GAO-09-344, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-lethal Weapons


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Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful 
Non-lethal Weapons' which was released on April 22, 2009. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

April 2009: 

Defense Management: 

DOD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, and Testing to Enhance 
Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-lethal Weapons: 

GAO-09-344: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-344, a report to congressional requesters. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Nonlethal weapons (NLW) provide an alternative when lethal force is 
undesirable. The Department of Defense (DOD) defines NLW as those that 
are explicitly designed and primarily employed to incapacitate 
personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment. DOD 
created the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program in 1996 to have 
centralized responsibility for the development of NLW and coordinate 
requirements among the services. GAO was asked to review the status of 
NLW programs within DOD and the military services by identifying the 
extent to which (1) DOD and the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program have 
developed and fielded NLW since the program’s inception; (2) DOD has 
established and implemented policy, doctrine, and training for NLW; and 
(3) DOD has conducted testing and evaluation prior to fielding NLW. GAO 
reviewed and analyzed DOD and service plans, guidance, and doctrine and 
interviewed officials associated with NLW development. 

What GAO Found: 

The joint non-lethal weapons program has conducted more than 50 
research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 
1997, but it has not developed any new weapons and the military 
services have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only 
partially fill some capability gaps identified since 1998. Three major 
factors contribute to the program’s limited progress in fully 
addressing capability gaps. First, DOD did not prioritize 
departmentwide non-lethal capability gaps until 2007 and still does not 
fully address these gaps. Second, DOD has not consistently incorporated 
logistics and supportability considerations early in the development 
process. As a result, DOD may miss opportunities to allocate resources 
more effectively. Third, DOD has exercised limited general oversight of 
the NLW program which has resulted in gaps in key program guidance as 
well as limited measurement of progress and performance. For example, 
DOD’s road map of ongoing and projected NLW capabilities and efforts 
could be used to discharge oversight responsibilities, but the road map 
lacks guidance about how to allocate resources and evaluate 
performance. Further, DOD has no single organization with visibility 
over all spending, and available budget information may not fully 
capture all spending associated with the development of non-lethal 
capabilities. 

DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into 
policy, doctrine, and training but has not yet clearly articulated what 
constitutes acceptable risk for fatality, fully developed weapons 
employment policies for the use of force in overseas warfighting or 
homeland applications, or ensured that warfighters and domestic 
responders are fully trained in NLW use. Until these issues are 
resolved, doctrine and training for non-lethal weapons may be limited, 
and the warfighter or domestic responder may have fewer options other 
than resorting to lethal force. 

DOD lacks a clear methodology for estimating the human effects of non-
lethal weapons and does not fully test and evaluate many non-lethal 
weapons because they have been fielded under urgent operational 
requirements that abbreviate normal DOD testing standards. Testing can 
be bypassed for commercial items because DOD officials can use 
contractor test data instead of conducting their own tests. Therefore, 
when NLW are fielded, commanders are uncertain about acceptable risk on 
targets and bystanders and cannot accurately predict their effects. DOD 
has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology to 
address human effects testing; for example, it has drafted a Risk of 
Significant Injury scale, which broadly categorizes levels of health 
care capabilities required to reverse NLW effects. However, DOD has not 
completed a risk assessment methodology that would provide information 
to commanders so that they may then make a determination about its 
acceptability in their operating environment. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends 8 actions to help DOD assess the extent to which 
capability gaps are filled, better incorporate logistics and 
supportability considerations, develop performance criteria and improve 
program oversight, clarify NLW policy and doctrine, and finalize a risk 
assessment methodology for NLW test and evaluation. DOD generally 
agreed with our recommendations. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-344]. For more 
information, contact Davi M. D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 
dagostinod@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOD Research and Development Efforts Have Yielded Few Products to 
Address Non-Lethal Weapon Needs: 

DOD Has Not Fully Developed Policy and Doctrine for Use and Training in 
Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities: 

Testing and Evaluation for NLW Programs Lack Human Effects Guidance and 
Are Not Uniformly Applied across All Programs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix III: Capability Gaps Not Being Addressed by Non-Lethal Efforts 
under Development: 

Appendix IV: Non-Lethal Programs under Development That Were Evaluated 
by the Investment Decision Support Tool: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Thirty-Six Capability Gaps and Their Priorities: 

Table 2: Comparison of Capability Gaps Identified since 1998: 

Table 3: Non-lethal Programs under Development and the Gaps They Are 
Intended to Address: 

Table 4: DOD NLW Program Management Documents' Status/Overview: 

Table 5: Long-duration NLW Development Efforts: 

Table 6: Lethal Weapon Programs Having Non-lethal Capability: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Management Structure of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: 

Figure 2: Summary View of the DOD Acquisition Effort, from JCIDS 
through Fielding and Support: 

Figure 3: Active Denial System 2: 

Figure 4: FN-303 Less-Lethal Launching System: 

Figure 5: TASER® X-26: 

Figure 6: Draft Risk of Significant Injury Scale for Non-Lethal 
Weapons: 

Abbreviations: 

AT&L: Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

JCIDS: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System: 

JNLWD: Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate: 

NLW: Non-lethal weapon: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

April 21, 2009: 

The Honorable Adam Smith: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Jeff Miller: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry: 
House of Representatives: 

The armed forces expect to encounter a shifting military environment, 
including greater mixing of enemy combatants with noncombatants, in 
which there are likely to be situations where lethal force is 
undesirable. Increasing non-lethal options widens the range of effects 
the joint force is able to achieve without using deadly force.[Footnote 
1] In order to be flexible enough to deal with the rapidly changing 
threat environment, in 2002 the services and combatant commanders 
described a family of non-lethal capabilities as a high-priority need 
that must be satisfied immediately.[Footnote 2] Such capabilities may 
include applying targeted munitions, destruction of enemy command and 
control, and electronic jamming, all of which may have non-lethal 
effects. Non-lethal capabilities may also include non-lethal weapons 
(NLW), which the Department of Defense (DOD) defines as "weapons that 
are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate 
personnel or materiel, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to 
personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment." 
[Footnote 3] 

Congress has long been interested in DOD management and organization of 
NLW programs. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1996, Congress found that "the role of the United States military in 
operations other than war has increased... Weapons and instruments that 
are non-lethal in application yet immobilizing could have widespread 
operational utility and application." Congress further noted that "the 
use of non-lethal weapons in operations other than war poses a number 
of important doctrine, legal, policy, and operations questions, which 
should be addressed in a comprehensive and coordinated manner." 
[Footnote 4] Congress urged DOD to "provide improved budgetary focus 
and management direction to the non-lethal weapons program," and 
directed the Secretary of Defense to "assign centralized responsibility 
for development (and any other functional responsibility the Secretary 
considers appropriate) of non-lethal weapons technology to an existing 
office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense or to a military 
service as the executive agent." 

In July 1996, DOD published a directive to establish policies and 
assign responsibilities for the development and employment of non- 
lethal weapons. DOD assigned principal oversight to the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L), and 
designated the commandant of the Marine Corps as the Executive Agent 
for the DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Program. In 1997, DOD created the Joint 
Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) to perform day-to-day management 
activities and other coordination duties on behalf of the Executive 
Agent. Over the past 12 years, the JNLWD has reported receiving funding 
of about $462 million, of which it had reported spending at least $386 
million. This includes funding for more than 50 NLW development efforts 
as well as related support activities such as exercises and 
experimentation.[Footnote 5] The military services may also 
independently pursue service-unique research efforts as well as 
procure, operate, and maintain NLW and train personnel on their use. 
During the same 12-year period, DOD budget data showed that funding for 
the military services totaled at least $355 million for NLW, the 
majority of which was for procurement of existing commercially 
developed products. 

The Army and Marine Corps have published strategies[Footnote 6] that 
direct commanders to consider the use of NLW in scenarios across a 
range of military operations - especially in such areas as military 
operations other than war[Footnote 7] and military operations in urban 
terrain.[Footnote 8] Recently, in its Strategy for Homeland Defense and 
Civil Support[Footnote 9] and its 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review DOD 
has also cited a need for non-lethal capabilities in order to defeat 
terrorist networks[Footnote 10] and secure sites containing weapons of 
mass destruction so that materials cannot be removed.[Footnote 11] 

You asked us to review the status of NLW programs within DOD and the 
military services. In response to your request, our objectives for this 
report were to identify the extent to which (1) DOD and the Joint Non- 
Lethal Weapons Program have developed and fielded non-lethal weapons or 
capabilities since the program's inception; (2) DOD has established and 
implemented policy, doctrine and training, and applied them throughout 
the spectrum of military operations to guide the NLW programs it has 
undertaken since 1997; and (3) DOD has conducted testing and evaluation 
prior to fielding its NLW in support of military operations. 

To identify the NLW programs DOD has undertaken since 1997 and evaluate 
how they were managed, we compiled and analyzed NLW program budget 
information from the directorate and the services and reviewed DOD's 
fiscal year 2009 budget submissions. We also reviewed DOD and JNLWD 
management guidance as well as DOD acquisition management criteria and 
federal internal control standards. Although we were able to identify 
spending for the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, because of gaps in 
available service and other data we are not assured that we identified 
all NLW funding. To determine the extent to which DOD has established 
and implemented policy, doctrine, and training, we reviewed and 
analyzed joint and service directives and other publications and 
conducted interviews with cognizant officials in DOD, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice. To determine the 
extent to which NLW have undergone testing and evaluation, we compared 
the results of independent human effects assessment review panels with 
DOD test and evaluation guidance, compared DOD's prefielding testing 
requirements with the documentation that recorded the tests actually 
performed, and compared service urgent and standard fielding 
requirements. In addition, we reviewed DOD acquisition policy and 
related risk management guidance and reviewed the status of test and 
evaluation management plans and relevant documentation. Except where 
noted, we limited our discussion of technology development to those 
items that were specifically designed to conform to the DOD definition 
of NLW. 

We conducted our review from March 2008 through April 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology 
used in our review are described in further detail in appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program has conducted more than 50 
research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 
1997, but it has not developed any new weapons, and the military 
services have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only 
partially fill some capability gaps identified since 1998. Three major 
factors contributed to the program's limited progress in fully 
addressing capability gaps with fielded equipment: DOD (1) did not 
prioritize departmentwide non-lethal capability gaps until 2007 and 
still does not have efforts under way to fully address these gaps; (2) 
has not consistently incorporated logistics and supportability 
considerations into the development process, and (3) provides limited 
general oversight of the program. With respect to the first factor, DOD 
generally requires that capability gaps be identified through its 
existing Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, 
so that the department can match development efforts to high-priority 
capability gaps identified by the warfighter. Since 1998, DOD has 
determined its capability gaps with respect to non-lethal capabilities, 
and in 2007 it finalized a prioritized list of those gaps. 
Additionally, the JNLWD has applied programs and efforts to partially 
address two-thirds of those gaps. However, only 4 of more than 50 
programs undertaken since 1997 have completed the development and 
testing process and been fielded. Of these, three are variations of or 
munitions for existing weapons, and the fourth was in an early stage of 
development when the JNLWD began funding the program. While the 
directorate has pursued efforts that are intended to address the upper 
two-thirds of identified capability gaps, ongoing efforts will not 
fully satisfy those gaps. Regarding the second factor, the Joint 
Coordination and Integration Group, by joint service agreement, is 
responsible in coordination with the JNLWD for ensuring that program 
managers plan for logistics and supportability considerations, but it 
has not consistently done this. For example, the latest prototype of 
the directed-energy Active Denial System weighs 9 tons and has several 
subsystems that are too complex for extensive field repair. In 
addition, when urgent and commercial-off-the-shelf items are fielded, 
DOD does not fully plan for repair, replacement, and other 
supportability considerations. Regarding the third factor, DOD has 
exercised limited general oversight of the program. The Under Secretary 
of Defense for AT&L has principal oversight responsibility for the 
joint NLW program.[Footnote 12] This responsibility includes the 
development of acquisition-related plans, strategies, guidance and 
assessments to oversee program performance. However, key program plans 
and other program documents are outdated and do not fully incorporate 
these elements. This has resulted in inconsistent oversight of the 
program and limited measurement of progress and performance. A well- 
managed program, according to federal internal control standards, 
[Footnote 13] sets clear and consistent objectives and has metrics to 
monitor progress. This allows program officials to adjust funding 
accordingly. DOD's road map of ongoing and projected NLW capabilities 
and efforts is one vehicle that AT&L could use to discharge its 
oversight responsibilities, but the current road map lacks guidance 
about how to allocate resources and evaluate performance. Further, the 
program lacks performance evaluation criteria to guide decisions on how 
and for how long to allocate resources to research and development 
efforts. Without an established means of measuring progress, DOD may 
have difficulty determining which efforts warrant continued support. 
Complicating DOD's ability to effectively oversee the program is the 
fact that no single organization has visibility over all spending 
categories and that available budget information may not fully capture 
all spending associated with the development of non-lethal 
capabilities. Without such visibility, DOD is unable to provide 
effective general oversight of the NLW program, and as a result DOD 
cannot be assured that the program is making the most effective use of 
departmentwide resources to address identified capability gaps. 
Therefore, we are recommending that DOD (1) assess and document the 
extent to which ongoing programs will satisfy the highest-priority 
capability gaps; (2) ensure that logistics and supportability 
considerations are integrated early into non-lethal capability 
development efforts; (3) ensure that strategic guidance for NLW that 
sets out goals, objectives, and a framework for research, development, 
and acquisition--including science and technology efforts--is 
established and routinely updated; (4) develop performance evaluation 
criteria to guide decisions on how and for how long to allocate 
resources to NLW research and development efforts; and (5) develop and 
execute a methodology for monitoring all NLW-related funding and 
programs across DOD. 

DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into 
policy, doctrine, and training, but gaps in policies on the acceptable 
level of risk for fatality and weapons employment overseas or in the 
homeland limit the effectiveness of revised doctrine and training. DOD 
policy states that NLW should enhance the capability of U.S. forces to 
discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; limit escalation; take 
military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the 
preferred option; better protect the forces; temporarily disable 
equipment facilities and personnel; and help decrease the postconflict 
costs of reconstruction.[Footnote 14] DOD and the services have issued 
doctrine citing a need for non-lethal capabilities that may be applied 
across the range of military operations,[Footnote 15] and have 
explained that NLW shall not be required to have a zero probability of 
producing fatalities or permanent injuries. However, this doctrine is 
of limited use to the warfighter because key policies that influence 
doctrine and operations remain unclear. DOD has not fully articulated 
what constitutes acceptable risk of fatality or injury because there is 
no departmentwide consensus. DOD officials have been discussing the 
development of a methodology for characterizing acceptable risk that 
can be applied more specifically to individual non-lethal weapons or 
devices, but this has not been formally approved. In addition, DOD 
guidance for NLW employment for overseas and domestic operations is 
incomplete. Overseas warfighters lack clear guidance in joint and 
service publications for employing NLW, particularly in ambiguous 
situations where hostile intent has not been clearly demonstrated, and 
in operations that are not unequivocally either peacetime or wartime. 
Domestically, while force is normally to be used only as a last resort, 
DOD has not established new policy or unique training for NLW. Not 
knowing acceptable risk levels can hinder efforts to write formal 
requirements for material solutions to identified capability gaps, 
especially since some NLW can be lethal at short range or if improperly 
used. Lack of clarity about acceptable risk can also complicate efforts 
to field NLW that are purchased from commercial vendors, to use them, 
or both. While DOD can and does produce situation-specific rules of 
engagement, the absence of broad weapons employment concepts impedes 
its ability to develop appropriate doctrine and training for NLW use 
prior to deployment. Until these policy and doctrine issues are 
resolved, DOD's ability to integrate NLW concepts into doctrine and 
subsequently train personnel in those operations will be limited. 
Therefore, we are recommending that DOD improve policy and doctrine for 
overseas and homeland operations by (1) articulating a methodology for 
determining acceptable risk with respect to lethality and permanent 
injury for operators, targets, and bystanders because of the use of 
specific types of NLW, and (2) providing clearer weapons employment 
guidance that can be used to modify or augment existing rules of 
engagement or rules for the use of force for both warfighters and 
domestic responders on how NLW should be used under certain conditions, 
and incorporate this guidance into training curricula. 

DOD lacks a clear methodology for estimating the human effects of non- 
lethal weapons and does not fully test and evaluate many non-lethal 
weapons because most have been fielded under urgent operational 
requirements that abbreviate normal DOD testing standards. Developing 
and testing non-lethal technologies is an inherently complicated 
undertaking. Since DOD policy limits testing on human subjects, 
computerized and other testing models are used instead, and these may 
not accurately reflect human responses. DOD is not conducting complete 
testing and evaluation of many non-lethal weapons because they are 
fielded under urgent operational requirements that abbreviate normal 
DOD testing standards and because there is no clear guidance for 
conducting human effects testing. DOD policy requires user safety 
testing for both standard fielding processes and urgent fielding, which 
accelerates the process in order to more quickly provide capabilities 
to the warfighter. According to Army officials, however, the urgent 
fielding process does not require safety or human effects testing for 
targets and bystanders, whereas the standard fielding process does. 
Therefore, when non-lethal weapons are fielded through urgent fielding 
processes, human effects testing may be bypassed. Testing can also be 
bypassed for commercial items because DOD officials can use contractor 
test data instead of conducting their own tests. DOD has begun to 
develop elements of a risk assessment methodology to address human 
effects testing; for example, it has drafted a policy that uses a Risk 
of Significant Injury scale, which broadly categorizes three levels of 
health care capabilities required to reverse the effects of NLW. 
However, DOD has not completed a risk assessment methodology - or 
established a timeframe for doing so --that would provide information 
to commanders about how frequently a non-lethal weapon may cause 
significant injury or death so that they may then make a determination 
about its acceptability in their operating environment. Without clear 
guidance on what level of risk is acceptable for injury or fatality--as 
discussed above--and a risk assessment methodology, program managers do 
not know what to design for or what parameters to work from, and cannot 
interpret test results in relation to agreed upon policy. If suitable 
testing that models NLW effects on humans is not conducted, then it 
becomes unclear how and when to use non-lethal weapons given the lack 
of assurance concerning the effects on the targets, operators, and 
bystanders. Therefore, we are recommending that DOD finalize and 
implement a risk assessment methodology and develop a timeline for 
implementation of the methodology. 

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD agreed or 
partially agreed with all our recommendations and described actions it 
plans to take to implement them. DOD also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated into the final report as appropriate. A summary 
of DOD's comments and a summary of our response to these comments 
follow the Recommendations for Executive Action section of this report. 
DOD's written comments are reprinted in appendix II. The Departments of 
Justice and of Homeland Security also reviewed a draft of this report 
and had no comments. 

Background: 

In February 1996, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996, in which it found that the role of the United 
States military in operations other than war had increased, and 
directed the Secretary of Defense to assign centralized responsibility 
for the development of non-lethal weapons technology to an existing 
office within the Office of the Secretary of Defense or to a military 
service as the executive agent. The office or executive agent was to 
oversee development and any other functional responsibility that the 
Secretary of Defense considered appropriate. Since that time, the joint 
non-lethal weapons program, with the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
assigned as executive agent, has assumed a role in the requirements 
development process as well as research, development, test and 
evaluation. 

Structure and Management of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: 

DOD Directive 3000.3 assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics principal oversight for the DOD 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program, including joint service program 
coordination to help highlight and prevent duplication of program 
development, while the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict under the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy, has policy oversight for the development and 
employment of non-lethal weapons. 

The Commandant of the Marine Corps is the executive agent for the DOD 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program.[Footnote 16] The executive agent serves as 
the primary DOD/U.S. Coast Guard point of contact for non-lethal 
weapons and is tasked to coordinate, integrate, review, and recommend, 
the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons program to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and coordinate requirements 
among the services. Such action is to be taken in consultation with the 
services, combatant commanders, DOD agencies, and U.S. Coast Guard. 
Within the Commandant of the Marine Corps' command, the Joint Non- 
Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) was established to perform the day- 
to-day management of the NLW program. The JNLWD's director reports to 
the executive agent and, in addition to overseeing joint development 
efforts which are led by a designated service, monitors the status of 
service-unique NLW programs. The directorate consists of three 
divisions --Concepts and Requirements, Technology, and Acquisition -- 
and a support branch. The JNLWD provides program research and 
development funds but the services are responsible for acquisition 
program management in accordance with applicable instructions and 
regulations. The services also established a joint coordination and 
integration group comprised of representatives from each service as 
well as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. Coast Guard, whose 
principal role is to advise on and assist in NLW system acquisition. 
The management structure of the program is illustrated in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Management Structure of the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy); Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict): (direct oversight of); 
* Executive Agent, DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Program (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps) (direct oversight); 

Under Secretary Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics): 
(direct oversight of); 
* Overarching Integrated Product Team; 
* Executive Agent, DOD Non-Lethal Weapons Program (Commandant of the 
Marine Corps) (direct oversight of); 
* Chairman, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Integrated Product Team; (direct 
oversight of); 
* Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) (direct oversight of); 
- Joint Science and Technology; 
- Joint Research and Development. 

Under Secretary Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics): 
(Coordination of); 
* Service Unique Non-Lethal Weapons Programs (direct oversight of); 
- Service Science and Technology; 
- Service Research and Development; 
- Service Procurement; 
- Service Operations and Maintenance. 

[Chairman, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Integrated Product Team and Joint 
Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) also have coordination of 
Service Unique Non-Lethal Weapons Programs] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

Requirements Development Process: 

Under DOD's Requirements Generation System, the precursor to the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), requirements 
were broadly identified in Mission Needs Statements and specifically 
described in later Operational Requirements Documents. Under this 
system, the Joint Staff issued a Mission Needs Statement for non-lethal 
capabilities in 2002. In order to respond to a recommendation from the 
2001 Quadrennial Defense Review[Footnote 17] to shift from threat-based 
defense planning to a capabilities-based model, DOD implemented JCIDS 
in 2003 as the department's principal process for identifying, 
assessing, and prioritizing joint military capabilities.[Footnote 18] 

JCIDS supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who is 
responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense on the priorities of 
military requirements in support of the national military strategy. The 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council assists the Chairman in this role 
by reviewing and approving proposals for new military capabilities, 
among other responsibilities. Such proposals may be developed by any of 
the military services, defense agencies, or combatant commands, which 
are referred to as sponsors. To support these proposals and to 
facilitate the development of capabilities that are as joint and 
efficient as possible, Joint Staff policy calls for the sponsors to 
conduct capabilities-based assessments that identify gaps in military 
capabilities and potential solutions for filling those gaps. The Joint 
Non-Lethal Weapons Program has co-led a capabilities-based assessment 
process that resulted in a Functional Area Analysis and Functional 
Needs Analysis and, in February 2008, a Joint Capabilities Document 
that identified and prioritized gaps in non-lethal capabilities. Once 
JCIDS has established and validated a need, DOD can decide that the 
best way to meet the need is to begin an effort to develop a materiel 
solution. In that case, a defense acquisition effort begins and follows 
certain steps, or milestones, during the developmental process. Figure 
2 summarizes this process. 

Figure 2: Summary View of the DOD Acquisition Effort, from JCIDS 
through Fielding and Support: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

DOD Strategic Guidance: 
Capabilities Based Assessment; 
Initial Capabilities Document; 
Materiel Development Decision; 
Materiel solution analysis phase; 
Milestone Decision Authority; 
Milestone A; 

Technology development phase: 
Capabilities Development Document; 
Milestone Decision Authority; 
Milestone B; 

Capabilities Production Document; 
Engineering and manufacturing development phase: 
Milestone Decision Authority; 
Milestone C; 
Production and development phase; 
Operations and support phase. 

Source: GAO summary of processes and requirements described in DODI 
5000.02 and CJCSI 3170.01G. 

Notes: The milestone decision authority could be an Office of the 
Secretary of Defense or service official, a determination made based on 
specified factors such as dollar value or special interest in a 
particular acquisition. In order to pass Milestone B, a program also 
needs an approved acquisition strategy and test and evaluation master 
plan. 

[End of figure] 

DOD Acquisition Process: 

The requirements and acquisition systems interlock to create products 
that are intended to meet DOD's needs. DOD's oversight of its systems 
acquisitions is described in a set of documents that provide the 
policies and guidance for departmental efforts to acquire service 
capabilities and systems.[Footnote 19] As figure 2 illustrates, the 
acquisition process consists of five phases, and at certain points the 
designated individual with overall responsibility for the program 
(known as the milestone decision authority) reviews the status of the 
effort and decides whether to approve entry into the next phase of the 
acquisition process. The materiel solution analysis phase begins with 
the Materiel Development Decision review, "at which point the Joint 
Staff shall present the JROC recommendations and the DOD component 
presents the [Initial Capabilities Document] including: the preliminary 
concept of operations, a description of the needed capability, the 
operational risk, and the basis for determining that non-materiel 
approaches will not sufficiently mitigate the capability gap." The 
Technology Development phase begins at Milestone A, when the Milestone 
Decision Authority has approved a material solution and a Technology 
Development Strategy and has documented the decision in an Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum. Its purpose is to "reduce technology risk, 
determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be 
integrated into a full system, and to demonstrate [critical technology 
elements] on prototypes." The Technology Development Strategy documents 
a number of things, including "a preliminary acquisition strategy, 
including overall cost, schedule, and performance goals for the total 
research and development program," and exit criteria for the Technology 
Development phase. 

The Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase begins at Milestone 
B, when the Milestone Decision Authority approves the Acquisition 
Strategy and the Acquisition Program Baseline and documents the 
decision in an Acquisition Decision Memorandum. Its purposes include: 
to develop a system or an increment of capability; complete full system 
integration… develop an affordable and executable manufacturing 
process; ensure operational supportability with particular attention to 
minimizing the logistics footprint… ensure affordability… and 
demonstrate system integration, interoperability, safety, and 
utility.[Footnote 20] This phase includes a System Capability and 
Manufacturing Process Demonstration, which ends when "the system meets 
approved requirements and is demonstrated in its intended environment … 
manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated in a pilot 
line environment; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and 
the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and Milestone C entrance 
requirements."[Footnote 21] Successful developmental test and 
evaluation is also required during this effort. Test and evaluation are 
used to assess improvements to mission capability and operational 
support based on user needs. This phase concludes with Milestone C, 
where the Milestone Decision Authority must commit to the program or 
decide to end the effort. 

The purpose of the Production and Deployment phase is to "achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs," utilizing 
operational test and evaluation to determine the effectiveness and 
suitability of the system.[Footnote 22] Criteria for entrance into this 
phase include: "acceptable performance in developmental test and 
evaluation and operational assessment… an approved Initial Capabilities 
Document (if Milestone C is program initiation); an approved Capability 
Production Document (CPD)... acceptable interoperability; acceptable 
operational supportability; and demonstration that the system is 
affordable throughout the life cycle, fully funded, and properly phased 
for rapid acquisition."[Footnote 23] The Operations and Support phase 
is used "to execute a support program that meets materiel readiness and 
operational support performance requirements, and sustains the system 
in the most cost-effective manner over its total life cycle." Criteria 
for entrance into this phase include "an approved CPD; an approved 
[Life Cycle Sustainment Plan]; and a successful Full-Rate Production 
Decision."[Footnote 24] Life-cycle sustainment includes considerations 
such as "supply; maintenance; transportation; sustaining engineering... 
environment, safety, and occupational health; supportability; and 
interoperability."[Footnote 25] 

Testing and Evaluation: 

The fundamental purpose of testing and evaluation is the same for 
military and commercial products. Testing is the main instrument used 
to gauge the progress being made when an idea or concept is translated 
into an actual product. According to DOD guidance, a test is any 
procedure designed to obtain, verify, or provide data for the 
evaluation of research and development; progress in accomplishing 
development objectives; or performance and operational capability of 
systems, subsystems, components, and equipment items. Evaluation refers 
to what is learned from a test.[Footnote 26] The test and evaluation 
process provides an assessment of the attainment of technical 
performance, specifications, and system maturity to determine whether 
systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for 
intended use. Testing and evaluation is used at a variety of levels, 
including basic technology, components and subsystems, and a complete 
system or product. The fundamental purpose of testing and evaluation is 
to provide knowledge to assist in managing the risks involved in 
developing, producing, operating, and sustaining systems and 
capabilities.[Footnote 27] In both DOD and commercial firms, product 
testing is conducted by organizations separate from those responsible 
for managing product development. 

Standard fielding processes require extensive testing for new programs. 
For example, the Army's process to certify weapons for normal fielding 
requires several different kinds of assessment before a weapon can be 
fielded. Environmental and air worthiness statements are required. 
Results of user safety reviews, inspections, and analyses are also 
required, in addition to a safety confirmation from the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command. The Army Test and Evaluation Command must also 
provide an operational test report. Operational test and evaluation is 
conducted to estimate a system's operational effectiveness and 
operational suitability. The testing agency will identify needed 
modifications; provide information on tactics, doctrine, organizations 
and personnel requirements; and evaluate the system's logistic 
supportability. Thorough and complete testing not only provides 
assurance that weapons achieve the desired results intended by design, 
but also allows decision makers in charge of fielding determinations 
some level of confidence that their selections will perform as 
advertised. By contrast, an urgent or abbreviated fielding decision 
allows much of this testing to be bypassed when there is an established 
and immediate operational need, and then usually only user safety 
testing is required. For example, one Marine Corps policy states that 
abbreviated acquisition programs--which the policy identifies as 
generally small, low cost and low risk programs--are not required to 
undergo operational testing. Furthermore, another Marine Corps policy 
states that with appropriate commanding general authority, all testing 
can be waived, allowing weapons to be fielded in limited quantities to 
meet urgent operational requirements. Testing for commercial-off-the- 
shelf items[Footnote 28] can be even more limited than testing for 
those that are urgently fielded. DOD guidance states that--in order to 
take advantage of reduced acquisition time and to ensure that testing 
is not redundant and is limited to the minimum effort necessary to 
obtain the required data--"testing can be minimized by 1) obtaining and 
assessing contractor test results; 2) obtaining usage and failure data 
from other customers of the item; 3) observing contractor testing; 4) 
obtaining test results from independent test organizations (e.g., 
Underwriter's Laboratory); and 5) verifying selected contractor test 
data."[Footnote 29] Agency officials must determine that a contractor's 
test results are sufficient before making the decision to use those 
test results instead of conducting their own tests. 

In 1998 the JNLWD contracted The Pennsylvania State University to 
convene the Human Effects Advisory Panel, a group of scientists who 
provide assessment of NLW. The panel issued recommendations on the 
following subjects: 

* A quantitative definition of "non-lethal" and other associated terms, 
including incapacitation. 

* An assessment of DOD's methods to generate and verify human effects. 

* An evaluation of DOD's methodology to generate and validate data. 

* An evaluation of data to support NLW effect analysis. 

The Human Effects Advisory Panel report concluded that there was a 
knowledge gap between the expectations of the warfighter and the 
information provided by the scientific community's simulation tools. In 
response to the panel's recommendations, the JNLW Integrated Process 
Team Chairman directed that the Human Effects Process Action Team be 
formed and requested membership from all of the services. The Human 
Effects Process Action Team was chartered to study the deficiencies in 
the process of understanding NLW human effects and to recommend policy 
changes that will help resolve these issues. The team examined current 
processes for evaluating NLW human effects and made three primary 
recommendations to DOD: (1) establish an independent board to review 
the human effects assessments accompanying NLW systems and to ensure 
that all reasonable assessments have been performed based on available 
technology and resources; (2) create a NLW Human Effects Center of 
Excellence to serve as the NLW program managers one-stop resource for 
information on human effects testing; and (3) adopt a risk assessment 
approach to evaluating the NLW human effects data due to the 
uncertainties involved with the science of human effects 
characterization. The first two recommendations have been implemented. 

In 2001, the Human Effects Center of Excellence was created via a 
memorandum of agreement between the Air Force Research Laboratory and 
the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program. The center was founded to provide 
assistance and advice to program managers concerning likely effects of 
non-lethal technologies and the risks associated with those effects. 
The center also serves as a central location for non-lethal human 
effects data and provides recommendations on which laboratories or 
field activities can collect scientifically derived information when 
such information is not already available. The Human Effects Review 
Board was established in 2000 to independently review non-lethal human 
effects research and analyses associated with specific NLW systems or 
technologies. The board consists of representatives from the services' 
offices of the Surgeons General, the Medical Officer of the Marine 
Corps, and the services' Safety Officers and includes legal and DOD 
policy participation. The board provides NLW program managers and 
milestone decision authorities with an independent measure of health 
risks and recommendations for mitigating potential risks. 

DOD Research and Development Efforts Have Yielded Few Products to 
Address Non-Lethal Weapon Needs: 

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program has conducted more than 50 
research and development efforts and spent at least $386 million since 
1997, but it has not developed any new weapons, and the military 
services have fielded 4 items stemming from these efforts that only 
partially fill some capability gaps identified since 1998. Among the 
contributing factors, we found that DOD did not prioritize 
departmentwide non-lethal capability gaps until 2007 and still does not 
have efforts under way to fully address these gaps, that DOD did not 
give consistent consideration to logistics and supportability in its 
NLW development process; and that DOD exercises limited general 
oversight of the program. 

DOD Has Only Partially Addressed Its Capability Gaps: 

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program is sponsoring efforts that address 
about two-thirds of DOD's NLW capability gaps, but even those efforts 
provide incomplete solutions, according to the current joint capability 
assessment. Under the JCIDS process, formal capability assessments are 
to be used for identifying gaps in military capabilities and potential 
material and nonmateriel solutions for filling those gaps. Using this 
approach, the JNLWD, which sponsored the 2008 Joint Capabilities 
Document for Joint Non-Lethal Effects, identified 36 capability gaps 
that represented specific tasks where needs were not met by existing or 
planned systems.[Footnote 30] The tasks were categorized as either 
counter-personnel or counter-materiel, and included numerous 
variations, such as stopping a vehicle or vessel, suppressing 
individuals, and denying individuals access to an area, all under 
varying conditions.[Footnote 31] The gaps were then prioritized by 
service and combatant command representatives. The resulting list 
represented the areas in which Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program 
research and development initiatives, service acquisition decisions, 
and other related resource investments are most needed to satisfy the 
needs of joint force commanders. Table 1 shows the 36 tasks that were 
analyzed and found to represent gaps in DOD's NLW capability, as well 
as their relative priorities. 

Table 1: Thirty-Six Capability Gaps and Their Priorities: 

Categories: Counter-personnel; 
Tasks: Deny individuals access into or out of an area; 
Conditions: 
Open area; Priority ranking: 9; 
Confined area; Priority ranking: 8; 
Underwater area; Priority ranking: 29. 

Categories: Counter-personnel; 
Tasks: Move individuals through an area; 
Conditions: 
Open area, single or few individuals; Priority ranking: 27; 
Open area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 10; 
Confined area, single or few individuals; Priority ranking: 17; 
Confined area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 15. 

Categories: Counter-personnel; 
Tasks: Disable individuals[A]; 
Conditions: 
Open area, single individual; Priority ranking: 21; 
Open area, few individuals; Priority ranking: 19; 
Open area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 25; 
Confined area, single or few individuals; Priority ranking: 14; 
Confined area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 26. 

Categories: Counter-personnel; 
Tasks: Suppress individuals[B]; 
Conditions: 
Open area, single individual; Priority ranking: 13; 
Open area, few individuals; Priority ranking: 11; 
Open area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 6; 
Confined area, single or few individuals; Priority ranking: 5; 
Confined area, many individuals; Priority ranking: 12; 
Underwater area, single individual; Priority ranking: 34. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Stop vehicle; 
Conditions: 
Confined area, single small vehicle; Priority ranking: 1; 
Open or confined area, in pursuit of single small vehicle; Priority 
ranking: 16; 
Confined area, single medium vehicle; Priority ranking: 2; 
Open or confined area, in pursuit of single medium vehicle; Priority 
ranking: 22; 
Confined area, single large vehicle; Priority ranking: 3; 
Open or confined area, in pursuit of single large vehicle; Priority 
ranking: 23. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Disable vehicle; 
Conditions: 
Single vehicle; Priority ranking: 31; 
Many vehicles; Priority ranking: 33. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Stop vessel; 
Conditions: 
Confined area, single friendly small vessel anchored; Priority ranking: 
4; 
Open area, single friendly small vessel underway; Priority ranking: 7; 
Open or confined area, in pursuit of single small vessel; Priority 
ranking: 20; 
Open area, performing intercept of single large vessel; Priority 
ranking: 18. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Disable vessel; 
Conditions: 
Single vessel; Priority ranking: 30; 
Many vessels; Priority ranking: 35. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Stop fixed-wing aircraft on the ground; 
Conditions: 
Single aircraft; Priority ranking: 28. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Disable aircraft on the ground; 
Conditions: 
Single aircraft; Priority ranking: 36. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Divert aircraft in the air; 
Conditions: 
Single aircraft; Priority ranking: Categories: 32. 

Categories: Counter-materiel; 
Tasks: Deny access to a facility; 
Conditions: 
Building or confined area; Priority ranking: 24. 

Source: Joint Capabilities Document for Joint Non-Lethal Effects 
(version 1.0; January 2008). 

[A] DOD defines "disable individuals" as totally affecting the ability 
of an individual to take any voluntary action. 

[B] DOD defines "suppress individuals" as affecting individuals in some 
manner short of totally disabling them. 

[End of table] 

While DOD is now building on the results of this process to determine 
how to fill the capability gaps, most of the gaps were already broadly 
identified 11 years ago. The list of 36 gaps is consistent with needs 
that were acknowledged in DOD's 1998 Joint Concept for Non-Lethal 
Weapons as well as its 2002 Mission Needs Statement for a Family of Non-
Lethal Capabilities.[Footnote 32] Though the JNLWD and the services 
have been working on non-lethal capabilities since 1997, most of these 
gaps in non-lethal capabilities still exist today. Table 2 compares non-
lethal capability needs that DOD has identified prior to the ongoing 
capability-based assessment process. 

Table 2: Comparison of Capability Gaps Identified since 1998: 

Counter-Personnel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Crowd control; 
December 2002: 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Crowd control; January 2008: 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Move individuals through an area. 

Counter-Personnel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Incapacitate 
individual personnel; 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Incapacitate individuals and groups; 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Disable individuals. 

Counter-Personnel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Deny personnel 
access to an area (land, sea, or air); 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Deny an area to personnel (restrict access 
and exit from facilities/structures, land, water, and aerospace); 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Deny individuals access; into/out of an area; Deny 
access to a facility. 

Counter-Personnel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Clear facilities 
and structures of personnel; 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Clear facilities and structures of 
personnel; 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Suppress individuals. 

Counter-Materiel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Deny land areas 
to vehicles. May also be possible to design similar area-denial systems 
for seaspace, airspace, or both; 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Deny an area to vehicles, vessels, and 
aircraft (restrict access and movement on land, air, water surface or 
submerged); 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Stop vehicle; Stop vessel; Stop fixed-wing 
aircraft on the ground; Divert aircraft in the air. 

Counter-Materiel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": Disable or 
neutralize specific types of equipment and facilities; 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Disable or neutralize vehicles, vessels, 
aircraft, and equipment without causing catastrophic damage; 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Disable vehicle; Disable vessel; Disable aircraft 
on the ground. 

Counter-Materiel; 
January 1998: "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons": No comparable 
tasks identified in document; 
December 2002: Counter-Personnel: "Mission Need Statement for a Family 
of Non-Lethal Capabilities": Disable or neutralize facilities and 
systems; prevent or neutralize the production, storage, deployment, 
employment, or delivery methods of weapons of mass destruction; 
January 2008: Counter-Personnel: "Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects": Deny access to a facility. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

[End of table] 

During the recent capability-based assessment, several NLW efforts were 
examined, including the 4 programs that have completed the development 
process[Footnote 33] and been fielded by one or more of the military 
services.[Footnote 34] These programs are: 

* 40 mm non-lethal crowd dispersal cartridge, 

* modular crowd control munition, 

* portable vehicle arresting barrier, and: 

* vehicle lightweight arresting device. 

Of these, 3 are variations of or munitions for existing weapons, and 
the portable vehicle arresting barrier was in an early stage of 
development when the JNLWD began funding the program. 

Even when combined with the 12 additional efforts that are ongoing as 
of March 2009, these programs will not completely eliminate the 
capability gaps they were designed to address. Existing joint efforts 
will not fully satisfy all of the tasks, conditions, and standards that 
DOD analyzed in the process of identifying NLW capability gaps. Based 
on our analysis of the JNLWD's program information worksheets and other 
documents, we found that there are efforts under way to address the top 
two-thirds of the list of 36 gaps, although we note that there was no 
comprehensive source that identified each ongoing effort and linked it 
to the capability gap(s) it addressed. Appendix III provides further 
detail on the gaps that lack a corresponding effort to address them. 
Table 3 shows a list of current NLW programs and the priorities of the 
gaps they are supposed to address. 

Table 3: Non-lethal Programs under Development and the Gaps They Are 
Intended to Address: 

Non-lethal program: Mk 19 Short-Range Non-Lethal Munitions; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 8, 9, 19, 21, 25. 

Non-lethal program: Improved Flash/Bang Grenade; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 19, 21, 25, 26. 

Non-lethal program: Airburst Non-Lethal Munition, Low Velocity; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27. 

Non-lethal program: Joint Non-Lethal Warning Munition; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 11, 13. 

Non-lethal program: Mission Payload Module; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 17, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27. 

Non-lethal program: Radio Frequency Vehicle Stopper; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 1, 7, 16, 33. 

Non-lethal program: Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device Single Net 
Solution/Remote Deployment Device; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 1, 2, 3, 7, 16, 33. 

Non-lethal program: Boat Trap; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 4, 7, 20, 30. 

Non-lethal program: 66mm Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System 
Grenades; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 19, 21, 25, 26. 

Non-lethal program: Human Electro Muscular Incapacitation TASER® X-26; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 13, 14, 21. 

Non-lethal program: Improved Acoustic Hailing Device; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 10, 15, 17, 27. 

Non-lethal program: Scalable Distributed Sound and Light Array; 
Priorities of the capability gaps addressed: 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 
15, 17, 19, 21, 25, 26, 27. 

Source: GAO analysis of JNLWD Program Information Worksheets and the 
Joint Capabilities Document for Joint Non-Lethal Effects (2008). 

Notes: These NLW efforts were ongoing before the priority list was 
published. DOD has been working on a vehicle stopper, for example, 
since at least 1996. 

An additional effort, Optical Warning Distraction and Suppression, was 
canceled in November 2008. At that time, the Marine Corps' Ocular 
Interruption effort was determined to have joint interest and to be a 
more advanced alternative. 

The 66mm Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System Grenade program was 
developed by the Army's Chemical and Biological Defense Program. 

The JNLWD did not have Program Information Worksheets for the last four 
programs, so priorities addressed are assigned based on GAO analysis of 
program descriptions. 

[End of table] 

Even though the programs listed in table 3 are intended to address 
about two-thirds of the capability gaps, they (along with systems 
already fielded) still only partially meet DOD's NLW needs, based on 
the latest joint capability assessment.[Footnote 35] For example, a 
vehicle stopper that uses spikes and netting may not cause a quickly 
moving car to come to a complete stop before it reaches a checkpoint. 
Therefore, those capability gaps will not be fully addressed and will 
remain identified gaps. By not assessing and describing the extent to 
which efforts are expected to satisfy capability gaps, for example, in 
forums where information on ongoing and proposed programs is presented, 
the JNLWD has missed an opportunity to fully meet the warfighters' 
highest-priority needs for non-lethal capabilities. The military 
services may also fund their own separate development efforts to 
address service-unique needs, but with few exceptions have not done so. 
According to both service and joint program officials, this reflects 
the low priority that services place on funding non-lethal weapons 
development. In addition, service NLW proponents have said that the 
existence of joint funding has made service funding more difficult to 
obtain. With little progress made toward filling the capability gaps 
with fielded equipment, joint force commanders continue to lack 
sufficient non-lethal capabilities. 

DOD Has Not Given Timely and Consistent Consideration to Logistics and 
Supportability: 

The Joint Coordination and Integration Group, by joint service 
agreement, is responsible in coordination with the JNLWD for cataloging 
and tracking progress of programs to include logistics sustainment and 
logistics requirements planning and ensuring that program managers in 
the military services conduct appropriate integrated logistic support 
planning and execution. However, DOD has not given timely and 
consistent consideration to NLW logistics and supportability because 
fielded NLW items, which have generally been urgently requested, 
commercially purchased, or both, have not been subject to the logistics 
requirements of the normal acquisition process. Moreover, the JNLWD 
does not make the best use of its own tools for assessing the status 
and progress of NLW efforts. 

Specific logistics planning procedures vary by service. For example, 
under Navy acquisitions policies, program managers are required to 
complete an independent logistics assessment before a research and 
development effort may advance through the acquisition process to the 
point, known as Milestone B, at which an acquisition program is 
formally initiated.[Footnote 36] However, only 6 ongoing joint 
directorate-funded NLW efforts have passed Milestone B, of which 4 have 
reached Milestone C, by which point operational supportability with 
particular attention to minimizing the logistics footprint should be 
ensured. Another 18 efforts were terminated for various reasons (one 
after passing milestone B), and two were advanced concept technology 
demonstrations, which were not required to follow the normal 
acquisition process while the demonstrations were under way.[Footnote 
37] One of the advanced concept technology demonstrations pursued 
directed-energy technology research to develop a NLW that uses 
millimeter waves to produce an intense heating sensation on the surface 
of skin, causing an immediate response and movement by target 
personnel. This effort, which cost about $35.5 million, yielded two 
prototypes known as Active Denial Systems 1 and 2. The second prototype 
weighs more than 9 tons, and has been mounted on a heavier vehicle than 
the first prototype to accommodate additional armor and air- 
conditioning (see figure 3). Because of its weight, it is not easily 
used for missions requiring mobility. This system also needs about 16 
hours to cool down to its operating temperature of 4 degrees Kelvin (-
452 degrees Fahrenheit), making it difficult to use on short notice 
unless the compressor is kept continuously running. In addition, the 
Marine Corps considered this system's gyrotron, waveguides, super-
conducting magnets, antenna, and some other major subsystems too 
complex to allow extensive field repair, so its utility could be 
further reduced. Combat damage to the antenna could create a logistics 
problem as it is a large item making storage and replacement difficult. 
The Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program sponsored a Concept Exploration 
Program for crowd-control technologies which published an analysis of 
multiple concepts in 2003. The report evaluated eight systems using a 
variety of criteria, including logistics, and found that the Active 
Denial System received the lowest benefit:cost score of these. JNLWD 
officials have made multiple attempts to field the Active Denial System 
under the rubric of an urgent operational need despite the logistics 
problems noted above and even though, if it is deployed, its mobility 
could be further limited where highway overpasses are present. In 
December 2008, the joint NLW program executive agent terminated efforts 
to deploy Active Denial System 2 overseas. 

Figure 3: Active Denial System 2: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Photograph] 

Source: Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. 

[End of figure] 

The manner of purchase and fielding can also affect whether NLW undergo 
full suitability and supportability evaluations. The fielding process 
normally provides an opportunity to scrutinize items that a service has 
procured and intends to provide to its personnel. They receive a formal 
certification that they are safe, meet performance requirements, and 
are logistically supportable when used within stated operational 
parameters. However, nine NLW systems were purchased from commercial 
vendors and fielded under urgent processes which allow services to 
certify materiel on a limited basis in order to rapidly support an 
operational need. In some cases, logistics weaknesses that might have 
been uncovered by the normal fielding process were not discovered 
during the abbreviated analysis that takes place prior to fielding. For 
example, the FN-303 Less-Lethal Launching System program, which DOD 
spent about $2 million to evaluate, was terminated because the weapon 
was too heavy and ergonomically cumbersome, the weapon and ammunition 
magazine was too fragile, and the weapon required compressed air 
canisters in order to launch its non-lethal munitions. However, several 
dozen FN-303s were fielded to units even though their utility was 
limited by the availability of the canisters and the infrastructure to 
replenish them (see figure 4). 

Figure 4: FN-303 Less-Lethal Launching System: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

In addition, human electro-muscular incapacitation is an ongoing 
program that was initiated in fiscal year 2005. One such device, the 
TASER® X-26 (see figure 5),[Footnote 38] has already been fielded to 
units--both domestically and overseas--as part of the multiple-item Non-
Lethal Capability Set. According to NLW training course materials, 
however, the TASER® X-26E will not be deployed near flammable materials 
or liquids, as the arcing from the probes could ignite flammable 
material. In addition, if it is exposed to significant moisture, 
operators should dry the weapon thoroughly and wait at least 24 hours 
before proceeding. We believe that these factors could limit the range 
of environments in which the X-26E (which, like the X-26, has already 
been fielded) could be employed. 

Figure 5: TASER® X-26: 

[Refer to PDF for image: Photograph] 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

We believe that the JNLWD is missing the opportunity to provide 
sufficient visibility to logistics concerns in part because it does not 
make optimum use of available tools to catalog and track progress and 
in part because most of the efforts it funds have not advanced to the 
stage where these concerns are paramount. The directorate's program 
information worksheet, for example, is one of the means that the 
directorate uses to gather information from program managers about 
ongoing and proposed efforts, but it does not include a specific space 
for the program manager to describe logistics supportability goals and 
how they will be met. The JNLWD uses the program information worksheet 
to develop an Investment Decision Support Tool, in which the 
directorate ranks proposed efforts overall and according to five 
subcategories: cost, schedule, operational contribution, and technology 
and human effects readiness levels. In our review of available 
worksheets, we found that there was not necessarily a direct link 
between the operational contribution score and logistics concerns. For 
example, the Active Denial System and Mobility Denial System[Footnote 
39] have both received operational contribution scores of 100 despite 
their supportability problems. Further, requirements for logistics 
analysis in preparation for a Milestone B decision are often not yet 
applicable, since 10 of the efforts that the JNLWD was funding as of 
March 2009 had not yet advanced to that step. An Army official told us 
that his senior leadership is beginning to require this earlier in the 
process for Army programs. Without giving full and early consideration 
to logistics and supportability issues, DOD increases the risk that 
developmental efforts may not meet service requirements and obtain 
service funding beyond research and development into acquisition and 
fielding. While the joint program funds technology research, it is the 
services that pay to procure, operate, and maintain equipment. DOD also 
increases its risk of fielding items under urgent processes that are 
infeasible, difficult to sustain, or both. While DOD has procedures to 
try to field needed capabilities quickly, these procedures are designed 
to maximize utility to the warfighter. To the extent that these 
procedures result in fielding cumbersome or fragile equipment, they may 
not achieve that goal. Without building these considerations into the 
earliest stages of development or consideration of commercial off-the-
shelf items, DOD may miss opportunities to allocate resources more 
effectively. 

DOD Exercises Limited Oversight of the NLW Program: 

DOD's oversight of the Joint NLW Program, for which the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) has 
principal oversight responsibility, and for which the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps has been assigned as Executive Agent, has been limited. 
This has resulted in gaps in the timeliness and utility of key program 
guidance as well as limited measurement of progress and performance. A 
well-managed program, according to federal internal control standards, 
[Footnote 40] sets clear and consistent objectives, monitors 
performance, and ensures that findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved. Further complicating DOD's oversight, no single 
organization has visibility over all spending categories and available 
budget information may not fully capture all spending associated with 
the development of non-lethal capabilities. 

NLW Program Guidance Is Incomplete and Outdated: 

Both AT&L and the Executive Agent have broad responsibilities for 
oversight and management of DOD's NLW program. Although DOD's NLW 
policy directive does not specify how AT&L should carry out its 
oversight of the NLW program, AT&L's general oversight 
responsibilities, including the development of acquisition-related 
plans, strategies, guidance, and assessments, and the principles of 
good program management are delineated in other DOD directives. 
[Footnote 41] According to the 2002 joint service memorandum of 
agreement, meanwhile, the Executive Agent is supposed to draft, staff, 
publish, and maintain a master plan that defines the vision, goals, and 
objectives of the program and includes an overarching framework for 
research, development, and acquisition as well as modeling and 
simulation and experimentation plans. 

However, these plans, along with other key program documents, are 
outdated and some are currently being revised, as noted in table 4. 

Table 4: DOD NLW Program Management Documents' Status/Overview: 

Document: DOD Directive 3000.3, NLW Policy; 
Initiated: July 1996; 
Last updated: Certified current Nov. 2003; 
Current status: In revision; sent to Deputy Secretary of Defense for 
signature in Dec. 2008; has not been signed. 

Document: Joint Services Memorandum of Agreement; 
Initiated: June 1999; 
Last updated: May 2002; 
Current status: In revision; out for comment as of Jan. 2009. 

Document: Master Plan; 
Initiated: June 2000; 
Last updated: n/a; 
Current status: No current plans to revise. 

Document: NLW Capabilities Roadmap; 
Initiated: 2005; 
Last updated: August 2008; 
Current status: In revision; projected August 2009. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of table] 

The Memorandum of Agreement is an agreement among the service chiefs of 
staff, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Commander of the 
U.S. Special Operations Command to implement procedures for the NLW 
program. The 2002 memorandum is outdated, for example, in its lack of 
provision for oversight of science and technology programs, which the 
Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program began to fund in fiscal year 2005. 
Army and Navy officials have identified science and technology 
oversight as an issue to be addressed. 

The Joint NLW Program Master Plan's purpose is to define the vision, 
goals, and objectives of the program and it includes an overarching 
framework for research, development and acquisition as well as modeling 
and simulation and experimentation plans. It is supposed to be updated 
biennially. The JNLWD started to update this plan but decided to await 
the 2003 release of JCIDS to accommodate its requirements. During this 
same time frame, the directorate was tasked to develop the NLW 
Capabilities Roadmap, to which it has turned its efforts. The Roadmap 
is designed to assist in the planning process and to support DOD 
leaders in making informed decisions regarding resources, priorities, 
and policies for NLW capabilities. While the existing version describes 
current efforts and lists anticipated milestones for them, it lacks 
some elements that could be helpful to decision makers. For example, 
the Roadmap does not provide guidance on how to allocate resources 
among priority areas, nor does it relate funding to overall DOD policy 
and strategy or provide guidance about how to evaluate program 
performance. Program officials recognized that the Roadmap had 
limitations and began to revise the initial version as soon as it was 
approved. As of March 2009, the Roadmap is still being revised. 

A key AT&L official said that NLW program oversight is exercised 
through participation in the semiannual meetings of two departmentwide 
NLW groups: the Joint Coordination and Integration Group and the 
general officer-level Integrated Product Team. The former advises on 
and assists in NLW system acquisition while the latter coordinates and 
integrates joint requirement and priorities and approves consolidated 
plans and programs. In addition, AT&L officials meet quarterly with the 
JNLWD Director and participate in other activities, such as the 
development of the Roadmap, as necessary. Notwithstanding the 
participation in meetings, however, strategic program direction rests 
on documents that have been delayed or that lack important elements 
necessary to make effective decisions. As a result, there is limited 
strategic direction for the program to guide its day-to-day efforts. 

While DOD's NLW program lacks the visibility of other programs with 
higher priorities and larger budgets, sound program management and 
oversight practices should apply. Without a greater degree of 
participation in setting program priorities and reviewing and reporting 
on performance by AT&L, DOD will not have the level of necessary 
information needed to make informed decisions about the effective and 
efficient management of the NLW program. 

DOD Lacks Clear Criteria to Assess Whether Programs Should Continue to 
Receive Funding: 

We identified 6 cases in which the joint non-lethal weapons program did 
not make timely decisions about when to discontinue its research 
efforts when several years have passed without substantive progress. 
Although not designed specifically for NLW efforts, DOD's Financial 
Management Regulation sets a goal of 6 years (within the future years 
defense program) for a program to advance through advanced technology 
development into the acquisition process.[Footnote 42] Based on our 
analysis of JNLWD programs, three active development efforts and three 
terminated efforts reached or exceeded this time frame (see table 5). 

Table 5: Long-duration NLW Development Efforts: 

Program: Airburst non-lethal munition; 
Program status: In development; 
Years in program: 10; 
Cost: $14.7 million. 

Program: 66mm Light Vehicle Obscurant Smoke System (LVOSS) grenade; 
Program status: In development; 
Years in program: 12[A]; 
Cost: $7.1 million. 

Program: MK 19 non-lethal short range munition; 
Program status: In development; 
Years in program: 8; 
Cost: $7.2 million. 

Program: Mobility Denial System; 
Program status: Terminated; 
Years in program: 8; 
Cost: $10.0 million. 

Program: FN 303 Less-Lethal Launching System; 
Program status: Terminated; 
Years in program: 6; 
Cost: $1.9 million. 

Program: Pulsed Energy projectile (PEP); 
Program status: Terminated; 
Years in program: 6; 
Cost: $14.2 million. 

Source: JNLWD data. 

[A] According to JNLWD data, the 66mm Light Vehicle Obscurant Smoke 
System (LVOSS) grenade program was funded from FY 1997 through FY 2001 
by JNLWD, whereupon it became a service-unique program in development 
funded by the Army. 

[End of table] 

For example, the Airburst Non-Lethal Munition has been under 
development for the Army since 1999 (at a cost of nearly $15 million) 
and has yet to be fielded. In another example, the Mobility Denial 
System--which relied on slippery foam to limit vehicle traction-- 
continued for 8 years (at a cost of about $10 million) before being 
terminated because it did not meet combat developers' needs and its 
extensive water requirement was considered a logistics burden. Although 
the Active Denial concept demonstration only lasted 5 years, active 
denial technology research projects have been underway since at least 
1997, at a combined cost of $55.2 million.[Footnote 43] According to a 
JNLWD official, the criteria used to determine when to cancel a program 
are formulated by the program sponsor, program manager, and joint 
representatives. They reflect technical, programmatic, and policy 
objectives to be accomplished, and program decisions are made based on 
the program's achievement of these tasks with recommendations from the 
Joint Coordinating and Integration Group. However, as each program is 
addressed individually, there are no standard termination criteria that 
are applied to all NLW programs. 

The directorate uses an Investment Decision Support Tool to evaluate 
proposed NLW programs as well as active development programs, scoring 
them on a scale of 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). The directorate uses 
this tool to assist in deciding if certain programs are worthy of JNLWD 
attention and funding, and its results are briefed to service 
representatives. However, according to a JNLWD official, the scores 
programs receive on the tool do not directly correlate to the priority 
for investments because the tool does not incorporate all factors that 
decision makers need to consider. For instance, the tool does not 
include the relative degrees of service and combatant command support, 
past technical performance, or technological feasibility. Appendix IV 
presents further detail on all of the JNLWD-sponsored programs 
currently under development and their most recent total scores on the 
investment decision support tool. While such a tool may be useful to 
decision makers, a method that incorporates all of the factors needed 
to make an informed decision, such as logistics and supportability and 
exit timeframes and criteria, would be a more effective instrument in 
allocating limited resources. By continuing to fund over long periods 
of time programs that have not demonstrated their intended capability 
or have logistics and supportability challenges, the directorate is 
encumbering resources that might better be used toward the development 
of other non-lethal weapons programs and capabilities. 

NLW Program Funding Lacks Centralized Visibility: 

Further complicating DOD's ability to oversee its NLW program is the 
fact that no single organization has visibility over all spending 
categories, and available budget information may not fully capture all 
spending associated with the development of non-lethal capabilities. To 
identify funding for all DOD NLW programs, the JNLWD could only provide 
us full budgetary figures for its own programs for science and 
technology or research, development, test and evaluation. Directorate 
officials are not assigned oversight over service-unique programs and 
so could not determine exactly how much the services and other DOD 
components (such as U.S. Special Operations Command) are spending on 
their own NLW programs. Conversely, the interservice coordinating 
groups may not provide all necessary information, as the 
representatives review and approve the approximately 70 percent of the 
JNLWD budget that goes to research and development, but do not receive 
a detailed breakdown of the remaining costs. These include such items 
as studies and analysis, contract support, and salaries for liaisons to 
the services and combatant commands. 

We examined budget documents to ascertain what DOD invested for NLW and 
we found that--in addition to the JNLWD--all four military services, 
U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense have spent money on NLW programs in some capacity during at 
least some of the last 12 years, but documentation did not always show 
which non-lethal programs were being funded, nor was it always evident 
what year the money was being spent. Based on this limited 
documentation, we identified funding for the military services and 
other organizations that totaled about $355 million from 1997 through 
2008. The JNLWD provided data showing that funding for JNLWD programs 
totaled about $462 million, giving DOD a total of $817 million budgeted 
for that time period. 

The reliability of our estimate of total spending was also affected 
because DOD budgets do not isolate the portion of weapon procurement 
budgets that should be attributed to non-lethal effects. Several lethal 
weapon systems may have non-lethal capabilities. For example, the 
Army's Spider Anti-Personnel Landmine Alternative system can use non- 
lethal munitions to deter, rather than destroy, enemy personnel. 
However, none of the $172.1 million budgeted for the Spider through 
fiscal year 2009 was listed as part of the NLW program. Table 6 lists 
several examples of normally lethal weapon programs that have the 
capability to be used in a non-lethal manner or use non-lethal 
munitions. 

Table 6: Lethal Weapon Programs Having Non-lethal Capability: 

Programs: Spider networked munitions system; 
Capabilities: Allows measured and graduated responses including sense 
only, non-lethal, and lethal modes. 

Programs: Modular accessory shotgun system; 
Capabilities: Provides the capability to fire lethal, non-lethal, and 
door-breaching 12-gauge rounds. 

Programs: Future force high energy laser; 
Capabilities: Ultra precise lethal/non-lethal effects against a variety 
of targets. 

Programs: Armed robotic vehicle, assault variant; 
Capabilities: Destroy enemy platforms and fortified positions, employ 
non-lethal weapons, and remotely provide limited reconnaissance. 

Programs: Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun; 
Capabilities: Ability to fire all non-lethal shotgun rounds in the 
Marine Corps inventory. 

Programs: Applied research--materials for electronics, optics and 
survivability; 
Capabilities: Demonstrate capabilities of advanced materials and 
material process technologies for ultra-lightweight, ultra-high-power 
aircraft electrical generators enabling airborne lethal and non-lethal 
directed energy weapons. 

Source: Fiscal Year 2009 Budget Justification Books. 

[End of table] 

We also found that part of what the military services categorized as 
non-lethal weapons spending included items that were not necessarily 
developed as NLW. For example, non-lethal capability sets, which 
account for about $122 million, are being procured and distributed to 
units overseas as well as to National Guard troops stationed in units 
in U.S. states and territories, and are packed in several modules that 
may be tailored according to mission, for example, checkpoint guards. 
However, the sets contain such items as riot gear (face shields, shin 
guards, flex cuffs, etc.) that are not, by DOD's own definition, non- 
lethal weapons. Rather, they could more accurately be described as 
personal protective equipment. Because of definition considerations 
such as this, we found determining the exact amounts of NLW-related 
spending to be problematic. DOD plans to spend about $789 million on 
non-lethal weapons from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The complex 
nature of categorizing lethal versus non-lethal weapons and programs 
makes it all the more important for DOD to have a much clearer 
understanding of all the programs and investments it is making in NLW. 
DOD officials told us that they are trying to reach consensus among the 
services on defining what constitutes a non-lethal weapon in order to 
more accurately categorize them for budgetary and other purposes. The 
inability to easily track all money spent specifically on non-lethal 
capabilities--be they lethal weapons that have non-lethal capabilities 
or programs that contain items that are not NLW by definition--puts 
JNLWD and service officials at a distinct disadvantage as they will not 
have all the information they need to make informed budget decisions. 
Without adequate oversight, including program direction and visibility 
of all costs and individual program efforts, the directorate, the 
services, and DOD at large lack assurance that they are making the most 
effective use of departmentwide resources and meeting warfighters' 
needs. 

DOD Has Not Fully Developed Policy and Doctrine for Use and Training in 
Non-Lethal Weapons Capabilities: 

DOD has begun to incorporate ideas about non-lethal capabilities into 
policy, doctrine, and training, but gaps in key policy decisions limit 
the effectiveness of doctrine changes and subsequent training. DOD has 
not yet clearly defined the accepted level of risk for fatality, nor 
has it fully developed weapons employment policies for overseas 
warfighting or homeland applications or ensured that warfighters and 
domestic responders are fully trained in NLW use. Without resolving 
these policy problems, DOD's ability to integrate NLW concepts into 
doctrine and subsequently train personnel in those operations is 
limited. 

DOD Has Begun to Incorporate Non-Lethal Capabilities into Policy, 
Doctrine, and Training: 

DOD published a directive in 1996 establishing policy and assigning 
responsibilities for the development and employment of non-lethal 
weapons.[Footnote 44] According to this directive, non-lethal weapons, 
doctrine, and concepts of operation are to be designed to reinforce 
deterrence and expand the range of options available to commanders. Non-
lethal weapons are also meant to enhance the capability of U.S. forces 
to discourage, delay, or prevent hostile actions; limit escalation; 
take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the 
preferred option; better protect the forces; temporarily disable 
equipment facilities and personnel; and help decrease the postconflict 
costs of reconstruction. DOD has begun to incorporate non-lethal 
weapons into existing doctrine and concept publications. The joint 
staff and the services have issued several dozen doctrine publications 
that cited a need for non-lethal capabilities and began to discuss the 
importance of developing capabilities that may be applied across the 
range of military operations, such as for Peace Operations, Urban 
Operations, and Civil Support. These organizations have also updated 
publications that describe a need to include NLW as part of the overall 
use of force continuum within planning for such diverse missions as 
command and control for joint land and maritime operations and joint 
counterdrug operations. 

In addition to mentioning the need for NLW capabilities in policy and 
doctrine, the services and combatant commands also have begun to 
incorporate non-lethal weapons into their plans and procedures. U.S. 
Northern Command has developed concept of operations plans for Defense 
Support to Civil Authorities/Homeland Defense missions.[Footnote 45] 
The military services have issued a joint tactics, techniques and 
procedures manual and updated the manual in 2007.[Footnote 46] They 
have also issued service-specific guidance. For example, the Air Force 
has a manual tailored to the particular needs of Air Force security 
forces and the Army has published a field manual on civil disturbance 
operations. The Marine Corps has developed mission-essential tasks and 
individual training standards in support of NLW use and recently issued 
specific use policy for human electromuscular incapacitation devices 
such as TASER®. Beginning in 1998, the Marine Corps was designated as 
the lead service for the Interservice Non-lethal Individual Weapons 
Instructor Course--the source for formal NLW instructor training for 
all of the services--and has also deployed mobile training teams to 
help facilitate on-site NLW training in Iraq. 

Although DOD has begun to incorporate NLW concepts throughout its body 
of operational doctrine, our analysis indicated that most references 
are limited, recognizing the value of such a capability, the need for 
it, or both, but not providing additional guidance about how such 
capabilities should modify existing operational concepts. For example, 
the joint doctrine publication, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations, 
[Footnote 47] includes two paragraphs that describe the potential 
flexibility offered by non-lethal weapons but offers no other 
operational perspective or guidance in the 150-page publication. This 
may limit the utility of information on non-lethal weapons in existing 
doctrine. One reason for this is that we found gaps in DOD's policy and 
guidance for NLW. DOD recognizes that policy tends to drive doctrine 
[Footnote 48] and doctrine, in turn, influences training and the 
execution of operations.[Footnote 49] Therefore, weaknesses in policy 
make it difficult to effectively produce or augment the doctrine and 
training. 

Gaps Remain in NLW Policy, Doctrine, and Training for Overseas and 
Homeland Operations: 

While DOD has clearly articulated a policy that non-lethal weapons 
shall not be required to have a zero probability of producing 
fatalities or permanent injuries, it has not (1) fully articulated what 
constitutes acceptable risk, (2) fully explained how employment 
doctrine should vary by scenario, or (3) provided specialized training 
to enable operators to make effective use of NLW in various 
contingencies, particularly within the United States. DOD has not 
reached consensus on how to answer these questions. 

Level of Acceptable Risk Is Not Clear: 

The directive that establishes DOD policies and assigns 
responsibilities for the development and employment of non-lethal 
weapons states that NLW are designed and employed to minimize, rather 
than eliminate, fatalities. As such, NLW may have lethal effects and 
therefore carry some level of risk that is not precisely defined. For 
example, non-lethal is described in a joint functional concept as the 
degree to which the joint force is able to create desired effects using 
incapacitating, nonfatal capabilities. In addition, DOD stated as part 
of the capabilities-based assessment that increasing non-lethality 
widens the range of effects the joint force is able to achieve without 
using deadly force, or in the case of defense support to civil 
authorities, that the avoidance of casualties is imperative.[Footnote 
50] An early assessment by the Human Effects Advisory Panel[Footnote 
51] posited that acceptable risk was 1 percent suffering permanent 
damage (of which half were lethal), 98 percent incapacitation, and no 
effect on 1 percent of the population, but senior NLW program officials 
said that those figures were never considered authoritative and that 
acceptable risk had not been quantified. 

DOD has also not fully clarified what constitutes acceptable risk short 
of fatality. Current DOD policy defines NLW as weapons that are 
explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate, and 
are intended to have "relatively reversible" effects. Based on the 
results of the capability-based assessment, the JNLWD has modified its 
definition of NLW to include weapons, devices, and munitions that are 
explicitly designed and primarily employed to "immediately 
incapacitate" targeted personnel or material, and that are intended to 
have "reversible" effects. These changes have not yet been incorporated 
into overarching DOD policy, although JNLWD officials have said that 
they are understood within DOD. However, publications are not fully 
synchronized throughout the department; for example, Army doctrine 
states that the use of NLW should "temporarily incapacitate." 
Furthermore, it states that NLW use must not result in unnecessary 
suffering"[Footnote 52] without defining this term in the context of 
NLW effects. Each of these definitions has different implications for 
NLW development and employment, because as the "dose" of a weapon 
increases, so does its potential both to achieve the desired effect and 
to produce permanent injury. Thus, a NLW that is more successful with 
respect to onset - that is, immediately incapacitates --could be less 
so with respect to duration - that is, proves irreversible. 

Once DOD does finalize a new common definition, though, uncertainty 
about acceptable results of the use of NLW may still create unrealistic 
expectations. For example, the Marine Corps prepared an urgent needs 
statement to support its request to field a laser dazzler, in which it 
noted that the flares then in use caused injury and one fatality. The 
Marine Corps requesters wanted a capability that would avoid that 
outcome. The uncertainty of outcome may lead to expectations that non- 
lethal actually means never lethal, and moreover may not even cause any 
kind of serious injury. According to a senior NLW program official, the 
term "non-lethal" itself sets up false expectations, and DOD should 
establish a concerted strategic communications program to disabuse 
those who may be the target of such weapons as well as military users 
of the idea that "non-lethal" is risk-free. DOD's interservice NLW 
training course materials also cite the possibility that political or 
military leaders might form an incorrect perception that NLW will allow 
wars and military operations other than war to be prosecuted without 
casualties. Other federal agencies, whose personnel may use NLW within 
the United States, manage expectations differently. For example, the 
Department of Justice uses the term "less-lethal" so as not to create 
the expectation that certain weapons never produce fatal results. The 
Department of Homeland Security uses both terms. Congress also defined 
NLW in a way that may reinforce expectations. In the statute directing 
DOD to establish centralized responsibility for the establishment of 
NLW technology it defined a "non-lethal weapon" as a weapon or 
instrument the effect of which on human targets is less than fatal. 
[Footnote 53] 

DOD has not been able to provide further clarification on acceptable 
risk primarily because there is no departmentwide consensus on what 
constitutes acceptable risk. DOD officials have been discussing the 
development of a methodology for characterizing acceptable risk that 
can be applied more specifically to individual non-lethal weapons or 
devices. They told us that they are nearing agreement within the 
department on this methodology. However, as of February 2009, the 
methodology had not been formally approved. The lack of a consistent 
and clear methodology regarding risk levels can hinder efforts to write 
formal requirements for material solutions to identified capability 
gaps, without which new products cannot progress through the 
acquisition process, and can complicate efforts to field NLW that are 
purchased from commercial vendors, to use them, or both. Until NLW 
terminology is clarified and fully disseminated, it could continue to 
create unrealistic expectations that could complicate the efforts of 
material developers, result in inconsistent rules of engagement, and 
make operational commanders more hesitant to employ any available NLW. 
Moreover, until DOD clarifies its policy on how to assess the risk of 
fatality or permanent injury it is willing to accept, it will be very 
difficult to develop, deploy, train for, and use any NLW that have the 
potential either to be lethal or create detrimental political effects. 

DOD Has Not Fully Explained How NLW Employment Should Differ by 
Scenario: 

Our analysis of DOD's policy and doctrine showed that DOD personnel 
lack clear guidance about how to employ NLW across the range of 
military operations, both overseas and domestically. This could be 
relevant, for example, for a range of missions that involve force but 
occur in a nominally "peacetime" scenario, or in ambiguous situations 
across the spectrum of conflict. NLW may be used to determine intent: a 
warning NLW, such as the laser dazzler, might be used to induce an 
approaching vehicle, individual, or group to stop, and failure to stop 
is then assumed to mean hostile intent against which lethal force may 
be used. However, our review and analysis of existing doctrine showed 
that it does not provide adequate guidance for employing NLW in 
ambiguous situations, such as when a vehicle or pedestrian is 
approaching a checkpoint and intent is not obvious. In some cases, 
servicemembers might not be able to determine intent until an 
individual is within a short distance. While there are NLW such as the 
laser dazzler that can allow troops to attempt to provide warnings over 
long distances, the existing suite of NLW that can incapacitate an 
individual is only effective at close range, so servicemembers have 
limited options. They could use blunt-force munitions or electro- 
muscular incapacitation devices, both of which are generally 
ineffective beyond a short range; or wait for an individual to approach 
to within the range at which these work, at which point effective self- 
defense may no longer be possible. These policy and weapons employment 
considerations are important to the warfighter because they represent a 
balance between safety/risk for U.S. service personnel and safety/risk 
to individuals or groups targeted by NLW. They are also important to 
provide context for the application of the standing rules of engagement 
that apply to military operations, for use where U.S. forces face 
hostile forces, hostile acts, or demonstrated hostile intent.[Footnote 
54] 

Concepts of operations for use of DOD forces within the United States 
consider the avoidance of civilian casualties imperative, and the 
standing rules for use of force state that, normally, force is to be 
used only as a last resort and the force used should be the minimum 
necessary.[Footnote 55] Deadly force is to be used only when all lesser 
means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed,[Footnote 56] which 
implies that all other options must be exhausted first. By contrast, 
overarching DOD non-lethal weapons policy states that the existence of 
NLW in no way constitutes an obligation for their employment and that 
the United States retains the option for immediate use of lethal 
weapons.[Footnote 57] DOD has not issued new guidance or instituted 
training that reconciles these two stances; for example National Guard 
Bureau guidance for the domestic employment of NLW contains little more 
than a restatement of passages from the DOD directive on non-lethal 
weapons. DOD also has not directed that any specific pieces of 
equipment that could produce lethal effects be excluded from the 
capability sets that have been fielded in the United States. For 
example, non-lethal capability sets containing TASER® have been fielded 
to National Guard units in every state. TASER® is controversial because 
of concerns about injuries and fatalities that occurred in the course 
of its use in law enforcement. The Marine Corps proscribed use of these 
weapons until it published a policy specific to TASER®, and the Army 
component at U.S. Central Command decided not to train troops in their 
use. 

Furthermore, the joint staff has issued doctrine that states the 
employment of non-lethal weapons in certain supporting operations will 
also be governed by their political impact, For such operations, 
weapons employment policies would need to be developed and disseminated 
so that the existing rules of engagement and rules for the use of force 
could be adequately tailored to minimize detrimental political effects 
resulting from the use of NLW. In particular, DOD policy for employment 
of directed-energy NLW such as the Active Denial System is incomplete. 
The Under Secretary for Policy deemed the system politically untenable 
for detainee operations[Footnote 58] but has not yet issued employment 
policy for other missions. While the office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy has approved the Active Denial System in principle, 
a former senior policy official wrote that DOD would continue to 
require the development of definitive concepts of operation; rules of 
engagement; and tactics, techniques, and procedures before the Active 
Denial System could be deployed. While the Joint Non-lethal Weapons 
Program executive agent in December 2008 terminated efforts to deploy 
the existing Active Denial System overseas, DOD continues to try to 
find ways to deploy the system in the United States, possibly at the 
southern border. 

Unresolved questions about acceptable risk and proper employment 
guidance can also have an impact on the quality of training that 
warfighters and domestic responders receive. DOD's Interservice Non- 
Lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course provides scenario-based 
training that can be applied under the standing Rules for the Use of 
Force and Rules of Engagement that apply to all services, but it cannot 
integrate realistic training for specific situations into its 
curriculum unless appropriate policy has been developed. Because 
currently available NLW have short ranges, reaction time is limited and 
warfighters will need to make quick decisions, possibly in rapidly 
changing circumstances. While DOD can and does produce mission-specific 
rules of engagement, gaps in policy and doctrine limit the training 
that can be provided prior to deployment. Until these issues are 
resolved, doctrine and training for non-lethal weapons may be limited, 
and the warfighter or domestic responder may have fewer options other 
than resorting to lethal force. 

Testing and Evaluation for NLW Programs Lack Human Effects Guidance and 
Are Not Uniformly Applied across All Programs: 

Testing NLW for effects on targets and bystanders is a difficult 
technological undertaking, in part because human effects testing needs 
to be done using modeling and surrogates which may not accurately 
reflect human responses. Further, almost all NLW have been fielded to 
date using abbreviated processes because of urgent needs, and as a 
result, NLW have generally not undergone the same level of effects 
testing to meet standard fielding requirements. One of the components 
lacking in DOD's approach to testing NLW is a consistent methodology 
for assessing the risks of various human effects. While DOD has begun 
to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology, this methodology 
cannot be completed until human effects testing requirements are 
standardized in DOD policy. Testing and evaluation that include human 
effects testing measures could improve planning and commanders' ability 
to avoid unintended effects of NLW use. 

Human Effects Testing and Evaluation Is Technologically Difficult for 
NLW: 

The complicated nature of testing the outcomes of NLW use centers on 
the testing of the effects of these weapons on targets and bystanders-
-typically referred to as human effects testing. The test and 
evaluation process provides an assessment of the attainment of 
technical performance, specifications, and system maturity to determine 
whether systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable 
for intended use. Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their 
targets principally through blast, penetration and fragmentation, NLW 
are intended to prevent the target from functioning and their effects 
are intended to be reversible. Testing of human effects would measure 
the NLW's likelihood and degree of causing irreversible effects on 
human targets and bystanders. There are, however, several limitations 
to human effects testing. Although technology is improving to better 
test for and predict NLW human effects, DOD policies[Footnote 59] limit 
the use of human subjects for testing and the nature of nonlethality, 
which is aimed at producing reversible effects, poses challenges to 
testing accuracy. DOD policy[Footnote 60] states that "the rights and 
welfare of human subjects in research supported or conducted by the DOD 
Components shall be protected." Therefore, when possible, human effects 
are derived from animal and computer-based models in substitution for 
direct effects on human subjects. We acknowledge the importance of 
ensuring the protection of human test subjects but also recognize that 
the test measures designed and put in place to operate within these 
restrictions--such as surrogate (i.e., test dummies) and animal tests-
-face unique challenges to produce accurate and timely test results. 

Furthermore, according to a DOD human effects testing official, the 
confidence intervals associated with non-lethal effects testing are 
typically low. For example, the Human Effects Center of Excellence 
reports that testing non-lethal munitions requires accurate accounting 
for projectile properties such as its mass, impact velocity, shape, 
target size, and impact location. However, potential for injury on the 
target varies depending on the weight and size of the target and the 
accuracy of the NLW projectiles--which are often hard to predict and 
test for. According to the Human Effects Advisory Panel,[Footnote 61] 
there is a knowledge gap between the expectations of the warfighter and 
the information that is being provided by models and simulation tools 
from the scientific community. Testing accuracy is inherently limited 
when extrapolations are based on subjects other than human subjects. 
The Advanced Total Body Model is an example of a simulation tool used 
to predict the risks associated with blunt impact weapons and was 
designed to test for effects upon various body parts (e.g., ribs, 
abdomen, head-neck). However, simulation tools are not capable of 
testing for all possible effects derived from a NLW. A broken rib, for 
example, could result in a punctured lung which may cause death. 
According to officials at the Human Effects Center of Excellence, other 
sources used to test and collect data for non-lethal effects are 
animals that share similar human characteristics. For example, they 
said chinchillas have similar inner ear structures to humans and are 
used to test for ear damage caused from acoustic NLW such as flash bang 
grenades. However, functional and anatomical differences between human 
and animal subjects may limit the generalizability of test results to 
human populations. If suitable testing that models NLW effects on 
humans is not conducted, then it becomes unclear how and when to use 
non-lethal weapons given the lack of assurance concerning the effects 
on the targets and bystanders. 

DOD Lacks Standardized Policy for Human Effects Testing and a Complete 
Risk Assessment Methodology: 

Current DOD testing policies do not address testing of NLW effects on 
human targets and bystanders. DOD has started to draft a policy that-- 
once approved--would establish guidance and procedures for the 
characterization of target human effects in support of the development 
of NLW acquisition programs, but this policy has not yet been agreed on 
within DOD, formally approved, or implemented. Therefore, with the 
exception of laser-related weapons,[Footnote 62] human effects testing 
is currently not required, including the use of simulation tools and 
other methods. JNLWD officials told us that all NLW programs that 
receive JNLWD funding must be reviewed by the Human Effects Review 
Board[Footnote 63] before every major acquisition milestone. Service- 
funded programs are not required to undergo the same review; however, 
JNLWD officials said they encourage it. Army officials told us that 
they conduct human effects testing for non-urgently fielded NLW. 
Further limiting the amount of human effects testing being conducted is 
the fact that, to date, almost all NLW have been fielded using 
abbreviated processes to meet urgent operational requirements. When 
there is an established and immediate operational need, an urgent or 
abbreviated fielding decision allows DOD to bypass most testing, other 
than user safety testing, that is normally conducted for weapons 
fielded through the standard process. For example, the Army's Urgent 
Material Release process requires a safety assessment, but Army 
officials told us that this safety testing is for the user of the 
weapon only, and does not test for the safety of the target or 
bystanders. Marine Corps policy states that with appropriate commanding 
general authority, weapons may be fielded in limited quantities to meet 
urgent operational requirements, even if all safety requirements are 
not met. A Marine Corps official told us that a commander's willingness 
to accept safety risks associated with an NLW's rapid acquisition given 
the urgent need of the weapon in the field is ultimately what drives 
NLW deployment. He said that the most complicating factor of 
streamlining and regulating the acquisition process for NLW from 
beginning to end is managing this balance between urgency and safety. 

DOD testing for commercial-off-the-shelf items can be even more limited 
than for those urgently fielded because agency officials can use 
contractor test data instead of conducting their own tests.[Footnote 
64] The Defense Acquisition Guidebook recognizes the importance of 
oversight and government involvement in testing performed by 
contractors.[Footnote 65] Anytime agency officials decide to use 
contractor test results without adequate oversight or involvement in 
the testing, there is an increased risk that the testing was biased, 
the testing environment was not relevant for the weapon's intended 
operational use, or the test results were inaccurately represented. One 
example of a commercial item where use of contractor test data had the 
potential to lead to unpredictable results was the TASER®. In 2002, the 
Human Effects Review Board reviewed the TASER® M26 model and submitted 
an approved but limited fielding recommendation. The recommendation was 
largely based on anecdotal data and field experience gathered over the 
last 20 years from police enforcement activities where TASER® was 
predominantly used on male targets. The Human Effects Review Board was 
concerned by the lack of unbiased, peer-reviewed scientific evidence of 
TASER® effects and effectiveness that is necessary to support a 
stronger endorsement. In 2003, the Army's safety office at Picatinny 
Arsenal issued a safety certification to support the urgent fielding of 
the TASER® M26 model. However, the Army did not field the M26 model and 
instead fielded an even more advanced version of TASER®--the X26E 
model--that produces a 5 percent increase in muscle contraction 
compared to the approved M26 because it uses a waveform that is 
different from that of any preexisting models. Although the Human 
Effects Review Board did evaluate testing results for the TASER® X26 
model in 2008 and determined that the human effects research conducted 
was sufficient, DOD increased the risks of unintended effects by 
reviewing testing data after the weapon was already being used in the 
field. Although testing the effects of NLW is technologically 
challenging, JNLWD recognizes that human effects, effectiveness, and 
risk must be quantified in order to support legal, treaty, and policy 
reviews and to ensure warfighter confidence in new technologies. 

DOD has begun to develop elements of a risk assessment methodology, but 
the methodology will not be complete until human effects testing 
requirements are standardized in DOD policy. In its Risk Management 
Guide for DOD Acquisition,[Footnote 66] DOD recognizes that risk 
management is critical to acquisition program success. In particular, 
DOD notes the need to define a program by satisfying the user's need 
within acceptable risk. According to this guide, the purpose of 
addressing risk in programs is to help ensure that program cost, 
schedule, and performance objectives are achieved at every stage in the 
program's life cycle and to communicate to all stakeholders the process 
for uncovering, determining the scope of, and managing program 
uncertainties. Although DOD policy does state that NLW shall not be 
required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or 
significant injuries, our review found that the policy does not 
articulate a methodology for what constitutes acceptable risk of 
fatality and significant injuries across DOD and the services. Without 
a better understanding of acceptable risk, NLW developers and designers 
have no way of knowing whether the risk levels associated with the 
effects produced from NLW are in compliance with standards and whether 
NLW developments are progressing sufficiently to meet the needs of the 
warfighter. 

Although DOD has not established standardized acceptable levels of risk 
of fatality and significant injuries, DOD has a draft policy in 
development for a Risk of Significant Injury scale that characterizes 
the amount of treatment necessary to reverse the effects of an NLW (see 
figure 6). The Risk of Significant Injury scale broadly categorizes 
three levels of health care capabilities required to reverse the 
effects of NLW once they are used on targets, but it does not take into 
account the risk probabilities of injury for each category for a given 
weapon or target. In other words, the Risk of Significant Injury scale 
does not assess the likelihood that non-lethal effects could cause a 
score of 0, 1, or 2 within the scale, and thus does not provide 
information about what probability to expect for each category of 
injury. The Human Effects Process Action Team concluded in 2000 that 
the Human Effects Review Board should make adopting a risk assessment 
approach to evaluating the NLW human effects data a priority because of 
the uncertainties involved with the science of human effects 
characterization. The team--directed by a Marine Corps lieutenant 
general and composed of each service's acquisition executive and 
surgeon general--stated that a risk assessment methodology would allow 
the human effects of NLW to be expressed along with a measure of the 
confidence in the data. Hypothetically, if testing showed that a NLW 
carries a 15 percent risk for permanent injuries, a risk assessment 
methodology would allow a risk level (e.g., low-to-moderate or moderate-
to-high) to be assigned. A commander can then use this as a basis for a 
decision on whether to accept that risk.[Footnote 67] 

Figure 6: Draft Risk of Significant Injury Scale for Non-Lethal 
Weapons: 

[Refer to PDF for image: illustration] 

Link to health care capability standards: 

Risk of significant injury rises from 0 to 2: 

0: 
Limited first responder capability: self-aid, buddy aid, and combat 
lifesaver skills. 

1: 
First responder capability: requiring resuscitation, stabilization, and 
emergency care. 

2: 
Forward resuscitative and theater hospitalization capabilities: 
advanced emergency, surgical, and ancillary services. 

Source: DOD. 

[End of figure] 

DOD has not yet established a risk assessment methodology for human 
effects testing that is capable of identifying the potential risks 
associated with the use of NLW. Without a risk assessment methodology, 
NLW human effects are not fully understood and cannot accurately be 
predicted, which may result in unexpected effects upon targets and 
bystanders and cause political consequences. DOD recognizes that part 
of a successful risk management strategy includes sufficient testing 
and evaluation measures, and DOD also recognizes the importance of 
assessing operational effectiveness.[Footnote 68] Nevertheless, testing 
and evaluation that include human effects testing measures could 
improve planning and commanders' ability to avoid unintended effects of 
NLW use. 

Conclusions: 

DOD's Non-Lethal Weapons Program is intended to provide U.S. armed 
forces with flexibilities for dealing with the rapidly changing threat 
environment, especially when using lethal force is undesirable. 
However, key aspects of this program, such as assessing the extent to 
which priority capability gaps will be addressed, focusing on 
supportability and operational utility in the field, and providing 
oversight and full funding visibility, have been limited. These 
problems have contributed to the program's overall limited progress in 
fielding suitable NLW. New weapons requirements and development are 
often understandably affected by technology hurdles and a preference to 
field an item that will partially meet needs quickly rather than wait 
indefinitely for a perfect solution. However, we note that 12 years 
have passed since DOD established the JNLWD and that the services were 
working on NLW development efforts even before that. Better planning, 
management, and oversight of NLW developmental efforts to incorporate 
early consideration of technology readiness, suitability, and 
supportability could improve the rate of progress. While individual 
services may attempt to satisfy some service-unique gaps on their own, 
the measure of a successful joint program will be whether it can 
successfully foster joint development. Without clearer policy on 
acceptable risk to both warfighters and potential targets, in both 
overseas and domestic scenarios, doctrine and training for NLW will 
continue to be limited. Finally, conducting suitable testing and 
evaluation is complicated in an environment where acceptable 
alternatives to human testing - animal tests and modeling and 
simulation - are themselves both limited and inherently difficult to 
extrapolate to humans. Although DOD recognizes that it needs to develop 
a risk assessment methodology and has taken steps toward that end, it 
still lacks the means to predict levels of risk concerning non-lethal 
effects on targets and bystanders. As a result of all these factors, 
DOD's NLW program has had limited success in planning, developing, 
overseeing, and testing effective and efficient weapons. Unless these 
factors are addressed, the ability of U.S. forces to conduct operations 
across the full range of potential lethality where and when needed will 
be hindered, and they will continue to lack the means to escalate force 
while still achieving non-lethal effects. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following eight 
actions: 

* To help DOD better match program priorities to identified capability 
gaps, the Secretary of Defense should direct the JNLWD, in consultation 
with the services and combatant commanders, to assess and document the 
extent to which NLW efforts at the technology development stage and 
beyond (including procurement and operations and maintenance) address 
the highest-priority Joint Staff-validated capability gaps. 

* To help DOD better incorporate logistics and supportability 
considerations, the Secretary of Defense should direct the JNLWD, in 
consultation with the services and combatant commanders, to ensure that 
appropriate logistics and supportability planning is integrated into 
development efforts at the earliest possible stage, including both DOD- 
developed and commercial weapons and capabilities. Incorporating 
changes to--and using information already gathered for--the JNLWD's 
Investment Decision Support Tool might assist the directorate and DOD 
in establishing clear criteria and ensuring progress in this area. 

* To help the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics in its role in overseeing DOD's Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Program, the Secretary of Defense should take the following actions: 

- Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics, in consultation with the Executive Agent, to ensure that 
NLW strategic guidance that sets out goals, objectives, and a framework 
for research, development, and acquisition--including science and 
technology efforts--is established and routinely updated. 

- Require the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology 
and Logistics to oversee the development of performance evaluation 
criteria to guide decisions on how and for how long to allocate 
resources to research and development efforts. In addition to 
established DOD financial management regulations, DOD could use 
existing tools, such as the Investment Decision Support Tool, to help 
develop and implement these measures. 

- Direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics to develop and execute a methodology for monitoring all NLW- 
related funding and programs across DOD and designate a central focal 
point within that office to coordinate the effort with the JNLWD. 

* To help DOD more fully incorporate non-lethal concepts and 
capabilities into its existing and new policy and doctrine for 
operations overseas and in the homeland, 

- the Secretary of Defense should direct the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy to articulate a methodology and develop a time frame for 
determining acceptable risk with respect to lethality and permanent 
injury for operators, targets, and bystanders due to the use of 
specific types of NLW, and: 

- the Secretary of Defense should direct the Joint Staff, in 
consultation with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the 
Services, to provide clearer weapons employment guidance that can be 
used to modify or augment existing rules of engagement or rules for the 
use of force for both warfighters and domestic responders on how non- 
lethal weapons should be used under certain conditions, and incorporate 
this guidance into training curricula. 

* To help DOD conduct more thorough testing and evaluation of non- 
lethal weapons and aid end users' ability to plan by knowing what to 
expect from NLW before using the weapon, the Secretary of Defense 
should direct the JNLWD and the military services to finalize and 
implement a risk assessment methodology for human effects testing of 
NLW and develop a timeline for implementing the methodology. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with five 
of our recommendations, partially concurred with the other three, and 
described actions it is taking or will take to implement all of the 
recommendations. DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also 
provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the draft 
as appropriate. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security also 
reviewed a draft of this report and had no comments. 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that DOD assess and document the 
extent to which non-lethal weapons efforts at the technology 
development stage and beyond address the highest-priority capability 
gaps and stated that they will incorporate a methodology for 
accomplishing this into the NLW Capabilities Roadmap and into the 
overall Joint Non-lethal Weapons program management process. 

With respect to our recommendation that DOD integrate logistics and 
supportability planning into NLW development efforts at the earliest 
possible stage, DOD agreed and stated that it would elevate 
consideration of logistics and supportability during program reviews 
and by using other existing tools, as appropriate. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it ensure that NLW strategic 
guidance that sets out goals, objectives, and a framework for research, 
development, and acquisition is established and routinely updated. DOD 
stated that to implement this recommendation, in addition to completing 
updates to DOD Directive 3000.3 and the Joint Services Memorandum of 
Agreement, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) is 
working with the JNLWD to develop a new version of the Non-lethal 
Weapon Capabilities Roadmap and plans to be more active in the NLW 
Joint Integrated Product Team. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that it develop and execute a 
methodology for monitoring all NLW-related funding and programs across 
DOD and designate a central focal point to coordinate the effort with 
the JNLWD. DOD stated that AT&L will coordinate with the directorate to 
develop and implement a methodology for monitoring NLW and funding and 
progress across the department in order to provide a more effective 
foundation for decision making. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation that DOD finalize and implement 
a risk assessment methodology for human effects testing of NLW and 
develop a timeline for implementing the methodology. DOD stated that in 
addition to implementing a risk assessment framework across technology 
development programs, the JNLWD has begun to develop a human effects 
characterization guidance document that will become standard across 
DOD. 

We believe that these steps will improve management and operations of 
the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program and encourage DOD to fully 
implement them as soon as possible. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 
Defense require the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L to oversee the 
development of performance evaluation criteria to guide decisions on 
how and for how long to allocate resources to research and development 
efforts. DOD agreed that enhanced performance evaluation criteria could 
better guide resource allocation decisions, but does not believe that 
new measures are needed. Nevertheless, DOD stated that the JNLWD, with 
oversight from AT&L and the Joint Integrated Product Team, would 
improve existing evaluation criteria to more effectively guide resource 
allocation decisions. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD articulate a 
methodology and develop a time frame for determining acceptable risk 
with respect to lethality and permanent injury for operators, targets, 
and bystanders because of the use of specific types of NLW. DOD agreed 
with the need for a methodology and time frame for assessing the risks 
inherent in employing non-lethal weapons. DOD stated that as we 
mentioned in our draft report, the Risk of Significant Injury 
methodology will help address our recommendation and that DOD intends 
for this methodology to be the basis for the human effects 
characterization guidance document in development. DOD stated that it 
does not believe that such a methodology should articulate thresholds 
for acceptable risk and that such determinations should be left to 
military commanders with the advice of legal advisors. DOD also stated 
that it does not believe an acceptable risk methodology should include 
the risk to operators of a weapon because such risks are already 
addressed in the existing acquisition process. We agree that military 
commanders (with the appropriate legal advice) should make the 
determination of acceptable risk when employing any weapon--including 
NLW. Our intent was to highlight that in order to make these decisions, 
military commanders require accurate information on what effects a NLW 
should be expected to have. By finalizing and fully incorporating the 
risk of significant injury methodology and guidance into NLW efforts 
and properly implementing them, DOD should be able to arrive at the 
kind of consistent and accurate information needed. To the extent the 
acquisition process includes risk to the operator of a NLW, we would 
expect that this information would be provided to commanders in the 
same context as risk to targeted individuals and bystanders. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD provide 
clearer weapons employment guidance that can be used to modify or 
augment existing rules of engagement or rules for the use of force for 
both warfighters and domestic responders on how NLW should be used, and 
incorporate this guidance into training curricula. DOD agreed with the 
necessity of doctrine that more clearly addresses NLW employment, but 
stated that such doctrine should be integrated into existing policy 
documents rather than creating separate employment guidance. To the 
extent that clear guidance on the employment of NLW overseas and in the 
United States can be incorporated into existing or supplemental 
documents, we agree this should allow DOD to clarify how NLW are 
intended to be employed in the wide range of operational circumstances, 
enhance the broad understanding of the use-of-force continuum, and 
facilitate the modification of training curricula. We continue to 
believe that, in whatever form it is presented, DOD should provide the 
clearest possible guidance. As we discussed in our report, policy and 
doctrine tend to drive training, and the clearer they are, the better 
the training that can be provided. 

Although not addressing a specific recommendation, DOD expressed 
concern that we did not sufficiently acknowledge the positive steps 
taken and important contributions made by its investments in NLW, and 
cited the contribution of the Non-Lethal Capability Sets in supporting 
Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in providing U.S. forces 
with valuable escalation-of-force options. We acknowledged the fielding 
of the Non-Lethal Capability Sets in our draft report. We also 
acknowledge that DOD has made progress in adapting the way it conducts 
operations by expanding the use and potential use of NLW, and also that 
several of the commercial-off-the-shelf items fielded under urgent 
requests have proven valuable and timely to the warfighter. Moreover, 
we recognize that the Non-Lethal Capability Sets have been requested by 
Army units and that the Army Chief of Staff directed a requirement that 
all brigade combat teams be issued these sets. However, DOD officials, 
including some who are part of the Joint Non-lethal Weapons Program, 
have pointed out to us that range limitations of current munitions and 
other Non-Lethal Capability Set items are important factors driving the 
JNLWD's and services' current development efforts. We continue to 
believe that in order to achieve the kinds of operational flexibility 
DOD seeks, including saving lives, greater effort is required to align 
policies, doctrine, technology, and logistics. 

DOD also expressed the view that we had not accurately portrayed its 
efforts with respect to the Active Denial System. DOD states that it 
intended the Active Denial System to be a concept demonstration and did 
not intend to develop a fully integrated, production-ready system. 
Although we acknowledged in our draft report that the Active Denial 
System was a concept demonstration, we observed that the level of 
resources the JNLWD devoted to the Active Denial System in comparison 
to its other efforts indicated a significant investment in a capability 
that was intended to eventually meet warfighters' needs. Our use of the 
Active Denial System in our report was primarily in the context of 
illustrating specific findings. For example, we noted missteps with 
regard to the effort to deploy Active Denial System 2 as a way of 
illustrating gaps in DOD's emphasis on fully developing logistics and 
supportability plans at the earliest possible stage of development. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other 
interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge 
on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are 
listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To identify the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has 
developed or fielded non-lethal weapons (NLW) or capabilities since the 
NLW program's inception, we obtained and analyzed the lists of 
developmental efforts and fielded items from the directorate and the 
services, and compared these with the lists in the joint services' 
manual on NLW tactics, techniques, and procedures. We interviewed 
program management officials from the directorate as well as Marine 
Corps Systems Command, the Army Program Executive Office for Close 
Combat Systems, the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Under 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, and U.S. Coast Guard 
headquarters. We attended the spring and fall 2008 meetings of both the 
joint coordination and integration group and integrated product team 
group, and reviewed briefings prepared to support prior years' 
meetings. We reviewed the products of the capabilities-based assessment 
conducted under JCIDS (for example the Functional Area Analysis, 
Functional Needs Analysis, and Joint Capabilities Document for Non- 
Lethal Capabilities) as well as the program information worksheets and 
investment decision support tool that the directorate uses to help it 
analyze priorities in light of identified gaps. To identify DOD non- 
lethal weapon program funding since 1997, we compiled and analyzed non- 
lethal weapon program budget information from the directorate and the 
services, reviewed DOD's fiscal year 2009 budget submissions and future 
years defense program data. We also reviewed DOD and Joint Non-Lethal 
Weapons Directorate management guidance as well as DOD acquisition 
management criteria and federal internal control standards. Our use of 
the budget data was to provide context for our discussion. We concluded 
that the figures were sufficient to provide context for our discussion. 
However, since NLW funding information is not centralized, we were not 
assured that the identified funding amount allocated to NLW programs 
was comprehensive. 

To determine the extent to which DOD has established and implemented 
policy and doctrine, we reviewed and analyzed joint and service 
directives and other publications, and conducted interviews with 
cognizant officials in DOD, including the Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Policy, Arlington, Virginia (both Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and America's Security 
Affairs; and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low 
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities); National Guard 
Bureau, Operations (J34), Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 
Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Deputy Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, Plans, Policies, and Operations, Arlington, Virginia; and Joint 
Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Virginia. In addition, we 
held teleconferences with officials from U.S. Northern Command 
headquarters and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters. 
We also interviewed Department of Homeland Security officials with the 
Science and Technology Division, Customs and Border Protection, and 
U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, all in Washington, D.C. Also in 
Washington we interviewed Department of Justice officials within the 
National Institute of Justice. To determine the extent to which DOD has 
established and implemented NLW training, we also met with officials at 
the Army Non-lethal Scalable Effects Center at the U.S. Army Military 
Police School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and the Marine Corps, 
Inter-Service Non-lethal Individuals Weapons Instructor Course at Fort 
Leonard Wood, Missouri, and reviewed training materials including the 
training course manual. 

To determine the extent to which NLW have undergone testing and 
evaluation, we first reviewed overarching acquisition policy--which 
includes both DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System and 
DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System--to 
ascertain test and evaluation guidelines for programs such as weapons 
that must be procured. We also reviewed the Risk Management Guide for 
DOD Acquisition and DOD test and evaluation guidance. We then compared 
the results of independent human effects assessment review panels with 
DOD test and evaluation guidance, compared DOD's prefielding testing 
requirements with the documentation that recorded the tests actually 
performed, and compared Service urgent and standard fielding 
requirements. Service-specific fielding policy such as Army Regulation 
700-142, Type Classification, Material Release, Fielding, and Transfer 
and Marine Corps Order 5000.23, Policy for the Fielding of Ground 
Weapon Systems and Equipment Policy provided information about what 
testing was required prior to fielding under various circumstances. For 
the few NLW fielded, we reviewed the status of test and evaluation 
master plans and relevant documentation as well as Human Effects Review 
Board assessments to determine if adequate testing was completed prior 
to fielding. In addition to meeting with DOD and services' test and 
evaluation officials, we also interviewed officials at the Human 
Effects Center of Excellence to discuss NLW testing in detail. Except 
where noted, we limited our discussion of technology development to 
those items that were specifically designed to conform to the DOD 
definition of non-lethal weapons. 

To conduct our work, we interviewed officials in the following DOD 
organizations at the stated locations: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in Arlington, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition Technology, and 
Logistics in Arlington, Virginia: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense and 
America's Security Affairs in Arlington, Virginia: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Special 
Operations - Low Intensity Conflict in Arlington, Virginia: 

* Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation in Arlington, 
Virginia: 

* Joint Staff, (J8) Force Application Engagement Division in Arlington, 
Virginia: 

* U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida: 

* U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida: 

* U.S. Northern Command via teleconference: 

* National Guard Bureau, Operations (J34) in Arlington, Virginia: 

* Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in Quantico, Virginia: 

* Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Assistant Secretary for 
Acquisition (Deputy Assistant Secretary for Science, Technology, and 
Engineering), Science and Technology Division, in Arlington, Virginia: 

* Air Force Security Forces Center in San Antonio, Texas: 

* Human Effects Center of Excellence personnel with the Air Force 
Research Laboratory in San Antonio, Texas: 

* Department of the Army Headquarters (G3/G8) in Arlington, Virginia: 

We conducted our review from March 2008 through April 2009 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

April 10, 2009: 

Ms. Davi M. D'Agostino: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street. N.W. 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. D'Agostino: 

This is the Department of Defense (Doll) response to the GAO draft 
report. GAO-09-344, "Defense Management: DoD Needs to Improve Program 
Management. Policy, and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field 
Operationally Useful Non-Lethal Weapons," dated March 13. 2009 (GAO 
Code 351149). Detailed comments on the report recommendations are 
enclosed. 

The draft report does not acknowledge the positive steps taken and 
important contributions made by the Departments investments in non-
lethal weapons. For example. the Military Departments, with assistance 
from the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program, have fielded Non-Lethal 
Capability Sets in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom. providing our forces with valuable escalation of force 
options. 

The draft report also does not accurately portray the Department's 
efforts with respect to the Active Denial System (ADS). The Department 
pursued the ADS under an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration with 
a goal of demonstrating the military utility of the active denial 
technology with a system prototype and potentially fielding the 
prototype. The Department's intent did not include developing a fully 
integrated, production-ready system. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. Technical 
comments were provided separately for your consideration. Should you 
have any questions, please contact Mr. Stefan Tretiak, 
Stefan.Tretiak@osd.mil, 703-695-0376. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: As stated: 

[End of letter] 

GAO Draft Report - Dated March 13, 2009: 
GAO Code 351149/GAO-09-344: 

"Defense Management: DoD Needs to Improve Program Management, Policy, 
and Testing to Enhance Ability to Field Operationally Useful Non-Lethal 
Weapons" 

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, in consultation with 
the Services and Combatant Commanders, to assess and document the 
extent to which non-lethal weapons efforts at the technology 
development stage and beyond (including procurement and operations & 
maintenance) address the highest-priority Joint Staff-validated 
capability gaps. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department recognizes the value of mapping 
technology development programs to validated capability gaps. The 
Department is developing a methodology for such a mapping in the 
revision of the Non-Lethal Weapon Capabilities Roadmap, and will 
incorporate this methodology into the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program 
management process. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD), in 
consultation with the Services and Combatant Commanders, to ensure that 
appropriate logistics and supportability planning is integrated into 
development efforts at the earliest possible stage, including both DoD-
developed and commercial weapons and capabilities. Incorporating 
changes to-and using information already gathered for-the JNLWD's 
Investment Decision Support Tool might assist the directorate and DOD 
in establishing clear criteria and ensuring progress in this area. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department concurs that logistics and 
supportability planning should be incorporated at the earliest possible 
stages of non-lethal weapons development. The JNLWD will elevate the 
consideration given to logistics and supportability planning during its 
regular program reviews and use other tools, as appropriate, to 
implement this recommendation for development programs within its 
purview. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
require the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics), in consultation with the executive agent, ensure that non-
lethal weapons strategic guidance that sets out goals, objectives, and 
a framework for research, development, and acquisition-including 
science and technology efforts-is established and routinely updated. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department concurs with the value attributed 
to non-lethal weapons strategic guidance and agrees that updates (which 
are in progress) to the DoDD 3000.3 and Joint Services Memorandum of 
Agreement are overdue. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) is working closely 
with the JNLWD to complete these updates and to develop a Version 1 of 
the DoD Non-Lethal Weapon Capabilities Roadmap. OUSD(AT&L) also plans 
to take a more active role in the Non-Lethal Weapons Joint Integrated 
Product Team. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
require the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) to oversee the development of performance evaluation 
criteria to guide decisions on how and for how long to allocate 
resources to research and development efforts. In addition to 
established DoD financial management regulations, DoD could use 
existing tools, such as the Investment Decision Support Tool, to help 
them develop and implement these measures. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department agrees that enhanced 
performance evaluation criteria can better guide resource allocation 
decisions. The Non-Lethal Weapons Joint Integrated Product Team (JIPT) 
makes funding decisions using established criteria for programs within 
its purview. The Department does not believe that new measures are 
needed. The JNLWD, with oversight from OUSD(AT&L) and the JIPT, will 
make improvements to the existing evaluation criteria to more 
effectively guide resource allocation decisions. 

Recommendation 5: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense d 
reel the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics) to develop and execute a methodology for monitoring all non-
lethal weapons related funding and programs across DoD and designate a 
central focal point within that office to coordinate the effort with 
the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees that better visibility of 
spending related to non-lethal weapons can assist with making 
investment decisions, particularly in avoiding duplication of effort. 
OUSD(AT&L) will coordinate with the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Directorate to develop and implement an improved methodology for 
monitoring non-lethal weapons-related funding and progress across the 
department, with a goal of providing a more effective foundation for 
decision making. 

Recommendation 6: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to articulate a 
methodology and develop a timeframe for determining acceptable risk 
with respect to lethality and permanent injury for operators. targets, 
and bystanders due to the use of specific types of non-lethal weapons. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department agrees with the need for 
a methodology and timeframe for assessing the risks inherent in the 
employment of specific types of non-lethal weapons. We appreciate the 
GAO's acknowledgement of our efforts to draft the Risk of Significant 
Injury methodology to address this need. The methodology is intended to 
enable requirements developers to characterize risks to targets. It has 
been incorporated into the requirements development process of two non-
lethal weapons programs and will be the basis for a human effects 
characterization guidance document currently in development. 

DoD Directive 5000.02, The Defense Acquisition System, requires that 
the acquisition and procurement of DoD weapons and weapons systems 
shall be consistent with all applicable domestic and international law 
including the laws of armed conflict, and that an attorney shall 
conduct a legal review of intended acquisition of weapons systems. 
Moreover, DoD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, 
specifically requires that legal reviews be conducted for non-lethal 
weapons programs. In addition, once a weapons is procured, legal advice 
on the employment of weapons, including non-lethal weapons, is provided 
throughout the training cycle. 

The Department does not believe the methodology should articulate 
thresholds for acceptable risk. This is a matter to be decided by the 
appropriate commander with the advice of a legal advisor. Legal 
advisors are available to commanders at every level. The commander 
making full use of available legal advice is the proper authority for 
determining the acceptable level of risk with respect to lethality and 
potential injury to targeted individuals and bystanders based on the 
circumstances ruling at the time. Additionally, the Department does not 
believe that this methodology should include risks to operators, 
because such risks are addressed by existing acquisition processes. 

Recommendation 7: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Policy) and the Services, to provide clearer weapons 
employment guidance that can be used to modify or augment existing, 
rules of engagement or rules for the use of force for both warfighters 
and domestic responders on how non-lethal weapons should be used under 
certain conditions, and incorporate this guidance into training 
curricula. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Department agrees with the 
necessity of doctrine that more clearly addresses non-lethal weapons 
employment. As GAO acknowledges, we have "begun to incorporate ideas 
about non-lethal capabilities into policy, doctrine. and training." 
However, the Department believes non-lethal weapons employment should 
be integrated into existing policy documents to provide complementary 
guidance. Implementing this recommendation through separate employment 
guidance would not adequately convey the place of non-lethal weapons on 
the use of force continuum, potentially creating confusion for war 
fighters about the role of non-lethal weapons. 

Recommendation 8: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate and the Services to 
finalize and implement a risk assessment methodology for human effects 
testing of non-lethal weapons and develop a timeline to implement the 
methodology. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Department agrees with the need for a 
Department-wide risk assessment methodology for human effects testing 
of non-lethal weapons, and we appreciate the GAO's acknowledgement that 
"testing non-lethal weapons for effects on targets and bystanders is a 
difficult technological undertaking." The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Directorate (JNLWD) has developed a risk assessment framework and 
implemented it across technology development programs within its 
purview. Additionally, the JNLWD has begun development of a human
effects characterization guidance document, which will standardize the 
requirement for such characterizations across the Department. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Capability Gaps Not Being Addressed by Non-Lethal Efforts 
under Development: 

Capability gap: Stop a single large vessel in an open area while 
performing intercept of vessel; 
Priority: 18. 

Capability gap: Stop a single medium vehicle in an open or confined 
area while in pursuit; 
Priority: 22. 

Capability gap: Stop a single large vehicle in an open or confined area 
while in pursuit; 
Priority: 23. 

Capability gap: Deny access to a facility, building or confined area; 
Priority: 24. 

Capability gap: Stop a single fixed-wing aircraft on the ground; 
Priority: 28. 

Capability gap: Deny individuals access into or out of an underwater 
area; 
Priority: 29. 

Capability gap: Disable a single vehicle; 
Priority: 31. 

Capability gap: Divert a single aircraft in the air; 
Priority: 32. 

Capability gap: Suppress a single individual in an underwater area; 
Priority: 34. 

Capability gap: Disable many vessels; 
Priority: 35. 

Capability gap: Disable a single aircraft on the ground; 
Priority: 36. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data and the Joint Capabilities Document 
for Joint Non-Lethal Effects (2008). 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Non-Lethal Programs under Development That Were Evaluated 
by the Investment Decision Support Tool: 

Non-lethal program: Improved Flash/Bang Grenade; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $2.9; 
Score[A]: 77. 

Non-lethal program: Mk 19 Short Range Non-Lethal Munition; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $7.2; 
Score[A]: 72. 

Non-lethal program: Airburst Non-Lethal Munition, Low Velocity; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $14.7; 
Score[A]: 71. 

Non-lethal program: Joint Non-Lethal Warning Munition; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $2.4; 
Score[A]: 71. 

Non-lethal program: Mission Payload Module; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $5.0; 
Score[A]: 70. 

Non-lethal program: Radio Frequency Vehicle Stopper; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $7.1; 
Score[A]: 70. 

Non-lethal program: Vehicle Lightweight Arresting Device Single Net 
Solution/Remote Deployment Device; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $2.0; 
Score[A]: 62. 

Non-lethal program: Optical Warning Distraction and Suppression 
(OWDS)[B]; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $1.4; 
Score[A]: 60. 

Non-lethal program: Mobile Active Denial System (ADS); 
FY 1997-2008 funding: n/a; 
Score[A]: 58. 

Non-lethal program: Boat Trap; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $2.2; 
Score[A]: 52. 

Non-lethal program: XM-104 Hand Grenade; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $0.2; 
Score[A]: n/a[C]. 

Non-lethal program: Improved Acoustic Hailing Device; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $3.2; 
Score[A]: n/a[C]. 

Non-lethal program: 66mm Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System 
Grenades; 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $7.1; 
Score[A]: n/a[C]. 

Non-lethal program: Human Electro Muscular Incapacitation X-26 
(TASER®); 
FY 1997-2008 funding: $2.9; 
Score[A]: n/[AC]. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

[A] The Investment Decision Support Tool scores programs on a scale of 
0 (lowest) to 100 (highest). 

[B] OWDS was canceled in November 2008 because the Integrated Product 
Team decided that the requirement could be met by leveraging the U.S. 
Marine Corps' Ocular Interruption and U.S. Navy's Unambiguous Warning 
Device programs. OI has a schedule to reach a Milestone B decision in 
2009 . 

[C] Investment Decision Support Tool scores were not available for four 
of the programs because those programs had no funding requested in the 
latest Program Objectives Memorandum. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Davi M. D'Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Joseph Kirschbaum, Assistant 
Director; Sandra Burrell; Scott Clayton; Grace A. Coleman; James 
Driggins; David F. Keefer; Gregory Marchand; Sally Newman; Rae Ann 
Sapp; Rebecca Shea; and Jena Whitley made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Department of Defense, Force Application Functional Concept, March 
5, 2004. 

[2] Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM 211-02), 
Mission Needs Statement for Family of Non-lethal Capabilities (December 
2002). 

[3] DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (July. 9, 1996, 
certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003). 

[4] Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 219 (2006). 

[5] The directorate has also invested money in several classified 
programs. 

[6] Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-99, Concept for Non-
Lethal Capabilities in Army Operations, June 22, 2005, and Marine Corps 
Doctrine Publication 1-0, Marine Corps Operations, September 27, 2001. 

[7] DOD defines military operations other than war as operations that 
encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military 
operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to 
complement any combination of the other instruments of national power 
and occur before, during, and after war. Joint Publication 3-06, 
Doctrine for Urban Operations (Sept. 16, 2002). 

[8] Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Urban Operations, Sept. 16, 
2002. 

[9] Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil 
Support (Washington, D.C.: June 2005). 

[10] Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report p. 23 
(Feb. 6, 2006). 

[11] Quadrennial Defense Review Report p. 35 (Feb. 6, 2006). 

[12] DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, (July 9, 
1996, certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003). 

[13] GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and 
Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] 
(Washington, D.C. August 2001). 

[14] DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (July 9, 1996, 
certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003). 

[15] For example, see Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban 
Operations (Sept. 16, 2002); Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Defense, 
(July 12, 2007); and Joint Publication 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, 
Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Aug. 15, 
2001). 

[16] The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations, a three-
star general, represents the Commandant in this role. Among other 
tasks, he chairs the semiannual meetings of the general/flag officer 
level integrated product team. 

[17] The Quadrennial Defense Review is a major DOD review done every 4 
years that is designed to provide a comprehensive examination of the 
national defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, 
infrastructure, and budget plans. 

[18] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01G, Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (Mar. 1, 2009). This 
version of the instruction superseded CJCSI 3170.01F, which was current 
during the conduct of our audit. 

[19] Department of Defense, DOD Directive 5000.01, The Defense 
Acquisition System (May 12, 2003, certified current as of Nov. 20, 
2007), and DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008). 

[20] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 6a. 

[21] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 5c(6)(d). 

[22] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 7a. 

[23] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 7b. 

[24] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 8b. 

[25] DODI 5000.02, encl. 2 at para. 8c(1)(b). 

[26] The Defense Acquisition University Press, Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide, 5th ed. at 23-4 (January 2005). This Guide is a 
technical management educational guide, intended for use at Defense 
Acquisition University courses and secondarily as a desk reference for 
program and project management personnel. 

[27] DODI 5000.02, encl. 6, para 1a. 

[28] One general definition of "commercial item" is any item, other 
than real property, that is customarily used for non-governmental 
purposes and that has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the 
general public. 

[29] Defense Acquisition University Test and Evaluation Management 
Guide at 23-4. 

[30] United States Marine Corps, Joint Capabilities Document for Joint 
Non-Lethal Effects (version 1.0, January 2008). 

[31] Non-lethal counter-personnel tasks require incapacitating and 
reversible effects against individuals that will not result in 
permanent injury. Non-lethal counter-materiel tasks require 
incapacitating and reversible effects against materiel (e.g., vehicles, 
vessels, aircraft, buildings, etc.) that do not result in gross 
physical destruction and must remain non-lethal to personnel with 
respect to reversibility. 

[32] Commandant of the Marine Corps, Joint Concept for Non-Lethal 
Weapons (January 1998) and Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Memorandum (JROCM) 211-02, Mission Needs Statement for a Family of Non- 
Lethal Capabilities (Dec. 10, 2002). 

[33] We use the term completion of the development process to refer to 
an effort that has successfully satisfied acquisition Milestone C and 
entered production. 

[34] A fifth program--the running gear entanglement system--was also 
fielded, but to the U.S. Coast Guard, which is part of the Department 
of Homeland Security. 

[35] The Marine Corps also conducted its own analysis of missions whose 
accomplishment could require non-lethal capabilities, and found 
numerous full or partial gaps in capabilities and associated tasks. 

[36] Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4105.1B, Independent Logistics 
Assessment and Certification Requirements (Dec. 18, 2008). 

[37] The directorate has also sponsored some short-term concept 
studies. 

[38] A TASER® is a handheld, battery-operated device that fires two 
barbed projectiles into a subject. The darts are discharged to a range 
of up to 35 feet and remain connected to the handheld device via small- 
gauge insulated wires. Electrical pulses are sent through the wires to 
the subject. TASER® systems have two reported effects: (1) causing pain 
or the sensation of shock through effects on the sensory nervous 
systems, and (2) involuntary muscle contraction through effects on 
muscle nerves. Both effects are instantaneous, and persist only as long 
as pulses are sent to the subject. 

[39] The Mobility Denial System was terminated after milestone B. 

[40] GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control Management and 
Evaluation Tool, [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-01-1008G] 
(Washington, D.C. August 2001). 

[41] DOD Directive 5134.01, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), (Dec. 9, 2005, incorporating 
Change 1, Apr. 1, 2008) and DOD Directive 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, 
(Sept. 3, 2002, certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003). 

[42] DOD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation Appropriations, vol. 2B, ch. 5 (July 
2008). 

[43] The ADS advanced concept technology demonstration lasted from 2002 
through 2007 and cost $35.5 million; Active Denial Technology efforts 
were also funded for $19.7 million from 1997-2001. The Air Force has 
also conducted directed energy research before 1997. 

[44] DOD Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons (July 9, 1996, 
certified current as of Nov. 21, 2003). 

[45] These overlap in some respects with doctrine for military 
operations other than war or in urban terrain. 

[46] MTTP for the Tactical Employment of Non Lethal Weapons, 2003, and 
Army FM 3-22.40/MCWP 3-15.8/NTTP 3-07.2/AFTTP(I) 3-2.45, NLW Multi- 
Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment 
of Non-lethal Weapons (Oct. 24, 2007). 

[47] Joint Publication 3-06, Doctrine for Joint Urban Operations (Sept. 
16, 2002). 

[48] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5120.02A, Joint 
Doctrine Development System, at A-3 (Mar. 31, 2007). 

[49] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide 3501, The Joint 
Training System: A Primer for Senior Leaders, at 3-4 (July 31, 2008) 

[50] U.S. Northern Command CONPLAN 2501-05, Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities, at ann. C, app. 24 (Apr. 11, 2006). 

[51] In 1998 the JNLWD contracted The Pennsylvania State University to 
convene the Human Effects Advisory Panel, a group of scientists to 
provide assessments for NLW. 

[52] Before any weapon may be used, DOD must certify that it has 
undergone and satisfactorily completed legal, treaty, and policy 
reviews. 

[53] Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 219(e). 

[54] CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules 
for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, encl. A (June 13, 2005, current 
as of June 18, 2008). 

[55] CJCSI 3121.01B encl. L, para. 5.b.(1). 

[56] CJCSI 3121.01B encl. L, para. 5.c. 

[57] DODD 3000.3, para. 4.5. 

[58] Defense Science Board, Final Report of the Defense Science Board 
on Directed Energy Weapon Systems and Technology Applications, at 38- 
39, (December 2007). 

[59] For example, see DOD Directive 3216.02, Protection of Human 
Subjects and Adherence to Ethical Standards in DOD Supported Research 
(Mar. 25, 2002, certified current as of Apr. 24, 2007), and Secretary 
of the Navy Instruction 3900.39D, Human Research Protection Program 
(Nov. 6, 2006). 

[60] DOD Directive 3216.02 at 2. 

[61] The Human Effects Advisory Panel consisted of a group of 
scientists convened by Pennsylvania State University on behalf of JNLWD 
to provide an assessment of NLW. 

[62] Currently, lasers are held to a higher standard than other NLW 
because all lasers, even those that are urgently fielded, must undergo 
human effects testing by the Human Effects Center of Excellence prior 
to fielding. In addition, DOD policy requires that the heads of the DOD 
Components that own and operate lasers shall establish a service- 
specific laser safety review process. 

[63] The Human Effects Review Board is composed of service medical 
representatives and was established to review human effects research 
for NLW programs. 

[64] The Defense Acquisition University Press, Test and Evaluation 
Management Guide, 5th ed. At 23-4 (Jan. 2005). 

[65] Defense Acquisition University, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, at 
para. 9.3.1 [hyperlink, https://akss.dau.mil/dag/], last accessed Mar. 
3, 2009. The Guidebook is maintained by the university as an online 
reference to acquisition policy and discretionary best practices. 

[66] Department of Defense, Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, 
6th ed. (August 2006). 

[67] This is a purely hypothetical example to illustrate how a risk 
assessment methodology can inform the decision process for whether to 
accept a specific risk level and does not reflect existing human 
effects technical research or policy. 

[68] Department of Defense, Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, 
6th ed. (August 2006). 

[End of section] 

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