



The Future of Jemaah Islamiyah & the Radical Islamist Challenge in Southeast Asia

Dr. Zachary Abuza

Bali, 12 October 2002



JW Marriott, 5 August 2003



Australian Embassy 9 September 2004



Resiliency: 300+ Arrests



Colonels



Dr. Azahari



Dulmatin



Zulkifli Marzuki



Noordin
Mhmd Mop
Top




Zulkarnaen



Abdulrahman Ayob



Organizational Dynamics



Timetable

- Hambali has revealed that there was a debate within the organization whether to continue the pace of attacks or lie low and rebuild in the wake of the post-Bali arrests.
- The PUPJI outlines a 30 year time-frame for jihad, which it describes in the phraseology of guerilla war:
 - “View, analyze and explore all aspects of life in the enemy’s body and in the environment”;
 - “View carefully and honestly all our potential strengths and effective powers we possess”;
 - “Determine points of target at the enemy and the environment to be handled in relation with our goals.”

Abdullah Azzam: Organization Based on the Life of the Prophet




Natural Timetable

- Press reports cited intelligence officials as saying there is a second cell of suicide bombers poised to attack again.
- It took 9 months to plan and execute the Bali attack; 10 months to execute the bombing of the Marriott and 12 months to launch this attack.
- Although press reports suggested that JI was about to unleash a wave of attacks in Jakarta last December, they did not materialize.



Charismatic Leadership

- Noordin Muhammad Top and Zulkarnaen are charismatic individuals, both credited with recruiting groups of *shaheeds* - suicide bombers; something that just did not seem possible in Southeast Asia a few years ago.
- Interrogations in Malaysia revealed that Hambali had recruited some six individuals for martyrdom missions.
- Zulkarnaen established a suicide cell of the JI, known as the Laskar Khos, which had approximately 15 members.



Ability to Learn

- The *General Manual for Operations*, a section of the PUPJI, details the four-stages of operations:
 - 1) Planning
 - 2) Execution
 - 3) Reporting
 - 4) Evaluation
- Emphasis is placed on education, meticulous planning, and learning from past acts (including mistakes). But do they actually learn?

Composition of Bombs



Recruitment

- Though estimates on the size of JI vary from around 500 to several thousand, it is not a large organization.
- By their very definition, terrorist organizations are elite, not mass based. For their survival, they have to be highly selective of who they take into their ranks.
- Four factors play the greatest role in recruitment into JI: kinship, mosque, *madrassa* and friendship.

Al Ghuraba

- Established in 1999, by Hambali, for the purpose of developing young JI members to become trained operatives and future leaders
- Led first by Abdul Rahim, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's son, and later by Hambali's brother, Rusman Gunawan, who also handled some finances for his brother.
- Of the 19 members, six were Indonesian, thirteen were Malaysian, though two resided in Singapore.
- Thirteen of the 19 have family ties to JI or the MILF.
- Six of the Malaysians are graduates of JI's Luqmanul Hakiem school.
- Only a few received combat training at LET or Al Qaeda camps. One said "al Ghuraba was formed purely for religious study and discussion." Another said senior Jemaah Islamiyah members 'saw the urgency of regeneration in the movement' and sent their sons and their students to Pakistan to study to become *ulamas*."

Mindanao & the MILF Link

- Tawfiq Riefqi, Rohmat Zulkifli & Mustaqim
- Camps are still in existence, though smaller. 1-2 dozen people at a time.
- 3 Classes already “Graduated.”
- Undetectable or at least plausible deniability.
- Debates within the MILF over ties to JI
- But now a card to play at the peace talks.

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.




Balik Terrorism

- 2/27/04 Superferry
194 killed
- 12/04 Bombing
- 10/04-1/05 Three
aborted bombings
- 2/14/05 triple
bombings
- C4 in Aglipay Street





All Channel Network



Sectarian/Lateral Violence



- The first half of 2004 saw a brief but alarming up-tick in communal violence in Maluku and Sulawesi; attempt to spoil Malino Accords (2002)
- ASG has called for a jihad against Christians (ASG targeting 1991-1995 was exclusively sectarian).
- MILF never really engaged in sectarian bloodletting, but some are frustrated and more predisposed.
- Zulkifli and JI members calling for it.
- Specter of broader sectarian violence in Thailand: Targeting of Monks

Factionalism?



Neo-Darul Islam



International Jihadists

Laskar Mujihideen




Pertubuhan al Ehasan

Laskar Jundullah



Funding through Kompak & Al Haramain



Jihad

Training/
Indoctrination




Propaganda/Fundraising




MILF
Weaponry



Monthly Attacks by Type (Jan 04 - Feb 05)



Monthly Deaths by Type of Attack (Jan 04-Feb 05)



Pre Tak Bai

January-October 2004

- 24 Bombings (1 double, 1 triple)
- 7 Attempted bombings
- 5 Killed & 72 wounded
- 9 Bombings had no victim



Post Tak Bai

25 October - 22 March

- 48 Bombings (4 double, 1 triple)
- 12 Attempted
- 31 Killed, 318 wounded
- 9 Bombings had no victim



Out of the Woodwork: Jihadis in Aceh

- Mujihideen Council of Indonesia (MMI)
- Abu Jinril & the Laskar Mujihidin
- Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)
- Medical Emergency Relief Charity (MERC)



PKS

- 1-8% of DPR seats between 1999-2004.
- 650% increase in share of popular vote.
- Downplayed Islam/Sharia, focused on governance and corruption.
- Sights set on 2014 election.


QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
are needed to see this picture.

PAS

- In 1999, PAS and the opposition had to win 65 seats to deny the National Front a two-thirds majority. Though they failed to do so, the BN lost 18 seats, dropping to an uncomfortable 76 percent of Parliament.
- The majority of those lost seats were in the Malay heartland of the northeast.
- In the 1999 election, over half of Malay voters in peninsular Malaysia sided with the opposition.
- Previously UMNO accounted for 70-80 percent of that constituency. Thus UMNO has to rely on their Indian and Chinese coalition partners even more, further alienating their core Muslim constituency and fodder for PAS's propaganda.
- PAS controlled 2 of the 13 federal governments.
- At the national level, PAS controlled 14 percent (27 of 193) of parliamentary seats.

2004 Polls

- In the 2004 elections, the first under Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, PAS experienced a serious setback: losing control of Terengganu.
- Arguably this was because of gerrymandering and electoral irregularities.
- Yet, PAS took some comfort from the fact that their share of the absolute vote increased over the 1999 poll.
- PAS appears to have held onto the electorate that defected to them in 1999.



X= Propensity for Violence

Y= Islamist Goals

Saiful Mujani

- Conducted with the help of the Muhammadiyah, the October 2004 poll found an alarming upsurge in support for Islamic terrorists.
- 16 percent of the respondents agreed with the bombers, while 25 percent refused to disagree with their means and ends.
- “There is a significant number of Indonesians, at least half, [who] do not have a negative reaction to that and they agree with silence at least, or protect this kind of activity. Of the 40 percent of respondents who had heard of Jemaah Islamiyah, one third explicitly supported them.”

Zachary Abuza

zabuza@usip.org

abuza@msn.com

202-429-3861 (w)


617-669-5798 (c)



Militant Islam in Southeast Asia

CRUCIBLE OF
TERROR

ZACHARY ABUZA



www.rienner.com

303-444-6684