

STATEMENT BY

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BEFORE

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Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman and the honorable members of the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Sub-Committee, I am BG Edward C. Cardon, the Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the Deputy Commanding General of the US Army Combined Arms Center. On behalf of LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth and Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, I would like to extend to each of you a warm welcome from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and the Soldiers and Civilians of the Combined Arms Center. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about Professional Military Education at the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

Everything I will say today must start with a preface – our graduates are doing well in operations all around the world, especially in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their service is selfless and often at great personal and family sacrifice. The faculty and staff of the College recognize that we owe them the best education possible and are dedicated to growing the next generation of leaders for our Army and Nation. In military terms of reference, the students are our center of gravity. Our challenge is and remains the same: to prepare them for both today and the future. We are grateful for the Committee's tremendous support to professional military education.

For 127 years the United States Army Command and General Staff College has developed military officers to lead our citizen soldiers, in peace and in war. Distinguished graduates include Eisenhower, Bradley, Marshall, Arnold, MacArthur, and tens of thousands of officers no less important to the security of our Nation. In addition, over the last 100 years, more than 7,100 international officers from 155 countries have joined America's military leaders in the classrooms at Fort Leavenworth to study military art and science at the operational level of war. This rich history of distinguished international officers includes 28 officers who subsequently rose to lead their Nations, including four who are currently serving Heads of State. The Fort Leavenworth United States Students Hall of Fame and International Students Hall of

Fame is a “who’s who” of Military Leadership. Just two examples from the international list reflect the critical importance of our international program to the strategic interests of the United States. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia graduated from the Command and General Staff College in 1991 and was inducted into our International Hall of Fame in 2005. The Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani graduated from CGSC in 1988 and was recently inducted into our International Hall of Fame in 2009. Both are poignant examples of the criticality of our international exchange program. Further illustrating this point are the words of our Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, who commented to the Military Education Coordinating Council (MECC) this year that he did not know where relations with Pakistan would be today if General Kayani had not attended Fort Leavenworth.

I realize the Committee is constantly reviewing the overall health of the professional military education process – now in its 20th year following the original issuance of the Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress, which came to be known to us in military education as the Skelton Report. First, we have implemented the HASC’s report recommendations and they continue to serve us well at CGSC, but more importantly, we strive to meet your intent of a rigorous quality education that prepares officers to operate in an ever changing environment.

For today’s testimony, you have asked us to specifically address the following five topics:

- **What should the military schools be and do?**
- **What constitutes rigor?**
- **What are the organizational structure and resources needed to accomplish your schools’ mission?**

- How do you define the quality of the senior leaders, best faculty, and qualifications for students at your school?

- How do you manage the curriculum broadly and specifically in the focus areas of strategy operational art, Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental, and Multinational (JIIM), language, regional studies and culture, irregular warfare and hybrid threats, and ethics.

The theme of our testimony is two-fold. First, we have implemented the HASC's report recommendations and they continue to serve us well at the College. Military education has been profoundly changed over the course of 20 years to achieve the development of a joint force as envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. While we have made tremendous progress, we also recognize we do not have a perfect system, and we continue to evolve to meet your overarching goals.

The second major focus of my testimony is to present the vision of our way ahead. A way to put this into the context of our discussions is to ask a question. What recommendations should shape the next 20 years of professional military education? What changes can and should we make in order to achieve the far-reaching impact we have witnessed from the original report?

First, allow me to present a more complete picture of the College. The answers to some of your questions are better explained in the context of describing the history and educational processes that causes us to conclude that we are successfully meeting the goals outlined in the 1989 Report..

The Army, by policy, provides an intermediate level education to all active duty majors and the opportunity for the same level of education to National Guard and Reserve majors through distance learning programs. For many years selection to attend resident CGSC was made by a Department of the Army Selection Board. This board selected approximately 50

percent of the eligible officers by year group to attend the resident CGSC course, while the remainder were required to complete the course by correspondence. All officers were required to complete CGSC, resident or non-resident, to remain competitive for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. The CGSC selection board became a determinant for branch qualifying follow-on positions, and was a major discriminator for future success.

In 2004, the Army made the decision to take a different direction in selecting students to attend CGSC. There were a number of reasons for changing this policy. First, if CGSC was needed for success for assignments as a major and beyond, why should the Army provide less than half of the officers the requisite education? Secondly, the operational environment was growing more complex, increasing the demand on education for leader development. For these and other very supportable reasons the Army moved forward to implement universal resident Intermediate Level Education (ILE) for all active duty majors.

Universal ILE has two parts: a common core and a credentialing course. The current 10-month CGSC experience consists of two courses: a 14-week core course which emphasizes joint educational outcomes, and a 28-week Advanced Operations and Warfighting Course. The resident course is primarily oriented toward branch officers – those officers who serve in duty positions directly related to their basic branch (infantry, armor, artillery, etc...), while most officers serving in specialty branches and career fields attend one of our resident satellite campuses where they take the 14-week Core Course and then complete a follow-on credentialing course based on their unique specialty.

Under current policy, approximately 75 percent of active duty officers should come to Ft Leavenworth for CGSC, but the resources, instructors, and facilities were never provided to make this a reality. Given this lack of resources and today's operational demands that impacts the availability of officers, the Army simply cannot man the operational force and have 75

percent of a year group attend CGSC. This has resulted in a large backlog of officers waiting to attend the 10 month resident course. The Army is currently reexamining this issue. An unintended consequence of this policy has been the demand growth for our sister services to support the increased number of staff groups.

Educationally, the concept of universal Intermediate Level Education for all majors is an intriguing debate for the Army. There is one line of analysis which maintains that universal ILE really makes sense, especially today. This supportive logic proposes that the 50 percent of majors who would not have attended CGSC under the old policy may have been the same officers who could have benefitted most from additional resident education, if the rigor and standards of the course are maintained. The counter argument assumes that when you enroll everyone the standards would have to be lowered to account for the weaker educational background of some students. The fact that I believe cannot be disputed is the Army is going to need all of our majors to be successful and all will face tough challenges. It is our task to provide the best education we can offer to every officer attending CGSC.

While this dialog will continue, I can assure you that all majors today receive a better education than provided previously. Those officers not attending resident CGSC at Ft Leavenworth receive the same 14 week ILE core curriculum taught by instructors who have been prepared and certified by our Faculty Development staff and the teaching departments at Ft. Leavenworth. We have traded our old correspondence courses for computer-based distance learning which strives to use the newest technology to improve the education experience. I do caution that these distance learning courses are not interchangeable with resident experiences. All our data identifies the interactions of our students in the classroom as the most important aspect of their learning experience and this level of interaction cannot be provided through distance learning. Regardless of what the Army decision is on universal ILE, all options which exist for majors today are far superior to that available 20 years ago.

As the Committee identified more than 20 years ago, professional military education is a critical component to leader development. We often say we train for certainty, but we educate for uncertainty. Given the unknowns of the future environment, we believe education today is more important than ever. It will allow our leaders to operate with complexity over extended time; to work ill-structured problems; and to operate in a more decentralized environment with increasing interactions with coalition and non-military partners. Education prepares our leaders for an uncertain future. CGSC has seen tremendous change over the past 20 years. Today, we focus on how to think about complex problems, not studying complicated yet tractable situations, which can yield linear solutions. Our Cold War planning for major combat operations has been replaced by studies in the full spectrum of conflict across the broad expanse of today's contemporary operating environment. Full spectrum operations have themes such as irregular warfare, counterinsurgency (COIN), and hybrid threats, and the contemporary operating environment includes both the human and physical domains with the culture, language and regional analysis being important areas of study at CGSC today.

Within the Department of Defense and specifically the professional military education community, we now habitually work together to plan and execute a uniform set of educational goals at all intermediate level schools. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, referred to as the OPMEP, is our common standard. Under the direction of the Director of the Joint Staff, the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC) is the corporate management body for the process and also the integrating activity for many cooperative programs that have emerged from this regular gathering of the senior leaders of all of the schools. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly visits with this group to provide his vision for the military education mission. Overall, and as you expected, we have found a lot more common ground than divergence in working

through even the most contentious issues and this organizational structure is greatly enhancing joint education in all of the schools.

This presents the opportunity to address your specific question concerning the value in the uniqueness of the service schools. We believe strongly that there is value at the intermediate level of education because these schools are not solely joint focused, but retain important requirements for service specific education. In the case of CGSC, we are the Army's land power institution, both in teaching and in research. This mission is critical for the overall success of the Army. The joint mission integrates well because the sister services routinely assign students who benefit in better understanding the Army because they routinely work with us in meeting their missions during operational deployments.

The *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (OPMEP) process is built on a set of common learning areas and educational standards, with a supporting accreditation process that assures uniformity of effort and also regularly evaluates the programs to assure that schools achieve the rigor of graduate education which was a key component of the Skelton Report recommendations. The OPMEP standards reflect good adult learning methodology, applying an educational outcomes-based model with the appropriate levels of review and reporting. The seven common educational standards of the OPMEP are our guidance addressing many of the questions you have posed and more. OPMEP addresses the specific standards in your question, to include covering qualifications for and recruiting of faculty, in assessment of students and program effectiveness, and the curriculum management and educational processes. We also have met all the standards of our regional accrediting body, the Higher Learning Commission, the accrediting activity which allows us to confer graduate degrees. These standards also examine rigor, faculty credentials, educational process, and assessment.

Your committee had a specific question concerning the value of our Advisory Committee, which is another part of our program assessment process. Our Advisory Committee consists of both educators and scholars in the military sciences. The value provided by the Advisory Committee is an independent review of educational processes and advising the leadership on issues from their perspective. The best evidence of their value is to recognize that significant organizational changes have been made based on advice from the Advisory Committee. I think this process is healthy because it provides the military leaders that come and go through the College independent review and unencumbered advice.

In considering the committee's question concerning processes to identify potential strategists early on, the College provides a number of venues to aid in this identification. As part of our research thesis program, students can pursue the Strategist track of study to research and write on a topic that falls within this category. They can also pursue the Joint Planner track of study and research and write in this area as well. How well these individuals handle the analysis of these complex questions and synthesize their results is a strong indicator of their potential in these critical areas.

We also have a very competitive selection process for students (Army, Sister Service, and International Military Students) who wish to continue their studies at Ft. Leavenworth for a second year, as part of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). These students who study in the Advanced Military Studies program are assigned to coded planning positions upon graduation from SAMS and many serve as senior planners and strategists repeatedly throughout their career. Many of our students also apply for similar programs throughout the joint professional military education community, such as at Quantico Marine Corps Base or at Maxwell Air Force Base.

Next to the students, the faculty of the College is the second critical line of operation for the College. The faculty at CGSC has changed dramatically over the past eight years, going from a predominately military faculty to a current faculty construct that is 65 percent civilian; although more than 95 percent of the civilians have active duty experience. The senior leadership of CGSC is the 3-star Commandant with a 1-star Deputy Commandant. The general requirement for both of these positions includes recent operational command experience, graduate education, and completion of a senior military college. The Dean of Academics is the chief academic officer for the College. This position requires a doctorate, significant leadership in education, and experience in the operational arts. Previous military experience is an obvious plus, but not a prerequisite for the position. The schools within the College are directed by colonels with operational experience, graduate degrees, and senior service college. There are also additional credentials depending on the position. As an example relevant to this discussion, the Director of the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations Department must also have joint experience sufficient for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair of Military Studies.

A current snapshot shows we currently have 275 civilian faculty members, 249 of which have active duty experience. The military faculty projected for this summer consists of 90 Army, 13 sister service, and 3 interagency officers. Within our civilian faculty, 32 served in our sister services, which yields a comparable joint representation in the civilian faculty. Later, I will talk about how this faculty model may be modified as we study comprehensive approaches.

Civilian faculty provides a core of professional educators who are critical to achieving graduate level education within an adult learning environment. Also, with the addition of civilian faculty, CGSC has grown from a very small number of Ph.D.s to more than 50 who possess terminal degrees and many more who are actively engaged in doctoral programs, adding depth to the teaching and learning at CGSC. The civilian faculty empowers us to seek specific expertise that

cannot be found in uniform, such as historians, political scientists, and economists. For example, the College is currently seeking to hire faculty with expertise in counterinsurgency, culture studies, and media relations. The value added by civilian faculty at CGSC is well established in external assessment data and in the feedback we collect from our students.

We recognize the value of the civilians teaching at CGSC, but we also understand the importance and value of Army officers teaching at CGSC. Our military faculty at the College is indispensable and provides balance in our faculty composition. The military faculty includes Army and joint leaders who coach and mentor our young officers, bring recent operational experience to the classroom, and provide context in our current military environment, among other benefits. The challenge is balancing the needs at CGSC and all the Army schools with the personnel pressures on all our formations and organizations at the midgrade and senior ranks. Army officers with the right education and experience are the lifeblood of the College.

The OPMEP process has provided CGSC with the joint service officers critical to infusing the joint service perspective into the Army's premier center of intellectual excellence. However, with the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2007 a change was made to the rules for granting joint credit to non-host faculty teaching at CGSC. These billets were previously on a list of assignments receiving joint duty credit on the Joint Duty Authorization List (JDAL) and from the College's standpoint this was both necessary and appropriate. This JDAL listing made teaching at CGSC attractive for sister service faculty because it assured them joint credit. There is now a different system in place which removes the Joint Duty Authorization List status for our sister service slots. The new process allows officers assigned to CGSC to apply for this credit after the fact, but joint officers consider the previous system much better, which (negatively) influences their interest in coming to Ft. Leavenworth. The second related issue is more critical. Because our sister service faculty positions were dropped from JDAL status they are a much lower fill priority for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. They are not 'must fill' jobs.

Recommendation 2 from the Skelton Report emphasized the criticality of recruiting and retaining a high quality faculty; having these positions on the JDAL better achieves this goal than the changes made with the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007. This also speaks to your fourth question, concerning the selection of uniform faculty by the Services and the Chairman.

Military faculty remains a significant challenge for the Army into the foreseeable future. The College will continue providing a superb educational experience, and military faculty is one of our watch areas. Adding retired military instructors with recent combat experience alleviates immediate concerns for currency and relevance within the civilian faculty; however, we are carefully reviewing and assessing the long-term impacts.

The final recommendation of the Skelton report that applies to CGSC, and is also one of your focus areas, is the question concerning the rigor of our program often measured by exams and writing requirements. CGSC assesses student work and provides feedback on performance to our students as an integral part of our educational model. A typical student receives 25 or more grades on their transcript with each grade being the composite of their performance on written work, oral presentations, participation, and exams in each numbered course they complete. We have a published grading policy and our graduation standards include achieving graduate level performance in our course work.

A number of awards for overall performance and writing are offered in every class as an incentive. Some examples include awards for the best overall performances by US, international, and interagency students, a history writing award, a thesis writing award, and a leadership writing award. Further, the top logistician, tactician and strategist are selected based on grades in their regular coursework and performance on additional written and oral exams.

Over the last several years the College has seen a need to provide majors more work in writing and communications, which has generated additional emphasis in our overarching education outcome of “communicate effectively.” Our course has, what we believe is, an appropriate level of rigor for graduate education. We side with those who insist that time for processing and reflections are critical components of graduate education. Full spectrum operations, with its renewed focus on stability operations, requires officers to think outside of the better previously understood parameters of major combat operations. This requirement will not be met by shortening intermediate level education experiences, but by maintaining their quality and integrity.

With that as a backdrop and I would like to sum up the first theme of this testimony with a quote by one of their military history heroes. General Pershing, in his memoirs while examining America’s performance in WW I, acknowledged the following:

“Our most highly trained officers as a rule came from the Staff College at Fort Leavenworth and from the Army War College...I was fortunate in having at my disposal ...a small group of men which included some of the most efficient and highly educated officers in our Army.¹“

This remains our standard and we should not settle for less. The evidence we collect internally and externally on the performance of our graduates supports that we remain a source of highly educated and trained men and women who are performing extremely well in these most difficult times. In our view, 20 years of developing and refining the *Officer Professional Military Education Policy* has been value added to the education of the officer corps and is reflected in the conduct of our operations around the world today.

This segues into the second topic I believe germane to today’s deliberations - what are the future needs of the Army in military education? Today, this is a subset of a larger issue

¹ John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, Vol. 1, (New York: Frederick K. Stoles and Company, 1931), 103.

being addressed by the Army, which is defining a comprehensive process to manage leader development. The Army recognizes that leader development is a balance and mix of education, training, and experience throughout a career. Each of the three components must be sequenced to effectively and efficiently develop our leaders as they progress. Just focusing on the education and training of officers, it is intuitive that to obtain the optimum result, each educational experience from Officer's Basic Course to the War College needs to cumulatively build on all preceding education, training, and experience. Each educational experience builds on the previous and subsequent assignments are a practicum for what has been learned.

To accomplish a comprehensive execution of leader development, the Army has assigned the management of leader development to the TRADOC Commander, currently GEN Martin Dempsey. GEN Dempsey has further delegated design and management of the leader development program to the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center LTG William B. Caldwell, IV. Our strategy is nearly complete and when approved, it will become the guidepost for the Army education process. The synergies for Army education that result from the Army Leader Development Strategy are certain to be positive. Allow me to examine this in more detail and specifically as it applies to education at CGSC.

CGSC manages the curriculum under a process we call the Accountable Instruction System. We are accountable for achieving our educational outcomes at the appropriate graduate learning levels. Our Accountable Instruction System process provides us two important data points, 1) an assessment of how well we achieved our learning outcomes, and 2) What should we be teaching that we are not teaching now. Answering the first question is relatively straightforward and provides us confidence in the analysis I have just presented. The second is the much harder question. This committee tackled the same issue 20 years ago with its creation of the joint education process that led to the OPMEP. The Army charges the leader development strategy with coordinating a vision for the Army. The synergy between the leader

development program and CGSC co-existing at Ft Leavenworth, is the College faculty can contribute to examining the future needs for the Army and help design the education needed to meet these challenges. This process will help focus the CGSC curriculum and allow our program to interrelate with previous and follow-on experience and education. In reality, co-existing understates the relationship because, CGSC will have a significant part in the planning and execution of the Army's leader development strategy.

Secondly, in education and development of military leaders, there will always be more to do than time to accomplish the mission. The education process must allow the College to measure the benefits and costs of proposed changes in comparison to the current curriculum. This is the natural friction in a healthy process. Our Accountable Instruction System provides us the data needed for that calculation. However, our internal processes cannot examine the impacts on the overall leader development strategy. Do changes at Ft Leavenworth cause unintended consequences elsewhere? The leader development strategy provides the appropriate process for the Army to answer the secondary questions.

The constant in this discussion is that CGSC remains a professional school for developing military officers and national security professionals into experts in the operational art of war. War applies in the broadest sense as defined by Clausewitz. In today's definitions, war equates to full spectrum operations, not just major combat operations, therefore, war is offense, defense, stability, and civil support with all the intervening transitions. These all transpire concurrently, yet with different levels of intensity. War has gone from being a very complicated set of conditions that could be modeled to a complex and adaptive living system, much more difficult to analyze. Writing plans has been a process of military decision making that assumed that the problems could be modeled. Today, adaptive problem solving and design are the tools required to prepare officers for planning and commanding. Further, topics such as irregular war or hybrid threats, stability operations, reconstruction, and comprehensive approaches to winning

the final peace, must be and are part of the CGSC curriculum. All of this must be done without adding to the course lengths or simply demanding more from the students. To maintain the hallmarks of a graduate educational institution, with time for reading, reflection, writing and discussion, we must incorporate the critical topics into the natural rhythm at CGSC. We realize that friction will always exist where the current curriculum competes with the many emerging topics. As one of your questions alludes to, we are regularly pressed to insert new material into the curriculum. We apply the College's Accountable Instruction System process to select only those that are most critical and thus retain an appropriate amount of time for study and reflection in the academic day. The solution to what should be in the curriculum is hard, but not intractable. The second great synergy for Army leader development program coexisting at CAC with CGSC is that the solutions to these issues can be managed across the Army education and training continuum, rather than CGSC in isolation making changes without accounting for what occurs before and after officers attend CGSC.

Inside the College, the development of an integrated curriculum is one approach that we employ to lessen the friction in curriculum management. We briefed your staff delegation on how the integrated curriculum approach designed at CGSC allows us to address multiple learning outcomes in common lesson blocks. The topics are not organized into discrete blocks such as individual classes in counterinsurgency, stability operations, threats, culture, major combat operations, etc. In the course by course approach we would either run out time before we covered all of the most important topics, or be forced to teach a myriad of topics broadly, but without depth in any one area. For us, the latter approach is not acceptable. Philosophically, we have to make the hard choices on what must be taught. We teach applying a realistic scenario for students to analyze which recognizes the full spectrum of operations and is set in a real world contemporary environment. Officers understand that as military leaders they are either engaged in, or planning for, all of these elements simultaneously. For example, students

may plan and execute a major operation with hybrid threats while simultaneously conducting stability operations while designing the transition to stability/reconstruction operations. Three major exercises provide practice in planning and execution across the full spectrum of operations , culminating with a brigade stability operation. In parallel to our integrated course of study, we teach military history and leadership throughout the year. Leadership includes our ethics programs. Again, these courses are leveraged to achieve multiple learning outcomes that cover full spectrum operations. It is quite insightful how much we teach about the contemporary operating environment in the study of history.

We at CGSC have begun our analysis of the needs for officers over the next ten years. As a product of our self-assessment, there are a number of initiatives in military education ongoing at CGSC and I want to take a few moments to highlight the most important of these. I will introduce our interagency education campaign, placing warrant officers in the intermediate level education course, the student health and wellness program, additions to our language studies being piloted for the first time with our current class, and a new focus on strategic communications.

Over the history of the College, civilian student participation in education at CGSC has been minimal, whether these were civilians from the Army or outside agencies. We have had minor faculty support from some agencies, but almost no civilian students attending. With the war in Iraq and a better understanding within DOD of the criticality of whole of government solutions to win the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan, the need to add interagency studies to the curriculum became paramount. As a professional school, this would logically lead to the addition of interagency professionals to the faculty to develop curriculum and teach. Further, the great value of having mid-career military officers studying with their interagency was also easily recognized. In discussions with Department of State (DOS) and a number of other government agencies it became clear that bringing interagency students and faculty to the

Heartland was going to require a major campaign on the part of the CGSC. The College assigned a senior faculty member to direct the Interagency Program and hit the road to contact the agencies we saw as contributors and partners. Over the last two years we have talked to dozens of agencies and done our best to market this program. The story was uniformly the same. These agencies understood and supported this initiative, but lacked the education and training account of people to support our efforts.

The Army developed a program which allows a small number of Army officers to intern with these agencies to help mitigate the manning issues they experience by sending students to Ft Leavenworth. While helping our interagency partners is a critical component in getting interagency students to Ft. Leavenworth, the experience that these officers gain working within a partner organization is a powerful educational experience and cannot be underestimated. Our results to date are encouraging with 23 total interagency students scheduled to attend CGSC this summer. Eighteen of these will be in the intermediate level education course and in exchange, 22 Army majors will serve internships in 14 agencies. We also have interagency faculty from the Department of State, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a great start, but there is more to be done. This is an area where we believe we can use your support. Our current policies set standards for joint representation within the student body. We feel a similar system to support interagency participation at the intermediate level is appropriate, similar to the process applied at the senior service schools. We will be working through the Military Education Coordination Council to develop a proposal, which may eventually require legislative action. Here, I just wanted to introduce this as a concern to full integration of interagency students and faculty into CGSC.

Our second initiative has been to expand our Army student body to include senior warrant officers. We just completed a very successful pilot program, where we graduated five senior warrant officers from the ILE course. These experienced technical experts in our Army

provided yet another broad perspective of how our Army operates, enriching the educational experience for all the students. We plan to continue the inclusion of small number of select warrant officers in each subsequent class.

The third initiative I want to showcase is the student health program that has been added at CGSC. The Army War College has, for a long time, operated a wellness program for its students, with dramatic impact. It has literally saved people's lives by detecting critical health issues that were going undiagnosed. The program not only provides health screening, but educates on health maintenance issues such as diet, exercise, stress and other life style issues. Three years ago, the leadership at CGSC began to see the signs and symptoms of stress in the population of majors at CGSC. As an experiment, we solicited the support of the Army Physical Fitness Research Institute (APFRI) from the Army War College (AWC) to screen the majors at CGSC. The results were startling. The majors were, overall, in worse physical condition than the students at AWC, officers 10 years their senior. A plan was developed to add a satellite program at CGSC to educate our officers on the criticality of a healthy force for Army readiness and ensure these leaders were aware of their health and fitness level. This program is resourced and we now have a full wellness program for our majors. This program is also being established at the Army's Sergeants' Major Academy. Our next step is to develop and implement the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program in our curriculum to allow these leaders to institute strong programs in the units they will both serve in and command in the future.

The next initiative I wish to share concerns the teaching of language and culture. The Army now has a strategy for addressing the development of culture and language skills within the service. CGSC had already added more cultural education and created language opportunities. My report today represents an update on a work in progress. Culture is part of the foundation curriculum required for all Army majors. Further, of eight required electives, every student must take at least one from a list of approved cultural electives, usually a regional

studies course. After this initial volley, culture becomes a component of the integrated curriculum I described earlier. Students learn to conduct cultural analysis to address the impacts of culture on military operations, particularly as they practice or exercise their planning skills using scenarios crafted to require cultural understanding.

Teaching language as an additional subject in a 10-month warfighting course is an educational challenge. Consider that Defense Language Institute courses to bring students to a rudimentary working level of proficiency are all immersion experiences lasting from nine months to over a year, depending on the relative difficulty of the language. Language instruction is needed at CGSC, but must be prudently implemented. Students who know they are going to Iraq or Afghanistan take appropriate culture and language elective courses. New with this class, we have started a pilot program to offer more language to interested students. Students will have intensive afternoon classes for a week with Defense Language Institute instructors in our classrooms. They will then have a five-month online program of study that will include VTCs with their instructor in California, and then at the end of the term the Defense Language Institute instructors will return to Ft Leavenworth to teach for a month. We have 42 students enrolled in Arabic, Chinese, and French. At the end of the year, we will assess how much the students have been able to learn and whether the program has value in the future.

The final initiative I want to highlight is our new emphasis on preparing our majors to employ the weapons of strategic communication. One of the most profound lessons learned from today's conflicts is the power of the media to influence the outcome. I grew up in an Army in which no comment, maybe subtly rephrased, was the smart approach to dealing with any media. Today, as the media relations experts that we bring to the College point out, a whole broadcast studio fits in a large suitcase. The media is going to be there so we must be ready to engage with them, because our adversaries are. The second important issue in media relations is the requirement to engage with the American people. They want to support their military, but

also want to know more about what we are doing. Therefore, at CGSC every student must write for publication, be interviewed by the media, complete a public speaking engagement, and touch the blogosphere. The early results of having our students engage with the public are inspiring. There are great stories to tell and important messages that the American people should hear. This program is having an immediate impact on our Army and has long-term benefits for our officers.

In closing we are unbelievably proud of the men and women who serve at Fort Leavenworth, both the military and our dedicated civilians. Teaching and learning is strong in the College. We will continue to evolve and adjust to meet the needs of the future. Our analysis is that the impact of the Skelton Report has been outstanding represented by the actions of our leaders on the ground. The challenge is to adapt for the future, and while what we have now is much better and certainly appropriate for our officers for the next ten years, we cannot rest on the past. We must continue to prepare these leaders to be adaptive and open minded in framing the problems they will face, agile in considering new ideas, and grounded in the values to which our Nation aspires.

In the years following his graduation from CGSC, George S. Patton Jr. continued to study each year's staff college curriculum, and to work the tactical exercises therein. He stated, "I am convinced that as good as Leavenworth is it is still only a means not an end and that we must keep on. I have worked all the problems of the two years since I graduated and shall continue to do so. However I don[']t try for approved solutions any more but rather to do what I will do in war²."

We look at each class and recognize that somewhere in the mix may be, or must be, the next Marshall, Eisenhower, or Patton, both in the quality of the person and the criticality of the

missions the country will heap upon him or her. We understand the importance of what must be done. We greatly appreciate your support in this mission.

This concludes my prepared statement and again, thank you for this opportunity to testify before the committee today.

2. Martin Blumenson, ed. *The Patton Papers: 1885-1940*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1972, 801.