


### **INTRODUCTION**

Human error remains the leading cause of Navy and Marine mishaps. Mishaps are rarely attributed to a single cause but are often the end result of a series of errors, sometimes called the "Swiss Cheese Model" (see below). Root cause analysis can be performed in many different ways, but it always comes down to first asking why something occurred. Start with the problem, asking what prompted the problem to happen in the first place. Then keep taking it further and further until you can pinpoint specific processes, policies, or procedures that didn't work. It all comes down to asking "why?" until you see a pattern in the problem. This HFACS flip book was developed as a tool to guide in root cause analysis, and can also be used to develop interview questions, determine potential ORM hazards, and detect human error trends. The concept of Human Factors Analysis and Classification flip book is to provide a quick reference guide for mishap investigators. This booklet demonstrates a hierarchical approach to link each act to a precondition to supervisory and then organizational role. This tool can help identify the starting point of the investigation.

### **BENEFITS OF DOD HFACS**

- 1 Structured analysis of human error
  - Sophisticated, complete...yet operational
  - Detects error patterns
- 1 Gets to the "why"... not just the "what"
  - More insightful root cause determination
  - Better CO decisions...more effective ORM
- 1 A new, data-driven approach
  - Supports research across the Force
  - Easily applied to large body of existing data
  - Easily applied to new incidents and mishaps
- 1 Can be used for more than Operational purposes
  - Can be a tool for ORM brainstorming
  - Can help develop interview questions
  - Applies to both on-duty and off-duty evolutions




### HOW IT WORKS

Start at the lowest level and ask "What did the person do, or not do, to cause the mishap (e.g., pushed the wrong button, made a bad decision, or violated the regulations)?" This is called the "Acts" level. Using the HFACS model on the next page, look at the boxes under "Acts", along with the most common types of errors, and pick those that apply to your situation.

- 1 Next, ask "Why did the person do this unsafe act?" This is what is called the "Precondition" level. Perhaps he was fatigued, going through a divorce, complacent, or was trying to do the procedure in really bad weather. Just like before, look at all the boxes under "Preconditions", along with the most common types, and pick those that apply.
- 1 Now that you know the preconditions for the individual, you look at what the command's role was in this event. Many times we find that someone in the command knew about the person's preconditions, but didn't take steps to prevent disaster, or perhaps there were SOPs in place, but they were unclear or not enforced. This level helps the command to know where they can tighten up things.
- 1 Finally, you look at the organization as a whole. Perhaps the procedures the guy was given to use were unclear or the training he got was inadequate. Sometimes we even find that because of big-Navy budget issues, items are known to be faulty but don't get fixed.

**DoD HFACS** 



## "What happened?" (Acts)

<u>SKILL-BASED ERRORS</u>: Errors that occur during an individual's performance of a routine, highly practiced task that are considered "ingrained" skills.

٠	Unintended operation of equipment	AE101
	Checklist not followed correctly	
	Procedure not followed correctly	
	Over-controlled/ Under-controlled aircraft/vehicle	
	Breakdown in visual scan	
٠	Inadequate Anti-G straining maneuver	AE106

<u>JUDGMENT & DECISION-MAKING ERRORS</u>: Errors that occur when an individual proceeds as he intended, yet the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation (i.e., "an honest mistake").

٠	Inadequate real-time risk assessment (e.g. failure of Time Critical ORM)	AE 201
٠	Failure to prioritize tasks adequately	AE 202
٠	Rushed a necessary action	AE 203
	Delayed a necessary action	
	Ignored a Caution/Warning	
	Wrong choice of action during an operation	
	(e.g. wrong response to an emergency)	

<u>PERCEPTION ERRORS</u>: Unique skill-based and decision-based errors that occur as a result of an individual's inappropriate response to his degraded or "unusual" sensory inputs (such as sight, hearing, or balance illusions).

Note: Specific type of skill-based and decision errors will need to be identified with this error.

<u>VIOLATIONS</u>: Are factors in a mishap when the operator <u>intentionally</u> breaks the rules and instructions. <u>Violations are deliberate</u>.

- Extreme violation (e.g. a violation not condoned by management) ...... AV003

## "Why did they do it?" (Preconditions)

<u>PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT</u>: Are factors when the environment such as weather, climate, brownout (dust or sand storm) or whiteout (snow storm) affect the actions of individual.

• • • • •	Icing/fog on window restricts vision	PE 102 PE 103 PE 104 PE 105 PE 106 PE 107 PE 108 PE 109 PE 110
	Noise Brownout (e.g. sand storm)/Whiteout (e.g. snow storm)	

<u>TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT</u>: Are factors in a mishap when automation or the design of the workspace (e.g., cockpit, inside vehicle, or control station) affects the actions of an individual.

* * * *	Seat and restraint systems problems Instrumentation and warning system issues Visibility restrictions (not weather related) Controls and switches are inadequate Automated system creates an unsafe situation Workspace incompatible with operation Personal equipment interference	PE 202 PE 203 PE 204 PE 204 PE 205 PE 206 PE 207
	Communication equipment inadequate	

<u>SELF-IMPOSED STRESS</u>: Operator demonstrates disregard for rules and instructions that govern the individual's readiness to perform.

٠	Physical fitness level (inappropriate for mission demands) PP 201
٠	AlcoholPP 202
٠	Drugs/over-the-counter medication/supplements (not prescribed) PP 203
٠	Nutrition/diet PP 204
٠	Inadequate rest (self-imposed) PP 205
	Operating with known disqualifying medical condition PP 206

## Preconditions (Continued)

<u>COORDINATION/COMMUNICATION/PLANNING FACTORS</u>: Refer to interactions among individuals, crews, and teams involved with the preparation and execution of a mission that resulted in human error or an unsafe situation.

٠	Failure of crew/team leadership	PP 101
٠	Failure to cross-check/ back-up	PP 102
٠	Inadequate task delegation	PP 103
٠	Rank/position intimidation	PP 104
٠	Lack of assertiveness	
٠	Critical information not communicated	PP 106
٠	Standard/proper terminology not used	PP 107
٠	Failure to ensure communicated intentions/actions were	
	understood and followed	PP 108
٠	Mission planning inadequate	PP 109
٠	Mission briefing inadequate	PP 110
٠	Failure to re-assess risk and adjust to changing circumstances	PP 111
٠	Information is misinterpreted or disregarded	PP 112

<u>AWARENESS (COGNITIVE) FACTORS:</u> Attention management or awareness failures that affect the perception or performance of individuals.

٠	Not paying attention	PC 101
٠	Fixation ("channelized attention")	PC 102
٠	Task over-saturation (e.g., too much information to process)	PC 103
٠	Confusion	PC 104
٠	Negative transfer (e.g., using old procedures for a new system)	PC 105
٠	Distraction	PC 106
٠	Geographically lost (Confusion about location)	PC 107
٠	Interference/interruption during task	PC 108

<u>PHYSICAL/MENTAL LIMITATIONS</u>: Limitations in physical or mental capabilities that decrease the ability to cope with a situation.

٠	Learning rate limitations	PC 401
	Memory limitations	
	Body size/movement limitations	
	Coordination deficiency	
	Technical or procedural knowledge not retained after training	

## Preconditions (Continued)

<u>PERCEPTUAL FACTORS</u>: Degraded sensory inputs (visual, auditory, or vestibular) create a misperception of an object, threat, or situation.

• • •	Motion illusion Turning illusion/balance Visual illusion Misperception of changing environment	PC 502 PC 503
٠	Misinterpreted/misread instrument	PC 505
	(e.g., misjudge altitude/distance/speed)	
٠	Inaccurate expectation (e.g., seeing/hearing what is expected	
	instead of what is actually there/heard)	PC 506
٠	Misinterpretation of auditory cues	
٠	Spatial disorientation not recognized	PC 508
٠	Spatial disorientation recognized	PC 509
٠	Spatial disorientation incapacitating	PC 510
٠	Time distortion	PC 511

<u>PSYCHO-BEHAVIORAL FACTORS</u>: Factors when an individual's personality traits, psychosocial problems, psychological disorders, or inappropriate motivation creates an unsafe situation.

\* As determined by qualified medical personnel.

## Preconditions (Continued)

<u>ADVERSE PHYSIOLOGICAL STATES:</u> Medical or physiological conditions that can result in unsafe situations

• •	Effects of G forces (e.g., G-LOC) Effects of prescribed drugs Operational injury/illness	PC 302
٠	Sudden incapacitation/unconsciousness (not due to G)	
٠	Pre-existing physical illness/injury	PC 305
٠	Physical overexertion	
٠	Fatigue (sleep deprivation)	PC 307
٠	Circadian rhythm de-synchronization (e.g., jet lag or shift work)	PC 308
٠	Motion sickness	PC 309
٠	Trapped gas disorders	PC 310
٠	Evolved gas disorders (e.g., decompression sickness/bends)	PC 311
٠	Reduced oxygen (hypoxia)	PC 312
٠	Hyperventilation (rapid breathing)	PC 313
٠	Inadequate adaptation to darkness	PC 314
٠	Dehydration	
٠	Physical task over-saturation	PC 316

## "What errors did the command make?" (Supervision)

<u>INADEQUATE SUPERVISION:</u> Is a factor in a mishap when department-level or command-level supervision proves inappropriate or improper and/or fails to identify hazards, recognize and control risk, provide guidance, training and/or oversight and results in human error or an unsafe situation.

٠	Command oversight inadequate	. SI 001
	Failed to ensure proper role-modeling	
٠	Failed to provide proper training	. SI 003
	Failed to provide appropriate policy/guidance	
٠	Personality conflict with supervisor	SI 005
٠	Lack of supervisory responses to critical information	. SI 006

<u>FAILURE TO CORRECT KNOWN PROBLEM</u>: This is a factor in a mishap when supervision fails to correct known deficiencies in documents, processes or procedures, or fails to correct inappropriate or unsafe actions of individuals, and this lack of supervisory action creates an unsafe situation.

٠	Failed to identify/correct risky behavior	SF 001
	Failed to correct upsafe practices	SE 002

Failed to correct unsate practices...... SF 002

<u>PLANNED INAPPROPRIATE OPERATIONS</u>: Are factors in a mishap when supervision fails to adequately plan or assess the hazards associated with an operation and allows for unnecessary risk.

٠	Directed mission beyond personnel capabilities	SP 001
٠	Personnel mismatch	SP 002
٠	Selected individual with lack of current experience	SP 003
٠	Selected individual with limited overall experience	SP 004
٠	Selected individual with lack of proficiency	SP 005
	Performed inadequate risk assessment	
	Authorized unnecessary hazard	

<u>SUPERVISORY VIOLATIONS</u>: Are factors in a mishap when supervisors willfully disregard instructions or policies, that creating the unsafe situation.

٠	Failure to enforce existing rules	SV	001
	Allowing unwritten policies to become standard		
•	Directed individual to violate existing regulations	SV	003
•	Authorized unqualified individuals for mission	SV	004

## "Did organizational errors influence the outcome?" (Organizational Influence)

<u>RESOURCE/ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT:</u> Resource management is a factor when processes or policies influence system safety, result in inadequate error management or create an unsafe situation

Air traffic control resources are deficient	OR 001
Airfield resources are deficient	
Operational support facilities/equipment are deficient	OR 003
<ul> <li>Purchasing or providing poorly designed or unsuitable equipment</li> </ul>	OR 004
<ul> <li>Failure to remove inadequate/worn-out equipment in a timely manne</li> </ul>	r OR 005
Personnel recruiting and selection policies are inadequate	OR 006
Failure to provide adequate manning/staffing resources	OR 007
Failure to provide adequate operational informational resources	
Failure to provide adequate funding	OR 009

<u>ORGANIZATIONAL CLIMATE:</u> Is a factor in a mishap where the working atmosphere within the organization influences individual actions resulting in human error. (e.g., command structure, policies, and working environment)

٠	Organizational culture (attitude/actions) allows for unsafe mission demand/pressure	OC 001
٠	Inappropriate perception of promotion or evaluation procedures	
	lead to an unsafe act	OC 002
•	Organizational over-confidence or under-confidence in equipment Impending unit deactivation or mission/equipment change	OC 003
•	leads to unsafe situation	
•	Organizational structure is unclear or inadequate	OC 005

<u>ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES</u>: Organizational processes are factors in a mishap if these processes negatively influence performance and result in an unsafe situation.

	Pace of ops-tempo/workload creates unsafe situation Organizational program/policy risks not adequately assessed,	OP 001
·	leading to an unsafe situation	OP 002
	Provided inadequate procedural guidance or publications	OP 003
٠	Organizational (formal) training is inadequate or unavailable	OP 004
٠	Flawed doctrine/philosophy leads to unnecessary risks	OP 005
	Inadequate program management leads to unsafe situation	


### Sample Case Study

A 21-year-old man was driving his motorcycle home after working the mid-watch. He noticed his LPO's car at a bar along the way, and decided to stop and have a drink with him, even though he was tired. Well, as was usually the case for him, one drink turned into a couple, which turned into several. When he decided to call it a night, he staggered out of the bar into a pouring rain, jumped on his motorcycle, and took off into the night. Feeling invincible, he was speeding and weaving in and out of traffic until he found himself behind a semi-truck whose driver suddenly slammed on the brakes. He didn't see the brake lights in time and lost control of his motorcycle, causing him to swerve into oncoming traffic where he hit a 20-year-old woman's vehicle. The crash killed the woman, but he walked away with only some terrible road rash and other minor injuries.

Before this incident, our motorcyclist had a prior DUI. His command set him up with a meeting with DAPA, but he decided that he didn't need it and didn't go. No one at his command bothered to make sure he followed though with the DAPA. According to his LPO, our motorcyclist was quite the heavy drinker, but no one in his chain of command had counseled him about his drinking habits. Speeding was a repeated offense for him and he had never taken the required motorcycle safety course. He had told his LPO that he had tried to enroll last year, but that there weren't enough classes available.



## Sample Case Study (Cont)



# Causal Factor 3:

ACTS: What caused him to drive recklessly (speeding, DUI, weaving in and out of traffic)?
<ul> <li><i>Extreme Violation (AV003)</i></li> <li>He intentionally violated speeding rules and chose to drive under the influence.</li> </ul>
PRECONDITIONS:       Why did he violate the rules?         Self-imposed stress       Alcohol impaired his judgment.         • Alcohol (PP201)       He was feeling invincible.
<ul> <li>Overconfidence (PC205)</li> <li>Personality style (PC205)</li> <li>Coordination/Communication/Planning</li> <li>Failure of crew/team leadership (PP101)</li> </ul>
LPO failed to take action, and prevented intoxicated Sailor from driving.
SUPERVISION: Could the command have influenced his extreme behavior?         Inadequate Supervision       Command oversight inadequate (SI 001)         Failure to Correct Known Problem       Command id not ensure sailor went to DAPA appointment.
• Failure to identify/correct risky behavior (SF001) Command knew he was a heavy drinker, but did not council him.
ORGANIZATIONAL: Could the Navy have influenced his extreme behavior?

• None noted.

This booklet is a result of a collaborative effort from many contributors. Both a print and electronic version of this booklet is available. The electronic version is available on line at the Naval Safety Center's Home Page:

http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/aviation/aeromedical/downloads/human\_factor\_analysis\_flipbook.pdf.

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Special thank you to the editor in Code 70 for proofreading and providing input to this booklet

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