Publications: Charter Flips by National Banks
by Gary Whalen
Abstract
Bank management can change its charter and so its supervisor(s) at any time. Some
argue that the supervisory competition resulting from the existence of the charter flip
option promotes more efficient bank regulation. Others assert that it leads to
"competition in laxity" as supervisors compete for clientele. Research on this issue is
warranted because little empirical research on charter flips is available and the frequency
of flips appears to have risen during the past decade.
Disclaimer
Any whole or partial reproduction of material in this paper should include the following citation: Gary Whalen, "Charter Flips by National Banks," Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, E&PA Working Paper 2002-1, June 2002.
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