Congressional

Documents received from Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs

- 1. Document entitled "Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda." 3 pages. (F2001-00630)
- 2. E-mail to Richard Glick from Michael Fourcher, dated May 22, 2000. Subject: RE: May 26. 1 page. (F2001-00630)
- 3. E-mail to Arlene Estep from Doreen Williams, dated June 11, 2002. 1 page. (F2001-00630)
- 4. E-mail to Arlene Estep from Michael Iyahnenko, dated June 11, 2002. 1 page with one enclosure. (F2001-00630)
 - A. Undated draft document entitled "SA Enron op-ed Draft." 2 pages. (F2001-00630)

Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda

10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m., Friday, May 26, 2000 George R. Brown Convention Center, Room 302 1001 Avenida De Las Americas Houston, Texas

Open and closing statements are anticipated to be brief

- 1. State Senator Rodney Ellis
- 2. Mayor Lee Brown
- 3. Secretary Richardson
- 4. Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy, Bob Gee
- 5. Open panel discussion, moderated by Bob Gee
- 6. Closing by Bob Gee
- 7. State Senator Rodney Ellis' closing remarks
- 8. Mayor Lee Brown's closing remarks
- 9. Secretary Richardson's closing remarks

Round Table Participants

Secretary Bill Richardson, Co-Host State Senator Rodney Ellis, Co-host

Congressman Gene Green

Houston Mayor Lee Brown

State Senator Rick Noriega

Brett Perlman Commissioner Texas Public Utility Commission

Ken Fiedler
Sr. Vice President
City Public Service of San Antonio

Michael McCluskey
Manager, Fuels & Marketing
Austin Energy
Austin, TX



David Keane Sr. Director, Legislative Affairs Dynegy Inc. Houston, TX

Steve Kean Executive Vice President Enron Corp Dallas, TX

Steve Schaeffer Sr. Vice President - Regulatory Reliant Energy, Inc. Houston, TX

Paul Plunket
Executive VP - Regulatory Affairs
Texas Utilities Co.
Dallas, TX

Robert Bryant President and General Manager Golden Spread Electric Coop., Inc. Amarillo, TX

Gregory Lucero Business Manager IBEW Local 66

Marty Buckley Vice President for Energy Air Liquide America Corp.

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Ken Fiedler - 210-353-3058 (F) Randall - 512-477-5329(F)

Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda

11:00 a.m. – 12:15 p.m., Friday, May 26, 2000 George R. Brown Convention Center, Room 302 1001 Avenida De Las Americas · Houston, Texas

Open and closing statements are anticipated to be brief.

- State Rep. Rick Noriega
- 2. State Senator Rodney Ellis
- 3. Mayor Lee Brown
- 4. Secretary Richardson
- 5. Moderator, Bob Gee, Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy
- 6. Open panel discussion, moderated by Bob Gee
- 7. Closing by Bob Gee
- 8. State Rep. Rick Noriega
- 9. State Senator Rodney Ellis' closing remarks
- 10. Mayor Lee Brown's closing remarks
- 11. Secretary Richardson's closing remarks

Panelists: CO-HOST, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson CO-HOST, State Senator Rodney Ellis Mayor Lee Brown State Rep. Rick Noriega Michael McCluskey, Manager, Fuels and Marketing, Austin Energy San Antonio City Public Service Board Comm. Brett Perlman, Texas Public Utility Commission Reliant Energy Inc. Steve Kean, Executive Vice President, Enron Erle Nye, Chairman and CEO, Texas Utilities Co. David Keane, Sr. Director, Legislative Affairs, Dynegy Inc. Robert Bryant, President and General Manager, Golden Spread Electric Coop., Inc.

Gregory Lucero, Business Manager, IBEW Local 66

Marty Buckley, VP for Energy, Air Liquide America Corp.

Nolan, Betty

From:

Sent: To:

Fourcher, Michael Monday, May 22, 2000 10:37 AM Glick, Richard

Subject:

Nolan, Betty RE: May 26

Rich-

Great! I sent Cynthia a copy of the latest agenda.

Also, Richard D. says Houston Mayor Lee Brown will come and participate.

-Mike

----Original Message--From: Glick, Richard

Sent: Friday, May 19, 2000 6:09 PM To: Fourcher, Michael; 'michael nolan'

Subject: FW: May 26

---Original Message-----

From: Allison.Navin@enron.com%internet [mailto:Allison.Navin@enron.com]
Sent: Friday, May 19, 2000 6:05 PM
To: Glick, Richard

Cc: Cynthia.Sandherr@enron.com%internet

Subject: May 26

Cynthia Sandherr asked me to let you know that Steve Kean, Enron's Executive Vice President and Chief of Staff, will be participating in the Houston electricity reliability roundtable next Friday, May 26. Thanks.

Estep, Arlene From: Williams, Doreen

Sent:

Tuesday, June 11, 2002 4:09 PM

To:

Estep, Arlene

Business Card given to Dan Brouillette

Enron Corp. search:

John Shelk

1775 Eye St., NW, Suite 800

Washington, DC 20006

202 466 9172

john.shelk@enron.com

Estep, Arlene

From: Ivahnenko, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2002 11:37 AM

To: Estep, Arlene Subject: Enron Doc's

Importance: High







Enron op-ed,Draft 01.doc

Enron op-eed draft 02

01.doc.lnk

I found this on my computer and

obviously I was not here in January....So I have no idea who wrote this. Thanks



The fall of Texas-based Enron – as recently as a year ago the nation's 7th largest company – may very well go down in the annals of business history as the most spectacular corporate collapse ever seen. And as with the rise or fall of any commercial behemoth, there are invariably lessons to be learned. Unfortunately it looks as if the first lessons being drawn from the precipitous collapse of Enron are ones we would do best to avoid.

A host of knee-jerk commentators and political activists are using the Enron downfall to campaign against one of the left's most reliable bogeymen: deregulation.

The Boston Globe pointed to "a diminishing faith in markets." A Miami Herald headline read "Energy Deregulation Loses Steam." An outfit called the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights cited the Enron debacle evidence of deregulation's evils. Biggovernment politicians in Washington and in state capitals are saying this proves government must control energy industries.

There's just one problem with this approach: It's wrong. What's clear as the dust begins to settle is that Enron's fall had nothing to do with how California's or the nation's electricity markets are or aren't regulated.

In the mid-1990s Enron grew to prominence as a company that traded various energies as commodities. More recently, it expanded into a conglomerate that dealt in a host of different industries, energy being just one. It ran paper mills and was the seventh largest supplier of newsprint in North America. It pioneered telecommunications bandwidth trading. It manufactured plastics and glass. It handled real estate, directed Internet services, and even sold insurance. Enron was still a large player in the energy industry, but it was becoming less and less an energy company everyday.

Still, because of its size Enron was a tempting target for California politicians who wanted to deflect attention from their disastrous attempts at what some called deregulation. What really happened was a perverse system of regulation where one part of the market was freed, but not the other.

In a nutshell, California set strict controls on retail prices – that is, they capped the prices which utilities could charge consumers (read, voters). They did not cap the prices utilities had to pay from wholesalers. And as the demand for electricity grew, those prices went up. Here's the kicker: California mandated that the utilities buy as much electricity as the public wanted.

As could be predicted, Californians gorged themselves on cheap electricity, the utilities were forced to the point of bankruptcy, and we found ourselves in the middle of an energy crisis threatening large parts of the country. And the politicians who brought us

that mess blamed deregulation.

An analogy might help. Consider the market as a captive, unfairly imprisoned. What California did is like unshackling one leg but not the other, and when no progress is made, saying, "See, freedom doesn't work."

Blasting the straw man of deregulation is merely a smokescreen for saying that the government should be in control of the major decisions about energy production and consumption. Most notably this means that the government should set price controls.

But price controls have never worked. We tried them on oil and gas in the 1970s. They were an utter failure. They led to shortages and rationing and the idea that America was gripped by malaise. Further price controls on electricity will only lead to misery and blackouts while doing nothing to address the steps that must be taken to create a competitive market for electricity in this country.

So what did happen to Enron? There is plenty of evidence to suggest that corporate overreaching and questionable accounting practices played the largest part in the fall of Enron. There appears to be no connection, however, to the California electricity situation.

Whether anything improper or illegal occurred is a matter for the securities regulators and the relevant congressional committees. My concern as Energy Secretary is with the impact on energy markets, and the need for stable markets.

To that end, it is important to repeat this Administration's commitment to pursuing thriving and stable markets with a minimum of government direction. One of the crucial initiatives promoted by the president's National Energy Policy is broad electricity restructuring according to free-market principles.

We are working closely with the House and the Senate, as well as with the various state governments, to do this in a bipartisan fashion. But we shouldn't let those with an ideological beef against free markets distort the news in an effort to derail this much needed reform.

752 words

SA Enron op-ed Draft Auplicate

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Freedom of Information Act Request Certification

To: Laura Brown

Request # F2001-00630		Date: June 7, 2002	
The at return	tached request has been referred to yo it along with any responsive documer	ur office, for action. Please complete this form and its to splin. Direct any questions to me on 6-50.4	
Please	check/complete where appropriate:	·	
	The documents transmitted herewith contain no classified or unclassified information on technologies supporting nuclear weapons design and production, etc.		
· ,		were found to contain classified or unclassified ng nuclear weapons design and production, etc., and hav hed).	
	We have been unable to locate any do	ocuments responsive to this request.	
12	Pages (Number) of documents have been identified.		
It is re	commended that the documents transm	itted herewith be:	
	Released in their entirety		
XXX	Partially withheld for the reasons stated in the attachment		
	Withheld in their entirety for the reas	ons stated in the attachment	
	ough search has been conducted for refill in the following:	cords/information responsive to this request. Also,	
Search	Time/Hourly Rate:	· 	
Reviev	v time/hourly rate:		
I certify	by signature that all responsive material has be	on brought to the attention of the FOIA/Privacy act office.	
Laura	I. Brown	Eura J. Brown	
Authoria	zing Official Print Name	gnature	
	essional and Intergovernmenta		
		une 13, 2002	
Title Di	rector, Resource Mgmt. Da	ate	

Please Note: When releasing or denying information this form can only be signed by the designated Authorizing/Denying Officials.



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SUBJECT: FOI Request #F2001-00630--ENRON Documents

In response to your request dated June 7, 2002, a file search was conducted by staff in the Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs (CI) for files concerning ENRON, and the following documents have been located:

- 1. Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda for May 26, 2002, identifying Round Table Participants;
- 2. Texas Electricity Reliability Summit Agenda for May 26, 2002, identifying Panelists;
- 3. E-mail from Michael Fourcher to Richard Glick dated May 22, 2000, regarding May 26 agenda;
- 4. E-mail from Doreen Williams stating that Dan Brouillette, Assistant Secretary/CI, provided his business card to Enron rep;
- 5. E-mail from Michael Ivahnenko stating that the following documents regarding Enron were located on his computer. Mr. Ivahnenko also states that the writer is unknown. The computer currently used by Mr. Ivahnenko was previously assigned to Mr. Ellis Disch who has since departed from DOE. The documents are: Enrol op-ed Draft 01; Enron op-ed draft 02 and Enron op-ed Draft 01. It is recommended that these three documents under item #5, not be released since there is no knowledge of the writer, what or who the documents were prepared for, or whether they are DOE documents.

If you have any questions, please give me a call (x65524).

Attachments