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Speeches and Testimony |
of Ricki Helfer Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Before the May 22, 1997
Mr. Chairman, Congressman LaFalce, and members of the
Committee, I deeply appreciate your very kind comments. I am
pleased to have this opportunity to present the views of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) on legislation to
modernize the nation's banking laws, and I commend you for this
effort to strengthen our financial system.
I also want to thank you and the other members of the
Congress for passing legislation last year providing immediate
financial stability to the Savings Association Insurance Fund
(SAIF). The SAIF still faces long-term risks because it insures
far fewer, and more geographically concentrated, institutions
than does the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF). To distribute these
risks more broadly, the FDIC strongly supports a merger of the
two funds as soon as practicable.
Mr. Chairman, I have detailed written testimony to submit
for the record. This morning, I will discuss briefly three
topics: one, the lessons we have learned from our analysis of the
most recent banking and thrift crises that should guide us in
considering financial modernization; two, the key questions that
financial modernization should address; and, three, the
independence of the FDIC.
First, several of the lessons we have learned in our in-depth analysis of bank and thrift failures between 1980 and 1994
-- the worst financial crisis since the 1930s -- should be useful
to this Committee. Our analysis points to the need for financial
modernization. Geographic and product constraints on insured
institutions resulted in inadequate diversification of income.
Restrictions on financial activities combined with increased
competition may have led many banks into riskier lending. Our
analysis, however, also underscores the need for caution in
easing restrictions on activities of banking organizations beyond
those financial in nature. We found that without adequate
supervision rapid expansion of insured institutions into
unfamiliar activities had undesirable consequences. We also
found that there is no substitute for regular, on-site
examinations of depository institutions for addressing specific
problems, nor for the authority to close failing institutions in
a timely way.
Second, my written testimony discusses five key questions
that any financial modernization proposal should address. I will
briefly discuss several of them here.
What activities should be permitted? Financial
organizations should be permitted to engage in any type of
financial activity, unless the activity poses significant safety
and soundness concerns or is potentially harmful to consumers or
small businesses. We should, however, avoid at this time
combinations of commercial firms and banks because they may
result in undue concentrations of economic power that could
affect the general availability of credit during an economic
downturn and could present other significant conflicts of
interest. The alternative that I favor would permit merchant
banking activity through noncontrolling investments in
nonfinancial firms by well-managed Financial Services Holding
Companies (FSHC), as H.R. 10 would permit. Should Congress,
nevertheless, take a "basket approach" to mixing banking and
commerce that permits controlling investments in commercial
firms, our research shows that a commercial "basket" comprised of
five percent of a banking organization's revenue may be
sufficient to allow most financial service firms to affiliate
with banks without divesting their commercial activities.
How should activities be regulated? Financial reform must
ensure that any regulation of a diversified holding company will
not result in duplicative regulation or in the artificial
restructuring of banking operations and services. It must also
ensure adequate safeguards for the protection of consumers and
investors. Finally, regulators must be able to review
transactions between insured banks and their affiliates and
subsidiaries as part of the regular examination process for
insured banks. To address concerns regarding the stability and
liquidity of the financial system, it may be necessary to provide
for some general federal oversight of consolidated financial
organizations, but supervising nonbanking companies as banks are
supervised is not necessary.
What safeguards are necessary to protect the insured entity
and the deposit insurance funds? Any proposal should be
consistent with the safeguards of Sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act, and the capital adequacy of an insured
institution should be determined after deducting the
institution's investment in subsidiaries.
Lastly, my foremost concern is preserving the independence
of the FDIC. The FDIC's ability to do its job of stabilizing the
banking system in times of stress rests on its independence. To
promote stability, the FDIC must make unbiased assessments of
risk in the financial system and act upon those assessments
without fear or favor. Independence gives the FDIC the
legitimacy and credibility it needs to serve the public interest.
Given the lessons of the recent banking and thrift crises,
the proposals the Bankers Roundtable announced Tuesday to limit
deposit insurance protections that Americans have enjoyed for
three generations are extremely misguided and shortsighted, and
would ultimately result in the unfortunate and unnecessary
politicization of the process for addressing financial
institution failures.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, the FDIC stands
ready to assist the Committee in evaluating how best to reform
our financial system. I would be happy to respond to your
questions.
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Last Updated 06/25/1999
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