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142nd Meeting

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR WASTE
5	(ACNW)
6	142nd MEETING
7	+ + + +
8	WEDNESDAY,
9	MAY 28, 2003
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11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
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14	The Advisory Committee met at the Nuclear
15	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North,
16	Room T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 1:00 p.m.,
17	George M. Hornberger, Chairman, presiding.
18	
19	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
20	GEORGE M. HORNBERGER, Chairman
21	B. JOHN GARRICK, Vice Chairman
22	MILTON N. LEVENSON, Member
23	MICHAEL T. RYAN, Member
24	
25	

1	ACNW STAFF PRESENT:
2	JOHN T. LARKINS, Executive Director, ACRS/ACNW
3	SHER BAHADUR, Associate Director, ACRS/ACNW
4	NEIL M. COLEMAN, ACNW Staff
5	TIMOTHY KOBETZ, ACRS Staff
6	HOWARD J. LARSON, Special Assistant, ACRS/ACNW
7	MICHAEL LEE, ACRS Staff
8	RICHARD K. MAJOR, ACNW Staff
9	RICHARD SAVIO, ACRS Staff
10	
11	ALSO PRESENT:
12	FRANK CARDILE
13	CARL FELDMAN
14	ROBERT L. JOHNSON
15	CHRIS McKENNEY
16	ROBERT A. MECK
17	GEORGE POWERS
18	CHERYL TROTTIER
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1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 (1:03 p.m.)The meeting will 3 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: 4 come to order. This is the first day of the 142nd 5 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste. My name is George Hornberger, Chairman of 6 7 The other members of the committee present the ACNW. John Garrick, Vice Chairman; Milton Levenson; 8 and Michael Ryan. 9 10 During today's meeting the committee will: 1) hear presentations and hold discussions with 11 representatives of the NRC staff on a potential 12 regulation control of solid materials 13 on the 14 containing no or very small amounts of radioactivity; 15 and 2) hear presentations and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC staff on its evaluation of 16 17 related making the issues to restricted release/alternate criteria provisions of the LTR more 18 19 available for licensee use; and 3) prepare ACNW 20 reports on recent committee reviews. 21 John Larkins is the designed federal 22 official for today's initial session. 23 meeting is being conducted This 24 accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory

Committee Act. We have received no requests for time

1 to make oral statements from members of the public regarding today's sessions. 2 Should anyone wish to 3 address the committee, please make your wishes known 4 to one of the committee staff. 5 It is requested that the speakers use one of the microphones, identify themselves, and speak 6 7 with sufficient clarity and volume, so that they can 8 be readily heard. Before proceeding, I would like to cover 9 some brief items of interest. 10 Members and staff 11 regret to note that this is the last meeting during 12 which the committee will enjoy the services of Barbara Well, Barbara anyway. Whitaker and Tim Kobetz. 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 No. Oh, rats. That's on the record now, Tim. 16 17 (Laughter.) Barbara reports Monday to her new position 18 19 in Research, while Tim reports to NMSS. Both will be 20 missed, and we wish them well. 21 Gibran Hamdan -- this is an unbelievable 22 Gibran Hamdan, Indiana University note to me. 23 quarterback, and son of Latif Hamdan, NMSS, who was on 24 rotation to the ACNW last year, was picked by the

Washington Redskins on the seventh round.

(Laughter.)

And that's on the record, and I think quarterbacks now are always at least 6'3" and 230. Oh, well, I haven't met Latif's son. He is 6'3" and 230, huh? Okay.

(Laughter.)

Where am I? I better hurry up here.

(Laughter.)

Three, the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors held their annual meeting and awarded Commissioner Dicus their highest award -- the Gerald S. Parker Award, named after one of the founders of CRCPD. Congratulations.

George Dials, former WIPP Manager and President and CEO of LES, the Urenco-led uranium enrichment consortium that hopes to build a plant in Hartfield, Tennessee, resigned May 13th. LES's press release cited Dials' interest in pursuing other business interests and ventures now that the enrichment project was up and running.

Five, DOE's nuclear waste program must receive at least 460 million in fiscal 2004 in order to have a chance of meeting its December 2004 target for submitting a repository license application to NRC, DOE Deputy Program Director John Arthur III said

at the May NWTRB meeting

Six, DOE must be confident the repository project meets nuclear QA before it submits a repository license application to NRC, DOE Waste Program Head Margaret Chu told the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board during this month's meeting.

John Arthur III, Chief Deputy at Yucca Mountain, later told reporters that DOE plans to submit a schedule to NRC in roughly two weeks that outlines the Department's schedule for determining QA compliance. Arthur indicated that the schedule would include a date by which DOE must decide there is full QA compliance in order to be able to meet its December 2004 target of sending a license application to NRC.

Seven, Australia has selected a repository for low-level and short-lived intermediate radioactive waste in the state of South Australia. The selection process concluded May 9th when Federal Science Minister Peter McGauran chose a site 20 kilometers east of Woomera. Reason cited for the selection of the site over two other candidates were that it offered better security, less environmentally sensitive access route, and is more saline.

The site selection process began in 1992

and included both scientific assessments and community
consultations. McGauran said in a statement that he
hopes the repository will open next year. The waste
is now stored at more than 100 temporary sites around
the country.
Okay. And now back to our regularly-
scheduled programming. We have several presentations,
as I mentioned. The first discussion will be on
control of solid materials, and Mike Ryan is going to
chair the meeting for this portion.
MEMBER RYAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
guess our first presentation is Frank Cardile. Where
is Frank? Ah, there he is, hiding behind the pillar.
Do we have copies of your slides?
MR. CARDILE: Yes, I believe so.
MEMBER RYAN: All right. Thank you.
MR. CARDILE: I think we're just going to
go from the handout material rather than going to
overheads.
Okay. Thank you. I guess I'm going to
MEMBER RYAN: Please proceed.
MR. CARDILE: walk through the overhead
material or the handout material, rather than go with
slides.
Thank you We're here to discuss our

rulemaking effort on controlling the disposition of solid materials -- basically, jumping over to page 2. The task lead for this rulemaking effort rests in NMSS, specifically IMNS. We are supported by NMSS's Division of Waste Management in preparation of a Generic Environmental Impact Statement, and by the Office of Research in the preparation of technical information in a number of areas.

What we'd like to do today is give you a status of our rulemaking effort and also, as I've noted, how the technical information support is being developed. You'll see as I go through my remarks some of the questions that have come up in our rulemaking effort, and, therefore, then how some of the technical work will hopefully support that.

What I'm going to go through today is the solid materials that we're dealing with, why we're doing a rulemaking process, the information-gathering efforts we've conducted, the workshop that we just held last week, and what we're doing now.

The range of solid materials -- we're basically covering solid materials that are no longer needed at the facilities we license. This slide shows the spectrum of the materials at our facilities, the broad spectrum of facilities -- reactors,

manufacturing facilities, laboratories, medical facilities, etcetera.

Despite their presence at these facilities, much of this material has no radioactivity from license operations because it didn't come in contact with radioactive materials. For example, some of the furniture, some piping or electrical equipment, some packaging, material like that.

Other materials have very small amounts of radioactivity from license operations, because they just have limited contact with radioactive materials. This can be some of the tools or equipment, some structural materials, that type of thing. All of this is from the restricted or impacted area of a facility.

The levels we have discussed in our issues paper that might be on these kinds of materials are -- and the doses that one might receive from them are at levels that could be 1/100th of the dose that's in natural background. Other materials have larger amounts of radioactivity at a facility. As we well know, these are kept separate from the ones I just mentioned, and they are required to be sent to license disposal.

These are not part of our rulemaking effort. We are not changing our approach for these,

1 and all our discussion in the following slides and remarks don't apply to them. 2 3 On page 4, our current approach for 4 controlling the disposition of the solid materials 5 that have no or very small amounts of radioactivity involves separating it from material with larger 6 7 amounts, conducting a radiation survey to see if radiation is detected, and, if so, how much. 8 In making these detection determinations 9 we use existing quidelines based on survey instrument 10 11 capabilities. These are contained in Regulatory 12 Guide 1.86 and in other documents that the agency 13 uses. 14 Basically, if radiation is not detected, 15 or if the amount meets these existing guidelines, material is allowed -- solid material is allowed to be 16 17 released. On page 5 --VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: To what level are 18 19 you able to conduct these surveys, what radiation 20 level? 21 MR. CARDILE: Well, our current approach 22 is basically guided by the levels that are Regulatory Guide 1.86, which are 5,000 disintegrations 23 24 minute per square centimeter for 25 contamination. That's been an issue that -- and

1	you'll see as we talk some more perhaps that different
2	detectors can detect different levels, obviously, and
3	can detect below that.
4	And so while our methodology, while our
5	approach is based on a detection standard rather than
6	a risk-based standard, that's a whole, or that's an
7	issue.
8	MEMBER RYAN: I just want just for
9	clarification, you say "released," do you mean
10	released without regard to radioactivity for further
11	disposition or whatever
12	MR. CARDILE: Yes. Once the material
13	either is passes because it's not detected or
14	because it meets the levels at in the 1.86 type
15	levels, they are released without regard for
16	radioactivity levels.
17	MEMBER RYAN: Okay. And I guess just to
18	further
19	MR. CARDILE: In other words, there are no
20	more conditions or restrictions on it.
21	MEMBER RYAN: Right. I mean, as far as
22	you're concerned, it's not within regulatory control
23	at that point.
24	MR. CARDILE: Yes.
25	MEMBER RYAN: Is it fair to say that

1 when you say "licensees," do you mean both NRC and 2 agreement state licensees, or --MR. CARDILE: 3 Yes. Agreement state 4 licensees, to a large degree -- I don't know for every 5 state, but they to a large degree use 1.86 or --6 MEMBER RYAN: Right. 7 MR. CARDILE: -- similar standards. 8 MEMBER RYAN: Okay. Thanks. MR. CARDILE: 9 I guess on page 5, kind of 10 getting into the remarks on page 5, is that we 11 generally do a rulemaking when we want to review an 12 existing approach. What's interesting is that a recent study by the National Academies reviewed our 13 14 existing approach and indicated that it does protect 15 public health and is workable. So one would ask, well, why are we doing 16 a rulemaking? Well, the National Academies report, 17 and as we've kind of just touched on now, we're 18 19 looking to make our approach more consistent as well 20 as more risk-based. The National -- we're looking to 21 that, and that's what the National Academies report 22 also did. 23 The National Academies report, while 24 saying our report does -- our approach does protect

public health noted that it could be improved to make

it more consistent and to make it more dependent upon risk or more risk-based.

So they all -- the National Academies report also went on to say that NRC should, therefore, proceed with a process to evaluate alternatives and invite public input. That's our rulemaking process, so that's where we're at now is in the rulemaking process, with the goal of establishing a consistent way to decide on what material needs continued regulation to protect the public and that which does not because it is clean or poses insignificant risk.

We've been engaged and involved, and continue to be, in a number of information-gathering efforts. This included publication of an issues paper in June of 1999 and receipt of over 800 stakeholder letters with a diverse set of views. We held six meetings to hear from stakeholders in '99 and 2000.

The stakeholders, as you can see, listed here represented a range of organizations and views. What was interesting is we got a lot of strong input from the metals and cement industries. We'll talk about those in a minute. They are the recipients, to a large degree, of the material we would release, so their views are important.

We also heard from citizens groups and

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individuals, licensees, federal, state, and local agencies, tribal governments, scientific organizations, and the solid waste industry, by which I mean the landfill operators and associations.

Going to page 7, following this public comment period, the Commission requested a study by the National Academies to obtain an independent review of the issues and the alternatives involved with disposition of solid material. As part of this information-gathering, the National Academies held three additional meetings open to the public in 2001 and submitted their recommendations to us in March of 2002.

We're also conducting а number of technical studies -- you'll hear about them in a few moments from our research staff -- on possible impacts and practicalities associated with different alternatives. And we've also gotten input from various scientific organizations, including a recent study or a recent technical report by alternatives by the NCRP. I have a copy of that here. It's NCRP Report Number 141.

That's all been put together over the last two, three years. Where we're at now is that we've got a large bank of that information. I'm just going

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to jump ahead. Information, those comments, those views can be viewed in a SECY paper that we prepared a couple of years ago. It can be reviewed on our -- or viewed on our website and also reviewed in a NUREG report which summarizes the various comments.

So we've tabulated and are continuing to bring those comments forward, even though, as you can -- I didn't really get into the timeline, but our timeline was is that we held a number of the public meetings in late '99 and 2000, and then we had the National Academies conduct their study in basically 2001 and 2002.

But all of the comments that we received, both in our process of gathering information, and in the -- and from the National Academies' input and the NCRP input, they're all in our data bank, so they're all part of what we're working from as we move forward.

From the information we gathered we get now into some specifics as to where we are and what we know and what we've heard from different views. Preliminary alternatives can be divided into two broad categories. One is those alternatives involving some further use after radiation surveys verifies that the health and safety is protected. This could either be

for unrestricted use, either by continuing the current practice or through -- by passing or by issuing a dose-based regulation, or the further use could be some conditional use.

The alternatives also involve the broad category of no further use, either because the material is sent to an EPA-regulated landfill disposal or because it's disposed of in a licensed NRC or agreement state low-level waste site.

Most of the comments, most of the information gathered focused on unrestricted use, and most of the comments we received, although not all, and some of the important ones are not -- were in the area of health and safety. What I've listed here is just a few of the diverse information and comments we have received. As I mentioned, they can be viewed in much more detail in material that's on our website.

Some information gathered, most notably or including from the National Academies and the NCRP report, noted that the radiation levels in our issues paper for possible release are in the range of other health-based standards -- for example, similar or less than the EPA drinking water standards. They pose negligible risk, and they're a small fraction of natural background.

On the other hand, the commenters have noted that the risks are uncertain, that they're not accurately modeled, that they can't be accurately measured, and that no dose above background is justified.

On the next page you get to the -page 10, we also got important comments on the
regulatory or economic burden that could result from
a rule in this area. In particular, as I mentioned
earlier, the metals and cement industries noted there
could be a very large impact on them because consumers
would not buy products made with material recycled
from licensed facilities.

Commenters also noted that there wouldn't be any liability for material that was released into the -- into consumer products in the public sector, and the burden for this could fall on the public. On the other hand, commenters also noted that disposal of not allowing release and, rather, disposing of the material and licensed low-level waste would use up resources for material that is essentially clean, and that, in particular, small licensees such as medical facilities could face severe economic impact if all of their materials and routine trash materials needed to go to a licensed low-level waste.

We also got -- received quite a bit of information on alternatives that would restrict where the material would go. These are in particular, as I just noted, the conditional use option, which restricts material to only certain uses. For example, perhaps it could go to a bridge or a sewer line or someplace where the public is not as intimately associated with it perhaps as in a consumer product.

Another restricted alternative, or limited alternative, is disposal at an EPA landfill. An advantage of these alternatives, of course, is that they can minimize potential radiation dose to the public by restricting material to only certain authorized destinations that have limited public exposure.

There are some issues raised regarding the safety of landfill disposals. Despite a potential positive of limiting public exposure, there were concerns expressed in all our public meetings, and, again, at the meeting we held with the Commission in 2000, that it might not be viable economically to set up a specific conditional recycle process for the limited quantity of material from NRC licensees. And it also wasn't clear that restrictions would work to limit where the material goes.

So where are we now? What are we doing now? Well, that's a quick snapshot of a lot of the information we gathered. We haven't made any decisions about the alternatives. They're all part of our consideration. In October of 2002, the Commission directed us to conduct a rulemaking process to evaluate alternatives, including one of which would be a rulemaking process, retaining the current approach, to give fair consideration to these alternatives and ensure stakeholder input.

We are also directed to build on these previous efforts and to focus on solutions, as I have gone through this -- quite a bit of information that we've got there. And, in particular, we were directed to focus on the feasibility of these restricted alternatives. We also were directed to increase web use to interact with stakeholders.

If we go on to page 13, we've kept our website up to date. It has information on our current activities, what's going on now. You can link to a variety of information, a variety of documents, and all of the comments we have received. And also, it provides information on when additional comment opportunities exist.

We issued a Federal Register notice in

February, which invited additional comment, invited new comment in this area, and announced an EIS scoping process for this rulemaking. And we held a workshop on May 21 and 22, last week.

Going to page -- what I'd like to do over the next couple of pages is give a very early summary of that meeting, or of that two-day workshop. As I mentioned on page 14, the agenda of the workshop, the first three bullets, we -- allowed us to talk with -- a little bit with stakeholders about our rulemaking process, about our information-gathering efforts, and about our environmental review process.

Most of the next -- rest of the two days was involved in stakeholder discussion on the stakeholder's perspectives on all of the alternatives, with a particular focus on conditional use and landfill disposal.

The next few pages, as I mentioned, give you a very quick and very brief summary of what we heard. We got a lot of input. We're still digesting the comments. There will be a more detailed summary and a transcript on our website very shortly, but I want to -- but these slides give you some idea of some of the points made at the workshop.

The first page, page 15, talks about some

of the views we received on unrestricted use and was useful because it allowed us to give some updated views and current views from the different stakeholders.

With regard to economic issues, the metals industry reiterated their concern that consumer perceptions could cause product deselection, and they also noticed that there could be business interruption if an incoming load of solid material, particularly metal, sets off alarms at their steel facilities, because in that case it must be rejected because of continuing concerns about orphan sources.

What we were told is that you can't -- you must check for the orphan source if you see a radiation alarm go off. You can't just assume it's just cleared material at very low levels. So this is a -- these are two continuing economic concerns to them that we've heard before and that they restated.

We also heard radiation protection concerns expressed in the meeting. Despite information developed in the National Academies and NCRP reports about the levels involved here and the fact that they're in the range of other risk levels that are used in -- by government agencies and their comparison to background, we still hear -- concerns

remain that there is no safe level of radiation that can be released and that we don't know the health effects of radiation at low doses.

Concerns were also expressed that -continue to be expressed that we can't measure the
releases accurately. And also, basically, that we
can't do environmental monitoring of consumer
products. We don't go out and monitor a particular
chair or Ford Taurus, which is the example that the
steel industry always bring up, for radioactivity. So
those are a number of the concerns we heard there.

We did also hear from a representative of the American National Standards Institute, who issued ANSI N13.12. I don't know if you're familiar with that. That was a document that the ANSI issued I believe two years ago, which contains dose criteria for control of solid materials and screening values for those materials.

It contains a one millirem dose criteria. And what the gentleman from ANSI, who was representing ANSI I guess as well as the Health Physics Society, indicated is that the NRC should adopt the levels in the ANSI standard, which -- because they are levels that can be used to set standards in a protective way and are consistent with international standards being

worked on.

We also heard a statement by the NEI that, despite the fact that they still believe that safe criteria for clearance and release can be set, they had modified their position somewhat to note that metals suitable for recycle should only be released on a case-by-case basis to assure that they don't wind up in consumer products. So those were some of the views we heard last week on unrestricted use.

With regard to conditional use, we heard a fairly consistent or similar discussion from a number of the participants or stakeholders. The metals industry continued to note that conditional use may not be viable or economically feasible, noting that a dedicated melter wouldn't -- would probably likely not be feasible economically because of the small amount of NRC material.

We heard from the states that a conditional use option would be too much of a burden, because it's hard to control where material goes. We heard from ANSI that the ANSI N13.12 did not address conditional use generically, because conditional use possibilities and possible uses are unknown and unlimited.

And basically, kind of what we heard --

and we heard this from a couple of people, including an NEI representative -- was that a rule should, therefore, not define specific requirements for conditional use, but rather outline a process by which someone could come in and propose for a particular set of materials and a particular scenario and location to which they might go, propose that to us and we could review it on a case-by-case basis, and perhaps do an environmental assessment.

Such a process would be -- they noted it would be similar to the 20.2002 process. So that was what we heard in that regard.

On page 17, we had more discussion on landfill disposal than we had had three years ago, and that was good, because it brought us a little more up to speed. We had some discussion about -- that reviewed the types and designs and post-closure uses and liquid and gas testing in RCRA C and RCRA D landfill sites.

We heard pros and cons of a number of discussions on landfill sitings, the fact that it can already be somewhat difficult to site landfills, in particular RCRA D landfills, whether or not you have -- you know, even without radiation, so this could make that more difficult.

We heard pros and cons on whether you can model landfill disposal successfully. We heard that you can, because it's been done in RESRAD modeling, and we heard concerns that landfill scenarios are pretty diffuse and may be hard to model.

We heard discussion about costs that should be considered, who should have the authority for the landfill disposal, and other issues, including the potential that the material going to a landfill could be diverted to other uses, and whether the design for a landfill can accommodate this material.

And we also heard discussions about that
-- with regard to conditions on releases that this
shouldn't be considered a conditional release, in the
sense that any material in a RCRA D landfill should be
at clearance levels or whatever is defined as a clean
or safe level, and that additional conditions or extra
limits or conditions or constraints should not be
placed on RCRA D landfills at any rate because the
landfill should not -- the landfill should be seen as
an unconditional release rather than some kind of
thing that can have further design conditions have to
be placed on it.

So we heard a spectrum of views, and we are working to digest them.

On page 18, we also heard some other views. We heard a call for a task force of industry licensees and consumers, convened with NRC assistance, that would focus on specific materials and what industries might take what. And they were looking to maybe get more involved in the specific materials and, as I said, who -- where it might go in a particular case.

We heard requests for extension of our comment period from its current June 30th date, and requests for additional public input in this process. We heard a request that there be -- or comments that there be more complete records needed to let an end user know the source of the material. And we heard a number of suggestions on what should be specifically included in the scope of a GEIS.

On the last page, on page 19, are where we are now. Our scoping comment period runs through June 30th of this year, which is about a month away. As I mentioned, we heard requests that that comment period be extended. Our schedule for our rulemaking process and our NEPA processes are on our website, and it calls for providing a recommendation to the Commission in mid-2004 on how to proceed, whether to go to a rulemaking and what that rulemaking would be.

1 So that's where we are on the schedule. 2 And I guess that pretty much completes my remarks, and my research colleagues will now describe 3 4 the technical work that they're doing to support the 5 rule and this rulemaking process and answer, as you can see, a number of these questions that have been 6 7 raised. 8 MEMBER RYAN: Thank you, Frank. That's a 9 great overview. 10 A couple of quick questions. One is with 11 regard to sources of radioactive material that -- as 12 I assume this is just Atomic within your scope. Energy Act materials, correct? And not NORM or T-NORM 13 14 or --15 MR. CARDILE: That's right. 16 MEMBER RYAN: Okay. 17 MR. CARDILE: We've been -- that was a question in -- a scoping question asked in the public 18 19 meeting, but at the moment we're focusing on them, 20 although we have looked at the breadth of 21 inventory of those types of material that might be at 22 DOE or that might be at -- controlled by the states. 23 But at the moment, our GEIS will -- is focusing on AEA 24 material. But, again, that's a scoping question that

was raised and we'll --

1 MEMBER RYAN: It's still under 2 consideration, yes. -- work with you. 3 MR. CARDILE: 4 MEMBER RYAN: And the second, as you 5 mentioned, RCRA subtitles C and D landfills is a disposal option. And it just raises a question in my 6 7 mind -- have you been coordinating at all with EPA who has kind of principal regulatory authority over those 8 facilities? 9 MR. CARDILE: Yes. Well, as a matter of 10 11 -- in two ways. We talked -- we have -- we worked 12 with them, or are working with them, on the ANPR effort that they have now on the mixed waste 13 14 facilities, which is the last draft I saw that was 15 discussing possibly extending questions of putting -of having, you know, radioactive material in both RCRA 16 17 C and RCRA D landfills. I haven't seen a draft of that in a month or two. 18 19 Also, the representative from the EPA's 20 Office of Solid Waste came to our workshop and gave an 21 overview at the beginning of, you know, what was a 22 RCRA C landfill, a hazardous waste landfill, and what 23 was a RCRA D landfill. Obviously, as we now go 24 forward, we'll work with them some more.

MEMBER RYAN:

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Thanks. Do members have

other questions? Milt?

MEMBER LEVENSON: Two questions. One, I know the steel and scrap industry has had a few incidents. Have any of those resulted from released material, or have all of the cases been from lost or foreign sources?

MR. CARDILE: I believe that most of the -- I believe that probably all of the problems that have cost them a lot of money have been from lost sources that got into the melt and contaminated material. The material, the levels of material that we're talking about in a clearance or released at a millirem is already low and diffuse. And so it would only tend to diffuse more. Yes, I think -- I don't know that they've -- they've not identified to us that they've had any problems with melted material.

MEMBER LEVENSON: Yes. I think that's probably the case. That seems to be getting mixed up, though.

MR. CARDILE: Well, the point that they made to us at the workshop and at other places is that -- and I'm not an expert, but when a load comes in, when a rail car or whatever comes in and it's full of metal, and it sets off an alarm on their detector -- I guess they have very sensitive detectors -- that

it's -- they don't know, of course, whether that's because there's a buried -- there's an orphan source or a lost source buried in amongst this big load, or because the -- you know, just the general radiation level.

So to some degree, they have to treat it as if it's a -- and it's not economic for them to dig through that rail car and find the lost source. So sometimes they'll just reject the whole shipment, which means that's a business interruption. That's the word that they use. That means that while they had some material coming in, and now they have to turn it around. So we heard that they'd just as soon not get any of this material. That way they don't have to worry about the pedigree or any of that.

MEMBER RYAN: There's another category, too, that's not just the orphan source coming in the gate. There's also a few of those cases, Milt, where it's been a level gauge that's been melted, you know, within the plant.

MEMBER LEVENSON: But what I'm saying is that I -- at least the cases I've heard of, none of them have been because of release of low level of material. They've all been because of a source problem.

1 MEMBER RYAN: Yes, I haven't heard of a 2 case of other than a source problem. 3 MEMBER LEVENSON: Yes, okay. The other 4 question I had -- and when people talk about not above 5 background, are we talking about the background in 6 Denver or in San Francisco, or, you know, 7 Washington near a building that's out of granite? 8 Because if it's absolutely local 9 background, then you've got probably thousands of standards, because at the level we're talking about --10 11 one mr per year or something -- probably every city in 12 the country is different, and many different places even within each city it would be different. So what 13 14 are people talking about when they say "not above 15 background"? MR. CARDILE: Well, I think you're right. 16 17 As you mentioned, even in Chicago you can walk down the street past I guess their post office, and, you 18 19 know, the granite buildings have a high -- higher 20 exposure level. And, of course, there's a large variation in background between what's in Denver and 21 22 what's in the coast. 23 I think the comment -- so that's what, for 24 example, the National Academies report noted was that

there's a variation -- that if background is high or,

you know, is a certain level, then it can vary. I think the concern we've received, though, is that while it's in the noise of -- what's noise between different areas, or while it's less than what can be between the coast and Denver, for example, it's an addition which shouldn't be added. That's the comment that we received.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Just a simple clarification. On slide 9, I've got a radiation balance problem here. The third sub-bullet says small fraction of natural background, and then the sixth one says no dose above background justified. Is that -- are those compatible statements?

MR. CARDILE: Well, I think they're from -- yes, I apologize. This is a slide that summarizes the views from a range of commenters, and I guess the first three I think I would characterize them as those were comments from -- that were -- or statements that were made in the National Academies and NCRP reports that a level like one millirem is a small fraction of natural background.

And then, the lower three ticks or bullets, whatever, are concerns about even a level like one millirem, that no dose above background is -
VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: These are just

1 different sources. MR. CARDILE: These are different sources 2 3 of comments. 4 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Okay. Thank you. 5 MR. CARDILE: Yes, I should separate them so that it's a little clearer, but --6 7 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: For the alternatives involving no further use -- for example, your disposal 8 in licensed low-level waste disposal sites -- have 9 people calculated the cost of going to that kind of 10 11 option? 12 CARDILE: The National Academies MR. report had a chapter comparing the cost of EPA 13 14 regulated landfill -- I think it was either RCRA C or 15 RCRA D, I forget which -- to disposal in licensed And it was -- they noted one of their 16 landfill. 17 findings was that it was substantially lower. That will be one of the items in the 18 19 environmental impact statement or regulatory analysis 20 that we do will be compare those and tabulate those, 21 as well as the cost of a clearance option. 22 answer your question, specifically, yes, the National 23 Academies report did tabulate the cost of disposal and licensed low-level waste burial. 24 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: And will the GEIS --25

1 again, we all commented on the comment "no dose above 2 background, " which is not possible. But in the EIS, 3 the dose be compared for unrestricted or 4 restricted release versus disposal in a landfill? 5 Disposal in a landfill is not zero dose. Zero --6 MR. CARDILE: Right. 7 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: -- above --8 MR. CARDILE: Right. There would have to 9 be -- I think our thoughts would be, well, there would be a similar dose criteria placed on disposal in a 10 11 landfill. 12 MEMBER RYAN: other questions No comments from members? Thank you, Frank. 13 14 we'll move on to our other presentations, and Cheryl 15 Trottier is going to introduce those presentations. 16 MS. TROTTIER: Good afternoon. I'm Cheryl Trottier in the Office of Research. What we're going 17 to try and do this afternoon is talk to you about all 18 19 of the work that we're doing to support the effort 20 that the agency is undertaking on this rulemaking. 21 Our main task is to develop a technical 22 basis that would support rulemaking. I have three 23 project managers who are working in this area. 24 first one you'll hear from is Dr. Robert Meck. He is

working on a NUREG, which we have previously published

as a draft. We are currently in the process of finalizing it, which will provide individual dose estimates for some materials. It doesn't include all of the materials that we will eventually analyze. It includes metals and concrete and reuse of equipment.

He will be followed by Dr. Carl Feldman, who is doing some of this follow-on work, which will include looking at some of this other material such as just average trash that would be released during normal operations. He is also working on the collective dose analysis that will be used to support the rulemaking.

And then the third person will be Dr. George Powers, who is working on the survey methodology. And he will actually be able to answer your question about, you know, how low can you go. I mean, today's technology does go very low. Thanks to 9/11 it's getting -- the capability is getting better all the time.

Anyway, one thing I want to say about the work that George Powers is doing, this work is broad work in that it supports decommissioning decisionmaking as well. If you are familiar with the times we've come and talked to you about the MARSSIM techniques for decommissioning, it doesn't deal with

subsurface contamination. That still has to be analyzed in a more cumbersome manner.

What this survey methodology will eventually do is enable us to design surveys to have high assurance that we have adequately characterized subsurface situations. So it will be handy for this situation where you may have large amounts of material going out in huge canisters. You want to make sure you've accurately characterized it, but it will also be useful in the soil environment.

And with that, I'll shut up and let Bob start.

DR. MECK: Thank you. Good afternoon. I'd like to acknowledge my co-authors who are doing technical assistance in parallel with us and assisting staff on the assessments that this presentation is about. And before we go to the next slide, I'd like to make a distinction for you, a definition and distinction, so that it might make the presentation a little more understandable.

Clearance by international agreement definition is the cessation of control from -- with respect to radiological properties. And so if I speak of something being cleared or clearance, we're not talking about any conditions whatsoever with respect

2.0

1 to the radiological properties of the material or the 2 equipment. 3 And in the previous presentation you heard 4 a broader consideration, which was the control of 5 solid materials, and a subset of that control is clearance. 6 Okay? So --7 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Has that definition been generally adopted? Is that --8 9 Both the European -- the EC, DR. MECK: Commission, thank you. 10 European Council? The 11 European Commission and the International Atomic 12 Energy Agency use that definition and have defined it in that way. And that's the way that we're using it 13 14 here this afternoon. 15 Let's see. Okay. Well, we'll go up here. The report's official number is NUREG-16 17 1640, and you saw the title on the title slide. This report assesses doses to people potentially associated 18 with the processing and the use of materials and 19 equipment released from licensed facilities. 20 21 The doses are normalized to the amount of 22 radioactivity in a gram or a square centimeter of the 23 surface. Just as a reminder, NUREG-1640 is limited in 24 scope of materials that are assessed, and that

equipment for reuse is also assessed in this report.

Over 80 scenarios were analyzed for this report. In other projects, soils and ordinary trash are being analyzed. With the addition of these other materials, most of the material that realistically would be candidate for release are covered. Dose assessments were performed using Monte Carlo techniques to take into account the variation of parameters.

As you can imagine, in each of these 80 scenarios the amount of time, for example, that a worker or a process would take could vary, and so this is one of the advantages of taking into Monte Carlo techniques.

Let's see, comments on the draft came from the NRC staff, peer reviewers, including the National Academies report, and public meetings, and also in written submissions. They concerned improving the accuracy and completeness of the models used in the assessments. The final version will have a better description of the basic oxygen furnace processes and will add consideration of induction and cupula furnaces.

The potential for mixing of cleared materials with like materials in general commerce will be treated in more detail and in a probabilistic

sense. Considerably more research has gone into the partitioning of elements in the various melt products.

The representations for the transportation of materials and the copper and aluminum industries have been almost entirely reworked. These responses were aimed at improving the realism, and often lead to less conservatism than in the draft assessments. However, in some cases, more restricted concentrations are the result.

The geometries for trucks hauling scrap and other processing products was made much more realistic. For example, the distance between the load and the truck driver was increased to the actual dimensions as compared to the draft. Disposal in a landfill was added, and drinking water down-gradient from a landfill was also added in the final document.

More radionuclides were added, and both ICRP 26 and ICRP 60 based models were assessed to provide more complete comparisons with international assessments.

The results are complete. For steel, most critical groups are workers or persons reusing large equipment -- for example, processing scrap or melt products. Use of consumer products does not rise to the level of identifying any critical group.

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Criticals groups, for a very few radionuclides, result from atmospheric or drinking water exposures.

For the volumetric or becquerel per gram radionuclides, 63 percent are less restrictive than in the draft. Most of these are a factor of one to 10 times less restrictive. Sixteen percent are less than a factor of three more restrictive. For the surface or surficial radioactivity, the becquerels per square centimeter, 74 percent of the ICRP 26, which is also the basis for Federal Guidance Report 11 from EPA, 74 percent from that model, and 78 percent from the model of ICRP 60, results are less restrictive than Regulatory Guide 1.86 levels.

So the bottom line is that defensible and robust dose assessments are ready for use in rulemaking. We've been turning the crank, as you can see illustrated here, and a publication is expected in June of this year. We're working hard to complete that.

And that concludes my presentation. Thank you.

MEMBER RYAN: Thank you very much. A quick question. You mentioned surface contamination and volumetric contamination. And how about in between? Do you have a methodology to look at

1 something that might have volumetric some 2 contamination but not uniform or --3 DR. MECK: I think that would have to be 4 examined on a case-by-case basis, and it would be, in 5 my mind, analogous to a sum of the fractions sort of approach. You know, how much -- what fraction of it 6 7 -- the activity, on a nuclide-by-nuclide basis, would be involved volumetrically. And then the remainder 8 9 assumed --10 MEMBER RYAN: As you bring that drafting to closure, that might be something to think a little 11 12 bit about, because that's practically speaking, you know, a common situation -- to have some material that 13 14 is surface contaminated and other that is volumetric. And how to deal with a mixture might be a helpful 15 16 thing to think about. 17 DR. MECK: All right. Thank you. Any other questions from 18 MEMBER RYAN: 19 members? George? 20 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Just a quick one. 21 So obviously all of this is done through calculation. 22 I mean, there are assumptions about the surface contamination, but then the doses or potential doses 23 24 are all done through calculation. Is that right? DR. MECK: Right, right. All of this is 25

done through calculation. The assumption that we made for modeling purposes is that the associated radioactivity was normalized. It was uniformly distributed either in the surface or throughout the volume.

Now, we know that in the real world that is not the case, and the idea in terms of implementation is that this is a suggestion -- that if a licensee wanted to verify, on a case-by-case basis, that he had, say, 10 percent of the surface of the material was -- had associated radioactivity, then, you know, he would have to come in on this case-bycase basis and say, "We would like to release this based on an average," and allow, then, for this 10 percent, perhaps even at a higher level than if it were uniformly -- than the same concentration if it was uniform, just because the total surface would average out to what we had calculated.

CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: And the scenarios, as you say, mostly job-related and reuse scenarios are the key. And you mentioned things like, what, the melters or the equipment?

DR. MECK: Well, actually --

CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Is the equipment fabricated? Large equipment fabricated from recycled

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1	material?
2	DR. MECK: Not really. Not really. I
3	think the intuitive approach is probably revealing in
4	that, you know, where would the most radioactivity,
5	most concentrated radioactivity occur, and where would
6	it be in the greatest group? Well, it would be in the
7	initial load
8	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Right.
9	DR. MECK: that the truck driver would
10	take away from the licensed facility and also in the
11	scrap yard where it got dumped. And so that turned
12	out to be, maybe not too surprisingly, the higher
13	groups of exposures.
14	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: And so a lot of
15	those exposures would occur regardless of where the
16	trucker was delivering the material, whether it be to
17	a RCRA landfill or to a melter.
18	DR. MECK: That's correct.
19	MEMBER RYAN: Any other questions?
20	Cheryl, next up is Dr. Feldman?
21	DR. FELDMAN: Good afternoon. I'm
22	basically taking the 1640 material that Bob Meck spoke
23	of and going the next step. Anyway, what I'm going to

do is give you an overview and status of the follow-on

effort after 1640.

24

And this effort is for purposes of information for the -- for purposes of supporting the GEIS to estimate the collective dose for the clearance of solid materials, and for the possible rule option considerations, things like what if it were 10 millirem release limits, one millirem, etcetera.

What we have so far is we haven't actually done the collective doses. We're in the process of concepts for calculational methodologies and developing information bases. And we have something called a draft blueprint letter report that we got from our contractor, SCNA. And it was reviewed by our staff for comments and adequacy.

In addition, we are also going to take into consideration the recent workshop we just had as to any comments they may have that we would also incorporate into the collective dose reports. Based on the review so far that we have looked at, we think that the blueprint methodology concepts is -- can do what we need to do to get the information for collective dose for the GEIS development.

Okay. The collective dose evaluation itself, the data that goes into it is obviously the inventory of the materials that we have from the NRC licensed facilities, things like metals, concrete,

trash. We're also looking at soils. That's under development; it's not as fully developed as these other -- metals, concrete, and trash.

The other thing that's looked at are the

The other thing that's looked at are the possible scenario pathways developed starting with the release of the material from the facility, and follows the path through all the various steps, through to the consumer -- to development of products to consumer use.

At each of these scenario pathways there's a vast amount of this layered data that's been developed by the contractor using something called Geographic Information System, which is a coordinate-type system, a map of, say, the United States. And it has all of the reactors laid out and has all of the distances to melters and all kinds of things of that sort.

And we can simply, depending upon what -how we choose to combine this material, select
enormous amounts of data and use various kinds of
Monte Carlo techniques to average the different -- for
different realizations of these different pathways
scenarios.

Okay. The collective dose methodology, as you might expect, parallels, as appropriate, the

methodology that was used in NUREG-1640, and it uses the dose conversion factors which are normalized doses per unit mass.

Again, we use a statistical approach, and what we get for the collective dose are average values and then a two sigma or 95 percent confidence interval.

Oh, status of the effort is -- we think the present effort can easily accommodate various kinds of information requirements and format presentations. We're at the stage now where we're doing the programming. We have the information in -say, in matrices-type structures, and we can format it to whatever needs the GEIS development requirements are. We can add different considerations. It's very flexible at this point in time, so that's why we're trying to get useful input right now.

The recommendations from the NRC staff who reviewed the blueprint paper, as well as the workshop, are coming in and we're going to input those to our contractor. And the soils effort is, again, early but proceeding. And I guess I'm done with that.

I also want to mention I'm going to give out a draft Chapter 2 of this blueprint, because I think it will give a better feel than I was able to

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1	give in this quick presentation.
2	I'm done.
3	MEMBER RYAN: Thanks very much. Just a
4	question. The collective dose at the kind of levels
5	that you generally talk about is a small fraction of
6	background, whether it's individual or collective.
7	So, you know, I guess it's a question is the real
8	use of collective dose in this modeling exercise to
9	identify critical groups? Or what's its goal?
LO	DR. FELDMAN: No. Its goal we have to
L1	do cost-benefit analysis, and the cost is the
L2	collective dose and the way we do NEPA analysis.
L3	MEMBER RYAN: Okay. That's fine. I
L4	understand. Any other questions from members?
L5	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: In your cost-
L6	benefit analysis, if you look at different clearance
L7	levels, such as one, 10, something, did you also
L8	attempt to compare the risk impact with the cost for
L9	different clearance levels? Was that in NUREG-1640?
20	Is that
21	DR. FELDMAN: Well, 1640 did the maximum
22	individual dose. We're not doing that. We're doing
23	the collective dose.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Yes.
25	DR. FELDMAN: And this part of the

contract doesn't do the cost. It just does collective dose. ICF is another contractor that has come on board -- is going to be doing the actual cost. But what we intend to do is basically look at different risk levels like, say, millirem, do the collective dose for that particular inventory of materials -- VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right.

DR. FELDMAN: -- and the associated cost

DR. FELDMAN: -- and the associated cost will be a comparison a ratio of cost-benefit. And then it'll be compared with, say, 100 -- just the way we normally do impact analysis.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Now, is the cost
-- what's the cost going to -- what's the scope of the
cost analysis going to be? It's the cost of what?

DR. FELDMAN: It's the cost of the dose with some conversion. We usually convert it to money, like \$2,000 per man-rem or \$3 million per fatality averted to one of those kinds of numbers. And we basically follow through on the risk part -- portion of it converted to money, and then the cost that it costs to transport things, and so on, all of those things are balanced and we come out with a ratio of cost-benefit greater than one, etcetera. We did that in the license termination, same idea.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right. Okay.

1 MS. TROTTIER: Can Ι just one 2 clarifying -- the Commission has come forward with a 3 reg analysis handbook, guideline handbook, that the 4 staff uses in rulemaking. And so that's really what 5 they're going to be using this for, to, you know, come up with the alternatives and be able to compare one 6 7 alternative against another. So it's pretty 8 prescribed in that every rulemaking basically follows 9 the same approach. 10 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Okay. 11 DR. MECK: And just to add a little bit 12 more detail, in this reg analysis handbook there are 18 attributes. You're asking about the scope of cost-13 14 benefit, and these 18 attributes are intended to cover 15 all reasonable attributes that one would consider for a range, and certainly risk is underlying each of 16 17 these attributes. However, the mechanism for normalizing 18 19 things that are qualitatively of a very different 20 nature is to monetize them. And so that's the 21 approach, but the scope is actually quite broad then. 22 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Thank you. 23 I just wanted to clarify DR. FELDMAN: 24 something. What we're also looking at in a collective

dose -- differs from the maximum individual doses --

we are looking at what maximizes that type of thing.
And, of course, things like how long somebody is
exposed to something, aside from just and the
number of people exposed, and then looking at things
like bedsprings as an example of that, where people
sleep on beds for long periods of time, things of that
sort and iterative aspects of it, and how much of the
inventory we have taken into account when we make
these kinds of products, and how much is left over,
and just to try to get some kind of an estimate of
bounding.
VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Yes, okay. Thank
you.
MEMBER RYAN: Milt, did you have a
question? George?
Okay. Thanks very much.
And our third presenter is Dr. Powers.
DR. POWERS: I'm George Powers. I'll be
talking to you about the performance-based radioactive
materials control. In essence, this is probably one
of the more fun parts of this entire rule process,
because we're trying to improve, or optimize if you
will, the process of determining the presence or
absence of radioactivity for the requirements or the
conditions present, requirements referring to

regulations, what have you. Conditions present would refer to pretty much everybody else -- spatial geometry, the isotopes, the instrumentation.

I'll be looking at four aspects of it from the perspective that we use it. It's necessary, before one gets into any form of magnitude, to actually understand the requirements of whatever the pending decision is going to be. Is it going to be recycled? Is there going to be reuse? Is there going to be disposal? Is it going to be radioactive metal turned into a waste container that's going to hold higher levels of radioactivity?

And, finally, you're going to want to identify explicitly the uncertainties that could lead to the decision errors that you might run into. And this turns out in some cases to be quite a process. One person might think that there will be an error associated with one form of measurement or technique. Somebody else might be more concerned about whether it's surface or subsurface.

The little discussion that's been going on on whether to look at subsurface or surface material -- Frank mentioned 1.86 and something like 5,000 d per m on a surface. Well, imagine a large piece of tinfoil, and find it can pass the 5,000 d per m, but

go ahead and roll it up into a 5,000-foot roll and put a detector up against it. You've got a completely different situation. So the configuration of what you are going to be measuring is going to be quite important.

What is accomplished? The last time that I was in front of the ACRS we had just completed NUREG-1505, which was the transformation from a document called 5849 to the MARSSIM. And transformation primarily led with the concept of from parametric statistics toward moving parametric statistics. And in the world of the nonparametric statistics you do not need to know what the distributions are that you're working with.

In the parametric world, you've got to have a pretty good handle on that to get reasonable results. But in any event, sampling uncertainties and so forth were worked out in MARSSIM, and it came out in around August 2000. Analytical uncertainties, material sending to the laboratory, is due out this December.

It's a document called MARLAP, which is the Multi-Agency Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocol Manual, and it's being headed up by John Griggs at EPA. And it turns out that's going to be a

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very, very good document. To date, the textbooks on radiochemistry, radiation chemistry, are old, pretty much out of date. This could very well become a college textbook. It's headed that way. It's been reviewed in that manner.

We have target for next year a materialsspecific document, which they are referring to as
MARSAME, just basically more pages, Multi-Agency
Radiation Survey Assessment of Material and Equipment.
This will probably be the heart of the regulatory
guide or whatever might come out of the NRC.

They have been working on this for a couple of years now. It was initiated when we published July last year a NUREG-1761. Some of you may or may not have this. It's the Radiological Surveys for Controlling the Release of Solid Materials. It was issued to get the ball rolling in that area.

And then, we're moving into the subsurface area. This will be accomplished, we hope, within the next couple of years. And to pull this all together, one of the things that has happened as you move from the two-dimensional world -- the surface surveys, the land surveys, to getting into subsurface, subsurface meaning below 15 centimeters, or inside waste

containers, anything that gets volumetric, the mathematics gets a little more complicated

So we've set up a program called SADA, and I'll mention that a little bit later.

Finally, we get into the instrumentation side of it. Selecting the proper instrumentation for surveys was pretty well covered under NUREG-1507, which came out some time ago. We later updated some of that information with the advances that have occurred in instrumentation, and part of it is in the Appendix B of this thing here.

And we put these out as letter reports internally, because of the changes that are occurring. Since 9/11, in the area of instrumentation, there has been quite a bit happening. Before everybody was pretty much interested in handheld meters, you had some NC-2 meters, projects like ISOX that Ken Berra put together for monitoring, has advanced quite a bit since then.

We've gotten into the capabilities of data logging. Instruments make readings. You don't have to write it down on a piece of paper. It'll take care of it for you. We're getting into live-time analysis where partial results are available at the site where the measurements are being made.

We're getting into GPS, location of where samples are taken, and this has all happened within the last couple of years. And probably one of the more exciting ones as far as subsurface is concerned, and related to things like partial contamination, subsurface contamination, is the world of computer tomography is starting to get involved now a little bit. So they can actually generate 3-D diagrams of what is in a container.

So these problems of facilities like smelters, and so forth, they might be able to identify and locate this material without having to completely empty out a vehicle. But that does lead to a problem, and I think it's worthy of bringing it up, making aware of it.

A lot of the analysis is moving toward the integration of the instrumentation to analytical softwares coming together. That begins to open up all sorts of areas in the area of quality. There's a lot of software that's being generated to go into, let's say, a little handheld instrument that's being used onsite.

And they assume it works one way, but does it? This is going to be I think something that's going to have to be worked out. NIST is interested in

this also.

We've gotten into the sampling designs. As I mentioned earlier, the so-called 5849, which uses a uniform grid, you take a sample at every square, collect your samples, and go for it. Simple, straightforward, everybody likes it. Doesn't require any brains. You apply a little brains to it, move into MARSSIM, you might be able to do the same thing with only 10 percent of the samples and get better results.

When we moved into MARSSIM we moved into the non-parametric random-type sampling. And applying things like the minimum detectable concentrations that instruments can detect, the more sensitive an instrument is to it, the fewer samples you're going to need, if we're talking that type of material. So this would be considered the active form of surveys that's being done today.

A few other little things have come out. We've set up double-sampling beyond MARSSIM. A lot of utilities or situations come up where a site or materials are being released. They expect, yes, we're going to take a survey, but if it fails we want to resurvey. Some of the criteria that's been set up is a bit harsh on the licensee, but they can plan ahead

for it.

One of the other items that has come up dramatically in the materials side of it is, what is a survey unit? Well, there's been quite a bit of time spent on that. Once the answer kind of got worked out, it turned out to be fairly simple. MARSSIM you have surface area that you apply.

Well, it so happens when you get into materials, a survey unit can range anywhere from a hammer that a guy is carrying out of a powerplant, just one hammer as a survey unit -- that's it, the results -- you aren't going to sit and do 15 or 20 measurements on it, maybe one going through. Or it may be an entire carload if you're able to make sufficient statistical samples against it to allow that to occur.

In the subsurface world, we're going toward the Bayesian concepts. This I think is going to have an impact also on the previous work that had been done in the area of 2-D. We're doing all of this to assure that what we are putting together is defensible. A lot of these techniques have been used helter-skelter. Depending upon the knowledge of the people that are in the field doing the work, it varies from place to place.

1 But I think we're bringing enough of it 2 together to where we're -- by using things like 3 Bayesian sampling, there's another one called adaptive 4 sampling, and, in particular, co-sampling, especially 5 in materials where you're measuring more than one item and you're going to compare to them and do things like 6 7 a covariance-type analysis on them. VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Now, why wouldn't 8 9 you use Bayesian sampling, for example, on surface? 10 DR. POWERS: You can. That's why I said 11 it's going to start beginning to impact the MARSSIM as 12 it was designed. Case in point -- MARSSIM was put together for a regulator. He knows nothing about that 13 14 site. So he has to -- when he gets done -- let's say 15 he chooses his alpha at five percent, he wants five 16 percent of the -- you're willing to accept five 17 percent of the material getting past you as the regulator. 18 So it's based on a national basis. 19 20 don't know anything about any sites you go onto, so 21 you set up this type of sampling. And you set your 22 alpha five percent, and you'll be 95 percent sure that 23 you collected whatever you wanted to. 24 Now, you move toward Bayesian, now you're

take credit for some site-specific

starting

to

information.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right.

DR. POWERS: Which is being done by the people that take care of the so-called license termination plans today. They know more about that site than the MARSSIM gives them credit for. And so where we're talking of an alpha of like five percent, probably in reality we're looking at maybe one percent or a half a percent. And we don't -- that doesn't show up. It just -- it was done by a fraction of a percent.

If you have a washout area, you would want to sample primarily where that area is to find the boundaries of it. That's adaptive sampling. There's no sense in sampling the rest of that site.

The SADA program that's doing this is from the University of Tennessee. It's a free program that can be downloaded. And the DOE and the EPA have already dumped over \$2-1/2 million into this program. We're contributing to it now on its shirttails by adding to it Bayesian sampling/resampling capabilities.

It has built into it an excellent visualization package. The areas up there that are described that we're spending time in now are in the

statistical analysis area. We're spending time in the secondary sampling design. And we're spending time in the geospatial uncertainty analysis.

We have other people in the research group that are working on uncertainty analysis of the modeling. We've got a pretty good handle, we think, on the surveying and the sampling statistics. The poor modelers, they've got it tough. We have also utilized as many technologies as we can from other fields. As I mentioned, computer tomography, from astronomy, decon pollution analysis, all of these techniques are turning out to be quite useful, and we keep looking around.

Why? To support this rule. We want to be sure that when we do go out with guidance for this regulation, if it occurs, that it is going to be totally defendable, as much as we can possibly make it at this point.

If you're interested in it more, on June 3rd to 5th we're going to have the University of Tennessee -- and the Environmental Measurements Lab will be here for three days, and the Professional Development Center, discussing the -- and showing SADA to the NRC personnel as a training issue.

And that concludes my presentation.

1	MEMBER RYAN: Thanks very much. Just a
2	quick question. Will this SADA capability ultimately
3	be tied back to the dose performance requirements?
4	And how do you link those two together? Is that a
5	goal? I mean, for example, if I'm a user, and I want
6	to show that something complies with the requirement,
7	will that be kind of laid out in the implementation
8	guidance, how to get there?
9	DR. POWERS: Yes. One of the features
10	that SADA has is it has an incredible number of
11	sampling styles and capabilities, some of which we
12	have not approved as an agency.
13	MEMBER RYAN: Right.
14	DR. POWERS: But they are available, and
15	they are in there. We're bringing in a new one, which
16	is a MARSSIM-type sampling, and then going into three-
17	dimension
18	MEMBER RYAN: I see.
19	DR. POWERS: with it. And as we go
20	through this development and through this workgroup
21	that we've got, we'll be getting to say, yes, this one
22	these are valid, acceptable survey situations that
23	can be used.
24	MEMBER RYAN: Great. Questions from
25	members? Milt?

1 MEMBER LEVENSON: Yes. If I understand 2 what you've said, the radiation measurements in this 3 program have no discrimination in the sense that you 4 don't determine anything about either half-life or 5 energy of the source, is that correct? DR. POWERS: Well, you would be using the 6 7 energy of a source to determine what it is, if you're getting into -- if you need that capability. A lot of 8 the instruments that occur today are like multi-9 channel analyzers that are portable, and they do 10 11 utilize the energy. 12 From the half-life, one should determine what the thing is, and then you probably have a pretty 13 14 good idea of what the half-life is. 15 MEMBER LEVENSON: Okay. So in this program you will be discriminating, or will not be? 16 17 I'm afraid I don't quite DR. POWERS: follow the question. 18 19 MEMBER LEVENSON: Instrument -- you know, 20 spectrometers, there's incredible capability 21 instrumentation. But in this program, when you're 22 monitoring materials for releases, etcetera, will you 23 be looking at -- numbers were quoted like so many 24 counts per square meter or something, whatever is --

are those kinds of things in the regs -- will they be

independent of half-life or what the source of the radiation is?

DR. POWERS: Well, given the source of the radiation, most people are familiar with surface measurements. When you start getting into subsurface measurements, you start looking at other parts of the spectrum. Like there's a Compton edge on the spectrum that will begin to move, and that will give you some idea of its depth, until you finally reach a point of electronic equilibrium or something like that, where you can't read the --

MEMBER LEVENSON: No, that's a slightly different kind of thing. What I'm trying to get at is that what's on a material -- it incredibly complicates the issue and the problem -- of what you might be willing to release. If the material had a half-life of 20 hours, it might be quite different than if it was 20 years. So --

DR. MECK: Ιf Ι can clarify -criteria from translated dose gets t.o t.he concentrations that I spoke of earlier, and this is on a nuclide-by-nuclide basis. And so the presumption is that the nuclides present will have to be identified, this and then translation to dose through concentration can be accomplished.

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1 MEMBER LEVENSON: That makes the 2 monitoring instrumentation significantly more 3 complicated. 4 DR. MECK: Yes. 5 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: With all the users for SADA, I assume it's -- and maybe you said this, 6 7 that it has gone through some sort of a formal code 8 verification program. 9 That's the other beautiful DR. POWERS: part of this. EPA has a pretty nasty QA program for 10 11 programmers, and this has gone through the EPA QA 12 which does exceed, I think, program, in this particular case that of the NRC's as far as --13 14 MS. TROTTIER: George means rigorous. 15 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Rigorous? 16 (Laughter.) 17 Nasty MS. TROTTIER: could mean ineffective. 18 19 (Laughter.) One other instrumentation 20 MEMBER RYAN: 21 question I had is it really -- it sort of implies that 22 the bar is raised a bit, and I'm following up on comment, that, you 23 Milt's know, a simple GM 24 measurement of counts per minute or disintegrations per minute without process knowledge probably isn't 25

1 going to be enough. 2 bad thing. That's not а I'm 3 criticizing that. I'm simply saying that 4 radionuclide-specific measurements will really be the 5 focus of how to demonstrate compliance rather than what is kind of the 1.86 of -- you know, world of 6 7 disintegrations per minute, and so on. Is that a fair 8 statement on my part or --9 DR. FELDMAN: I'm not sure. 10 DR. POWERS: Yes. I think --11 (Laughter.) MEMBER RYAN: We'll come back to the "I'm 12 not sure" in a minute. 13 14 (Laughter.) 15 On the very first slide I DR. POWERS: mentioned that one would want to know the reason for 16 17 what the release is going to be and what the intent is, what isotopes you're going to use. And that's 18 going to have a lot to do with whether or not you're 19 20 going to need to use the GM counter. 21 If you're working with something that's 22 going to have fairly high concentrations, but when 23 done it's going to be somewhat diffuse, you can use 24 simple equipment. It's going to depend upon your goal

for what you are going to release.

1	MEMBER RYAN: Sure.
2	DR. POWERS: The comment was made earlier
3	about backgrounds differing on the east coat versus
4	the west coast, and my favorite comment to that is
5	usually take the waste from the east coast, take it to
6	Colorado, and reduce the background in both places.
7	MEMBER RYAN: Well, I guess my point is a
8	little different. If, for example, you've got a
9	single radioisotope licensee, and you have cobalt-60,
10	it's a very simple detection question.
11	But if I have a reactor facility and my
12	question is releasing material that's been in the
13	neutron-activation field of some kind 20 years ago,
14	that's a whole different matter, and, you know, what
15	steel and concrete may be there and what activation
16	parts are there and what concentrations, and all of
17	that. That's a whole different matter requiring a
18	much more complicated detection scheme to make
19	assessments of samples or represented samples and all
20	of that.
21	So I guess what I'm hearing is is that
22	you're aiming to address that broad range of detection
23	complexities in this effort. Is that correct?
24	DR. POWERS: Right.

MEMBER RYAN: Okay. Good.

1	DR. POWERS: In the last 10 years or so,
2	I think I could probably safely say that you could
3	measure anything that you want. If you go to the
4	MARLAP manual, let's say you've got a background of
5	one count per week. You put a sample in, you have a
б	count in the second day. What is the probability that
7	that has radioactivity in it?
8	MEMBER RYAN: Sure.
9	DR. POWERS: That is the level that we
10	have been able to go to. You can go to mass spec, and
11	you can take stuff down to separate out the individual
12	atoms. It's a little expensive, but it's doable.
13	MEMBER RYAN: No, I understand.
14	DR. POWERS: If you want to go there,
15	I'm
16	MEMBER RYAN: No, that's fine. Thanks for
17	the answer. That's great.
18	Any other questions or comments?
19	DR. MECK: Could I just
20	MEMBER RYAN: Please.
21	DR. MECK: I'd like to point out that in
22	our current practice, the implementation of Reg
23	Guide 1.86 does require some process knowledge, and it
24	does categorize according to radionuclides of various
25	kinds. And so

1 MEMBER RYAN: It's not individual, though. 2 It's grouped. 3 DR. MECK: Yes, they are grouped. And so, 4 yes, this is going to be a sophistication of what --5 compared to what we do now. MEMBER RYAN: It may, in fact, be a good 6 7 one because it might clarify, you know, what applies 8 when, and so on perhaps, so that's great. 9 MR. CARDILE: Can I just remind everybody, 10 though, that we're at the stage again of developing a 11 technical basis, developing information to feed into 12 the process. When we get to a rulemaking, if we get to a regulation that we would discuss with you, and 13 14 supporting guidance, we'll come back, and we'll say --15 we'll talk about, you know, where we are -- how we're taking all of this and implementing it. 16 17 This is -- we're not yet at -- this is exactly what we're doing or we're going to be thinking 18 19 of doing. MEMBER RYAN: Sounds like good questions. 20 21 MR. CARDILE: Well, yes, these are -- and 22 this is good discussion, and it's good -- and you're 23 seeing that this type of improvement is -- as a matter 24 of fact, some of the comments we heard the other day 25 at the workshop were, you know, you need to be able to

1	measure it better, you need to be able to have better
2	records, etcetera, etcetera, and this is the type of
3	thing. But we're not at the finalized stage by any
4	means.
5	MEMBER RYAN: Thanks very much. Cheryl,
6	any other last comments? Are we
7	MS. TROTTIER: No. I just want to thank
8	you. And as we move forward, we'll be back to brief
9	you on our status at that time.
10	MEMBER RYAN: Great. Thanks very much.
11	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: I'm a little
12	curious as to what Dr. Feldman's differing view was.
13	(Laughter.)
14	DR. FELDMAN: I was basically when I
15	said I'm not sure, I was basically saying what Frank
16	Cardile was. I was thinking of saying what Frank was
17	saying. We haven't come to a criteria. Depending
18	upon how low you want to go, you know, conversion from
19	millirem to concentrations of dose, then the
20	methodologies change.
21	MEMBER RYAN: Sure.
22	DR. FELDMAN: And that's and we also
23	know, you know, some of the ways we've done other
24	things before is we have a pretty good idea of the
25	dose-contributing nuclides for a number of the

1	materials we're dealing with. Most of them come from
2	reactors. It's cobalt predominantly, cesium comes
3	next. And depending upon so those are the major
4	dose dominant contributors, and then those would
5	probably be more of a concern than looking at each
6	specific nuclide in many cases.
7	MEMBER RYAN: Sure.
8	DR. FELDMAN: So
9	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Thank you.
10	MEMBER RYAN: Mr. Chairman, I guess we're
11	through with our first group of presentations on
12	control of solid materials.
13	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Thank you, Mike, for
14	not only keeping us on time but actually getting us
15	ahead. I think we'll maybe take a break now. Is that
16	all right with everyone? Let's return at 3:00. Okay?
17	We'll take a break until 3:00.
18	(Whereupon, the proceedings in the
19	foregoing matter went off the record at
20	2:37 p.m. and went back on the record at
21	3:01 p.m.)
22	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Okay. We're going
23	to reconvene now. The second part of our afternoon
24	has to do with the License Termination Rule. And,
25	again, Mike Ryan is going to chair this portion of the

72 1 meeting. 2 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MEMBER RYAN: 3 Our speaker is Robert Johnson on the 4 results of License Termination Rule analysis. 5 afternoon. Welcome. MR. JOHNSON: Good afternoon. It's nice 6 7 to be here. I haven't been here for a few years I So this will be a good reentry maybe. 8 quess. 9 I'll give a talk today, an overview of the License Termination Rule analysis, and talk more about 10 11 restricted release, and Chris McKenney will talk more 12 about scenarios. Let me try this little mouse out. 13 14 So the talk today will really focus on 15 kind of two parts. The first part that I'll give is an overview of the analysis of the License Termination 16 17 Rule -- LTR I'll call it from now on -- and just kind of give a real guick summary of the background, 18 19 evaluation process. And, in particular, there are 20 nine issues, and so I'll just summarize very briefly 21 each of those nine issues, just to give you a flavor. 22 You all have the papers, so you can read

-- you know, pick and choose, because it is a long document, so pick and choose where you really want to look at. In talking with your staff, we figured that

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the second part we would go into two issues in particular that might be of more interest to you.

And, in particular, I'll talk about restricted release, institutional controls, and then Chris will talk about more realistic exposure scenarios. So that's sort of the game plan. We can proceed, then.

I am happy to say that -- well, let's see. How should I start? I'm happy to say that many of the team members that helped me on this analysis are in the audience. I'm looking around for them. Hopefully, they will be. So if there are questions, you know, they might be able to help in that regard.

Let's start a little bit on the background and start with the Commission direction. In June 2002, the Commission gave us an SRM that had directed us to conduct an analysis of the LTR implementation issues. In particular, they wanted us to focus on restricted release and institutional controls, and with the goal of making those provisions of the LTR more available for licensee use.

And in part this SRM, you might say, worded it -- what happened to it? Oh, okay. Sorry about that. I think this is the only one that does the fancy fade in. The rest are just right there.

Where did this SRM come from? In part, it probably came from the fact that we had been working with DOE for a few years. As a matter of fact, I briefed the committee a few years back on our attempt to seek an MOU with DOE to take over ownership of some of our restricted release sites under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

And this had been sort of the path that the LTR, when it was finalized, had envisioned. And so we were working diligently, you know, with DOE on that, but that did not -- that was not successful at the time. And meanwhile a couple of sites like Sequoyah Fuels were still trying to find a way to deal with that provision, and they weren't successful. So there was pretty good visibility that this provision of the LTR wasn't working, and so the SRM in particular wanted us to find some ways, make some recommendations, to make it work.

In addition, you know, there were other issues related to the LTR, and we thought it would be good, because many of these issues sort of interact. They should be looked at at one time by a team, but try to look at the interactions possibly that might exist between those issues.

In response to the SRM, the staff prepared

75 a Commission paper in October, and this was an initial analysis of these issues. It identified eight issues, and it also laid out the plans for the issues. But it was important because it scoped what the issues were. Based on that plan, we worked through the

next many months and completed the results of our analysis in SECY-03-0069 May 2nd, and the Commission recently approved the release of this Commission paper last week. And let's keep in mind, however, the Commission will be obviously reviewing the paper and the recommendations that we have made and giving us direction some time in the future.

So today what I'll be going over are just results and what our staff recommendations consist of.

Regarding the evaluation process, it was pretty straightforward. We put an NMSS/OGC team together to evaluate the eight issues that were identified in that October paper. We also identified a ninth issue, a new issue on intentional mixing. And because that came late in the process, we're just in this paper only putting together the plans for evaluations of that new issue.

The team, as I mentioned, were made up of a number of people. And we assigned people to each of the issues, and the Commission paper has an attachment

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that gives the results of each of these issues. So I just wanted to recognize the team members here for their diligent, persistent work, and they'll be able to maybe answer any questions that you might have.

I'll be going over these issues in a minute, so we don't have to talk about them or read them off here.

Going on to this next page, I just want to go ahead and just talk about most of the issues were evaluated in sort of a parallel fashion. We first thought it was important to find out what experience we may have had with other NRC regulations or just implementing the regulations.

And then we also wanted to look beyond NRC and look at what other experiences other agencies, EPA, DOE, Corps of Engineers, other groups may have had that would reflect on our issues. And, of course, this was more or less important depending on the issue. And I'll get into that in a little bit minute — in a little minute.

After we collected this information, we identified a number of options, and then, as usual, laid out pros and cons for them, and then made recommendations. We also put together a matrix of all of the current decommissioning sites and how they

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might be applicable to each of the issues, and that's in the Commission paper.

So that gives you a little more tangible feeling, you know, site by site rather than just, you know, issues and not knowing exactly how relevant they might be.

Now I'll start into a real brief summary of the issues. On restricted release, just in brief, since the issue itself was, like I mentioned, difficulties in arranging institutional controls that are required for both the restricted release and the alternate criteria provisions of the LTR.

And the outcome was basically what the Commission asked us to do -- make some recommendations to make these provisions viable. And I'll talk -- when I get into more detail later, I'll talk more about what those recommendations are.

Now, the next four issues are various questions about the relationship of the LTR criteria to other criteria that are out there. And the first one here -- unimportant quantities -- is a good one to start with. The issue can be viewed as there's an unclear relationship between the LTR unrestricted release criteria and the unimportant quantities in 40.13(a) -- that's the .05 weight percent criterion.

And, really, what that criterion is for in 40.13(a), it's the level to exempt from regulation if source material is less than .05 weight percent. So you can see that the purpose of this criterion is more of an entry into regulation, you know, rather than for the purpose of license termination.

And the .05, from what I've been told, was

And the .05, from what I've been told, was originated more from a safeguards purpose, you know, rather than, you know, a decommissioning purpose.

The desired outcome -- and when we say "desired outcome," what we did in the October paper was put down our objectives, so people would know not only what the issue is but what the objective of the staff's evaluation would be. And in this particular case, you know, we just wanted to describe the relationship here for all of the sites, because this originated from a formerly licensed site AAR that had proposed the use of the unimportant quantities as a decommissioning criteria for their site.

Both the staff and the Commission did not approve that, and so this led to this paper looking at the issue generically.

Okay. The next issue, again, is another form of relationship. And it was observed that in some cases the LTR unrestricted release criteria for

uranium and thorium could result in a higher -- well, there could be some other standards for uranium and thorium that are higher than the unrestricted release level.

Also, cleanup to the unrestricted release level could, in some cases, result in below natural where uranium and thorium occur in nature. So we thought that it would be important to look at the appropriateness of developing a separate unrestricted release standard for uranium and thorium that's higher than 1402.

And a number of regulations -- NRC regulations were looked at. EPA's use of Part 40, Appendix A, in their ARARs or applicable requirements was looked at. And in general, what I'll focus on here is particularly the Part 40, Appendix A, the equivalency criterion, which you may -- it may be called.

And this allows for the higher unrestricted release standard for mill tailings sites, but it was meant when it was put together, and the guidance for implementing it, it was meant for a few isolated sites with small areas. And more important, as I understand it, it's for where the uranium and thorium is a small component of the overall dose, and

small concentrations.

And so this particular use at mill tailings sites is in contrast to, you know, our decommissioning sites, our uranium/thorium sites, where uranium and thorium, you know, would be the primary, if not the sole, you know, source of dose.

Similarly, this sort of ties into EPA's use of a few ARARs that they have approved. They reference back to Appendix A, and also their guidance mentions Appendix A and exactly, you know, the same constraints on using it. And so our conclusion was that it really wasn't applicable for our kind of sites.

While the desired outcome was to determine or decide if a separate standard would be appropriate, our recommendation in the paper is that it's not appropriate. And there's a couple reasons, you know, here. We felt that the LTR, when you look at all the provisions, the unrestricted in 1402, the restricted release in 1403, and then even the alternate criteria in 1404, give a lot of flexibility.

It may not satisfy everybody, but if a particular licensee has difficulties because of volume and cost in meeting the unrestricted, then there is the restricted release option, and even the alternate

criteria option. So there's a degree of flexibility provided in the existing LTR.

And the second point here is that to implement -- obviously, to implement a separate standard you'd need a rulemaking, and there really are a few sites really that could benefit from this. There is roughly 18 uranium-thorium sites, and 14 of those are thinking of unrestricted release. And by the time you think about four years for a rulemaking to be finalized, the schedules for most of these sites, you know, they will have been mostly decommissioned by that time.

So the bottom line is it really isn't that cost effective, we didn't think, for a rulemaking which is a labor-intensive, you know, for so few sites.

Moving on to another issue -- again, it's sort of the relationship -- it's a question of the relationship between the onsite disposal approval standard and the LTR unrestricted release. The 20.2002 does not establish a clear standard for approving onsite disposals, but it allows agency discretion on a case-by-case basis and up to 100 millirem.

And so there is some flexibility there,

but part of the problem is is that at the time of the license termination all onsite disposals would need to be evaluated, of course, from a dose standpoint and meeting the unrestricted release criterion. So if one were approving over 25 millirem disposals and you did many of them, you know, you would -- a licensee may have great difficulty meeting the 25 millirem standard later on.

So we felt that what this was doing was -well, our staff practice has been, therefore, to
approve onsite disposals at a few millirem level. And
so what this does is it helps confidence that, you
know, by the time a licensee gets to license
termination, you know, they will be more able to meet
the 25 millirem.

However, the regulations permit, like I said, up to 100 millirem approvals. So we thought, well, we could approve above a few millirem if the licensee provided enough financial assurance to pay for the cleanup. And the problem here is that we don't want to create sites that might have more waste than they are able to pay for later on during decommissioning, particularly if they go bankrupt.

MEMBER RYAN: Sure. A quick question, though. By having that financial assurance

1 requirement for eventual decommissioning, you're 2 really signaling that disposal other than at a few millirem isn't really disposal. 3 4 MR. JOHNSON: That's right, yes. 5 MEMBER RYAN: Ι mean, it's а disposition of the material. It's just a temporary 6 7 fix until you want to terminate the license. MR. JOHNSON: Yes, it is a temporary fix 8 at a few millirem. But if you're going to be doing it 9 much more, then you're at risk of being stuck with it 10 or not able to pay for it. And that's what we're 11 12 trying to avoid. MEMBER RYAN: Sure. No, I understand that 13 14 I mean, it really signals the licensees that 15 this isn't, you know, a final disposition. MR. JOHNSON: Yes, right. I understand. 16 You'll see this issue referred to in a few minutes on 17 the financial assurance side. It's an indicator of 18 19 increasing cost, so we're trying to link some of these 20 issues together. 21 Next one, controlling disposition of solid 22 materials. The issue here is that there's an unclear 23 relationship, for some anyhow, between LTR's 25 24 millirem for unrestricted release and the existing

guidance of a few millirem for controlling disposition

of solid materials. And one of the questions is the potential removal of residual contamination after license termination from an unrestricted release site.

You know, when you're -- before license termination, if you want to release materials, it's a few millirem. After license termination for unrestricted, you know, it's 25, so the question is, what's the difference here?

So the evaluation and the desired outcome described a relationship. So in this particular attachment, lot of things described, are comparing/contrasting these two standards, and some of the recommendations here that I listed. There's a different purpose, obviously, for release of materials before termination. It's releasing usable materials for reuse, possibly reuse quite a lot, in contrast to the LTR where, you know, you don't expect release of material, because most of the valuable material has already been taken away as part of decommissioning.

You may have contaminated soils or building materials left, but the type of material is different, and, of course, the scope and the timing is different. Release of material is before license termination, and, of course, after license termination material is after decommissioning.

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1 Also, we felt that another important 2 factor was during decommissioning the ALARA part of 3 the LTR will, in actuality, for some sites reduce well 4 below 25 millirem for some sites. In addition, if 5 material is removed from a site after termination, obviously, if it's like soil you're going to get a lot 6 7 of mixing, you know, in the activity of removing that material, and then putting it elsewhere, wherever it's 8 9 being reused. So the combination of ALARA and mixing, 10 11 you know, is going to really, in fact, close the gap 12 between 25 and a few millirem, and the difference may not be that much. So the staff feels that the LTR is 13 14 protective if materials are removed from a site after 15 license termination. 16 In any event, as part of alternate 17 scenarios, if removing materials after termination for reuse is considered important, then it can be analyzed 18 19 as one of the scenarios. Speaking of scenarios, I won't go into it 20 21 here because Chris will tell you all about it. 22 The next one, we have two issues that 23 relate to preventing future legacy sites. The first 24 one here is changes to financial assurance.

particular, the issue relates to a lot of staff

experience with sites, some sites in bankruptcy, has led us to be able to identify various financial risks that could result in shortfalls in decommissioning funding.

And I've listed a few here. The paper goes into many more of these financial risks. It's sort of a risk-informed approach. You want to -- it's a little different, you know, than you might be usually talking about, but what we are trying to focus on here is areas of high financial risk from our experience.

And the first one there, underestimation of decommissioning costs, initial underestimation, some licensees have assumed restricted release, which is a lot cheaper than unrestricted release, with maybe no way of knowing if they're going to be able to achieve it.

Another example, operational indicators of increasing costs, like spills, for instance, or like the onsite, you know, disposals would be another example. Things can happen during operations that indicate there's going to be a higher cost of decommissioning, and, therefore, the cost estimate and the fund amount may need to be adjusted.

Also, there could be accidental releases

that could increase cost. And then, something entirely different, you could have inadequate financial disclosure by the licensees that could lead to not really knowing their financial well being well enough.

So these are examples of some of the

So these are examples of some of the financial risks, and in this particular attachment for each of them options are evaluated for dealing with them, and then recommendations are made for dealing with them.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: What would the incentive be for a licensee to go to anything more than a restricted release? What would be the incentive to pay the extra cost to go from restricted to unrestricted?

MR. JOHNSON: Well, I don't think there is an incentive for them to do it. There's an incentive for us to do it, because it could be a difference between, I'll say, ten and tens of millions of dollars. Okay?

And so if they assume restricted release in their cost estimate, and then five or 10 years from now get to the point of trying to make those arrangements and it doesn't work, and they are financially in trouble or close to bankruptcy, then

1 they won't have the funding to for the pay 2 decommissioning to unrestricted release. 3 Naturally, there's no incentive for them, 4 because they'll have to pay more for a higher amount 5 of financial assurance. So it's not an incentive. And that's really one of the reasons why we're 6 7 recommending here rulemaking. 8 We're recommending changes to the 9 requirements and, in particular, this leads right into the answer I think here is that -- two things. 10 would require the decommissioning cost estimate to be 11 12 based on unrestricted release, unless the licensee can demonstrate they can arrange for restricted release. 13 14 Secondly, we will require that the staff 15 review and approve the decommissioning funding plans, which right now we don't. So these two things will 16 help deal with this initial underestimation problem. 17 MEMBER RYAN: How many sites have actually 18 19 been terminated, or licenses have been terminated with restricted release? 20 21 MR. JOHNSON: None. See, that's my experience 22 MEMBER RYAN: 23 and point is that I don't think that's going to 24 happen, I quess practically speaking. You know, if

it's a restricted release, is it really released is my

1 question. 2 MR. JOHNSON: That's --You know, I mean, it's not 3 MEMBER RYAN: 4 really released. It's still a site that has some 5 control to it. MR. JOHNSON: I think the perspective was 6 7 in the license termination rule that originally the -it was released from NRC involvement. The license was 8 9 terminated, so, therefore, the site was no longer under license. Probably that was viewed as released, 10 11 and I'll talk a little bit --12 MEMBER RYAN: Okay. MR. JOHNSON: -- when I get to mine about, 13 14 you know, we have some different views now that may 15 help be able to achieve restricted release in a few 16 cases. 17 Also, just couple of other а recommendations briefly here. 18 We would require 19 reevaluation of cost estimates and fund amount when 20 certain indicators occur. We would also require 21 property damage insurance for major accidents, and 22 certification of financial statements. These are all 23 examples. 24 And there's a lot more detail in the

paper, if you're interested, that all kind of aim at

trying to fix some of these problems and make the funding more robust and have -- give us confidence that there will be adequate funding.

Now, this next issue is similar, kind of parallel to the financial assurance one, and it deals with changes to licensee operations. And the issue was that looking at our experience we looked at where there were -- the problem sites today, why they occurred.

And looking back historically we found that often times there was chronic releases to subsurface over time. None of these releases were safety problems, but they may have been small, some of the groundwater contaminated, but they were environmental contamination problems, which in some cases built up over years, and then your result is a complex and costly decommissioning problem.

Kind of associated with it was, believe it or not, late identification of contamination by licensees, late recognition that there had been an event, and the extent of the contamination. Reporting, therefore, wasn't happening, you know, to NRC, and so this was another major problem that we found looking at our staff experience.

Also, looking at the regulations and

1 quidance, it didn't really cover these things 2 specifically and explicitly enough. You know, we have -- they are covered in general, but we feel that to be 3 4 stronger, to aim at this problem and focus better, the 5 requirements would need to explicitly call out some things, which I'll mention here in a minute. 6 7 So we are thinking of rulemaking and guidance to mitigate some of these high operational 8 risks, and we're also kind of taking another form of 9 risk-informed, you know, review here, in that we're 10 11 looking at trying to -- we will be identifying high-12 risk sites, sites that would have high risk of contamination, maybe have large volumes of liquids. 13 14 We also will look at their higher risk 15 activities, and this would allow the licensees and the staff inspections to be focused on these areas of high 16 17 risk. We're also looking at minimizing the --18 requiring a minimization of contamination through 19 20 procedural changes. Right now, the LTR requires 21 minimizing contamination only for new licensees, and 22 what we want to add to it is existing licensees. 23 We would also be --24 MEMBER RYAN: A quick question.

Yes.

MR. JOHNSON:

MEMBER RYAN: I'm sorry to interrupt.

MR. JOHNSON: No, that's fine.

MEMBER RYAN: It raises an interesting speculation, I guess, on my part. You know, sometimes licensees might have a tendency to keep material on their facility in inventory as licensed material, which all has -- you know, and let's say it's just not in ready use today. It's in storage for all practical purposes. Is there any way to incentivize licensees to minimize the amount of material they actually have on hand and encourage them to dispose as you go, so to speak, through this financial assurance mechanism?

In other words, if I really need 10 curies of something, but I have 100, just because I had it for some other purpose, is there a way to incentivize them to get rid of the 90 they don't need any more, so that it doesn't become a potential problem or those kind of things?

And I just throw that out as something to think about, that very often they -- you know, licensees might say, well, we have a health physics program, so having 100 is no big deal. We can watch that just as well as we watch 10. But that may not always be right. You know, there may be other problems like leakage and ubiquitous kinds of problems

1	over 10 years or 20 years that ultimately become much
2	bigger issues at termination.
3	MR. JOHNSON: I guess reaction would be,
4	like you're saying, you have to look at the bigger
5	picture and maybe what risk that extra, you know,
6	amount of inventory might pose. And if it is a risk,
7	then maybe financial assurance would have to be
8	increased, and that would be
9	MEMBER RYAN: And, conversely, if they
10	don't have the material onsite, they could potentially
11	reduce their financial obligations, because they have
12	a reduced inventory, that kind of thing.
13	MR. JOHNSON: Right.
14	MEMBER RYAN: So it's sort of a two-way
15	street on that.
16	MR. JOHNSON: That's right.
17	MEMBER RYAN: Yes.
18	MR. JOHNSON: But it would certainly be
19	you'd probably have to look at a lot of factors to see
20	if that
21	MEMBER RYAN: Oh, no question.
22	MR. JOHNSON: inventory was really at
23	risk or not.
24	MEMBER RYAN: Yes. Is it at risk, or is
25	it not? Or, you know, if it's liquids and

dispersibles, obviously it's much more important than if it's a solid and encapsulated, and so on and so forth, but yes.

MR. JOHNSON: The next issue is the new issue that we added. Ιt deals with the appropriateness of allowing intentional mixing of contaminated soil to meet release criteria. This has generally not been permitted by the staff. I think everybody can understand there's potential financial and exposure reduction advantages possibly doing this under certain circumstances.

So the idea here is, you know, there's no results, you know, in this paper on this issue right now. But there are some planned evaluations listed to look at what NRC policy has been to look at our experience, also to look at policy and experience of others -- EPA, Corps of Engineers, and DOE, and international -- and then make some recommendations based on doing that homework.

Now, very quickly, kind of wrapping up this overview, is what are the recommended actions and the schedules that the staff have in this paper? Well, the first one here is to prepare the Commission paper on mixing, and that will be done this September. And then the rest of the actions here, and the dates

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that you see, are really assuming -- we had to make an assumption for planning purposes that we would hear back from the Commission, get an SRM, maybe in September, let's say.

And based on that assumption, we're saying the first thing we want to do is prepare a regulatory issue summary, and that's to get information out to the broadest audience, to the stakeholders, licensees, and others about what the issues are, what we recommended, and what the Commission directed us to do, so that people will understand what changes might occur, and what the plans are for rulemaking or guidance or whatever.

So it's really to quickly -- kind of beyond this Commission paper, you know, beyond an SRM, which not everybody is looking for all the time, is to provide a simpler, easier, briefer document that's more user-friendly to read than this paper and get it out as quickly as we can.

Then, the other items there is the rulemaking and its supporting guidance for -- again, for preventing future legacy sites. That rulemaking is a single rulemaking. It focuses on only those two issues that I talked about -- financial assurance and operational changes. And we're looking for a proposed

rule in '06 and a final in '07.

Many issues that I'll talk about next, like restricted release or the onsite disposal or the scenarios that Chris will talk about, will eventually come out in revised guidance. The decommissioning consolidated guidance would be revised where it needs to be done.

And then, lastly, revised inspection and enforcement guidance. That's a companion to the operational changes issue, so that we can focus our inspection program appropriately and where there might be enforcement actions that -- or tools that need to be made available, then the guidance there can be adjusted in the same way.

These dates are out in the future, '05, '06, '07.

Lastly, for the overview, just a quick idea on outcomes. What are we getting for all of this? Okay. And I broke this up into two bins sort of like. We're faced with existing decommissioning sites. These are sort of our legacy sites. These are the sites that have been problems, that are challenges right now to make progress on in decommissioning.

And so we think by addressing some of these issues that decommissioning will be facilitated

for some maybe more than others. In some cases, more economical decommissioning will result as a use of a realistic scenarios.

Restricted release/alternate criteria should help provide new options for some licensees that they might be able to use where they haven't been able to make arrangements so far. And, in general, we'll clarify a number of these questions about relationships that I just talked about, you know, for those that might be very interested in some of those questions.

And lastly, the matrix of sites and issues, this gives you in the paper a more tangible feeling for where we think there might be some benefit, you know, to specific sites. And that can vary a whole lot. We didn't do a real careful, indepth analysis here. But, you know, some sites might benefit quite a bit from scenarios, and maybe others not much at all, you know, so it's a range of outcomes there.

The next is, of course, we're also looking at the lessons we've learned today and to apply them to future licensees, so we can prevent future legacy sites basically, reduce the potential for them in any event. And we think that some of the issues may

1 actually reduce the need for using restricted release 2 or alternate criteria. 3 We may use these provisions for a few 4 sites that we have to deal with today, but we don't 5 want to encourage the use of this -- these particular 6 pathways. 7 And then, lastly, we think it contributes the Commission's preference for unrestricted 8 9 release, and that maximizes the opportunity for reuse of some of these sites. 10 Any questions on this overview before I 11 get into the restricted release one in more detail? 12 MEMBER LEVENSON: I have one question. 13 14 The .05 for uranium and thorium is a number that came 15 into being, I think, as a strategic issue way back when. If it arises here, I assume it's only relevant 16 to unirradiated material, is that correct? If it's 17 been irradiated, probably something else controls 18 rather than the uranium or thorium concentration. 19 20 it's probably just unirradiated material. 21 Unirradiated, okay. MR. JOHNSON: 22 MEMBER LEVENSON: And the question is, if 23 it's only unirradiated material, and the way the law 24 is structured, doesn't this end up being NORM

material, and, therefore something that we don't worry

1 about? I'm confused as to why it's sometimes NORM and 2 sometimes not NORM. 3 MR. JOHNSON: Ι can't answer that 4 question. Is there someone that may want to volunteer 5 from my team in the audience? I see a volunteer coming to the microphone. Jim Lieberman. 6 7 MEMBER RYAN: Just give your name, please. I'm Jim Lieberman 8 MR. LIEBERMAN: Hi. 9 from the Office of General Counsel. This is a very difficult question. We have the definition of source 10 11 material, which is ore, of less than a certain 12 concentration the Commission adopts, and they adopted We have unreported quantities of source 13 14 material. That's source material which is less than 15 .05 percent uranium or thorium. NORM is clearly ore which is less than 16 17 .05, but where the unreported quantities of source material is NORM or material NRC regulates and exempt 18 19 is just not clear. In fact, the staff just prepared 20 Commission paper to the Commission on joint 21 jurisdictional working group to address potential ways 22 we can clarify that very issue. So I don't have a 23 clear answer for you. Milt, it's even a more 24 MEMBER RYAN:

interesting question when you look at states handle

1 it. States who are authorized under the agreement 2 state rule tend to just lump both together and 3 regulate them all under one umbrella within the state. 4 But you're right, if you go back to the 5 Atomic Energy Act of '46, the original definitions are clearly strategically- and security-based. 6 7 control of the material was the focus not from a health and safety perspective so much as a safeguards 8 9 and security question. So, you know, and then when you kind of --10 MEMBER LEVENSON: The question I'm sort of 11 12 asking is, I think the law -- it's still on the books, I think -- differentiated the .05 into --13 14 MEMBER RYAN: Well, the definitions have 15 survived through the Atomic Energy Act of '54 as 16 amended today. 17 MEMBER LEVENSON: Right. MEMBER RYAN: With a few wording changes. 18 19 MEMBER LEVENSON: Right. And, therefore, 20 shouldn't the regulations conform to what's in the 21 law? 22 Well, the challenge is MR. LIEBERMAN: 23 that there's no way to read the Atomic Energy Act as 24 a whole and the Commission's regulations as a whole in 25 a logical way. The way they've been amended, both by

1 Congress and by the agency over time, it just doesn't 2 hang together perfectly. And the question is: 3 is the cost to 4 change the regulations to make it into a more uniform 5 way -- what's the best way to do that? And that's the purpose of that Commission paper I referred to. 6 7 MEMBER LEVENSON: I guess my point is that leaving out the legal, the regulatory, and all the 8 9 rest of it, from a standpoint of risk, of the uranium/thorium that's below .05, this must be a very 10 11 small fraction of the total involved. And should it 12 be treated separately, or shouldn't it be treated like NORM, which is probably the biggest --13 14 MEMBER RYAN: That's probably not a good 15 assumption, because it may be less than .05 percent by weight, but it may be large in volume. 16 17 MEMBER LEVENSON: But it's still NORM. MEMBER RYAN: Well, the secret is focus on 18 19 the radioactive material if you want to regulate the 20 risk or manage the risk, not the percentage by weight. 21 MEMBER LEVENSON: But we do --22 MEMBER RYAN: If you have a concentration of uranium or thorium, that's where the risk is 23 24 focused. 25 MEMBER LEVENSON: agree with you Ι

1	completely. I have never understood the
2	differentiation between NORM and T-NORM and stuff from
3	accelerators. I mean, if it's radioactive, it's
4	potentially the same risk. But legally we
5	differentiate. I don't understand why, but
6	MEMBER RYAN: Well, it's historical
7	origin.
8	MEMBER LEVENSON: I know. But the point
9	is it is differentiated.
10	MEMBER RYAN: Go ahead.
11	MR. JOHNSON: Shall I continue?
12	MEMBER RYAN: Yes.
13	MR. JOHNSON: Next part. Restricted
14	release/institutional controls. The issue we've
15	had a number of difficulties arranging institutional
16	controls required by restricted release and alternate
17	criteria. On this slide, I've just given a couple of
18	examples.
19	Governments and tribes have been unwilling
20	to accept ownership of our private sites and take
21	over, you know, a stewardship responsibility, and in
22	part due to the liability concerns. You know, what if
23	there's failure? You know, what if some repair or
24	major replacement has to occur? It's going to cost a
25	lot of money.

And I mentioned our attempts with seeking a DOE MOU. Another site in Michigan -- have talked to the State of Michigan about taking over controls of the particular site, and Michigan is undecided right now. So that's a big question. We haven't had a lot of success there.

Similarly, lack of independent third parties to take on the role in the LTR. And also, you might question about the long-term continuity of the third parties. And then, long-term effectiveness of more conventional institutional controls -- deed restrictions, and so forth -- particularly when we expect a change of ownership over the time period of concern.

And I probably should have mentioned earlier -- I mean, all of our sites are uranium/thorium sites that are considering restricted release. So we're talking about long term.

And then, lastly here, unclear flexibility of the existing LTR's risk-informed graded approach to institutional controls. I'll talk more about that in a minute, but sometimes there's a perception that federal ownership of a site is the only solution. And so part of clarifying the graded approach was to not only show the structure for it, but, you know,

1 examples other than just federal ownership. 2 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: What's the 3 incentive, or what -- is there an incentive for 4 governments or tribes to step forward and say, yes, 5 we'll do it? I don't see the incentive 6 MR. JOHNSON: 7 for that, other than good government, you know, feeling like they have a responsibility or can 8 9 contribute to solving a problem. Or it's in their state, and so, therefore, they should, you know, bear 10 11 some responsibility of protection for something in 12 their state. CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: 13 Yes. But I mean, 14 still, even as a state -- somebody concerned about a 15 state, if your option is to hold, you know, 16 responsible party's feet to the fire to get the 17 problem fixed, and let the liability with them or take it over yourself, I just don't see what the incentive 18 would be. 19 20 MR. JOHNSON: No. 21 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: I don't see why it 22 would be a surprise that there has been difficulty in 23 getting institutional control of restricted release 24 sites. MR. JOHNSON: The only observation I would 25

make is that our discussions with Ohio on agreement 1 state that it does have a possession-only license. 2 They were more comfortable, you know, using their 3 4 licensing authority to control the site. They felt it 5 was more effective. They knew what licensing was about, deed restrictions. They didn't know -- they 6 didn't have much confidence in that for the long term. 7 So the incentive was, I believe, from 8 9 hearing them talk that they could provide more effective protection. 10 11 Well, looking at the evaluations, one of 12 the things I think the committee recommended a few years back when I briefed you on stewardship was look 13 14 at what EPA is doing. In other words, look at what 15 others are doing. And, of course, in the past couple of 16 years a lot really has occurred in this institutional 17 control and stewardship arena. So we did look at 18 19 EPA's guidance, talk to EPA, looked at some of DOE's major reports, and followed the evolution of their 20 21 long-term stewardship program. 22 looked also at agreement state experience, in particular had discussions with Ohio, 23 24 I mentioned. We looked at National Academy

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restricting site use.

And then, most recently ECOS, the Environmental Council of States, set up a subcommittee on long-term stewardship, maybe a year or so ago, and so we became involved with that committee about a year ago. And that's a good mechanism, it looks like so far, to exchange information and try to deal with common problems that federal governments, states, and tribes have in this area.

We also looked at other NRC regulations. In particular, Part 40, Appendix A, the mill tailings experiences is a good model in many respects. It has a lot of good lessons learned there by what they require and what they have worked out with DOE over the past decade or so.

And also, the West Valley Policy Statement has some nuggets in it that, you know, are useful insights. So we looked at our regulations.

And then, we looked at the existing decommissioning sites that are considering restricted release, so we have a context. What problems actually at what sites do we have to solve, in the near term at least? And as a matter of fact, this list of restricted release sites has diminished over the years.

You know, we started with 15 about two years ago, and we're literally down to three right now. And they all have long-lived radionuclides, as I mentioned. They are all very specific and unique situations.

We've been having ongoing interactions with them. We have a phased report -- approach to the decommissioning plan development, and that means talk with the licensees prior to development of the decommissioning plan, and focus on this particular issue first in concept before you get too far investing in a particular pathway that may not work.

So we did a lot of homework that way to try to get some background and get some insights. And I've just highlighted here -- there are so many insights that are in the paper that are useful, but I've just highlighted a few of these. Some of these were kind of a repeating theme that you heard in National Academy documents, DOE documents, you know.

Some major themes are you really need to plan for failure of -- potential failure of institutional controls, particularly in the long term. You need to think about how they could fail and make your plans accordingly, so that you can anticipate and maybe help reduce or mitigate the possibility of

failure.

So that the second bullet here is that you need to select the right types of controls, implement them rigorously. Then, you have to monitor them, and you have to enforce in some cases. They aren't just controls you put in that are self-perpetuating at all. You need to work at them over the long term, and then you may have greater success.

In some cases, you may need federal -- an ongoing federal role. And then, lastly, it seems like flexibility is one of the big words. You know, of course, I think we all realize each site is a particular story and a case, and so the solutions are very particular, you know, to the site's situation or the legal jurisdiction that the site is in. So flexibility to tailor your controls is an important theme that's repeated.

Let's look at our recommendations, our key recommendations. This is a busy slide. Right in back of this slide I've put a table right out of the Commission paper that you can kind of look at if you want side by side, and it might help a little bit.

But the first thing we recommend is to clarify the LTR risk-informed graded approach for restricting use. First, we wanted to define the risk

1 framework I'm calling it, and it's really based on the 2 rule in 1403, the statement of considerations, and 3 quidance. 4 Putting all these things together --5 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Who is going to do this? Who is going to make that clarification? 6 7 MR. JOHNSON: We would clarify -- number 8 one, we would clarify this. What you read in the 9 Commission paper would be -- appear in the risk, the 10 regulatory issue summary. And then, secondly, it would be clarified 11 12 in guidance space, revised guidance --VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: So somebody is 13 14 working on how you're going to risk inform or adopt a 15 risk-informed graded approach. Somebody is working 16 that out. 17 MR. JOHNSON: Yes. The initial work is in this paper. As you read it, it's the concept. 18 19 the approach that we see. It's based on -- you know, 20 it's based on what exists in the rule and the 21 statement of considerations, as they walk through it. 22 You know, it's not something really new. The problem 23 I think we had is that there were pieces scattered 24 about, you know, and nowhere was it just described in 25 one place, so people could try to understand it and

see the various pieces.

So that's what we've attempted here in the Commission paper, and welcome any suggestions. You know, it's sort of an exercise in risk communication, too. You know, did we explain it clear enough? Is it a simple enough framework that the licensees can use? And so, in any event, that's where we're at. Yes, guidance would have to be -- further guidance would have to be developed, but I think you see a bulk of the approach explained in the paper.

But the framework here is twofold. It's based on hazard level, the dose without institutional controls, and that's what the LTR calls for in 1403. You have to calculate dose, assuming -- they say sometimes assuming failure of institutional controls. So in other words, how bad can it be without any restrictions? So that's the hazard level.

The second part is the likelihood of hazard occurrence, and we're kind of looking at that as the hazard duration. If you have long-lived radionuclides, your duration of controls has to be long, and the longer your duration of controls, the greater your likelihood of failure of controls.

So that's kind of the logic of the framework. Hazard level -- that's dose; likelihood of

111 1 hazard occurrence -- that's duration, short-term 2 versus long-term radionuclides. 3 So we used that logic and came up with two 4 bins -- lower risk sites and higher risk sites. lower risk sites are at less than 100 millirem, and 5 that's public dose limit. And this is what's in 1403, 6 7 So it's less than 100 millirem or -- I'll the LTR. 8 emphasize "or" -- short term. Similarly, higher risk sites are greater 9 10 than 100 millirem, greater than the public dose limit, 11 or long term -- over the long term. 12 Now, we recognize that, you know, this structure isn't in concrete. The boundaries aren't 13 14 absolute. There could be flexibility, because some of 15 our sites could literally be long-lived radionuclides, and you might have 30 millirem. You might have five 16 millirem above 25. And so there's going to have to be 17 consideration, you know, if there cases like that. 18 That's the framework, but now the 19 20

second part is look at the grades. There's two general grades, and, again, this is based on the risk existing LTR. The lower sites, legally institutional enforceable controls, like deed restrictions. That's right out of the existing LTR right now.

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1 Higher risk sites -- again, out of the LTR 2 and out of the statement of considerations, it's enforceable and durable 3 legally controls more 4 controls. What does that mean? 5 It might mean government ownership. might mean government control in some way, government 6 7 having a part, a local or a state or the federal government having a part of the responsibility for 8 control. Or it could mean DOE ownership under the 9 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, or in a minute, as I'll 10 11 mention, it could mean NRC possession-only license or 12 NRC monitoring. That provides the durability. But in any event, you have these two 13 14 general grades. But the specific grades really amount 15 to flexibility. What are you really going to pick for a particular site, given the particular site's legal 16 jurisdiction and circumstances? 17 Okay. Moving on to this one, some of the 18 19 new options The risk-informed graded approach was 20 sort of like based on the existing rule. Well, now 21 we're proposing some new options to involve NRC. 22 first recommendation is that NRC monitor and enforce 23 after license termination. We have two ways of doing 24 this.

Number one, under the existing regulation,

1 1401(c), allows NRC to come in after license 2 termination, if there's new information that leads to 3 a concern about a significant safety threat. Granted, 4 the LTR envisioned finality. It envisioned NRC not 5 involved after license termination. This particular provision allows us to 6 7 come back in only if there's a significant safety 8 So we are proposing that we use this 9 regulation for those sites that might pose institutional 10 significant safety threat if the controls fail, if the land use changed, and you would 11 12 have maybe an adverse land use like a residential --MEMBER RYAN: How would you monitor for 13 14 those kind of developing safety threats? 15 MR. JOHNSON: We would monitor a couple of 16 different ways. We described in the paper you may as part of the condition for license 17 require, termination, that the owner provides an annual letter 18 19 of certification explaining that the institutional 20 controls are still in place, that the land use is, you 21 know, as agreed to. 22 Or it could in this case, 1401(c), NRC may 23 on occasion go out and do an inspection of that facility -- again, looking for new information to

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1 circumstance, probably the site, local --2 MEMBER RYAN: There's another example somewhere that it really isn't terminated, then, it's 3 4 just in a state of quiet. MR. JOHNSON: It's a -- yes, a monitoring 5 role you might say. 6 7 The second way to monitor and enforce is under a legal agreement and an institutional control, 8 where NRC would be written into an actual deed 9 restriction to have the authority to come in and 10 11 monitor, to have the authority to come in and possibly 12 enforce or put institutional controls back in place. The Commission asked us in the SRM to look 13 14 at this monitoring role and use the formerly licensed 15 site AAR as a pilot, and we have been doing that. Discussions with AAR, and in working on a settlement 16 17 agreement as well as a restrictive covenant that would include NRC -- that's just work ongoing, and we've had 18 19 some meetings with them on this particular way of 20 doing it. 21 Another new option on this next slide is 22 NRC possession-only specific license after completing 23 remediation. So the key point here is that all the

requirements for 1403 must be met. The site dose

criteria must be met. Cleanup, in other words, needs

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1	to be completed. The possession-only license,
2	therefore, acts as an institutional control, similar
3	to how EPA looks at their permits and orders as a form
4	of institutional control. And that's how we would
5	view it also.
6	It provides the legal enforceability, and
7	it provides the durability of the controls, and it's
8	similar to Ohio's decommissioning and possession-only
9	license.
10	MEMBER RYAN: Well, that's clearly a case
11	where there wouldn't be a termination.
12	MR. JOHNSON: Right. It would not be a
13	termination; it would be an amendment to the license.
14	And the amendment then would contain the conditions
15	for restricting use.
16	It would also contain any conditions for
17	maintenance and monitoring, reporting. This is where
18	the annual letter of certification might be used, if
19	we felt that would work, and
20	MEMBER RYAN: Those can involve a lot
21	more, though. I mean, they can be even as complicated
22	as entry and egress requirements, and monitoring,
23	and
24	MR. JOHNSON: That's right.
25	MEMBER RYAN: It could include, you know,

1	entry and egress requirements, health physics
2	monitoring, and all that sort of stuff, too, so
3	MR. JOHNSON: That's right.
4	MEMBER RYAN: I see this as
5	significantly different than termination. Possession-
6	only to me is a whole different
7	MR. JOHNSON: That's right.
8	MEMBER RYAN: category.
9	MR. JOHNSON: And we're not saying it's
10	termination.
11	MEMBER RYAN: Right.
12	MR. JOHNSON: You know, I mean, we're just
13	saying it's an amendment to the license, and yet we
14	still want cleanup to the restricted release levels.
15	And we still would need the appropriate financial
16	assurance to be put in place, because that will pay
17	the bill for us and any other maintenance that goes on
18	in the future.
19	MEMBER RYAN: That's confusing, though.
20	Restricted release and possession-only are two
21	different things.
22	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: It's restricted
23	release without the release.
24	MR. JOHNSON: That's right.
25	(Laughter.)

1 MEMBER RYAN: I just throw that out as a caution because that could be very confusing to folks. 2 3 You know, there is now very clear provision about how 4 to have a possession-only license. 5 And whatever conditions you wanted to impose to make it a possession-only license could 6 7 involve any kind of structure of contamination limits 8 or cleanup requirements to get there, and health 9 physics, or whatever all else you -- you know, you want to put in environmental monitoring, air sampling, 10 11 water sampling, whatever it might be. And that to me has a different flavor than 12 restricted release where there is some notion that, 13 14 ah, that stuff isn't going to happen. 15 MR. JOHNSON: Well, we clearly say in the paper that this is different than what the LTR 16 17 envisioned for restricted release. Yes, it sure is. 18 MEMBER RYAN: 19 MR. JOHNSON: And which envisioned, of 20 course, being done, NRC out of the picture, and this 21 is a recognition that for some cases you may need to 22 do this. 23 I'm not disagreeing MEMBER RYAN: Yes. 24 I'm just simply saying that communicating 25 that forward and outward might be something that might

1 need a little bit of noodling to make sure you don't 2 confuse things. 3 MR. JOHNSON: That's right. The choice of 4 a word could throw thinking off and --5 MEMBER RYAN: You bet. MR. JOHNSON: Yes, that's a good point. 6 7 Ι was saying that the amount of involvement that NRC would have would vary. It would 8 It would be tailored to site-specific 9 be flexible. It could be based on risk. It could be as 10 factors. 11 simple as a letter each year certifying that the land 12 use is the same. You know, nothing has changed, you know, it's industrial use, period. Or a letter coming 13 14 in saying ownership we expect to be changed, and then 15 you would have to reissue a license to the new owner. So it can vary quite a bit. 16 It could be very much like some of the mill tailings sites that we 17 have, you know, where we just visit them on occasion. 18 19 In addition to these new options, we just also noted and concluded to the Commission that we 20 21 wanted to continue monitoring and participating in 22 some of these cooperative interagency efforts. A lot has been happening over the last year or two anyhow, 23 24 and it seems like when we were trying to finish this 25 paper it was like a moving target.

1 The National Academy Phase 2 report came 2 out May 1st, and our paper is dated May 2nd. 3 couldn't get anything in there about that. 4 ECOS memorandum of understanding was signed. 5 draft when we were preparing the paper. So a lot is happening here, and we see 6 7 some benefit from, you know, being involved and exchanging views with some of the other agencies. We 8 9 share some of the issues, although our regulatory schemes are different. You have to work within them, 10 11 of course. 12 Тο end here, we're envisioning implementing these recommendations in guidance space. 13 14 And so like you mentioned, the possession-only license 15 guidance, you know, would be modified so that there would be guidance for this kind of possession-only 16 license. Likewise, the decommissioning consolidated 17 quidance would be modified, you know, to mention this 18 19 -- these various options that are available, as well 20 as the risk-informed graded approach. 21 And also, the risk would be sent out, you 22 know, soon so that parties can have an understanding 23 of that approach. 24 Lastly, outcomes. We feel that these

recommendations provide more effective restrictions

that will protect public health and safety over the long term. The sites, like I said, we're thinking about are all uranium/thorium sites. And so they are likely, depending on dose and all that, going to need more durable controls. And so these options, short of some of the other ones that we've pursued, these options we think can be more effective at protection of public health and safety.

There are -- also, these options we feel can be implemented quickly and not through a rulemaking process, which would be another three or four years. So they are available. These options would make the provisions of restricted release and alternate criteria more available and immediately available. The approach is more consistent with EPA and National Academy and ASTM suggestions in many ways.

And lastly, it should increase public confidence in restricted release. There is still maybe lack of preference or objection to actually doing it at a particular site, but the way of doing it might -- there might be more confidence in the way of doing it.

We have noted that from one site in New Jersey where the local people said they would feel

1 comfortable with a possession-only license 2 approach, because they would prefer NRC stay in the picture, and they would feel that the approach is 3 4 safer with us in the picture. 5 That's the end of my particular summary of this issue. Before we move on to Chris and realistic 6 7 scenarios, if there are any further questions? 8 MEMBER LEVENSON: I have one. I want to 9 commend you for what I think you said, and that is that you are addressing the method of failure of 10 11 institutional controls. This is an issue that I've 12 been doing a little work on recently, thinking about. In the reactor safety field, you know, a number of 13 14 decades ago we talked about something failing or not 15 failing. And there wasn't a lot of progress made 16 until we began to look into the details of how it 17 failed, and I think the same thing is true 18 19 institutional controls. There is more than one way that institutional controls can fail. The institution 20 can be intact, but it's short of money. 21 22 whole series of things. 23 Do you intend to pursue this and identify 24 different methods or different ways that institutions

could fail? Because I think that can have an impact.

1 MR. JOHNSON: I think that's important in 2 a particular site's case to understand the site you're 3 working with, the community that may be wanting to be 4 involved, or the whole circumstance of a site, I 5 think, would help focus on what the needs are at that site. 6 7 And a lot of, well, our guidance, as well as some of the suggestions from various studies have 8 9 said to do this type of planning up front, and understand what the needs of the site are and what 10 11 things, you know, you need to protect and how things 12 can fail. And then design your conditions or your 13 financial assurance, for instance, you know, to 14 15 provide the funding over the long term, or the 16 monitoring, the reporting. You know, what parties need to be involved in that, you know, should be based 17 on how things can fail. 18 MEMBER LEVENSON: Well, not how the site 19 20 can fail, how the institutional controls can fail. 21 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, right. 22 MEMBER LEVENSON: For instance, yes, one 23 institution might be intact and might have enough of 24 a budget that it could continue its monitoring, but

not have money to do remedial work. And that would be

1 quite a different kind of thing, if it is being 2 monitored, even though they can't correct it. 3 there are a number of different ways institutional 4 controls can fail. 5 MR. JOHNSON: Right. Right. Okay. Thank you. I will turn it over to 6 7 Chris complete the last issue on realistic scenarios. 8 Do you want to take the chair? 9 MR. McKENNEY: This issue was not actually raised in SRM down from the Commission, but was self-10 11 identified by the staff. Since we were doing the 12 analysis of the LTR anyways, that this was an issue that could not only help restricted release sites but 13 14 also unrestricted release sites. 15 And mainly it's an issue of, how can we provide clear direction for licensees to actually use 16 as realistic of scenarios as they need? And I think 17 that's the important thing is, how much do they need? 18 19 Obviously, the conception -- the perception is is that 20 the LTR requires licensees to use the resident farmer. 21 And it's the perception both in-house and outside. 22 For evaluation, we looked at the existing It's flexible, it provides flexibilities, 23 quidance. 24 it allows -- in large part it says, "This is a way to

do it. If you want to do something different, justify

it."

It may be flexible, but the tone really discourages licensees, because it doesn't tell them what they have to do to justify it. It just tells them to justify it. It's in some -- some forms of bring another rock.

The analysis for the viable scenarios, the discussion of those for long-term radionuclides, was anything that could be -- any scenario that could be viable over 1,000 years. Obviously, that tends to drive you from the fact that you can't foretell the future and you can't foretell land use reasonably over a few decades to a lot of people reverting to resident farmer, because you just couldn't justify anything else.

We also looked at staff and licensee experience. One of the issues in this is that there — this is — scenarios are licensee—initiated and justified. It does lead to a catch 22. Licensees aren't likely to come in if they don't think the staff is going to approve things. But if the staff doesn't get anything, they can't approve anything. And so there can become the perception that we wouldn't approve anything, but we're not getting any requests in the first place.

1 We have had very few that have come in for 2 realistic scenarios, and we have worked with most of 3 those. 4 Because of the few number of sites, there is not a broad vision of how flexible the guidance is 5 or how vision -- how flexible the LTR is within the 6 7 staff itself. And that may lead to licensee and others to getting a false impression of the level of 8 9 flexibility allowed in the LTR. That's not as flexible. 10 11 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Now, what is the 12 licensee -- what's the licensee's role in this? MR. McKENNEY: The licensee's role is to 13 14 look at their site and decide what scenarios they want 15 to use at their site. They've got to decide what scenario is appropriate for their site. 16 17 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: But do they do --Do they do that on the basis of very site-18 okay. 19 specific considerations, or do they --20 MR. McKENNEY: They can. 21 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: -- pick and choose 22 from a set of scenarios that you would provide? 23 MR. McKENNEY: Usually, they pick from 24 what we have, because they don't want to have to 25 develop it all themselves. They can. The guidance

1 does allow you to make site-specific analyses. 2 few cases, we've had very site-specific analyses, such 3 as Watertown GSA in Massachusetts. That used a CERCLA 4 process. 5 But most licensees are falling back because the work has already been done for like RESRAD 6 7 and others for the resident farmer. If they use something like that, they don't have to provide any 8 9 justification. They don't have to do land use 10 planning and other things that may be required. 11 they didn't know how successful they'd be in the first 12 place. So because of the uncertainties, they 13 14 tended just to say, well, NRC has developed this 15 screening approach or this screening scenario, and you know what? I'll just do that, because that's the easy 16 17 way out. VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Yes. 18 The problem 19 with that is how -- is specificity. 20 MR. McKENNEY: Well, the problem is is the 21 third bullet right there, which is that we only have 22 the resident farmer sitting out there. We don't have 23 well-developed examples. If there was well-developed 24 examples of alternate scenarios, I believe that there

would be more use of them, because if they had some

1 sort of template to work off of, they would know where 2 to go. 3 You know, we're just showing them -- and 4 basically, in a lot of the guidance we're just showing 5 them the door, you know. Here's one way, but you can take this door until it's closed and nobody knows 6 7 what's beyond. And you can go that way, though, and 8 you might get to the -- you might get decommissioning. 9 MEMBER RYAN: Isn't part of that question, 10 too, a practical matter that a licensee is trying to get something accomplished? 11 12 MR. McKENNEY: Yes. And I think that's really 13 MEMBER RYAN: 14 the drivers. If they have a scenario that they know is, within some degree, favorable for review --15 16 MR. McKENNEY: Right. 17 MEMBER RYAN: -- then they're going to look at that. And, you know, even though that may 18 19 cause them to say, "Dispose more material at a higher 20 cost than not, "they're balancing that against, well, 21 you know, if we work for three years on a scenario of 22 our own and spend XYZ dollars, you know, we may end up 23 at the same or a worse place. 24 So I think -- I quess my own feeling is 25 sometimes it's very practically driven.

1	MR. McKENNEY: Yes. That's what I mean,
2	that it's practically driven. That they don't want
3	that there is too many there is a lot of
4	uncertainties on whether you can
5	MEMBER RYAN: And often under a time
6	constraint.
7	MR. McKENNEY: Right. That's another
8	thing is is that for the licensee-initiated and
9	justified is is that the last thing a licensee wants
LO	to become is a case study. They don't want to become
L1	the test case for the staff. They want to find out
L2	that somebody already somebody else has already
L3	done what they want to do, and they want to take that
L4	approach. And so you have a hard time finding that
L5	first person to come in and become the test case,
L6	because of the practicalities involved.
L7	They have the timeliness rule. They have
L8	a want just to get this over with. Decommissioning is
L9	not a profitable section of their operations.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: The reason I raise
21	this question is you put quite a bit of emphasis on
22	the word "realistic"
23	MR. McKENNEY: Yes.
24	VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: scenarios. And
25	one of the important lessons we learned in doing

1 nuclear powerplant risk assessments was how site-2 specific risk really is. And the underpin of that 3 whole specificity are the scenarios --4 MR. McKENNEY: Right. 5 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: -- associated with the risk. And this is quite a different situation in 6 7 many respects, but, nevertheless, it is something that has to be looked at in terms of, well, can you really 8 9 deal with this in a generic sense? That's kind of what you're doing and what the licensees are doing. 10 11 Given that risk in all other places where 12 we've gotten very quantitative, gotten very detailed, have discovered how site-specific it really is, and 13 14 just trying to --15 Right. MR. McKENNEY: 16 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: -- connect this with the lessons learned. 17 18 MR. McKENNEY: I mean, you know, Yes. 19 activities such as how much gardening is done in a 20 certain area is definitely site-specific. 21 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right. 22 MR. McKENNEY: But it's a standard form. 23 We also look to our case size in the CERCLA approach. 24 The CERCLA approach does bring in a lot more of site-25 specific analysis as it's a -- you bring in the local

planning boards, you bring in the local governments and other ones to get aid, and you do some roundtable discussion of what are the appropriate scenarios for a site, rather than this generic approach of using a resident farmer or just an industrial worker, or what have you.

As part of the thing -- we looked at a couple of options, and the -- one is to continue with the current guidance but just emphasize current flexibilities that are in the guidance. That would be staying with the fact that scenarios have to be viable over 1,000 years. That would be staying with -- well, mainly that.

The other one was to bring us in line with what -- partly in line with what CERCLA was doing, which is that they're using more foreseeable future scenarios. The scenarios are based on these discussions with local planning boards, with really site-specific issues, to try to make sure that you aren't like having to always assume that civilization is going to end, and then there's going to be residential farmers here.

And in the end, that's our recommendation is that licensees should be allowed to go that route. They should be able to use local planning boards.

They should be able to set up this process of consensus-building on what are the viable scenarios that should be used, even for long-lived radionuclides.

But that's not -- but in cases of that, while the compliance scenario may be based on this, what is the reasonable future land use scenario, there would be still done as a risk -- to risk-inform it, you'd still do the analysis of what other -- what are the possible doses from other land uses? Just so that you have an understanding of, well, this is the reasonable land use. This is what is likely, and this is what compliance is for unrestricted release.

But are we really -- is there things that could go really wrong at the site? It's within -- it's in the view of the robustness analysis by SERP that they've suggested, and it's been -- it is actually modeled on one of our sites, which is at Watertown GSA, which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers went through a CERCLA building process of scenarios in the state and -- the state environmental and radiation departments got together and decided to use a park as the scenario, as the land use for a site with uranium, because that's pretty much the only thing this land could be used for.

Τ	So any questions?
2	MEMBER RYAN: Chris, is there any way to
3	look in all of the CERCLA approaches that involve the
4	CERCLA sites that have gone through this process and
5	get some assessment as to how many end up as parks or
6	farm land or housing or industrial sites, or that kind
7	of thing? I mean, it would just be interesting. I
8	mean, it struck me as you were talking that
9	MR. McKENNEY: Right.
10	MEMBER RYAN: how many ended up as
11	resident farmers, I'll bet you it's a small
12	MR. McKENNEY: No. The actual guidance on
13	land use for EPA actually acknowledges that they, too,
14	have been accused of being way too conservative in
15	that way. And in 1995, they put out guidance to do
16	this foreseeable future, because of that, that they've
17	been
18	MEMBER RYAN: Is there any way to align
19	with that in a more complete way or
20	MR. McKENNEY: Well, I mean, that's what
21	we're suggesting is actually that alignment. But as
22	to a database of what the results are, we can only ask
23	EPA for that
24	MEMBER RYAN: That might be a great
25	guestion to ask. I'd be curious to see how that

washed out.

VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: In California, this is an easy take. It's all going to be houses.

(Laughter.)

MR. McKenney: Yes, again, site-specific. Okay. The foreseeable land uses -- even without our primary justification, which is in our rule right now, is that based on the scenario's modifications, or the scenario on the half-life of the material -- in other words, you know, short-lived radionuclides we're really only worried about -- like cobalt-60, we're really only worried about what's going to happen in the next five to 10 years at that site, because that's when the peak dose is. And it's going to drop off really fast.

The physical features of the site, which also forbid land use, and that the -- I already mentioned the robustness calculation.

On our outcomes, well, this all depends on how much the licensees use it. But we feel that it would lead to more economical safety, because you would have higher allowable concentrations by having less onerous scenarios. But you'd still have to maintain the level of risk, because you are just not being ultra-conservative.

1 And there would be fewer restricted use 2 sites, because some of the -- some sites that are on 3 the edge of being restricted use, you know, in the 30 4 to 35 millirem range, if you use a residential farmer, 5 would be able to get below 25 by possibly doing a site-specific realistic scenario. 6 7 Any questions? Thank you. 8 MEMBER RYAN: Any questions? 9 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Well, I sure like 10 the idea of trying to develop realistic scenarios. I 11 guess it's a matter of how realistic they are and how 12 they're done. 13 MR. McKENNEY: Yes. 14 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: But I think as far 15 as the general approach is concerned, this makes a lot 16 of sense. 17 MR. McKENNEY: Yes, a lot of it bringing it more prominent -- I mean, as -- since the 18 19 Army Corps of Engineers did work within our regular 20 guidance right now, and was able to bring in the 21 Watertown GSA approach the way they did it, and that's 22 all we're basically suggesting. We're going to bring 23 it much more prominent, and bring it much more -- for 24 uranium especially -- that we're not -- we're saying

25

we need shorter timeframes.

1 But that's true. It's all in actually how 2 it -- it's great now to see how it actually --3 VICE CHAIRMAN GARRICK: Right. 4 CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Isn't there 5 something between the site-specific realism and the resident farmer? Because the resident farmer, as you 6 7 said, is a pretty stylized calculation. Why can't there be a more or less stylized calculation for an 8 9 industrial usage scenario? 10 MR. McKENNEY: Well, that's one of the 11 things is that it may be able -- a way to do some 12 stylized alternative use ones. CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Right. 13 MR. McKENNEY: So that they don't have to 14 15 go fully site-specific, but they could go to like some general land use. So you just have a general idea of 16 17 They don't have to do a real what the land use is. specific thing of, "This is exactly what the land use 18 would be." 19 20 And maybe our guidance can get developed so that we can have some well-developed examples that 21 22 they can say, "Well, we're just using this scenario, 23 scenario B from your developed stuff, as our" -- and 24 this is why we can use that, which would assist the

licensees a lot in using the alternate scenarios.

1	MEMBER RYAN: Chris, what's the schedule
2	and forecast for this work and development? I'm just
3	curious.
4	MR. McKENNEY: It's with the rest of the
5	guidance, and it would
6	MEMBER RYAN: You may have had it in your
7	slide, and I just
8	MR. McKENNEY: Yes. '06 is September
9	of '06.
10	MEMBER RYAN: So it's out there on the
11	horizon a bit.
12	MR. McKENNEY: Yes. Well, a lot of it is
13	because of resources.
14	MEMBER RYAN: Say again?
15	MR. GREEVES: John Greeves, NRC. You saw
16	the guidance slide. We need to get an SRM back
17	deciding how much buy-in we have on this. But what's
18	also important is we're already doing this. The staff
19	is already doing realistic scenarios, and we might
20	like to, you know, visit with your staff and explain
21	there's a whole handful of cases where we're doing
22	this, and those are probably ones that would be
23	illustrative to the kinds of questions you're asking
24	here.
25	MEMBER RYAN: Right.

1 MR. GREEVES: The guidance will be useful 2 for our external stakeholders. It's also useful for our staff, because, as Chris said, the staff was 3 4 defaulting to these conservative scenarios. We've got 5 to kind of work that issue. But we're already getting pay off just by thinking this thing through already. 6 7 Ι want you to go away with understanding that a lot of these recommendations 8 we're actually doing in terms of realistic scenarios. 9 It isn't just Watertown Arsenal that we've looked at 10 11 this type of an approach. We've done some work at 12 NFS. We've got a couple of other cases where we're looking at this. 13 14 affects the people with large 15 inventories of soil, a little bit of groundwater, who, 16 you know, are faced with that Envirocare, \$10-, \$20-, 17 \$100 million ticket. Those are the people who are getting affected by this. 18 So --19 MEMBER RYAN: Thanks. That's so much 20 help. The other observation is 21 MR. JOHNSON: 22 that when we meet with licensees prior to their 23 developing a decommissioning plan, we talk through a 24 lot of the major issues or questions that they have. 25 And, you know, whether it's institutional controls,

for instance, or, you know, this is a prime opportunity here to talk about what scenarios are appropriate for their site.

MR. McKENNEY: I mean, between the risks

-- well, now we might not have the guidance until September of '06, but the staff will definitely be using most all of these issues except for the ones that -- if these were approved to -- except for the one that requires rulemaking, on a case-by-case basis while the guidance is being developed. It would not be we'll wait until the guidance is developed.

MR. EID: This is Bobby Eid. I would like to add that something -- in between, that in the dose impact analysis, the staff they do something between -- what normally we do, we try to eliminate certain pathways, like, for example, certain sites.

The drinking water is not viable for drinking, so we do not need that pathway. In some cases, the drinking water source, although it is good aquifer, so we could eliminate that, because we know the source is not directly from the aquifer, it could be somewhere else. It could be municipal water supplied, you know, on the site.

So there are different ways we do eliminate the pathways, although specifically we may

1 not call it different scenario. But we do, at the 2 end, when you eliminate the pathways, you end actually 3 with different scenarios. So we do something in 4 between because there was a question if there is 5 anything in between or not, yes, we do have something in between. 6 7 MEMBER RYAN: Okay. Thanks. Any other questions? 8 9 MEMBER LEVENSON: Yes, I have a question. You mentioned that essentially the sites you are 10 11 currently involved with are pretty much uranium and 12 thorium type sites. But how does this work relate? Some years down the road we're going to start having 13 14 license termination on reactor sites. How does that 15 relate to your current program? Well, we are currently 16 MR. McKENNEY: 17 having license termination plans coming in. We've had three in the past six months that we've approved. 18 19 All of these things could be used by 20 There are -- in this review, a lot of the reactors. 21 more restricted release issues especially, which is 22 what the focus of the SRM was on uranium and thorium 23 No reactor that I know of is thinking of sites. 24 restricted release as an option.

The realistic scenarios, though, on the

1 other hand, could definitely be used by 2 especially for the fact that they have short-term --3 relatively short-term -- from a decommissioning point 4 of view, the half-lives are short, 30 years or less. 5 But they could take definite advantage of that. 6 MEMBER LEVENSON: There may be some 7 reevaluation of that that it costs so much money to get a powerplant site environmentally approved as a 8 9 powerplant site, it seems to me that people start -that are out decommissioning nuclear plants, even if 10 11 they don't build another nuclear plant, they're 12 probably going to find it only makes economic sense to keep that site as a powerplant site, because it has an 13 14 incredible value for that. So you may find that, in fact, restricted release is the thing that makes 15 16 sense. 17 MR. McKENNEY: There may not even be restricted release under some of those conditions even 18 19 It depends on how, again, under a restricted 20 release -- in a realistic scenarios point of view --21 Right. MEMBER LEVENSON: 22 -- do you really need a MR. McKENNEY: 23 deed restriction to have them control -- make that 24 industrial site for the next 10 years? Or how likely

is it to not still be a powerplant in 10 years?

1	may be an argument that a licensee could make.
2	MEMBER RYAN: Well, I mean, that would be
3	a case where a possession-only type approach might be
4	real workable.
5	MR. McKENNEY: Exactly.
6	MEMBER RYAN: Thanks. Any other
7	questions?
8	Mr. Chairman, I'll turn it back to you.
9	Are there any staff comments or questions at this
10	point?
11	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Anything from the
12	audience?
13	MEMBER RYAN: Audience comments/questions?
14	CHAIRMAN HORNBERGER: Any comments or
15	questions? Okay. Thank you, Mike. Thank you,
16	Robert.
17	So we're not going to need the recorder
18	after this. So I think what we'll do is let's take a
19	10-minute break and reconvene and we'll finish up our
20	business for today. We're adjourned for 10 minutes.
21	(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the proceedings
22	in the foregoing matter went off the
23	record.)
24	
25	