[DOE LETTERHEAD]

April 19, 2001

The Honorable John T. Conway
Chairman
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

When the "Strategy for Utilization of the Chemical Processing Canyons at the Savannah River Site" was approved in July 1997, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) requested that a complex-wide review of materials potentially requiring canyon processing be completed before a final decision was made on canyon deactivation. The SRS canyons have unique capabilities, and the Department of Energy (Department) also believes it is essential to have a full understanding of its surplus material inventories and corresponding disposition plans prior to termination of canyon capabilities.

The enclosed Savannah River Site Canyons Nuclear Material Identification Study, responding to the DNFSB request, presents the results of over three years of extensive analyses. Examples of specific efforts include the Processing Needs Assessment, the Nuclear Materials Integration Project, and Westinghouse Savannah River Company analyses conducted in 1999 and 2000. The objective of these efforts was to identify and review all remaining surplus nuclear materials to determine which materials potentially require utilization of the canyons.

As a result of these analyses, the Department has reached the following conclusions:

• The Department has an excellent understanding of its inventory of nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel.



• Some of the Department's surplus nuclear materials and spent nuclear fuel do not have defined disposition pathways or have pathways with significant uncertainties.



• Based on in-depth reviews of these materials, the Department is confident that it has identified essentially all those potentially requiring canyon processing.



• A small fraction of the canyon-potential materials may actually require canyon processing.



• None of these materials requires the use of the F-Canyon PUREX process.

In the next few months, the Department will complete analyses of those few material categories for which canyon processing might be needed, e.g., off specification highly enriched uranium. In the longer term, we will also resolve the disposition paths for the limited amount of nuclear materials that have an undecided pathway and monitor to resolution each material category with uncertainties in its established baseline. As noted above, none of these materials requires the use of the F-Canyon PUREX process.

This Nuclear Materials Identification Study supports the Department of Energy Plan for the Transfer of All Long-Term Chemical Separation Activities at the Savannah River Site from the F-Canyon Facility to the H-Canyon Facility Commencing in Fiscal Year 2002, which was submitted to Congress on April 10, 2001. Also, the Department is currently evaluating the impacts associated with the use of H-Canyon for additional missions as well as the impacts of H-Canyon remaining operational as a backup capability. If the impacts on H-Canyon are significant, i.e., would require several additional years of operation, the Department could consider limited use of F-Canyon for certain materials if it is more cost effective.

The Department recently decided to delay the Plutonium Immobilization Plant and initiated a feasibility study to determine the possibility of using some of the facilities in the F-Area to perform parts of the fissile materials disposition mission. Specifically, we are studying the possibility of using the "built, but not used" Plutonium Storage Facility and New Special Recovery line in conjunction with other existing facilities in the F-Area. We expect preliminary results later this year and will keep you and your staff informed.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the review comments received from Mr. Michael Merritt of your staff. If you have any questions, please contact me at (202) 586-5151.

Sincerely,

David G. Huizenga
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Integration and Disposition
Office of Environmental Management

Enclosure

cc:
R. J. Schepens, DOE-SR