Statement of
Dr. Ronald P. Sanders
Associate Director for Strategic Human Resources Policy
U.S. Office of Personnel Management
Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
On
"Unlocking the Potential within Homeland Security:
the New Human Resources System"
February 10, 2005
I. Introduction
Mr. Chairman, I am Dr. Ronald P. Sanders, the Associate Director for
Strategic Human Resources Policy at the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM). On behalf of OPM, it is my privilege to appear before you today
to discuss the final regulations implementing a new human resources (HR)
management system in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) - a system
that we truly believe is as flexible, contemporary, and excellent as the
President and the Congress envisioned. It has been an honor for OPM (and
for me personally) to work with the dedicated men and women of DHS, including
its senior leaders, employees and union representatives, other stakeholders,
and the Congress, to develop this system. It is the result of an intensely
collaborative process that has taken almost two years -- and we are all
quite proud of it. However, it is not the end, but only the end of the
beginning, and the Department must now embark upon the challenge of implementation.
As it does, I want to express our appreciation to you for your leadership,
and that of this Subcommittee, in this historic effort. Without it, we
would not be here today, and we look forward to it in the future.
Mr. Chairman, with the Homeland Security Act of 2002, you and other Members
of Congress gave the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of
the Office of Personnel Management extraordinary authority, and with it
a grand trust: to work together with the Department's employees and their
union representatives to establish a "21st century human resources
management system" that fully supports the Department's vital mission
without compromising the core principles of merit and fairness that ground
the Federal civil service. Striking the right balance, between transformation
on one hand and tradition on the other, is an essential part of that trust,
and we believe we have lived up to it in these final regulations.
I would like to address the question of balance this morning, with a particular focus on three of the most vital components of the new HR system established by the final regulations: performance-based pay, employee accountability, and labor-management relations. In each case, I will discuss the careful and critical balance we have struck between operational imperatives and employee interests, without compromising on either mission or merit. The final result achieves that balance, and in so doing, what we have accomplished may very well serve as a model for the rest of the Federal Government.
II. Pay, Performance, and "Politicization"
The new pay system established by the regulations was designed to fundamentally
change the way DHS employees are paid, to place far more emphasis on performance
and market in setting and adjusting rates of pay. Instead of a "one
size fits all" pay system based on tenure, we have established one
that bases all individual pay increases on performance. No longer will
employees who are rated as unacceptable performers receive annual across-the-board
pay adjustments, as they do today. Instead, only those who meet or exceed
performance expectations will receive any such adjustments. No longer
will those annual pay adjustments apply to all occupations and levels
of responsibility, regardless of market or mission value. Instead, those
adjustments will be based on national and local labor market trends, budget,
recruiting and retention patterns, and other factors - as well as substantial
and substantive union input. And no longer will employees who merely meet
time-in-grade receive virtually automatic pay increases, as they do today.
Instead, individual pay raises will be determined by an employee's annual
performance rating.
This system is entirely consistent with the merit system principles that
are so fundamental to our civil service. One of those principles states
that Federal employees should be compensated ". . . with appropriate
consideration for both national and local rates paid by employers . .
. and appropriate incentives and recognition . . . for excellence in performance."
See 5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(3). However, some have argued that by placing so
much emphasis on performance, we risk "politicizing" DHS and
its employees. This is a most serious charge. Such a result, if true,
would constitute a prohibited personnel practice, something expressly
forbidden by the Congress in giving DHS and OPM authority to jointly prescribe
these regulations. Moreover, it would tear at the very fabric of our civil
service system. Fortunately, nothing could be further from the truth.
The merit system principles provide that Federal employees should be
". . . protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or
coercion for partisan political purposes." See 5 U.S.C. 2301(b)(8)(A).
And they are. Section 2302(b)(3) of title 5, United States Code, makes
it a prohibited personnel practice to "coerce the political activity
of any person . . . or take any action against any employee" for
such activity. This law is still in place and binding on DHS. The law
forbids any political influence in taking any personnel action with respect
to covered positions, and it most certainly applies to making individual
pay determinations. The DHS regulations did not dilute these prohibitions
in any way; indeed, they could not . . . and we would not. This is no
hollow promise. A close examination of the DHS regulations reveals that
they include considerable protection against such practices - and no less
than every other Federal employee enjoys today.
For example, if a DHS employee believes that decisions regarding his
or her pay have been influenced by political considerations, he or she
has a right to raise such allegations with the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC), to have OSC investigate and where appropriate, prosecute them,
and to be absolutely protected from reprisal and retaliation in so doing.
These rights have not been diminished in any way whatsoever. Moreover,
supervisors have no discretion with regard to the actual amount of performance
pay an employee receives. That amount is driven strictly by mathematical
formula -- an approach recommended by the DHS unions during the meet-and-confer
process. Of the four variables in that formula -- the employee's annual
performance rating; the "value" of that rating, expressed as
a number of points or shares; the amount of money in the performance pay
pool and the distribution of ratings -- only the annual rating is determined
by an employee's immediate supervisor, and it is subject to review and
approval by the employee's second-level manager.
Once that rating is approved, an employee can still challenge it if he
or she doesn't think it is fair - indeed, employees represented by a union
will even be able to contest their performance ratings all the way to
a neutral arbitrator, if their union permits. And if it gets to arbitration,
the arbitrator will review the grievance according to specific standards
set forth in the regulations, standards based directly on union input
provided during the meet-and-confer process. Finally, the other factors
governing performance pay are also shielded from any sort of manipulation.
Individual managers will have no say in how many points or shares a rating
is worth, or how much money is in the pool; that will be determined at
the headquarters level -- with union input and oversight through a new
Compensation Committee (another product of the meet-and-confer process)
that gives them far more say in such matters than they have today. And
as far as the distribution of ratings is concerned, the regulations ban
any sort of quota or forced distribution. Period.
Of course, DHS managers will receive intensive training in the new system, a further safeguard against abuse. And they too will be covered by it, with their pay determined by how effectively they administer this system. The same is true of their executives, now covered by the new Senior Executive Service pay-for-performance system - indeed, OPM regulations governing that system establish clear chain-of-command accountability in this regard. With these considerable protections in place, we believe that there is no danger whatsoever that the pay of individual DHS employees will become "politicized" just because it will be more performance-based. To the contrary, we believe that the American people expect and demand that performance determine the pay of "their" employees. That is exactly what the DHS pay system is intended to do.
III. Accountability and Due Process
Public trust is essential to the success of the Department's homeland
security mission. DHS has a special responsibility to American citizens;
many of its employees have the authority to search, seize, enforce, arrest,
and even use deadly force in the performance of their duties, and their
application of these powers must be beyond question. By its very nature,
the DHS mission requires a high level of workplace accountability, and
Congress recognized this fact when it gave DHS and OPM the authority to
waive those chapters of title 5, United States Code, that deal with adverse
actions and appeals. However, in so doing, Congress also assured DHS employees
that they would continue to be afforded the protections of due process.
We believe that the regulations strike this balance. They assure far greater
individual accountability, but without compromising the protections Congress
guaranteed.
In this regard, DHS employees are still guaranteed notice of a proposed
adverse action. While the regulations provide for a shorter, 15-day minimum
notice period, (compared to a 30-day notice under current law), this fundamental
element of due process is preserved. Employees also have a right to be
heard before a proposed adverse action is taken against them. This too
is a fundamental element of due process, and the regulations also provide
an employee a minimum of 10 days to respond to the charges specified in
that notice - compared to 7 days today. In addition, the final regulations
continue to guarantee an employee the right to appeal an adverse action
to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), except those involving a
Mandatory Removal Offense (MRO; see below). And as a result of the meet-and-confer
process with DHS unions, the regulations also provide bargaining unit
employees the option of contesting a non-MRO adverse action through a
negotiated grievance procedure . . . all the way to a neutral private
arbitrator, if their union permits. The proposed rules had only provided
for adverse action appeals to MSPB.
The final regulations continue to authorize the Secretary to establish
a number of MROs that he or she determines will ". . . have a direct
and substantial adverse impact on the ability of the Department to carry
out its homeland security mission" - like accepting a bribe to compromise
border security, or aiding and abetting a potential act of terrorism.
And, we have provided examples of potential MROs in the supplementary
information accompanying the final regulations, as you had requested,
Mr. Chairman. At the same time, the regulations provide a number of checks
and balances on the use of this authority: MROs must be published in the
Federal Register after consultation with the Justice Department, and they
must be communicated to all employees on an annual basis; in addition,
the regulations require case-by-case Department-level approval before
an employee is charged with one. The final regulations also provide full
due process to employees charged with a Mandatory Removal Offense. An
employee is still entitled to a notice of proposed adverse action, the
right to reply to the charges set forth in that notice, and the right
to representation.
The regulations also permit an employee to appeal an MRO to an independent
Mandatory Removal Panel, comprising three individuals appointed by the
Secretary for their "impartiality and integrity," as well as
their expertise in the Department's mission. Some have charged that this
Panel somehow is unlawful because it lacks independent outside review,
but nothing could be further from the truth. First, once appointed, the
Panel will operate outside the DHS chain of command- its members do not
report to the Secretary or any other management official and are every
bit as independent as an agency's administrative law judges (ALJs). And
just as ALJ rulings are binding on the agency that appoints them, so too
are the Panel's determinations binding on DHS with respect to MROs - subject
to appeal by either party to the MSPB and the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Panel's independence is further guaranteed by special protections
against removal of its members - protections that are patterned after
those that shield members of the MSPB. Second, the Panel's decisions are
in fact subject to outside review - indeed, at least two levels of such
review. An employee can appeal a Panel decision to MSPB, under the very
same standards that the Federal Circuit employs in reconsidering MSPB
decisions. And once the Board has ruled on the matter, the employee is
entitled to seek judicial review with the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
Further, in adjudicating employee appeals, regardless of forum, the final
regulations place a heavy burden on the agency to prove its case against
an employee. Indeed, in another major change resulting from the meet-and-confer
process, the regulations actually establish a higher burden of proof:
a "preponderance of the evidence" standard for all adverse actions,
whether based on conduct or performance. While this is the standard that
applies to conduct-based adverse actions under current law, it is greater
than the "substantial" evidence standard presently required
to sustain a performance-based adverse action.
Finally, the regulations authorize MSPB (as well as arbitrators) to mitigate
penalties in adverse action cases. The proposed regulations precluded
such mitigation, as does current law in performance-based adverse actions.
However, mitigation may occur, but only under limited circumstances. Thus,
the final regulations provide that when the agency proves its case against
an employee by a preponderance of the evidence, MSPB (or a private arbitrator)
may reduce the penalty involved only when it is "so disproportionate
to the basis for the action that it is wholly without justification."
Much has been made of this standard. Although it is admittedly tougher
than the standards MSPB and private arbitrators apply to penalties in
conduct cases today, it provides those adjudicators considerably more
authority than they presently have in performance cases - current law
literally precludes them from mitigating a penalty in a performance-based
adverse action. Moreover, MSPB's current mitigation standards basically
allow it (and private arbitrators) to second-guess the reasonableness
of the agency's penalty in a misconduct case, without giving any special
deference or dispensation to an agency's mission. That is untenable.
The President, the Congress, and the American public all hold the Department accountable for accomplishing its homeland security mission. MSPB is not accountable for that mission, nor are private arbitrators. Given the extraordinary powers entrusted to the Department and its employees, and the potential consequences of poor performance or misconduct to that mission, DHS should be entitled to the benefit of any doubt in determining the most appropriate penalty for misconduct or poor performance on the job. There is a presumption that DHS officials will exercise that judgment in good faith. If they do not, however, providing MSPB (and private arbitrators) with limited authority to mitigate is a significant check on the Department's imposition of penalties. That is what the new mitigation standard is intended to do, and it is balanced by the higher standard of proof that must first be met.
IV. Mission Imperatives and Employee Interests
The Department has a covenant of accountability with the American people,
and it goes to the heart of another of the most controversial - and critical
- provisions of the regulations: labor relations. Accountability must
be matched by authority, and here, the current law governing relations
between labor and management is out of balance. Its requirements potentially
impede the Department's ability to act, and that cannot be allowed to
happen. The regulations ensure that the Department can meet its mission,
but in a way that still takes union and employee interests into account.
For example, today, in trying to bring about the most extensive reorganization
of the Federal Government since the 1940s, the Secretary of Homeland Security
cannot issue personnel rules and regulations that are binding on his subordinate
organizational units. Instead, those rules must be negotiated in all of
the 70-odd bargaining units currently recognized by DHS (covering only
about 25 percent of the Department's workforce) - many of which bear no
resemblance to the Department's organizational structure or chain of command.
Congress created DHS to assure unity of effort in the war on terror, but
how can that possibly happen if the Secretary cannot even issue regulations
that bind together the disparate mission elements that are comprised in
that merger? The final rules give him, but only him, the authority to
do so. Therein lies the balance: personnel policies, practices, and working
conditions are still subject to collective bargaining below the Departmental
level, but now, when the Secretary speaks, his organizational components
and their patchwork of bargaining units must listen.
Today, if the Department wants to introduce new security or search technology,
it cannot - not without first negotiating with the Department's various
unions, at their various sub-Department levels of recognition, over the
implementation and impact of that new technology on bargaining unit employees
. . . and it cannot act until those negotiations have been concluded.
How can we hold the Department accountable for homeland security if it
cannot act swiftly to take full advantage of new technology in the war
on terror? The final regulations give the Department the authority to
do so. DHS now will be able to introduce new technology when and as it
sees fit. However, that right is balanced by a requirement to negotiate
over appropriate arrangements for employees adversely impacted by that
new technology
after the fact - a recommendation you had made, Mr.
Chairman. Thus, new technology cannot be delayed by collective bargaining,
but as is the case today, negotiations will still be required over appropriate
arrangements for employees adversely affected by it.
Today, the Department cannot assign or temporarily deploy its front-line
employees without following complicated, seniority-based procedures governing
who, when, and how such assignments and deployments will take place -
procedures that have been negotiated with unions. And if there is an operational
exigency that those procedures did not anticipate, they cannot be modified
without further negotiations. These procedures can force the Department
to assign the least senior employee to a particular task, when the situation
may call for the most seasoned. Or they can require the Department to
assign volunteers from one unit to meet a critical operational need, and
in so doing, leave that unit understaffed. These are real situations,
with real operational impact, all the result of current law. The final
regulations prohibit negotiations over these operational procedures. However,
the regulations do require that managers "confer" with unions
over them, and they also permit employees to grieve alleged violations
-- all the way to arbitration, if their union permits; in addition, the
regulations continue to require full collective bargaining over non-operational
procedures governing such important subjects as promotion rules, discipline
and layoff procedures, overtime, etc.
You will hear much about what is wrong with these changes.
You will hear that current law already allows the agency to do whatever
it needs to do in an emergency. However, that statement, while true, explains
why the current law is inadequate when it comes to national security matters.
The Department needs the ability to move quickly on matters before they
become an emergency, and the current law does not allow DHS to take action
quickly to prevent an emergency, to prepare or practice for dealing with
an emergency, to deploy personnel or new technology to deter a potential
threat, or do any of the things I have described above. Rather, the current
law requires agencies to first negotiate with union over the implementation,
impact, procedures and arrangements before it can take any of those actions.
By the time an 'emergency' has arisen it is literally too late. On balance,
that simply cannot continue.
You will also hear that the Homeland Security Labor Relations Board (HSLRB),
to be appointed by the Secretary to resolve collective bargaining disputes
in the Department, will not be independent, and that its decisions will
not be impartial because they are not subject to "outside review."
The HSLRB is expressly designed to ensure that those who adjudicate labor
disputes in the Department have expertise in its mission, and its members
are every bit as independent as those of the Department's Mandatory Removal
Panel
or an agency's ALJs. Just as an agency's ALJs operate outside
the chain of command, so too will HSLRB's members. Just as ALJ decisions
are binding on the agency that employs them, so too will HSLRB's decisions
be binding - subject to appeal by either party to the FLRA and the Federal
Courts of Appeal. Thus, assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the
regulations make it patently clear that the HSLRB's decisions will be
subject to at least two levels of outside review.
V. Conclusion
If DHS is to be held accountable for homeland security, it must have
the authority and flexibility essential to that mission. That is why Congress
gave the Department and OPM approval to waive and revise the laws governing
classification, pay, performance management, labor relations, adverse
actions, and appeals. And that is why we have made the changes that we
did. However, in so doing we believe that we have succeeded in striking
a better balance - between union and employee interests on one hand, and
the Department's mission imperatives on the other.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond
to any questions you and members of the Subcommittee may have.