|
TESTIMONY
OF
HONORABLE ALBERT C. ZAPANTA
CHAIRMAN
RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD
BEFORE THE
HOUSE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TOTAL FORCE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REGARDING RESERVE COMPONENT
TRANSFORMATION AND RELIEVING THE STRESS ON
THE RESERVE COMPONENTS
March
31, 2004
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of
the Subcommittee, it is an honor to testify
before you today on behalf of the Reserve
Forces Policy Board (RFPB), and the
extraordinary men and women who serve in the
Reserve components.
My remarks will focus on several
strategic areas and issues the Board has
addressed that affect the Reserve components
today and will continue to affect them in
the future. We appreciate the support for
the Reserve Components that you have
demonstrated and we look forward to the
opportunity to assist you as you develop
legislation relating to them.
MISSION
The RFPB provides independent
timely policy advice, and recommendations to
the Secretary of Defense on challenges
facing the Reserve components. The
Secretary of Defense has asked the Board to
aid efforts to support transformation,
rebalance and strengthen the Reserve
components, and assist the Reserve
components in reconnecting with America.
BACKGROUND ON RESERVE
FORCES POLICY BOARD
As provided in Section 10301
of Title 10, the Reserve Forces Policy Board
is the principal policy advisor to
the Secretary of Defense on matters relating
to the Reserve components, and pursuant to
subsection 113(c)(2) of Title 10, is
required to prepare a separate annual report
on DoD reserve programs and other matters
considered by the Board to be appropriate
for inclusion, for transmission to the
President and Congress by the Secretary of
Defense. The Board consists of 24 members
that include myself as the statutory
chairman, the Assistant Secretaries for
Manpower and Reserve Affairs of each
Military Department, and Flag and General
Officers from the Active and Reserve forces
and the Coast Guard. The Regular officers
are directly designated by the respective
Service Secretaries. The Military Executive
is designated by the Chairman with approval
of the Secretary of Defense. The other
Reserve officers are designated by the
Secretary of Defense, upon recommendation of
the Service Secretaries after the Chairman's
review of their qualifications. Congress
has repeatedly stated its desire that the
Board act independently in its advisory and
reporting roles-a position the Board
steadfastly maintains and feels is more
important now than at any time due to
increased reliance on the Reserve component
forces and mobilizations in support of the
Global War on Terrorism.
We meet at least quarterly,
conduct field visits to talk with our
mobilized Guard and Reserve personnel and
their leadership, and conduct Citizen
Patriot Forums with business, community
leaders, and families of deployed Reserve
component members. Our statutorily required
annual report is in final coordination and
should be to the Secretary of Defense for
transmission to the President and Congress
prior to our April 20 Board meeting.
In the past two years, the
Board has visited Headquarters, Joint Forces
Command, Central Command, European Command,
Pacific Command, Southern Command, Special
Operations Command, Strategic Command,
Transportation Command, and Northern Command
to include Guard and Reserve personnel in
the U.S., Puerto Rico, Guantanamo Bay,
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Korea and we plan to
visit Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the
very near future. I can report that our
Guard and Reserve personnel serve with
utmost professionalism and esprit d' corps.
MOBILIZATION
RELATED CONCERNS
The
Total Force policies, Abrams Doctrine,
downsizing, and increasing demands to
support peacetime missions and contingencies
have been major factors in the increased
reliance on the Reserve Forces. From
September 11, 2001, through the end of 2003,
over 319,000 of the 1.2 million Reserve
component personnel (about 27 percent) were
called to active duty. Reserve component
members were quick to support operations
centers, flight operations, and to provide
security at the Pentagon, World Trade
Center, airports, seaports, and military
installations around the Nation. They
fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and
Iraq and tracked terrorists throughout Asia
and Africa. They are maintaining the peace
in the Sinai, Balkans, Afghanistan and now
Iraq, and participated in a wide range of
domestic missions. There is no indication
that this increased reliance on the Reserve
components will change in the foreseeable
future.
Since
September 11, 2001, numerous studies,
symposiums, conferences, and the documenting
of lessons learned have been performed to
closely evaluate how the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the Services accomplished
the business of mobilization and to pursue
the identification of organizational and
process improvements. Considerable evidence
exists that the current mobilization process
and organization is not sufficiently
responsive to 21st century
operational requirements and thus will not
serve the nation well in the future. The
goal has been to mobilize Reserve component
forces based on operational plans developed
through a deliberate planning process;
however, it is generally recognized that the
need exists to move toward a
capabilities-based approach in order to
better respond to the current threat
environment. The Services have used
predictable operating cycles and advance
notification to prepare for mobilizations.
The existing operation plans were not
sufficient to guide mobilizations; thus, a
modified process that relied on additional
management oversight and multiple layers of
coordination was utilized.
The mobilization process
typically begins with the identification of
requirements, which are then consolidated
and forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as "requests for forces" (RFF). The
Services review approved requirements and
coordinate with Force providers and Reserve
component headquarters to verify individual
and unit readiness. Finally, the Services
issue mobilization (activation) orders to
Reserve component units and individuals.
This entire process can take anywhere from
one day to several months, but normally
takes several weeks. Most Reserve component
members complete the activation process
within 24 to 96 hours though some Reserve
component members require lengthy post
activation/mobilization training that delays
movement into the theater of operation.
Unfortunately, problems (medical, dental,
family, employers) can appear at any time
during the process requiring a replacement
that further delays the process. Factors
that impact the efficiency of the
mobilization process consist of:
identifying valid mobilization requirements;
negotiating the approval process;
identifying and validating the appropriate
fill; certifying individual readiness;
notifying individuals in a timely manner;
timely processing of mobilization
(activation) orders; completing the
activation process which include, for
example, medical and dental certification,
benefits/legal and mission related
briefings, security clearance certification
or processing, uniform and personal
protective equipment issuance, establishing
active duty pay accounts; and, validating
mission specific training, equipment
processing, etc. This process offers many
challenges that can result in problems or
delays that negatively impact individuals,
families, and mission readiness if not done
efficiently and effectively.
To ease the pressure on
stressed Reserve force capabilities we have
found that Combatant Commanders should
request capabilities in as much detail as
possible without specifying which service
will provide them. All Services that have
forces available to meet a valid requested
capability should be used to meet
requirements. This should be done without a
bias toward selecting the Service that, in
the past, has traditionally provided the
requested capability. Joint Reserve
component sourcing solutions should be
sought that are judicious and prudent to
meet all requirements externally to the
Services, while supporting their internal
Service requirements for the provision of
additional activated forces.
To ensure judicious and
prudent use of Reserve components and to
reach a high level of efficiency and
effectiveness, significant improvements to
the mobilization process will require
changes in policy, law, and doctrine. As
DoD continues its commitment to winning the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the
magnitude and duration of the conflict make
the Reserve component's role essential. It
is important to protect this vital resource
and ensure it remains available and ready to
respond. The decision to activate Reserve
component forces must be made only after
determining that it is both judicious and
prudent to do so. The following precepts
have been proposed, and supported by the
Board, for consideration before sourcing a
required capability to a Reserve component
unit or individual:
-
Activate Reserve component
forces, with the consent, when possible,
of the individuals being called to full
time duty.
-
Employ Reserve component
units and individuals in a manner that
maximizes utilization of core capabilities
throughout the validated requirement or
the length of the original orders to
active duty, whichever is shorter.
-
Give early consideration to
the feasibility of using alternate
manpower sources-such as active duty
forces, coalition forces, host nation
support, civilian contracted labor,
technological solutions, or other means
that may be available.
-
Apply innovative management
alternatives such as using retiree
volunteers, civilian volunteers, and
auxiliary members.
-
Provide as much
predictability as is possible to the
Reserve component members, their families,
and employers when sourcing requirements
to Reserve component forces.
To get Reserve component
members activated and in theater quickly
will require innovation in our funding,
training, and alert processes. The
collective training time spent at home
and/or the mobilization station must be
reduced. The right level of funding to
improve sustained training and equipment
readiness must be sufficient to reduce the
time from activation to arrival in theater.
Reducing the deficit between mobilized
mission readiness levels and peacetime
standards, manning and resourcing levels
will enhance the responsiveness of these
units while decreasing the overall
activation period required to validate
standards and to perform the operational
mission.
For all but the most urgent
operational requirements, the goal must be
to provide the Reserve component members a
minimum of 30 days notice to report for
duty. Predictability can be extended to the
maximum amount possible by notifying Reserve
component members that they are being
considered for activation. Once Reserve
component members are notified of a probable
or pending activation, it is necessary to be
diligent in assisting them to certify their
readiness to activate and help their
families and employers prepare to meet the
challenges of the activation period.
Another important tenet of predictability is
transitioning to the alert period by issuing
activation orders as soon as it is
operationally feasible.
Notification of Reserve
component members of their pending call to
active duty should be managed efficiently.
It is necessary to be skillful in providing
them the care and
respect they deserve, even when the
conditions of their activation are uncertain
and the environment is changing.
Predictability for Reserve component
members, their families, and employers is
extremely important. Additionally, a good
approach would be to exercise care when
notifying Reserve component members of
pending activation to ensure that
irreversible employment or personal
financial decisions are not made prior to
the actual issuance of activation orders.
Included below are some recommendations,
concurred with by the Board, to improve the
mobilization process to meet today's
operational needs:
-
Identifying one
organization as the single source process
owner for identifying requirements,
generating requests for forces, and
sourcing requirements based on
capabilities;
-
Developing a standard
operating cycle concept to help increase
predictability;
-
Reviewing and improving the
effectiveness of the existing Joint Billet
validation process;
-
Ensuring requests for
forces are prioritized and filled as they
are generated; replacing sequential
decision making with a parallel and
collaborative process;
-
Streamlining the
activation/mobilization process for
Reserve component members and equipment to
remove duplicative processes and
repetitive training;
-
Increasing full time
support manning to adequately support the
mobilization process;
-
Developing policies and
mobilization guidance that makes the
process more efficient;
-
Automating the process as
much as possible and developing capability
for all process owners to see the status
of individual and/or unit processing;
-
Improving supplemental
personnel equipment issue process;
-
Capturing readiness
information on the resources within all
the units that are available to meet the
tailored requirements of Combatant
Commanders to improve visibility to key
mobilization officials within DoD, the
Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders, and the
Services;
-
Investing resources early
to enhance individual and unit readiness,
with particular emphasis on
pre-mobilization medical and dental
screening and care, member processing,
security clearance processing, training
for mobilization, and equipment
processing; and,
-
Improving the tracking of
medical conditions of individuals in a
non-deployable status to ensure
deployability
The Board recognizes and
applauds the fact that all Services, OSD,
Joint Staff, Component Commanders, and
Reserve components have been diligently
working to improve the mobilization process,
rebalance the forces, and develop
sustainability and predictability. Support
and cooperation from DoD, Congress, and
collaboration among the Services, Joint
Staff, RCs, Combatant commanders, and
various defense agencies is necessary to
make the mobilization process more relevant,
efficient, and effective. The Board has
supported and participated with various
agencies within and outside of DoD in
developing the best policy, as well as
proposed legislative change recommendations,
to reform the mobilization process.
Changes That Support
Pre-mobilization Training
Each Service has occupational
specialist training for its personnel,
though it may be identified by a different
name in each of the Services. Reserve
components consist of individuals that are
either prior service or non-prior service
personnel. Each Service component is
challenged to a differing degree in training
these personnel quickly to both meet
deployability and unit readiness standards.
While a unit may have willing members
filling required positions, service members
may not be deployable because they are not
qualified in their occupational specialty.
Non Prior Service members recruited under a
split enlistment option (to accommodate
civilian education schedules) may have
attended basic training but may still be
awaiting a school seat for occupational
specialty training. Prior Service members
may have been recruited to a unit due to
domicile proximity but may not have
retrained in the appropriate occupational
skill. When a unit is activated, cross
leveling may be required to fill the skill
vacancies created by the above situations.
The Board supports a change in DoD
regulations and/or statutes to provide for
the capability for Prior Service and Non
Prior Service members to retrain as required
within 12 months from initial entry-level
training, or upon commissioning.
Need For More Flexibility
to Better Support Volunteerism
There exists a need to reduce
involuntary activations to support
contingencies. This, in effect, means there
must be a greater reliance on the use of
volunteers to achieve this goal. Current
policy, law, and regulations are not
conducive to supporting RC members
performing extended active duty in a
volunteer status. One area that
significantly impacts volunteerism is the
fact RC members currently count against
active duty end strength and controlled
grade limitations (Sections 115, 517, and
523 of Title 10) if they serve in excess of
179 consecutive days on voluntary active
duty orders or in excess of 270 consecutive
days in support of a combatant command.
This impact is somewhat mitigated through
delegation of end strength waivers to the
secretaries of the military departments at
the end of the fiscal year. However, all
Services currently employ volunteer force
management procedures based on the potential
impact on end strength and controlled
grades. Removing these restrictions will
reduce the uncertainty associated with the
current waiver process and facilitate the
use of volunteers in support of increased
operational commitments. The Board supports
a change in policy, and if appropriate for
the long-term, legislative change to Title
10 to allow the Services greater flexibility
in managing and employing Reserve component
members in a voluntary status in support of
contingencies.
Need For Joint Automated Tracking System
The
current process of mobilizing Reserve
component members is fragmented with
"stove-piped" and incomplete tracking
systems. These systems are not standardized
or interoperable across the joint community
and do not offer leaders and process users
visibility of critical information required
to make timely and accurate decisions. The
Services, Combatant Commanders and joint
planners have indicated the need for a
common system of tracking Reserve component
personnel in the mobilization process from
individual notification through
demobilization. Thus, there is an immediate
need to develop a joint tracking system to
track and manage individual Reserve
component members. Long-term focus should
be on developing a DoD-common mobilization
system, integrated and compatible with
current and planned DoD and Service
readiness, personnel management, and
operational planning systems. The Services
have recognized this problem and already
have systems in place or under development
to improve personnel tracking; however,
these systems are not integrated nor do they
contain consistent data elements.
The Board
believes an initial approach would be to
integrate existing Service specific system
data, to share this data across DoD at the
appropriate levels, and to dedicate funding
to accelerate further system development.
Need For Improved Individual Medical and
Dental Readiness
The state of individual
medical and dental readiness prior to
activation has a tremendous impact on
individual Reserve component members, on
overall unit readiness, and on the
effectiveness of the mobilization process.
Some Reserve component members arrive at the
mobilization processing station without
prior/proper medical or dental screening.
Often, these members have medical or dental
problems that delay or prevent deployment.
Additionally, Reserve components have
difficulty in complying with annual
medical/dental readiness requirements
because the Defense Health Program only
funds Reserve component medical and dental
care for Reserve component members who are
on active duty for more than 30 days.
Compounding this problem further, Reserve
component members often are unable to use
medical and dental treatment facilities for
statutory and regulatory screenings because
treatment facilities do not have sufficient
resources to provide the necessary screening
and care. The following approaches could
significantly improve this deficiency:
Implement DoD Individual Medical Readiness (IMR)
standards; improve the categorization and
tracking of individual medical readiness of
all Reserve component members; revise
Section 1074 of Title 10 to include funded
medical and dental examinations and
appropriate treatment to meet required
readiness standards for all Reserve
component members regardless of duty status;
and/or resource medical and dental readiness
at a level that will allow Reserve component
members to meet/maintain the statutory and
regulatory requirements for medical and
dental screening and readiness standards.
The Board recognizes that
keeping all Reserve component members fully
ready, medically and dentally, is costly;
however, with our continued reliance on the
Reserve components, the need exists to
determine the best alternatives to achieve
this goal. One
advance in this direction has been the
policy for standardization of individual
medical readiness reporting issued by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Health Affairs, and which the Services
are implementing. Another advance is
legislation to allow for medical and dental
screening and care of Reserve component
members who have been notified they will be
called to active duty for a period of more
than 30 days. DoD policy broadens the
applicability of this provision by stating
that a member of the Ready Reserve may at
any time while in a military duty status be
provided any medical and dental screening or
care necessary to ensure the member meets
applicable medical and dental standards for
deployment, as provided in accordance with
policies and procedures of the Military
Service and Reserve component concerned.
The effectiveness of these policies
throughout the Services and Reserve
components will require close evaluation to
determine whether they should be modified.
Need For Enhanced Family
Support
Since the Gulf War, much has
been done to improve all areas of family
support, particularly healthcare; yet there
is still a significant lack of
understanding, access to, eligibility for,
and rules governing TRICARE benefits, plus a
lack of understanding of the importance of
maintaining current Defense Enrollment
Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS)
information. These programs are complex and
often not designed with our Reserve
component members in mind. Considerable
work still needs to be done to ensure
continuity and equity of healthcare for the
families of our Reserve component members.
This is particularly important due to fact
that approximately 50 percent of our Reserve
component members' families do not live
within reasonable proximity to Military
Treatment Facilities. The goal needs to be
family healthcare and family healthcare
education at the right level for the right
person at the right time at the right cost
regardless of demographics and existing
medical coverage. Continuity of health care
has been the number one issue of the Reserve
component Chiefs the last three years.
In addition, family members
must be aware of and understand their
military benefits and how to access them.
Family Support Programs change frequently
and it is challenging to keep Reserve
component members informed about the latest
changes due to their geographic dispersion.
These Programs are important to many Reserve
component members and their dependents upon
return to active duty. There are some great
initiatives within the Services to improve
family support; however, much can be done to
improve standardization and accountability
across the Services. Family Support
Programs are being designed from a Joint
Service Total Force perspective and the
Services and Reserve components are making
every effort to ensure any member or family,
whether Active, Guard, or Reserve, can use
the family support programs available at any
base or installation. Additionally, the
National Guard has established over 400
Family Assistance Centers in the States and
Territories to
provide local support and
coordination for services. All Services and
Reserve components are also participating in
Military One Sources, an employee assistance
program accessible by a toll-free telephone
number and through the internet. The
Internet is proving to be an effective tool,
but has its limitations, in providing
information about programs available to
military families. The greatest challenge
in providing support for the families of
Guard and Reserve members is their
geographic dispersion. Many Reserve
component families do not reside close to an
installation and therefore, cannot take
advantage of those services. The Board
supports the ongoing efforts to improve
TRICARE and Family Support Programs for our
Reserve component members but stresses the
importance of timely education and
assistance. This will be particularly
important as we seek to utilize volunteers
more frequently and for shorter periods of
time.
Need For Enhanced Employer Support
Increased utilization of the
individual Reserve component members has
also increased strain on employers. The
Board is concerned that over a period of
continuous mobilizations this factor will
likely have a negative impact on the manning
of our Reserve components. Measures must be
put in place to ensure employer support does
not become too great a burden, particularly
for small companies, small business owners,
and self-employed Reserve component
members. Much is being done today by OSD,
Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve,
and Congress, but the Board believes there
is a need to develop policy as a basis for
solutions on how to best share the talents
of the individual Reserve component member,
enhance employer support and volunteerism,
and strengthen member rights and family
support.
Need For
Improved Force Management and Force
Rebalancing
Managing
force requirements in support of prolonged
contingency operations requires a
significant Reserve component contribution.
Use of the Reserve components must be
managed in a way that sustains their
capabilities over the long run. To prevent
overstressing capabilities, a process needs
to be developed that tracks augmentees and
individuals within units who have been
previously activated to support the GWOT.
The need exists to look toward other
solutions such as shifting recruiting and
retention efforts to target the
replenishment of stressed capabilities and
innovative training technology to reclassify
Reserve component members not previously
activated so as to meet the skill sets for
predictable requirements of future
campaigns. The Services must begin now to
look for approaches to sustain our Reserve
forces for future requirements, such as,
developing force structure that allows for a
"just in time," rather than a "just in case"
approach, and offering financial and other
incentives that
attract and retain Guard and Reserve
members for stressed units. Several
examples of force structure development
include: construction of modular units that
can be tailored to support required
capabilities, and blending Active and
Reserve components to support a common
mission and take advantage of the inherent
strengths and experience found in our
Reserve components.
Within DoD, the present
paradigm of the traditional 39-day Reserve
component member must be changed to allow
greater flexibility, and a transformation
construct, such as continuum of service, to
be instituted. The answer must also include
a New Compact with Reserve component
members, their employers and their families,
which provides realistic incentives for
extended participation beyond the confines
of the original "Reservist" expectations for
satisfactory participation of one drill
weekend per month, plus two weeks during the
summer. Reliance on the Reserve component
is significant today and will continue into
the foreseeable future; thus, it is crucial
that our governing laws and regulations
support this environment. The Active
component suffers under the current system
due to inability to efficiently and
effectively fill requirements and the
individual Reserve component member suffers
because the laws and regulations negatively
impact individual compensation, benefits,
entitlements, and even career progression.
Therefore, policy development or policy
changes may be indicated.
The Board applauds the fact
that Reserve components have developed
methods to support the Active component
mission with volunteers. However, the Board
realizes it will take DoD support and
Congressional action to develop the
statutes, and regulations to fully support
this transformation once policy is set. DoD
and the Services are moving forward rapidly
to identify and execute force structure
changes, to actively participate in
mobilization process reform, and to develop
policy and legislative changes necessary to
support innovative management practices for
more effective and efficient utilization of
the Reserve components. For example, with
transformation there is some discussion of
civilianizing the Military Judge Advocate
General's Corps that could raise possible
policy issues. The Board is interested in
assisting with the development of policy as
it relates to civilianization and/or
privatization of military positions that
impact the Reserve components.
The Services have
successfully implemented measures to improve
the force mix and early reliance on
involuntary mobilizations. For example,
between fiscal year 2005 and 2009 the Army
will rebalance over 100,000 spaces of force
structure in order to improve force
readiness and ease the stress on the Guard
and Reserve. The Air Force is organized and
funded for the integration of Reserve
components into every aspect of the Air
Force mission. Their Air and Space
Expeditionary Force construct allows for
maximum use of volunteers, thus, minimizing
the need for involuntary mobilization within
the first 15 days of a rapidly developing
contingency. The Naval Reserve contains a
significant portion of the Navy Airlift
capability and Maritime Patrol capability,
yet they are fully integrated to the point
of seamless operations. Beginning in fiscal
year 2002, the Coast Guard began
commissioning the first of thirteen Maritime
Safety and Security Teams for domestic
security operations, reducing the need for
Reserve-staffed Port Security Units to
respond to local contingencies. Port
Security Units are designed to support the
Combatant Commanders overseas in strategic
ports of debarkation. Every Service has
already made structural changes in the
Active components and/or Reserve components
that reduce stresses on critical skills and
enhances capabilities. Many of these
changes began before September 11, 2001,
though now the need to continue is fully
recognized. In some cases changes in
reserve management policies are being
implemented to improve volunteerism. The
Board concurs with the current direction and
measures to rebalance the force and develop
innovative management practices.
FAIRNESS AND
EQUITY CONCERNS
The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB)
continues to hear recurring themes of
differing equity and compensation issues
between the Active components and Reserve
components. These comments are voiced most
often as the RFPB visits the Combatant
Commanders and deployed Reserve component
forces supporting the Global War on
Terrorism. Equity in pay and benefits
remains a concern for many Reserve component
members and for the members of the RFPB.
Identifying the inequities and proposing
policy solutions through DoD will continue
to be a priority for the RFPB. As these
issues are examined we must be aware of both
the statutory and budget implications
associated with the recommended changes.
Regardless of which component a service
member belongs to-Active, Guard, or Reserve,
the pay and benefits for performing the same
duty in the same location should be the
same. To the RFPB this means the entire
compensation package, not limited to just
basic pay, but including incentives,
bonuses, special pays, and such benefits as
Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH), medical
and dental care, per diem, and family
support programs. Recognizing the
importance of these issues to the future of
our Total Force, Congress and DoD have
rightly focused their attention and efforts
to address and correct many of the problems
and concerns of our Reserve component
members. Most notable of these efforts are
improved health care benefits, full
commissary privileges, hostile fire and
imminent danger pay and new tax breaks.
A recurring issue voiced to RFPB members has
been the inconsistency in the method used by
the different Services to interpret and
subsequently pay travel claims. All the
Active components and Reserve components are
compensated using the Joint Travel
Regulations (JTR) to compute eligibility and
amounts of payments for travel related
expenses. But, the issue arises from the
interpretation of the JTR, which seems to be
different from one component to another.
The Board sees this difference among the
components as a significant morale issue.
It is impossible to answer Reserve component
members who ask why their per diem payment
or travel allowance differs from members
assigned to a different component,
especially when the members are stationed in
the same location doing the same duty. The
increasing use of our Reserve component
members, particularly in a deployed status,
has raised the intensity level and
visibility on this issue. On the surface
this appears to be an administrative issue
that could be easily fixed. However, when
the RFPB has dug deeper into specifics, we
always came away with the same response:
This is a legal interpretation of the JTR.
The Board does not view this as a systemic
problem with the JTR, but rather a problem
with the different interpretations applied
to these regulations by the Services. The
Board unanimously supports any effort aimed
at simplifying and clarifying travel and per
diem entitlements to provide uniformity of
interpretation and equal payment to all our
members. Our Reserve component members are
daily carrying out hazardous missions and
deserve fair equal treatment under the
regulations.
As identified in the RFPB's
Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Report, income
protection upon mobilization is an important
issue for many Reserve component members.
Many of these members can earn more in their
civilian jobs than they earn when mobilized
for active duty. This loss of income can
cause many problems for the member and their
families. A previous attempt to remedy this
issue with a mobilization insurance system
met with disastrous results and was quickly
terminated by DoD. The current level of
dependence on Reserve component forces to
support military commitments at home and
abroad makes the insurance solution
financially unsupportable without a huge
outlay of funds from DoD's already stressed
budget. While there does not appear to be
an easy answer to this issue, the RFPB
continues to support and encourage all
efforts to review the many proposals and
combinations of proposed solutions to
provide relief. This is a significant
recruiting and retention issue that will not
go away and must not be placed in the
too-hard-to-do box and forgotten.
Another often heard comment has been one of
inequitable treatment-such as in billeting,
personal protective equipment, and
organizational clothing. This "second class
treatment" shows a level of insensitivity
that must be changed to insure our Guard and
Reserve members serve equally with their
active duty peers.
The RFPB is concerned that a
proposed merger of the Reserve Personnel
appropriation with the active duty account
could result in a shifting of reserve
training dollars into the active duty pay
account; thus, the Board believes both
equity and policy concerns should be
addressed before this merger of
appropriations take place.
Under current law,
significant inequities exists in Basic
Allowance for Housing (BAH) for Reserve
component members serving on periods of
active duty less than 140 days, and for
Reserve component members without dependents
who must maintain a primary residence while
serving temporary periods of active duty.
While this disparate payment system results
in substantial cost savings to DoD, Reserve
component members serving tours of duty for
less than 140 days receive significantly
less housing entitlement money per day than
their active duty counterparts. While there
is an exception for those members serving in
support of contingency operations, the
separate BAH rates still apply for
non-contingency duty. The Services, Reserve
components, and DoD should actively seek
solutions to resolve these inequities
because of our increased reliance on Reserve
component members, the need for improved
retention, and the need to encourage
volunteerism,
The Board is concerned that,
while improvements have been made to the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of
1940 under the new Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act of 2003, there is no current
remedy for the inequities that occur when
our student Reserve component members are
involuntarily called to support our nation
in its fight against terror. Protections
need to be extended to our student Guard and
Reserve members who lose tuition and
placement at colleges and universities as a
result of a call to active duty.
JOINTNESS
Full integration of the Reserve components
in Joint Operations is no longer an idea,
but a reality of how business is being
accomplished. Given our current strategic
situation, National Security policy and
future commitments, the future utilization
of the Reserve components will most likely
resemble how it is being used today - with
the exception of it being more 'Jointly'
orientated and tasked. With the new steady
and future state of increased Reserve
component involvement, training, equipping,
maintaining, and educating our members to a
similar level of our active duty
counterparts is reality. Joint Officer
Management and Joint Professional Military
Education are inextricably linked.
Understanding service cultures, practices,
and procedures are fundamental to
successfully operating in the joint
environment-whether it be at a Headquarters
or unit level. Servicemembers coordinating
joint operations must know joint procedures,
capabilities, and doctrine. Reserve
component members are now serving in
increased numbers and frequency on joint
staffs and in joint billets. This trend
will continue as the Reserve component
continues to be integrated into the Total
Force. Therefore, it is intuitive, Reserve
component members must receive both Joint
Professional Military Education and joint
duty experience to maximize the
effectiveness of the Department's initiative
to adhere to the Goldwater-Nichols
requirement on joint force integration.
Without the Reserve component member
receiving the education or the opportunity
to serve in joint billets, the Reserve
component member will never become fully
qualified as a Joint Service member; and
with the continued use of the Reserve
component, the Department will not be
utilizing it's best augmentation resource,
the Reserve component member, as efficiently
and effectively as possible. All Reserve
officers should receive joint duty
experience and education as required by
Goldwater-Nichols.
A report to the Subcommittee on Military
Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, and
House of Representative by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) (03-238) regarding
the education piece of this issue, stated
the absence of a strategic plan for Joint
officer development is a significant barrier
to Joint Professional Military Education
integration and implementation. Further
studies by independent contractors concluded
operational and organization changes are
needed in order to implement the mandated
Joint Professional Military Education
program. The Board believes that DoD
Instruction, 1215.20 can be a catalyst for
change to address the systemic problems that
are seen as barriers to the full integration
of the Reserve component-Joint Officer
Management program. The Board believes that
the Joint Officer Management program should
be appropriately supported and managed to
preclude the need for a waiver to be
appointed as a Reserve component Chief.
STABILITY OPERATIONS
Recent experiences in
Afghanistan and Iraq have presented an
opportunity for the Reserve Forces Policy
Board (RFPB) to explore and contribute to
providing policy recommendations to issues
related to stabilization and reconstruction
operations. This certainly represents an
area where creative ideas might provide
solutions for the future. One idea that
arose from our 2003 symposium was the
concept of a Universal Command, a RC
organization containing military and
civilian volunteers. Other proposals include
separate stability and reconstruction
divisions, one Active and one Reserve, and
future Brigades and Units of Action. Our
Board held a stability and reconstruction
conference in January and resolved that one
thing is clear: We need a quick response
force that reflects modularity and
flexibility.
Stabilization and reconstruction operations
are sometimes referred to as the
post-conflict phase of operations, although
as we have seen in Iraq, the line between
the conflict and stabilization phases is
very gray. Reserve component units such as
Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations,
Military Police and Engineers already play a
key role in these operations. The RFPB is
very interested in stabilization and
reconstruction operations and plans in 2004
to actively focus on the development of
policy, organizational structure
implications, and its impact on Reserve
component units and members, to include the
use of civilian volunteers. Given the
strong emphasis placed on force rebalancing
and transformation, the RFPB has a role to
play in reviewing current proposals for
reform in the context of DoD policy and its
recommendation. The Board will coordinate
with various DoD and other Federal Agencies
including National Defense University (NDU),
the Office of Force Transformation (OFT),
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC),
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve
Affairs (ASD/RA), and the Army War College
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute (PKSOI), leading scholars, and
"think tanks" that have ongoing work in this
area.
The demands of warfighting in the 21st
century and stabilization operations demand
new thinking and approaches for how the
Reserve components can best contribute to
this effort. The RFPB is assisting other
organizations and doing independent research
concerning the viability of expanded use of
Auxiliaries and recalled retirees; utilizing
authority that exists for creating a
Temporary Reserve; expanding use of State
Defense Forces; and, examining other
mechanisms that will meet the needs of the
military and contribute to a new paradigm of
what Reserve service can mean. The
objective will be to develop policy for
utilization of some or all of these
mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
Our Guard and Reserve
personnel serve in a force that is the
single most technologically advanced in the
world and we are continually asking them to
do more. If we continue to utilize
Reservists at the pace we are today, we must
develop the best possible compensation and
incentive package, and sensitize our
leadership to ensure fair and equitable
treatment. Though our Guard and Reserve
members are true citizen patriots and fully
understand their responsibilities and
service, we are concerned that the stress on
their families and employers along with
existing fairness and equity issues may have
a negative impact on retention in the coming
months. In these turbulent and, indeed,
watershed times, it is essential that the
Reserve Forces Policy Board continue to be a
viable, independent source of policy advice
to the Secretary of Defense and at the same
time meet its role of keeping the President
and Congress informed with our annual
report. Thank you for this opportunity to
testify on behalf of the extraordinary Guard
and Reserve men and women who serve our
Nation.
Reference Materials
Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs (OASD) and Director, J-4,
The Joint Staff (CJCS, J4), Mobilizing
the Reserve Forces in the 21st
Century: Report of the DoD Mobilization
Symposium, (Washington, D.C., November
18-20, 2002)
United
States General Accounting Office (GAO),
Military Personnel: DoD Actions Needed to
improve the Efficiency of Mobilization for
Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921, (Washington,
D.C., August 2003)
Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, Review of Reserve
Component Contribution to National Defense,
(Washington, D.C., December 20, 2002)
United
States General Accounting Office (GAO),
Military Pay: Army National Guard Personnel
Mobilized to Active Duty Experienced
Significant Pay Problems, (GAO)-04-89,
(Washington, D.C, November 2003)
United
States General Accounting Officer (GAO),
Military Personnel: Joint Officer
Development Has Improved, but a Strategic
Approach Is Needed
(GAO)-03-238,(Washington, D.C., December
19, 2002)
DoD
Instruction 1215.20, Reserve Component
(RC) Joint Officer Management Program,
(September 12, 2002) |
