

The Computational Complexity of Enforceability Validation for Generic Access Control Rules

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Abstract

In computer security, many researches have tackled on the possibility of a unified model of access control, which could enforce any access control policies within a single unified system. One issue that must be considered is the efficiency of such systems, i.e., what is the computational complexity for the enforceability validation of access control rules of a system that is capable of implementing any access control policy? We investigate this question by arguing that two fundamental requirements exist for any such system: satisfiability of access rules and ensuring absence of deadlock among rules. We then show that both of these problems are NP-Complete by using some basic computational theorems applied to the components of the generic access control process.

1. Introduction

Access control policies can be as diverse as applications, and are heavily dependent on the needs of a particular environment. Some research has focused on a unified model or mechanism of access control, which could enforce any access control policies within a single unified system. As the modern theme in access control research is the separation of mechanism from policy, many researchers have provided elegant solutions for encompassing various access control models and policies in a unifying formalism. These works apply one of two approaches: The first is to provide configurable policy attributes and/or configurable enforcement mechanisms [1, 2, 3, 4]. The second is to provide policy (authentication) management systems or language to configure the authorization database [5, 6]. Thus, it is natural to speculate how efficient is a system that can enforce any arbitrary access control policy.

Endeavors have established in the computability analysis of access control systems such as: 1, finding the complexity of safety either through the use of

limited access control model or the verification via constraints [10], and has shown that the safety of access control is undecidable [11]. 2, developing of flexible and efficient models for access control rule generalization [12, 13]. In our paper, we are not proposing another similar works as above, instead, we analyzed the rudimentary access control rule enforceability validation processes that is inevitable for a system that can implement any arbitrary access control policy no matter which access control mechanism is applied.

Although not every access control policy can be specified by an access control model (for example, Rule Based AC), a certain AC mechanism such as Access Control List (ACL), Access Control Matrix (ACM) are required in order to implement the policy. Therefore, to demonstrate the generic, therefore universal without being restricted to any specific model or mechanism, we surpass any known models/mechanism and worked from the elementary components that any access control policy is built upon, and for algorithms embedded in any access control mechanism operated with. These basic components are subjects, operations, and objects.

Our goal is to determine the computational complexity for a completely general access control system. Therefore, the question can be rephrased as: what is the computational complexity of the enforceability validation of a mechanism that is capable of implementing any access control policy? We investigate this question by arguing that two fundamental requirements for the enforceability validation of access control policy exist for any such system: satisfiability of access rules and ensuring absence of deadlock among rules. That is, we argue that these functions are necessary, although possibly not sufficient, for any access control policy. We then show that both of validation problems are NP Complete.

The following proof outline summarize our computational complexity argument for the rest of the paper:

1. To implement an access control policy, a mechanism must incorporate rules that are evaluated in each system state.
2. If the mechanism is capable of implementing an arbitrary policy, it must be capable of incorporating an arbitrary set of rules.
3. All rules must be satisfiable, i.e. satisfying truth assignments of Boolean expression
4. No rule may be dependent on itself, i.e., deadlock or circular dependency is prohibited.
5. The problem of checking for satisfiability is NP-Complete.
6. The problem of checking for deadlock is represented by the AND-OR graph decision problem, which is also NP-Complete.
7. Consequently, the complexity for enforceability validation of a mechanism capable of implementing any conceivable access control policy is NP-Complete.

2. Authorization process

In access control, a privilege assignment refers to the association of a privilege to a subject, denoted by the triple $\langle \text{subject}, \text{operation}, \text{object} \rangle$, indicating that the subject is permitted to perform the operation on the object. A subject refers to an active entity that typically includes users and system processes. An operation refers to a specific action applied to an object, such as read and write, and an object is a passive entity, such as files and printers, that require protection.

Abstractly, access control mechanisms apply a set of rules to system states for the purpose of allowing or denying a specified operation to an object by a subject. The rule set are composed according to the access control policy, such that the final process of any access control is the decision-making for a subject's request to perform an operation on an object. To be universal, the operations must be arbitrary. Fig. 1 shows the relation mapping of an access control system from policy, model, and mechanism to the elementary algorithm. Note that not every policy can be described by a model (i.e. one policy can be modeled either by zero or one of the n known models as illustrated above of the arrows in the Figure1), however, every policy can be implemented by at least one of the n mechanisms, which can be implemented by an access control algorithm.

At an elementary level as in Figure 1 (Access Control algorithm), an access control system consists of the space of *states* and the space of *rules*. The *states* space contains privilege assignments permitted




Figure 1. The relation mapping of an access control system from policy, model, mechanism to the elementary algorithm.

by the implemented policy. And for historical type of access control policies, it is required to maintain the past access *states* (already granted access history), therefore, each *state* may be in a status of already granted (+) or not-yet-granted (-). The status of a *state* is changed from $-s_x$ to $+s_x$ when the privilege of the *state* is granted as marked to be the past event, and changed from $+s_x$ to $-s_x$ when the s_x is required to be reset. Each *state* is expressed by the relation mapping a subject's operations to access an object. The *rules* space contains information about the specified rules and/or constraints enforced by the implemented policy; each *rule* is generically expressed by the logic relations between security attributes with two types: the dynamic, which is the same as in the *states* space, we call them "dynamic", because they can be either already-granted (+) or not-yet-granted (-), which is in contrast with the static attributes such as specific time, locations and other physical attributes related to security. The static attributes are set according to the access control policy or the access environment, such as requiring that an object can only be read at a particular time period at a certain location. As examples, Table 1 shows the *states* and *rules* mapping of a simple MLS (Multilevel Security) policy with users and objects secreties ranked by High (*h*), Medium (*m*), and Low (*l*), and any object access can only be accessed at the certain time frame t_1 , the policy is modeled by the Bell-LaPadule model [14]. Where read operation is denoted as *r* and write operation is denoted as *w*.

Table 1. The *states* and *rules* mapping of a MLS policy

<i>states</i>	<i>rules</i>
$s_1=(h, r, h)$	No restriction
$s_2=(h, r, m)$	No restriction
$s_3=(h, r, l)$	t_1
$s_4=(m, r, m)$	t_1

$s_5=(m, r, l)$	No restriction
$s_6=(l, r, l)$	No restriction
$s_7=(h, w, h)$	t_1
$s_8=(h, w, m)$	$\neg s_1 \wedge t_1$
$s_9=(h, w, l)$	$\neg(s_1 \wedge s_2) \wedge t_1$
$s_{10}=(m, w, l)$	$\neg(s_4 \wedge s_5) \wedge t_1$
$s_{11}=(m, w, m)$	t_1
$s_{12}=(l, w, l)$	No restriction

Table 2 shows the *states* and *rules* mapping of a simple Chinese Wall policy [15] with only two users (groups) a and b , and two Conflict Of Interest (COI) classes x and y each contains objects x_1, x_2 , and y_1, y_2 . For the simplicity, we use only one read operation r .

Table 2. The *states* and *rules* mapping of a Chinese Wall policy

<i>states</i>	<i>rules</i>
$s_1=(a, r, x_1)$	$\neg s_2$
$s_2=(a, r, x_2)$	$\neg s_1$
$s_3=(a, r, y_1)$	$\neg s_4$
$s_4=(a, r, y_2)$	$\neg s_3$
$s_5=(b, r, x_1)$	$\neg s_6$
$s_6=(b, r, x_2)$	$\neg s_5$
$s_7=(b, r, y_1)$	$\neg s_8$
$s_8=(b, r, y_2)$	$\neg s_7$

Table 3 shows an example of a simple Work Flow policy [16] that allows user c to read object z only after user a has read object x , and user b has written object y , and the access can only be granted on the business location l_1 or l_2 . User b can write object y only after user a has read object x , and the access can only be granted on the business location l_1 .

Table 3. The *states* and *rules* mapping of a Work Flow policy

<i>states</i>	<i>rules</i>
$s_1=(a, r, x)$	No restriction
$s_2=(b, w, y)$	$s_1 \wedge l_1$
$s_3=(c, w, z)$	$s_1 \wedge s_2 \wedge (l_1 \vee l_2)$

In addition to the well-known access control policies as the shown in Table 2, 3, and 4, other

(known and unknown) access control policies may have different relation mapping of their *states* and *rules* elements; Assume S_R is the set of all *states* in R . Most of the access control policies are in the case of $S_R \subset S$ and $S_R = S$, i.e. all or some *states* in S are also in R , however, the cases of $S \subset S_R, S_R \cap S = \emptyset$, and $S_R \cap S = C$ (where C is the set of common *states*) represents some (or all) *rules* may contain *state*(s) that are not in S , means that the mapping *states* for those *rules* will never be granted until the *states* in R that are not covered in S are included in S in the future. Also, by different algorithm implemented, other type of relations of *states* and *rules* are possible, for example, instead of being the allowable *states*, S contains restricted *states* such as a popular implementation of Rule-Based Access Control that S contains the prohibited privileges. Further, The relation of the *states* and *rules* spaces can be either a one-to-many mapping if a *rule* can be shared by *states* or one-to-one, otherwise. The one-to-many relation can be transformed to one-to-one relation if allowing the *rules* to be duplicated in the mapping. Note that the elements in *rules* are finite with maximum number equal to the total number of dynamic and static attributes.

Formally, any access control policy, PO , can be described by the mapping of access control rules $AC = S \rightarrow R$, where S is the domain of all possible *states* (i.e. privilege assignments) space, and R is the range of all possible *rules* space. $S = \{s_1 \dots s_n\}$, and $s_i = (u_i, p_i, o_i)$ is any privilege assignment described by $u_i \in U$, a set of all subjects, $p_i \in P$, a set of all access operations, and $o_i \in O$, a set of all objects covered by the policy PO . Thus, subject u_i is allowed to access object o_i with the p_i operation under the policy PO .

A *rule* $r_i \in R = \{r_1 \dots r_n\}$ is a set of Boolean expressions. Each r_i is expressed by the variables in the sets of dynamic attributes $S_i \subset S$ and a set of static attributes $A = \{a_1 \dots a_n\}$, unlike S_i, A only exists in the *rules* space. The Boolean expression of r_i is arbitrarily connected by logic operators $l \in L = \{\wedge$ (AND), \vee (OR), \neg (NOT)}. The *states* attribute s_i in a *rules* are active only when the status of s_i is + in the *states*, because obviously, a *rule* is realistic only when the covered *states* are True. Thus, when s_i in the *states* is changed from + to -, the same s_i in the *rules* will be treated as "don't care" or "null", and the Boolean operators associated with it will be ignored in evaluating the Boolean result. This means s_i has not yet authorized, and should not be a decision

factor of the authorization process. (e1) is an example of a *rule* r_x , which contains dynamic attributes s_1 , and s_2 , and static attributes a_1 and a_2 , r_x will change to (e2) if s_2 has not yet happened (thus nulled) when evaluated.

$$((s_1 \wedge (\neg s_2)) \vee a_1) \wedge a_2 \quad (e1)$$

$$(s_1 \vee a_1) \wedge a_2 \quad (e2)$$

In conclusion, the fundamental authorization process of an access control system is first check if the user's access request is permitted under the organization's access control policy. The operation is checking if the requested user, operation, and object are presented in the *states*. Second, check what rule(s) in the organization's access control policy the request is regulated by. And the authorization of the access request is evaluating the Boolean result in the *rules* match the request *state*.

3. Rule validation

Based on the generic access control process as described in Section 2, any access control mechanism according to the access control policy implemented should be capable of (1) configuring the *states*; and (2) checking the validation of *rules* to make sure the *rules* are enforceable; Obviously, a *rule* is enforceable only if the *rule* can generate a result of grant or deny of an access request, and the calculation of the result is within finite steps of logical evaluation. Thus, the operation steps of granting an access request will first search for a matched *state* s_x in S for the request, then verify the *rule* r_x mapped to the state s_x , then evaluate the decision, and update the status of s_x from - to + (from not-yet-granted to granted) if it was - before the authorization. The configuration of *states* is either straight privilege assignment such as ACL or ACM, or the disseminated results of *groups* and *roles* assignments for policies such as role based access control (RBAC) [1]. Note that the *states* dissemination is usually performed when the *states* is initialized or rebuild, that is "off-line" of the authorization process, so, does not affect the efficiency of the "run-time" process (i.e. processing the access request), and in general, the efficiency of the access control mechanism. Hence, the enforceability validation check of a *rule* involves two functions: one is checking for *satisfaction*: if the rule generates result in respond to the values of its *state* parameters, and the other one is checking for *deadlocks*: if the result generates within finite steps of calculation. We define both properties as follow:

3.1. Satisfiability

We define a *rule* as *unsatisfiable* when its result will never be True no matter what the variables' truth-values of the *rule* are, i.e. the mapped *state* s_i will never happen (be True) under the *rule*.

Since any *rule* r_x has an unique truth value once the truth values of its elementary constituents are known, it is a well-formed Boolean expression over a finite set of elements $\{S, A\}$ and the set of logical operations $\{\wedge$ (AND), \vee (OR), \neg (NOT) $\}$. And a well-formed Boolean expression is not Satisfiable when every possible instantiation of its variables evaluates to False. Therefore, a *rule* is *unsatisfiable* when the Boolean expression of the *rule* r_i has no True result by any assignments of its variables, for example the *rule*

$$r_1 = (s_1 \wedge s_2) \vee (\neg s_3 \wedge s_1 \wedge \neg s_2) \wedge \neg s_1 \quad (e3)$$

will never be evaluated to be "true" no matter what the truth assignments of s_1 , s_2 , and s_3 are.

3.2. Deadlock

We define a *rule* r_x as *deadlocked* when it has a dependency on other *rule(s)*, which eventually depends back on r_x itself such that the mapped *state* s_x will never happen because of the cyclic referencing.

A Boolean function can be represented efficiently using a data structure called an AND/OR graph [17]; A *rule* r_x as a Boolean function is constructed to an AND/OR Graph by connecting all the non-terminal (has dependency of other *states*) s_x 's in r_x . The AND-OR Graph is an directed graph $G = (V, A)$, where V is the set of vertexes represented by the s_x 's in r_x and A is the set of links represented by the \wedge or \vee logical relations between s_x 's, with a single vertex $s_0 \in V$ have in-degree 0, for each $v \in V$ having out-degree weight $w(a) \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ for each $a \in A$. An s_x is non-terminal when there is other *rule* in R contains s_x as its Boolean variable, i.e. there is a link a from the non-terminal s_x . G can introduce dummy node such that each of the descendents of the dummy node starts a sub-graph of Boolean rule that require to be solved before it's ancestor, for example, $s_2 \wedge s_3$ need to be solved before the rule $s_1 \vee (s_2 \wedge s_3)$ represented by the dummy node s_d . For checking the *deadlock* validation, $w(a) = 1$ (see Section 4). Note that we leave static attributes a_x 's for the graph construction, because there are no dependencies

between them. We also ignored the unary operator \neg , since it does not invoke dependency between *states*. For example, some *rules* in the following R .

$$\begin{aligned}
s_1 \rightarrow r_1 &= s_2 \vee s_3 \\
s_2 \rightarrow r_2 &= s_4 \wedge s_5 \wedge s_6 \\
s_3 \rightarrow r_3 &= \text{no restriction} \\
s_4 \rightarrow r_4 &= s_2 \\
s_5 \rightarrow r_5 &= \text{no restriction} \\
s_6 \rightarrow r_6 &= l_1
\end{aligned} \tag{e4}$$

can be converted to an AND-OR Graph as Figure 2 when s_1 access request is made (r_1 is evaluated). The graph is construct by using the requested state (s_1) as the beginning note of the graph and links the *states* in the rules until the terminal condition (*no restriction* for access in this example) is met. Where s_3, s_5, s_6 are terminal nodes, and “ \cup ” represent the “ \wedge ” Boolean relation.




Figure 2. AND-OR Graph converted from (e4).

The *satisfaction*-check makes sure a *rule* is *satisfiable*, which means a rule is evaluated to a result according to its variables' values at the give *state* (instead of a fixed result no matter what the values of it variables are). Even though an *unsatisfiable* produces unchangeable result, we consider this check necessary when a well-defined access control policy implementation is required. The *deadlocks*-check makes sure that a rule generates a result within a finite number of evaluation steps; *rules* in deadlock will cause infinite loops when the *rule* is evaluated.

4. Computational Complexity

Different from the *states* configuration, which need to be set up before the access control system is operational, the enforceability validation of rules is usually performed at run-time when an access request is processed, because *rules* may be valid (or invalid) before an access request but invalid (or valid) when the status of the *states* changes from + to - (or vice versa), or other *rules* are modified/deleted at the time when processing the next access request. For

example, when processing the s_x access request, *rule* r_x may be invalid because it is *unsatisfiable* under the current status of *states*, but might be *satisfiable* when the status of the *state* s_x is later changed from + to - (therefore, removed from r_x) in r_x . As shown in (e3), r_1 is *satisfiable* when the status of s_1 is changed from + to -, and therefore becomes “don't care” in r_1 . Or, a *rule* r_x may be free from a *deadlock* when other *rule(s)* is (are) later removed from R . As shown in (e4), r_1 are no longer in *deadlock* when r_4 is removed, or changed such that contains no non-terminal *states* by the time when processing the next s_1 request. So, it is reasonable to compose a *rule* without validation check, which will be performed at run-time when an access request triggered the authorization process.

Checking for *satisfaction* as we have defined it is checking if every possible Boolean values of s_x s and a_x s in the r_x evaluated to False. This evaluation is a problem of Satisfiability of Boolean expression, which is NP-Complete [18]. And in a worst case, checking for *satisfiability* takes all the possible truth assignments of all variables in S (i.e. $S_i = S$) and A , therefore requires $2^{|S|+|A|}$ operations.

If each connection represents the reference from one *state* (node) to another in an AND-OR graph, then cycle exists when the number of connections between nodes is equal or greater to the number of nodes in a graph when traversing the graph form the root to any of it's terminal note. Therefore, checking for *deadlock* of r_x is equivalent to determining if all the costs for the solutions of the AND-OR graph G constructed from r_x are at most k , where a cost is assigned to a link (connection) between two nodes in the graph. Since our purpose is to determine the number of steps when traversing G , the cost is represented by the nodes in G is fixed to 1 and $k = |S| - 1$. Thus a cycle therefore *deadlock* exists in G when the cost accumulated exceeds the number of nodes in G minus the root note. For example, in Fig. 5, one solution for the determination of the cost to reach the terminal notes from the root is $(s_1, s_3) = 1$, and the other solution $(s_1, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6)$ is extended to $(s_1, s_2, s_4, s_2, s_5, s_6)$ and further extended to $(s_1, s_2, s_4, s_2, s_4, s_5, s_6)$ with accumulated cost equal to 6, which exceeds $|S| - 1 = 5$, the cost of this solution indicates that there exists a *deadlock* in r_1 . According to [19, 17], the AND-OR graph decision problem is in the class of NP-Complete.

A *rule* r_x may contain the number of elements in S and A minus the mapping state in S : $|S| + |A| - 1$

variables in a worst case (maximum number of variables), and $|S|!$ expanding steps are required to construct an equivalent AND-OR graph; note there is no expansion required for the static attributes a_x in A as there is no dependency between them. The AND-OR graph construction steps can be explained by the fact that any switching functions of \wedge , \vee , and \neg , r_x can be expanded into a canonical DNF (Disjunctive Normal Form)[17] product of $m+n-1$ variables in $S = \{s_1... s_m\}$ and $A = \{a_1... a_n\}$ except the s_x state that the r_x is mapped to. So, in maximum, a rule r_x is finally expanded into $\bigvee_{i=1}^k c_i$, where the c_i is a clause represented as $\bigwedge_{j=1}^{m+n-1} l_j$, the l_j is literal, which is either a variable or its negation of s_x or a_x , and k is equal to $|A|$ plus all the possible combination of S , i.e. the permutation of $(|S| - 1)$. In other words, the final expanded r_x may contain $(|S| - 1)!$ plus $|A|$ clauses after $(|S| - 1)!$ number of expansion steps. Adding the steps for each l_j in each c_i , the result is $|S|(|S| - 1)! = |S|!$ steps required to expand r_x into an equivalent AND-OR graph, because each Boolean operation requires one step in adding node and link to the AND-OR graph.

As summary, without considering the initial construction of the *states* and *rules* (built according to the access control policy), checking the *satisfiability* require $O(2^{|S|+|A|})$ computational steps, and checking the *deadlock* condition, i.e. cyclic reference require $O(|S|!)$ computational steps in worst case. And both functions are in the complexity of NP-Complete.

As stated previously, 1, we are considering the worst cast of enforceability validation of a generic access control mechanism or algorithms, by generic, we mean that mechanism or algorithms can be implemented to cover all known and unknown access control polices. 2, we also mentioned that to be truly dynamic (allow access control policy to be changed any time), the validation check has to be performed at run-time, i.e. processed at the time when access request needs to be authorized. 3, it is obvious that *states* in the *states* space and *rules* in *rules* spaces are interrelated when historical and workflow type of polices are implemented. However, most of the popular and practical access control mechanism/algorithm in use are not geared for meeting the above three requirements, therefore, are not bond to the complexity of our discoveries.

5. Conclusion

Diversity and flexibility of access control is becoming essential with the growth of global and distributed computing environments such as the Internet and Grid computing networks. Many research efforts have focused on the solution for the mechanisms of access control policy composition and combination, but have not studied the issue of efficiency such as lower complexity bounds in their efforts. In this paper we have shown that the problem of enforcing an arbitrary access control policy, regardless of the kind of mechanism, is NP-Complete, The computational complexity is critical if the access control policy is historical or workflow related, however, for most of the popular and practical access control systems today are not related to historical or workflow types of policies, therefore does not require enforceability validation of the *rules* at run-time, so the invalid check can be preformed "off-line" of the authentication process. Further, the enforceability validation only required when creating or changing a *state* or *rule* and they occurs less frequently than a users' access request, if the validation has been done before.

6. References

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