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That statement, petitioners urge, is incorrect.  We agree with petitioners to this limited extent: settlement is relevant to a class certification. The Third Circuit's opinion bears modification in that respect. But,  JN as we earlier observed, see supra, at 14, the Court of Appeals in fact did not ignore the settlement; instead, that court homed in on settlement terms in explaining why it found the absentees' interests inadequately represented. See 83 F. 3d, at 630!631. The Third Circuit's close inspection of the settlement in that regard was altogether proper.  Confronted with a request for settlementonly class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(b)(3)(D), for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other specifications of the rule"those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions" demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the"   settlement context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings as they  J` unfold. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c), (d).o` uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < Portions of the opinion dissenting in part appear to assume that  uB settlement counts only one way"in favor of certification. See post,  uB6 at 1!2, 13. But see post, at 7. To the extent that is the dissent's meaning, we disagree. Settlement, though a relevant factor, does not inevitably signal that class action certification should be granted more readily than it would be were the case to be litigated. For reasons the Third Circuit aired, see 83 F.3d 610, 626!635 (1996), proposed settlement classes sometimes warrant more, not less caution on the question of certification.  And, of overriding importance, courts must be mindful that the rule as now composed sets the requirements they are bound to enforce. Federal Rules take effect after an extensive deliberative process involving many reviewers: a Rules Advisory Committee, public commenters, the Judicial Conference, this Court, the Congress. See 28 U.S.C. 2073, 2074. The text of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered, a process properly tuned to the instruction that rules of procedure shall not abridge ... any substantive right. 2072(b).  Rule 23(e), on settlement of class actions, reads in its entirety: A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. This prescription was designed to function as an additional requirement, not a superseding direction, for the class action to which Rule 23(e) refers is one qualified for certification under Rule 23(a)  J and (b). Cf. Eisen, 417 U.S., at 176!177 (adequate representation does not eliminate additional requirement"   to provide notice). Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than trial, is proposed.  The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) classqualifying criteria, we emphasize, are not impractical impediments"checks shorn of utility"in the settlement class context. First, the standards set for the protection of absent class members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor's foot kind"class certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or overarching impression of the settlement's fairness.  Second, if a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule 23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed. Class counsel confined to settlement negotiations could not use the threat of litigation to press for a better offer, see Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1343, 1379!1380 (1995), and the court would face a bargain proffered for its approval without benefit of adversarial  J@ investigation, see, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston  J Corp., 100 F. 3d 1348, 1352 (CA7 1996) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (parties may even put one over on the court, in a staged performance), cert. denied, 520 U. S. ___ (1997).  Federal courts, in any case, lack authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria a standard never adopted"that if a settlement is fair, then certification is proper. Applying to this case criteria the rulemakers set, we conclude that the Third Circuit's appraisal is essentially correct. Although that court should have acknowledged that settlement is a factor in the calculus, a remand is not warranted on that account. The Court`"   of Appeals' opinion amply demonstrates why"with or without a settlement on the table"the sprawling class the District Court certified does not satisfy Rule 23's  J requirements.| uB ԍWe do not inspect and set aside for insufficient evidence district court  uB findings of fact. Cf. post, at 5, 9!10. Rather, we focus on the requirements of Rule 23, and endeavor to explain why those requirements cannot be met for a class so enormously diverse and problematic as the one the District Court certified.|  ;H2 d d-A؃  2  We address first the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) that [common] questions of law or fact ... predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. The District Court concluded that predominance was satisfied based on two factors: class members' shared experience of asbestos exposure and their common interest in receiving prompt and fair compensation for their claims, while minimizing the risks and transaction costs inherent in the asbestos litigation process as it occurs presently in the tort system. 157 F.R.D., at 316. The settling parties also contend that the settlement's fairness is a common question, predominating over disparate legal issues that might be pivotal in litigation but become irrelevant under the settlement.  The predominance requirement stated in Rule 23(b)(3), we hold, is not met by the factors on which the District Court relied. The benefits asbestosexposed persons might gain from the establishment of a grandscale compensation scheme is a matter fit for legislative  J consideration, see supra, at 2!3, but it is not pertinent to the predominance inquiry. That inquiry trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine controversy, questions that  J6 preexist any settlement.n6# uB1 ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < In this respect, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is similar to the requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that claims or de"##Ԯfenses of the named representatives must be typical of the claims or defenses of the class. The words claims or defenses in this context"just as in the context of Rule 24(b)(2) governing permissive intervention" manifestly refer to the kinds of claims or defenses that can be raised in courts of law as part of an actual or impend uB# ing law suit. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76!77 (1986)  uB (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).6"  Ԍ The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation. See 7A Wright, Miller,  J & Kane 518!519.J uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < This case, we note, involves no limited fund capable of supporting class treatment under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), which does not have a  uB_ predominance requirement. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc.,  uB 157 F.R.D. 246, 318 (ED Pa. 1994); see also id., at 291, and n.40. The settling parties sought to proceed exclusively under Rule 23(b)(3). The inquiry appropriate under Rule 23(e), on the other hand, protects unnamed class members from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compromise. See 7B Wright, Miller, & Kane 1797, at 340!341. But it is not the mission of Rule 23(e) to assure the class cohesion that legitimizes representative action in the first place. If a common interest in a fair compromise could satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), that vital prescription would be stripped of any meaning in the settlement context.  The District Court also relied upon this commonality: The members of the class have all been exposed to asbestos products supplied by the defendants .... 157 F. R. D., at 316. Even if Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement may be satisfied by that shared experience, the predominance criterion is far more demanding. See 83 F.3d, at 626!627. Given the greater number of questions peculiar to the several categories of classh "   members, and to individuals within each category, and the significance of those uncommon questions, any overarching dispute about the health consequences of asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard.  The Third Circuit highlighted the disparate questions undermining class cohesion in this case: BQ C  , , (  Class members were exposed to different asbestos- containing products, for different amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods. Some class members suffer no physical injury or have only asymptomatic pleural changes, while others suffer from lung cancer, disabling asbestosis, or from mesothelioma .... Each has a different history of cigarette smoking, a factor that complicates the causation inquiry. N N  The [exposureonly] plaintiffs especially share little in common, either with each other or with the presently injured class members. It is unclear whether they will contract asbestos-related disease and, if so, what disease each will suffer. They will also incur different medical expenses because their monitoring and treatment will depend on singular  J circumstances and individual medical histories. Id., at 626.BQ d   ( , ,  Differences in state law, the Court of Appeals observed,  Jo compound these disparities. See id., at 627 (citing  JG Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823 (1985)).  No settlement class called to our attention is as  J sprawling as this one. Cf. In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F. 3d, at 976, n.8 ( We would likely agree with the Third Circuit that a class action requesting individual damages for members of a global class of asbestos claimants would not satisfy [Rule 23] requirements due/"   to the huge number of individuals and their varying medical expenses, smoking histories, and family situations.). Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws. See Adv. Comm. Notes, 28  J8 U.S.C. App., p.697; see also supra, at 21!22. Even mass tort cases arising from a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the circumstances, satisfy the  J predominance requirement. The Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 23, it is true, noted that mass accident cases are likely to present significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, ... affecting the individuals in different  J ways. Ibid. And the Committee advised that such cases are ordinarily not appropriate for class treat J ment. Ibid. But the text of the rule does not categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification, and district courts, since the late 1970s, have been certifying such cases in increasing number. See Resnik, From Cases to Litigation, 54 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5, 17!19 (Summer 1991) (describing trend). The Committee's warning, however, continues to call for  J caution when individual stakes are high and disparities among class members great. As the Third Circuit's opinion makes plain, the certification in this case does not follow the counsel of caution. That certification cannot be upheld, for it rests on a conception of Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement irreconcilable with the rule's design.  ;H2 d d-B؃  2  Nor can the class approved by the District Court satisfy Rule 23(a)(4)'s requirement that the named parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent. See"    J General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157!158, n.13 (1982). [A] class representative must be part of the class and `possess the same interest  J and suffer the same injury' as the class members. East  J` Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S.  J8 395, 403 (1977) (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.  J to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)).K  uBx ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The adequacyofrepresentation requirement tend[s] to merge with the commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a), which serve as guideposts for determining whether ... maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff's claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their  uB absence. General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S.  uBy 147, 157, n.13 (1982).  The adequacy heading also factors in compe uB0 tency and conflicts of class counsel. See id., at 157!158, n.13. Like the Third Circuit, we decline to address adequacyofcounsel issues discretely in light of our conclusions that common questions of law or fact do not predominate and that the named plaintiffs cannot adequately represent the interests of this enormous class.  As the Third Circuit pointed out, named parties with diverse medical conditions sought to act on behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects, the interests of those within the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the critical goal is generous immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposureonly plaintiffs in ensuring an ample,  J inflationprotected fund for the future. Cf. General  J Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980) ( In employment discrimination litigation, conflicts might arise, for example, between employees and applicants who were denied employment and who will, if granted relief, compete with employees for fringe benefits or seniority. Under Rule 23, the same plaintiff could not represent these classes.).  The disparity between the currently injured and expoh "  Ԯsureonly categories of plaintiffs, and the diversity within each category are not made insignificant by the District Court's finding that petitioners' assets suffice to pay claims under the settlement. See 157 F.R.D., at 291. Although this is not a limited fund case certified under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the terms of the settlement reflect essential allocation decisions designed to confine compensation and to limit defendants' liability. For  J example, as earlier described, see supra, at 8!9, the settlement includes no adjustment for inflation; only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and lossofconsortium claims are extinguished with no compensation.  The settling parties, in sum, achieved a global compromise with no structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and individuals affected. Although the named parties alleged a range of complaints, each served generally as representative for the whole, not for a separate constituency. In another asbestos class action, the Second Circuit spoke precisely to this point: BQ C  , , (  [W]here differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses on the basis of consents by members of a unitary class, some of whom happen to be members of the distinct subgroups. The class representatives may well have thought that the Settlement serves the aggregate interests of the entire class. But the adversity among subgroups requires that the members of each subgroup cannot be bound to a settlement except by consents given by those who understand that their role is to represent solely the members of their  J respective subgroups. In re Joint Eastern and  J Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 982 F.2d 721,  J 742!743 (CA2 1992), modified on reh'g sub nom. In!"    J re Findley, 993 F.2d 7 (CA2 1993).9BQ d   ( , , The Third Circuit found no assurance here"either in the terms of the settlement or in the structure of the negotiations"that the named plaintiffs operated under a proper understanding of their representational responsibilities. See 83 F.3d, at 630!631. That assessment, we conclude, is on the mark.  ;H2 d d-C؃  2  Impediments to the provision of adequate notice, the Third Circuit emphasized, rendered highly problematic any endeavor to tie to a settlement class persons with no perceptible asbestosrelated disease at the time of the  J settlement. Id., at 633; cf. In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d, at 999!1000 (Smith, J., dissenting). Many persons in the exposureonly category, the Court of Appeals stressed, may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of the harm they may incur. Even if they fully appreciate the significance of class notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out.  Family members of asbestosexposed individuals may themselves fall prey to disease or may ultimately have ripe claims for loss of consortium. Yet large numbers of people in this category"future spouses and children of asbestos victims"could not be alerted to their class membership. And current spouses and children of the occupationally exposed may know nothing of that exposure.  Because we have concluded that the class in this case cannot satisfy the requirements of common issue predominance and adequacy of representation, we need not rule, definitively, on the notice given here. In accord with the Third Circuit, however, see 83 F.3d, at 633!634, we recognize the gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitu""  Ԯtion and Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.  9H1 d d-V؃  2  The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensat J ing victims of asbestos exposure.n uB ԍ FTN  &  XgEpXFr  ddf < The opinion dissenting in part is a forceful statement of that argument. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution. And Rule 23, which must be interpreted with fidelity to the Rules Enabling Act and applied with the interests of absent class members in close view, cannot carry the large load CCR, class counsel, and the District Court heaped upon it. As this case exemplifies, the rulemakers' prescriptions for class actions may be endangered by those who embrace [Rule 23] too enthusiastically just as [they are by] those who approach [the rule] with distaste. C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 508 (5th ed. 1994); cf. 83 F.3d, at 634 (suggesting resort to less bold aggregation techniques, including more narrowly defined class certifications).  3 Stars (*** K 3 Stars For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is  J `z:Affirmed.  J  Justice O'Connor took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.