Freight Rail Security: Actions Have Been Taken to Enhance Security, but the Federal Strategy Can Be Strengthened and Security Efforts Better Monitored

GAO-09-243 April 21, 2009
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Summary

An attack on the U.S. freight rail system could be catastrophic because rail cars carrying highly toxic materials often traverse densely populated urban areas. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is the federal entity primarily responsible for securing freight rail. GAO was asked to assess the status of efforts to secure this system. This report discusses (1) stakeholder efforts to assess risks to the freight rail system and TSA's development of a risk-based security strategy; (2) actions stakeholders have taken to secure the system since 2001, TSA's efforts to monitor and assess their effectiveness, and any challenges to implementing future actions; and (3) the extent to which stakeholders have coordinated efforts. GAO reviewed documents, including TSA's freight rail strategic plan; conducted site visits to seven U.S. cities with significant rail operations involving hazardous materials; and interviewed federal and industry officials.

Federal and industry stakeholders have completed a range of actions to assess risks to freight rail since September 2001, and TSA has developed a security strategy; however, TSA's efforts have primarily focused on one threat, and its strategy does not fully address federal guidance or key characteristics of a successful national strategy. Specifically, TSA's efforts to assess vulnerabilities and potential consequences to freight rail have focused almost exclusively on rail shipments of certain highly toxic materials, in part, because of concerns about their security in transit and limited resources. However, other federal and industry assessments have identified additional potential security threats, including risks to critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. Although many stakeholders agreed with TSA's initial strategy, going forward TSA has agreed that including other identified threats in its freight rail security strategy is important, and reported that it is reconsidering its strategy to incorporate other threats. Additionally, in 2004, GAO reported that successful national strategies should identify performance measures with targets, among other elements. TSA's security strategy could be strengthened by including targets for three of its four performance measures and revising its approach for the other measure to ensure greater consistency in how performance results are quantified. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a range of actions to secure freight rail, many of which have focused on securing certain toxic material rail shipments and have been implemented by industry voluntarily; however, TSA lacks a mechanism to monitor security actions and evaluate their effectiveness, and new requirements could pose challenges for future security efforts. GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for controls to be designed to ensure ongoing monitoring. While the freight rail industry has taken actions to better secure shipments and key infrastructure, TSA has limited ability to assess the impacts of these actions because it lacks a mechanism to systematically track them and evaluate their effectiveness. Having such information could strengthen TSA's efforts to efficiently target its resources to where actions have not been effective. New, mandatory security planning and procedural requirements will also necessitate additional federal and industry efforts and resources, and may pose some implementation challenges for both federal and industry stakeholders. Federal and industry stakeholders have also taken a number of steps to coordinate their freight rail security efforts; however, federal coordination can be enhanced by more fully leveraging the resources of all relevant federal agencies. GAO previously identified a number of leading practices for effective coordination that could help TSA strengthen coordination with federal and private sector stakeholders.



Recommendations

Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change from "In process" to "Open," "Closed - implemented," or "Closed - not implemented" based on our follow up work.

Director:
Team:
Phone:
Cathleen A. Berrick
Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice
(202) 512-3404


Recommendations for Executive Action


Recommendation: To ensure that the federal strategy to secure the freight rail system is comprehensive and considers a wider range of risk information, DHS's Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration should develop a plan for addressing identified security threats to freight rail other than Toxic Inhalation (TIH), such as destruction of or sabotage to freight rail bridges and tunnels and cyberattacks to the rail system, and incorporate this information and other related strategic updates into TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex. As part of this effort, further evaluate methods for estimating the likelihood of various threats occurring and ensure that this information is also considered when developing future risk assessments and strategic updates.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To better ensure that relevant federal and industry partners effectively leverage their resources to achieve the strategic vision of TSA's Freight Rail Modal Annex, DHS's Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration should ensure that future updates to TSA's annex more comprehensively address factors contained in Executive Order 13416 and identified key characteristics of a successful national strategy, including (1) describing the methodology used to develop the strategy and which organizations and entities contributed to its development; (2) more clearly defining federal and industry roles and responsibilities; (3) ensuring that performance measures have defined targets and are linked to fulfilling goals and objectives; (4) more systematically addressing specific milestones for completing activities and measuring progress toward meeting identified goals; (5) more thoroughly identifying the resources and investments required to implement the strategy, including priorities for allocating future grants; and (6) more comprehensively identifying linkages with other developed strategies, such as those that guide DHS IP, whose responsibilities overlap with TSA for protecting freight rail critical infrastructure.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that TSA is consistently and accurately measuring agency and industry performance in reducing the risk associated with TIH rail shipments in major cities, DHS's Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration should take steps to revise the baseline year associated with its TIH risk reduction performance measure to enable the agency to more accurately report results for this measure.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To ensure that TSA is able to more effectively assess the progress being made in securing freight rail, DHS's Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration should balance future activities against the various security risks to freight rail, and use its and industry's resources in the most cost-effective manner, take steps to more fully track and assess the implementation and effectiveness of security actions being taken to secure freight rail.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.

Recommendation: To better ensure that federal agencies are coordinating as effectively as possible, work with federal partners, such as Department of Homeland Security Office of Infrastructure Protection (DHS IP) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), DHS's Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration should ensure that all relevant assessments and information are shared and TSA and FRA field inspector resources are fully leveraged.

Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration

Status: In process

Comments: When we confirm what actions the agency has taken in response to this recommendation, we will provide updated information.


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