent an opening wedge for the forces galvanized by the "apparat revolt." Despite some movement in the first half of 1969 on foreign policy and economic issues it appears on balance that the adjustments in the Gomulka system have not satisfied these forces, the system has not yet proven strong enough to discipline them, and Poland faces problems which are insurmountable within the framework of present policies. The over-prolonged postponement of reform could lead to renewed upheaval within the Party and, in this case, the events of 1968 may prove to have been a prelude to further and more thoroughgoing attempt by lower level functionaries to force changes from below.

BACKGROUND

The Polish Equation

The popular rejection of Communism and the presence of Soviet troops, never absent from Poland as they had been from Czechoslovakia, are the first two constants in the Polish political equation. The Czechoslovak events of 1968 are sufficient proof of the significance of the Soviet presence.



Another constant, since the "Polish October" of 1956, has been the person of Wladyslaw Gomulka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). Almost pathologically nervous and stubborn, apparently incapable of tolerating spontaneity in any form, Gomulka came to personify both the Polishness of Poland and the continuity of Polish Communist power. Such contradictions in Gomulka's personality find expression in the "Gomulka system" which has maintained the factional balance for 12 years, which has led to the alienation of the top leadership from all elements of the society,

and which has resulted in the stagnation of Polish political, social, and economic life. A final constant of Polish political life is talk of Gomulka's fall.

Although an election which would stand the PUWP against socialist and other parties remains hypothetical, 1968 was a year of intense political activity in Poland. This activity involved the interplay of at least four types of factors--the various sub-apparats which make up the Apparat, the factions at the top, the personalities involved, and the dissident voices.

The Apparats and the Nomenklatura

In a conversation [redacted] in August 1967, a leading official of the Higher School of Social Science of the PUWP distinguished five elements of power in Poland: the Party, industry, the Ministry of Interior, the internal security troops, and the army. In the Polish context it is probably correct not to distinguish the state or administrative apparatus from the Party. The effective non-Party bureaucracy then falls very largely into the industrial apparat--the managers and the technicians who, if they have a self defining ideology, constitute the "Technocrats." The intermediate category of internal security troops is of marginal interest in the following analysis, for their transfer from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense pre-dates the period under consideration. Another category, in addition to the bureaucratic or administrative, missing from the five divisions above is that of the trade unions. Again the omission is valid for Poland in 1967-1968. The workers remain the force with the greatest revolutionary potential but the remnants of the 1956 workers' councils, suppressed for their spontaneity, and the trade union apparat are completely subordinate to the Party. The worker voice remains one of dissidence, if largely muted for the time being, but there is no separate "worker" apparat engaged in the power struggle.

An understanding of Polish politics in 1968 requires a further subdivision of the Party apparat. Ordinarily, a Communist regime works as a simple pyramid, with all power concentrated at and flowing from the top. However, basic Party organizations, the "cells," exist in the highest government offices and at the cell meetings even junior officials may, in theory, have disciplinary power (including that of expulsion from the Party) over the head of the office who attends the meeting as a simple Party member. Such power, which in any case is subject to review by Party Control Commissions, is almost never exercised except in rare periods of near anarchy--such as reigned within the Polish party in the spring of 1968.

The Party-government relationship is further complicated by the little noted institution of the "nomenklatura." The nomenklatura is a schedule which assigns personnel action on specified positions, including government positions, to specified higher-echelon Party organizations. The system of nomenklatura lists extends down to the very lowest positions in the state. Thus, for example, a village Party committee might have the right to appoint the chief of the tractor shed on a collective farm in its geographic area. But the nomenklatura principle (seldom mentioned in Communist literature) is jealously guarded only at the higher levels and may be moribund elsewhere. When the nomenklatura is referred to in this paper subsequently the term will refer to the lists of posts for which appointment and removal powers are reserved to the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central Committee departments.

As in the Soviet Union, the key role regarding central nomenklatura appointments is played in Poland by the Cadre Affairs Department of the Central Committee. When the nomenklatura rights of the central party authorities to control key appointments are violated, it is the Cadre Affairs Department which intervenes. The member of the Secretariat with responsibility for cadre affairs (i.e., Roman Zambrowski prior to 1963 and Ryszard Strzelecki after 1964) is generally credited by Polish sources with direct control over "thousands" of jobs, which he controls through the Cadre Affairs Department--sometimes, apparently, in violation of the nomenklatura rights of

lower party organs. This means that Zambrowski and, later, Strzelecki seem to have played a rather ambiguous role in that manipulation of cadre appointments which is one of the keys to factional struggle. Appointments on the nomenklatura lists of the Politburo, Central Committee, and Central Committee departments presumably served the Gomulka establishment but other, less responsible, posts were filled initially by Zambrowski favorites (often Jewish intellectuals) who became the chief targets of Strzelecki during the subsequent Partisan bid for power.

A final distinction is that between the central leadership and the provincial (voivodship) first secretaries. As early as 1963, the provincial first secretaries won inclusion in the commission preparing for the Fourth Congress, whether they were Central Committee members or not. [redacted] speculating on the Gomulka succession in May 1967, observed that in default of any effective central policy, Poland had become a "federation of provinces," with policy making largely in the hands of the regional Party secretaries. This presumably applies, however, only to the stronger provincial first secretaries, such men as Edward Gierek in Katowice Voivodship and Jan Szydlak formerly in Pozan Voivodship, whose economically important areas and large party organizations could be profitably manipulated on the basis of the generalized instructions from the center. While the prerogatives won by such men sometimes applied to all provincial first secretaries (such as inclusion, by right of office, in central counsels) the weaker first secretaries suffered from the inroads of Zambrowski and Strzelecki in the appointment of local cadres. The independent role of the provincial first secretaries, their failure to control, in some instances, the apparatchiks below them, and their eventual, almost universal, admission into the Central Committee are part of the story of what happened in 1968.

The Factions

The Party apparat, both central and provincial,

the Ministry of Interior, the army, and the industrial bureaucracy are the centers of power in the Polish apparat state. The power holders in all these apparats are, of course, also Party members. The history of the Polish Party is one of bitter factional struggles so intense that, in 1938 for example, they led to the dissolution of the Party by Stalin. More important is the division created by the war and the post-war settlement which, in Poland as throughout Eastern Europe, opposed the returning Muscovite leaders, many of them of Jewish origin, to the "native" leaders who had led the resistance against the German occupation. The Muscovite survivors of the Stalin purges were placed in and maintained in power by the Soviets and within a few years of the end of the war the native leaders were purged from the post-war coalition for "nationalist deviation." Gomulka was one of the more prominent figures to fall in this purge. Unlike his counterparts in other Eastern European countries, however, he survived.

In response to the Soviet changes following Stalin's death, the Polish Muscovites split into a hard-line Natolinist faction and a liberalizing Pulawian faction (both factions taking their name from the Warsaw suburbs in which they met). The struggle between these factions became deadlocked following the death of Party leader Boleslaw Bierut when Soviet intervention, inspired by Khrushchev's anti-Semitism, prevented the succession of heir-apparent Roman Zambrowski. Backed by a popular wave of nationalism and liberal aspirations resulting from de-Stalinization, the Pulawian faction sided with Gomulka and he came to power even in the face of Soviet opposition, bringing with him the previously suppressed native elements of the Party. Gomulka's suppression of the liberal aspirations of 1956, in defense of Party hegemony and the Soviet alliance, won him Soviet support but destroyed the spontaneous popular base which had helped bring him to power and precipitated a many-fractured factional struggle.

Relieved of the burden of Stalinist terror and deprived of the possibilities for participation in

politics which 1956 had promised, the Polish people sought a "little stability" in their private lives and the Gomulka era became the era of the "Small Stabilization." The inner circle of Gomulka's Politburo cronies, the "Little Politburo," consisted of Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spychalski, and Ignacy Loga-Sowinski. These men remained above the factional struggle, relying entirely on their relationship to Gomulka, and consequently failed to develop significant personal followings or personal popularity. The only possible exception was Kliszko, Gomulka's gray emminence, who may have a small group of followers on his own. Evaluating the strength of the other leading personalities has been the central problem for analysts of Polish politics. The problem was complicated by the sudden conversion of so many Jewish Muscovites from Stalinists to revisionists, by the emotional inheritance of the Polish resistance in World War II (for which the tragic Warsaw Uprising became the symbol), and by the fact that factional groupings of a transitional or hypothetical nature, reported to the West by often well-placed informants, tended to become set in the intimate feedback between these informants and such Western organs as Radio Free Europe.

Moczar and the Partisans

The factional struggle took on new seriousness with the emergence of the Partisans and Mieczyslaw Moczar. The first reference to the "Partisans" as a faction appeared in a June 1962 article in the New York Times. By the end of the year, all discussions of Polish politics included references to them. Anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic, they were the "boors" in opposition to the "Jews." The leaders were said to be the former partisan leaders, generals Moczar and Grzegorz Korczynski, sometimes the former Natolinist Ryszard Strzelecki, and in rare and early cases even Zenon Klisko. From 1963 on, however, the Partisan faction became virtually synonymous with the personal following of Moczar. Born in Poland in 1913, possibly of Russian or Ukrainian

parents (his real name has been reported as Nikolai Demkov or Mikolaj Demko), Moczar commanded partisan units in Lublin, Lodz, and Kielce during the war. In the fall of 1944, Soviet agents in Polish uniforms relieved him of his command and engaged his unit in a disastrous campaign in which it was annihilated. When Moczar arrived in Lublin, at the end of the war, all key jobs had been taken over by Soviet-trained officers, many of whom were Jews; and a commission of inquiry headed by a Soviet-trained Jew blamed Moczar for the Kielce defeat. In making common cause with the veterans of the non-Communist Home Army after 1956 Moczar made Polish patriotism an outlet for his personal grievances.

In the immediate post-war years, however, Moczar had become notorious for his brutal and tyrannical control of Lodz, where he headed the secret police (UB). At the third Plenum of the PUWP in November 1949, Moczar denounced his partisan commander, Gomulka, and was rewarded with a number of minor posts, emerging from obscurity in August 1956 to become Minister of State Farms. Despite this, in December 1956, Gomulka make him vice minister of interior.

By mid-1963, Vice Minister Moczar had taken over effective control of the Ministry of Interior from the ineffectual Minister Wladyslaw Wicha and the Partisan faction was rumored to have been responsible for a general "clean-up" of personnel attached to the personal offices of Gomulka. Partisan power increased from mid-1963 to mid-1965. At the Central Committee Plenum of July 1963, Roman Zambrowski, a Partisan target since the fall of 1962, resigned from the Politburo and Secretariat where he had been in charge of Party cadres. By the spring of 1964, as preparations were being made for the already delayed Fourth Congress of the PUWP, the Partisans were generally credited with administrative control of parts of the Ministry of Defense. Partisans then still held only secondary positions in the Party apparatus and they were weak in regard to controlling economic planning and especially foreign policy. At the Fourth Congress, in June 1964, Ryszard Strzelecki, a member of the Secretariat since 1960 and long rumored to have ties with the

Partisans, was appointed a candidate member of the Politburo (a newly created post from which he stepped to full membership in November 1964). The hold of the Partisans on Gomulka seemed to be increasing. In December 1964, Moczar became Minister of Interior, former Minister of Interior Wladyslaw Wicha entered the Secretariat with responsibility for security affairs, and Ryszard Strzelecki, who had been in charge of security affairs, became responsible for cadre affairs.

After this there was a setback for Moczar. In early 1965, amidst rumors of Soviet displeasure with nationalism in the Polish army, there was a shuffle of senior personnel in the Ministry of Defense. On 1 July 1965, Poland's uniformed internal security troops were transferred from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense, a move rumored to be linked with fears aroused by the attempted coup in Bulgaria. The dismissal of Yugoslav Vice President Rankovic (for having "bugged" Tito's residence, among other things) and the purge of the Yugoslav security apparatus in mid-1966 brought a painful parallel to mind. Warsaw wits saw the difference between Poland and Yugoslavia in the fact that Gomulka had not yet found the microphones under his bed.

[redacted] at least up to May 1965 Moczar had been enhancing his own position by putting his adherents into various government jobs. Personnel had been freely exchanged between the Central Committee apparatus and the Security Service (UB). [redacted] stated that UB personnel or agents were taking over the Foreign Ministry's departments at the working level, one by one. In a more sinister vein, he reported that Moczar had introduced audio surveillance of the offices and homes of important people and that their secretaries were passing on "public opinion samplings" to Moczar.

The apparent temporary halt in the rise of Moczar's party fortunes in 1965-1966 may have partly reflected a change in the position taken by Party Secretary and Politburo member Ryszard Strzelecki. Various contemporary

sources claimed that after the removal of Zambrowski, Jewish Muscovite turned liberal, and the promotion of Strzelecki, a commander of the Warsaw Uprising and a hard-liner ever since, in 1963-1964, the Partisans "turned to the people" and temporarily abandoned their attempts to advance within the Party structure itself. The subsequent intense Partisan activity in mass organizations and on a broad propaganda front suggests that this may have happened but does not explain it. According to some reports, Strzelecki turned his back on the Partisans when he was co-opted into the Politburo in 1964 and threw in his lot with that of the Gomulka establishment. Despite his links with the anti-Gomulka Natolinist faction, Strzelecki had been host to Gomulka and his family during the war and their personal ties were strong. Nevertheless, similar bonds tied Strzelecki and Moczar and it had previously been generally assumed that Moczar could count on Strzelecki's vote in the Politburo if the issue were Moczar's promotion. It is unclear, however, to what extent Party Secretary Strzelecki cooperated with Moczar in placing cadres in the lower-level positions of the apparat.

Reports from mid-1965 on noted the Partisan-inspired purge of the Sport and Tourism organization, a step directed at propaganda manipulation of Polish emigree centers. Reports in the fall of 1965 spoke of the increasing popularity of "Mr. Mieczyslaw" (Moczar) and of his exploitation of the Front of National Unity through whose provincial organizations Moczar was influencing the local units of the United Peasant Party and Democratic Party.

In January 1966, Moczar was being described as a "Polish Tito." An American journalist, surveying the Polish scene in February 1966, was struck by the colorful and vital figure of Moczar against a gray and static background--at the Television Actor's Ball, at the premiere of a major Polish film, writing his own book on his wartime experiences, preaching to veterans groups, making direct contact with writers and intellectuals, going to see the play "Tango" by the avant garde Slawomir Mrozek.

In May 1966, following maladroit measures by Gomulka against the Church in conjunction with the Polish millenium celebrations, one informant even noted that many Catholics put their hopes in Moczar, adding: "It is easy to expect something of Moczar because, actually, nobody knows what he really plans and thinks." Certainly, by this time, the renegade Catholic PAX group, under the former fascist Boleslaw Piasecki, was riding the Partisan coattails. In November 1966, the [redacted] who claimed to be a Partisan (it was not a faction, he claimed, but "a state of mind") and a friend of Moczar, attempted to convince an American official that Moczar and the Partisans were a significant force among the liberals, although he admitted that being Minister of Interior was a disadvantageous spot for a liberal to be in. Nevertheless, he said, Moczar wanted to continue in this position "lest the Ministry fall into more conservative hands."

One of the strongest cards in Moczar's hand, introducing a Tammany Hall element into his bid for power, was his control, since 1956, of the Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (Zwiazek Bojownikow o Wolnosc i Demokracje, ZBOWID). With a quarter million members, including veterans of the non-Communist Home Army, ZBOWID controlled military decorations, had large funds at its disposal, and ensured various privileges for its members. In the 10 years preceding mid-1967, decorations for wartime service (which entitled the bearers to 25 percent higher pensions when they retired) had been awarded to 220,000 persons. In the years 1960 to 1965, ZBOWID had disbursed 50 million zlotys in relief payments to members who needed help.

By mid-1967, the Partisans were credited with strong infiltration in the security organs and militia and with having people in leading positions in the armed forces, particularly among field officers, and in the Main Political Administration and the press department of the Defense Ministry. Partisan views were represented in the Warsaw weeklies Kultura, Zolnierz Wolnosci, and Stolica. Partisan influence over the mass media extended

into Polish radio and especially Polish television. And the Partisans were credited with control of 15 to 20 percent of the Central Committee. Their sole representative, if such he was, in the Politburo was Ryszard Strzelecki.

Gierek and the Technocrats

The "third man" (with Gomulka and Moczar) in every story of struggle in the Polish leadership was Edward Gierek. An informant who observed, in August 1967, that Moczar's position was overestimated abroad and that he "had no influence in the organizational section [that is, the Cadres Affairs Department] of the Central Committee," added that Gierek was in "a very solid position," a man "everybody had to take into account," a man without whom "it would be impossible to settle Gomulka's succession." Born in Poland in 1913, Gierek emigrated to France when he was 13 years old. He joined the French Communist Party in 1931 and the Belgian Communist Party in 1935. After fighting in the resistance there, Gierek became chairman of the National Council of Poles in Belgium after the war, returning to Poland in 1948. He was elected to the Central Committee in 1954, to the Secretariat in March 1956, and to the Politburo in July 1956. In October 1956, Gierek acquired prominence by calling for a recess of a Sejm (Parliament) session (at which PUWP members were voting on both sides of the same issue) and taking the initiative in convening a Politburo session to reimpose discipline. He was dropped from the Politburo after Gomulka's resumption of power and reinstated as a member at the Third PUWP Congress in March 1959. He left the Secretariat at the Fourth Congress in June 1964. Gierek has been First Secretary of the Katowice Voivodship provincial apparatus since March 1957. (A reference to the "270,000 strong" Katowice party organization--out of a total Party membership of a little over two million--appears in every Gierek speech.) Because of his ties to the Polish Communists who had emigrated to France and to the miners, the "Praetorian Guard" of the PUWP, and be-

cause of his reputation for organizational skill and for relying on the technical intelligentsia in his area, Gierek can count on considerable popular backing despite his sometimes doctrinaire approach to politics and ideology. Katowice is the most important economic area in Poland. Gierek has quietly used his strength to place close collaborators in other provincial organizations (e.g., Szczecin and Poznan) and in central organizations (e.g., the Socialist Youth Union). Gierek also represents the PUWP in contacts with Western European parties, has figured prominently in Plenum meetings and Congress preparations, and has travelled to the Soviet Union on a number of occasions, e.g., as a member of the five-man delegation to the Twentythird CPSU Congress in 1966.

When Katowice was presented as a model for economic reform at the November 1964 plenum, Gierek came to be regarded as Gomulka's "Crown Prince." Technocrat supporters of Moczar in January 1965 were numbering Gierek among the Partisans, pointing to Gierek's elimination of Jews from the Katowice party leadership and his alleged defiance of Gomulka. In this regard it appears that Gierek did refuse the chairmanship of the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers in 1964 on the general understanding that he would come to Warsaw only as Party First Secretary. Despite the still recurring rumors of a Gierek-Moczar coalition, it is fairly obvious that Gierek kept the Partisans out of Katowice. On the other hand, reports of implacable opposition between Gierek and Moczar also lack confirmation. Indeed, their two "factions" are to a great extent overlapping, the differences deriving from Gierek's access to a higher echelon of the Party and to Moczar's dependence on the security apparatus and the low-level apparatchiks. The reports of differences are based very largely on doctrinal disputes between what may be self-appointed spokesmen for the Technocrats and the Partisans, especially Polityka on the one hand and Kultura on the other.

Dissidence

Before reviewing the play of forces in 1968, it is necessary also to describe Polish dissidence as distin-

guished from the contention of apparats, factions, and personalities. Dissidence, while it may sway those who have power and may, in rare instances, provoke rebellion, is the expression of opposing values by those who are themselves without power. In Poland this includes the Church, the writers (including many who are Party members), and the students (most of whom are not Party members). Another approach would be to define dissidence in terms of the values expressed, the doctrines, rather than in terms of those who express these values. Such values, against the background of a Communist apparat state, are most often freedom of speech and assembly, individual liberty, and political democracy. Other forms of dissidence can be found in Poland--the anarcho-syndicalism of students Kuron and Modzelewski and the Stalinism of Albanian-based Kazimierz Mijal, for example--but these are of little relevance. With the outright rejection of Marxism-Leninism or socialism ruled out by the imposed Soviet and Party hegemony, the most meaningful dissidence is revisionism.

It is characteristic of Gomulkaism, which includes the autocratic suppression of any debate of the issues, that while Poland has produced some of the most insightful revisionist thinkers--such as Leszek Kolakowski--the revisionists have not been permitted to retain a faction within the Party. The Pulawian revisionists in the March 1959 (Third Congress) Politburo and Secretariat had all been removed by 1963--Jerzy Morawski from the Politburo in November 1959 and from the Secretariat in January 1960, Jerzy Albrecht from the Secretariat in January 1961, and Wladyslaw Matwin from the Secretariat in November 1963. The removal of Stalinist-turned-revisionist Zambrowski from both Politburo and Secretariat in July 1963 has been noted above. Kolakowski was expelled from the Party in 1966. And the last of the revisionists, Adam Schaff, Wilhelm Billig, and Stefan Ziolkiewski were to be removed from the Central Committee in 1968. These last survivors had not formed a Party faction but they were charged with having encouraged, from within the Party, the dissidence of the writers and students. It was the manifestation of this dissidence which was to spark the events of 1968.

"THE STIGMA OF REVOLUTION"

From the Mideast War, 1967, to the March "Coup," 1968

One of the taboos on which the Gomulka system depended concerned reference to the role of the Jewish Party leaders, who continued to occupy a number of key positions below the Politburo and Secretariat level until 1967. When popular sympathy for the Israelis at the time of the Mideast War in 1967 clashed with Gomulka's loyal adherence to the pro-Arab line of the Soviet Bloc, Gomulka himself broke this taboo. This break provided the opening for which the long-frustrated Partisans had been waiting; but more than this seems to have been involved. There is evidence that the Mideast War, even prior to any popular reaction to it, brought real shock and real fear into Polish politics. One minister of the government said on the day hostilities began that "we could become belligerent at any time." He foresaw Polish participation in a general war in Europe and this, he admitted, would be disastrous. Official installations abroad were instructed concerning the destruction of classified material and concerning notifications to be given to Polish nationals in the area. The socialist countries, one official stated, were "preparing for war." This official war scare apparently lasted only a few hours, but it seems credible to suppose that it energized the subsequent overreaction to celebrations of the Israeli victory.

A Polish Party intellectual, interviewed in August 1967, reported that the initial reaction to the Israeli victory had been a wave of nationalist and anti-Soviet feeling among military officers and in the Ministry of Interior. These elements drew the lesson that Polish dependence on the Soviet Union must be reduced. On 19 June 1967, Gomulka delivered his fateful speech about the Bloc intention to make a "strong and firm reply to Israeli aggression." Alluding to "victory celebrations" and "fifth columnists," he warned against pro-Israeli sentiment in

Poland, especially in the Party. One such celebration, allegedly cited in a Ministry of Interior report to Gomulka, was held at a birthday party for Major General Czeslaw Mankiewicz. The 28 August issue of Trybuna Ludu confirmed that Mankiewicz had been removed from his post as commander of the air defense forces. A committee headed by Minister of Interior Moczar was reportedly investigating almost 50 generals and senior officials in the Ministry of Defense and an article in the 18 August issue of the ministry's daily Zolnierz Wolnosci called for ideological vigilance in the armed forces. By August the purge had spread to the public media and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jews and defenders of Israel's right to exist who were removed in December 1967 included Leon Kasman, editor-in-chief of the Party daily Trybuna Ludu, Janusz Zarzycki, Chairman of the Warsaw National Council, and Stanislaw Kociolek, who was replaced as First Secretary of the Warsaw City Party Committee by Jozef Kepa. Also in December, a known Moczar supporter, Jan Ptasinski, was posted as Polish ambassador to Moscow. The Party school official who provided the categorization of apparats used above stated that, even prior to the Mideast War, Gomulka had promised Moczar a seat in the Secretariat and had charged Strzelecki with a general "cleansing" of the Party. Some Polish informants hypothesized that Gomulka was cynically exploiting the "Zionist" issue to generate popular support for a purge of anti-Soviet elements.

The loss of such supporters as Kasman and Kociolek could not but weaken Gomulka's own position, however, and by the end of 1967 younger Party members were reportedly pushing for an early Congress, preferably in March 1968, to take advantage of the disarray caused by the Mideast War, to remove head of state Edward Ochab and replace him with Gomulka or Cyrankiewicz, and to gain full Politburo membership for Moczar. As early as January 1967, Moczar supporters had been confidently predicting that Defense Minister Spychalski would replace Ochab, a move which would rid them of a long-time factional rival, Ochab, and simultaneously break Gromuka's personal hold on the military. When this step finally was taken, in April 1968, known UB agents stated that younger Party leaders had been agitating for Spychalski's removal for

some time, adding that Spychalski had "well concealed his Jewish origin," but "new evidence had been uncovered and made available to the proper authorities." If Gomulka had promised such a move, he had also taken action to mitigate its effects. On 21 November 1967, Edward Gierek, as chairman of the Sejm National Defense Commission, proposed a new defense law creating a National Defense Committee attached to the Council of Ministers. This law subordinated the Minister of Defense, as deputy chairman of the committee, to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, as chairman of the committee, significantly reducing the power of the Minister of Defense.

Apparently the purport of the maneuvering in Poland was almost as obscure to the Soviets as to Western analysts. A Polish ambassador reported in January 1968 from a post abroad that he had been "virtually interrogated" by Soviet officials there concerning "this Polish affair" and the fate of Gomulka. In Czechoslovakia, Dubcek had replaced Novotny and the Soviet leaders were in no mood for further changes in the Bloc. Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgornyy made an "unofficial" visit to Poland on 12-14 January 1968 and talked with Gomulka, Ochab, Cyrankiewicz, and Kliszko. The visit had all the earmarks of an urgent Soviet intervention in Polish internal affairs. The expected changes in the Polish Politburo and government did not take place.

As a corollary to the purges in the Party apparatus, the state administration, and the military, there was a further tightening of the screws on the intellectuals. In the fall of 1967, harsh sentences were meted out to Nina Karsow, for keeping a file of the Paris emigre journal Kultura, and to Janusz Szpotanski, for performing an unpublished skit privately at home. In January 1968, performance of the classical drama Dziady (Forefathers) was banned because of the anti-Soviet reaction of the audience. After the last performance, 300 students marched in protest, 50 were arrested, and two of the organizers of the march were expelled from Warsaw University. Over 200 members of the Warsaw branch of the Polish Writers Union petitioned for an extraordinary meeting to discuss the Dziady ban. At the two day meeting which opened on

29 February, attended by 500 writers and chaired by Jerzy Putrament, a party inspired "compromise" resolution was rejected by 100 votes and a second resolution, drafted by the writers and demanding resumption of performances of Dziady, restriction of censorship, and writer participation in drafting cultural policy, was passed in secret ballot even though the writers were warned that Gomulka would take it as a personal affront. Encouraged by the writers' support, a student meeting to protest the expulsion of the organizers of the student march was called for 8 March.

On 28 February the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee had ended with the passage of a resolution convening the Fifth Party Congress for the fourth quarter of 1968. On 6 March, Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Rapacki, Spychalski, and Wojciech Jaruzelski (Chief of Staff and future Minister of Defense) departed for a Warsaw Pact meeting in Sofia, where they were joined by Kliszko, coming from another conference in Budapest. This delegation did not return until 8 March.

The matter of the 6 March "coup" should be dealt with before tracing the transformation of student dissidence into apparat revolt. Although rumors of a coup attempt are tenuous and have never been substantiated, it is true that all three regional troop commanders were reassigned in little over a month after the rumored coup. It is thus likely that someone, possibly Gomulka, did believe the rumors, or at least found them too credible to ignore.

A 15 March article in the Moczar-oriented Prawo i Zycie made public reference to a putative coup d'etat. Although this was later dismissed as editorial hyperbole, the rumors persisted. On 25 March, the editor of [redacted] stated privately his belief that Moczar and Strzelecki had moved toward a coup while Gomulka was in Sofia, but had been prevented by the army. Other rumors spoke of an army alert in the Warsaw area called to prevent a coup on 6 March. There were recurrent rumors that Moczar had been in Moscow in the second week of March when the student disturbances began. Another rumor was that

Moczar had gotten in trouble after police moves taken during the later student demonstrations and that certain generals (only Jozef Kuropieska, Commandant of the General Staff Academy, was named in this connection) had saved him. Another story was that troops of the 6th Airborne Division, under Brigadier General Edwin Rozlubirski, sent into Krakow to suppress students, had joined them--a corollary rumor being that Rozlubirski himself had determined to support the students if excessive measures were taken against them. Finally, [redacted] with both Party and military contacts reported at the end of July, in connection with an allegedly stormy Politburo meeting convened on 22 July to discuss the Czechoslovak question, that senior military officers were divided on the Czech issue also, although the military wanted to avoid expressing an opinion, "feeling that the General Staff had compromised itself by backing Moczar during the March events." General Staff backing for Moczar would be assured, [redacted] said, only if the Czechoslovak experiment were allowed to succeed. [redacted] with access to Soviet Central Committee officials responsible for Poland stated in 1969 that Gomulka's fear of a Moczar-inspired coup was a major factor in the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia.

On 3 April--prior to the replacement of Ochab by Spychalski--Major General Czeslaw Waryszak was removed from command of the Warsaw Military District, which covers all of Eastern Poland, and named to the minor job of inspector of bases and equipment stores. Brigadier General Jozef Stabelski, Commander of the Pomeranian District, Northwest Poland, was reassigned. Brigadier General Edwin Rozlubirski was removed from command of the 6th Airborne Division in the Silesian District, covering Southwest Poland, and made deputy chief of training in charge of assault troops. On 12 April, following the replacement of Spychalski by Jaruzelski as Minister of Defense, Major General Eugeniusz Molczyk went into the General Staff, thus losing command of the Silesian Military District, and Major General Adam Czaplewski went from the General Staff to replace Major General Jozef Kuropieska, who retired, as Commandant of the General Staff Academy.

From Student Dissidence to Apparat Revolt

Major student disturbances began on 8 March. Nothing like them had happened in Poland since the demonstrations accompanying the closing of Po Prostu in 1957 and, in regard to magnitude, they were unparalleled by anything which had taken place in Eastern Europe in the absence of a revolutionary situation. But, as Western analysts stressed at the time, a revolutionary situation did not exist. The initial student demands did not challenge the Party hegemony in any of its essentials; the students did not support or have the support of any Party faction; and they did not have, though some sought, the active support of the workers. Nevertheless, the demonstrations were an impressive display of student discontent, of liberal dissidence. The peaceful protest of 5,000 students on 8 March turned violent after provocative police intervention. The next day, 3,000 students clashed with police on Warsaw streets. And on 11 March, 10,000 young people clashed with riot police in front of Communist Party headquarters and a movie theater belonging to the Ministry of Culture was sacked. Similar demonstrations took place in Lublin, Poznan, and Krakow on 13 March.

It appears that, with the return of the Sofia delegation on 8 March, the Politburo went into session and remained in session throughout the crisis period. The Czech parallel and the ouster of Novotny must have been very much on their minds. The suspicion was widespread that the demonstrations had gotten out of hand because someone wanted them to, the usual version being that disorder served Moczar and the Partisans. An alternative and less credible version is that Moczar initially resisted a Politburo order to use his police, knowing that popular feeling would then go against him. Whatever the nature of their "initial alarm," it is [redacted] reported that the leadership soon decided that there was really no widespread support for the students' defiance.

In addition to ordering the use of whatever force was necessary to put down the disturbances, the top leadership was canvassing the provinces in an attempt to

assess the true nature of the crisis. For example, on 16 March in a speech in Gdansk, Stanislaw Kociolek observed: "Comrades, when we reported yesterday to Comrade Wieslaw (Gomulka) on our work in the present situation, Comrade Wieslaw was much interested in our fears and in our actions." Meanwhile, the press associated with the Partisan cause was seizing upon the student demonstrations to further the anti-Jewish purge. The Jewish issue was raised first by the PAX daily Slowo Powszechne on 11 March, and on the same date Trybuna Ludu began noting the participation of children of officials in responsible positions. The 12 March issue of Kurier Polski, an organ of the puppet Democratic Party, reemphasized the "Zionist" issue. This distorted press treatment of the demonstrations created a credibility gap which increased the size of the RFE audience and fed the fires of student protest. The immediate injection of the Jewish issue was interpreted as an effort to divide the workers from the students and intellectuals but it is generally agreed that the workers received the anti-Jewish tirades with apathy. Some Jewish refugees subsequently reported expressions of sympathy from ordinarily anti-Jewish toughs once they saw the Party taking an anti-Jewish line. Nevertheless, the anti-Jewish campaign continued to mount with the publication on 13 March of a ZBOWID "Appeal to the Youth" linking the "campaign of ideological-political diversion" to "international Zionism," and concluding: "We know the inciters of these painful events.... We are convinced that they will be punished irrespective of the posts they hold."

The 13 March television coverage of workers' meetings revealed such slogans put up by local party organizations as "Out of the Party with them" and "Cleanse the Party of Zionists." Everywhere the posters were the same. In Katowice the additional pledge of continued loyalty to "Comrade Wieslaw," (Gomulka) was most prominent. On 14 March, Edward Gierek, the first Politburo member to speak out since the beginning of the crisis, addressed a rally of over 100,000 workers in Katowice. He officially assured Gomulka of the support of the largest Party organization in Poland and stressed that his workers were ready to use action as well as words. Two days later, Poznan first secretary Jan Szydlak pledged the support of the

second largest Party organization. The content of Gierek's speech, in comparison with that of Gomulka five days later, will be analyzed below.

By 15 March, it was apparent that lower level Party organizations were holding a feverish round of meetings. One at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had lasted until eleven at night on the 14th. On 16 March, stories reached the American Embassy that "something is happening at Polityka," where all but two members of the editorial board had allegedly submitted their resignations rather than go along with a Kliszko order to condemn the student demonstrations and the writers' meeting of 29 February. By 16 March, "We support Comrade Wieslaw completely and look forward to his remaining head of the Party" was noted as "a general worker demand." By this time, also, the army had come out with statements supporting Gomulka and great emphasis was being placed in the Warsaw press on "the voice of mining Silesia" (i.e., Katowice) and the Gierek speech supporting Gomulka. A rash of voivodship first secretary statements came on 16 March also, possibly following Politburo orders. Szydlak's statement supporting Gomulka is noted above.

The purges had begun already. It was announced on 12 March that the Premier had dismissed a ministry undersecretary of state, a ministry director general, and a Warsaw government plenipotentiary, apparently because their children had participated in the demonstrations. On 18 March it was announced that the basic party organization of the Supreme Chamber of Control had voted, 236 to two to expel Roman Zambrowski from the Party and that the Council of State had recalled him from his post as Vice Chairman of the Chamber. On 19 March, Gomulka addressed the Warsaw Party aktiv, in the name of the Politburo.

It is interesting to compare the Gierek and the Gomulka speeches. Both spoke in the context of the upcoming Party Congress, both condemned Zionism and anti-Semitism, and both spoke for unity. But Gomulka stressed unity with the Soviet Union; Gierek stressed Polish, worker and intellectual, unity.

Gierek said: "What matters is this: avoid pompous words; the greatest possible number of wise heads and the greatest possible number of working hands must help to raise the country rapidly to a higher rung of technical and economic development." And in this context, "strength in unity," he cited the dreams a century earlier of Adam Mickiewicz, author of Dziady. Gierek concluded: "We shall demand the safeguarding, once and for all, of order, which is imperative in our peaceful work!...We are firmly with the nation, with the Party and its leadership! The 270,000 strong Party organization of Katowice Voivodship sends you greetings, Comrade Wieslaw!"

Gomulka said: "In the events which took place in the country the dividing line runs between socialism and reaction of all kinds, between the policy of Polish-Soviet friendship and alliance and the anti-Soviet policy of reactionary bankrupts and flotsam, between a policy which guarantees to Poland the security of its frontiers and all-round development and the attempts to push Poland onto the road of disaster." In the final portion of his speech Gomulka made his famous distinction between Jews loyal to Israel (who should get out of the country), Jews without nationality (who should get out of responsible positions), and Jews loyal to Poland (who should not be made to suffer). He also thanked the factory workers whose attitude "was the main force which barred the road to disrupters of order."

Much has been made of the fact that Gomulka spoke in the name of the Politburo, and that Partisan organs later referred to his speech as "the Politburo statement read by Comrade Gomulka." This was seen as a confession of Gomulka's weakness, the end of his personal rule. But it could also be seen as evidence that the Politburo had united behind Gomulka in the interest of discipline, signalling the suppression of still persisting factional differences. When the statement was delivered, the Politburo sat behind Gomulka in solemn array in clear contrast to the unruly behavior of the Warsaw aktiv and the gallery.

After Gomulka chided them for their mood, demanding that they pay attention to what he had to say, they listened

in silence to his hour-long defense of the Soviet alliance. But when Gomulka launched into his attack on the Zionists he was greeted with loud applause. Observers differ on the subsequent sequence of events; the broadcast transcripts are unintelligible. But apparently someone started shouting "Down" (possibly, but rather incredibly, "Down with Gomulka"). This was followed by "Long live!" And then came the chanting of the name "Gierek." The chant was picked up by others and then there was alternate chanting of "Gierek" and "Wieslaw." Gomulka was visibly frightened and momentarily froze.

All possible variations were subsequently offered to explain this event. The Warsaw aktiv, or the Partisans, were attempting to embarass Gierek, or show their support of him against Gomulka, or link his name to that of Gomulka. But whatever the explanation, it was manifest evidence of a breakdown in Party discipline, a breakdown which came to characterize the purges in the succeeding month.

Gomulka himself spoke with scorn of the writers and the philosophers who had defied him. They were obviously fair game and the purge of them picked up momentum. On 25 March, professors Bronislaw Baczko, Leszek Kolakowski, Stefan Morawski, and Wlodzimierz Brus and lecturers Zygmunt Bauman and Maria Hirszowicz were dismissed from Warsaw university, "for choosing the road of struggle against the policy of our state and Party from a position of revisionism."

On 23 March, the Warsaw Pact met in Dresden to call the Czechoslovak leaders to account for the pace of liberalization in their country and to give Ulbricht, and possibly Gomulka, a chance to voice their fears in this regard to the Soviet leaders. Gierek accompanied Gomulka to Dresden, while Kliszko remained in Warsaw. On 26 March, after the delegation's return, there was a meeting of provincial Party first secretaries. The official press release stated that the meeting discussed current tasks of Party organizations and heard a report from Gomulka on the Dresden meeting. But the "inside story" was that the meeting was a stormy one, and that

Gomulka had had to resist strong pressure to convene a Central Committee plenum soon.

In the light of subsequent events, it seems likely that the message passed at this meeting was that some of the changes so long expected, perhaps promised, perhaps vetoed by Soviet intervention, would take place at the Sejm session a little over a week away. In return, a halt had to be called to purge excesses; and a plenum would not be convened in the current atmosphere. Gierek, at any rate, in a speech on 30 March, dissociated himself from the terroristic aspects of the purge and cautiously outlined reforms. In speeches to the Sejm on 10 April, Kliszko and Cyrankiewicz warned against an exaggerated "anti-Zionist" witch hunt. Warsaw City Party Chief Kepa, who had been among the first to jump on the anti-Zionist bandwagon, cautioned against excesses and issued a letter intended to reimpose discipline on the Warsaw Party organizations in mid-April. Polish Radio on 8 and 9 April featured Moczar's meeting with Warsaw student activists, dramatizing the fact that Moczar had spent hours replying to students' questions about the March events and that the meeting took place in "an unusually friendly atmosphere."

On 8 April, it was publicly announced that Edward Ochab had asked to be relieved of his post as Head of State. The government changes formalized at the Sejm session on 11 April, however, did little to satisfy Partisan ambitions. Spychalski took Ochab's place, but he in turn was replaced by Chief of Staff Wojciech Jaruzelski, not the Partisan candidate, deputy minister Grzegorz Korczynski. A Peasant Party speaker at the 10 April session called on the Premier to cleanse government ministries from top to bottom: "We want men whose very bones and blood were born and raised in Poland." His call was answered by minutes of applause.

The Partisan-associated press had been stepping up its call for a purge. The 24 March issue of Prawo i Zycie reminded readers that Gomulka's speech of 19 March had promised further analysis of the March events, and editor Kazimierz Kakol added that there would be "ominous

results" if urgent and necessary decisions were not taken. In the 7 April issue, Kakol praised the "decisions taken spontaneously by basic Party organizations" for having "outpaced administrative decisions." The 1 April issue of the PAX daily Slowo Powszechne reminded Gomulka: "We are still waiting for revelation of all details and drawing rigorous consequences against people." And it stated that the "misleading calm of 'small stabilization'" must be eliminated. Another PAX organ, Kierunki, had warned against the recent "small stabilization" on 31 March. On 10 April, the Polish radio spoke of the "very fruitful work being carried out by Party organizations in purging their ranks."

The Magnitude of the Purges

The top military transfers and the top government changes, which may have been related to the purges tangentially but were not produced by them, took place in orderly fashion. It was far more difficult to follow the course of the lower level purges or even accurately estimate their magnitude. Some people were expelled from the Party but kept their jobs. Some lost their jobs but remained in the Party. Others lost both job and membership. The basic Party organization voting to expel a member would frequently call on the appointing authority to dismiss the person purged, an action which ignored the nomenklatura prerogatives of higher party organs. On 30 March, Trybuna Ludu announced that Ignacy Druski, Poland's Public Prosecutor and a Jew, had been expelled from the Party by the unanimous vote of his basic Party organization on 19 March. It did not say whether he had been fired from his post. United Press International listed him as the 13th person and the seventh known Jew to fall in the purge. On 3 April, the basic Party organization in the Ministry of Foreign Trade expelled Deputy Minister Jozef Kutin and the Premier recalled him from his post. Reuters listed Kutin as the 20th victim. On 2 April, the basic Party organization of the Warsaw Branch of the Polish Writers Union called on the central board of the Union to expel three writers. A 4 April broadcast of Warsaw radio gave the names of

professors and directors of departments expelled by Party organizations at Warsaw University, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Sejm Bureau, and the State Council Office. Also on 4 April, it was announced that the Presidium and Executive Committee of the Central Council of Trade Unions had accepted the resignation of a Presidium member and had called on the Plenum of the Council to remove one of its members. A 9 April broadcast announced acceptance of the resignation of Professor Adam Schaff from his post as Director of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. By 10 April, Warsaw Party organizations claimed the purging of at least 50 persons.

As of 10 April, it was noted that daily television broadcasts were being used to read inflammatory articles which appeared in the same day's press or were scheduled to appear the next day. The articles centered around criticism of the workings of the various ministries and other organizations. No names were used, but it was clear that someone would be held responsible. On 13 April the pro-Moczar organ Zycie Warszawy criticized the Supreme Chamber of Control for having made no assessment for many years of the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the Central Statistics Office, or the Committee for Science and Technology. This was treading on dangerous ground--Politburo member Stefan Jedrychowski headed the Planning Commission and Politburo member Eugeniusz Szyr was director of the Science and Technology Committee. (It might be noted that the attack against Jedrychowski and Szyr continued onto the floor of the Fifth Party Congress itself. Szyr was eventually dropped from the Politburo while Jedrychowski retained his seat, while transferring from the Planning Commission to become Gomulka's new Foreign Minister.)

On 13 April, the press reported that the Chairman of the Council of Ministers had dismissed the Vice Minister of Agriculture at his own request. Reuters reported on 16 April that two additional resignations and two additional dismissals had brought to nearly 60 the known number of prominent victims of the purge. In his speech published

in the 19 April issue of Trybuna Ludu, Warsaw City First Secretary Kepa stated that in March and April, 164 persons in Warsaw had lost their jobs, their Party membership, or both. Of the 80 persons dismissed, he said, 14 had been at the ministerial and vice ministerial level, 12 had been department directors or heads of institutions, and 30 had been workers on the "ideological front" (presumably teachers or journalists). Kepa said that 97 persons had been expelled from the Party. A 22 April press report on Party membership developments in the first quarter of 1968 stated that 45,271 had joined the Party, 1,404 had been expelled, and 6,951 "passive" members had been dropped. On 22 April, [redacted] with high Party contacts, himself a victim of the purge, stated that 30 officials had been dismissed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [redacted] with access to middle level Party and government officials stated in January 1969 that a list distributed in Party circles in November 1968 named 180 high ranking officers and 600 civilians dismissed from the armed forces because of their Jewish background.

In the first week of May 1968, the files of the American Embassy listed 126 names of purge victims, a number considered only a fraction of the total. Beginning with Edward Ochab, the American Embassy list included the plenipotentiary for nuclear energy, the first deputy chairman of the Committee on Science and Technology, the Minister of Light Industry, the President of the State Reserve Board, vice ministers for foreign trade, agriculture, health and social security, and forestry, the vice chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control (i.e., Roman Zambrowski), the vice chairman of the Committee on Wages and Labor, some 30 other officials at the department director level or below in ministries and other central institutions, many local officials, directors and other employees of factories, cooperatives and other economic institutions in the provinces, and some 30 professors or academic personnel.

The final official count for 1968 was not published until 19 June 1969 when the Party daily Trybuna Ludu reported in a relatively brief article on the 18 June

plenary session of the Central Party Control Commission. Reporting on the activities of the commission for 1968 Chairman Zenon Nowak stated that 6,479 Party members and candidates "were removed from the party" while 27,708 "were struck off party rolls" in 1968. In a thought-provoking but unamplified passage the article noted: "The report of the Central Party Control Commission and the following discussion assessed the Party judicial powers of the commission, local commissions, and basic Party organizations." A 24 June report on this meeting stated that only 664 of those removed were removed for "antisocialist and nationalist actions and for revisionist activities," adding that this was 8 percent more than were removed in 1966 for similar offenses. The bulk of this article dealt with the more common "economic abuses" and the discussion was illustrated by examples from the reports of the voivodship party control commissions. Nothing further concerning the 1968 activities has been published as of this writing, but the six month delay in convening the meeting suggests that major problems of jursidiction may have been involved.

The purge of March and April 1968 was not a "Great Purge" of the Party rank and file and never approached in magnitude the "verification" campaigns of earlier years. On the eve of the Fifth Congress, a Party organ noted that between 1964 and mid-1968, only 34,000 members had been expelled while 200,000 had been removed from the rolls, primarily for passive membership. By way of comparison, the purges of 1957-1958 had involved over 380,000 persons. What distinguished the 1968 purge was the nature of the victims and the methods used.

"What Is Going On?"

The Warsaw Domestic Service, in a broadcast on 22 April 1968, noted that many letters to the Radio and telephone calls to the Television Service were asking "What is this all about?" An article by editor Rakowski in the 13 April edition of Polityka was titled "What Is Going On?" The answer, according to Warsaw Radio, was that it was

a continuation of 1956. The Party had then shown too much tolerance for those who "decided to reorient themselves from fierce Stalinists to equally fierce leaders of anti-socialist lines," but "a new stage in the development of these phenomena began at the time of the Israeli aggression in the Middle East."

The editor of Poland magazine explained to American officials on 17 April that the conflict was partly a settling of accounts with former Stalinists, partly a conflict between generations, and partly a squabble for power and positions. It was a reaction triggered by such accidents as the Arab-Israeli war, the developments in Czechoslovakia, the bad state of the Polish economy, and the upcoming Congress. This source claimed that Gomulka had called the shots in the beginning--but he was no longer in control. In May, a member of the Party Central Committee confided that although the supporters of Moczar had touched off the anti-Zionist campaign, Moczar no longer, at that time, controlled it. The anti-Jewish fervor, he said, had united the three major power factions in the country--the army, the Party apparatus, and the Ministry of Interior.

The "thrust from below," a general attack on the exposed middle level leaders of the Gomulka system, had turned into a revolt of the apparat, and the basic Party organizations in key offices were acting independent of and even in opposition to orders from above. The failure of the Politburo to check this revolt immediately, to purge the purgers, must be explained. It might be argued that the opposing factions, the putative supporters of Moczar's bid for power and the defenders of the Gomulka establishment, were so evenly matched as to paralyze the top leadership. It seems more likely, however, that in the initial stages the purge was perceived by all the top leaders as being in line with their own designs. Gomulka apparently had ordered, nearly a year previously, a purge of anti-Soviet elements and had decided on a final break with the remnants of 1956 revisionism. He had himself decided on a restructuring of his "system." Gierek, and to a lesser extent the other leading voivodship first secretaries still outside the higher Party counsels,

probably welcomed the elimination of alternate political forces. Moczar, with his strength still limited to the lower levels of the Party apparat, welcomed any change that would permit these forces to move upward.

This coincidence of perceptions could have encouraged a new "little stabilization." But in April the Partisan press, especially the non-Party organs, were already attacking the new "little stabilization" and were calling for a "critical continuation" in its stead. The purge had acquired a momentum of its own. A few examples will show the atmosphere, half pogrom and half Cultural Revolution, prevailing at the basic Party organization meetings still taking place throughout the country and in Polish installations abroad.

The United States consul in Poznan reported on 22 April that he had been at the home of film director Alexander Ford when Ford returned home from a day long meeting of the Party organization which had been called to attack him. Ford had been expelled from the Party and expected to lose all his positions in the film industry. The charges against him had been his cooperative film ventures with a West German producer, his Western style of life, and his failure to engage in self-criticism when confronted with the charges. Another director attacked at the meeting had engaged in a degrading self-criticism which he had had to repeat at great length three times in an increasingly degrading manner. Ford, a party member since 1932, confessed that he did not know who was calling the shots or what, exactly, was going on.

A number of versions of what happened at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gained general currency. Reference to a prolonged meeting on 14 March was made above. It appears that by 3 April Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki had submitted his resignation and gone into retirement, after refusing to carry out an "order" from his subordinates to fire his deputy Marian Naszkowski. A third-hand report dated 17 May and attributed to Foreign Ministry officials provides a typical example of these generally similar versions. The 17 May report states that a 36-hour open Party meeting had taken place "three weeks previously,"

probably prior to 3 April. The session allegedly began with a rational dialogue on changes required in Polish foreign policy posture, but it rapidly degenerated into a sustained vituperative attack on Minister Rapacki, who was accused of sponsoring and nuturing the careers of alleged pro-Zionists still holding positions of great influence. When Rapacki attempted to defend himself, he was shouted down by subordinates who concluded the meeting with pejorative charges and the unanimous demand that the Foreign Minister tender his resignation. It is noteworthy that this meeting (or these meetings) did not expel Rapacki from the Party although he was subsequently dropped from the Central Committee) nor expel the subordinate, Naszkowski, for whom he apparently placed his prestige on the line--and lost. As for Naszkowski, it was reported on 22 April that he had been literally hounded out of his office. First his secretary stopped reporting for work, then his telephone was cut off, and finally he gave up and stayed away from the ministry. He continued to be referred to by his title for another month, however, and only months after being "dismissed" by his subordinates was his transfer to a Party journal announced.

Jerzy Morawski, former Politburo member and a confirmed liberal, was expelled from the Party by a similar meeting of the basic Party organization at the Polish embassy in London. A Polish journalist, himself recalled from abroad because of his attitude toward Israel, told an American official in May that Morawski flew to Warsaw and sought an interview with Gomulka immediately after his expulsion. For 48 hours, according to this report, he sought an interview in vain, partly because Gomulka's private secretary, subsequently dismissed, was cooperating with elements trying to keep Gomulka in the dark. When Morawski did reach Gomulka, "through the back door," Gomulka was visibly shocked at Morawski's story and exclaimed: "They're trying to get rid of my ambassadors!"

The "my" in this sentence is worthy of reflection. It could refer to a lingering personal friendship between Morawski and Gomulka, or to Party loyalty to a former Politburo member. But it seems most likely that Gomulka

was speaking as First Secretary, and the reference was to the nomenklatura. It was this incident of the London ambassador, more than any other, which roused the Politburo to a defense of its prerogatives. Indeed, in related cases there were reports that representatives from the Cadre Department of the Central Committee were dispatched with the message that local Party organizations were not to take action against people, such as ambassadors, whose appointment was the prerogative of the Politburo. In the case of Morawski, his Party membership was reinstated after some such official intervention and/or the personal intervention of Gomulka. He was removed from his ambassador's post almost exactly one year later.

From the Western point of view such actions recalled the worst of Stalinism, the "Doctors' Plot," or raised the spectre of Nazi anti-Semitism. There is no doubt that many Poles of Jewish origin suffered simply because of their origin. The Jewish Chronicle of London estimated on 19 July 1968 that out of a total Jewish-Polish population of 35,000 (as compared to three million before the war), 6,000 had already entered the processing pipeline for emigration and that another 10,000 would enter into processing when the pipeline became unclogged. A Polish press service statement issued on 10 June 1969, announcing the end of eased emigration procedures effective 1 September 1969, stated that 5,264 Polish citizens of Jewish ancestry had left Poland between 1 July 1967 and 30 May 1969. The destroyed careers and lost property represented a genuine human tragedy. But the victims themselves saw their persecutors as "Red Guards," not as Nazis, and some Poles, while deploring the ad hominem and superficially anti-Jewish nature of the purge, continued to claim that it was an essentially liberalizing force.

A Party activist working as an adviser to a government minister portrayed the purge as absolutely necessary to clean out dead wood at the top. Speaking to an American official in April, he said that the exposed position of Poland necessitated this being done by attacking men rather than ideas, to avoid offending the Soviet Union. The Jews were the most vulnerable targets and they would be rooted out regardless of how it looked to the West.

When challenged in regard to the use of such unliberal tactics to achieve supposedly liberal ends, the source replied: "Don't ask me how a hard-liner becomes a liberal--ask Zambrowski, Staszewski, and Brus!" He enumerated some of the Stalinist crimes of these Jews in times past.

A Party member and liberal economist told an American official on 20 April that the "thrust from below" was aimed at eliminating people standing in the way of "progress." Noting that economic policy was not a subject for debate in the purge (and this despite the purging of Wlodzimierz Brus who had pioneered economic reform in 1957), he said that young officials would be moving up with qualifications for directing a gradual transition to a new, more liberal economic model. The young technocrats, some of their spokesmen said, were aiming at elmination of both the "dogmatic" and "revisionist" wings of the Party.

described as non-Party and very nationalistic told an American official in April that he had heard reports of a deal between Moczar and Gierek to assume power by the end of 1968. He explained that for three years the "so-called Partisans" had been using all their influence to move a steady stream of younger managers and technicians into key positions all over the country. But they had run into opposition from "Zambrowski's group," the thousands of men, many of them Jews, who had been put into responsible positions when Zambrowski had been chief of the Party cadres. who really wanted to see an end to Communist Russian domination, said that he and those like him would settle for a Moczar-Gierek takeover which, with its more pragmatic approach, would lead to a more rational, less dogmatic and ultimately freer and more liberal atmosphere.

In early May 1968, Polityka editor Rakowski gave the impression, in a private conversation with Western experts on Communist affairs, that the struggle would eventually favor "his young technocrats." Rakowski, whose journal had been under heavy attack even by Moczar personally and whose fall had been momentarily expected

a month earlier, credited the Partisans with raising new issues and attacking members of the older generation who should be removed. He gave them a good chance of success, but only on the basis of a compromise with Gomulka. If they took over, he said, they would quickly have to reach for educated cadres and these cadres would give a new trend to the policy of the authorities. Gierek, he said, was, "for the moment," outside the struggle.

By the end of May the pace of the struggle had slowed. Explanations which suggested themselves were fear of loss of control over zealous Party activists, nervousness over Czechoslovakia, or possible Soviet pressure (strong Soviet statements of support for Gomulka had been made in the latter half of April). A recently retired [redacted] saw it merely as the beginning of a second round. Moczar could have taken "complete command" in the first round, he said, but had decided against it because of the "stigma of revolution."

PLENUM AND CONGRESS

The Establishment Speaks Out

The 12th Plenum of the Central Committee, which opened on 8 July after at least a month's delay, was characterized by the two aspects of the new balance--a Politburo check on the "thrust from below" and a new self-confidence and assertiveness on the part of voivodship first secretaries. A minor theme was the swan song of the revisionists.

Kliszko's speech officially removed the anti-Zionist campaign from the agenda but, in a self-critical vein, he blamed his own ideological commission, among others, for lack of consistency in carrying out the struggle against revisionism and for tolerating deviations among the Warsaw intellectuals. In a little-noted passage, Kliszko called the Central Committee's attention to an equal and more immediate danger, the infringement by the thrust from below on the prerogatives specified by the central nomenklatura. His rare public reference to this institution appeared in the following passage: "Over the past few months numerous cadre changes have taken place. These changes pertain to various spheres of life, central institutions, universities, scientific centers, and some fields of economy, as well as to the press and other propaganda links. For instance, in Warsaw, 111 persons have been recalled from posts within the competence of the Central Committee or customarily agreed upon with Central Committee departments. (Emphasis added.) A certain number of persons have also been recalled from various posts in individual provinces and at lower echelons. The great majority of the cadre changes carried out, meaning both the recall and the new appointments, have been justified, correct, and useful . . ." Kliszko added, however, that cadre policy demanded that the new cadres be better than those they replaced and he urged the training of new cadres to establish a genuine cadre reserve.

With his traditional double role as a co-formulator of Politburo precepts and as sole authority for carrying these precepts out in his own voivodship, Gierek was even more emphatic in his condemnation of purge excesses. He said: "As a rule, unjust cadre decisions, that harm the people whom these decisions affect, are usually taken by individuals who have little or nothing in common with the Party and our ideology . . . They start talking a lot about revisionism, imperialism, morals, and social justice, and then follow this by taking cadre decisions which are without cause and are harmful. This happened several times in our province, and I do not have to convince you, comrades, that in every case Party echelons /i.e., from above/ have dealt with the culprits quickly and sternly." Although there is no confirmation of such stern treatment of the "thrust from below" in Katowice it would be in keeping with the tight control Gierek has always maintained there.

Central Committee members or candidate members Adam Schaff, Wilhelm Billig, and Stefan Ziolkiewski were sharply attacked at the Plenum for revisionism, but they were allowed to speak in their own defense. Speaking at the opening session on 8 July, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Wilhelm Billig criticized the personnel changes at the Polish Institute of Nuclear Energy as "nothing else but a purge, which is an expression of a wrongly conceived struggle against Zionism." These unjust changes, he said, took place on the basis of criteria which had nothing in common with scientific work or professional or political-moral qualifications. Warsaw City first secretary Kepa, and voivodship first secretaries Stanislaw Kociolek and Wladyslaw Kruczek answered Billig in detail, the first two on the grounds that Billig was asking for special treatment for scientists, the third in the most outspoken defense of the thrust from below.

"Comrade Billig," Kruczek said, "made the great charge that Red Guards had forced their way into the office for the problems of nuclear energy and that they were liquidating scientists, members of the Polish

Communist Party, and science in a great scientific institute under the slogan of anti-Semitism." The published accounts of Billig's speech did not mention the "Red Guard" charge. Kruczek went on to ask what did it matter if, for example, the Warsaw organizations had made a few mistakes in carrying out the purge, and he added ambiguously and apparently out of context: "I do not want to recall the role of Zambrowski, who had 'his own' voivodship committees and kept sending his people to these committees." The suggestion seemed to be that the voivodships had the right to purge the old Zambrowski appointees, without reference to Politburo or Central Committee prerogatives, but, apparently, in accordance with the designs of Zambrowski's replacement Strzelecki and, more distantly, Moczar. It might be recalled at this point that the Warsaw purgees could appeal membership decisions up the Party organization hierarchy through the Party control commissions. But many of their positions came under the Central Committee directly since they were on the nomenklatura lists.

Half of the 36 speakers at the Plenum were voivodship first secretaries and half of these explicitly supported Gomulka. Even those who defended the Partisan issues of purge and nationalism did so in a defensive and mild manner. Neither Strzelecki nor Moczar addressed the plenum. The moderately hard-line economist Boleslaw Jaszczuk replaced Ochab on the Politburo. Moczar entered the Secretariat, replacing Wladyslaw Wicha in assuming responsibility for security and military affairs, and won non-voting candidate membership on the Politburo. As a member of the Secretariat he could no longer serve as a minister and Moczar was replaced as Minister of Interior by Kazimierz Switala, a man Moczar apparently could not control and one who was rumored to have personal links to Gierek. Four days after the closing of the plenum, the heads of the Warsaw Pact "five" convened in Warsaw to deliver their first ultimatum to Prague.

If Moczar's aim had been merely to gain access to Gomulka, to enter the "establishment," then he had succeeded, though on a scale more modest than his ambitions.

Some observers did interpret the new arrangement as the result of a deal between Gomulka and Moczar, with the "Technocrats" still too weak to make a bid. But the other and more credible interpretation was that Moczar had been "kicked upstairs," that he was being "contained" and separated from his power base. In a sense supporting the latter rather than the former hypothesis were the stories apparently deliberately leaked to RFE that Moczar could not be stopped, that he had succeeded in compromising Gomulka and in winning the support of the majority of voivodship first secretaries, that he was allied with Gierek, and that he, Moczar, was the "Polish Dubcek." The stories are conflicting in matters of detail but convincing in their general tendency to suggest that Moczar supporters, at least, did not accept the "deal" of the 12th Plenum but continued their attacks on Gomulka intimates right up to the eve of the Congress. Some of the rumored maneuvers smack of desperation, especially when one adds the rumors of Soviet disapproval of Moczar's nationalism, rumors supported by the manifest Soviet return to naked power in defense of the status quo. Indeed, the Soviet divisions which eventually moved against Czechoslovakia were at one time said to be ready in Poland to prevent a coup against Gomulka.

The Czechoslovak Intervention

A report of Politburo division on intervention in Czechoslovakia was noted above in regard to an alleged meeting of the Politburo on 22 July. There is at least one report that this division continued up to the eve of the intervention. It is reported that the Central Committee was called to a sudden and brief meeting at 2100 hours on 20 August, with only half of the committee members able to attend. Gomulka announced that the Soviet Union had prepared a plan for intervention in Czechoslovakia to prevent German occupation and it was in Poland's interest to take part. Allegedly both Moczar and Gierek strongly opposed intervention, while Kliszko supported Gomulka. After the meeting was adjourned, without any vote being taken, Sypchalski, Moczar, and Gierek left as

a group together. Although there were no reports of overt resistance, a third wave of reassignments of top military leaders followed the intervention.

Whatever the initial positions or private feelings, Gomulka, Moczar and Gierek had publicly defended the Czechoslovak intervention by mid-September. Gomulka, in his Harvest Festival speech of 8 September, raised the bogy of Bonn's designs on Poland's frontiers and West German hopes for a realignment of forces. He continued: "There appeared a concrete threat of detaching Czechoslovakia from the ranks of the Warsaw Pact countries. In order not to allow this it became necessary to send Soviet, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops to the territory of allied Czechoslovakia. This decision was made by the five member states of the Warsaw Pact after having exhausted all other means and after thorough thinking. There was no other alternative." The security of Poland against alleged West German designs was once again the prime determiner of Gomulka's policy.

Moczar, in his 15 September speech commemorating the feats of Polish arms in World War II, tried to tar Czechoslovakia with the Zionist brush, possibly in a belated and desperate awareness of the nationalist, and anti-Party, crimes with which the "Polish Dubcek" (formerly the "Polish Tito") could be charged. After introducing the spectre of psychological warfare, Moczar added: "The imperialist revisionist, Zionist, perfidious calls for humanization and democratization of social conditions in socialist countries are aimed at socialism. The situation which has arisen in fraternal Czechoslovakia clearly shows their perfidious intentions."

Gierek's defense of the intervention was more moderate. In May 1969, at the signing of a protocol on mutual cooperation and friendship between the north Moravian region of Czechoslovakia and the Katowice voivodship of Poland, he expressed the wish that all unpleasant things dividing the two countries be forgotten.

At the time, only one Polish voice protested the intervention from within Poland itself. Jerzy Andrzejewski, the long silenced author of "Ashes and Diamonds," sent his Czechoslovak colleagues a letter expressing shame at Poland's participation in the invasion. The letter was published in the Yugoslav daily Borba on 26 September and was beamed to Poland by Western broadcasts. On 10 October it was published, together with a mildly worded rebuke, by Kultura, whose editor Janusz Wilhelmi had been engaged in an esoteric debate with Polityka's Mieczyslaw Rakowski over the intervention issue since 7 September. Briefly, Rakowski had defended the intervention in terms of Poland's interest in the European status quo. Wilhelmi had defended it in terms of Poland's mere survival, a defense which Wilhelmi ended in the 6 October issue of Kultura with the cry: "Awake! Awake, and look at the contemporary world!"

Possibly under pressure from Gomulka but certainly from a new perception of the international realities, Moczar began to mend his fences with the USSR. On 15 October, in a speech at Lenino, Belorussia, in the presence of Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy and other Soviet dignitaries, Moczar effused on the eternal heritage of Polish-Soviet friendship and condemned the "counterrevolution" which had been inspired in Czechoslovakia by the "Bonn militarists and revanchists." On 31 October, Moczar gave a speech to the Party organization of the Ministry of Defense, voicing his unqualified support for Gomulka. The 51st anniversary of the Great October Revolution was marked in Warsaw on 6 November 1968 with a concert at the opera house preceded by a speech by Moczar--stressing the importance of close ties between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Fifth Congress of the PUWP opened on 11 November.

Elections and Leaflets

Moczar's "machine," however, ran on with or without him. When, on 8 October, Gomulka gave an agitated and stumbling speech in Katowice, apparently as a result of unexpected criticism and complaints from Party workers,

the speech was broadcast by Warsaw television, an old Moczar stronghold, in an apparently unauthorized and unedited version, forcing Trybuna Ludu to publish the full text after first publishing only an abbreviated version. The election of Congress delegates in the provinces was sometimes used to whip up anti-Semitism contrary to the official line now prevailing. Rapacki, who had been absent from his post in the Foreign Ministry since April and who was genuinely ill, was the only Secretariat or Politburo member not elected as delegate to the Congress, but his retirement was already an accepted fact. More serious was the fact that Gomulka intimates Kliszko and Starewicz were elected delegates only after switching from their accustomed constituencies. In the case of Starewicz and the Zielona Gora Voivodship, this was the direct result of an apparatchik refusal to abandon the anti-Semitic purge and their open revolt against voivodship first secretary Tadeusz Wieczorek. Always considered close to Gomulka, Wieczorek began having trouble after the March events when he refused to accede to the growing anti-Semitic pressure from below, which then increased until the voivodship organization refused to elect the Jewish Starewicz. (Wieczorek was one of six voivodship first secretaries replaced within two months of the Congress.)

In early November, prior to the opening of the Congress, there were rumors circulating in Warsaw that Kliszko had been attacked by leaflets printed and distributed by employees of the ministries of foreign affairs and foreign trade. A more coherent version of this story was reported in February 1969. According to the latter version a group of young activists in the ministries of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and interior, all supporters of the Partisans, became concerned that no changes would take place at the Congress. They banded together and drew up a list of charges, primarily against Kliszko but also against Gomulka, Loga-Sowinski, and Spychalski. The charges said that these leaders were not meeting the country's needs, that they should be removed from power, and that new blood was needed in both Party and government.

The charges were printed as leaflets and distributed by hand to the population. When Kliszko found out about the leaflets an investigation was launched by Minister of Interior Switala. Those who confessed complicity were jailed and dismissed from their government jobs and people in possession of the leaflets destroyed them immediately to avoid arrest. Yet a third version of the story specifies that a number of persons were arrested in the ministries of foreign affairs, foreign trade, and interior and adds that the leaflets were widely distributed in the Ministry of Defense as well. Those attacked by the leaflets, according to the third version, were Gomulka, Kliszko and Cyrankiewicz.

There can hardly be any doubt that some such "leaflet incident" did take place, and that it was the work of Moczar supporters. There were no reports that Moczar himself was personally involved. Less certainty can be ascribed to a sequel reported to RFE in the context of the alleged purge of the Ministry of Interior beginning in December 1968 or January 1969. According to this report relations between Moczar and Gomulka became aggravated just prior to the congress when Switala asked Moczar, in the presence of Gomulka, what he would talk about at the Congress, supposing that Moczar would mention the rumored leaflets. Moczar is supposed to have said that he had more important things to talk about, and Gomulka, in a fit of temper, refused to let Moczar address the Congress. Whatever the reason, Moczar did not address the Congress.

A more bizarre and almost certainly distorted version of Moczar's "eleventh hour" fall from grace is propvided by a Polish [redacted], expelled from the Party in April 1968 and deprived of his position because of protests against the anti-Semitic campaign. This [redacted] reported [redacted] on stories current up to mid-January 1969 including a story that a few weeks before the Congress the Russians, fearing Moczar's nationalist leanings, supplied Gomulka with some tapes, recording conversations held by Gomulka with the people from his closest entourage during preparatory discussions concerning the Congress. Together with the tapes the

Russians enclosed documents which clearly proved that the clandestine recordings were the work of the Polish Ministry of Interior. Gomulka played the tapes to about 100 specially invited members of the Central Committee, thus sealing Moczar's fate. Once again, this story illustrates the close feedback between Polish politics and Western propaganda activities, for the "secret tapes" story, so reminiscent of the fall of Rankovic in Yugoslavia several years before, has become, since its broadcast by RFE, a standard component of reports of purges in the Ministry of Interior and apparently provoked Gomulka into a public declaration of support for Moczar following his eclipse at the beginning of 1969. This "purge" of the purgers and this eclipse or capitulation of Moczar will be dealt with in the final section of this paper.

Institutionalizing the New Order

Brezhnev's personal support for Gomulka set the tone for all subsequent speeches at the Congress, including those from voivodship first secretaries, several of whom had been thought to be in the Moczar camp. There was a general attack on revisionism but "revisionists" Adam Schaff and Stefan Ziolkiewski, who had been expelled from the Central Committee at a special plenum on 9 November, were not personally attacked at the Congress. The majority of the voivodship first secretaries included attacks on cadre policy and on the lack of adequate information from Central Committee organs, criticism subsequently endorsed by the central leadership, including Gomulka, with the added admonition that cadre policy be based on selection for higher quality and that the lower organs put their own houses in order.

The address by Edward Gierek, the first following Gomulka's report to the Congress, presented a moderate and "Technocrat" policy line, with an emphasis on quality and reform. After a preliminary nod to the increasing role of the working class, Gierek noted the strengthening bonds between the working class and the working

intelligentsia and called for a policy which would "duly appraise both the magnitude of the effort and the level of skill, reliability, and the quality of work and degree of responsibility attached to the work." Gierek called on every echelon to analyze its work from the viewpoint of effectiveness, an analysis which should begin "in one's own backyard." Although he attacked the revisionists, Gierek added: "I am also concerned, comrades, with not letting this necessary and intrinsically just struggle against revisionism within the Party hold back the creative Marxist progress leading to the Party's further development in the field of theory and practice of building socialism." He advocated a moderate economic reform to improve the quality and modernity of production, including the use of foreign licenses and improving the methods of planning.

A final echo of the purge, suggesting that the thrust from below had involved not only a violation of but an attempt to change the rules, appeared in the report of Ryszard Strzelecki, speaking as chairman of the Party Statutes Commission. The key passage is: "We propose to make the decision of basic Party organizations on accepting or expelling Party candidates /i.e., candidates for Party membership/ final and not subject to approval by higher branches . . . On the other hand, the principle of approving by proper Party branches the decision of basic Party organizations concerning the enrollment of candidates as members remains in force." (Emphasis added.) He stopped short of publicly rebuking the basic organizations in the matter of expelling full Party members without higher clearance but it seems fair to presume that this was what some apparatchiks had requested--a request incompatible with cadre discipline, from the viewpoint of the guardians of the central nomenklatura, such as the Cadre Affairs Department.

Even in the face of the sober reaffirmation of unity behind Gomulka, however, die-hard Moczar supporters carried the fight onto the floor of the Congress itself, and made a concerted effort to persuade delegates to cross out three names in the Central Committee membership ballot--Artur Starewicz, Eugeniusz Szyr, and Stefan

Jedrychowski. According to a member of the Central Committee, their names were crossed out by over 600 of the 1,693 delegates. Spychalski's name was crossed out by 300 delegates, Kliszko's by 250, and Strzelecki's by 150. All of Gomulka's associates found themselves at the very bottom of the list. Gomulka's name was crossed out by seven delegates (and Moczar's by approximately the same number). When the list of elected members of the Central Committee was read, prolonged applause and shouts of "Long live" followed the reading of Moczar's name. Gomulka looked deeply shocked, and looked at his presidium colleagues as if to ask them what it all meant. Even Brezhnev, it is said, could see that the First Secretary did not seem to know what was going on in the Party.

In his closing address, Gomulka noted: "The composition of the present Party Central Committee differs from the previous one in many respects. There are many new members in it. Apart from tried and tested Party activists on a national scale, it includes activists representing all the voivodship Party organizations, all social milieus." Who were the new members, and whom did they represent? Central Committee membership increased from 85 to 92 of whom 14 were promoted from candidate membership and 26 were newcomers. Of the old Central Committee, 24 were not even elected delegates to the Congress and seven more were dropped. Candidate membership increased from 75 to 91, of whom 58 were newcomers and 33 were held over. Intellectual ranks were reduced and the seal of defeat was put on the liberals with the removal of 27 of their adherents. The new Central Committee included 18 central Party officials, 18 out of the 19 voivodship first secretaries, six voivodship secretaries, three local Party officials, 19 central government officials, one provincial government official, and 17 worker-farmer-factory activists as full members and another 17 as candidate members, as compared to six such activists elected candidate members at the Fourth Congress. The new Central Committee has no liberals or Pulawians, only three ex-Socialists, and only two members identifiable as of Jewish origin. At the same time, a few notorious Stalinists, including General Kazimierz "Gaspipe" Witaszewski, were dropped. There was a sharp reduction in the representation of the state apparat and the military.

The Fourth Congress in 1964 had elected six military representatives to full membership in the Central Committee; the Fifth Congress re-elected only two--generals Wojciech Jaruzelski (who, as Minister of Defense, did not become a member of the Politburo as his predecessor Spychalski had been) and Grzegorz Korczynski. On the other hand, military representation among candidate members in the Central Committee increased from three to eight with six of the eight being elected for the first time.

Following the Fifth Congress, Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Gierek, Jaszczuk, Jedrychowski, Kliszko, Kociolek, Kruczek, Loga-Sowinski, Spychalski, Strzelecki, and Tejchma were elected to full membership in the Politburo. Rapacki, Szyr, and Waniolka were dropped. Jagielski, Jaroszewicz, Moczar, and Szydlak were elected to candidate membership in the Politburo. Gomulka, Jaszczuk, Kliszko, Moczar, Olszowski, Starewicz (the only Jew remaining in the top leadership), Strzelecki, Szydlak, and Tejchma were elected to the Secretariat. Jarosinski was dropped. Except for 58-year-old former Natolinist Wladyslaw Kruczek, the newcomers are younger men, Kociolek and Olszowski being under 40. Kociolek, Kruczek, and Szydlak entered the Politburo as voivodship first secretaries, thus breaking Gierek's monopoly in this regard. An evaluation of the new young men in the Politburo and Secretariat appears in the "Prognosis" section below, but it should be noted here that none of them can be clearly identified with any "anti-Gomulka" faction, while two of them are clearly Gomulka proteges.

AFTERMATH AND PROGNOSIS

"Base Fabrications and Provocative Lies"

Despite the continuing and undisciplined support of many apparatchiks, including over one-third of the delegates to the Fifth Congress, Moczar and the Partisans did not gain the long-awaited promotions at the Congress, and Moczar emerged under a cloud. By mid-January 1969 it was rumored that Moczar was under house arrest, that the Ministry of Interior was being purged of his supporters, that he had lost his Secretariat responsibility for military and security affairs, and that he was about to lose his position as head of the veterans organization ZBOWID. On the other hand, he was never out of sight for more than two weeks and he continued to address ZBOWID meetings in his accustomed manner, with nationalistic appeals to the heroic tradition of the resistance.

Despite the unreliability of many of the rumors, the weight of the evidence does indicate that the new Central Committee undertook an investigation of the Ministry of Interior, possibly as a result of the pre-Congress leaflet incident noted above. Several sources reported that a few weeks after the Congress, the Central Committee established a Party Political Commission with the ostensible purpose of combatting revisionism but with the real purpose of staging a showdown with Moczar. Its first task was to investigate the Ministry of Interior. This Political Commission, whose active members are said to include Kliszko, Kociolek, Starewicz and Szydlak, should not be confused with the new Central Committee Ideological Commission headed by Szydlak (replacing Kliszko) which held its first publicized meeting in April 1969. The rumors of a "purge" of the Ministry of Interior have never been confirmed, but the rumors state that the investigating commission had the cooperation of Minister of Interior Switala and possibly of Moczar himself, who was pictured as "throwing his former subordinates to the wolves." Another version of the story

is that Switala himself initiated a purge of the Party organization within the ministry and of the ministry's "Nationalities Department" (in charge of anti-Zionist research) after a meeting at which ministry journalists took an excessively anti-Semitic tone and attacked Kliszko and, by implication, Gomulka. Western press reports in mid-January named journalist Ryszard Gontarz and anti-Zionist author Tadeusz Walichnowski as key purgees in these two organizations.

The rumors of Moczar's troubles, apparently supported by the light sentences being given the students then coming to trial for their participation in the March 1968 events and by the removal of provincial first secretaries known to be Partisan supporters (Franciszek Wachowicz from Kielce Voivodship and Stefan Jedryszczak from Lodz Voivodship), were the subjects of RFE broadcasts and, according to one source, Moczar's followers began to desert his camp en masse. Then, speaking to the Warsaw Party organization on 8 February 1969, Gomulka and Warsaw Party chief Kepa denied the existence of factionalism within the Party and attributed the rumored existence of "Partisans, Technocrats, Young Turks, and so on" to RFE. Gomulka singled out RFE programs concerning "Comrade Moczar," calling them "trash, base fabrications, and provocative lies." This, it is said, ended the desertions from the Moczar camp. Moczar himself subsequently spoke out against RFE's "deceitful information meant to split the unity and cohesion of our society." On 27 June 1969, the first session of the new Sejm elected Moczar to membership in the powerless Council of State. Traditionally this has signified the end of one's political career--unity through fossilization.

Policies and Manifestoes

Despite a near complete turnover in the top economic leadership, there are few indications that meaningful economic reform is in the offing. A Polish economist speaking in private at the end of February 1969 stated that the hoped for major revision in economic policy had

not come and that confusion seemed to have deepened with the new stress on investment policy. This source said that while the new leaders were competent men meaningful changes would have to follow political changes, noting in this connection that Jedrychowski's replacement as head of the Planning Commission seemed to be charged with little more than liaison with the top political leaders.

The Technocrat policy claims are being pushed in the press, however, and with a renewed assertiveness and confidence. Some reports tie this to Gomulka's final disillusionment with the economic dogmatists who have opposed and sabotaged economic reform since 1957. Other reports suggest that the new assertiveness results from a "deal" Gomulka made with the Technocrats in return for their support in 1968. There is no evidence to support these hypotheses, however, and it seems much more likely that the renewed debate of economic policy is a corollary of the muting of the artificial political issues stressed by the Moczar-oriented press in 1968. With the basic Party organizations primed to denounce any deviation from an ill-defined orthodoxy, in the absence of central guidance, and with the outcome of the leadership struggle in doubt there were severe inhibitions on any debate, even in regard to a moderate economic reform. With the removal of these inhibitions old debates have been resumed.

In December 1968 and January 1969, the Katowice daily Trybuna Robotnicza published a series of articles on the Hungarian economic reform, concluding that it did not involve inflationary dangers and that it had resulted in an improvement in the standard of living. Most striking has been the resurgence of Polityka, which had been so long on the defensive after the events of March 1968. On 22 February 1969, Polityka published a compilation of public pronouncements by Party leaders at recently concluded Party conferences. This compilation deserves consideration as a tour d'horizon, from the Technocrat viewpoint, of the "post-Moczar" era. Noting that economic problems had come into the fore while ideological ones had receded, the article equated the struggle against revisionism with the struggle against nationalistic

attitudes, "attitudes which provoked the manifestations of political anarchy or the tendencies to social demagogy." On 1 March 1969, Polityka published an extensive account of a debate on the "dangers" of Technocracy, giving the most extensive public exposure since March 1968 to the moderate position which seeks to put to rest "exaggerated fears" concerning Technocrats--that the Technocrats advocate a "hidden form of the petit-bourgeois ideology"and the creation of an elite opposed to the "leading role of the worker class."

But the Partisan voices have not been silenced. Each new student trial brings forth justifications of the 1968 purges, the heroic wartime leadership of "Mietek" (Moczar) is praised on each suitable occasion by such speakers as Grzegorz Korczynski, and individual Partisan spokesmen are far from admitting, publicly or privately, that they are in any trouble at all. On 5 and 7 April 1969, Zycie Warszawy published an interview with Colonel Zbigniew Zaluski, whose "The Seven Polish Deadly Sins," published nearly a decade ago, could be considered the original literary foundation of the Partisan movement. Colonel Zaluski reaffirmed his faith in the romantic national tradition in what could be considered a Partisan manifesto, a program for popular mobilization, one which is intrinsically much more appealing than the former anti-Zionist harangues or Moczar's continuing maudlin references to the heroic past. Zaluski chided his contemporaries for daring too little. The younger generation, he said, was looking for a great vision and he proposed offering them a "social dream" which might transform the Polish national character on the basis of a "great, romantic civilizational upheaval."

Problems and Personalities

Poland faces problems which would be formidable for any regime and may be insurmountable for the present one. The most tangible of these problems are demographic and economic. Poland is the youngest nation in Europe.

With a population of 32 million and a birth rate of over 16 per 1,000, Poland has over six million pre-school or elementary or secondary school children. Nearly two million young people participated in elections for the first time in June 1969. Of the 2,030,000 Party members and applicants recorded in June 1968 (10 percent of the total population over 18 years of age), 39 percent joined less than five years previously, 57.6 percent were under 40 years of age, and 9.5 percent were between 18 and 24. Despite a respectable rate of economic growth, the demographic pressures are outpacing the economy. In his closing speech to the Second Plenum on 4 April 1969, Gomulka foresaw acute shortages in many raw materials. He admitted that investments were needed everywhere but added that the planned investment reserve had been swallowed up by excesses in the fiscal plans and by overspending on project construction.

The demographic and economic problems will reach critical proportions unless two contradictory problems are solved--the introduction of rational and pragmatic planning, which involves economic reform potentially inimical to the immediate needs of the populace, and mobilization of the populace to solve the national problems with less regard to immediate individual well being, which is now served very largely by laxity and theft. The Technocrats offer the former, rational planning, while the Partisans claim to offer the latter, popular mobilization. Successfully combining the two is especially difficult with the silencing of the liberal dissident voices and in the absence of participatory or representative democracy which might encourage a genuine uniting of the nation without self-defeating coercion.

At the moment, August 1969, the Gomulka system survives but the events of 1968 brought radical changes. The establishment now relies on a larger representation from the provincial leaders but it has received what amounts to a vote of no confidence from the next lower echelon of the apparat, the Congress delegates. The Party rank and file have been neither effectively disciplined nor satisfied in their aspirations. Although Moczar's

link with the security forces may have been cut, the reassertion of Central Committee control over these forces has yet to be proved. The army, subjected to three waves of punitive or preemptive purges in 1967-1968 and excluded from the top Party counsels, is probably loyal to the Party in the abstract but not to any faction, including the establishment, and thus might not act to prevent changes resulting from other combinations of forces. If the industrial bureaucracy is not soon satisfied in regard to reform, it could throw its weight more decisively behind any force which promised change.

Although Gierek and Moczar remain potential alternatives to Gomulka, neither of them seems to have enhanced his position by the role he played in 1968. Gierek proved again his preference for order over change while Moczar came close to provoking a revolutionary situation, only to recoil from the stigma of it--probably because he saw it could not succeed, at least partly due to events outside of Poland. Change through an orderly succession, if it is possible, would seem to devolve increasingly on the new young men in the Politburo and the Secretariat. It seems inevitable that Gomulka's fall would involve the fall of his entire "Little Politburo." Zenon Kliszko (born in 1908) might survive briefly as an interregnum figurehead and he may have his own "group" of young men, but this "gray emminence" is grayer with each passing year. The same interim role might be played by Boleslaw Jaszczuk (born in 1913), who was spoken of as a possible successor to Gomulka from 1963 to 1966 and who attained full Politburo membership only in July 1968. But Jaszczuk, who entered the Secretariat in 1963, after four years as ambassador to Moscow, is most unconvincing in his recent defense of a more liberal economic policy, he may have dallied with the Partisans in 1965 but without mutual profit, and the June 1969 elections, in which he received the lowest percentage of any elected candidate, suggest that he is one of the most unpopular men in Poland.

The strongest of the new young men would seem to be Stanislaw Kociolek. Born in Warsaw in 1933, he moved from a leading position in the Communist youth organization to become first secretary of a Warsaw district Party

committee in 1963 and to first secretary of the Warsaw Party Committee in 1964. He was made a candidate member of the Central Committee at the Fourth Congress in June 1964 and a full member at the Fourth Plenum in 1966. Kociolek apparently rebuffed a Moczar approach in 1965 and Partisan hostility may partially explain his transfer to Gdansk Voivodship in late 1967 following his defense of Israel's right to exist and his condemnation of "reactionary Arab nationalism" in September 1967. Kociolek has a doctor's degree from the Department of Philosophy of Warsaw University, where he studied under Leszek Kolakowski, and he is said to be intellectually gifted, although a "fanatic" in regard to Marxism-Leninism. He took the lead, together with Zenon Kliszko (Kociolek is said to be married to Kliszko's daughter), in ousting Kolakowski from the Party in 1966 and Kociolek has a reputation as an anti-intellectual and a hard-fisted apparatchik. Taking over the Warsaw organization following an economic scandal, he used "Stalinist" methods to eliminate corruption. Most important, he is devoted to Gomulka and in 1965 he was being called one of Gomulka's two "Party sons" (the other was Jozef Tejchma). Kociolek retains his position as first secretary of the Gdansk Voivodship organization after entering the Politburo at the Fifth Congress in November 1968. In June 1969, Kociolek accompanied Gomulka, Cyrankiewicz, Kliszko, and Starewicz (and Central Committee department heads Jozef Czesak and Andrzej Weblan) to the International Communist Conference in Moscow, thus filling the slot one might have expected Gierek to fill.

In his speech to the Fifth Congress, Kociolek delivered one of the few specific rebuffs to the "apparat revolt" when he noted: "It is essential to consistently apply the statutory principles in judging the attitudes of comrades and in cadre policy . . . In the pre-Congress discussion there was legitimate criticism . . . of the failure of a number of Party organizations to keep check on their members, both those in positions of leadership and those in the ranks." Groomed by Gomulka and Kliszko, but not associated with the stagnant "establishment," a believer in the "dictatorship of the apparatchiks" but not guilty of apparat revolt, and owing nothing to either

Moczar or Gierek, Kociolek may offer the best hope of an orderly succession, and might be regarded as the new "Crown Prince." But he lacks one essential--a secure power base. Kociolek made more enemies than friends during his Warsaw tenure, he is new in Gdansk, and he has entered the central leadership as an apparently unwelcome outsider. Only strong Soviet support could overcome this shortcoming.

Jozef Tejchma, the other "Party son" of Gomulka as noted above, is said to be co-responsible (with Jan Szydlak and Stefan Olszowski) for restoring order in the ideological sector. These three young men are said to have responsibility for keeping students and journalists under control, while Gomulka and Kliszko retain the right to make all basic decisions concerning ideology. Born in 1927 and a Party member since 1952, Tejchma worked in the Organization Department of the Union of Polish Youth prior to its dissolution in 1956. From 1957, he headed the new rural youth organization, until he became director of the Central Committee Agricultural Department in 1963. He served on the preparatory commissions for the Third, Fourth and Fifth Congresses, was elected a deputy member of the Central Committee at the Third Congress and a full member at the Fourth Congress, when he also entered the Secretariat reportedly under the sponsorship of Ochab. He has been spoken of as a possible successor to Gomulka since 1967. He entered the Politburo at the Fifth Congress. Tejchma is described as intelligent and resolute, a "Gomulka man" but highly regarded by all. His Fifth Congress speech was devoted largely to the ideological shortcomings of the youth.

Jan Szydlak, who won the double promotion to the Secretariat and to candidate membership in the Politburo at the Fifth Congress, while not an immediate candidate for the job of First Secretary, must be considered a major factor in the new balance of power. Born in 1925, Szydlak spent the war years at forced labor in Germany and joined the Party immediately after returning to Poland in 1945. After completing the Central Committee

Party School in 1951, Szydlak served in several youth organization positions until joining Gierek in Katowice where he served as secretary for propaganda from 1957 to 1960, when he was made first secretary of the Poznan Voivodship Party Committee. He was made a candidate member of the Central Committee at the Third Congress and a full member at the Fourth Congress. He gave up his Poznan post in November 1968 following his appointment to the Secretariat. Described as arrogant and overbearing, nicknamed the "Ox," Szydlak ruled Poznan as a demanding autocrat and apparently offended enough people to provoke investigations from Warsaw in 1961 and 1963. The cause of his present success remains somewhat of a mystery. According to one hardly credible story, the outcome of the Fifth Congress remained in doubt until Szydlak, at Gierek's urging, swung Poznan formally behind Gomulka, this creating a strong Gierek-Szydlak faction on which Gomulka was forced to depend. An opposing and only slightly more credible story is that Szydlak was one of a group backing Gierek in March 1968, a group which now considers Gierek a "broken reed" after his "deal" with Gomulka. The public explanation, by a member of the Party Auditing Commission interviewed after the Congress, seems adequate--Szydlak's promotion was a recognition of Poznan's importance as the second largest Party organization and a province with outstanding agricultural and industrial accomplishments, and a recognition of the "correct action taken during the March disturbances." (Szydlak's pledge of support to Gomulka followed Gierek's by only two days, and he showed increasing self-confidence in dealing with Warsaw authorities thereafter.) It is doubtful if Gierek retains any real influence over Szydlak or that Szydlak owes his promotion to Gierek. Even if the above "broken reed" story is discounted, it remains true that reports of Szydlak's increasing self-confidence were sometimes accompanied by reports of Gierek's increasing isolation prior to the Congress.

New Secretariat member Stefan Olszowski is the least of the new leaders but perhaps most typical of the coming generation. Born in 1933, Olszowski held various youth organization posts prior to 1956. In the critical

year preceding October 1956, he was in Prague and so returned as a relative unknown to take over the Polish Student Association from which he rooted out the "October men" between 1957 and 1960. Reportedly with Kliszko's sponsorship, Olszowski obtained a Party secretary post in Poznan in 1960 and then promotion to director of the Central Committee Press Office in 1963. He was made a member of the Central Committee at the Fourth Congress in 1964. In addition to being identified as a member of "Kliszko's group," Olszowski has been variously identified as a Moczar supporter and as a member of the "Gierek-Szydlak" faction. Polityka editor Mieczyslaw Rakowski, speaking privately in March 1969, noted that "in the absence of top-level attention and guidance, the Polish scene is more and more dominated by ambitious individuals at a lower level," people who have a "lower middle class mentality." Stefan Olszowski, Rakowski added, is the prototype of these new men.

Prognosis

As conformist as Gierek is and as lacking in any concrete program as Moczar has seemed to be, the men named above seem even less likely to introduce imaginative reforms. What movement there has been in 1969 has been limited to rather faltering overtures in foreign policy and trade, primarily in regard to Bonn, and to talk of decentralization in economic decision making. Soviet hostility to political reform or even to economic reform which seems to presage political reform limits any initiative even further. Looking toward the future, the first approximation is therefore that nothing will change. Gomulka's style, the nature of the system, and Soviet hostility to change all militate against meaningful reform. No one personality and no combination at the top have emerged to challenge the status quo. The masses, the students, and the intellectuals are all presently quiescent. But their apathy masks a profound discontent and it is generally admitted, by Polish sources and Western analysts, that things cannot go on as they are.

Certainly Warsaw and the Kremlin must be concerned already with one inescapable change--the choice of Gomulka's successor. The choice can hardly be an easy one. Gierek's Western experience and Moczar's nationalism, over and above their possible opposition to the Czechoslovak intervention, would be enough to evoke a Soviet veto in the present international atmosphere. And in the present atmosphere a Soviet veto should be decisive. Control, not competence, is the crucial Soviet criterion, and it is control which the events of 1968 bring most into question.

These multiple contradictions, the tension between the need for change and the impossibility of it, the impending selection of a successor and the absence of qualified candidates, would seem to raise the possibility of another violent upheaval within the Party. In Poland and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Party monolith has turned rather unexpectedly to sand. In Poland today, the usual image of a tightly disciplined Party is now rightly suspect and there has already been an example of the Party fracturing along the lines of its internal structure. The Polish apparat revolt of 1968 may prove a prelude to a further and more thoroughgoing attempt by lower-level functionaries to force change from below upon an immobile regime.

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