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THE YOUTH POPULATION DECLINE AND
PROSPECTS FOR MILITARY RECRUITING IN THE 1990s
 
 
March 1987
 
 
PREFACE

Despite continuing successes in recruiting for the active enlisted forces, the ongoing decline in the size of the enlistment-age youth population has remained a cause for concern about the quality of recruits that the services will be able to attract in the 1990s. Some observers see the New GI Bill, authority for which is due to expire in 1988, as a significant aid to recruiting. To assist it in its deliberations on extending authority for the New GI Bill, the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Armed Services Committee asked the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to provide projections of recruit quality in the 1990s. This paper presents those projections.

Richard L. Fernandez of CBO's National Security Division prepared the report under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and Neil Singer. The author thanks Joel Slackman, also of CBO, for his help and advice. Patricia H. Johnston and Paul Houts edited the manuscript; Rebecca J. Kees prepared it for publication.
 

Edward M. Gramlich
Acting Director
March 1987
 
 


SUMMARY

In the early 1980s, military recruiting experienced such a striking improvement that, in November 1983, the Secretary of Defense declared an end to the "experiment" of the all-volunteer force. "We know now that an All-Volunteer Force can succeed," he said, "and we know what it takes to make it succeed." With a substantial drop in the size of the enlistment-age population pool still ahead, the Secretary's assessment was not shared by all. In the years since then, however, recruiting has continued to improve.

Improvements in recruiting have been particularly impressive for the Army, the service that traditionally has had the greatest difficulty in attracting recruits of high quality. By 1981, the Army had joined the other services in achieving a larger percentage of high school graduates among its recruits than is present in the youth population pool from which it draws. Since 1983, its percentage of high-aptitude recruits--those scoring above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT)--also has exceeded the percentage in the youth population. In 1980, half of Army enlistees were in "category IV" (10th through 30th percentile on the AFQT); by 1986, the proportion was under 5 percent A large part of the Army's success appears to stem from a new recruiter management system, suggesting that much of the improvement will persist regardless of the state of the civilian economy.

Although the enlistment-age populations have fallen nearly half-way to their mid-1990s trough, the decline has had little effect on enlistments. Recent research on manpower indicates that population changes do not lead to equal percentage changes in enlistment levels for "high-quality" males--high school graduates of above-average aptitude, the most difficult group to recruit. The remaining population decline--about 15 percent from fiscal year 1986 through the mid-1990s--would reduce high-quality male enlistments by only about 5 percent. When the projected stability of total accession requirements is also considered, the mid-1990s should see a return to recruit quality levels at or somewhat above those of fiscal year 1982, which by historical standards was a very successful recruiting year.

Other factors could make recruiting better, or worse, than the 5 in percent fall would indicate. With the growing labor force participation of women, the earnings and employment prospects of young men appear to have been diminished; and the Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts further growth in female employment through 1995, which could help recruiting efforts. Smaller youth cohorts could raise the earnings of young workers relative to those of older workers, however, which would tend to hurt recruiting. Holding military pay raises below private-sector increases would both reduce high-quality enlistments and, through reduced retention, increase accession requirements.

A major buildup in forces would affect recruit quality more adversely. A 10 percent end-strength increase phased in over three years, for example, would increase Army accession requirements by roughly 25 percent, forcing the Army to devote more of its recruiting resources to simply meeting overall numerical goals. Even with an increase of this magnitude, however, the quality of Army recruits would still easily satisfy the Congressionally imposed constraints--less than 20 percent in category IV and at least 65 percent high school graduates.

Recruit quality reached a peak in the last few years that probably will not be approached again in this century, but this does not mean that quality should be a major concern in the 1990s. Although some of the gains of recent years will probably be reversed, Army recruits, in particular, will include a higher percentage of high school graduates and will achieve higher average aptitude-test scores than the overall civilian population of enlistment-age youth.

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