This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-09-447 
entitled 'Department Of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant 
Vulnerabilities in State's Passport Issuance Process' which was 
released on March 16, 2009.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

March 2009: 

Department Of State: 

Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State's Passport 
Issuance Process: 

GAO-09-447: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-447, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

A genuine U.S. passport is a vital document, permitting its owner to 
travel freely in and out of the United States, prove U.S. citizenship, 
obtain further identification documents, and set up bank accounts, 
among other things. Unfortunately, a terrorist or other criminal could 
take advantage of these benefits by fraudulently obtaining a genuine 
U.S. passport from the Department of State (State). 

There are many ways that malicious individuals could fraudulently 
obtain a genuine U.S. passport, including stealing an American 
citizen’s identity and counterfeiting or fraudulently obtaining 
identification or citizenship documents to meet State requirements. GAO 
was asked to proactively test the effectiveness of State’s passport 
issuance process to determine whether the process is vulnerable to 
fraud. 

To do so, GAO designed four test scenarios that simulated the actions 
of a malicious individual who had access to an American citizen’s 
personal identity information. GAO created counterfeit documents for 
four fictitious or deceased individuals using off-the-shelf, 
commercially available hardware, software, and materials. An undercover 
GAO investigator then applied for passports at three United States 
Postal Service (USPS) locations and a State-run passport office. 

What GAO Found: 

GAO’s investigation shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an 
American citizen’s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create 
fraudulent documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. 
passport from State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach 
and was successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. 
In the most egregious case, an undercover GAO investigator obtained a 
passport using counterfeit documents and the Social Security Number 
(SSN) of a man who died in 1965. In another case, the investigator 
obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of 
a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created for a previous 
investigation—even though the investigator’s counterfeit documents and 
application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports were 
issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all 
four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained 
documents. State and USPS employees did not identify GAO’s documents as 
counterfeit. 

Figure: Genuine U.S. Passports Obtained with Counterfeit or 
Fraudulently Obtained Documents: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration of passports] 

Source: GAO (presentation); and the U.S. State Department (image). 

[End of figure] 

GAO’s investigator later purchased an airline ticket under the name 
used on one of the four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, and then 
used that passport as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get 
a boarding pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major 
metropolitan-area airport. 

At a briefing on the results of GAO’s investigation, State officials 
agreed with GAO that the investigation exposes a major vulnerability in 
State’s passport issuance process. According to State officials, 
State’s fraud detection efforts are hampered by limitations to its 
information sharing and data access with other federal and state 
agencies. After GAO’s briefing, State officials notified GAO that they 
identified and revoked GAO’s four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, 
and were studying the matter to determine the appropriate steps for 
improving State’s passport issuance process. 

View [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-447] or key 
components. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 512-
6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Undercover Investigator Obtained Four Genuine U.S. Passports Using 
Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents: 

Corrective Action Briefing: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to Obtain 
Genuine U.S. Passports: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security: 

Abbreviations: 

D.C.: District of Columbia: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

SSA: Social Security Administration: 

SSN: Social Security Number: 

USPS: United States Postal Service: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 13, 2009: 

The Honorable Jon Kyl: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security: 
Committee on the Judiciary: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein:
United States Senate: 

A U.S. passport not only allows an individual to travel freely in and 
out of the United States, but also can be used to obtain further 
identification documents, prove U.S. citizenship, and set up bank 
accounts, among other things. Because passports issued under a false 
identity help enable individuals to conceal their movements and 
activities, there is great concern that passport fraud could facilitate 
acts of terrorism. In fact, the 9/11 Commission stated that "for 
terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons," and further 
noted that terrorists need to travel "to meet, train, plan, case 
targets, and gain access to attack."[Footnote 1] Further, passport 
fraud facilitates other crimes such as illegal immigration, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, tax evasion, and alien smuggling. 

Malicious individuals may seek to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
Department of State's (State) current passport issuance process, such 
as a lack of due diligence on the part of examiners who screen 
applications, by using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents 
as proof of identity and U.S. citizenship[Footnote 2] to obtain genuine 
U.S. passports. For example, between July 2005 and August 2008, State 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified 112 
individuals who had fraudulently obtained U.S. passports by using the 
birth certificates of deceased Americans. Individuals who fraudulently 
obtained passports included fugitives, sex offenders, and delinquent 
taxpayers, all of whom wanted to use a U.S. passport to conceal 
themselves from law enforcement authorities. State and the FBI 
identified these 112 individuals by matching State passport records 
against state-level death records. 

In 2005, we reported that using the stolen identities and documentation 
of U.S. citizens is the primary tactic of those fraudulently applying 
for U.S. passports, and that passport fraud is often linked to other 
crimes.[Footnote 3] Our report mentioned a number of ways in which a 
person might fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport, including using an 
assumed identity that is supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained 
identification documents; submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or 
mutilated passports; using counterfeit citizenship documents; and using 
the identity of a deceased person. We also reported weaknesses in 
State's information sharing with other federal agencies. For example, 
we stated that the information that State received and used from the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) was limited and outdated. In the 
report, we stated that although State and SSA signed a memorandum in 
April 2004 that gave State access to SSA's main database to help verify 
passport applicants' identity, the memorandum had not been implemented 
as of March 2005. Moreover, we reported that the memorandum did not 
include access to SSA's death records, but that State officials said 
they were exploring the possibility of obtaining these records in the 
future.[Footnote 4] 

In 2007 we reported on the risk of fraud that exists in the lack of 
State's oversight of the more than 8,000 passport acceptance facilities 
nationwide that it designates to provide passport application services 
to the American public.[Footnote 5] Passport acceptance facilities are 
located at certain United States Postal Service (USPS) locations, 
courthouses, and other institutions, and do not employ State personnel. 
The passport acceptance agents at these facilities are responsible for, 
among other things, verifying whether an applicant's identification 
document (such as a driver's license) actually matches the applicant, 
and sending each applicant's proof of citizenship and passport 
application to State. Although we found that State had taken some steps 
to address weaknesses identified in the training of acceptance agents, 
we found that additional measures were needed to ensure adequate 
controls over the application acceptance process. 

This report responds to your request that we proactively test the 
effectiveness of the current passport issuance process to determine 
whether malicious individuals could use counterfeit or fraudulently 
obtained documents to obtain a genuine U.S. passport. To perform this 
work, we designed four test scenarios that would simulate the actions 
of a malicious individual who had access to another person's identity 
information (a practice commonly known as identity theft). We then 
attempted to obtain four genuine U.S. passports by using counterfeit or 
fraudulently obtained documents, such as birth certificates and 
drivers' licenses, and the Social Security Numbers (SSN) of fictitious 
or deceased individuals. We created all of these counterfeit documents 
with off-the-shelf, commercially available hardware, software, and 
materials. In addition, we used some of these counterfeit documents to 
obtain a genuine District of Columbia (D.C.) identification card, which 
we subsequently used to obtain a U.S. passport in one test. 

The fictitious identities we used in our first two tests were based on 
information and SSNs we had previously obtained from SSA for the 
purpose of conducting undercover tests. These tests were meant to 
simulate a malicious individual stealing another person's identity and 
using it to obtain a passport. On our third test, we used the genuine 
SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child we created for a previous 
investigation[Footnote 6] to simulate a malicious individual stealing 
the identity of a real child to get a passport. Finally, on our fourth 
test, we used the SSN of an individual who died in 1965 to simulate a 
malicious individual using a deceased person's identity to obtain a 
passport.[Footnote 7] For three of our four tests, we submitted our 
passport applications and supporting materials at USPS locations that 
accept passport applications. For one of our four tests, we submitted 
our application and materials at State's regional Washington, D.C., 
passport-issuing office.[Footnote 8] 

We conducted the work for this investigation from May 2008 through 
March 2009 in accordance with quality standards for investigations as 
set forth by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Undercover Investigator Obtained Four Genuine U.S. Passports Using 
Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents: 

Our investigator was easily able to obtain four genuine U.S. passports 
using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. In the most 
egregious case, our investigator obtained a U.S. passport using 
counterfeit documents and the SSN of a man who died in 1965. In another 
case, our undercover investigator obtained a U.S. passport using 
counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old 
child--even though his counterfeit documents and application indicated 
he was 53 years old. State and USPS employees did not identify our 
documents as counterfeit in any of our four tests. Although we do not 
know what checks, if any, State performed when approving our fraudulent 
applications, it issued a genuine U.S. passport in each case. All four 
passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four 
different names. 

Our tests show a variety of ways that malicious individuals with even 
minimal counterfeiting capabilities and access to another person's 
identity could obtain genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or 
fraudulently obtained documents. Table 1 below shows the month of 
passport application, type of counterfeit or fraudulently obtained 
documents used, and the number of days that passed between passport 
application and passport issuance for each of our four tests. 

Table 1: Counterfeit or Fraudulently Obtained Documents Used to Obtain 
Genuine U.S. Passports: 

Test number: 1; 
Month of application: July 2008; 
Documents submitted as part of passport application process: 
* Counterfeit West Virginia driver's license; 
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate; 
* Passport application form; 
Number of days between application and issuance: 8 days. 

Test number: 2; 
Month of application: August 2008; 
Documents submitted as part of passport application process: 
* Genuine District of Columbia identification card obtained with 
fraudulent documentation; 
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate; 
* Passport application form; 
Number of days between application and issuance: Same day (passport 
issued the date of application). 

Test number: 3; 
Month of application: October 2008; 
Documents submitted as part of passport application process: 
* Counterfeit West Virginia driver's license; 
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate; 
* Passport application form containing SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old 
child, which we obtained on a previous investigation; 
Number of days between application and issuance: 7 days. 

Test number: 4; 
Month of application: December 2008; 
Documents submitted as part of passport application process: 
* Counterfeit Florida driver's license; 
* Counterfeit New York birth certificate; 
* Passport application form containing SSN of a deceased individual; 
Number of days between application and issuance: 4 days. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: In all four tests, our investigator also submitted two color 
photographs and a passport application fee. For the second test, the 
investigator also submitted an e-ticket for an August 2008 flight to 
Germany. 

[End of table] 

Our investigator used a genuine U.S. passport obtained by using 
counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents to pass through airport 
security. In January 2009, our investigator purchased an airline ticket 
for a domestic flight using the fictitious name from one of our test 
scenarios. He then used the fraudulently obtained passport from that 
test as proof of identity to check in to his flight, get a boarding 
pass, and pass through the security checkpoint at a major metropolitan- 
area airport. Figure 1 below shows the boarding pass. After our 
investigator successfully passed through the checkpoint, he left the 
airport and canceled his airline ticket. 

Figure 1: Boarding Pass Used to Pass through Airport Security: 

[Refer to PDF for image: photograph] 

Source: GAO (presentation), and Delta Airlines (image). 

[End of figure] 

Test One: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Counterfeit 
Identification Documents: 

Our first test found that USPS did not detect the counterfeit West 
Virginia driver's license our undercover investigator presented as 
proof of his identity during the passport application process. Further, 
State issued our investigator a genuine U.S. passport despite the 
counterfeit New York birth certificate he used as proof of his U.S. 
citizenship. In July 2008, our investigator entered a USPS office in 
Virginia and approached a USPS employee to apply for a passport. The 
USPS employee greeted the investigator and took his application form, 
counterfeit New York birth certificate, and counterfeit West Virginia 
driver's license. On these documents, we used a fictitious identity and 
a SSN that we had previously obtained from SSA for the purpose of 
conducting undercover tests. The USPS employee reviewed the application 
materials line by line to make sure that the information on the 
application form matched the information on the birth certificate and 
driver's license. After she completed her review of the application 
materials, the USPS employee took the investigator's birth certificate 
and funds to pay for the application fee. She administered an oath, and 
then told the investigator that he should receive the passport within 1 
to 4 weeks. 

State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our undercover investigator 8 
days after he submitted his application. About a week after State 
issued the passport, it arrived at the mailing address indicated on the 
application materials. 

Test Two: Investigator Obtained Passport Using a Genuine but 
Fraudulently Obtained State Identification Card: 

Our second test found that State did not detect a counterfeit New York 
birth certificate our undercover investigator presented to prove his 
U.S. citizenship in support of a passport application. In July 2008, 
our investigator--the same investigator as in the first test above-- 
obtained a genuine identification card from the Washington, D.C., 
Department of Motor Vehicles using counterfeit documents, which he then 
used to apply for a U.S. passport. 

In August 2008, the same investigator entered State's regional 
Washington, D.C., passport-issuing office with a completed passport 
application form, a counterfeit New York birth certificate, the genuine 
D.C. identification card, two passport photographs, sufficient funds to 
pay for the application fee, and an electronic ticket (e-ticket) 
confirming that he had a flight to Germany.[Footnote 9] For this test, 
we used a fictitious identity and SSN that we had previously obtained 
from SSA for the purpose of conducting undercover investigations. The 
investigator presented his application form and materials to a State 
employee, who went line by line through the application form matching 
the information to the accompanying documents. The State employee 
provided the investigator with a number and instructed him to wait 
until his number was called. After his number was called, the 
investigator proceeded to a window to speak with another State 
employee. The second employee looked over his materials to make sure 
that he had all of the necessary documentation, took his birth 
certificate and money, and administered an oath. 

A few days later, the investigator returned to the same passport 
facility and picked up his passport. State issued the passport on the 
same day that the investigator submitted his application, in the 
fictitious name presented on the fraudulently obtained and counterfeit 
documents. 

Test Three: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Social Security Number 
for a Fictitious 5-Year-Old Child: 

As with our first test, our third test found that USPS did not detect 
the counterfeit West Virginia driver's license our undercover 
investigator presented as proof of his identity during the passport 
application process. Further, State issued our investigator a genuine 
U.S. passport based on a counterfeit New York birth certificate as 
proof of U.S. citizenship. In October 2008, our investigator--the same 
investigator as in the first two tests mentioned above--entered a USPS 
office in Maryland to apply for a U.S. passport. A USPS employee 
greeted the investigator and took his application form, as well as his 
counterfeit New York birth certificate and counterfeit West Virginia 
driver's license. The application materials used the name and genuine 
SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child, which we obtained from a previous 
investigation. However, our investigator listed his age as 53 on the 
application materials, which clearly did not match the date of birth 
associated with the SSN used in this test. The USPS employee reviewed 
the application materials, including meticulously matching the 
information on the application form to the birth certificate and 
driver's license. After she completed her review of the application 
materials, the USPS employee took the investigator's birth certificate 
and payment for the application fee, administered an oath, and told the 
investigator that he should receive the passport within 2 to 4 weeks. 

State issued a genuine U.S. passport to our investigator, in the 
fictitious name based on the counterfeit documents, 7 days after he 
submitted his application. The passport arrived at the mailing address 
indicated by our investigator on the application materials a few days 
after its issuance. 

Test Four: Investigator Obtained Passport Using Social Security Number 
of a Deceased Individual: 

As with our first and third tests, our fourth test found that USPS did 
not detect the counterfeit identification document--a bogus Florida 
driver's license--our undercover investigator presented to support his 
passport application. Further, State issued our investigator a genuine 
U.S. passport based on a counterfeit New York birth certificate as 
proof of U.S. citizenship. In December 2008, our investigator--the same 
investigator as in the three tests mentioned above--entered a USPS 
office in Maryland to apply for a U.S. passport. A USPS employee 
greeted the investigator and took his application form, as well as his 
counterfeit New York birth certificate and counterfeit Florida driver's 
license. His application materials used a name and SSN that was issued 
to a person who died in 1965, and who would have been 59 years old at 
the time of our test had he still been alive.[Footnote 10] The USPS 
employee reviewed the application materials, matching the information 
on the application form to the birth certificate and driver's license. 
After completing the review of application materials, the USPS employee 
took the investigator's birth certificate and funds to pay for the 
application fee. The USPS employee administered an oath then told the 
investigator that he should receive the passport within 4 to 6 weeks. 

Four days after our investigator submitted his application, State 
issued a genuine U.S. passport in the fictitious name presented on the 
counterfeit documents. The passport arrived at the mailing address 
indicated by our investigator on the application materials. 

Corrective Action Briefing: 

We briefed State officials on the results of our investigation. They 
agreed that our findings expose a major vulnerability in State's 
passport issuance process. According to State officials, the 
department's ability to verify the information submitted as part of a 
passport application is hampered by limitations to its information 
sharing and data access with other agencies at the federal and state 
levels. They said that some federal agencies limit State's access to 
their records due to privacy concerns or the fact that State is not a 
law enforcement agency. In addition, they said that State does not 
currently have the ability to conduct real-time verification of the 
authenticity of birth certificates presented by passport applicants. 
They added that birth certificates present an exceptional challenge to 
fraud detection efforts, as there are currently thousands of different 
acceptable formats for birth certificates. Further, they indicated that 
there are difficulties with verifying the authenticity of drivers' 
licenses. Moreover, they said that although State attempts to verify 
SSN information submitted on passport applications on a daily basis 
with SSA, the results of this data-sharing process are imperfect. For 
example, State officials said that many of the mismatches identified 
through this verification process are actually due to typos or other 
common errors. However, they said that while these data checks may not 
identify all cases in which an applicant's data do not match the 
information in SSA's records, in some instances--such as cases in which 
an SSN is tied to a deceased individual--investigators from the 
Passport Fraud Branch of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security will 
attempt to check publicly available databases to resolve the mismatch. 

State officials acknowledged that they have issued other fraudulently 
obtained passports but did not offer an estimate of the magnitude of 
the problem. In order to improve State's current passport fraud 
detection capabilities, officials said that State would need greater 
cooperation from other agencies at both the federal and state levels, 
and the ability to access other agencies' records in real time. 
Subsequent to our briefing, State officials informed us that they 
identified and revoked our four fraudulently obtained U.S. passports, 
and that they would study the matter further to determine what steps 
would be appropriate to improve passport issuance procedures. We did 
not verify the accuracy of these State officials' statements. We also 
briefed a representative of USPS on the results of our investigation, 
who did not offer any comments at the time of our briefing. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of State and 
other interested parties. The report will also be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you 
or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact 
me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. 

Signed by: 

Gregory D. Kutz: 
Managing Director Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Government 
Printing Office (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 22, 2004). 

[2] As required by State's instructions on the Application for a U.S. 
Passport, form DS-11, applicants must provide proof of U.S. citizenship 
and proof of identity, along with two recent color photographs and 
funds to cover the passport application fees. 

[3] See GAO, State Department: Improvements Needed to Strengthen U.S. 
Passport Fraud Detection Efforts, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-477] (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 
2005). 

[4] On June 29, 2005, a State official testified before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs that the 
initiative with SSA would be operational nationwide by early August 
2005. 

[5] See GAO, Border Security: Security of New Passports and Visas 
Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent Use, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] (Washington, D.C.: 
Jul. 31, 2007). 

[6] See GAO, Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to 
Strengthen Procedures for Issuing Social Security Numbers to 
Noncitizens, but Some Weaknesses Remain, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-12] (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 
2003). 

[7] We did not design a test scenario to simulate a malicious 
individual attempting to obtain a passport by using the identity and 
SSN of a person who already had a current U.S. passport, as this 
scenario was beyond the scope of our investigation. According to 
information provided to us by State for a previous report, about 28 
percent of the U.S. population has a passport. See GAO, State 
Department: Comprehensive Strategy Needed to Improve Passport 
Operations, GAO-08-891 (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2008). 

[8] State operates 17 domestic passport-issuing offices, where most 
passports are issued each year. These offices are located in Aurora, 
Colorado; Boston; Charleston, South Carolina; Chicago; Honolulu; 
Houston; Los Angeles; Miami; New Orleans; New York; Norwalk, 
Connecticut; Philadelphia; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; San Francisco; 
Seattle; and 2 offices in Washington, D.C.--a regional passport agency 
and a special issuance agency that handles official U.S. government and 
diplomatic passports. Fifteen of these offices are regional passport 
agencies that process in-person applications in addition to 
applications received by mail. The remaining 2 facilities--Charleston, 
South Carolina, and Portsmouth, New Hampshire--are mega-processing 
centers with no access to the public. 

[9] We chose this office because it offers an expedited service-- 
passports are usually issued within 1-2 days--for travelers who present 
a confirmed airline reservation to prove that they will be traveling 
out of the United States within 14 days. 

[10] We used SSA's Death Master File to obtain the identity of the 
deceased individual. 

[End of section] 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Phone: 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of
production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the
publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and
white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s Web site, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm]. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or
TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card,
MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional 
information. 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: