(a) It may be reasonable for a labor organization to establish a
requirement of attendance at a specified number of its regular meetings
during the period immediately preceding an election, in order to insure
that candidates have a demonstrated interest in and familiarity with the
affairs of the organization. In the past, it was ordinarily considered
reasonable to require attendance at no more than 50 percent of the
meetings over a period not exceeding two years. Experience has
demonstrated that it is not feasible to establish arbitrary guidelines
for judging the reasonableness of such a qualification. Its
reasonableness must be gauged in the light of all the circumstances of
the particular case, including not only the frequency of meetings, the
number of meetings which must be attended and the period of time over
which the requirement extends, but also such factors as the nature,
availability and extent of excuse provisions, whether all or most
members have the opportunity to attend meetings, and the impact of the
rule,
i.e., the number or percentage of members who would be rendered
ineligible by its application. \25\
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\25\ If a meeting attendance requirement disqualifies a large
portion of members from candidacy, that large antidemocratic effect
alone may be sufficient to render the requirement unreasonable. In Doyle
v. Brock, 821 F.2d 778 (D.C. Circuit 1987), the court held that the
impact of a meeting attendance requirement which disqualified 97% of the
union's membership from candidacy was by itself sufficient to make the
requirement unreasonable notwithstanding any of the other factors set
forth in 29 CFR 452.38(a).
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(a--1) In Steelworkers, Local 3489 v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 94 LRRM
2203, 79 L.C. para. 11,806 (1977), the Supreme Court found that this
standard for determining validity of meeting attendance qualifications
was the type of flexible result that Congress contemplated when it used
the word ``reasonable.'' The Court concluded that Congress, in
guaranteeing every union member the opportunity to hold office, subject
only to ``reasonable qualifications,'' disabled unions from establishing
eligibility qualifications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the
union political process as the Steelworkers' attendance rule. The rule
required attendance at fifty percent of the meetings for three years
preceding the election unless prevented by union activities or working
hours, with the result that 96.5 percent of the members were ineligible.
(b) Other guidance is furnished by lower court decisions which have
held particular meeting attendance requirements to be unreasonable under
the following circumstances: One meeting during each quarter for the
three years preceding nomination, where the effect was to disqualify 99
percent of the membership (Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union of
Florida, 65 LRRM 2104, 55 L.C. par. 11,857 (M.D. Fla., 1967)); 75
percent of the meetings held over a two-year period, with absence
excused only for work or illness, where over 97 percent of the members
were ineligible (Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 244 F.
Supp. 745 (W.D. Pa., 1965), order vacating decision as moot, 372 F. 2d
86 (C.A. 3 1966), reversed 389 U.S. 463; decision on remand, 405 F.2d
176 (C.A. 3 1968)); Wirtz v. Local 262, Glass bottle Blowers Ass'n., 290
F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal., 1968)); attendance at each of eight meetings in
the two months between nomination and election, where the meetings were
held at widely scattered locations within the State (Hodgson v. Local
Union No. 624 A-B, International Union of Operating Engineers, 80 LRRM
3049, 68 L.C. par. 12,816 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 19, 1972)); attendance at not
less than six regular meetings each year during the twenty-four months
prior to an election which has the effect of requiring attendance for a
period that must begin no later than eighteen months before a biennial
election (Usery v. Local Division 1205, Amalgamated Transit Union, 545
F. 2d 1300 (C.A. 1, 1976)).
[38 FR 18324, July 3, 1973; as amended at 42 FR 39105, Aug. 2, 1977; 42
FR 41280, Aug. 16, 1977; 42 FR 45306, Sept. 9, 1977; 50 FR 31311, Aug.
1, 1985; 60 FR 57178, Nov. 14, 1995]