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P['CP&[G' ԦGG P['C^P͔&;s12&&)&;єt)єє&+;ߔvݔ)є>ՔZYXá͔&+t&͔vՔáєH;͔t ͔]ՔQ&&*2IrYQ&&*2rOpin InitInitial Opinion codesdpЊ #  ( (    П I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) I A 1 a (1)(a) i) a)@@2NEoFHGIBQck QuoteSingle spaced indented quote - Circv C   (  Cd  ( ( ( FTNFormats for each footnote,  X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:BQ d   ( , ,  Respondent contends that he has a significant private interest in the uninterrupted receipt of his paycheck. But while our opinions have recognized the severity of depriving someone of the means of his livelihood, see,  J e.g., Mallen, supra, at 243; Loudermill, 470 U.S., at 543, they have also emphasized that in determining what process is due, account must be taken of the  J4 length and finality of the deprivation. Logan, supra, at 434 (emphasis added). Unlike the employee in  J Loudermill, who faced termination, respondent faced only  J a temporary suspension without pay. So long as the suspended employee receives a sufficiently prompt postsuspension hearing, the lost income is relatively insubstantial (compared with termination), and fringe benefits such as health and life insurance are often not affected  J at all, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 18; Record, Doc. No. 19, p.7.  On the other side of the balance, the State has a significant interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of great public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers. Respondent contends that this interest in maintaining public confidence could  J have been accommodated by suspending him with pay until he had a hearing. We think, however, that the government does not have to give an employee charged with a felony a paid leave at taxpayer expense. If his services to the government are no longer useful once the felony charge has been filed, the Constitution does not require the government to bear the added expense of"   hiring a replacement while still paying him. ESU's interest in preserving public confidence in its police force is at least as significant as the State's interest in preserving the integrity of the sport of horse racing, see  J` Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S., at 64, an interest we  J8  deemed sufficiently important ... to justify a brief period of suspension prior to affording the suspended  J trainer a hearing, Mallen, 486 U.S., at 241.  J  The last factor in the Mathews balancing, and the factor most important to resolution of this case, is the risk of erroneous deprivation and the likely value of any additional procedures. Petitioners argue that any presuspension hearing would have been worthless because pursuant to an Executive Order of the Governor of Pennsylvania a state employee is automatically to be suspended without pay [a]s soon as practicable after [being] formally charged with ... a felony. 4 Pa. Code 7.173 (1997). According to petitioners, supervisors have no discretion under this rule, and the mandatory suspension without pay lasts until the criminal charges are finally resolved. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. If petitioners' interpretation of this order is correct, there is no need for any presuspension process since there would be nothing to consider at the hearing except the independently verifiable fact of whether an employee had indeed  J been formally charged with a felony. See Codd v.  J Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627!628 (1977). Compare  J Loudermill, supra, at 543. Respondent, however, challenges petitioners' reading of the Code, and contends that in any event an order of the Governor of Pennsylvania is a mere directiv[e] which do[es] not confer a legally enforceable right. Brief for Respondent 20. We need not resolve this disputed issue of state law because even assuming the Code is only advisory (or has no application at all), the State had no constitutional obligation to provide respondent with a presuspension  J` hearing. We noted in Loudermill that the purpose of a`"    J pretermination hearing is to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. 470 U.S., at 545!546. By parity of reasoning, the  J` purpose of any presuspension hearing would be to assure that there are reasonable grounds to support the  J suspension without pay. Cf. Mallen, 486 U.S., at 240. But here that has already been assured by the arrest and the filing of charges.  J  In Mallen, we concluded that an ex parte finding of probable cause such as a grand jury indictment provides adequate assurance that the suspension is not  J unjustified. Id., at 240!241. The same is true when an employee is arrested and then formally charged with a felony. First, as with an indictment, the arrest and formal charges imposed upon respondent by an independent body demonstrat[e] that the suspension is not  JX arbitrary. Id., at 244. Second, like an indictment, the imposition of felony charges itself is an objective fact that will in most cases raise serious public concern.  J Id., at 244!245. It is true, as respondent argues, that there is more reason to believe an employee has committed a felony when he is indicted rather than merely arrested and formally charged; but for present purposes arrest and charge give reason enough. They serve to assure that the state employer's decision to suspend the  J employee is not baseless or unwarranted, id., at 240, in that an independent third party has determined that there is probable cause to believe the employee committed a serious crime.  Respondent further contends that since (as we have  J( agreed to assume) Levanowitz had discretion not to suspend despite the arrest and filing of charges, he had to be given an opportunity to persuade Levanowitz of his innocence before the decision was made. We disagree.  J In Mallen, despite the fact that the FDIC had discretion  J` whether to suspend an indicted bank employee, see 64` "    J Stat. 879, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1818(g)(1); Mallen,  J supra, at 234!235, and n.5, we nevertheless did not believe that a presuspension hearing was necessary to protect the private interest. Unlike in the case of a termination, where we have recognized that the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination  J takes effect, Loudermill, supra, at 543, in the case of a suspension there will be ample opportunity to invoke discretion later"and a short delay actually benefits the employee by allowing state officials to obtain more accurate information about the arrest and charges. Respondent has an interest in seeing that a decision concerning his or her continued suspension is not made  J with excessive haste. Mallen, 486 U.S., at 243. If the State is forced to act too quickly, the decision maker may give greater weight to the public interest and leave  JX the suspension in place. Ibid.  ;H2 d d8C؃  l2  Much of respondent's argument is dedicated to the proposition that he had a due process right to a presuspension hearing because the suspension was openended and he theoretically may not have had the opportunity to be heard for weeks, months, or even years after his initial suspension without pay. Brief for Respondent 23. But, as respondent himself asserts in his attempt to downplay the governmental interest, [b]ecause the employee is entitled, in any event, to a prompt postsuspension opportunity to be heard, the period of the suspension should be short and the amount  J of pay during the suspension minimal. Id., at 24!25.  Whether respondent was provided an adequately  J prompt post!suspension hearing in the present case is a separate question. Although the charges against respondent were dropped on September 1 (petitioners apparently learned of this on September 2), he did not "   receive any sort of hearing until September 18. Once the charges were dropped, the risk of erroneous deprivation increased substantially, and, as petitioners conceded at oral argument, there was likely value in holding a  J` prompt hearing, Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. Compare Mallen,  J8 supra, at 243 (holding that 90 days before the agency hears and decides the propriety of a suspension does not exceed the permissible limits where coupled with factors that minimize the risk of an erroneous deprivation). Because neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court addressed whether, under the particular facts of this case, petitioners violated due process by failing to provide a sufficiently prompt postsuspension hearing, we will not consider this issue in the first instance, but remand for consideration by the Court of Appeals.  3 Stars 3*** f 3 Stars The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  J ` BIt is so ordered.ă