Moreover, petitioner argues forcefully that his execution would be especially “cruel.” Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for nearly a generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous appeals on his own part. His three successful appeals account for 18 of the 23 years of delay. A fourth appeal accounts for the remaining 5 years—which appeal, though ultimately unsuccessful, left the Florida Supreme Court divided 4–2. 706 So. 2d 1340 (1997); see Brief in Opposition 12 (conceding that “[a]ll delays were a result of [petitioner’s] ‘successful litigation’ in the appellate courts of Florida and the federal system”).

As Justice Stevens has previously pointed out, executions carried out after delays of this magnitude may prove particularly cruel. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U. S. 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). After such a delay, an execution may well cease to serve the legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a necessary constitutional justification for the death penalty. Ibid. Moreover, British jurists have suggested that the Bill of Rights of 1689, a document relevant to the interpretation of our own Constitution, may forbid, as cruel and unusual, significantly lesser delays. Riley v. Attorney Gen. of Jamaica, [1983] 1 App. Cas. 719, 734–735 (P. C. 1982) (Lord Scarman, joined by Lord Brightman, dissenting). See generally Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 966–967 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (on the relevance of the 1689 Bill of Rights to the interpretation of our own Constitution).