Addressing Significant Vulnerabilities in the Department of State's Passport Issuance Process

GAO-09-583R April 13, 2009
Full Report (PDF, 9 pages)   Accessible Text   Recommendations (HTML)

Summary

A genuine U.S. passport is a vital document, permitting its owner to travel freely into and out of the United States, prove U.S. citizenship, obtain further identification documents, and set up bank accounts, among other things. Since May 2005, we have issued several reports identifying significant fraud vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process. This report (1) describes our recent work on passport fraud and (2) summarizes actions the Department of State (State) has indicated it is taking to address the fraud vulnerabilities we identified.

In 2005, we reported that using the stolen identities and documentation of U.S. citizens is the primary tactic of those fraudulently applying for U.S. passports, and that passport fraud is often linked to other crimes. Our report mentioned a number of ways in which a person might fraudulently obtain a U.S. passport, including using an assumed identity that is supported by genuine but fraudulently obtained identification documents; submitting false claims of lost, stolen, or mutilated passports; using counterfeit citizenship documents; and using the identity of a deceased person. We also reported weaknesses in State's information sharing with other federal agencies. A little over 2 years later, in July 2007, we recommended that State take additional actions to address weaknesses in the oversight of passport acceptance facilities (e.g., USPS locations). While we reported State had taken actions to address some weaknesses we had previously identified in the acceptance agent program, such as the need for improved training of acceptance agents, we found that many of the previously identified problems in the oversight of the acceptance facilities persisted. Specifically, State lacked a formal oversight program for its acceptance facilities to ensure effective controls are established and monitored regularly, a lack that State officials believed contributed to problems with applications received through acceptance agents. In March 2009, we reported that our undercover tests confirmed the continued existence of significant fraud vulnerabilities in the passport issuance process. Our undercover investigator was easily able to obtain four genuine U.S. passports using counterfeit or fraudulently obtained documents. State officials agreed that our investigation exposed a major vulnerability in the department's passport issuance process and acknowledged that they have issued other fraudulently obtained passports in the past. In order to improve State's current passport fraud detection capabilities, officials said that State would need greater cooperation from other agencies at both the federal and state levels, and the ability to access other agencies' records in real time. State continues to struggle with reducing fraud risks at both the application point and the adjudication point. With respect to acceptance, State officials told us that they are in the process of improving oversight of passport acceptance facilities as we recommended in our July 2007 report. Although State has proposed reasonable oversight measures for passport acceptance facilities in response to our July 2007 recommendations, it is too early to determine whether these measures will be effective.



Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director:
Team:
Phone:
Jess T. Ford
Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade
(202) 512-4268


Recommendations for Executive Action


Recommendation: The Secretary of State should improve the training and resources available to passport acceptance facility employees for detecting passport fraud, especially related to detecting counterfeit documents.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should, for applications containing an SSN, establish a process whereby passport specialists are not able to issue a passport prior to receiving and reviewing the results of SSN and Death Master File checks, except under specific or extenuating circumstances and after supervisory review.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should explore commercial options for performing real-time checks of the validity of SSNs and other information included in applications.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should conduct "red team" (covert) tests similar to our own and use the results of these tests to improve the performance of passport acceptance agents and passport specialists.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: The Secretary of State should work with state-level officials to develop a strategy to gain access to the necessary state databases and incorporate reviews of these data into the adjudication process.

Agency Affected: Department of State

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.


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