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U.S. SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY

CONTACT: Office of Senator Leahy, 202-224-4242

VERMONT


Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy,
Ranking Member, Committee On The Judiciary,
On The Nomination Of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.,
To Be An Associate Justice Of The Supreme Court Of The United States
January 27, 2006

The Constitution gives the Senate an essential role in the confirmation of Supreme Court justices.  It is a role that I take very seriously.  The Senate is not a rubber stamp.  So it was important for me to get a sense of how Judge Alito thinks, and whether he would be a Supreme Court justice for all Americans, before deciding whether or not I could support his nomination.

He came to his hearing with a record he has created over the last 30 years.  As a judge and before that as a high-ranking government official appointed to a succession of posts by Republican presidents, Judge Alito seemed consistently to defer to Executive power and to show little empathy for the plight of ordinary Americans.  His record also suggested a pattern of saying what he needed to say to get to the next job.  In the course of this nomination he sought to retreat from his own words without really doing so.  The hearing provided him an opportunity to explain his record.  It was an opportunity he chose to squander when the President’s supporters and Republican Senators urged him not to be forthcoming.  He had the chance to answer some of the troubling questions that his past words and actions raised.  He had the opportunity to demonstrate that his replacement of Harriet Miers was not what it appeared to be — the President selecting someone he knew he could count on to support Government power and the expansive doctrine of the “Unitary Executive” and someone the extreme faction in the President’s party felt assured would march with Justices Thomas and Scalia in their culture war.

It was an opportunity that he did not take.  The hearings, and the whole confirmation process, left us with more questions and greater concerns than before.  I have already discussed his failure to assure us that he would serve as an effective check and balance on executive power.  He failed to show me, or the American people, that when he recited platitudes -- “no one is above the law” -- that he was not just telling us what he thought he needed to say to get this promotion.

Broken Commitments On Recusals

One question for the Senate is whether Judge Alito takes seriously his promises to the Senate and his obligations to avoid the appearance of impropriety.  He had an opportunity to allay concerns about his repeated failures to recuse himself from cases during the nominations process and at the hearing, and it was another opportunity that he missed.

In 1990, when Judge Alito was before the Senate seeking confirmation to his current job on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, he made a pledge.  He promised the Senate that he would recuse himself from five categories of cases: cases involving three different financial companies with whom he had dealings, cases in which his sister’s law firm represented a party, and cases he had overseen as the United States Attorney in New Jersey.  I was disappointed to discover that, despite making an explicit promise to disqualify himself from these cases, a sworn commitment, he failed to disqualify himself in at least four of the five categories of cases he had listed. 

He apparently failed even to put several of the financial companies on the Third Circuit’s automatic recusal list despite promising the Senate to recuse from cases involving these companies.  I am not suggesting that he gained a financial benefit in any of the decisions he made in cases in which he should have recused.  That is beside the point.  The issue is his sworn promise to the Senate and his varying explanations for breaking that promise.  I am concerned, and would expect that other Senators would be concerned as well, by his apparently systematic disregard for his promise to the Senate to steer clear of certain categories of cases. 

One case, involving the Vanguard funds, in which he has invested hundreds of thousands of dollars and which he expressly included in his 1990 pledge to the Senate, is particularly troubling -- not just because of his involvement but because of the shifting excuses he has given us during the course of this confirmation process.  He provided a series of explanations that conflicted with each other and with the facts.  He told me and others before the hearing that he was assigned to the Vanguard case due to a glitch in the computer screening program that was supposed to identify conflicts.  After significant investigatory work and pressing for answers, we found that that answer was not accurate.  Vanguard was not on his computerized list to identify conflicts when he led us to believe that a computer glitch occurred.  Judge Alito finally acknowledged at the hearings that there was no computer glitch.  At the end of the day there was no getting around the fact that he was responsible for failing to live up to his sworn commitment to the Senate from 1990.  What was most disappointing is that he did not own up to his responsibility or his error but sought to evade and excuse his conduct for weeks and weeks.  He acted like the Bush Administration most often does when it errs, by blaming others: his surrogates attacked those raising questions, while he proffered numerous conflicting excuses.

For example, one of his many explanations was contained in a letter he wrote to Chairman Specter.  He contended that the 1990 promise he had made to the Judiciary Committee in order to become a Circuit judge only applied to his “initial service” and that he later, apparently secretly and unilaterally, decided that his promise to this Committee had been “unduly restrictive” and that he need not follow it anymore.  He did not so inform the Judiciary Committee or the Senate of these determinations at any time before his 2005 nomination to the Supreme Court.  Moreover, it is wholly inconsistent with his finally adding the Vanguard companies to his recusal list in December 2003.  This letter seems more like self-serving, after-the-fact rationalizing than it does a truthful explanation for what had happened in 2003.  As we discovered through due diligence, Vanguard and Smith Barney were not on the judge’s automatic recusal list even in 1993.  There is no reason to think they were on there before that.  It certainly does not seem that Judge Alito tried to live up to his sworn commitment to the Senate even during what he would have to concede was his “initial service” period as a Circuit judge. 

Moreover, the “initial service” excuse makes no more sense with respect to his Vanguard investments than it would with respect to his sister.  She did not cease being his sister after some “initial service” period of his on the bench.  In fact, his Vanguard investments significantly increased over the period of his service on the bench.  The “initial service” concept in the Judiciary Committee’s approach to recusal applies to transition from a law practice to the bench.  Thus, for example, once the cases on which he had been involved while the U.S. Attorney in New Jersey had run their course, he was not prohibited for all time from hearing cases from that office.  Eventually, even he had to acknowledge at the hearing that this “initial service” argument was not the real reason he failed to recuse from the Vanguard case, even though that had been the argument he made in a written response to our Committee’s chairman.   

To the end, Judge Alito has failed to take responsibility for his action.  Instead, the best he can do is to admit at his hearing that he “just didn’t focus on the issue of recusal” and that “no light went off.”  There was no remorse, no apology, and no embarrassment for the string of conflicting and inaccurate explanations he gave during the course of this nomination.  Accordingly there is no reason to think that if he becomes a Supreme Court Justice he will focus any better on conflict of interest and appearance of conflict issues, in a system without accountability.  I voted against the nomination of Justice Rehnquist to become Chief Justice in large measure because of his involvement in a case in which he should not have been.  I take these matters very seriously.  It is apparent that this nominee does not.

Concerned Alumni of Princeton

After evaluating the record and the testimony at the hearing, I also suspect that this nominee was less than candid about his 1985 job application and his inclusion of his membership in the Concerned Alumni of Princeton (“CAP”).  In a 1985 application for a political position in the Meese Justice Department, Judge Alito emphasized his membership in the group, which he termed “a conservative alumni group.”  It was one of only two group memberships that he included in his carefully constructed personal statement; the other was the Federalist Society.  By contrast, he chose not to include his membership at the time in the Princeton Club of Washington.  He referenced CAP, a group that had received local and national media attention for its resistance to the admission of women and minorities to the university and for its prolonged hostility to students who did not fit Princeton’s traditional mold.  My question was, why?  Why would he emphasize membership in a group like that? 

Concerned Alumni of Princeton represented a view of Princeton and its clubs, a view which excluded women, African Americans and other minorities.  Surely he would have known that the same people who in the 1970s and 1980s resisted coeducation and affirmative action would have, only a generation earlier, resisted the admission of people from Italian immigrant families, like his and mine, and members of religious minority groups, like Catholics and Jews.  My parents often spoke about seeing signs in Vermont saying, “No Irish,” and “Catholics Need Not Apply.”  My parents tried to instill in me the idea that such discrimination, and all discrimination, is wrong.  Knowing my family’s roots and heeding my parents’ teachings, I have tried my best to promote tolerance and inclusion.  It disturbed me that Judge Alito proudly proclaimed affiliation with a group that did just the opposite. 

So I asked him about it and gave him a chance to explain.  He did not.  Instead, he ducked the question.  He started by telling the Judiciary Committee that he could not remember anything about his membership in the group.  After the White House first publicly suggested that the explanation for his joining was his concern about ROTC, he adopted that self-serving rationale for why he had joined the group, in a contorted explanation — he said he did not remember, but if he did it would probably have been because of ROTC.   The truth is that ROTC had returned to campus long before 1985, and neither CAP’s own materials nor media accounts suggest that ROTC was a primary focus for CAP at the time.  And of course, that was not an answer to my question.  My question was why he touted his membership in 1985.  He never answered my question.

I will give him the benefit of the doubt and accept that he was not very active in the group.  That makes all the more important the question of why he went out of his way to emphasize it, a group in which he says he was not active, in connection with his seeking political promotion in 1985. 

Although we do not know for certain, it appears from the hearing that Samuel Alito did not join CAP at its founding but waited until around the time of his efforts in 1985 to get that political promotion.  That leads me to wonder whether it was part of his campaign to get the promotion.  I know how partisan and ideologically driven the Meese Justice Department was.  Until the Bush Administration it was probably the most partisan in modern history.   So it is logical to think that he proudly proclaimed his membership in CAP and the Federalist Society, as well as his support of Republican candidates and conservative causes and his recent submission of articles to the American Spectator, to establish his right-wing credentials to help win that coveted promotion.  It seems apparent that he said all this in 1985 to show those making promotion decisions that he was not just a traditional conservative, but a “movement conservative,” and that the activists in control of political promotions at the Meese Justice Department and the White House could rely on him.

I am concerned that he was trying too hard in 1985 and before to fit in with those in power.  In this time of Executive overreaching, illegal spying, and expanding Government power, what the American people need is a Supreme Court that is willing to stand up for the liberties and rights of all Americans, not someone who curries favor with the powerful. 

I am concerned, as well, about his failure to be forthcoming in answer to my questions.  I would have been more willing to give Judge Alito the benefit of the doubt if he had taken the opportunity the hearings provided to come clean about all this.  He gave me no adequate answers.  When Senator Schumer raised the matter of his inclusion of CAP on his job application again, on another day, later in the hearing he hinted at what he had done in 1985 but still would not own up.  He said:

“[Y]ou have to look at the question that I was responding to and the form that I was filling out.  I was applying for a position in the Reagan Administration, and my answers were truthful statements, but what I was trying to outline were the things that were relevant to obtaining a political position.”  But he stopped far short of answering because he had gotten himself into another box by his previously saying to us that he had no recollection of CAP.  He concluded with the following:  “Well, Senator, since I don't remember this organization, I can't answer your question specifically, but I think that the answer to the question lies in the nature of the form that I was filling out and the things that I put.”

Regrettably, when he had been asked by ABA representatives about his putting CAP in his 1985 job application and whether he was “pandering,” he failed to take that opportunity to reflect on what he had done and own up to the matter, as well.  Instead, according to Marna Tucker’s testimony, he answered that he put CAP on that application because “it would be improper to not tell the truth on an application” and “that he was a member of that organization.”  That answer says a lot. 

He is right that it is “improper to not tell the truth on an application,” but that does not explain why he chose to list CAP.  The form does not call for him to list all clubs and affiliations.  The form used to seek political advancement during the Reagan Administration asked for something else, a demonstration of partisan, political commitment.  It said:  “Please provide any information that you regard as pertinent to your philosophical commitment to the policies of this administration,” and asked applicants whether “you ever served on a political committee or been identified in a public way with a particular political organization, candidate or issue.”  That is why he included CAP, an organization that in the mid-1980s was a place that activists like Dinesh D’Souza and other rising stars in the conservative movement favored.  

Regrettably, at his hearing, and under oath, Judge Alito evaded.  He could not remember, tried to say the right things about discrimination, stood by while his supporters attacked the question and then watched as his supporters pushed so hard that they made his wife break down in tears.  I do not think that the Republican Senator who pressed that awkward line of defense intentionally meant to upset Mrs. Alito, but Republican partisans have turned that moment that they created into a partisan weapon. 

Like the matters of recusal, the CAP issue is another that Judge Alito could have put to rest by being more forthcoming at the outset.  He has never answered the question of why he touted his membership in CAP in 1985.  To me the true answer seems obvious.  Indeed, in a news account that appeared on the last day of the hearings, his mentor at the Department of Justice in those days admitted what was really going on in that 1985 application.  Charles Cooper, who was the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel and Samuel Alito’s supervisor, said:  “The only purpose of that essay was to satisfy the Office of Presidential Personnel that he was simpatico with the Reagan Administration’s legal policy agenda.”  He went on to call Samuel Alito’s 1985 statement “his essay of his political bona fides.” 

1985 Job Application

Judge Alito’s 1985 job application is an ideological manifesto that goes a long way to explain why the same people on the far right who shot down the President’s nomination of Harriett Miers, because they were not assured how she would rule, rushed to support Judge Alito when his nomination was announced.

Judge Alito wrote in that 1985 application that “[I]t has been an honor and source of personal satisfaction for me . . . to help to advance legal positions in which I personally believe very strongly.  I am particularly proud of my contributions in recent cases in which the government has argued in the Supreme Court that racial and ethnic quotas should not be allowed and that the Constitution does not protect a right to an abortion.”  At the age of 35, Samuel Alito was not satisfied representing the United States through work in the office of the Solicitor General and applied to the White House to be appointed to be Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Meese Justice Department when Charles Cooper was the Assistant Attorney General.  He was eager to highlight his work in the Solicitor General’s office, which should be a place where lawyers honor the law in a nonpartisan, professional manner, rather than seek to twist it to partisan political ends.  He bragged of his personal commitment against programs that helped to create equal opportunities for all Americans and against the constitutional right to privacy, including a woman’s right to choose.  Regrettably the Bush Administration’s regime of secrecy has prevented the Judiciary Committee, the Senate and the American people from reviewing Samuel Alito’s work product while in the Office of the Solicitor General and Office of Legal Counsel.  This was work done during a Republican administration that litigated and lost the famous Bob Jones University case about tax breaks for institutions that discriminate; that lied to Congress about the EPA and Iran-Contra; that sought to overrule Roe v. Wade; and that sought to roll the clock back on fundamental rights to equal protection.

The hearing gave Judge Alito an opportunity to do either of two things.  He could have embraced his statement from 1985 and his record as a judge and set out to explain why his deferential view of presidential power and his restrictive view of individual rights are appropriate for a justice who is supposed to be there for all 290 million Americans.  We could have had the great ideological debate that so many on the far right seemed to want to have when the President’s nominee was Harriett Miers.  Or he could have disavowed the 1985 job application and much of his record as a judge and told us that he would in fact be a check on the President and protect the fundamental constitutional rights of all Americans.  He did neither.  Instead he refused to share his views and tried to finesse his statements in the 1985 application and limit them “technically.”  He was so unresponsive that commentators from across the political spectrum have called for an end to Supreme Court confirmation hearings since they reveal so little about the nominee’s thinking.

For example, he said that his statements about privacy represented his views at the time, but that he would view the issue with an “open mind” as a justice with the authority to cut back, or overrule the rights expressly recognized in Roe v. Wade.  Judge Alito never disavowed his 1985 statement that in his legal view the Constitution does not protect a woman’s right to choose.  In fact, he responded to Chairman Specter that his statement in 1985 was a “true reflection of [his] views at the time” and “the position that [he] held at the time.” 

We also have his multi-page memorandum on the Thornburgh case from his days in the Solicitor General’s office — on of the handful that slips through the veil of secrecy that the Bush Administration sought to construct -- in which he asserts his legal view that Roe was wrongly decided and should be overruled, but that tactically the better approach would be to incrementally undermine its legal authority. 

This one memo is enough to demonstrate why such material should have been produced rather than hidden by this Administration so that the Senate and the American people would have the nominee’s views and record.  The Bush Administration refuses to produce Samuel Alito’s work at the Solicitor General’s office and at the Office of Legal Counsel.  Who can tell what those other writings would reveal about the nominee’s legal views?  The Washington Post recently reported that Charles Cooper has now indicated that Samuel Alito worked on defending the Reagan Administration in connection with the Iran-Contra crimes by working on legal theories so that they would not have to inform the Congress which was investigating in its oversight capacity.  What else did Samuel Alito work on that is being hidden from the Senate and the American people?

On the issue of a woman’s right to choose, we also have Judge Alito’s opinion in Casey in which he follows the script he laid out in his memorandum to the Solicitor General and finds no state regulation an undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.  Of course, the Supreme Court, including Justice O’Connor herself, were in place then to hold the line in Casey, reaffirm Roe and reject Judge Alito’s position.

Although he would not testify what his legal view is today, Judge Alito’s answers to questions about the precedential value of Roe and Casey can leave no doubt that he continues to believe that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided.  Even in his dry recitation of what should be routine methodology for how a justice decides a case in which there is precedent, he got it wrong.  He left out a step.  He left out the step where the justice, knowing that there is a controlling precedent, decides whether the precedent was correctly or incorrectly decided.  Obviously if a justice believes the preceding case correctly decided, he has no reason to go on to make the other calculations about weight and reliance and all the other factors that a justice is to consider when deciding whether to overrule past  precedent.  In other words, Judge Alito’s testimony presupposes that he continues to believe now what he believed in 1985, that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided.  Otherwise his answers make no sense.  A justice does not waste time worrying about factors and weight and reliance when he considers the precedent correctly decided; that happens only when he is considering whether to overrule or limit that precedent.   

Political Issues

Similarly his contradictory testimony at the hearing about his view were revealing about this nominee.  He went to great lengths to distance himself from his public endorsement of Judge Bork’s unsuccessful nomination to the Supreme Court.  He had called Judge Bork one of the most qualified nominee of the last century and was effusive in his praise — until asked about it at the hearing.  There he sought to backtrack.  He sought to excuse his comments as those of a political appointee supporting his employer’s nominee, but had to concede that was not an accurate explanation for his comments.  Only when pressed did he concede that he indeed thinks highly of Robert Bork’s candidacy. 

And when Senator Kohl asked him for his views of whether the Supreme Court should have taken the case of Bush v. Gore, his evasiveness reminded me of when I asked Clarence Thomas whether he had ever discussed Roe v. Wade with anyone.  Senator Kohl was not even asking his views on the holding of that case.  

Conclusion

This is a pivotal constitutional moment in our history, with a single, fundamental question:  Will the Senate serve its constitutional role and preserve the Supreme Court as a constitutional check on the expansion of presidential power?   

The reason presidential power issues have come to dominate this confirmation process is that we have clearly arrived now at a crucial juncture in our Nation, and on our highest court, over the question of whether a President of the United States is above the law.  The Framers knew that unchecked power leads to abuses and corruption, and the Supreme Court is the ultimate check and balance in our system.  Vibrant checks and balances are instruments in protecting both the security and the liberty of the American people.

The Supreme Court is the ultimate check and balance in our system.  The independence of the Court and its members is crucial to our democracy and way of life.  The Senate should never be allowed to become a rubber stamp, and neither should the Supreme Court. 

And so we owe it to the American people of today, and the Americans of generations to come, to ask and answer several essential questions:  Can this President, or any President, order illegal spying on Americans?  Can this President, or any President, authorize torture, in defiance of our criminal statutes and our international agreements?  Can this President, or any President, defy our laws and Constitution to hold American citizens in custody indefinitely without any court review?  Can this President, or any President, choose which laws he will follow and which he will not, by quietly writing a side statement when he signs a bill into law?  These are some of the most vital questions of our time, and these are among the most vital questions that confront the Senate in considering this nomination to our highest court.  Judge Alito’s record, and his responses -- and his failure to adequately answer questions about these issues -- are deeply troubling.

Regrettably, it seemed as if Judge Alito approached the question of a lifetime appointment to succeed Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the United States Supreme Court as a “job application” process that resembled a political campaign with two distinct parts.  First, he had to get the nomination, which he sought as a committed, arch-conservative, and as a reliable vote in favor of Government power.  That mission was accomplished when he was named to replace the nomination of Harriet Miers with the support of the President’s most extreme supporters.  That was his “primary” campaign.  The Senate confirmation process is more the equivalent of a general election, in which he strives to appear as middle-of-the-road as possible.  What he did not do successfully in my view is reconcile the two roles.  I will vote against this nominee, who I believe the President picked for his demonstrated legal views, which are in stark contrast to the image the White House handlers and supporters have attempted to create. 

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