




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
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
THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

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THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

This Annex supplies the bulk of detailed information and analysis upon which the Intelligence Report entitled, "The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle," published 5 July 1968, was based. It is being circulated as a reference for the benefit of those who follow Soviet internal affairs in detail.

The Annex is divided into three chronological sections with three further sub-divisions in each. The first sub-division deals with the use of the Stalin issue in the Soviet leadership struggle. The second considers the practical effects on intellectual freedom resulting from a policy of greater restrictions and central controls. The third sub-division traces the treatment of the Stalin issue in Soviet communications media.

The Annex is not a coordinated document. The research analyst responsible for preparing the study is Carolyn Ekedahl.

John Kerry King
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


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POINT COUNTERPOINT

From Khrushchev's Fall to Shelepin's Set-Back
(October 1964-December 1965)

LEADERSHIP

The Sides Are Formed

After the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the task of rewarding those who had cooperated in overthrowing Khrushchev and reversing some of Khrushchev's more unpopular measures. The man who seemed to benefit the most from the early appointments was Aleksandr Shelepin, former Komsomol and KGB Chief.* He was promoted to full membership in the CPSU Presidium in November and several of his associates and proteges received promotions within the party apparatus.** Shelepin also appeared to benefit from changes made in the leadership of the press and propaganda organs.***

Podgorny's position also seemed to be fairly strong at this time. Aleksey Rumyantsev, who had been secretary for propaganda and agitation in Khar'kov Oblast', probably when Podgorny was there, became chief editor of Pravda.

*At this time Shelepin was a Party Secretary, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the Party State Control Committee.

**Petr Demichev, a former First Secretary of Moscow City, became a candidate member of the Presidium. He is reportedly a good friend of Shelepin and owes his position to him. Vladimir Semichastnyy, KGB Chief and a Shelepin protege, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the central committee.

***Vladimir Stepakov, who had come up in Moscow City under Demichev, became editor of Izvestiya and Nikolay Mesyatsev, who had served under Shelepin in the Komsomol, became Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television. Another subordinate of Shelepin's in the Komsomol, Mikhail Khaldeyev, became Chief of the RSFSR Propaganda and Agitation Section in January 1965.

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Podgorny gave the main report at the November party plenum, and at the November anniversary celebrations, the toast to the party was given by Podgorny rather than Brezhnev, who followed with a toast to the military. More importantly, moderate trends with which Podgorny was subsequently to associate himself seemed to prevail throughout this period. The 1965 budget included a reduction in the overt military budget and concessions to the consumer, both of which Podgorny favored.

Condemnation of Khrushchev began almost immediately after his ouster; this was necessary if the new leaders were to justify their own action in getting rid of him. However, these attacks were frequently accompanied by support of collective leadership and occasionally accompanied by condemnation of the cult of personality as well.*

The approach to the Stalin issue by members of the hierarchy remained essentially as before. On 6 November an article by Latvian First Secretary Arvid Pelshe, who has been associated with Suslov, appeared in Pravda; in it he discussed the cult:

The ideology and practice of the personality cult, alien to Marxism-Leninism, has done considerable harm to our party and the Soviet state. The personality cult reduced the role of the masses and of the party, minimized collective leadership, undermined intra-party democracy, and suppressed the activity, initiative, and independent action of the party members

*For example, a November Kommunist Belorussii editorial stated that where the cult of personality takes root, collectivity of leadership is impossible. And a January 1965 article in Kommunist Sovetskoye Latvii, probably controlled by Pelshe, attacked the cult of Stalin's personality in harsh terms and stated that it had done serious damage to party and state leadership, adding, however, that this could not and did not change the nature of the socialist system.

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The 20th CPSU Congress put an end to this. It was thus a turning point in the party's history . . . The Congress recommended to the Party Central Committee 'not to relax the struggle against the remnants of the personality cult'

Similarly, in December, First Secretary of Kazakhstan, Kunayev,* a Brezhnev protégé, spoke at a commemorative meeting for Saken Seyfullin, a writer who had died in the purges. On 6 December, a strong attack on Stalin was carried in a Pravda article, which also strongly praised the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses.

In February 1965 the journal Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life), scoffed at the suggestion that criticism of the cult would cease:

Some people abroad have begun to speculate and even assert that after the October plenum of the Central Committee the CPSU will give up criticizing the cult of Stalin's personality and revise its general line, elaborated at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. Vain hopes! . . . The process begun at the 20th Party Congress is an irreversible process. There is no return to the old ways, and there will be none. It is not a matter merely of somebody not wanting this return, but of the objective conditions of life of Soviet society and of the Communist Party at the present stage.

That some party figures felt the need to reassure the party and public that there would be no return to the past may well have reflected the fact that there was indeed pressure being exerted to do just that.

*D. A. Kunayev was reappointed First Secretary in December 1964. He had held this post from 1960 to 1962 and had then named Chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

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Shelepin's Drive For Power

The expression of the neo-Stalinist views that Stalin should not be criticized and that intellectuals should be made to conform began somewhat sporadically, but seemed clearly to come from a Shelepin-oriented group. The first, and for a number of months, the only, favorable reference to Stalin appeared on 6 November in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the organ of the Young Communist League (Komsomol); the Komsomol had been headed previously by Shelepin and Semichastnyy, and since 1959 its chairman had been their protege, Sergey Pavlov. In this article Stalin was referred to as one of Lenin's "comrades-in-arms."

In February Kommunist published an article by Moscow City First Secretary Nikolay Yegorychev,* who has been one of the most violent spokesmen for the neo-Stalinists. This may well have been the opening salvo in Shelepin's attack on Brezhnev's position. Yegorychev advanced a number of themes which were subsequently to be stressed by the neo-Stalinists. After paying lip service to the important measures taken to root out the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, he concentrated his attacks on the sins of the Khrushchev era. He stated that "events of recent years" had caused doubts among ideologically unstable youths, and he criticized those who take what he called a one-sided view of the past and stress only shortcomings.

In connection with this, we must lodge a complaint against those of our creative intelligentsia who sometimes are too attracted by describing the willfulness of the period of the cult of personality and the moral experience and physical deprivation of innocently condemned people.

He coupled this criticism with a call for more patriotic and ideological training. This represented precisely the sort of statement which Partiynaya Zhizn', in the same month, had indicated was impossible.

*Yegorychev rose to his position through the Moscow Komsomol and party apparatuses; he succeeded Demichev as first secretary there.

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Yegorychev continued to press his point at the Second Congress of RSFSR Writers early in March. He attacked a number of articles which had appeared in liberal journals, as well as Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, a sensational novel published during the Khrushchev period which graphically described life in a Stalin labor camp. He condemned those who permit criticism of shortcomings to degenerate into blackening the "glorious history" of party and people. He called on writers to instill in youth pride in the great achievements of their history, and said that

The instilling of such views is hardly facilitated by the excessive enthusiasm of part of our creative intelligentsia for depicting the cruelties and willfulness of the period of the cult of personality

Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege who also spoke at this congress, scored pessimistic works which, he said, as a rule are "connected with the cult theme. The opening statement to the congress by Party Secretary and Presidium member Andrey Kirilenko* had been somewhat less harsh than these speeches; while he had stressed the party's demands on writers, he had not criticized writers for dwelling on the cult nor had he condemned criticism of shortcomings.

From 24 through 26 March an agricultural plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held. The main order of business was the agricultural report delivered by Brezhnev and the adoption of his proposed five-year program designed to bolster the agricultural sector of the economy. A number of personnel changes were also made at the plenum. Demichev, probably a Shelepin supporter, became party secretary responsible for ideological matters. Kirill Mazurov** was named a full member of the Presidium and was succeeded as Belorussian First Secretary by Petr Masherov,*** who also

*Kirilenko served in the Ukraine under Brezhnev, but at times has seemed closer to Podgorny in his policy views.

**Mazurov was First Secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol during the late 1940's--when Shelepin was all-union Komsomol secretary for cadres.

***Masherov rose through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party organizations after Mazurov.

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became a candidate member of the Presidium. Both Mazurov and Masherov had served in the Belorussian Komsomol and may well have become aligned with Shelepin. Masherov's subsequent statements would indicate his clear support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinists; Mazurov's views have not been made as clear.

During 1965 there were indications of increasing dissension within the leadership. Evidently, the Stalin issue was a major, if not the major, source of conflict. A number of reports were received in the West in the spring and summer, all asserting that the leadership was planning to rehabilitate Stalin.* The [] varied, however, in their analysis of who was promoting the rehabilitation. One [] stated that Brezhnev favored it but that Suslov felt himself too committed to de-Stalinization to change. Another said that Mikoyan was violently opposed to making any concessions to the Chinese and was supported in this by technologists like Kosygin, but that under pressure from ideologues who look back nostalgically to the days when Moscow was undisputed leader of orthodoxy, they might have to succumb to the point of finding justification for Stalin's actions. One [] included both Brezhnev and Kosygin in a middle-of-the-road grouping being pushed by a military hierarchy composed of Stalinists.

Although none of these reports mentioned Shelepin as a major proponent of re-Stalinization, other indicators discussed below, suggested that he and his faction were strongly backing the drive to restore Stalin's name. On 16 April at a meeting of central committee ideological specialists, Demichev, in his new role as ideological spokesman, reportedly proposed changes in policy toward the intellectuals and called for "more balanced treatment" of Stalin.

In May Brezhnev became the first member of the new leadership to mention Stalin's name in public. The occasion

*With the exception of one Reuters report in May which indicated that the Soviets wanted to abolish the system under which political losers became unpersons and that Stalin would be mentioned in an historical context--but not rehabilitated.

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was the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. In his speech Brezhnev stated that as was well known the war had begun under unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Union and that great efforts had been made to strengthen the country:

The State Defense Committee was formed with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Josif Visarionovich Stalin, at its head to exercise leadership over all action in the matter of organizing the repulse of the enemy.

Brezhnev went on to pay tribute to the armed forces and the intellectuals for their wartime performance, but did not mention either of Shelepin's organizations, the KGB or the Komsomol. Thus, while supporting the neo-Stalinist position on the Stalin issue, Brezhnev was clearly shying away from any support, implied or explicit, of Shelepin. Brezhnev had thus made clear his support for a policy of at least partial rehabilitation of Stalin. His reasons for doing so probably include the fact that as party first secretary he had the most to gain from such a rehabilitation. If he could establish that much of Stalin's power position was both legitimate and desirable, he could hope to acquire at least some of this power.

Rumors concerning impending changes in the leadership began in the summer of 1965 and ended somewhat abruptly in September. The common thread of all these reports was that Shelepin would replace Brezhnev, who was portrayed as a bumbling incompetent. There were a number of variations and subsidiary themes. According to one source, Suslov was the most prominent member of the leadership, but did not want the top position. Several reports indicated that Mikoyan would retire, that Brezhnev would take his place, and that Shelepin would take Brezhnev's position. Some claimed that Kosygin would also be relieved.

One of the issues causing disagreement among the leaders at this time was that of politics versus economics. Support for the dogmatic position which views the party as a political and ideological body was indicated by Suslov,

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Shelest, and, most strongly, by Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze, who, in June, invoked Stalin's words to support his position. After expressing his hostility to the influx into the party of a large number of people with production expertise, he stated:

Proceeding from the Leninist principle of building our party, I.V. Stalin, acutely and figuratively, said at one time, 'Our party is a fortress the doors of which open only to the tested.'

Indications of controversy within the leadership also came in the form of several strong statements on the need for collective leadership. Such a defense appeared in Pravda on 15 April and an even stronger one appeared in the Uzbek paper Pravda Vostoka on 20 April. The latter article praised the 22nd Party Congress, which had strongly condemned the cult of personality, and attacked the cult as well as the methods of personal dictatorship, suggesting that its target was a neo-Stalinist individual or faction. Thus it would appear that the First Secretary in Uzbekistan, Rashidov, was at this time giving some support to a moderate faction which felt itself losing ground, probably to Brezhnev.

During the spring and summer Podgorny seemed to be losing strength, while Shelepin was acquiring it. In April party secretary Titov, a Podgorny associate, was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary; he was removed from the secretariat the following September. In May Shelepin supporter Stepanov was promoted from chief editor of Izvestiya to head of the central committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.* That same month all Moscow-resident Presidium members with the exception of Podgorny received medals for their wartime contributions. And in May and June a large number of articles extolling the virtues of the KGB appeared in the press.

*The Izvestiya post was to remain vacant until October, an indication that the leaders could not agree on the appointment.

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In July the central committee reprimanded Kharkov Oblast, with which Podgorny had been associated, for serious shortcomings in the work of party admissions. An 11 August Pravda editorial reported this and also criticized the oblast' for emphasizing numerical over qualitative growth. This marked the climax of a campaign of criticism of Podgorny's oblast' which had begun in February with an article by Brezhnev protege Shcherbitskiy. This suggests that Brezhnev was pushing the campaign, probably with the concurrence of neo-Stalinist and orthodox elements.

In August and September, on the eve of the economic plenum, forceful articles appeared from both the neo-Stalinist and liberal camps. On 29 August Pravda published an article by Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege, who again attacked those who look at history through the "prism of the negative results of the personality cult." He urged that the great achievements of the 1930's be stressed.

Pavlov's theme was picked up by a secretary of the traditionally hard-line Leningrad city party committee, Yu. Lavrikov, in a 9 September speech. He too condemned a "one-sided" approach to the complexities of the cult. And, on 15 September, First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast' V. Tolstikov came down strongly on the side of orthodoxy with an article criticizing the lack of positive heroes and ideology in literature and art. The Azerbaydzhan first secretary, V. Akhundov, also stressed a hard line in his speech in September to a plenum of the republic's creative unions. Interestingly, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, a Shelepin protege, had served briefly as Second Secretary under Akhundov in the late 1950's, an indication that Akhundov might be in league with the neo-Stalinists.

On 9 September the liberals launched a counterattack with the publication of Rumyantsev's second liberal defense of the intellectuals in Pravda.* In this article he criticized the call for positive heroes as the sole criterion of a work and said that shortcomings should not be ignored. Sometime before 21 September, when the official

*See page 18 for further discussion of this article.

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announcement was made, Rumyantsev was relieved as Pravda's editor and succeeded by M. Zimyanin,** this was a real blow to the moderates, and represented a major defeat for Podgornyy. Rumyantsev's identification several months later in a fairly responsible position** indicated, however, that Podgornyy still retained considerable strength.

Shelepin may have made his major push for power in September. About this time several articles were published defending the Party-State Control Committee--which he headed--suggesting either that the organization was under attack, that Shelepin was trying to strengthen this organization, or both. This committee had been established in 1962. Its function was to find and punish party and government officials guilty of misconduct. The existence of such an extra-party organization had been controversial and Shelepin's position as head of the committee gave him a fairly powerful base from which to operate. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, the Belorussian paper, in a 13 August editorial, described party state control as an "inherent, integral part of party organizational work." This was an indication of the support being given Shelepin by the Belorussian party and its leader Masherov. Also, in mid-September the writers Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuriy Daniel were arrested by the KGB for publishing works in the West under pseudonyms. The timing of these arrests may have represented an attempt by the neo-Stalinists to seize the initiative on the eve of the September plenum. But the Presidium must have agreed to the action, indicating that Brezhnev approved and had taken a number of key votes with him.

According to a report [redacted] opposition before the September plenum to proposals to reform the economic structure through de-centralization and an emphasis

*Zimyanin rose to prominence through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party; he also served as deputy minister of foreign affairs.

**Rumyantsev's identification in November as Acting Academician Secretary of the Department of Economics indicated that he still had support.

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on profits, came from Shelepin and Suslov, who feared the increased freedom for plant managers would weaken central control of the economy. The reform adopted at the September party plenum represented a compromise with the economic reformers, backed by Kosygin, achieving only a portion of their goal. [redacted] reported that while reform was a significant issue, the major political issue before the plenum was the proposal to partially rehabilitate Stalin. There were those, he reported, who favored political as well as historical rehabilitation. It was decided, however, to leave the rehabilitation at the level of the 20th anniversary of the end of the war--public reference to Stalin's existence as an historical figure when obviously called for. Thus, on both issues--the economy and Stalin--a compromise position seems to have prevailed. At the Supreme Soviet session which followed the plenum, Brezhnev was named a member of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, a largely honorific post, but still indicative of his growing strength. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming Shelepin's senior in the government. Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin mentioned Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in his speech, a fairly obvious omission.

Brezhnev Undermines Shelepin

Brezhnev's support for the neo-Stalinist position both on re-Stalinizing and cultural policy was revealed shortly after the plenum. A protege of his, Sergey Trapeznikov who in June had been appointed Chief of the central committee's Section for Scientific and Educational Institutions, wrote an article which appeared in Pravda on 8 October, in which he strongly asserted the supremacy of theory over practice. Trapeznikov said that no party is guaranteed against tactical errors, but that the main question is the depth of these mistakes and the timely correction of them. He condemned one-sided approaches to industrialization, collectivization, and, of course, the war. Thus, several specific policies were added to the subject of Stalin's wartime leadership as being no longer suitable topics for criticism. The official, and clearly

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Brezhnev-supported, line on the cult of the personality was made clear:

. . . Certainly the cult of personality brought significant harm to the cause of socialist construction in certain spheres of the life of society. However, neither the cult of personality itself nor its consequences flowed in any way from the socialist system and did not change and could not change its character. Therefore, it cannot be recognized as either theoretically or factually correct when in some of our scientific or artistic publications life is portrayed only from the viewpoint of the manifestations of the cult of personality and they thereby cloud the heroic struggles of the Soviet people who are building socialism

This article by Trapeznikov was followed on 20 October with an instructional letter, sent out by Trapeznikov's department to schools, calling for changes in the treatment of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods in history courses. It called for increased emphasis on the role of the central leadership in mobilizing economic resources for defense during the war and for restoration after it. The letter also stressed the need to reveal the harm of subjectivism. These two Trapeznikov statements clearly demonstrated that a policy had been adopted, that Brezhnev had endorsed that policy, and that the line was orthodox.

Thus, the major protagonists in the struggle taking place within the leadership at this time both seemed to be supporters of the neo-Stalinist line. That Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, was involved was clearly revealed in the ongoing dispute over the future of the Party-State Control Committee. On 8 and 12 October respectively Izvestiya and Pravda asserted that the role of the committee would rise under the new ministry system set up at

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the September plenum. On the 15th Krasnaya Zvezda supported the role of the control groups in the armed forces and demanded that persecution of them stop. However, Partiynaya Zhizn followed the line taken by Kosygin and Brezhnev at the September plenum, and completely ignored the role of party-state control organs, referring to party organs as the checking bodies. And Soviet State and Law criticized party-state control groups quite strongly. This sharp divergence over an organization closely connected with a Presidium member, Shelepin, clearly revealed the intensity of the struggle.

Shelepin's neo-Stalinists continued to push their position. Demichev addressed members of the RSFSR Writers Union in Moscow and reportedly called for an end to "camp" literature (i.e., literature concerning Stalin's crimes) and for an emphasis on the "heroic" aspects of Soviet history. In early September he had reportedly apologized to the writers for excessive attacks on them; now he was pushing the attack again. On 28 November a Pravda article by RSFSR Agitprop Chief Khaldeyev, a Shelepin associate, also emphasized a hard-line approach. He criticized a one-sided approach in literature and called for improvement in the ideological and political indoctrination of youth. He particularly called upon the Komsomol to do more in this area. Deputy Chief of the central committee's cultural section, G. Kunitsyn, in November's Kommunist, threatened nonconformist artists with expulsion from creative unions.

A central committee plenum was held from 4 to 6 December and was followed by a two-day session of the Supreme Soviet. A number of high-level personnel changes were made, thus vindicating to some extent the flood of rumors of the previous summer. Mikoyan, who had undoubtedly opposed any rehabilitation of Stalin and would continue to push the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, "resigned" as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and was succeeded by Podgorny. Podgorny probably simultaneously left his position on the CPSU Secretariat, although this could not be announced until the next central committee meeting--the congress in March 1966. This action marked a real set-back for the moderates. However, it was matched by a blow to Shelepin. The Party-State Control Committee

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was abolished and Shelepin lost his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In his speech to the plenum Brezhnev said that there had been shortcomings in the work of the committee, a clear slap at Shelepin. A protege of Brezhnev's, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, was named a candidate member of the Presidium. Thus, Brezhnev seemed to have emerged the victor from this particular skirmish. He had administered a decisive rebuff to the moderates and had also managed to stave off Shelepin's challenge, dealing him a severe defeat in the process.

INTELLECTUALS

Press For More Freedom

The unsettled nature of the leadership and the lack of an agreed position during the first few months after Khrushchev's ouster was reflected in relatively more freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were published and attacks on conservative views were commonplace. Literaturnaya Gazeta's 12 November criticism of a conservative novel, for example, recalled the harsh methods of the Stalin years. The book being reviewed had called for a militant struggle for party-mindedness in art; the review stated that the struggle for socialist realism had been complicated by the "subjective approach of Stalin" and by attempts at administrative solutions to complicated problems.*

On 13 December 1964, A. Bocharov in Izvestiya made a plea for a liberal artistic policy, stating that criticism should persuade and educate, not suppress. His closing statement was quite pointed:

In order to be authoritative, a critic must be guided by the highest interests of the people and not by group predilections, not by the 'literary policy' of the moment, which too often resembles literary confusion.

*The application of the term subjective to Stalin is unusual, for at this time the term was being applied primarily to Khrushchev.

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An article by Noviy Mir's chief editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, commemorating the journal's 40th anniversary appeared in the January issue of that journal. Tvardovskiy defended the need to present the whole truth, arguing that there is no such thing as truth of life versus truth of fact--that there is only truth.* He continued his attack on orthodox cultural viewpoints by stating that each work cannot present the whole picture--that only literature as a whole can do that--and that no hero is able to represent all things. He stated that at one time (i.e., under Stalin) the exaltation of the hero had taken the place of reality.

Tvardovskiy was answered on 9 January by a Pravda editorial which argued that the artist must present life in full historical perspective and criticized works which concentrate on the negative aspects of life. These contradictory views, as expressed by the most liberal journal published in the Soviet Union and the party paper, recur repeatedly in the dialogue between liberal intellectuals and the conservatives.

In February Pravda published two contrasting articles on cultural policy. The paper's editor Rumyantsev, an apparent Podgornyy supporter, was the author of the first, which appeared on 21 February and was moderate. Rumyantsev made the necessary bows toward the need for party spirit in all forms of creative work, but he concentrated his energies on support for the "highest humanist ideal," the free all-around development of every individual in conformity with the general interest. Rumyantsev then connected a strong defense of collective leadership with the concept of the freedom to create, thus reflecting the knowledge

*This particular issue bears a somewhat frightening resemblance to the basic question in the purge trials in the late 1930's--did it matter in fact whether or not the accused person had conspired against Stalin; or was it enough that he had the potential to do so? The facts in other words are irrelevant. The argument for the truth of life is that any fact which does not support the official view is out of tune with the truth of life, is therefore wrong, and should not be expressed. It is an attempt to suppress by the use of jargon any honest and objective attempt to describe and assess history and life.

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and fear of the intellectuals that the emergence to dominance of a single man, be he Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev, greatly increases the chances of arbitrary interference.

Neither the right of leadership in and of itself nor the post occupied gives grounds for intervening in the course of life; only competence in one or another sphere of knowledge and practice entails this right.

The second Pravda article appeared on 26 February and was written by Yu. Barabash, who was not further identified. Barabash strongly defended socialist realism and the "positive hero." He presented the basic arguments for the truth of life, stating that the good artist even if he depicts ugly and alien phenomena does so in the context of an affirmation of what is wonderful. Writers fail, he stated, when they do not rise above superficial, empirical observations to the great generalizations. Barabash ended his article with a statement concerning the world-wide struggle for the minds of men, stating that the question of the goals of art concerns the place of the artist in the struggle of ideologies. This somewhat vague linking of the issues of creative freedom and alien ideology was to become a basic tenet of the neo-Stalinists attacks, and is very reminiscent of Stalin's attacks on intellectuals, accusing them of internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The publication of these two, conflicting articles in Pravda suggests that at this point the official position on culture was still being sharply disputed, reflecting the unsettled nature of the leadership struggle. Podgorny may have backed the first, moderate article; the quick appearance of an orthodox article revealed that the backers of a hard line would not be defeated easily.

The Neo-Stalinists Push; The Moderates Counter

The pressure of the neo-Stalinists in the leadership began to be reflected in cultural trends in the spring of 1965. On 27 April an article appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta which called for the restoration to respectability

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of the literature of the Stalin period, and the repudiation of subjectivism (i.e., Khrushchevianism) in the study of the history of Soviet literature. The article stated that although the cult of personality had inflicted losses on the development of Soviet literature, it never cut short its progressive movement. An article in that same paper two days later appealed to writers to seek historical truth "in all its entirety."

For this it must be kept in mind that genuine penetration into the truth of life of those years is the thorough investigation of many objective factors and not merely the depiction of Stalin's errors and miscalculations.

Arrests and demonstrations apparently began at least as early as April. In that month the two young intellectuals, A. Amalrik and A. Zverev, were reportedly arrested; one was sentenced to two and a half years in exile for parasitism--the other apparently was released. There is also a report that in April leaders of the central executive committee of SMOG* planned a demonstration. This was held on 14 April and resulted in several arrests and several university expulsions.

The hard-line view taken by the Leningrad organization, particularly its oblast' first secretary, Tolstikov, was reflected in a 30 June Leningradskaya Pravda article which reported that a meeting of party members from the Leningrad writers organization had acknowledged that "justifiable criticism" had been leveled at Leningrad writers by a plenum of the city party committee.

However, the liberal intellectuals were far from cowed. In July the theatrical journal Teatr published an article by A. Anikst, criticizing the theater of the Stalin era and praising the theater of the early 1960's. The

*A loose, illegal organization of young dissidents taking its name from the first letters of the Russian words for word, thought, form, and profundity.

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liberal journal Yunost' in July took a similar line on films and defended the portrayal of diversified types of heroes. And, on 1 August, Pravda published an article by Tvardovskiy defending against an attack on his poem "Terkin in the Other World" made in a 30 July letter to Pravda. Tvardovskiy stated that "anyone who reads the poem without prejudice" would see that it presents a satirical picture of those aspects of reality--stagnation, bureaucracy, formalism--that hamper Soviet progress.

In September there were several important articles representing the liberal point of view. Noviy Mir published an editorial which again denied the validity of counter-posing small and large truth, arguing that truth is truth. And on 9 September Pravda carried the previously mentioned liberal editorial by its chief editor Rumyantsev, in which he made a liberal defense of the arts. He stated that positive heroes are certainly important but should not be the only criterion of the artistic value of a work. He argued that socialist realism should not be oversimplified and that criticizing faults is not alien to socialist realism; on the contrary, ignoring shortcomings may lead to nihilism. He also supported the Noviy Mir position that no writer, let alone in one work, can do that which is possible only to literature as a whole. Rumyantsev criticized those who try to set the intelligentsia against party spirit, stating that this amounts to a demagogic attack on culture. He supported party guidance of the arts, but explained why some people question this guidance:

One can see in such questions the legitimate alarm caused by recollections of the fact that not so long ago words about party guidance sometimes masked crude rule by decree in the sphere of artistic life, and categorical, dilettantist judgments about certain artists and their works.

Furthermore, Rumyantsev's concept of party guidance differed somewhat from the conservative view; he emphasized that the party should defend the artist's right to select his own theme and style.

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On 19 September Pravda, in another editorial, presented a conservative version of Rumyantsev's article, suggesting that the decision to fire Rumyantsev had already been made, and another article on the 24th was even more conservative. Radio Moscow, however, continued to carry Rumyantsev's editorial in broadcasts for two weeks. A certain inability to decide just what the official line was at this time was displayed by Izvestiya which published two contradictory articles in a three-day period. On 23 September F. Kuznetsov made a plea that works be judged by their artistic merit, not their ideological content. Three days later V. Shcherbina stated that these two concepts are inseparable.

According to one report, in October the 70th birthday of the poet Yesenin was marked and the poet Yevtushenko read an unpublished poem "Letter to Yesenin" which was clearly an attack on Komsomol chief Pavlov:

When a rosy-cheeked Komsomol chief
Bangs his fist at us poets
And wants to knead our souls like wax
And wants to fashion them in his own image,
His words, Yesenin, do not terrify us,
Although it is hard to be happy . . .
You were more party-oriented than all the scoundrels
Who tried to teach you to think like the party.

In a November Kommunist article a man named V. Ivanov attacked the "so-called theory of deheroization," and refuted the Noviy Mir editorials on "the truth of life versus the truth of fact." He quoted Lenin to the effect that facts in totality are definitely conclusive, but taken out of context and totality are fragmentary and arbitrary.

The arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in mid-September frightened the intellectual community, and on 5 December a demonstration was held in Moscow to protest these arrests; a number of persons were arrested, some of whom were subsequently tried. Also in December the first of what was to be a series of written protests was sent by Sinyavskiy's wife to Brezhnev, the USSR Procurator General, and various

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Soviet newspapers. In it she recalled the trials of 1937 and termed her husband's arrest an example of lawlessness.

Thus, throughout 1965, while the liberals and moderates managed to score occasional points, the clear trend was toward an increasingly more orthodox line. By the end of the year Noviy Mir stood virtually alone in its defense of the liberal position. In its November editorial it again quoted Lenin to support its view that ideological persuasion is only effective when accepted voluntarily, a plea that there be no clamp down on the intellectuals.

STALIN THEMES

Criticism of Stalin Continues

The unsettled nature of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union opened the way for a push by the intellectuals to attain greater freedom. It also permitted the continuation of harsh criticism of Stalin as a leader and continued rehabilitation of those who suffered and died in the purges.

The liberal journal Noviy Mir published a number of articles in the months after Khrushchev's fall which were highly critical of Stalin's handling of the pre-war situation. Ivan Mayskiy,* in memoirs published in that journal in December, attacked Stalin for failing to heed warnings about an impending attack and for failing to strengthen defenses. The writer Ilya Erenburg, in a January article, attacked Stalin's extermination of army commanders before the war. These have been the main criticisms of Stalin's pre-war leadership.

Voprosy Istorii KPSS, the organ of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, published a number of anti-Stalin articles during this period; in November it carried several such articles. One deprecated Stalin's revolutionary theories and charged that he had in fact conspired with Kamenev and Zinovyev against Lenin in 1917 on the question of whether

*Mayskiy was Ambassador to London before the war. In March 1966 he was to be one of the signers of an appeal to Brezhnev not to rehabilitate Stalin.

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the time was ripe for armed revolution. Another criticized Stalin's theory of disproportionate rates of development, claiming this had, in fact, caused a decline in production.* A third article attacked Stalin for issuing contradictory directives, for indulging in wishful planning, and for making decisions alone. In February Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried an article attacking the cult of personality, stating that it had delayed the modernization of Soviet armed forces; the article charged that the most dangerous consequence of the cult was the destruction on the eve of the war of many talented military leaders.

Various other anti-Stalin articles were also published in the months following the coup. In December Kommunist carried an article concerning the signers of a peace treaty with Germany in 1917. Lenin favored the treaty, but Stalin, according to the article, vacillated and committed the unpardonable error of siding with Trotskiy in the dispute. After Lenin sharply criticized Stalin, he reportedly admitted his mistake and supported Lenin.

The rehabilitation program continued uninterrupted in the first months after Khrushchev's fall, with Pravda carrying particularly strongly-worded articles. In November an inkling of things to come appeared, however. The 75th birthday of purged Ukrainian leader S. Kosior was marked by praise from most papers. However, Pravda Ukrainy pointed out that Kosior had erred in joining the "left communists" on the issue of signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This paper would prove to be one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist organs, probably reflecting the position of Ukrainian party leader Shelest.

Volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, which was presumably an official publication, was signed to the press in March 1965, although it did not appear

*The question of disproportionate rates of development between heavy and light industry continues to be explosive. The dogmatists think heavy industry should develop at a faster rate; the liberals argue that the gap between the two rates should close.

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until the following October. The tone on a number of issues was clearly anti-Stalin, indicating that as of March the official line on the Stalin question had not been changed. An article on collectivization by V. Danilov praised the policy itself, but criticized Stalin's role:

Starting in the fall of 1929 the tendency toward excessive forcing of collectivization, which reflected the position of I.V. Stalin, sharply increased. This policy was based on a scornful attitude toward the opinions of the peasant, ignoring his attachment to his individual farm, ignoring the instructions of Engels and Lenin, the party decisions on the impermissibility and harmfulness of haste and force in cooperatizing small farms The theoretical justification of the forcing of collectivization was Stalin's article published on 7 November 1929 in Pravda entitled 'The Year of the Great Breakthrough,' which asserted that the basic masses of the peasantry had already joined the kolkhozes and that 'the deciding victory' had already been attained.

Danilov stated that in early 1930 directives were issued for a retreat, but that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success," in blaming local officials for the chaos, had caused even greater mistakes.

The volume also used very strong language in discussing Stalin's crimes:

Stalin began to misuse power and crudely violate the Party Statute and Soviet laws The cult of personality engendered careerism and servility, suspicion and distrust, and in the field of theory it engendered dogmatism and alienation of theory from practice. Having established his own personal control over organs of the NKVD, Stalin dealt summarily with officials whom he did not like. In 1937 . . . Stalin advanced the harmful and theoretically mistaken thesis that as socialism becomes

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stronger and the Soviet state moves further ahead, the class struggle in the country will become sharper and sharper. This thesis served as justification for mass illegal repressions against prominent leaders of the party and state, members and candidate members of the central committee, important military leaders, and many other people who were guilty of nothing The repressions began at first against ideological opponents, the majority of which were represented as agents of imperialism and foreign intelligence, and then the very same false accusations were made against other Communists who had never taken part in any opposition

The language used in this article is very reminiscent of Khrushchev's secret speech denunciation of Stalin. As stated above, the fact that this was signed to the press in March indicated that no decision to totally restore Stalin to a position of respectability had yet been made.

Drive to Restore Stalin's Image Begins

Meanwhile, the neo-Stalinist drive for power which began in February 1965 was quickly reflected in articles relating to the Stalin issue. A sharp reduction in rehabilitations of Stalin's victims began in February and the first indications of an organized effort to restore Stalin to respectability appeared about the same time; this first concerted effort was concentrated on Stalin's wartime image.

Soviet military figures have generally been in the forefront of the shifting lines on the Stalin issue, but always pushing the same point. Their main interest is increased control of military matters by the military. When the party line was anti-Stalinist, the military argued that Stalin had been an incompetent wartime leader because he had failed to listen to the professionals. Now, with

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the start of re-Stalinizing, military figures were to argue that Stalin had been an effective wartime leader precisely because he had listened to his military advisors. A February article in Krasnaya Zvezda by Marshal Bagramyan credited Stalin with participation in successful military planning--after he had listened to military advice.

In April 1965, according to a Reuters report, Soviet historians were ordered to stop picturing Stalin only as a "muddle-headed military fallure" during the war. In the future, it said, history books would show him neither as a military genius nor as a complete imbecile in matters of strategy. This order was reflected in a reported interview of several Soviet historians with journalists in April. The spokesman for the group stated that Stalin had made a mistake in thinking that Hitler would not attack and in not taking more precautions. However, he warned that Stalin's merits should not be ignored and quoted Stalin himself to prove that he had consulted others and had admitted his own mistakes.

Articles commemorating the 20th anniversary of victory over the Germans in World War II began appearing in April; these reflected the new "balanced" approach to Stalin and the war. A first step was simply to identify Stalin in his wartime positions without further comment, a technique used by Brezhnev in his 8 May speech. A second approach was to ignore the deplorable state of Soviet defenses at the start of the war, dismissing all discussion of miscalculations, purges, and defeats as subjective and one-sided. Still a third method was to blatantly lie about the state of Soviet defenses on the eve of the war. For example, a 30 April Pravda article defended military-industrial preparations for the war. The author, Vasiliy Ryabikov, then First Deputy Chairman of USSR Sovnarkhoz and later First Deputy Chairman of USSR Gosplan, had a special axe to grind as he had become Deputy Peoples Commissar for Armaments in 1939; however, the publication of the article in Pravda indicated that his argument had high-level support. In this article Ryabikov dated the drive to prepare for the war from 1939, and claimed that the

powerful industry established in the Soviet Union before the war ensured the Soviet army's uninterrupted supply of everything necessary for the rout of the enemy.

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The vehicle used most widely to convey a favorable portrait of Stalin was the memoirs of military figures who simply reported their wartime contacts with Stalin, presenting him as a reasonable, if fallible, leader. Marshal Konev, a former First Deputy Minister of Defense, performed this function in a series of interviews and articles published during the spring of 1965. In one article Konev described his success in persuading Stalin to change his mind on a military plan, and in another he credited him with participating in the forming of plans to capture Berlin. In his memoirs in Noviy Mir in May, he stated that Stalin was a wise leader who was "particularly alert to the political and economic overtones of his military decisions." And in a press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 April, Konev expressed the new "balanced" formulation of Stalin's wartime role:

Stalin played a certain positive role in the cause of insuring victory over the enemy, but in the first period of the war and before its beginning, there were miscalculations and shortcomings in Stalin's activities and these have already been mentioned.

A similar approach was taken by Marshal Bagramyan in a 17 April article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, as well as by Marshal Sokolovskiy in a May interview with a L'Unita correspondent. Bagramyan did criticize the purge of military figures on the eve of the war and stated that there had been strategic miscalculations before the war. However, he stated that measures had been taken to prepare the country. Sokolovskiy went further than this, stating that the "main" reason for early defeats was that the young Soviet state had not had time to build the necessary military-technical base, and that for this reason Stalin had tried to delay the war.

On 8 and 9 May various celebrations were held in honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory in World War II, and numerous speeches were given. The most important of these was one by Brezhnev, in which he identified

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Stalin in his wartime role; he also glossed over the errors made in the early stages of the war:

It is well known that the first stage of the war took place in conditions that were unfavorable to us, and advantageous to the enemy. On the side of the fascists who committed this insidious and treacherous attack was the factor of surprise

He thus ignored the numerous warnings of impending attack, and made no reference to failure to prepare defenses.

The start of re-Stalinizing was reflected in various articles on other Stalin-related issues, although there was not the same uniformity as in the articles relating to his wartime role. An April article in a Turkmen journal discussed the rise of the cult of personality and the 20th congress in a "balanced" manner. The article stated that the cult had been the result of exceptional conditions, and that various factors, including imperialist encirclement, had demanded strict centralized leadership and certain limitations on democracy. The article went on to state that Stalin's personal shortcomings had, however, caused the cult of personality to emerge. While the article stated that the 20th congress had criticized the cult, it emphasized that the June 1956 central committee decree on the cult had analyzed the cult profoundly and had rebuffed attempts to use criticism of the cult to undermine the socialist system. The call to use the June 1956 decree as a guideline for statements on the Stalin issue would be made with increasing frequency in the months ahead. This decree had marked a sharp modification of Khrushchev's February 1956 denunciation of Stalin. The decree had praised Stalin as a Marxist-Leninist and leader, but said that he had had certain negative character traits which had lent themselves to the development of the cult. The decree's sharpest criticism was reserved for enemies who tried to use the issue to sow confusion and undermine socialism. Thus, the attempts to restore this decree as the basic guideline on the Stalin issue was a clear step toward re-Stalinizing.

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During the summer and early fall of 1965 there were a number of instances in which Stalin was mentioned without comment. A July Voprosy Istorii KPSS article included Stalin in a list of persons who had played an important role in the struggle against the Trotskiyites. The film The Aurora Salvo which was released in October 1965 contained one scene of Stalin--smoking a pipe and voting in favor of Lenin's call for armed action. On 12 September Pravda carried an excerpt from a book on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in which Stalin is simply included in a list of those who voted "correctly" (i.e., for the treaty.)

Whereas Volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, signed to the press in March 1965, had dealt harshly with Stalin on the subject of the repressions, volume 8, signed to the press in October 1965, represented a more "balanced" approach, similar to the line of the June 1956 decree. This volume emphasized that iron discipline and some restrictions on democracy had been necessary under the complex conditions of the times, but that these had always been considered temporary. The article praised Stalin for fighting deviation, organizing the building of socialism, and protecting Lenin's attitudes on the possibility of building socialism in one country. It then went on to criticize the cult and the use of administrative methods. The article closed by stating that the party had liquidated the violations of socialist legality.

Anti-Stalinists Continue to Resist

During this period articles attacking Stalinist positions continued to appear, indicating that those who wished to prevent a rehabilitation of Stalin had not been subdued. On 15 April Kommunist Ukrainy published an article on the contributions of the Ukrainians to the defeat of the Germans, and included Khrushchev in a list of those who had held responsible posts. The moderate position taken by this paper suggests that it was under the influence of Podgorny, rather than the more orthodox Shelest. The journal Voprosy Istorii KPSS, while acceding to the

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apparent directive to identify Stalin in his wartime positions, also blamed early military reverses on various factors, tracing many of these to violations of collectivity under Stalin's cult of personality.

From February through April 1965, the journal Noviy Mir published the memoirs of Soviet writer Il'ya Erenburg. Erenburg was highly critical of Stalin and the cult; he attacked Stalin as a military leader.

. . . Litvinov and Mayskiy told me that the pact with Hitler had been necessary--Stalin had succeeded thereby in frustrating the plans of the Western allies . . . But Stalin did not use the two-year respite to strengthen defenses--military men and diplomats alike have told me this. I have written that Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious and saw in his closest collaborators potential "enemies of the people," but for some reason he trusted Ribbentrop's signature. The Hitlerites' attack caught us by surprise. At first Stalin lost his head. He did not dare to announce the attack himself; he charged Molotov with doing so

Erenburg also denounced at some length the purges. He discussed the "deification of Stalin and Stalin's responsibility for all that occurred, ridiculing the attempt to shift blame elsewhere.

A group of writers was invited to the central committee where one of the secretaries explained to us the reasons for Beria's arrest The comrade who spoke with us said: 'Unfortunately, in the last years of his life Comrade Stalin was strongly influenced by Beria.' When I later thought about these words, I recalled the year 1937. Would someone then say that at that time Yezhov had influenced Stalin? It was obvious to everyone that such insignificant people could not have prompted Stalin's political course.

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Another voice of moderation came from the journal Soviet State and Law in an article by Deputy Procurator General Zhogin, attacking Vyshinskiy and Stalin. Zhogin charged that Vzshinskiy had cooperated with the NKVD, had suppressed attempts to enforce legality at the purge trials, and had engineered the purges of those who protested. He said that all of this was the fruit of the cult of personality and that Vyshinskiy had carried out Stalin's orders. Vyshinskiy's words had served as "theoretical justification of tyranny and coercion and of the mass persecution of entirely innocent people." Zhogin called for the exposure of these distortions in order to strengthen socialist legality.

In May there was a sudden upsurge of rehabilitations in the press which lasted through June. Voprosy Istorii KPSS resumed its publication of rehabilitation items with no apparent change in formulation. Izvestiya and Sovetskaya Rossiya carried rehabilitation items as did Krasnaya Zvezda. Kommunist Estonii published a strongly worded article on the suffering of the Estonian party in the purges.

Noviy Mir persisted in its resistance to re-Stalinizing trends. In September it published an article by V. Kaverin in which he discussed a number of writers who had had difficulties in the 1930's. He stated that the 20th party congress had put an end to arbitrariness, and, in discussing the trials of the 1930's, said that it had turned out that those convicted had been right and the accusers had been devoid of any moral values. And in October, Noviy Mir published an article reviewing the book The Last Two Weeks by A. Rozen.* The author of the review, A. Kondratovich, sharply criticized a TASS statement which had been issued a week before the outbreak of World War II, denying the possibility of war. He said that it would have been one thing if it had come from a man who was excessively trustful, "but we all know that Stalin was distinguished by completely different qualities." He then attacked those who argue for the "truth of life" as opposed to the "truth of fact:"

*This book was published in February 1965 and criticized the handling of the two weeks before the war.

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Sometimes the attempt is made to link the 1941 defeats to a petty "truth of fact" which it is said is a far cry from what "truly occurred;" those writers who examined that threatening summer of 1941 in an attempt to understand how it happened, have been called "narrow-minded writers." But in those months we lost hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people, and we surrendered to the enemy, even if only for a time, a huge territory, and to call this petty, non-essential "truth of fact" is really a blasphemy. To "dissuade" writers from the "1941" theme means at the very least to show a lack of interest in historical truth . . . Much of what A. Rozen writes about looks unbelievable. During the reading one often asks the question how could such things happen? But even this astonishment is a blessing; that means we have come a long way from those times

Re-Stalinizing Dominates

The strength of the conservative position was reflected in the fall of 1965 in the reduction in the number of rehabilitations appearing in the central press,* and the modification of the language used in those that did appear. For example, on 3 September Pravda carried

*The provincial papers continued to publish some rehabilitations, particularly the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Armenian papers.

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an article about V. Knosin, former Comintern Secretary, but failed to mention his death in the purges, simply giving 1937 as the last date in his career. In general, this was the new format to be followed in the months ahead.*

In October there was a report that a number of military leaders were beginning to speak favorably about Stalin in private. Marshal Chuykov was reportedly one of these as was one of Marshal Rotmistrov's deputies. They argued that Stalin had made mistakes during the war, as had Churchill and Roosevelt, but that he had led the nation to victory. Although he was guilty of excesses before and after the war, these had been necessitated to an extent by the need for harsh measures to insure the build-up of the armed forces.

In September, October, and November, the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov were published; these carried on the process of presenting a "balanced" view of Stalin. While somewhat critical of Stalin's behavior on the eve of the war, Kuznetsov's emphasis was on Stalin's positive achievements. He indicated that Stalin had been a competent and reasonable leader and he denied the "malicious" story that Stalin had planned strategy on a globe (Khrushchev's story) and said that he could vouch for numerous cases where Stalin was engrossed in pinpoint detail and "knew everything right up to the position of each regiment." He stated that more and more during the war Stalin had listened to his front commanders, and he added that every man made mistakes and that wartime errors should not always be blamed on an "incorrect evaluation of the situation by Stalin."

In December a fairly clear step toward rehabilitation of Stalin as a revolutionary was taken in the pages of Pravda Ukrainy. The article concerned the 1917 Sixth Party Congress and the question of whether or not Lenin should

*There were of course exceptions to this. On 17 November, the 76th birthday of Kosior, Radio Moscow stated that "in 1938 Kosior was defamed and arrested. S.V. Kosior perished . . . as a victim of arbitrariness."

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appear before the court of the Provisional Government. This article glided gently over Stalin's position, stating that

in the past few years contradictory data have been presented on the position of individual delegates concerning the problem of V.I. Lenin's appearance before the court . . . Some delegates considered it possible for the leader of the party to appear before the authorities under certain conditions. I.V. Stalin made the solution of this problem contingent upon guarantees for Lenin's safety. Since there were no guarantees he was against an appearance before the court at the given moment. . . .

The appearance of this positive appraisal of Stalin's revolutionary role in the Ukrainian paper suggests once again the neo-Stalinist position of Ukrainian leader Shelest.

SUMMARY

For the first several months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leaders were busy undoing some of Khrushchev's policies and making personnel appointments. Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, emerged with considerable strength after the November plenum, and successfully installed many of his proteges in the party and state apparatuses, particularly in the cultural and information media. He also maintained his previous strength in the KGB and Komsomol.

Podgornyy, a moderate, also appeared to have gained some strength after the ouster, and for several months a moderate policy prevailed, more in keeping with Podgornyy's views than Shelepin's. This line was reflected in the publication of numerous liberal articles on cultural matters and by the continued criticism of Stalin and rehabilitation of his victims. If anything, more freedom

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to write existed in the first few months after the coup than had previously been the case, possibly reflecting the fact that the leadership situation was in a state of flux and that no agreed upon position existed.

In February 1965 the paper Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life) published an article stating that there would be no return to the pre-1956 view of Stalin. While this article was reassuring on the surface, it indicated that there were those who feared such a revival and therefore probably also those who supported it. Support for re-Stalinizing was revealed almost immediately. Kommunist, in February, published an article by Moscow city chief Yegorychev which raised for the first time a number of neo-Stalinist themes--including the idea that many people had gone overboard in criticizing events of the period of the cult of personality. This line was picked up by various individuals and journals quite quickly; in February Voprosy Istorii KPSS, which had been publishing a number of anti-Stalin articles, suddenly stopped its program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims.

A party decision must have been made early in 1965 on the question of mentioning Stalin in his wartime positions. The uniform nature of the campaign and the public approval given it by Brezhnev in May, as well as the importance of the issue, indicated that this decision had been made at the highest level. Given the split between moderates and hard-liners existing in the presidium at this time, it seems clear that Brezhnev must have supported the rehabilitation, along with the neo-Stalinist and orthodox members of the presidium. Rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader was the most logical place to start a total rehabilitation; for the issue was a war from which the Soviet Union emerged victorious and in which Stalin, at least as a unifying symbol, played an important part.

However, Brezhnev must have been aware that a total rehabilitation of Stalin would be a real shock and he was prepared only to move gradually. This was indicated by several equivocal statements made by him as well as by the fact that persons closely associated with him, such

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as the First Secretary of Kazakhstan Kunayev, were not pushing the neo-Stalinist line. Thus, while the decision to restore Stalin's wartime image was being carried out fairly consistently during this period, uniform rehabilitation of Stalin in other areas did not occur. Both praise and criticism of his general role continued to be expressed.

The neo-Stalinists used various other issues in their assault on the liberals in the spring of 1965. In April articles were published urging the restoration of Stalin-era literature to respectability and strongly asserting the argument supporting "truth of life." Also in April arrests of dissident intellectuals began, although on a relatively small scale compared with what would come later. In June the Leningrad newspaper indicated that the intellectuals in that area had been criticized by the city party committee, revealing the hard-line posture being taken by that party organization. In the spring the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims was also halted for several months.

During the summer the liberals enjoyed a brief but not unchallenged resurgence as reflected in the resumption of the rehabilitation program and the publication of various liberal articles; these articles were subjected to sharp criticism, however. In September the liberals apparently attempted to defend their position with the publication of a very bold article by Pravda editor Rummyantsev, who may well have been speaking for Podgornyy. This liberal push was quickly repulsed. Rummyantsev was fired and at almost the same time Daniel and Sinyavskiy were arrested, marking a real clamp-down on the liberal intellectuals.

Signs that the neo-Stalinists were pushing hard at this time could be seen in the various defenses made of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee. Defense of the committee came from the Belorussian paper, suggesting that Shelepin had the support of that republic's organization headed by Mazurov and Masherov. The new Pravda editor Zimyanin, who had replaced Rummyantsev, had risen in Belorussia, and Pravda from now on would support a fairly consistent hard-line, another indication of the Belorussian

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orientation. Pravda expressed its support for party-state control (i.e., Shelepin) in December--after that committee had been abolished.

Shelepin received a rebuff at the September central committee plenum; neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev mentioned party-state control, an obvious omission. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming senior to Shelepin in that organization. And a compromise economic reform program, reportedly opposed by Shelepin, was passed.

The appearance in the beginning of October of a dogmatic article by Sergey Trapeznikov, Brezhnev's protege who had been appointed chairman of the department of Scientific and Educational Institutions the previous June, revealed Brezhnev's support for the hard-line, re-Stalinizing policy. This article exempted from criticism various new aspects of Stalin's policies--collectivization, primacy of heavy industry, politics over economics; in addition, Trapeznikov criticized "some" rehabilitations. Brezhnev's pre-emption of a major portion of the neo-Stalinist platform served to weaken Shelepin's basis for arguing that he (Shelepin) deserved to be the party's leader.

At the December party plenum, the Party-State Control Committee was abolished and Shelepin was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the council of ministers. At the same time the moderates were weakened by Podgorny's appointment as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also meant that he had lost his more powerful position on the party secretariat. Furthermore, he replaced Mikoyan, suggesting that this moderate was finished as a political force.

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NOVEMBER 1964

MARCH 1965

CPSU PRESIDIU

CPSU PRESIDIU

Full Members

Full Members

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
PODGORNY
POLYANSKIY
MIKOYAN
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SHVERNIK
SUSLOV
VORONOV

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV²
MIKOYAN
PODGORNY
POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SHVERNIK
SUSLOV
VORONOV

Candidate Members

Candidate Members

DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
MAZUROV
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
YEFREMOV

DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
USTINOV²
YEFREMOV

CPSU SECRETARIAT

CPSU SECRETARIAT

ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
IL'ICHEV¹
PODGORNY
PONOMAREV
RUDAKOV
SHELEPIN
SUSLOV
TITOV

ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
PODGORNY
PONOMAREV
RUDAKOV
SHELEPIN
SUSLOV
TITOV³
USTINOV²

1. Dropped in March 1965.
2. Elected in March 1965.
3. Dropped in September 1965.

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CREEPING CONSERVATISM

The 23rd Congress--Before and After
December 1965--November 1966

LEADERSHIP

Build-Up To The Congress

Following the December plenum an orthodox, hard-line approach to cultural matters as well as to the Stalin issue seemed to prevail in the leadership. At the same time, however, the neo-Stalinist members of the Shelepin faction expressed less extreme views than had previously been the case, suggesting that they were reacting cautiously to Shelepin's set-back in December. For example, in a 25 December speech Demichev retreated somewhat; although he called for approval of all that is new and truly commu-nistic and criticized lack of principles and ideals, he closed by stating

The party has a cautious and careful regard for the intelligentsia, trusting it, being concerned for the future of talent, and the directing of it so that it is socially useful, and about the healthy, normal development of it. 'Talent is a rare thing,' said Lenin, 'it must be methodically and cautiously encouraged'

In January 1966 reports that two volumes of Stalin's works were to be published appeared. The first secretary at the Italian Embassy in Moscow expressed surprise at this because another report which had come into the embassy in December indicated that Shelepin had suffered a setback when the majority in the leadership blocked distribution of two works of Stalin which had already been printed. The source of this report stated that the Stalin issue was being used as the touchstone of the opposition in the

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hierarchy and that favorable evaluation of certain aspects of Stalin's works was merely a reflection of political struggle.

The fact that Shelepin's set-back in December had not meant a corresponding set-back for neo-Stalinist views was quickly demonstrated, however. On 30 January Pravda published an article by three historians which urged that the use of the term "period of the cult of personality" be discontinued, and called for more positive portrayals of the Stalin era. They argued that emphasis should be put on the enormous successes of the period and that the cost in human suffering should be minimized. They attacked those who pay tribute to "unprincipled opportunism," apparently a reference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization. Also in January the Moldavian paper Sovetskaya Moldaviya published an article by a member of the council of the House of Political Education of the Moldavian Central Committee, analyzing the cult and its exposure. The article instructed propagandists to refer to the June 1956 decree; it attacked those who turn criticism of the cult into a campaign and told propagandists to emphasize that the party had dealt with all that had conflicted with the lines of the 20th Congress. Both of these articles reflect the carrying out of the instructions issued by Trapeznikov in October 1965 and mark a further step in the road to re-Stalinization.

The clearest expression of the prevailing orthodox approach was the trial in February of the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy, an action which must have been approved by the Presidium. According to the writer Valentin Katayev, Kosygin had opposed the trial and "the whole damned thing" but had been outvoted. It seems likely that Mikoyan would have opposed it and probable that Podgornyy, too, would not have supported it. It seems clear that Brezhnev, in league with the neo-Stalinists and other orthodox members of the hierarchy, supported the action. The two men received five and seven years respectively for their "crime" of publishing so-called anti-Soviet works under pseudonyms in the West.

In January 1966 a letter was reportedly circulated in party meetings on the subject of the upcoming party congress. A similar, perhaps identical, letter which was

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sent to the Soviet Embassy in Athens, stated that Stalinism had not been bad except for the cult of personality and that many Stalinists would be rehabilitated during the congress. It was explained to [redacted] that the change on the issue of Stalinism would neutralize the Chinese ideological grounds for attacking the Soviet Union.

Numerous reports circulated during the months before the congress to the effect that Stalin would be rehabilitated, and Eastern European countries apparently received some warning. For example, in mid-January the Soviets reportedly told a Czech delegation led by Novotny that Stalin would be partially rehabilitated at the congress. These reports caused some anxiety in these countries. On 15 February the Polish party organ Trybuna Ludu published a strongly worded editorial in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress. This editorial could be read as a warning to the Soviet Union, linking as it did the coming 23rd Congress with the heritage of the 20th, which it said had become "a common gain for the entire Communist movement." In contrast, the anniversary received only muted attention in the Soviet press.

On the eve of the 23rd congress, a number of republic and regional party meetings were held, at which party leaders expressed for the most part hard-line sentiments. The most strident voice came, not surprisingly, from Mzhavanadze's bailiwick, Georgia, where party secretary Sturua spoke of the "costs" of de-Stalinizing, saying it had brought nihilism and cosmopolitanism (an old Stalinist term with anti-Semitic connotations), as well as attempts by some authors to bring back Trotskyism and other deviations. He condemned the term period of the cult of personality, claiming that it belittled a period of heroic victories and enormous successes. And, finally, he attacked those who undervalue ideological work and write about shortcomings. He stated that this does not help the building of communism. And he closed with a call for party coordination of ideological work.*

*The Italians reacted quickly to Sturua's speech. On 27 March Unita warned that if the 23rd congress re-evaluated Stalin and minimized the negative judgment of the 20th congress, "we cannot accept it."

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At the Belorussian congress first secretary Masherov stated that de-Stalinization had brought into disrepute "an entire historical era" in the country's life. He also criticized those who distort certain events of the war and emasculate the class content of history. First Secretary Bodyul, in Moldavia, implied that the uncrowning of Stalin had led to a distortion of the historic achievements of the party in its struggle for socialism. In Latvia Pelshe emphasized the importance of party education and criticized those writers and artists who are disposed to fault finding and exaggerating existing shortcomings and difficulties. In the Ukraine Shelest used Sholokhov's formulation that when the heart of each artist belonged to the party, he would be free to write as his heart dictates. And, at the Leningrad Oblast' Party conference, Tolstikov presented his neo-Stalinist solution to the problem of non-conforming intellectuals:

Under present conditions, we are faced with having to strengthen the party's influence on the creative intelligentsia, and to help it, by its creative works to strengthen Communist ideals.

At the end of March several warnings were sounded about the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin. One came from the journal Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) which warned that reversion to one-man rule was still a possibility:

In the conditions of the application of socialism there exists the possibility that while taking part in collective work, definite personalities may pursue aims which are their own or which are aims of a faction. Moved by ambition, they have personal aims and cause harm to the common cause, particularly if those personalities have leading positions.

The article then proposed that reforms be adopted to "prevent the repetition of past mistakes."

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The second, and most spectacular, warning came from 25 Soviet intellectuals. These individuals sent an urgent appeal and warning against the rehabilitation to Brezhnev.* The letter stated that the authors saw nothing to indicate that condemnation of the personality cult had been mistaken-- on the contrary, they said, many horrifying facts remained to be revealed. They said that any attempt at rehabilitation would cause great dissension within Soviet society, and would be interpreted by the world as capitulation to the Chinese.

The Congress Opens

The 23rd Congress opened on 29 March and proved to be much less interesting than the build-up to it. The reported rehabilitation of Stalin amounted only to the restoration of the terms "Politburo" and "General Secretary;" these were perhaps the symbolic vestiges of an abandoned plan. Whether the proposed rehabilitation was abandoned because of opposition in Eastern Europe, internal protest, or power shifts in the Presidium is not clear; it seems most likely that the leaders were startled by the vehemence of the reaction, both at home and abroad, and decided that it would be wise to move cautiously.

In his speech to the congress, Brezhnev mentioned neither Stalin nor Khrushchev by name, but he did refer to the miscalculations, undue haste, and subjectivism of recent years (a clear slap at Khrushchev). He called for party-mindedness and a class approach, although he rejected arbitrary influence (an apparent rejection of the more neo-Stalinist recommendations of Tolstikov). Brezhnev's speech was less extreme in tone than many of the pre-congress speeches had been, perhaps a reflection of the leadership's decision to pull back; nonetheless, the tone of his speech was orthodox:

The party will always support art and literature which confirm beliefs in our ideals and will wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of ideology which is alien to us.

*See Appendix Item A and page 49 for further discussion.

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Socialist art is deeply optimistic and cheerful This, of course, does not mean that one must write only about what is good. As everyone knows, we have many difficulties and shortcomings and the truthful criticism of them in works of art is useful and necessary; it helps the Soviet people to eliminate the shortcomings. Unfortunately, one also encounters those hacks in art who, instead of assistance to the people, choose as their specialty the blackening of our system and the slander of our heroic people. Of course, we have only a few such people. They do not to any extent reflect the feelings and mind of our creative intelligentsia who are linked inseparably with the people and with the party

After Brezhnev spoke, a number of speeches were given which were more hard-line than his. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, warned against relaxing ideological work, and stated that some "bearers of petty bourgeois licentiousness" under the pretence of struggling against the consequences of the cult of personality and others under the guise of advocating historical truth, run down the heroic history and struggle of party and people, and try to blacken Soviet reality and minimize the grandeur of our triumphs over fascism.

The series of neo-Stalinist reports was begun by Yegorychev, that stalwart supporter of the Soviet Union's heroic past, who started by reassuring those who had been frightened by the spectre of Stalinism:

The personality cult, the violation of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality--all that has hindered our movement forward--has been decisively rejected by our party, and there will never be a return to this past!

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He then proceeded, however, to attack once again those who write off the heroic history of the Soviet people, and to condemn insufficiently party-minded approaches to history and individuals. He closed by stating that the sensational instances when direct ideological saboteurs penetrate the ranks of the workers of art can be explained only by political carelessness. Yegorychev's attack seemed to include a large portion of the intelligentsia in its scope. The liberals had demonstrated their apprehension about this sort of approach in a January Noviy Mir article which criticized Stalin's statement at the 18th party congress that the main bulk of the intelligentsia had opposed the revolution, and therefore had to be broken and dispersed.

Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul, a Brezhnev man, called for stricter literary controls. He urged that a decisive rebuff be given to the falsifiers of history and to those who slander the Soviet people. He described the nature of freedom in the Soviet Union, stating that artists are free to create but

in the same degree the party and state organs enjoy the right of free choice of what to print In our opinion, the weak side of leadership of this sector of ideological work is insufficient party demandingness toward selection and publication of works of literature, art, and cinema.

Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop was more explicit and more harsh in his recommendation than Bodyul had been:

Each person is free to write and to speak everything which pleases him, without the slightest restrictions. But every free union (including the party) is also free to dismiss those members who use the party for preaching anti-party opinions.

Thus the threat had been raised of expulsion from party and creative unions; expulsion from the latter would mean the end of the right to publish. Other hard-line speeches

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were given on this occasion by Masherov, Mzhavanadze, Pelshe, and Rostov party chief, M. Solomentsev.

On the other side of the fence, the more moderate Podgorny stated that the party had done much to strengthen law and order and to eliminate harmful elements connected with the cult of personality. He said that economic and cultural issues present new questions, requiring legislation. In his speech Podgorny also appealed for greater democracy in the party. In general those leaders who support a moderate approach have been silent on the Stalin issue and related subjects such as cultural freedom. In this particular speech Podgorny dealt only briefly with the topic but his treatment was clearly moderate, as he implied that these issues should be dealt with through legislation--not administrative fiat.

At the congress Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Pelshe was added; formerly First Secretary of Latvia, Pelshe is reportedly close to Suslov. Pelshe also took over Shvernik's function as chairman of the party's Control Commission. These actions marked another setback for the moderates on the Politburo.* Kunayev, a Brezhnev follower, and the Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, an apparent Shelepin supporter and probably Mazurov's protege, became candidate members of the Politburo.

*Before the congress, in February, the moderates had suffered another setback when A. Kochinyan replaced Ya. Zarobyan as First Secretary in Armenia. A subsequent speech by Kochinyan revealed that Zarobyan had been demoted for opening party membership to the masses and recruiting technicians rather than political workers, as well as for poor ideological leadership. Zarobyan had come from Khar'kov Oblast', Podgorny's bailiwick, as had N. Sobol, dismissed in March from his position as Ukrainian Second Secretary. Both of these actions therefore represented a defeat for Podgorny, and the Armenian shake-up may also have marked a defeat for Mikoyan, an Armenian who probably had had considerable influence in personnel appointments in that republic over the years.

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In other personnel actions during this period, Shelepin's associate Khaldeyev was shifted from his position as RSFSR Agitprop Chief to become the new editor of Partiynaya Zhizn and G. Yenyutin, a long-time Brezhnev associate was named Chairman of the RSFSR People's Control Commissions. After the congress, there were a number of indications that Shelepin had been assigned responsibility for light industry matters, and from a meeting he attended the following September, it appeared that Demichev had assumed Shelepin's responsibility for supervising the Soviet security apparatus. From these actions it would appear that the moderates had received a further setback as had Shelepin, but Shelepin still had considerable strength judging from his ability to keep his supporters in high-level posts.

Post-Congress Orthodoxy

Following the congress a number of speeches given by party leaders indicated that the orthodox re-Stalinizing line continued to prevail. At a Leningrad Oblast' meeting early in April, Tolstikov delivered an only thinly veiled warning:

The congress devoted attention also to the negative phenomena in the development of literature and art. We also have been having cases of lowered demandingness toward the results of creative work here in Leningrad. Such lack of demandingness appears especially often in evaluating the creative work of the young writers and this has a negative effect on their creative growth. Our creative organs should think seriously about these facts.

And Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev, who had previously been quite moderate, gave a dogmatic speech in May at a congress of Kazakh writers. He called on writers to be in the forefront of the ideological struggle and to combat the challenge of bourgeois propaganda, and he affirmed party leadership of the arts. He did make several concessions to the

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moderate view, stating that writers could depict negative aspects of life--but from a Communist position--and that demands should not be made on writers to write on specific subjects.

Demichev, in his May election speech, condemned ideologically harmful works and linked them to foreign propaganda which seeks to subvert Soviet society. This line by now had become almost standard and is reminiscent of the Stalinist concept of a sharpening class struggle. There can be no dissent within the structure as envisioned; therefore, any dissonance must be attributed to an aggressive, alien ideology. In the logical continuum of this line, Demichev condemned bridge building between East and West. Subsequent extension of the line would lead to the charge that dissident writers were in fact agents of the West and should be tried for treasonous activity.

On 16 May Yepishev, head of the armed forces' political administration, gave a dogmatic speech at a conference on the indoctrination of youth. He reportedly called on writers to show the greatness of the times instead of questioning heroic legends. He praised the literature of the Stalin era, and said that Stalin's reasons for sending people to death or prison camps should be understood. He then criticized both Noviy Mir and Yunost' for publishing articles describing setbacks during the war and for paying tribute to abstract humanism and pacifism.

Differences within the leadership on the Stalin issue were reflected in the publication of contradictory articles by the two highest-ranking military figures in the Soviet Union in June 1966. Defense Minister Malinovskiy wrote an article in Izvestiya on 23 June in which he mentioned neither the purge of military leaders before the war nor mistakes on the part of Stalin. He attributed the initial defeats to the enormous size of the attacking forces which he said had been built up with the help of Western imperialists. He emphasized the pre-war buildup by the Soviet regime which, he said, saw the danger long before the war, and he praised the party for strengthening

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the moral-political unity of the country.*

In an article in the June issue of the Military Historical Journal Marshal Andrey Grechko, First Deputy Minister of Defense, bucked the prevailing line and returned to the historiography of the Khrushchev era. He criticized Stalin and charged ineptitude by "the highest military and political leadership" on the eve of the war. He accused the regime of underestimating the immediacy of the Nazi threats, and stated that Stalin and his closest advisors--men at the head of the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff (Timoshenko and Zhukov) "grossly miscalculated" the strategic situation. He further asserted that decisions on major defense problems were made by one man while responsible military leaders "often enough supported and encouraged these erroneous views." The use of this issue by Grechko may have demonstrated his dissatisfaction with what he considered the lack of consideration being given strategic military problems, and the willingness of some military men, for example Malinovskiy, to go along with it. Grechko was to change his emphasis on the Stalin issue considerably before being named Defense Minister the following year.

A Shift In Positions

A debate on the subject of collectivity of leadership versus individual responsibility was carried on in the press during the summer and fall of 1966. On 20 July a Pravda article by F. Petrenko reaffirmed the principle of collective leadership and warned against the imposition of individual power. On 8 August a Pravda editorial appeared to respond to this by citing the need both to strengthen party democracy and at the same time to develop a sense

*A Rude Pravo version of this article had apparently been tailored to take into account bloc sensitivities. In this version, Malinovskiy referred to a series of grave mistakes committed during the early stages of the war, asserted that the USSR had a very limited time in which to prepare, and cited shortages of planes, tanks, and artillery at the start of the war.

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of responsibility and discipline. The editorial quoted Lenin to the effect that "irresponsibility taking shelter under references to collectiveness of work, is a most dangerous evil."

An article by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev in Partiynaya Zhizn' on 1 October supported the Pravda editorial. Kunayev stressed the primacy of individual leadership, and he too used the Lenin quotation. However, Georgian Second Secretary P. Rodionov, in a Voprosy Istorii KPSS article reasserted Petrenko's view and emphasized that individual leaders must subordinate themselves to the collective. In this debate the neo-Stalinists, represented by Petrenko and Rodionov, demonstrated their fear that Brezhnev was acquiring too much power. They resorted to the same argument used previously by the moderates--that there are dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule and that the collectivity of leadership must be preserved. The neo-Stalinists were answered by the Brezhnev forces in the Pravda editorial and Kunayev's article. The argument used by them was that while collectivity is fine, it must not be used to cover up irresponsibility, and that there must be individual responsibility and discipline.

In August and September Izvestiya published two articles which strongly attacked Stalin and the personality cult. The first article stated that Stalin had departed from the norms of party life and had destroyed collectivity of leadership. The second was even stronger in its denunciation of Stalin; it accused him of overestimating his own services and crudely violating collectivity. It charged that his thesis that the class struggle was growing more and more aggravated had led to crude violations of socialist legality. These articles seem to have come from the moderate side as they condemn the Stalinist theory of intensifying class struggle, a term which was being resurrected by the neo-Stalinists. The Izvestiya articles do, however, agree with the neo-Stalinist defenses of collective leadership mentioned above, and for good reason. The moderates had been on the defensive for a long time and they, too, feared Brezhnev's increasing strength. Thus, the neo-Stalinists and the liberals had a common interest in stopping Brezhnev.

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An indication that Shelepin's faction had cause to be concerned about the strength of its position was the identification of Shelepin in August as secretary in charge of consumer goods, a real come-down for him. In September Shelepin lost another foothold in the security forces. A new Ministry for the Protection of Public Order was established with N. Shchelokov, a long-time Brezhnev associate, appointed to head it. The logical appointee had been V. Tikunov, a Shelepin associate, who had been serving as chief of the RSFSR militia. On the eve of the August plenum of the central committee there were a number of reports that there would be numerous personnel changes--particularly that Kosygin would be fired. This did not occur.

In November Brezhnev indicated his support for a general rehabilitation of Stalin; in a speech in Tbilisi, he again mentioned Stalin's name, this time including him among a group of "ardent revolutionaries" who had led the struggle for the revolution in Georgia. Thus, while the neo-Stalinists were siding with the moderates on the question of collective leadership, Brezhnev took the Stalin issue an additional step. By further restoring Stalin he could also restore the concept of one-man rule to respectability and thereby legitimize his own drive for increased power.

INTELLECTUALS

Pre-Congress Clamp-Down

The general shift to an increasingly hard-line policy was reflected in a clamp-down on the intellectuals in the first few months of 1966. In addition to the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and their sentencing to five and seven years at hard labor respectively for the publication of "anti-Soviet" works in the West, there were a number of other arrests and trials. In early January, diplomatic sources reported that a Soviet student had been sentenced to seven years in prison as the alleged leader of

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approximately 250 Leningrad students who had secretly published the magazine Kolokol (The Bell), the magazine of "free thought." Eight others reportedly received sentences ranging from two to five years. The group reportedly claimed that it was not anti-Communist, but was opposed to Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, and was against what they considered the remnants of Stalinism. Once again Leningrad was acting as the leader in implementing a hard-line policy. In February the young poet Vladimir Batshev was sentenced to five years exile in Siberia. Accused of being a parasite, he was condemned for participation in the 5 December demonstration protesting the arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and for carrying on literary activities without being a member of the Union of Writers. Also in February the writer Valeriy Tarsis was deprived of his Soviet citizenship while traveling abroad.

The Soviet intellectuals reacted to the increasing pressure with fear and courage. Just before the 23rd congress convened on 29 March, 60 members of the USSR Union of Writers sent a letter to the presidiums of the congress, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.* They asked permission to stand surety for Daniel and Sinyavskiy. While criticizing the publication of works abroad without authorization, the signers stated that the trial of the two writers had set a dangerous precedent and threatened the progress of Soviet culture. They called for more freedom, not its condemnation.

Also on the eve of the congress, a group of 25 intellectuals sent a signed letter to Brezhnev, arguing against any rehabilitation of Stalin at the congress.** They mentioned tendencies in speeches and articles directed at such a rehabilitation and stated that this caused them deep apprehension. They said they had seen nothing which would warrant thinking the original condemnation of the personality cult was wrong; on the contrary, they maintained

*See Appendix Item B.

**See Appendix Item A.

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that many of the most horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes had not yet been made public. They said that there were many dangers involved in any rehabilitation of Stalin, including serious dissensions in Soviet society.

. . . Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

The letter went on to describe another danger--that a rehabilitation would pose a threat of a new split in the world communist movement--between the Soviet Union and the Communists in the West who would see this as a surrender to the Chinese. The letter closed by saying that such a decision by the Central Committee could not be regarded as routine--that it would have historic importance for the destiny of the country.

In its March editorial Noviy Mir again defended truth in literature and used Pravda's 26 February article on the coming 23rd Congress to support its position. It said that Pravda, which had in fact given limited attention to the 20th Congress, had praised that congress for overcoming the personality cult and for restoring Leninist norms of party and state life, the observance of collectivity

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of leadership and intra-party democracy. Noviy Mir asserted, optimistically, that the party was constantly strengthening these things and was doing everything to avoid a repetition of the violations of legality connected with the cult. In obvious disfavor, Noviy Mir's editor-in-chief, Tvardovskiy was the only candidate or full member of the central committee not elected a delegate to the congress.

The Congress and After

As noted above, the 23rd Congress did not formally rehabilitate Stalin and, in fact, skirted the issue almost entirely. However, most of the speeches which dealt with culture were hard-line. This was true not only of the leaders who spoke, but also of those members of the intelligentsia itself who spoke. Mikhail Sholokhov gave one of the most vicious speeches of all, stating that if Daniel and Sinyavskiy had been caught in the 1920's they would have received harsher judgment and that if anything the sentences they received were too mild. One exception to the general trend was a speech given by USSR Cultural Minister Yekaterina Furtseva. While admitting that there were shortcomings in the arts, she named no names and called for friendly guidance. She said that the October 1964 plenum had gotten rid of the last vestiges of administrativeness in the arts and that in the new atmosphere intellectuals could work calmly and assuredly.

The sycophants and hacks immediately picked up the basically tough line projected at the congress. Both Pravda, in an article by Literaturnaya Gazeta editor Chakovskiy, and Literaturnaya Rossiya, in an editorial, attacked foreign propagandists for trying to frighten the creative intelligentsia with the "spectre of Stalinism." According to the latter paper

Our ideological opponents are trying again to put an equal sign between the basic principles of Soviet literature of socialist realism and its party spirit and closeness to the people, and the shortcomings connected with the cult of personality

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The editorial also described as slanderous, claims that Sholokhov's views on Daniel and Sinyavskiy were not shared by other writers.

In April the literary journal Yunost' (Youth) published a very self-critical editorial. According to one report the Komsomol was trying to take over the journal and the editorial represented the attempt to forestall this. Yunost' had been sharply criticized at the congress. The editorial recited conservative views on such topics as positive heroes and the ideological content of writing, but closed with a defiant statement:

Nobody and nothing hinders or can hinder all the young and truly talented in the Soviet Union from growing and developing. It is not for nothing that the young in Soviet literature blossomed particularly well in recent years.

Thus the editorial closed by implying that there had been an upsurge in Soviet literature during the Khrushchev years and that the writers were aware of this and would not tolerate repressive measures aimed at cutting off this growth.

In April, at a plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers Union, a secretary of the union, M. Alekseyev, defended the literature of the Stalin years and condemned the "devastating term 'cult literature.'" He stated that some people had gone too far in condemning the cult:

. . . Because of certain reasons, a good little bit of confusion was brought into the understanding of history and the present day during the last 10-12 years. The word 'great' related not to the whole history of the Soviet state but only to the decade which began approximately in 1953. It was suggested that this period should define the concept of the present day while events which happened earlier were not history. . . . Since in a certain part of this history there developed an ugly phenomenon, which was unnatural for our society and which at the 20th Party Congress was named the 'cult of personality', our ideological opponents did not fail to use this to blacken our revolution

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and to cast aspersions on Soviet real life as a whole. As regards Soviet literature, despite the obvious facts which we cited above, it was simply declared non-existent.

Alekseyev praised several of Konstantin Simonov's war novels, but stated that he could not accept everything in them, specifically the idea that some heroes operated during the war with doubts which they could not possibly have had until after the 20th Party Congress. In other words Alekseyev was claiming that nobody knew of Stalin's crimes until they were revealed by Khrushchev in 1956.

Various articles published in the spring demonstrated the prevalence of a conservative trend. For example, in its lead editorial in May, Voprosy Istorii KPSS criticized false portrayals of the cult period, and cited the influence of subjectivism and voluntaristic mistakes. It said that there were still instances where "under the guise of criticism of the cult of personality, the work of our party and people in the construction of socialism was belittled." On 7 May a Pravda article conceded that the period of the cult of personality had been linked with serious perversions and mistakes in the work of state security, but claimed that this did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.

Pressure also continued to be exerted on the intellectuals. In May the writer Igor Galamchok was given a suspended sentence for having refused to testify at the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial. In July 1965, 40 Ukrainian intellectuals had reportedly been arrested for nationalistic activities. Open trials for some of these were held in January and February 1966, but because of protest demonstrations open trials were discontinued. In April a closed trial was held, but three intellectuals managed to attend. Two of them, Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Drach, later started a campaign to obtain signatures for a petition, pleading for the release of those tried. This was the beginning of a series of arrests and trials in the Ukraine which would increase in number and intensity in the next few years.

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A Frightened Response

Clearly frightened by the prevailing trend, and possibly encouraged by what they may have considered to be the success of their previous letter pleading that Stalin not be rehabilitated, liberal intellectuals continued to protest. Lidiya Chukovskaya addressed a letter to Mikhail Sholokhov, which was subsequently smuggled to the West, condemning him for his congress speech. A number of other letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial were also written during this period and smuggled out. In one of these, written by A. Yakobson, the statement appears that the works of the two men were not anti-Soviet, but were "against Stalinism, its survivals and all attempts to revive it in our society."

Several articles appeared during the summer which revealed continued intransigence on the part of even published writers. In the Armenian paper Kommunist, Bagish Ovsepyan wrote an article in which he reported glowingly on the 23rd congress, saying it had guaranteed once again that there would be no return to lawlessness and that it was a worthy successor to the 20th and 22nd congresses. His description bore little resemblance to the real thing. In an Izvestiya article on 21 July, Konstantin Simonov stated that it was worth repeating that had it not been for the purges, the USSR would have faced Hitler with many more commanders. On 22 July Literaturnaya Rossiya carried another Simonov article which contained implicit criticism of Zhdanov. On 30 July Tvardovskiy wrote a letter to Literaturnaya Gazeta in which he rejected criticism of the staging of his play "Terkin in the Other World" at the Satire Theater which had been closed at the end of June. The editors of the paper accompanied Tvardovskiy's letter with the statement that his evaluation was one-sided. The play was performed once more--in mid-August, but thereafter disappeared from the theater's repertoire.

In August Noviy Mir published an article which was to cause considerable controversy in the months ahead. The article was by V. Lakshin, an editor of the journal, and

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was entitled, "Writer, Reader, Critic." In it Lakshin praised works by Solzhenitsyn and Semin which had previously been criticized, and again presented Noviy Mir's case for truth in literature. This article was subsequently attacked by both Literaturnaya Gazeta and Literaturnaya Rossiya; both Lakshin and the journal itself were criticized. This was the start of an intense campaign against Noviy Mir which would continue into the following year.

STALIN THEMES

Re-Stalinizing Is Pushed

The prevalence of an orthodox line during and after the December 1965 plenum was reflected in the appearance in early 1966 of numerous articles glossing over Stalin's errors and crimes. The focus of attention had shifted, however, from Stalin's wartime role to more general policies and achievements of the Stalin years, with the policy of collectivization receiving the most attention. This indicated that Trapeznikov's October 1965 instructions were being followed.

Sel'skaya Zhizn', in a 29 December 1965 article attacked those who assert that conditions were not right for collectivization in the 1930's and who concentrate on the negative features of collectivization, ignoring all that was progressive. The article admitted that errors had been committed early in the process of collectivization, but minimized their seriousness; it spread the responsibility among local, oblast, and central organs, and failed to criticize Stalin at all. In fact, the article praised as "courageous fighters for the triumph of Lenin's cause" those who stood "at the source of the construction of the kolkhozes;" this can certainly be read as indirect praise of Stalin.

This theme was further advanced by F. Vaganov in a February Kommunist article, and by S. Kaplan in Pravda

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Ukrainy on 14 February. Kaplan even used a Stalinist argument to explain early difficulties in collectivization. He said that the policy had been accompanied by a sharpening of the class struggle in a country encircled by capitalist states. He did mildly criticize Stalin's "inclination" to be hasty and "overly decreatory" but clearly minimized the importance of this factor.

Evidence that the January article in Pravda, in which the three historians urged that the term "period of the personality cult" be renounced, was being taken seriously can be seen in two articles which appeared in early 1966. In late February Sel'skaya Zhizn stated that criticism of collectivization could not be justified by references to the subjectivist term "period of the personality cult." Similarly, a 12 March Pravda Ukrainy article criticized the use of this term, stating that its use had led to the detraction of Soviet achievements.

Another indication of the prevalence of a conservative line was the halt in the rehabilitation program. From January through April Voprosy Istorii KPSS again suspended its rehabilitations and on the eve of the congress the section of the journal which had included such articles was eliminated. In December the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported a trend in Soviet writing to concede that the Stalin cult had been regrettable, but had been an aberration unrelated to the system's basic structure. The embassy cited several poems emphasizing the need to stress the positive, including one stating that youths who have heard about special camps, the Kirov murder, and so forth, should balance such a "momentary bit of offal" against the stride of the century.

A somewhat ominous indicator of the trend was Oktyabr's publication in March of an article referring to Boris Kedrov as a son and brother of "enemies of the people." Kedrov's father had been one of the first rehabilitations after Stalin's death, and Stalin's term "enemies of the people" had been specifically condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

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Exceptions to Rule; Nekrich Book Debate

There were exceptions to the generally hard-line emphasis in early 1966, but for the most part these came from the most intransigent and liberal journals. Noviy Mir, for example, continued to publish anti-Stalinist items. In January it carried a review of A. Nekrich's book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and by now was very controversial. The book had been highly critical of Stalin for his handling of the prewar situation, and the review also charged Stalin with grave errors, and stated that those who arrested and persecuted Marshal Tukhachevskiy and his comrades must have known that they were innocent.

In February 1966 a meeting was held to discuss the Nekrich book and to determine the propriety of the book's condemnation of Stalin.* Participants in the conference included people from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, the foreign ministry and the armed forces. G. Deborin, later identified as head of the editorial board at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, opened the meeting by criticizing the book for what he considered a number of incorrect evaluations and facts. He argued that Soviet unpreparedness at the start of the war was not primarily due to Stalin's stubbornness, but was the result of various factors including misinformation. He attacked Nekrich's implication that Stalin, Voroshilov, Budenny, Blyukher, and others had known of the innocence of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, but had condemned them nonetheless. Throughout this talk, there were numerous shouts from the floor, and when Deborin attempted to pay tribute to the honor and conscience of Budenny and Voroshilov, he was shouted off the rostrum.

A number of people then spoke and disputed Deborin's statements, putting the blame for military unpreparedness

*This account is based

A similar transcript was published by Posev.

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on Stalin:

Stalin bears the main responsibility for the tragedy. He created the situation in the country. Stalin's biggest crime was usurpation of power and destruction of our best military and Party cadres Now there are still people who say that Stalin must not be spoken of badly. They say he was not alone Stalin assumed the boldness of independently leading the country and his guilt is tremendous. It is necessary to speak of this so that it not be repeated.

This speaker then went on to discuss the trial of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, stating that the "fraud was prepared by the Gestapo, but the idea came from Stalin."

Another speaker provided an example of the kind of statement probably most feared by the hierarchy; he criticized those around Stalin, who had not stopped him.

Each is guilty, but the degree of guilt varies. One is guilty in that he decided not to say what he was thinking. The further and the higher, the greater the responsibility. At each level rejection of truth for the sake of personal well-being is a crime, and the higher the level, the more serious the crime. The main culprit is Stalin.

At the end of this meeting there was an exchange between Deborin and a man named Snegov, who said that Stalin should have been shot, not exonerated. Snegov charged that Stalin had helped Hitler in every way, especially in the invasion of Poland, because he had shot all the Polish Communists in the Soviet Union and had declared the Polish Communist Party illegal; he then stated that Stalin had betrayed all communists in all countries. At that point Deborin accused Snegov of saying things that "come from a

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camp hostile to us," and he asked Snegov to what camp he belonged. Snegov's reply was, "I am from Kolyma."* Snegov closed by stating that

you can't frighten us with camps.
We will not be intimidated. The time
is different, and the past will not
return

Snegov's optimism was not supported by subsequent events. In July 1967, Nekrich, the author of the book under discussion, was to be expelled from the party as an example to those who do not conform with the party line.

There were several other instances of intransigence on the part of the liberals in early 1966. In February Noviy Mir carried an article by V. Kardin which was to have repercussions for months to come. Kardin stated that since the 20th congress there had been a strong desire to "drink from the river named fact," but that historians and memoirrealists faced numerous obstacles--including the opposition of those who disagree with the restoration of historical truth. The other major liberal journal Yunost', in January, published for the first time in the Soviet Union, the text of a letter of Lenin's which was written in March 1923 and in which he upbraided Stalin for the latter's rude treatment of Nadezhda Krupskaya, and demanded either an apology from Stalin or the "severance of relations between us." The existence and contents of this letter as well as the quarrel itself had been described in an article in Pravda in 1964, but the text itself had never been published before.

There were several other anti-Stalinist articles before the congress. In March, for example, Voprosy Istorii KPSS published an article by A. Solov'yev which was very critical of Stalin's 1922 position on the nationalities issue (which had amounted to forced incorporation). Solov'yev stated that this concept had "conflicted with the ideas of equality and independence of fraternal Soviet republics."

*One of the forced labor camps under Stalin.

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He described Lenin's opposition to this proposal, and stated that Lenin had favored strengthening both the union of republics and the sovereignty of each republic, and had warned of the dangers of extreme centralism.

Post-Congress: Pro-Stalin Line Dominates

The conservative impression given by the congress was picked up and reinforced in various articles and speeches in the spring of 1966. At the Writers Union Congress in April, union secretary Alekseyev scoffed at those who refer to the battle of Stalingrad as the battle of Volgograd, stating that there was no such battle. Similarly, he scoffed at those who try to ignore the fact that Stalin was the supreme commander during the whole war. And Kalashnik, deputy to Yepishev at the armed forces political administration, criticized those who sometimes place the blame for the failures and difficulties at the start of the war on one figure--Stalin. While he admitted that the lawlessness and some errors played a certain negative role, he emphasized other factors such as the military and economic superiority of fascism which at that time had the benefit of the resources of almost the entire continent, and the fact that many Soviet troops had to be maintained in the East in case Japan entered the war.

On 9 May an article by Deborin, who had participated in the attack on Nekrich's book in February, appeared in Pravda. In this review of a history of Soviet foreign policy from 1917-1945, Deborin stated that despite the desire of the Soviet Union to conclude a collective security pact with Britain and France in 1939, the Soviet Union "was forced to accept the German proposal for signing a non-aggression pact." He blamed this situation on the British and Americans who, he said, preferred to make a deal with the fascists.

In addition to articles glossing over wartime difficulties, articles restoring Stalin's image in other areas also appeared. In May Oktyabr' attacked Zalygin's Na Irtyshe for portraying collectivization one-sidedly and for exaggerating the influence of the cult of personality on this

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great historical event. In June Izvestiya included Stalin on a list of those who played a major role in speeding up industrialization. In July an article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' presented a favorable picture of Stalin at the Potsdam negotiations in July 1945.

In July Oktyabr' carried several very hard-line articles. In one of these Stokov, in typical fashion, launched an attack on that great Khrushchevian sin--subjectivism--and described how that insidious quality manifests itself:

. . . . Subjectivism may appear in the modernization of history and then a man, let us say from the 1940's, begins to think like a 'prophet', anticipating the party in condemning the cult of personality Subjectivism can incidentally 'reappraise' crucial historical events--and then it turns out that kolkhoz construction from the very beginning even to this day was a 'fatal mistake.' Yielding to the widespread fashion--to portray mainly our failures in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War--subjectivism will dismally concentrate on the 'horrors' of our 'defeats,' even when a gladiose attack by the Soviet armies is under way, and ardently will expose the commanders as 'fools' and the sinister 'osobisty' (KGB).

In the same issue, A. Dymshits attacked the concept of abstract humanism,* stating that it is impossible to approach in terms of abstract humanism such policies as war communism and collectivization, because it must not be forgotten that despite hard times progress was always being made.

*Also a favorite target of the Chinese.

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On 21 July Kazakhstanskaya Pravda attempted to shift blame for the excesses in collectivization to local officials, stating that the central committee had cautioned local organization against artificially forcing the rate of collectivization. This article, coming from the republic headed by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev suggested that he probably sanctioned this approach and, therefore, felt that Brezhnev approved. A 17 August Pravda article also criticized those who argue that collectivization had to be imposed from above. It said that while the party did not wait for the development of a material-technical base, this base had been developed simultaneously.

Liberals Fight Back

Coincident with a brief upsurge in other areas of the cultural community, probably a combination of fear at the prevailing hard-line and relief because Stalin had not been formally rehabilitated, a number of anti-Stalin articles were published in the spring and summer of 1966. First of all there was a sharp upsurge in the rehabilitation program in May. Most interesting were two articles in Izvestiya, which had not carried rehabilitation articles since May 1965.* One article stated that the historian V. Nevskiy was arrested in February 1935 on false charges and two years later was dead; the other was about the Uzbek leader, F. Khodzhayev** and mentioned only his "tragic" death in 1938. Other articles appeared in Literaturnaya Rossiya and Kommunist Estonii on purge victims, and the Military History Journal carried an article which stated that the personality cult had harmed strategic theory because of the unjust reprisals against many who were best trained in military theory, including Tukhachevskiy.

*Pravda had halted its rehabilitation articles after Romyantsev was replaced in September 1965.

**Khodzhayev was executed in 1938 after his confession at the last of the big show trials. Only two other people who were involved in any of the three big trials, A. Ikramov and N. Krestinskiy, have been rehabilitated.

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For the first time since December 1965 Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried items on purge victims, although it now used a very conservative format. It mentioned Nevskiy and Kirov, but mentioned neither the purge of the former nor the assassination of the latter. Furthermore, the May issue carried an article which indirectly provided justification for the purges, by stating that the struggle with the "enemies of Leninism" had been instrumental in preventing differences within the party during the war. The article also criticized subjective errors which led to the deprecation of the party and people under the guise of criticizing the cult of personality.

After May the rehabilitations again dropped off, although the provincial press continued to be stubborn.* Those articles which did appear carefully skirted any mention of the purges. For example, an article noting the death of R. Katanyan and signed by Anastas Mikoyan gave Katanyan's career until 1938 with no further elaboration. On 24 August Izvestiya discussed the events of 1935 and 1936, and mentioned Stalin only once--when he was held responsible for "violations of socialist legality" which did not alter the nature of the system. On 21 July Izvestiya had carried an article by Konstantin Simonov in which he cited the grave harm done the military by the purges. Throughout this period Izvestiya was consistently more moderate on the Stalin and cultural issues than was Pravda, perhaps a reflection of the government-party rivalry--i.e., Kosygin's relative moderation compared to Brezhnev's orthodox views.

*Bakinskiy Rabochiy on 7 June carried an article on a former First Secretary of Azerbaydzhan, stating that his life was "tragically cut short" in 1938. A 14 July article in Kommunist Tadzhikistan carried the same wording on Rakhinbayev. In August Kommunist Armenia published an article on Marshal Gay, calling him one of the outstanding Armenian officers "ruined by slander during the years of the personality cult." The same issue published an item on the poet Vartanyan, closing with

. . . in 1937 the storm cloud, which was hanging over many persons also touched even the Communist poet Azasi Vartanyan.

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In July 1966 the Outline History of the Moscow Party Organization was signed to the press. While the history placed the blame for excesses in collectivization on local officials and praised Stalin's 1930 article "Dizzy With Success" for having stressed the impermissibility of using force to carry out collectivization it came down surprisingly hard on the crimes of Stalin. It criticized the

crude violations of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality, the willfulness and misuse of power, and the mass repressions against completely innocent Soviet people, engendered by the cult of Stalin's personality.

According to the history, Stalin deserved authority, but after the 17th congress he had begun to violate Leninist norms, and at the February-March 1937 plenum advanced the mistaken thesis that as socialism strengthens the class struggle intensifies:

This was said at a time when the exploiting classes were already liquidated This assertion served as a theoretical basis for illegal repressions against honest Soviet people. Enormous harm was caused to the party and the whole people by the political adventurists Yezhov and Beria, who subjected many honest officials to unjustified repressions.

This particular history also treated Khrushchev fairly kindly, quoting from a 1963 speech by him in which he stated that there would have been even worse repressions if everyone had agreed--implying that he and others had stood up to Stalin. The history stated that in general party organs were improved in Moscow after a December 1949 plenum; it was at that plenum that Khrushchev became first secretary of the oblast. It is not at all clear who was responsible for the publication of this history. Moscow city and oblast' leaders Yegorychev and Konotop were at this time pushing a much harder line than that suggested in the history. For example, while presenting a "balanced"

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view in some respects, the history cited shortcomings in the party in the 1940's, stating that there was not the proper struggle against dogmatism.

Noviy Mir continued to resist the re-Stalinizing pressure, as did several other journals. In August, for example, Noviy Mir published an article criticizing the 1938 decision of Stalin and Vyshinskiy to declare subsidiary activities of kolhkozoes illegal. This particular issue is still very much alive in the Soviet Union now, with the pragmatists supporting such activities. Several articles critical of Stalin's handling of collectivization were published in the spring and summer. The Ukrainian Historical Journal published two on the subject, one in April and one in July. The articles denied that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" had ended excesses in the countryside, attributing this instead to the work of Ukrainian party organizations. One of the articles stated that excessive haste and violations of the principle of voluntariness were among the biggest errors in the beginning of collectivization.

Revolt Of The Old Bolsheviks

In the summer of 1966 a meeting was held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which covered the period from March 1917-March 1918. The meeting was chaired by Pospelov, chairman of the institute and chief editor of the volume, and was attended by a group of Old Bolsheviks. Pospelov, in opening the meeting, described the difficulties in compiling the volume, stating that it had been necessary to overcome the "subjective layers which had been written in the previous ten years."

Following Pospelov's remarks a number of Old Bolsheviks rose to criticize the history and denounce Stalin. Several speakers attacked the praise given Stalin's official history, The Short Course, in the volume. One speaker claimed that he had spoken with Brezhnev protege Trapeznikov, head of the scientific and educational institution about this in April 1966, and that Trapeznikov had

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said he did not agree with the editorial board on this and that he would give corresponding instructions. The speaker stated that he would like to know why this had not been done.

Several speakers then rose to challenge Stalin's performance as a revolutionary. Numerous specific charges were made, including the statement that Stalin had been no better than Trotskiy. One speaker stated that Stalin and Voroshilov had wiped out many loyal military specialists, and another said that Stalin had fabricated charges against Lenin's closest workers. A man named Snegov, possibly the same man who had participated in the debate on the Nekrich book,* launched perhaps the strongest attack:

It is said that one man cannot change as much as an entire army. Stalin proved that more could be destroyed by one man than by a whole army. He destroyed millions of people Affectionate mothers are defending the child Stalin is every way possible The thing boils down to the fact that some counted on having the 23rd Congress rehabilitate Stalin. That didn't happen and it won't happen! The 23rd Congress confirmed once again the lines of the 20th and 22nd Congresses. There is no return to the times of Stalin.

An old Bolshevik named Zorin attacked the methods of the meeting, charging that the previous day some young historians had not been permitted in the room. He charged that documents were hidden, and said that it must be revealed how Leninist norms had been perverted by Stalin:

Your conception is the conception of the Chinese leaders. You stand together with the bourgeois falsifiers. The history of the Party must not justify the perversions. You wrote that Trotskiy tried to replace Leninism with Trotskiyism, but you remain quiet about Stalin's having replaced Leninism with Stalinism. Now will the young people believe you; can they believe lies?

*See page 58 for further discussion.

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At the end of the meeting there were various comments from those who had helped frame the history. Bugayev, the head of the commission, said that in writing the history it was necessary to be guided by the decisions of the central committee on 30 June 1956. At this there were shouts that the 22nd Congress had declared Stalin a criminal and that this congress had not been abrogated. When Pospelov spoke and tried to maintain that Stalin's role had been mostly positive during this period, he was interrupted by shouts that he stop falsifying history.* Publication of this volume of the history was very slow; it finally appeared in October 1967 and its publication was accompanied by a Pravda article, whose re-Stalinizing tone indicated that the efforts of the Old Bolsheviks had failed.

Leadership Shift Reflected in Stalin Issue

In September and October, Pravda Ukrainy, which for several years had published neo-Stalinist articles, carried a two-part article by G. Kikalov which evaluated the Stalin cult more critically than it had in the past. While he made the usual calls for emphasis on positive achievements and ignored the question of excesses in collectivization and the purges, Kikalov said that sometimes "arbitrary administrativeness was condoned," principles of free exchange of opinion were violated, and objective truth suffered as a result. He said that while it was only natural that people respected Stalin, who had properly fought the Trotskiyites and rightists, Stalin had begun to manifest some negative traits; he began to think of himself as infallible, made theoretical errors, and ignored collective leadership. It would appear that publication of this article in this neo-Stalinist journal was part of the campaign being started at this time by the Shelepin

*The original account of this meeting was carried in the underground journal Feniks 66, whose publisher Yuriy Galanskov was sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp in January 1968. The shortened version of the meeting was carried in the April issue of Survey, a London-based quarterly journal of Soviet and East European studies.

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faction. Their target was Brezhnev, who they feared was gaining too much strength and their weapon was the Stalin issue--pointing out the consequences that can flow from the concentration of power in the hands of one man. In general, neo-Stalinist attacks on Stalin concentrate on the abuses of collective leadership through the accumulation of power in the hands of a single man, whereas moderate anti-Stalin attacks include charges of repression and criticism of the purges.

On 1 November Brezhnev made his adoption of the re-Stalinizing policy complete when he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary. This line was echoed rapidly by various publications. On 6 November an Izvestiya chronicle of Lenin's activities in November 1917 listed Stalin among those consulted by Lenin during the critical days of armed uprising in Moscow. The November issue of Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta credited Stalin as well as Lenin with authoring the regime's November 1917 declaration of the rights of nationalities. And Komsomolskaya Pravda on 6 November, published excerpts from Theodore Dreiser's 1928 book Dreiser Looks at Russia, in which he treated Stalin as a dedicated national leader and as a revolutionary figure concerned with the fate of humanity and the individual.

SUMMARY

Indications that a further step toward the neo-Stalinist position had been taken at the December 1965 plenum were substantiated in early 1966. A January Pravda article instructed historians to stop referring to the term period of the cult of personality and to take a positive view of the Stalin era. A similar article appeared shortly thereafter in a Moldavian paper, instructing propagandists of the correct view to take on the cult. The trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in February, as well as the arrests of several other young intellectuals, indicated the start of an actively repressive policy toward dissident intellectuals.

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The decision to proceed with the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and to impose harsh sentences must have been made by the Presidium, as the implications of this decision were important enough to warrant high-level consideration. Of the twelve members of the Presidium, at least seven must have supported the measure. Kosygin reportedly opposed it, Mikoyan presumably opposed it, and Podgorny, in this subsequent statement at the congress that cultural matters should be dealt with through legislation, indicated that he would have opposed it. Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Shelest almost certainly supported the decision. Brezhnev must therefore have given his support and have taken with him the votes of at least two of the following--Kirilenko, Polyanskiy, Voronov, and Shvernik.

In the months before the congress there were numerous reports that Stalin would be rehabilitated, as well as various indications that this might well be true. At several pre-congress regional party meetings, high-level spokesmen indicated their support of a hard-line. Among those who expressed neo-Stalinist viewpoints were Masherov of Belorussia, Shelest of the Ukraine, and the First Secretary of Moldavia, Bodgul, who at one time may have served under Brezhnev in Moldavia. Leningrad chief Tolstikov urged that party influence on the creative intellectuals be strengthened. The most strident tones came from Georgia, where party secretary Sturua used the term cosmopolitanism, which under Stalin had been an anti-Semitic charge used to justify repression of the intellectuals; Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze also gave a hard-line speech.

In addition, many articles which were written during this period, particularly on the subject of collective collectivization, reflected a coordinated policy of rehabilitating Stalin and his policies. Particularly ominous were the Stalinist terms which were resurrected. In addition to Sturua's use of the term cosmopolitanism, a February article on collectivization referred favorably to Stalin's long-discredited theory of the sharpening

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of the class struggle in the 1930's. And in February, the neo-Stalinist journal Oktyabr' referred to two rehabilitated purge victims as enemies of the people. This term had been condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

When it opened in late March 1966, the 23rd Congress proved to be somewhat anticlimactic. Stalin was not rehabilitated and the only remaining vestige of a rehabilitation plan was the symbolic restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary. It seems likely that the decision not to proceed with public and formal rehabilitation was based on the violent reactions to the proposal, both at home and abroad. Various communist parties had indicated disagreement and the rumors had brought a frightened response from Soviet intellectuals, a group of whom bravely sent a letter of protest to Brezhnev urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.

Brezhnev emerged from the 23rd congress as clearly the first among equals; his acquisition of the title General Secretary had clearly strengthened his position. Although this was primarily a symbolic victory, it nonetheless served to set him apart from his colleagues and establish him as Stalin's legitimate heir. The fact that Brezhnev was the beneficiary of the policy of re-Stalinizing supports the view that he had supported the policy. However, a number of speakers at the congress, including Yegorychev and Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop, gave much tougher speeches than that given by Brezhnev. Thus it would seem that in spite of Brezhnev's support of much of the neo-Stalinist position, pressure for even more repressive measures was being exerted by members of the neo-Stalinist faction.

Personnel changes made at the congress indicated that the moderates were continuing to lose ground. Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Suslov associate Pelshe, the First Secretary of Latvia, was added. In addition Brezhnev-protége Kunayev, the First Secretary of Kazakhstan, and neo-Stalinist Masherov,

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the First Secretary of Belorussia, became candidate members of the Politburo. However, Shelepin was apparently assigned responsibility for light industry at the congress--a clear set-back for him also. Thus, the net gainer was Brezhnev.

In the months immediately after the congress, a conservative line prevailed, but the more extreme neo-Stalinist statements virtually ceased. Furthermore, while the intellectuals continued to write letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trials and the generally orthodox line, they must have felt a certain amount of relief at the failure of the congress to rehabilitate Stalin. In addition, they might have felt that the ~~ret~~ retreat by the leadership on this issue had been brought about by their protests, a belief which might have encouraged them to draft further protests. Thus, still frightened by the prevailing conservative line, but hopeful that things might change, the liberals apparently decided to press ahead. In May there was a resurgence of rehabilitations and during the spring and summer a number of articles were published criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization.

This liberal push was soon halted, however; the rehabilitations ended by summer and articles critical of Stalin were quickly outnumbered by articles exonerating him. As the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow approached, Stalin's military image was further improved, and prewar miscalculations and errors were increasingly rationalized. One exception to this was a June article by Marshal Grechko, reportedly a Brezhnev man, in which he attacked Stalin and charged the prewar leadership, both political and military, with ineptitude. The purpose of this article may have been to stress the need for more emphasis on contemporary military defenses; he may well have been annoyed by the adoption at the May plenum of an enormous agricultural program. Grechko's point may have been that the military should not be slighted and his method was to show the disastrous

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results of ignoring military needs.

Friction in the leadership continued throughout the summer. This was most interestingly demonstrated in a debate which took place in the press during the summer and fall. Several articles were written by neo-Stalinists, stressing the importance of collective leadership and warning against the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule. An article in the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy criticized Stalin's tendency to think of himself as infallible and to ignore collective leadership. These articles revealed the concern felt by the Shelepin faction over their leader's decline and Brezhnev's growing strength.

The apprehension of the neo-Stalinists was shared by the liberals who also had a vested interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring further power. During the summer two articles in Izvestiya also defended collective leadership strongly. Izvestiya, the government paper, had been consistently moderate during the period, possibly reflecting Kosygin's views. These articles defending collective leadership, which used the Stalin issue, suggested that Kosygin and the moderates were also very uneasy about Brezhnev's growing strength.

These attacks by both moderates and neo-Stalinists on Brezhnev's position, were answered fairly quickly. A Pravda editorial and an article by Brezhnev protege Kunayev both emphasized the need for responsibility and discipline, and quoted Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be allowed to hide under references to collectivity; Kunayev also stressed the primacy of individual leadership. Furthermore, on 1 November, Brezhnev pushed even further the issue of Stalin. By referring to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary", he reinforced his own claim to be Stalin's heir and by implication defended the concept of one-man rule.

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DECEMBER 1965

APRIL 1966

CPSU PRESIDIU

CPSU POLITBURO

Full Members

Full Members

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
MIKOYAN¹
PODGORNY
POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SHVERNIK¹
SUSLOV
VORONOV

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
PELSHE⁴
PODGORNY
POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SUSLOV
VORONOV

Candidate Members

Candidate Members

DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
SHCHERBITSKIY²
USTINOV
YEFREMOV¹

DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
KUNAYEV⁴
MASHEROV⁴
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
SHCHERBITSKIY
USTINOV

CPSU SECRETARIAT

CPSU SECRETARIAT

ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV²
KULAKOV³
PODGORNY¹
PONOMAREV
RUDAKOV
SHELEPIN
SUSLOV
USTINOV

ANDROPOV
BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV
KULAKOV
PONOMAREV
RUDAKOV⁵
SHELEPIN
SUSLOV
USTINOV

1. Dropped in April 1966.

2. Elected in December 1965.

3. Elected September 1965.

4. Elected in April 1966.

5. Died in July 1966.

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NEO-STALINIST LINE ADOPTED
The 50th Anniversary Year
November 1966-December 1967

LEADERSHIP

Hard Line Dominates; Dissension Continues

Following Brezhnev's indication in early November that he favored further restoration of Stalin's name, a number of leaders rushed to follow suit. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Akhundov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, and, of course, Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze all mentioned Stalin favorably in February 1967. In the last two months of 1966 both Shelest and Yegorychev once again expressed their typically neo-Stalinist views, indicating that this neo-Stalinist faction continued to push. In a speech at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers Congress, Shelest called for more vigilance and militance toward the enemy. He stated that if the enemy praised you, you must have made a political mistake. According to Pravda Ukrainy, Shelest recalled the 1965 central committee decree criticizing Khar'kov Oblast' (Podgorny's old domain) and indicated that there were still shortcomings there, a clear slap at Podgorny. On 6 December Yegorychev spoke on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow; he had only praise for Stalin's role.

In early 1967 there were a number of reports concerning continued friction in the Soviet leadership. In April [redacted] stated that there was a group within the leadership which included Shelepin, Suslov, and Ponomarev, and which wished to return to Stalinism. He stated that a struggle for power was going on and that numerous compromises were being reached, such as those at the 23rd congress, but that there was no firm cohesion within the leadership.

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Reports of tension between Brezhnev and Kosygin were also received early in 1967. According to one, Kosygin had lost some ground following a disagreement. In February four Soviet musicians who were visiting the United States reported that Kosygin was an emphatic supporter of the creative intelligentsia--that he had a deep appreciation of culture and was sympathetic to the problems of the intellectuals, demonstrating this both vocally and through policy influence. They said that Brezhnev was just the opposite. In June there was a report that Brezhnev wanted Kosygin's job and that Kosygin was trying to subordinate political issues to economic ones.

During this period there continued to be articles on the subject of collective leadership and criticism within the party. The most significant of these was a March article by Petrenko in Voprosy Istorii KPSS. Petrenko argued that collective leadership and a scientific approach help prevent but cannot exclude serious mistakes and that Lenin had considered honest acknowledgement and correction of mistakes as a sign of the seriousness of the party, its moral strength, and its ability to implement revolutionary reorganizations. For example:

The frank, bold statement on the serious mistakes and distortions, committed as a result of the personality cult of Stalin, which was made by our party at its own initiative can serve as an example of resolute criticism and self-criticism. The 20th Party Congress resolutely subjected these mistakes to fundamental criticism. The party began step by step to correct them

Petrenko stated that every party member has the right to criticize any other Communist no matter what position he holds, and that persons guilty of suppressing criticism should be punished--even expelled from the party. Petrenko seemed clearly to be indicating his strong support for current criticism of party members, at any level, implying that this was directed at high-ranking people--possibly Brezhnev.

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However, Petrenko's concept of criticism was limited. He quoted Lenin to the effect that "if freedom of criticism means freedom to defend capitalism, then we will crush it." And he stated that it was necessary to take a critical look at the past, but that this look should not be negative:

. . . For instance, many historians and writers are now striving to interpret in a critical manner the time during which the harmful consequences of the personality cult of Stalin had a negative influence on the development of Soviet society. This is a necessary step in the further development of historical science and artistic creativity. The task is not easy, but is of the highest degree of importance. Incompatible with its implementation, however, are the attempts to distort our past in a one-sided manner, in a distorted mirror, as just a solid chain of mistakes and shortcomings.

Thus Petrenko's article, while using the Stalin issue to illustrate the need for criticism, was conservative in emphasis, suggesting that it came from the neo-Stalinist faction which must have considered itself on the defensive at this time.

Leaders Speak

On 23 February First Deputy Defense Minister Grechko, in an Izvestiya article, completely exonerated the party leadership of blame for failing to prepare for World War II. Less than a year before, in June 1966, he had been quite critical of prewar preparations. Now he stated that

In connection with the growing threat of an armed attack the party and government adopted the necessary measures to further strengthen the Soviet Army. In the period between 1 January 1939 and 1 June 1941 the numerical strength of the armed forces increased almost 2.5 times. The formation of mechanized corps, aviation divisions, and new artillery and anti-tank units began in 1940-1941, but unfortunately by the outbreak of the war they had not yet been fully supplied with new material equipment.

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In April Grechko became USSR Minister of Defense, reportedly with Brezhnev's backing, and in a 9 May article in Pravda he completely explained away the initial setbacks of the war:

. . . Encouraged by the reactionary circles of the Western powers, Hitler at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union had enslaved most European countries and had forced their manpower and industrial resources to serve his predatory plans. As a result, fascist Germany invaded the territory of our country with an enormous already mobilized and powerful army. Not a single state could have resisted such pressure. Only a state born by the Great October and only a people who had liberated themselves from the fetters of capitalism were strong enough to engage in a singlehanded struggle against such a formidable enemy and achieve a brilliant victory.

In the spring several members of the hierarchy referred in speeches to the state of culture in the Soviet Union. In his March election speech, Brezhnev cited shortcomings in creative work and stated that criticism of these shortcomings was directed solely at the fruitful development of culture and that this was a concern which the party manifests unflinching and constantly. While still more moderate than statements by neo-Stalinists such as Shelest and Yegorychev, this was Brezhnev's strongest statement up to this time on the subject of party control of the arts.

In late April two somewhat different attitudes toward cultural matters were expressed by Kirilenko and Yegorychev. Kirilenko in the past had expressed both moderate and pro-Brezhnev sentiments. In November 1966 he had given a speech in which he strongly praised Brezhnev for his wartime activities. Now, on 22 April, he stated simply that Soviet literature and art were flowering. Two days later, in Pravda, Yegorychev warned against negative attitudes and called for the strengthening of ideological work. He stated that one cannot for a minute forget that

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communism is being built in circumstances of a sharp struggle of two ideologies, and that malicious attacks on the revolution and falsification of historical events had intensified. He stated that Soviet history must be evaluated correctly and he casually dismissed the crimes of the Stalin era:

Of course, now everything is clear, as they say, looking back. Apparently some things could have been done better perhaps and with less expenditure of forces At one time in our country so much was said about errors and mistakes that some people . . . could get the impression that all we have done is make mistakes We must have a more exacting attitude than ever before toward everything that is put out in publications, that is presented in exhibits, that is put out on screens and on stages of theaters and is secured in concert halls. The role of Communist creative organs grows especially in this.

Thus, whereas Kirilenko had indicated that all was well, Yegorychev was full of accusations and warnings that the party would exert even more pressure upon the intellectuals. This difference between these two speeches suggests that while Brezhnev and his followers supported re-Stalinizing and a generally orthodox position, they were being pushed to proceed still more rapidly toward more repressive measures. This pressure still being exerted by the neo-Stalinists was apparently part of their ongoing effort to gain the initiative in their struggle for the leadership.

The Fourth All-Union Writers Congress finally opened in May, having been postponed several times previously. The party's message to the congress demanded of literature well-developed ideological criteria, emphasized party control of the arts, and warned against western influence. Podgorny was the highest-ranking speaker at the congress and the tone of his speech was orthodox, although he did not call for further party control of the arts or do any threatening. He discussed the fierce

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struggle taking place between the two social systems and said that ideological enemies try to disarm the Soviet people. He said that loyalty to the truth of life and the indelible principles of party-mindedness enable writers to write vivid history of the great deeds of the Soviet people. On the other hand, he had only praise for Soviet writers, and said that there was every reason to expect that the writers union would continue to champion party-mindedness and people-mindedness. Thus, he seemed to be saying that any control necessary should be exercised by the writers union, a clear difference from Yegorychev's threat that the party should do more.

In a speech on 12 June Mzhavanadze called for the purification of party ranks and used a Stalin quotation to support his point. Whether or not he was calling for a purge of impure party members is not certain, but such a call is implied, making this a very threatening speech:

First, I would like to draw your attention to the need for a most decisive struggle for the purity of party ranks The penetration of the party by unworthy members has not yet been overcome I will cite in this connection the words of I.V. Stalin, who said that there was nothing higher than the title of a member of the party, the founder and leader of which was Comrade Lenin. He also said, "It is not given to everyone to be a party member . . ." This means that the door of the party must not be open to all but only to worthy people, entirely dedicated to the cause of the party.

In June 1967 the theses of the central committee for the 50th anniversary were published. They contained some criticism of the cult of Stalin, although they presented the 50 years of Soviet rule as a period of unbroken progress. To the extent that they reintroduced some criticism of the cult, however, they differed from the January central committee decree on preparations for the anniversary. That decree had projected an overwhelmingly favorable image of the entire course of Soviet history.

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There was no mention of Stalin or criticism of his reign--not even a reference to difficulties at the start of the war. Thus the return of some criticism was a definite shift.*

Shelepin's Defeat and Reaction To It

In the spring and early summer of 1967 Shelepin suffered a series of defeats in the form of personnel shifts. Goryunov, the head of TASS and a Shelepin man, was replaced in April. In the same month Grechko became Minister of Defense, replacing Malinovskiy, who had died two weeks earlier. In the intervening two weeks a number of reports had circulated to the effect that Shelepin was backing Ustinov, party secretary in charge of the defense industry, while Brezhnev favored Grechko. In May Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief by Andropov.** While the KGB had had several failures right before this shift--including the defection of Stalin's daughter--it seems clear that the firing of Semichastnyy was primarily a blow at Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction. Also in May, Pospelov was relieved as Chairman of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a position he had held since 1949. While Pospelov's allegiances are not clear, the timing of his removal and the fact that his journal had published Petrenko's March article which was apparently anti-Brezhnev, suggests that he was considered sympathetic to Shelepin.

A crisis in the leadership occurred following the Middle East debacle in early June. At the end of that month a party plenum was held and Brezhnev apparently reported on the situation. A number of regional leaders (all republic first secretaries except Masherov who had previously indicated his neo-Stalinist tendencies) rose

*See page 98 for further discussion.

**In June Andropov was taken off the Secretariat, but became a candidate member of the Politburo, the highest position held by a KGB chief since Beriya's death.

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to support Brezhnev. However, Yegorychev, in his speech, reportedly attacked the regime's handling of the situation, possibly arguing that the Soviet Union should have taken a stronger position. Yegorychev's apparent support of a harder foreign policy provides an example of the correlation between these policies and the Stalin issue. Yegorychev, one of the most outspoken members of the neo-Stalinist faction, was also supporting a very hard foreign policy.

Several days after his attack, the Moscow city committee relieved Yegorychev of his positions and appointed Viktor Grishin, who had previously headed the Soviet trade union organization. The following month Shelepin replaced Grishin as head of Soviet trade unions, indicating a further decline in his fortunes and strongly suggesting that he was being punished along with Yegorychev* for the latter's move at the congress. At the September plenum Shelepin was released from his position on the secretariat; however, he retained his position on the Politburo.

Following Yegorychev's removal and Shelepin's demotion, a group of articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members to criticize. These seemed clearly to be reactions to the firing of Yegorychev and indicated the degree of support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction within the party apparatus. They may also have represented the fear of various second-level officials that they might meet Yegorychev's fate. For example, the first article was by Georgiy Popov, Yegorychev's counterpart in Leningrad City. The Leningrad party organization had long been hard-line; now it was clearly siding with Yegorychev and, by implication, Shelepin. Popov emphasized the right to criticize and the dangers inherent in the tendency of some leaders to suppress criticism from below and to attempt one-man leadership.

The second article was by Petrenko, who had previously written several articles defending collective leadership and the right to criticize. The article was published in Partiynaya Zhizn' in September and was particularly interesting as Petrenko again raised the personality cult spectre, even though he seemed to be defending Yegorychev, a neo-Stalinist. Petrenko stated

*Yegorychev was subsequently named Deputy Minister of Tractor-Agricultural Machine Building.

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that the party theses issued in June had resolutely condemned the cult of Stalin's personality which had expressed itself in the raising up of the role of one person which, he said, is alien to Marxism-Leninism and a deviation from the principle of collective leadership. He went on to defend collective leadership, and to say that the party secretary must not misuse his position. In praising criticism he stated that "cases where certain officials [Brezhnev?] incorrectly take criticism from below [Yegorychev?] are far from having been eliminated."

The third article in this series also appeared in Partiynaya Zhizn' in the same month; this too is significant as Khaldeyev, a close Shelepin associate, had been appointed chief editor of that journal in the spring of 1966. In this article Masherov, the Belorussian First Secretary and apparently a member of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction, quoted from Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Congress in support of criticism and self-criticism. According to Masherov, each party member should have an opportunity to express his judgments, expose shortcomings, and work to eliminate these shortcomings. He said that an important place in the development of criticism is occupied by central committee plenums [such as the June plenum at which Yegorychev expressed his criticism?] and that a correct response to criticism is necessary. Critics must be listened to and their criticism must be followed by the correction of errors. Masherov went on to say that critics too have a responsibility and should not be impatient, and should not engage in criticism for the sake of criticism or in order to achieve some personal egotistical goals. However, Masherov left little doubt of where his allegiance lay. He stated that the desire of a leader to guard himself from criticism could lead to violations of Leninist norms and he closed with a case study. He cited a bureau head [Brezhnev?] who was justifiably criticized for shortcomings. But the bureau head was offended and took revenge by accusing the critic [Yegorychev?] of irresponsibility and having him transferred to a lower paying job.

A fourth article dealing with this subject appeared on 19 September in Sovetskaya Rossiya; this was written by Gorkiy First Secretary Katushev, who has been close to

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Brezhnev,* and its tone was quite different from that of the other three. Katushev did not emphasize collective leadership nor did he stress the right to criticize; rather he concentrated on the need to convince through argumentation and reasonable plemics. He stated that sometimes opponents act without restraint and hurl accusations at each other, a situation which results in even greater divergence of viewpoints. He stated that in order to convince someone it is necessary to use logic and reason--that no organizational measures or administrative threats can force him to change his mind. While these words might have been directed at Brezhnev, Katushev's closing statements supported the view that the main target was Yegorychev and the neo-Stalinists. Katushev stated that freedom of discussion is permitted only until a decision is adopted, and that then that decision must be carried out. He stated that sometimes a complication arises when a man who agreed to a decision and voted for it, subsequently does not implement it--a possible reference to Yegorychev's criticism of Middle East policy after the fact. Katushev closed by stating that conviction and exactingness must be joined, and he quoted Lenin to the effect that after the attempt to convince fails, then force may be used.

It is ironic that in the first three of these articles, written in defense of Yegorychev (and by implication Shēlepin as well) by his neo-Stalinist allies, liberal arguments were used. Support of a Stalinist position carries with it implied approval of the right of the leader to get rid of his opponents, and the need of the Shēlepin group was the opposite--to emphasize the rights of those not in control to attack with impunity. As a result, a somewhat bizarre situation arose in which supporters of Yegorychev, one of the most fanatic re-Stalinizers, were forced to resort to arguments for collective leadership, the right of criticism, and even outright condemnation of the cult of personality, in an effort to safeguard their

*Katushev's appointment as Gorkiy First Secretary had been personally supervised by Brezhnev in December 1965; Katushev had indicated strong support for Brezhnev at the 23rd Congress and Brezhnev personally defended Gorkiy Oblast' in January 1967 after it had been criticized in Pravda in 1966.

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own survival. In defense of Brezhnev, Katushev responded with an article stating in effect that the right to argue is limited to the period before a decision is made, but that then there must be unity and compliance.

Year End Atmosphere Repressive

An insight into the atmosphere prevailing at high levels of the Soviet hierarchy was provided in a private speech given by Pravda editor Zimyanin in October. Zimyanin first attacked Solzhenitsyn, calling him a schizophrenic who was obsessed with his years in a concentration camp and the fact that he had been "justly or unjustly" repressed. He stated that Solzhenitsyn's works were anti-Soviet and that in the old days he would have been imprisoned for them--that certainly they could not have been published.* He then turned on Voznesenskiy, condemning him for his behavior in June. Voznesenskiy had complained bitterly about the cancellation of his planned trip to the United States in a letter to Pravda which found its way to the West.** Zimyanin stated that he had met with Voznesenskiy, who had denied having sent the letter to the West himself. Zimyanin reported that he had told the poet that while he might get off with a reprimand this time if it ever happened again

. . . I told him . . . that he would be
crushed . . . that I myself would see to
it that he did not even leave a wet spot

The 50th anniversary of Soviet rule was celebrated in November and was unsensational. As suggested by the January decree on preparations for the anniversary and the

*The December issue of Noviy Mir had reportedly planned to carry Solzhenitsyn's novel The Cancer Ward; when this issue finally appeared in February 1968, the novel was not included. According to several Soviet sources, this decision had been made in high political circles and had involved a bitter struggle before Christmas.

**See page 91 for further discussion.

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theses issued in June, the entire period of Soviet history was treated overwhelmingly favorably. Even the cult, which had been condemned in the theses, was not mentioned. Brezhnev gave the major speech on this occasion. He did not mention Stalin by name, but was favorable by implication. He praised the 18th Congress of 1939 and stated that the party had foreseen the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism at this time and had prepared the country and the people for defense. He admitted that there had been miscalculations, but explained these away on the basis of the pioneering role of the Soviet regime.

During December there were various rumors that more members of the Shelepin group would lose their positions. The reports involved the chairmen of the committees on broadcasting and television (Mesyatsev), publishing (Mikhaylov), and cultural relations with foreign countries (Romanovskiy), and indicated that these committees would either be abolished or absorbed by the council of ministers. These reports were partially vindicated by a 23 December Izvestiya announcement that Romanovskiy's committee had been abolished. Thus, at this time, Shelepin still appeared to be very much on the defensive.

INTELLECTUALS

Pressure Increases; Protests Continue

Following Brezhnev's favorable mention of Stalin in November 1966, pressure on intellectuals to conform was to increase. However, liberal intellectuals continued to make their feelings and apprehensions known. On 27 December Literaturnaya Gazeta published a fascinating article by A. Yanov, which contained a strong liberal appeal for a truthful examination of the past. Yanov called for a clear interpretation of past and present, and stated that problems need investigation--not indignation. He argued that an examination of the past is a prerequisite to obtaining freedom from the consequences of those mistakes:

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'A nation which has forgotten its past runs the risk of experiencing it again,' said some philosopher.

Yanov then attacked an Oktyabr' article by K. Bukovskiy.

K. Bukovskiy writes: 'Regardless of what we were--blind or "hypnotized"--and regardless of the origin of the "hypnosis"--in those years we not only did not lie, but we had no doubts about anything.' And that is all! Black on white. But wait a minute, esteemed Konstantin Ivanovich, how about the investigation of the mechanism of that gigantic illusion, that unprecedented historical mystification, and that "hypnosis" which you yourself were talking about--has it been completed, exhausted, signed and filed away in the archives? So what gives you the right to offer your personal opinion and your personal experiences as the final result of the investigation as a categorical imperative? How do you know that 'we' did not doubt?

In December Soviet intellectuals again expressed their apprehension at orthodox trends, this time in a letter which warned against confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of a decree published in September 1966, extending Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to cover literary protests.* The letter was signed by nine academicians, various members of the intellectual community, and a number of Old Bolsheviks. It stated that the signers considered the adoption of the decree unjustified and that the decree raised the danger of "violations of socialist legality" and the "creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation" (i.e., a return to Stalinist methods).

The concern expressed both by Yanov, who was in effect stating that the refusal to continue to probe the crimes of the Stalin era could well foreshadow a return to Stalinist methods, and of the intellectuals, who were protesting what they considered to be the sign of such

*See Appendix Items C for text of decree and D for text of protest.

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a return, was valid. The year 1967 opened with a harsh clamp-down on the dissident intellectuals. In mid-January Yuriy Galanskov, editor of Feniks (Phoenix) 1966, a secret typewritten literary-publicist journal,* was arrested, as were three of his co-workers. On 22 January a demonstration held to protest these arrests resulted in the arrests of more people, including art critic Igor Golomshtok, who had defended Sinyavskiy at his trial, and Viktor Khaustov, who was subsequently sentenced to four years in a labor camp. Khaustov was the first person convicted and sentenced under the new section of Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Others arrested at this time were tried in August 1967.**

On 24 January it was reported from Moscow that Aleksandr Ginsburg had been arrested for compiling the Belaya Kniga (White Book), a collection of documents on the Daniel Sinyavskiy case. Ginsburg had sent a copy to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1966. Ginsburg and Galanskov were tried in January 1968.*** In March, according to Posev,**** a number of young people were arrested in Leningrad on charges of having organized a circle connected with emigre groups under the cover of a philosophical circle. Posev reported that a trial was being prepared for some of these people, and that as a result of preliminary investigations, 11 of the 25 had been sent to psychiatric hospitals or released under surveillance.

The general tightening of policy was also revealed in the closing down of two art exhibits in January. One

*Among the items published in Feniks was the previously mentioned "Discussion of the Third Volume of the History of the CPSU."

**See page 93 for further discussion of the trial.

***See page 94 for further discussion of this trial.

****An anti-Soviet emigre publishing organization in West Germany.

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was an unofficial, unsanctioned exhibit of unorthodox art and the second was a display of Chagal paintings.* On 23 January the Fifth Plenum of the USSR Union of Artists was held and dogmatic speeches were given by the union's acting head, F. Belashova, and by USSR Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva. Furtseva had been quite moderate in previous speeches and stood out for her moderate statement at the 23rd congress. Her shift at this time suggests that she had been given clear instructions about prevailing policy.

Campaign Against Noviy Mir

During the first few months of 1967 there was considerable evidence that the liberal journal Noviy Mir was in trouble. The first indication came in a 27 January Pravda editorial--its first major editorial on culture in over a year. In a personnel change in January Kunitsyn, a consistent hard-liner and formerly deputy chief of the central committee's cultural section, became editor of Pravda's Department of Art and Literature; he may have been responsible for this editorial which criticized both Noviy Mir and Oktyabr', but was much more harsh in its comments on the former.

On 1 February Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article which followed the line of Pravda's editorial. This journal had reportedly been taken over by a dogmatic group in December, although Chakovskiy remained as chief editor; in January the paper began a new format. In this article Noviy Mir was sharply criticized. The journal was also attacked at a session of the Board of the Union of Writers during this period. At the meeting various speakers pointed out the "substantial ideological and artistic errors, over-simplification, and shortcomings in the journal's activities."

An 8 March article by Tvardovskiy in Literaturnaya Gazeta revealed, however, that he would not give in easily.

*In February three of the artists who had participated in the exhibit were called to a meeting of their combine and "condemned."

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He stated that "We are attentive and will be attentive in the future to criticism," but only if this criticism

proceeds from the lofty concepts of the literature of a socialist society, worthy of the great traditions of Russian realism bequeathed by the classics.

His omission of the adjective "socialist" modifying "realism" indicated his continued opposition to the official line. In March, while in Italy attending a writers meeting, Tvardovskiy stated that the concept of realism did not need to be explained by adjectives.

Publication of Noviy Mir was held up during the early part of 1967. During January there were reports that the central committee was trying to force changes in the editorial board by removing A. Dementyev and B. Zaks, two assistant editors upon whom Tvardovskiy reportedly relied heavily. The party central apparatus was said to be reluctant to have a scandal but determined to weaken Tvardovskiy. In March, when the first issue of the journal finally appeared, Dementyev and Zaks had been removed from the board and three new members had been added. The two removed were definitely liberals; the leanings of the new three was less clear.

In May Yunost' published two poems by Tvardovskiy, both applicable to freedom and the attacks made against him. The first read

I myself inquire and find
All my own mistakes.
I shall remember them
Without a given libretto.
There is no sense--I am a grown man--
In laughable self-defense.
But please, don't hang on my soul.
Don't breath down my neck.

In the second, more allegorical poem, Tvardovskiy described his birth--under the fir trees in the forest--saying it is

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Dnipro was quickly rebuffed for publishing such an article. On 25 February Molodoy Ukrainy attacked the journal and said that it had been criticized by the Ukrainian Komsomol central committee.

Another example of a republic journal being censured is that of Zvezda Vostoka, the organ of the Uzbek Union of Writers. In its first four issues of 1967 the journal published a number of works by semi-controversial authors. In one of these Konstantin Simonov reviewed For Whom the Bell Tolls, and alluded to the purges. The fifth and sixth issues of the journal did not carry any such works in spite of promises that it would do so, and in August, the editor V. Kostyria, was reportedly dismissed.

In April and May, in the weeks preceding the Fourth Writers Congress, the efforts by the liberals to stage a comeback were overshadowed by the orthodox articles being published. On 19 April an editorial in Literaturnaya Gazeta made a strong demand for unity and central control over the arts. It used as its reference the 35th anniversary of the party resolution which banned all independent literary organizations and forced writers into a single, tightly-controlled writers union. Similarly, Pravda published two threatening articles on the eve of the congress. One implied that those who did not respond properly to criticism might well lose their jobs, and the other, one of whose authors was Kunitsyn, called for more aggressive criticism of incorrect concepts. This article proposed the establishment of an institution of "readers' opinions" to help those involved in publishing works to deepen the educational influence of literature and art; in other words they proposed the establishment of still another control organization to weed out "incorrect concepts."

Originally scheduled for the spring of 1966, the Fourth Writers Congress had been postponed twice before it finally opened in late May 1967. According to several reports the congress had been put off because of dissidence and "hundreds" of writers had been arrested in Leningrad and Kiev in the weeks before the congress. An orthodox line dominated at the congress and the most interesting

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episode occurred behind the scenes. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn circulated a letter to the delegates strongly condemning censorship in the Soviet Union and describing his own persecution at the hands of the authorities.* In addition, 79 intellectuals circulated a petition calling for discussion of Solzhenitsyn's letter. According to [redacted], Solzhenitsyn was severely reprimanded after the congress and threatened with expulsion from the union if he did not mend his ways. In June 1967 Grani** published a letter sent by an anonymous person in Moscow, stating that even Solzhenitsyn himself had given up hope of being published.

Solzhenitsyn's letter was followed in the early summer of 1967 by a number of protests, concerning censorship. The intellectuals had undoubtedly been frightened by increasing threats of tightened control as well as by the actual clamp-down on liberal journals and dissident intellectuals. It seems likely that they were encouraged to mount their attack when they did because of the defeat of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction in the spring and early summer.

On 19 June a scheduled trip to New York by the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy was suddenly cancelled. Voznesenskiy, obviously angry, sent a letter to Pravda in which he described the "atmosphere of blackmail, confusion, and provocation" in which he had been living. A copy of this letter was sent to the West and printed in the New York Times.*** On 2 July Voznesenskiy appeared at the Taganka Theater and read a poem attacking censorship; two days later he was reportedly called before a special meeting of the Board of the Union of Writers and put under pressure to withdraw the comments in his letter and poem. He refused to do so even though he was censured and threatened with expulsion from the union.****

*See Appendix Item E.

**The quarterly journal of Posev.

***See Appendix Item F.

****See also page 83 for Voznesenskiy's reported conversation with Zimyanin, who reportedly threatened him if he did not conform.

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On 30 June Komsomolskaya Pravda carried an article by Pravda correspondent Burlatskiy and a former secretary of the Komsomol Karpinskiy. These two men attacked censorship in the theater and strongly implied their support of freedom to criticize. They attacked those who avoid discussing certain phenomena because it might put the system in an unfavorable light, stating that these people sacrifice real political interests--the improvement of Soviet society--for the sake of improperly understood propaganda interests. They argued that art is obligated to intrude into life and touch all its aspects. They said that Lenin's formula for guiding creative work

definitely excludes a secret and narrow departmental approach which is never guaranteed against a subjective bias

Publication of this liberal article in the organ of the Komsomol, an organization headed by Shelepin protege Sergey Pavlov indicates that the neo-Stalinist faction had allied itself with the liberals on the issue of censorship, as well as on the subject of the right to criticize. The publication of this article coincided with the publication of three articles defending collective leadership and freedom to criticize which were published following Yegorychev's dismissal and Shelepin's setback.

This particular article was decisively rebuffed only a week after its publication. On 8 July Komsomolskaya Pravda itself, in an editorial, rejected the article, calling it erroneous and stating that it contradicted party principles.

The Komsomol Central Committee having examined the article . . . has found that the publication of the article was a crude ideological mistake on the part of the Komsomolskaya Pravda editorial board.

The editorial then quoted Brezhnev's comments on party guidance of the arts, made at the 23rd Congress. Thus, this attempt to challenge Brezhnev, made in the form of

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a liberal article but apparently sanctioned by the neo-Stalinists, was rejected immediately, undoubtedly at the bidding of high-level officials.

Year Ends With Harsh Policy

In the fall of 1967 the ominous tendencies continued. On 30 August Vladimir Bukovskiy and two others arrested in January for protesting the arrests of Galanskov and his co-workers went on trial. Bukovskiy, who said he had organized the demonstration was sentenced to three years and the two others to one year each. Bukovskiy did not plead guilty at his trial, although the Soviet press indicated that he had; on the contrary he made a spirited plea in his own behalf and attacked the manner in which the whole trial had been conducted. The text of his plea was attached to a letter sent by Pavel Litvinov to four Soviet newspapers, as well as to the French and Italian party papers. In his letter Litvinov, the grandson of Maxim Litvinov and a physicist, described a warning he had received from the KGB not to become involved in any reporting on the Bukovskiy trial.* Litvinov defied this order and has subsequently participated in the drafting of several protests.

Evidence of further pressure being exerted on the intellectuals came from several sources. On 22 September the head of Moscow City party's cultural section, Solovyeva, called for more control by theater party organizations over theater repertories:

There are cases when it is necessary for all the members of the party bureau to convince one director or another that he must review his selection of plays or his outline and at times even replace a performer.

In October a joint plenum of the boards of cultural unions and organizations of the USSR and RSFSR was held, and a very dogmatic line dominated. Ye. Belashova stated that the artist must take a side in the struggle for ideologies and that "even silence can be treason."

*See Appendix Item G.

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The 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution came and went in November and there was no indication that the prevailing repressive line would lift. In fact, if there was any shift in policy line in the months after the anniversary, it was toward a still more orthodox line. In October and November Oktyabr' published a novel by Kochetov in which Stalin was viewed as a very positive, though fairly minor, figure and the use of terror received implied approval.

Even more threatening than orthodox articles, however, were the continuing arrests and trials of intellectuals. In mid-December there was a report that four people were being tried in Leningrad on the serious charge of having participated in an armed terrorist network trying to overthrow the Soviet state. This trial had reportedly grown out of the arrest in early 1967 of 25 intellectuals connected with the philosophy department at the University of Leningrad. Many rumors circulated in Moscow, including the report that similar groups had been discovered in the Ukraine and another that the case was so serious that the central committee had met to consider it. Other reported trials included one involving six youths in Moscow charged with distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and one involving a student charged with writing an allegedly anti-Soviet film script. A report smuggled to the West in early 1968 contained charges made by a Ukrainian journalist, Vyacheslav Chornovil, that harsh repressions were taking place in the Ukraine. Chornovil, who was sentenced to 18 months in a labor camp in November 1967, had addressed his letter to Shelest. In it he described the KGB techniques of harassment and extracting confessions; he also described a number of arrests and trials of intellectuals in the Ukraine during 1966 and 1967.

In January 1968 the four individuals arrested the previous January--Ginsburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolskiy, and Lashkova, went on trial. In connection with this particular case, several petitions were reportedly circulated. The first was said to be signed by about 100 members of the intellectual community and was sent to the Procurator General; it requested assurances that the trial would be

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public. The second petition was reportedly signed by 44 intellectuals and charged that the long imprisonment of the four persons without trial was in violation of the criminal code of the Soviet Union. In addition, Litvinov and the wife of the imprisoned author, Yuriy Daniel denounced the trial in a letter which was published in the West.* In what they termed an appeal to world opinion, they condemned the manner in which the trial had been held and demanded a new trial. Litvinov was subsequently fired from his position as a physics instructor. Two other petitions were reportedly circulated with respect to this trial; one was an appeal by 30 intellectuals and the other a petition of 12 who wished to appear as defense witnesses. In December there were reports of another petition, this one signed by 180 Moscow intellectuals who urged that a law be adopted which would implement the constitution's pledge of freedom of the press. All of these pleas were to no avail; the trial of the four was not public and heavy sentences were imposed. Ginzburg and Galanskov received seven and five year sentences respectively; Dobrovolskiy, who turned state's evidence, received a two-year sentence, and Lashkova, who had merely typed for the group, received a one-year sentence.

Thus, during the early part of 1968 there was considerable evidence that a very harsh policy prevailed--the harshest policy since the death of Stalin--and that repression of intellectuals who dared to voice opinions which deviated from the party line would continue. Official sanction was put on this policy with the central committee resolution passed at the April 1968 plenum; this resolution called for a further tightening of ideological pressure.

STALIN THEMES

Stalin Era Whitewashed

The continued shift toward more and more orthodox views, revealed in the arrests of dissident intellectuals in early 1967, was also reflected in the new extremes reached in extolling the Stalin era. In November and December, on the eve of the anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, numerous articles and speeches were published

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praising Stalin for his leadership at this time of crisis. In a January article in Molodaya Gvardiya, N. Mikhaylov, possibly the chairman of the State Committee for Publishing and a Shelepin protege, described Komsomol unity during the war and attributed this to Stalin's inspiring leadership. Mikhaylov stated that Stalin must have known of Hitler's designs, for with his experience and hatred of fascism he would not have treated reports of the planned attack carelessly. But he also knew what Hitler's strength was, so he tried up until the last minute to ward off the approaching war and buy time for preparations. He stated that Stalin withstood all pressures because he had great ideological conviction, implicit faith in the party, and recognition of the party's authority.

A 16 January broadcast over Moscow Domestic Service on the years from 1933 to 1941 ignored any errors or problems of the period, and concentrated on praising industrial and agricultural growth. It paid tribute to the 1936 constitution as well as to the 1937 elections which saw a "remarkable victory" for the block of party and non-party candidates. It praised the 18th party congress of 1939 for its approval of the war prevention policy of the party--and it totally ignored the purges.

In March Kommunist Moldaviya urged that the positive achievements of collectivization be stressed and attacked a West German author (a euphemism for Soviet writers who make the same point) who

attempts to impose on the reader the current but absolutely groundless thesis prevalent in bourgeois historiography concerning the forcible nature of collectivization

And on 7 May Pravda published an article which glossed over the disagreement between Stalin and Lenin on the subject of nationalities in 1917:

. . . On the basis of the report by I.V. Stalin, the conference adopted a resolution signed by V. I. Lenin, on the nationalities

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question. The Bolshevik Party came forth decisively in favor of meeting the demands of the working people of all oppressed nations, recognizing their right to self-determination, including separation and formation of an independent state.

On 30 May Krasnaya Zvezda criticized various World War II memoirs, and charged that personal memoirs should not contradict the "truth of history." It attacked those who criticize General Headquarters for its conduct of the war, stating that

The best evidence of the fact that the General Headquarters and its working organ, the General Staff, skillfully directed the operations of the Soviet troops is the victorious outcome of the war. The General Headquarters included prominent commanders and party and state leaders. The Supreme Commander, I.V. Stalin, displayed great firmness; his leadership of the military operations was on the whole correct, and his merits in this field were numerous.

In this early part of 1967, there was a virtual suspension of any references to the purges and rehabilitations of purge victims. Even the provincial papers halted publication of such articles with very few exceptions. Interestingly, those references which did appear seemed to involve the military. For example, in February the Armenian paper Kommunist published a series of articles on Marshal Gay and there was also apparently a commemorative meeting held for Gay in which Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan participated. On 26 March Krasnaya Zvezda carried an article by Marshal Vasilyevskiy in which he referred to Tukhachevskiy as an outstanding theorist and leader. Both Tukhachevskiy and Gay had been proponents of modernization of Soviet forces before their purges, and it is possible that these particular rehabilitations were being pushed by those who wished more emphasis to be put on modernization of Soviet armed forces.

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In June 1967 the central committee issued its theses on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the revolution. On the subject of war preparations, the theses gave official sanction to the complete ignoring of prewar miscalculations and errors. The theses stated that the Soviet Union had done all it could to establish a system of collective security in Europe, but that these efforts were rebuffed by the men of Munich who preferred an alliance with Hitler. In this very complex situation the Soviet Union had been forced to sign a nonaggression pact with Hitler, thereby gaining time to prepare. Even though the party and government took steps to strengthen defenses it was impossible to prevent war. The theses also praised the 20th party congress resolution which it said had condemned the Stalin personality cult; the cult, according to the theses, had expressed itself in the glorification of the role of one man, departures from the Leninist principle of collective leadership, unwarranted repression, and other violations of socialist legality. This reference is very low key, as the resolution passed by the 20th Congress was relatively mild; the strong anti-Stalin element at the congress was Khrushchev's "secret speech."

Wartime Errors Erased

On 21 July the new First Deputy Minister of Defense, Yakubovskiy, wrote an article for Krasnaya Zvezda which successfully passed over whatever errors there might have been in prewar preparations. He praised measures taken to train military personnel and did not even make an oblique reference to the purges. He then explained why the Soviet Union had suffered some defeats in the early stages of the war:

It was not possible, however, to fully implement the planned program of preparing the armed forces for the war. Specifically, the rearmament of the ground forces with new military technical equipment and the formation of mechanized groups of units remained unfinished. This explains the

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difficulties encountered by our troops
in the first period of the Great
Fatherland War

In mid-July it was reported that Nekrich, author of the controversial book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and discussed at a stormy meeting early in 1966, had been expelled from the party. Thus, Nekrich became the scapegoat for past "errors" in analysis of prewar preparedness and Stalin's wartime role, and an example to those who might wish to write in a similar vein. It was also reported that the editor who had approved the publication of Nekrich's book had been fired. In September Voprosy Istorii KPSS followed this with an attack on Nekrich by Deborin, who had also participated in the February 1966 meeting held to criticize Nekrich's book.* Deborin claimed that the book had been written in the spirit of bourgeois historiography. He then proceeded to defend war preparations and the leadership of the party during the war; he asserted that the Soviet Union had signed the Ribbentrop Pact only when it was clear that an anti-Nazi alliance was impossible. Deborin denied that preparations for an attack had not been made and that the Soviet leadership had underestimated the danger of war.

On 24 August a Krasnaya Zvezda article by Major General Zhilin called for a new official wartime history to correct the "subjective" view of Stalin's leadership. He stated that bourgeois falsifiers must be refuted--that they try to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the prewar years and conceal the fact that this policy was directed at providing collective security in Europe and restraining aggressive forces. He called for criticism of subjective statements made by some memoirists who mistakenly evaluate the readiness of the Soviet Union to repulse aggression in the late 1930's and wrongly evaluate events at the start of the war.

An 8 December article in Krasnaya Zvezda completed the transition to a positive view of Stalin as prewar and wartime leader:

*See pages 57-59.

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Historical experience obviously confirms the correctness of the military policy of the party at all stages of socialist construction and the decisive significance of the prewar five-year plans for the defense potential of the country. This experience rejects the formerly existing anti-historic views on alleged miscalculations of the Communist Party and Soviet government in the creation of military-economic potential. In any case, in such a short time the military-industrial base of the USSR simply could not reach the volume of the military-industrial base of fascist Germany, which as early as 1933 began to actively reorganize its economy for war purposes and later completed its military-economic potential by making use of the heavy industry of the European states it had occupied.

The treacherous attack on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, which had previously mobilized its first-class equipped war machinery, as well as a certain incompleteness in the measures taken by our country to prepare itself to repel an aggression, allowed the Hitlerite army, despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, to rapidly penetrate into the USSR

Thus all that remains of previous criticisms of the handling of the prewar situation, is the statement that there was a certain incompleteness in the measures taken to repel aggression.

Collectivization Smoothed Over

In August several articles were published on the period of collectivization. The first was by Brezhnev-protege Trapeznikov and appeared in Pravda on 4 August.

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Trapeznikov acknowledged that there were complications and difficulties in collectivization, which were the result of the fact that this policy was carried out among a culturally backward and widely dispersed peasant population. He stated that this had been one of the "most brilliant periods" in Soviet history and that collectivization had been an historical necessity. However, he said that there had been no way of knowing exactly what stages had to be gone through, how fast to go, and exactly what economic forms the new type of enterprise would take.

It must be said that a considerable mess and confusions prevailed in this respect. There were elements in the party which, engaging in hare-brained schemes for the selection of forms of collective economy, tried at first to create various types of gigantic units--agro-industrial combines--in order to propagate communes, or to design agro-cities without consideration for the objective conditions and the practical experience of the masses.

The agro-gorod concept described by Trapeznikov had been supported by Khrushchev; thus Trapeznikov had absolved Stalin and the party of any guilt and had shifted blame for confusion in agriculture to Khrushchev, implicating at the same time those who also had supported such policies--Podgornyy, Polyanskiy in 1959 and, more recently the Belorussians.

A 26 August article in Pravda Ukrainy by A. Yevdoki-mov continued the line found in Trapeznikov's article, and criticized the ideologists of anti-communism for treating collectivization as though it had been implemented contrary to Leninist principles. He then discussed the complexity of the development of socialist agriculture and some of the problems encountered. In particular, he stated that the defense of the country during the war had placed demands on heavy industry, thus retarding the strength of the material-technical base of agriculture. There was no mention of Stalin, and no indication that incorrect orders from the center had created difficulties in collectivization.

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Stalin's Revolutionary Role Praised

On 8 August several articles were published commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Sixth Party Congress. A Pravda article by first deputy editor Zarodov stated that the report to the central committee, delivered by Stalin and Sverdlov, had presented a bright, vigorous picture of the development of the revolution. An article published in Belorussia also mentioned Stalin's report and noted that he was elected a member of the central committee. The article listed several delegates who had wavered on the subject of Lenin's court appearance, but Stalin was not included on the list. According to this article, Stalin did make one error, but the error is minimized. At a time when Lenin was saying that the situation was fully defined and power was in the hands of the counter-revolutionary military, Stalin stated that "it was still not clear in whose hands the power is." The article makes it clear that the situation had, in fact, only been defined for about a month. An October article in Pravda discussed the October 1917 adoption of a resolution on armed uprising, and listed Stalin among those who had supported Lenin.

In October the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which had caused such a furor in the summer of 1966, was finally published. It was accompanied on 26 October by a Pravda editorial which blasted previous one-sidedness and serious errors which had been made in the characterization of the early struggle of the party; these errors had involved viewing these struggles in terms of the blunders made by people involved in them. While the editorial did not mention Stalin by name he was obviously the person now being exonerated.

On 22 October the Georgian paper Zarya Vostoka published an article on the uprisings in Georgia in the early 1920's. In discussing Orzhonikidze's handling of the uprising, the article referred constantly to telegrams sent to Lenin and Stalin; the two names are always mentioned together. Then, according to the article, in September 1920 Stalin was sent to study and clean up the situation in Georgia. After establishing Communist power

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in that state, the article stated, the party's Orgburo adopted a decree at Stalin's suggestion calling for the immediate dispatch of cadres to Georgia.

Liberal Efforts--Feeble and Hopeless

Several feeble efforts were made by the moderates to combat the steadily increasing orthodox pressure, but these efforts were doomed to failure. The rehabilitation program was virtually ended, but there were several commemorative meetings held. In August such a meeting was held for Yan Rudzutak, who had died in the purges in 1938; Mikoyan spoke at this meeting as did various Latvian veterans of the revolution.* In September a similar meeting was held for another of Stalin's victims, Postyshev; press coverage of both these meetings was, however, minimal.

In October a war film based on a scenario by Konstantin Simonov opened in Moscow. Among the subjects discussed in the movie were the lack of preparedness for the war, Stalin's refusal to believe that the Germans would attack, and the catastrophic effect of the purges on the Soviet high command. According to one report this film had encountered fierce opposition before it was finally released; however, the fact that it was released indicated that there was still some support for a moderate position in high places.

Another interesting deviation from the general trend was the passage in September of a decree exonerating the Tatars of the charge of collaborating with the fascists. The decree stated that the accusation made in 1944 had been without foundation and had groundlessly attributed this crime to the whole Tatar population. This decree

*In December Mikoyan again demonstrated his sympathy for the liberals when he attended a performance of the controversial play "Bolsheviki" at the Sovremennik Theater and made a demonstrative show of approval. This play delivered the message that the start of Red Terror during the Civil War had been a dangerous step.

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was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of which Podgornyy is chairman. However, in spite of this rehabilitation there was apparently little change in the situation of the Tatars. A petition sent to the West in early 1968 included the charge that although the Tatars had been officially rehabilitated, they still could not return to their homeland.

On 30 December one of the most interesting turn arounds of this period occurred. Pravda Ukrainy, which had been one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist journals, published a rehabilitation. On the 70th birthday of V. Primakov, a former member of the Military Council in Leningrad, the paper stated that he had been slandered in 1935, removed from his job, and a year later was dead. The use by this paper of a rehabilitation might be a further indication of the fear of the neo-Stalinists in the wake of the Yegdrychev purge, that they were now in danger of being repressed by Brezhnev.

SUMMARY

A rigid, orthodox line dominated the first six months of 1967, in spite of reports of dissension within the leadership. While there may well have been dissension, a conservative-orthodox faction, led by Brezhnev and perhaps strongly influenced by Suslov, was strong enough to enforce its line. This line was demonstrated in the arrests of a number of intellectuals early in January and by large-scale arrests in the Ukraine and Leningrad on the eve of the Fourth Writers Congress. The leaders in these two areas, Shelest and Tolstikov, had been among the most outspoken proponents of the neo-Stalinist line; the suppression of intellectuals in their regions demonstrates the direct relationship between an expressed orthodox viewpoint and direct administrative action.

The few liberal articles which were published during this period were met with fairly swift punishment, reflecting the orthodox solution of dealing with non-conformists through administrative action. The most

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notable example of this was the harrassment of Noviy Mir which culminated in the replacement of two key members of that journal's editorial board. Another instance was the expulsion of Nekrich from the party for having written a book in 1965 critical of the handling of prewar preparations. His expulsion was a clear warning to others who might be tempted to indulge in historical objectivity.

The orthodox line was also reflected in the continued halt in the rehabilitation program; the only exception was the publication of several articles on purged military leaders Gay and Tukhachevskiy. Both of these men had been supporters of modernization of the Soviet armed forces in the 1930's, and these articles might have been backed by contemporary supporters of increased emphasis on a modernized military establishment. Articles which appeared during this period concerning Stalin's wartime role and his actions as a revolutionary and leader seemed to exonerate him completely of any mistakes.

Signs of dissension within the leadership continued. Several more articles were published defending the need for collective leadership. One of these, by Petrenko, defended collective leadership and also called for the right of criticism and self-criticism within the party. The tone of Petrenko's article was quite hard-line, however, suggesting that he was speaking for the neo-Stalinists rather than the liberals. He used the cult of personality to illustrate the evils of one-man leadership-- the first time the neo-Stalinists had resorted to this device.

Having effectively beaten down the moderates, Brezhnev was now ready to launch a major campaign against Shelepin, and during the spring and summer of 1967, the latter's strength was gradually whittled away. In April his protege Goryunov was relieved as head of TASS, and in May Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief. Following the Middle East crisis and his apparent challenge to the leadership on its handling of that situation, Yegorychev, the most outspoken member of the neo-Stalinist faction, was fired as Moscow City boss. As a final blow, Shelepin

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was appointed head of the Soviet trade union organization and removed from the party secretariat.

In the wake of these major setbacks for the neo-Stalinist faction, several articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members (i.e., Yegorychev) to express criticism of their superiors (i.e., Brezhnev) even at the highest party levels. These articles seemed clearly aimed at Brezhnev, and came in at least two instances from members of the neo-Stalinist camp. The adoption by this faction of an anti-Stalin line suggested real desperation on their part; their use of this line was clearly defensive--an attempt to stave off further setbacks. Another apparent shift was the publication of a rehabilitation by the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy in late December. Having previously backed the halt in the rehabilitation program as part of a general re-Stalinizing, they now apparently feared that they themselves were in danger of being purged and therefore were now identifying with the purge victims rather than with Stalin.

That Shelepin's defeat and that of various of his neo-Stalinist backers did not signify a corresponding defeat for their point of view was revealed almost immediately. Encouraged by Shelepin's defeat, the liberal intellectuals published several articles at the end of June in which they criticized censorship and seemed to urge its abolition. These articles were quickly suppressed. The continuation of a harsh policy was also reflected in the continuation of the arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals and in the favorable treatment Stalin and his policies continued to receive. Thus, it was clear that an orthodox line, favored by Brezhnev, still dominated.

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APPENDIX A: TEXT OF APPEAL AGAINST STALIN'S REHABILITATION
March 1966

Respected Leonid Ilich!

Tendencies have appeared lately in some public speeches and articles in our press which are in fact directed at a partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. We do not know how firmly these tendencies are grounded, but they manifest themselves ever more frequently as the XXIII Party Congress draws nearer. However, even if it is only a matter of a partial revision of the decisions of the XX and XXII Party Congresses, this causes deep apprehension. We think it our duty to inform you about our opinion in this matter.

Until now we have not been aware of a single fact, of a single argument which would permit us to think that a condemnation of the personality cult was wrong in any of its respects. On the contrary, it is difficult to doubt that a large part of striking, of truly horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes has not yet been made public. These facts would confirm the absolute correctness of the decisions of both Party Congresses.

There is something else as well. We believe that any attempt to whitewash Stalin conceals a danger of serious dissensions within Soviet society. Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles. We are convinced, for instance, that this would cause great unrest among the intelligentsia and would seriously complicate the moods of our youth. Like the whole of the Soviet

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public we are worried about the young people. No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

We also see another danger as equally serious. The question of Stalin's rehabilitation concerns not only home, but also international politics. Any step towards his rehabilitation would undoubtedly pose a threat of a new split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between ourselves and the Communists of the West. They would assess this step as a surrender to the Chinese, to which they would never agree. This is a factor of exceptional importance which we cannot write off. In the time when we are threatened, on the one hand, by ever more active American imperialists and West German revanchists and, on the other, by the leaders of the Communist Party of China, it would be extremely unwise to risk a rift or even complications with the fraternal parties in the West.

So as not to claim your attention for too long we limit ourselves to mentioning only the most substantial arguments against any rehabilitation of Stalin, first and foremost concerning the danger of the two-way split. We do not even speak about the great complications which any departure from the decisions of the XX Party Congress would bring upon the international contacts of our cultural community--among other things upon its struggle for peace and international cooperation. All that has been achieved so far would be endangered.

We could not but write you about our thoughts. It is quite clear that a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on this question cannot be regarded as a routine one, taken in the general course of work. In either case it will have historic importance for the destinies of our country. We hope that this will be taken into account.

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APPENDIX B: TEXT OF SOVIET WRITERS' PETITION TO KREMLIN
November 1966

To the Presidium of the 23d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Comrades:

We, the undersigned group of Moscow writers, request you to grant us permission to stand surety for the recently sentenced writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. We believe that this would be an act of both wisdom and humanity.

Although we do not approve the means by which these writers published their work abroad, we cannot accept the view that their motives were in any way anti-Soviet, which alone could have justified the severity of the sentence. The prosecution failed to prove the existence of such a motive.

At the same time, the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical works creates an extremely dangerous precedent and threatens to hold up the progress of Soviet culture. Neither learning nor art can exist if neither paradoxical ideas can be expressed nor hyperbolic images be used as an artistic device. In our complex situation today, we need more freedom for artistic experiment and certainly not its condemnation. From this standpoint, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel has already caused us more harm than did any of their mistakes

Sinyavsky and Daniel are gifted men who should be given the chance to make up for their lack of political prudence and tact. If they were released on our surety and remained in touch with Soviet society, they would soon

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realize their mistakes and redeem them by the artistic and ideological value of the new literary works they would create.

We beg you, therefore, to release Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel on our surety.

This would be an act dictated by the interests of our country, the interests of the world and those of the world Communist movement.

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APPENDIX C: TEXT OF A DECREE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RSFSR [RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] ON 16 SEPTEMBER, ENTITLED "ON THE ENTRY OF A SUPPLEMENT TO THE PENAL CODE OF THE RSFSR", 16 September 1966

Chapter IX "Crimes Against the Administrative Order" in the Penal Code of the RSFSR is hereby supplemented by Articles 190 [sub-section 1], 190 [sub-section 2], and 190 [sub-section 3] which contain the following provisions:

Article 190--1. Spreading scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and social order: systematic dissemination, in verbal form, of scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and the Soviet social order, as well as preparation of writings or printed products of the same content and their dissemination in any form shall be punished with deprivation of freedom up to 3 years or with corrective labor terms up to one year or with a fine up to 100 rubles.

Article 190--2. Defamation of the coat of arms of the state or of the national flag: defamation of the government coat of arms or the flag of the USSR, the RSFSR, or any of the other Union Republics shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 2 years, corrective labor service up to one year, or a fine of up to 50 rubles.

Article 190--3. Staging group actions which violate public order or active participation in such actions: the staging of group actions or active participation in such actions, which violate public order in a serious manner or which are accompanied by open failure to comply with the legal requests of agents [representatives] of the government, or which interfere with the activities of the transportation system, of government and community [social] agencies or enterprises, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to 3 years or corrective labor service up to one year or a fine of up to 100 rubles.

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APPENDIX D: PETITION AGAINST EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 190
January 1967

Copies to the Political Bureau of the CPSU;
to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR;
to the Attorney General of the USSR.

Comrade Deputies:

We, a group of Soviet citizens, consider it to be our duty to express our attitude toward the 16 September 1966 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR "On the Entry of a Supplement to the Penal Code of the RSFSR."

In our opinion, the additions to Articles 190--1 and 190--3, of the Penal Code of the RSFSR, have no foundation in the political reality of our land. The passage of such laws, at this time, seems to us to be an unjustified act which conjures up the danger of false judicial verdicts, the violation of socialist justice, and the creation of an atmosphere of suspicions and denunciations. Article 190--1 facilitates subjective evaluations and arbitrary interpretations of statements as scientific slander against the Soviet system of government and social order.

We are convinced that Article 190--1 and 190--3 are in conflict with the Leninist principles of socialist democracy. If the Plenum of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR should confirm these Articles, they might become an obstacle on the road to the implementation of the freedoms guaranteed in the USSR constitution.

The signers include the following: Academician Asturov, biologists; academician Zeldovich, physicist; academician Knunyants, chemist; academician Leontovich, physicist, Lenin Prize winner; academician Sakharov, physicist; academician Skazkin, historian; academician Tamm, physicist; academician Engelhardt, biochemist; author

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Kaverin; author Nekrasov; author Dombrovskiy; author Voynovich; composer Shostakovich; movie director Romm.

This letter was also signed by a group of old Bolsheviks and others, giving us a total of 21 signatures, some of the signatures being illegible. The document was received by the Supreme Soviet between 1 and 10 January 1967.

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APPENDIX E: TEXT OF SOLZHENITSYN LETTER PROTESTING
CENSORSHIP, May 16, 1967

To the presidium and the delegates of the congress,
to members of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the editors
of literary newspapers and magazines:

I.

The oppression, no longer tolerable, that our
literature has been enduring from censorship for decades
and that the Union of Writers cannot accept any further.

This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit
[Soviet censorship agency], not provided for by the Con-
stitution and therefore illegal and nowhere publicly
labeled as such, is imposing a yoke on our literature and
gives people who are unversed in literature arbitrary con-
trol over writers.

A survival of the Middle Ages, censorship manages
in Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existence al-
most to the 21st century. Of fleeting significance, it
attempts to appropriate unto itself the role of unfleet-
ing time of separating the good books from the bad.

Our writers are not supposed to have the right,
they are not endowed with the right, to express their
anticipatory judgments about the moral life of man and
society, or to explain in their own way the social problems
or the historical experience that has been so deeply felt
in our country.

Works that might have expressed the mature think-
ing of the people, that might have timely and salutary
influence on the realm of the spirit or on the develop-
ment of a social conscience are prohibited or distorted
by censorship on the basis of considerations that are
petty, egotistic and, from the national point of view,
shortsighted.

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Outstanding manuscripts by young authors, as yet entirely unknown, are nowadays rejected by editors solely on the ground that they "will not pass."

Many union members and even delegates at this congress know how they themselves bowed to the pressure of censorship and made concessions in the structure and concept of their books, changing chapters, pages, paragraphs, sentences, giving them innocuous titles, only to see them finally in print, even if it meant distorting them irremediably.

We have one decisive factor here, the death of a troublesome writer, after which, sooner or later, he is returned to us, with an annotation "explaining his errors." For a long time, the name of Pasternak could not be pronounced out loud, but then he died, and his books appeared and his verses are even quoted at ceremonies.

Pushkin's words are really coming true: "They are capable of loving only the dead."

But tardy publication of books and "authorization" of names do not make up for either the social or the artistic losses suffered by our people from these monstrous delays, from the oppression of artistic conscience. (In fact there were writers in the 1920s, Pilnyak, Platonov and Mandelshtam, who called attention at a very early stage to the beginnings of the cult and the particular traits of Stalin's character; however, they were destroyed and silenced instead of being listened to.)

Literature cannot develop between the categories "permitted" and "not permitted"--"this you can and this you can't." Literature that is not the air of its contemporary society, that dares not pass on to society its pains and fears; that does not warn in time against the threatening moral and social dangers, such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and its published works are used as waste paper instead of being read.

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Our literature has lost the leading role it played at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and the brilliance of experimentation that distinguished it in the 1920s. To the entire world the literary life of our country now appears as something infinitely poorer, flatter and lower than it actually is, then it would appear if it were not restricted, hemmed in.

The losers are both our country, in world public opinion, and world literature itself. If the world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of the world would move along in a different way, acquiring a new stability and attaining even a new artistic threshold.

I propose that the congress adopt a resolution that would demand and insure the abolition of all censorship, overt or hidden, of all fictional writing and release publishing houses from the obligation of obtaining authorization for the publication of every printed page.

II.

The duties of the union toward its members:

These duties are not clearly formulated in the statutes of the Union of Soviet Writers (under "Protection of copyright" and "Measures for the protection of other rights of writers"), and it is sad to find that for a third of a century the union has defended neither the "other rights nor even the copyright of persecuted writers.

Many writers were subjected during their lifetime to abuse and slander in the press and from rostrums without being given the physical possibility of replying. Moreover they have been exposed to violence and personal persecution (Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Zoshchenko, Platonov, Aleksandr Grin, Vasily Grossman).

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The Union of Writers not only did not make available its own publications for reply and justification, not only did not come out in defense of these writers, but through its leadership was always first among the persecutors.

Names that adorned our poetry of the 20th century found themselves on lists of those excluded from the union or not even admitted to the union in the first place.

The leadership of the union cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution ended in exile, camps and death (Pavel, Vasilyev, Mandelshtam, Artem Vesely, Pilnyak, Babel, Tabidze, Zapolotsky and others).

The list must be cut off at "and others." We learned after the 20th congress of the party [on de-Stalinization in 1956] that there were more than 600 writers whom the union had obediently handed over to their fate in prisons and camps.

However, the roll is even longer, and its curled-up end cannot be read and will never be read by our eyes. It contains the names of young prose writers and poets whom we may have known only accidentally through personal meetings, whose talents were crushed in camps before being able to blossom, whose writings never got further than the offices of the state security service in the days of Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria and Abakumov [heads of the secret police under Stalin].

There is no historical necessity for the newly elected leadership of the union to share with preceding leaderships responsibility for the past.

I propose that paragraph 22 of the union statutes clearly formulate all the guarantees for the defense of union members who are subjected to slander and unjust persecutions so that past illegalities will not be repeated.

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III.

If the congress will not remain indifferent to what I have said, I also ask that it consider the interdiction and persecutions to which I myself have been subjected.

1. My novel "In the First Circle" was taken away from me by the state security people, and this has prevented it from being submitted to publishers. Instead, in my lifetime, against my will and even without my knowledge, this novel has been "published" in an unnatural "closed" edition for reading by a selected unidentified circle. My novel has become available to literary officials, but is being concealed from most writers. I have been unable to insure open discussion of the novel within writers associations and to prevent misuse and plagiarism.

2. Together with the novel, my literary archives dating back 15 and 20 years, things that were not intended for publication, were taken away from me. Now tendentious excerpts from these files have also been covertly "published" and are being circulated within the same circles. The play "Feast of the Victors," which I wrote down from memory in camp, where I figured under four serial numbers (at a time when, condemned to die by starvation, we were forgotten by society and no one outside the camps came out against repressions), this play, now left far behind, is being ascribed to me as my very latest work.

3. For three years now an irresponsible campaign of slander is being conducted against me, who fought all through the war as a battery commander and received military decorations. It is being said that I served time as a criminal, or surrendered to the enemy, (I was never a prisoner of war), that I "betrayed" my country, "served the Germans". That is the interpretation now being put on the 11 years I spent in camps and exile for having criticized Stalin. This slander is being spread in secret instructions and meetings by people holding official positions. I vainly tried to stop the slander by appealing to the board of the Writers Union of the R.S.F.R. [Russian Republic], and to the press. The board did not even

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react, and not a single paper printed my reply to the slanderers. On the contrary, slander against me from rostrums has intensified and become more vicious within the last year, making use of distorted material from my confiscated files, and I have no way of replying.

4. My story "The Cancer Ward," the first part of which was approved for publication by the prose department of the Moscow writers organization, cannot be published either by chapters, rejected by five magazines, or in its entirety, rejected by Novy Mir, Zvezda and Prostor [literary journals].

5. The play "The Reindeer and the Little Hut," accepted in 1962 by the Theater Sovremennik [in Moscow], has thus far not received permission to be performed.

6. The screen play, "The Tanks Know the Truth," the stage play "The Light That Is in You," short stories, "The Right Hand," the series "Small Bits," cannot find either a producer or a publisher.

7. My stories published in Novy Mir have never been reprinted in book form, having been rejected everywhere--by the Soviet Writer Publishers, the State Literature Publishing House, the Ogonyok Library. They thus remain inaccessible to the general reading public.

8. I have also been prevented from having any other contacts with readers, public readings of my works --in November, 1966, 9 out of 11 scheduled meetings were canceled at the last moment--or readings over the radio. Even the simple act of giving a manuscript away for "reading and copying" has now become a criminal act, and the ancient Russian scribes were permitted to do.

My work has thus been finally smothered, gagged and slandered.

In view of such a gross infringement on my copyright and "other" rights, will the fourth congress defend me, yes or no? It seems to me that the choice is also not without importance for the literary future of several delegates.

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I am, of course, confident that I will fulfill my duty as a writer under all circumstances, from the grave even more successfully and more unchallenged than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to the truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to accept even death. But, maybe, many lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime. At no time has this ennobled our history.

A.I. Solzhenitsyn
May 16, 1967.

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APPENDIX F: TEXT OF VOZNESENSKIY LETTER, TO PRAVDA,
22 June 1966

For nearly a week now I have been living in an atmosphere of blackmail, confusion and provocation.

On June 16 I received an official notification from the Union of Writers that my trip to New York to give a reading at the Arts Festival there June 21 (this was the only poetry reading at the festival and it had been allotted to a Soviet poet) was "inadvisable."

I warned the leadership of the Union of Writers of the consequences of cancellation: the evening had been advertised for six months ahead, posters had been put up and tickets sold, and it would have been too late to arrange an alternative program. Despite my conviction that the union's decision was extremely unwise, I immediately, after talking with them, sent a cable to the United States saying I could not come.

But what does a poetry evening matter? That's not the main point. Let's also forget that at first (until June 16) everybody was in favor of it, but that then they suddenly changed their minds. What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruples that went with all this.

Here I have been working, taking part in functions organized by the Union of Writers, going to the theater, receiving foreign writers at the request of the Novosti agency, only to learn that for three days now the Union of Writers has been telling journalists that I am seriously ill. Of course, the leaders of the Union of Writers must know what they are talking about, but why haven't they at least informed me that I am sick? It's difficult to imagine anything more idiotic. It's an insult to elementary human dignity.

I am a Soviet writer, a human being made of flesh and blood, not a puppet to be pulled on string.

Why is it that I suddenly have to learn from foreign broadcasts that "the government of the U.S.S.R. has

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allowed Voznesenskiy to go to the festival. The ban has been lifted and he has received his visas. It now is only a matter of his getting a ticket . . ."

But at this very same moment the union tells me: "Your trip is off. In reply to questions we are saying you are ill." In other words they tell one lie to me and another to the world at large. What sort of position does that put me in? What am I supposed to tell people? Why, during all this, has nobody in the leadership of the Union of Writers bothered to call me and explain what was going on, or at least, tell me what the official reasons for my non-departure were? Why do they pull the wool over everybody's eyes by saying (variously) that I'm ill, that I've left it too late to get a ticket, or (now that everybody knows that it's too late for me to get to the poetry reading) that I am just about to leave? Why compromise a Soviet poet in the eyes of thousands of lovers of Soviet poetry? Why lead people to think that the reading might take place after all? Why involve the organizers of the evening in further expense? And why, in general, create all this fuss about my trip at such a crucial time as this in world affairs!

It is not a question of me personally, but of the fate of Soviet literature, its honor and prestige in the outside world. How much longer will we go on dragging ourselves through the mud? How much longer will the Union of Writers go on using methods like these?

Clearly the leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knocking people's heads together, is standard practice. This is what they do to many of my comrades. Letters to us often do not reach us, and sometimes replies are sent in our name. What boors, what chameleons they are! We are surrounded by lies, lies, lies, bad manners and lies.

I am ashamed to be a member of the same union as these people.

That is why I am writing to your newspaper, which is called "Truth" (Pravda).

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APPENDIX G: EXCERPTS FROM LITVINOV LETTER TO VARIOUS PAPERS

I regard it as my duty to make public the following:

On September 26, 1967, I was summoned by the Committee of State Security (K.G.B.) to appear before Gostev, an official of the K.G.B. Another officer of the K.G.B., who did not give his name, was present during our conversation.

After this talk was over, I wrote it down immediately and as fully as I could remember. I vouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between the representative of the K.G.B. and me.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, [we] have knowledge that you together with a group of other people intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.

I: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.

Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be held responsible for this.

I: I know the laws well and I cannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition of such a document.

Gostev: There is such an article, 190-1. Take the criminal code and read it.

I: I know this article very well and can recite it from memory. It deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What

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kind of slander could there be in recording the hearing of a case before a Soviet court?

Gostev; Well, your notes will be a biased distortion of facts and a slander of the court's actions, and that would be proved by the agency competent to handle such cases.

I: How can you possibly know this? Instead of starting a new case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumors circulating in Moscow.

Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.

I: If so, it is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people see that it is really an ordinary case.

Gostev: Vechernyaya Moskva (a Moscow newspaper) of September 4, 1967, gives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about that trial is in there.

I: In the first place, there is too little information: The reader who had heard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what it is all about. In the second place, it is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of Vechernyaya Moskva or the person who gave such information should be charged with slander.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.

I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty. Yet I who was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.

Gostev: What does it matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, he is guilty.

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I am not talking now about the court's decision; nor did the newspaper have it in mind. And confession of guilt by the defendant represents a completely independent judicial concept. In general, it would be a good idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for example, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.

Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.

I: His mother said so.

Gostev: Who cares what she said?

I: She did not tell it to me--I do not know her-- but to the court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slander.

Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about the conduct of her son. We can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind: Vechernyaya Moskva has printed all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information is completely true and we warn you that if not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this record, you specifically will be held responsible for it. You understand very well that such a record can be used by our ideological enemies, especially on the eve of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

I: But I do not know of any law that would prohibit the dissemination of a non-secret document only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical material from Soviet newspapers might also be misused by somebody.

Gostev: It should be clear to you what we are talking about. We are only warning you, and the court will prove the guilt.

I: It will prove it, I have no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes that clear. And how about my friend Aleksandr Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for the same kind of actions that you are warning me about?

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Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he is put on trial. He will be acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, in the 50th year of Soviet power, a Soviet court would make a wrong decision?

I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the public?

Gostev: It was not.

I: Yet it was impossible to get in.

Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There were representatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend to rent a club (auditorium) because of this case.

I: In other words, the public nature of legal proceedings was violated.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov (Maxim M. Litvinov, former Foreign Minister) is busy with such doings, this would be a blot on his memory.

I: Well, I do not think he would blame me. Can I go?

Gostev: Please, The best thing for you to do now would be to go home and destroy all that you've collected.

I know that a similar kind of conversation was conducted with Aleksandr Ginzburg two months before his arrest.

I am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded it.

P. M. LITVINOV.
Assistant in the Faculty
of Physics in Moscow,
Institute of Precision
Chemical Technology

October 3, 1967
Moscow, 8 Alexei Tolstoy
Street, Apartment 78.

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APPENDIX H: TEXT OF LITVINOV-DANIEL APPEAL, 12 January
1967

To World Public Opinion:

The judicial trial of [Yuri] Galanskov, [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, [Aleksei] Dobrovolsky and [Vera] Lashkova, which is taking place at present in the Moscow City Court, is being carried out in violation of the most important principles of Soviet law. The judge and the prosecutor, with the participation of a special kind of audience have turned the trial into a wild mockery of three of the accused --Galanskov, Ginzburg and Lashkova--and of the witnesses--unthinkable in the 20th century.

The case took on the character of the well-known "witch trials" on its second day, when Galanskov and Ginzburg--despite a year of preliminary incarceration, in spite of pressure from the court--refused to accept the groundless accusations made against them by Dobrovolsky and sought to prove their own innocence. Evidence by witnesses in favor of Galanskov and Ginzburg infuriated the court even more.

The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defense lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and the witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence that unmask the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.

Judge [Lev M.] Mironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defense to say only that which fits in with the program already prepared by the K.G.B. (state secret police) investigation. Whenever any participant in the trial departs from the rehearsed spectacle, the judge cries, "Your question is out of order," "This has no relation to the case," "I will not allow you to speak." These exclamations have been directed at the accused (apart from Dobrovolsky), to their lawyers and to the witnesses.

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The witnesses leave the court after their examination, or rather they are pushed out of the court, in a depressed state almost in hysterics.

Witness Yelena Basilova was not allowed to make a statement to the court--she wanted to record how the K.G.B. had prosecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence given during the investigation when he was in a certifiable state, plays an important role in the prosecution case. Basilova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience howled, drowning her words.

P. Grigorenko (former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko of the Soviet Army) submitted a request asking that he be examined as a witness because he could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky. Galanskov gave him this money. Grigorenko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly mentally ill. This is not true.

Witnesses Aida Topeshkina was not allowed to make a statement to the court in which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshkina, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom, while the audience howled at her.

The "commandant of the court," K.G.B. Colonel Tsirkunenko, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the court after a recess, and told her, "if you have given other evidence, you could have stayed."

None of the witnesses have been allowed to stay in the court after giving evidence, although they are obliged to stay under Soviet law. Appeals by the witnesses on the basis of Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [the relevant article] went unheeded, and the judge said sharply to witness V. Vinogradova, "You can just leave the court under Article 283."

The courtroom is filled with specially-selected people--officials of the K.G.B. and volunteer militia--who give the appearance of an open public trial. These

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people make a noise, laugh, and insult the accused and the witnesses. Judge Mironov had made no attempt to prevent these violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from the hall.

In this tense atmosphere there can be no pretense that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about it. The sentence was decided from the very start.

We appeal to world public opinion, and in the first place to the Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage:

Demand public condemnation of this shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it!

Demand the release of the accused from arrest!

Demand a new trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers!

Citizens of our country! This trial is a stain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of everyone of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges--demand that they be deprived of the posts which they have abused. Today it is not only the fate of the three accused which is in danger--their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirties, which involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.

We pass this appeal to the Western progressive press, and ask for it to be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible. We are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers because that is hopeless.

(signed)


LARISA BOGORAZ-DANIEL
Moscow, V-261,
Leninsky Prospect 85,
Flat 3

PAVEL LITVINOV
Moscow, K-1, Ulitsa Alexei,
Tolstoy 8, Flat 78.

-129-

~~SECRET~~


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ERRATA

The attached pictures are part of an Intelligence Report previously disseminated--the Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership Struggle, reference title CAESAR XXXII, RSS No. 0030A/68, 17 July 1968.

~~SECRET~~





STALIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

JUNE 1967

CPSU POLITBURO

Full Members

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
PELSHE
PODGORNYI
POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SUSLOV
VORONOV

Candidate Members

ANDROPOV¹
DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
KUNAYEV
MASHEROV
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
SHCHERBITSKIY
USTINOV

CPSU SECRETARIAT

BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV
KULAKOV
PONOMAREV
SHELEPIN²
SOLOMENTSEV³
SUSLOV
USTINOV

SEPTEMBER 1967

CPSU POLITBURO

Full Members

BREZHNEV
KIRILENKO
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
PELSHE
PODGORNYI
POLYANSKIY
SHELEPIN
SHELEST
SUSLOV
VORONOV

Candidate Members

ANDROPOV
DEMICHEV
GRISHIN
KUNAYEV
MASHEROV
MZHAVANADZE
RASHIDOV
SHCHERBITSKIY
USTINOV

CPSU SECRETARIAT

BREZHNEV
DEMICHEV
KAPITONOV
KULAKOV
PONOMAREV
SOLOMENTSEV
SUSLOV
USTINOV

1. Elected in June 1967 and dropped from Secretariat.
2. Dropped in September 1967.
3. Elected in December 1966.

~~SECRET~~

NATURE OF THE LEADERSHIP



COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP



FIRST AMONG EQUALS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAJOR PROTAGONISTS



BREZHNEV



SHELEPIN



PODGORNY



SUSLOV



KOSYGIN



MIKOYAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SHELEPIN SUPPORTERS



SEMICHASTNYY



YEGORYCHEV



PAYLOV


BELORUSSIAN CLIQUE



MAZUROV



MASHEROV



ZIMYANIN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

KEY FIGURES IN THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT



MALINOVSKIY



GRECHKO



YEPISHEV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIBERAL SPOKESMEN



RUMYANTSEV




TVARDOVSKIY



VOZNESENSKIY



YEVTUSHENKO



ERENBURG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISSENTING WRITERS



SINYAVSKIY



DANIEL



SOLZHENITSYN




GINSBURG




GALANSKOV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGIONAL LEADERS



MZHAVANADZE



KUNAYEV



SHELEST



TOLSTIKOV




PELSHE



BODYUL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE CHANGING SCENE



September 1965

FRONT ROW: R. TO L.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN, PODGORNYY,
SUSLOV


BACK ROW: R. TO L.
POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, VORONOV,
SHELEPIN, GRISHIN



August 1966

FRONT ROW: R. TO L.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, PODGORNYY, SUSLOV,
VORONOV

BACK ROW: R. TO L.
POLYANSKIY, KIRILENKO, MAZUROV,
SHELEPIN, PELSHE



November 1965

L. TO R.
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, MIKOYAN, SUSLOV
PODGORNYY



April 1966

L. TO R.
PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, BREZHNEV, SUSLOV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Secret~~



~~Secret~~