

**COMMISSION ON
THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**HEARING ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO
THE NATIONAL GUARD**

2:00 P.M. SESSION

WITNESS:

**GENERAL PETER PACE,
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

JANUARY 31, 2007

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ARNOLD L. PUNARO: Mr. Chairman, we're a few minutes from starting, but if you're ready, we're ready.

GENERAL PETER PACE: I'm ready, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Okay. The commission will reconvene and come to order. This afternoon, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves continues its exploration of the provisions of S2658 and HR5200, the proposed National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006 as updated and reintroduced yesterday, so the legislation is pending again, now entitled the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2007.

As I've noted previously, this legislation evokes strong feeling from supporters and opponents alike and the commission is seeking testimony from witnesses on all sides of the issues in order to get as full an understanding as possible of its implications. And as I've also stated many times, General Pace, the sponsors of this legislation are well-known to you and well-known to the department, because they're some of the strongest supporters of the Department of Defense. So the advocates of this legislation have been consistent supporters of the Guard and the Reserve and the Department of Defense over their long history here in the Congress, and they're not coming at it from the kind of critic side of the House, so to speak.

We also appreciate the tremendous cooperation that we've received from you and Admiral G. and the Joint Staff, but particularly your two fine assistants – two-star assistants – regarding reserve matters. The nation is very fortunate, and I know you know you're very fortunate, to have two of the finest minds on these issues looking at this. And frankly, if these were easy issues and if they were easy to solve, the department would have already solved them; the Congress would have already solved them. And we would probably have already kind of figured out what we might want to recommend. And here we are very close to our March 1 deadline still struggling with trying to come up with some solid recommendations. And so your appearance here today will be extremely timely and extremely helpful.

So our final witness as we prepare our March 1 report is General Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And of course we thank you for your long and distinguished service to the nation and your dedication to our men and women in uniform and their families. And I might add from a personal note, General Pace – and I think it was Barbara Mandrell that had the song, "I Was Country When Country Wasn't Cool" – I will tell you that from personal experience, having served for General Pace in uniform not once but at least twice, he was a strong proponent of the Guard and Reserve when it wasn't in fashion and nobody was paying a lot of attention to who was a strong proponent of the Guard and Reserve.

When he was a three-star commander of the Marine Forces Atlantic and I had the privilege to command the Fourth Marine Division – because of the way forces are all assigned, except for the Guard, to the Joint forces command – and he was the JFCOM Marine component commander, we essentially worked for him from an operational standpoint. And we'd get our commanders in the Fourth Marine Division spread all over the country. Our regimental separate battalion commanders together at least once a quarter, and General Pace – three-star active duty commander – would come to our commanders conferences. He wouldn't spend half an hour. He wouldn't spend an hour. He'd spend an entire day, and he would not only listen to all our pitches, he'd get in and get in the dialogue.

He not only attended the Division Commanders Conference, he also attended the Marine Forces Reserve, which is now the Marine component of NORTHCOM executive committee where we had all our reserve general officers together for several days. And he did that every quarter on a regular basis as a three-star before he moved up.

I will say that I also worked for him when he was a one-star and I think I was a colonel. And I noticed, General Pace, there are a lot of people that say when you had the opportunity to wield the veto pen on my career, you should of – (chuckles) – done it a lot earlier. (Laughter.) So, we thank you and we know that you are a strong proponent of the Guard and Reserve, not just because you are now the chairman, but because you believe it in every bone in your body and have demonstrated that through the career.

So in seeking to give the chief of the National Guard Bureau a larger voice in decision-making and resource allocation within the Pentagon, this legislation would alter a number of existing relationships in DOD, the Joint Staff and the services, and with the Department of Homeland Security and several combatant commands. When Under-Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness David Chu testified last month, he opposed every provision of the legislation and offered support for only one departmental request, that actually in not included in the legislation, but the commission has also been asked to review. Secretary Chu did not suggest any alternative approaches to deal with any of the issues that the legislation seeks to address.

And, General Pace, I know firsthand from what the commission has heard in testimony, what we've learned, not just in our several months specific focus on this new statutory tasking we got from Congress, but we've been in business almost a year, and I know that sort of approaching this from the status quo is probably not going to pass muster, certainly not in the Congress and certainly not from a commission standpoint. So, what we're looking for – and you can greatly assist the commission's work, helping us identify what you feel the real problems are, if any – we believe there are, and have compelling testimony to that effect – and to the extent you're not supportive of the current legislation that currently proposed, if you have any alternative approaches to address those problems.

To give a few examples: what structures would improve, rather than impede, total force integration? And I think we all recognize that when we passed Goldwater-Nichols

in '86, we sort of overlooked the Guard and Reserve and it hasn't been adapted and brought forth and brought into and integrated into that Goldwater-Nichols structure. We certainly don't want to move away from the Goldwater-Nichols structure. We've heard numerous concerns, including from the nation's governors, about the current process used when DOD to resource the National Guard's dual mission, particularly dual-use equipment. Do you have suggestions and ways to improve that process?

As vice chairman, you ran the JROC on a day-to-day basis. As chairman, you chair the JROC, which you've delegated that to Admiral G., so you know requirements back and forth. Are the current efforts of DOD and the Department of Homeland Security to coordinate domestic preparedness adequate, including the identification of the requirements for resources necessary to accomplish this mission?

And I know from your previous testimonies and things I've seen and heard you say, you are a strong proponent of seeking ways to improve the interagency process. I don't believe I would characterize you as one that believes the status quo in that area is acceptable. So you've done a lot there already. What more could we do?

In the JROC, is there a role in facilitating the requirements determination process in this area? And, as indicated, there are a lot of new areas, new structures, new organizations – northern command, the ASD for Homeland Security. Actually, the new command relationships established under Goldwater-Nichols for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military advisor, the increased power of the combatant commanders, the need for crisp military professional advice to the senior decision makers – those relationships were established, but the guard's charter and the guard's relationship has not been brought forward into the future, even though those are 20 years old.

So do you have suggestions for the appropriate roles and interactions between the National Guard bureau, NORTHCOM and JFCOM in planning for and responding to particularly future domestic emergencies?

So, those are just a few of the issues that we've been wrestling with. So again, welcome. We look forward to any opening statement, General Pace, that you might like to make. And then we really appreciate you taking some Qs and As. And I will tell you, on both our end and your end, we have a hard stop at 3:30. I know you would say 15:30, because the House Armed Services Committee – we'd love to keep you – they want us out. They've been very generous in letting us use their room, so we're going to make sure we're out of here on time. So, with that, sir, if you have any opening statement, we'd love to hear it.

GENERAL PETER PACE: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And to the commissioners and yourself, thank you all for taking on this very important task. I do have tremendous respect, admiration for the Guard and Reserve and all that they have done. And whatever we can collectively do to strengthen their capacities, to make their utilization more efficient, is something that is well worth all of our time.

I would like to go on record right up front to say how much we all appreciate, especially those of us in uniform, all that the Guard and Reserve is doing for this country. Put simply, we just flat could not do what we're doing today without the tremendous contributions of our Guard and Reserve. And we all owe them a debt of gratitude and enormous respect. That means, too, their families, who have been uprooted and had their lives changed dramatically in the last several years also deserve our many thanks. Because as you all know, but some folks forget, our families serve this nation as anyone in uniform, and their sacrifices are real and we appreciate.

And especially with the Guard and Reserve, then you have the trickle down impact on their employers. The fact that these men and women are performing their jobs so well simply highlights the fact that they are quality people. That means that whatever job they came from, there's a quality hole that some employer is trying to live with or cope with. And that is a contribution to the nation that we do not take lightly. So I want to thank them.

I came in here without any pre-judgements. I really do want to have a dialogue with you about how best to get from where we are to where we should be. And I think, Mr. Chairman, rather than pretend to know exactly what you all would like to talk about, I would respond to your questions in a dialogue in a way that hopefully will put some meat on the bones.

MR. PUNARO: Great. Thank you, General Pace. And in the interest of dialogue, I really appreciate that. That would be a very welcome format to help us the most. I'd like to talk to you first a little about this issue of advice. And one of the concerns of the proponents of the legislation, and one of the things that we've heard consistently, and one of the things General Blum felt very strongly about this morning is that the Title 10 side of the house, that's well understood and he works directly with the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force. But there seems to be – I won't call it a fuzzy area – but let's just say that he feels, and the proponents feel like – particularly when he's talking about Title 32 and a lot of the activities that the Guard is involved in everyday – are not brought to the table in the most forceful way.

But actually, just so that the senior decision-makers are hearing from an expert that probably knows more about all the dimensions of those responsibilities – the feelings of the governors, things of that nature. And the question is, if you think about it – and let's set aside this issue of what the legislation says he should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If we could set that aside and maybe just have a dialogue about what could we do to basically insure that the voice of the governors is heard – that the issues that relate to homeland defense, that Northern Command is truly oriented toward some of those responsibilities, even though their predominant staff and command structure is active duty and they don't have a lot of experience in those areas. But right in your own backyard as chairman and as a secretary of Defense, how do you get the very best advice from an expert like the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and other experts in that area

in not kind of an informal, ad hoc way – but how could we, you know, what could we do there?

And if there's a better way of phrasing the question, ask the question – (chuckling) – that you think would be better answered than I did.

GEN. PACE: Mr. Chairman, thank you for the flexibility.

I think that – you know, use (?) personalities today, but it's the position. General Steve Blum has enormous wealth of experience and talent that we need to make available to as many decision-makers as possible. As you know, the 1947 law sets up relationships between he and the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and he – Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of the Staff of the Air Force – but there's not relationship in the charter between the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, the combatant commanders – no relationship at all, officially.

Truth of the matter is that all those folks know Steve Blum knows a lot of stuff. So we have informally reached out to him on numerous occasions to get his good advice. I do believe that the charter should include relationships between the Chief of the Guard Bureau and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, so that I can reach out to him and get advice. The Secretary of Defense can reach out to him and get advice. And, so that he can be asked for his opinion and advice by the combatant commanders. Not only NORTHCOM, which is very important, and joint forces command, but also the Pacific commander or the European commander need some very precise information about the Guard and Reserve. Why wouldn't he be able to pick up the phone to an advisor and just say, hey Steve, what do you think about this? What do you think about that?

So I would encourage, in whatever re-writing of the charter is done, that we recognize the unique capacities and experience of the Chief of the Guard Bureau and allow him to be tapped by numerous leaders who have responsibility.

MR. PUNARO: Do you believe there's any statutory prohibition? Now, a lot of what's in the charter is spelled out in statute. It sounds like something that you, working with the Secretary of Defense, could strap on today and take a look and see how you might want to change that. And if changes were necessary that were statutory, could make such recommendations to the Congress. Because, as I understand the legislation, there's some mandate in there about changes to the charter and who should do that. Is there anything precluding the department from making those kind of adjustments you just suggested already?

GEN. PACE: There's no mandate against us talking to whoever General Blum happens to be, but I think it's important that if we are going to add those kinds of tasks to his rucksack, that we also resource him. So I don't know how much additional in office space or individuals on his staff that General Blum would need. But clearly, if we're

going to want him, as we should, to be available to all those decision-makers, we want to resource him properly to be able to do all of that and not do it out of his hip pocket.

MR. PUNARO: Let's talk a little bit, if it's – dialogue a little bit about transition from the issue of getting that good professional military advice at the right levels. It's not just in Washington; it's in the combatant commanders, obviously the governors, to sort of – the duties and responsibilities of some of the commands associated with that, and a lot of the legislation revolves around the rank of general. And as you know from your long experience, that in the military, the highest permanent rank in the military is two-star general. And they'll want to go to one- and two-star for the most part, although the president has some constitutionals where he could send something in that's not done by a board. Those are done by boards. But the three- and four-star rank is tied to the designation of a position of importance and responsibility. And that's within the allocations of the number of flag and general officers in the various grades as authorized by the Congress in statute, and subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, as are all military nominations, you know, above the rank of captain.

Do you think that there's any reason why a Guard or Reserve general officer could not serve – qualified Guard or Reserve general officer – could not serve as the commander, for example, of the U.S. Northern Command – a command heavily oriented to homeland defense?

GEN. PACE: In my opinion, there's reason why he could not or she could not. If they are the best qualified officer for that job, clearly they ought to be assigned the job.

MR. PUNARO: Do you believe that in the ranks of the Guard and Reserve general officers today, that we have individuals that are qualified to be considered to be the commander of U.S. Northern Command?

GEN. PACE: I do.

MR. PUNARO: Now let's jump one step further to the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. And he has all the duties – and these additional duties that we dialogued about that have been added since Goldwater-Nichols – and that thing has been locked in going even before Goldwater-Nichols, so the rank structure for that job has not been adjusted, even though the duties and responsibilities have been significantly adjusted. How would you evaluate the duties and responsibilities of the National Guard Bureau, as a position of importance and responsibility, relative to others in the four-star rank?

GEN. PACE: The way he is currently tasked, and the responsibility he currently has, the rank of Lieutenant General is about right. But, as we go into the future, as we add on the additional responsibilities, then we really should take a step back and just do a very clean, honest evaluation. In total, these new responsibilities, are they in fact more than you would expect a three-star to be responsible for? Are they commensurate with responsibilities of our other four-stars – the combatant commanders, the service chiefs, the service vice chiefs. If the responsibility that, collectively, we put together for the

Chief of the Guard Bureau are commensurate with those of other serving four-stars, then I'd be comfortable recommending he be a four-star.

On the other hand, if they are not commensurate with that level, then we shouldn't just do it to make ourselves feel good. It ought to be the individual has a responsibility. He needs a certain rank to discharge those responsibilities, and base it on that.

MR. PUNARO: And to close out, what would be the best way of doing that evaluation process, because I hate to admit, I'm influenced a little bit by history. I can remember back in the late '70s when the Senate, for example, wanted to make the commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That, of course, was opposed by everybody in the Department of Defense. When Lou Wilson (sp) was transitioned into General – (inaudible) – it wasn't going to affect General Wilson, and the Congress passed that over the objection of the Department of Defense.

I don't think there'd be anybody today that would suggest the commandant of the Marine Corps shouldn't be a member. And I remember when the assistant commandant could only be a four-star if the Marine Corps had 200,000 or more in strength. And, of course, they haven't had that since Vietnam. And so, if it wasn't tied to a position of importance and responsibility, they wouldn't have that. And the examples go on and on.

So what would be the best way – I think you're, you know, having that serious type of evaluation – what would be the best way for that to occur?

GEN. PACE: Well, first of all, if it wasn't for all those changes you mentioned, I would not be sitting here before you as the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Laughter.) So I do believe that there is no one of my grade in the services today who is opposed to promoting the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, if the responsibilities are there. So, it's not like you're trying to overcome some kind of bureaucratic shields up with regard to that.

I do believe that we are capable of doing the analysis – either through someone like Dr. Chu in the building, or some combination of Dr. Chu and the manpower folks in the Army and the Air Force and the Joint Staff – to lay out, side by side, here are the 34 officers who currently have four stars in the U.S. Armed Forces. And these are the responsibilities they have. Here is the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Here are the new proposed responsibilities that he or she is going to have. How do they compare? And is it commensurate? And if it is, then I would recommend four stars. If it's not, then I would recommend leave it alone.

MR. PUNARO: Is there somebody in the military that could do that on an objective basis, as well – a second opinion? Because I will tell you, just being up front, kind of turning that over to Dr. Chu would be viewed with some great suspicion, I suspect, in the Guard community. I'm not speaking for them, but –

GEN. PACE: Let me – to just pull a name out of my head right now I think would be wrong. We could certainly help. I would be happy, as a chairman, to have my J-1 and my vice chairman and myself help in this process. Whatever entity would give everyone comfort that it was about quality and quantity, and not about bias, I would be happy to participate in that.

MR. PUNARO: Great. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Commissioner Ball.

WILLIAM L. BALL: Thank you Mr. Chairman. And welcome, General Pace. Thank you very much for your being with us today, and for your record of distinguished service –

GEN. PACE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MR. BALL. – and for your willingness to engage in this dialogue which promises to be one of the more helpful sessions, I think, that we have had.

I wanted to put a question on the – stemming from testimony we received earlier this morning – on the requirements business in which you are heavily engaged. And the role that has been cited to us by General Blum and others of defining re-equipping requirements for the Guard and Title 32 requirements, which he feels strongly face certain gaps and result in certain gaps in the planning programming process. And I would appreciate your speaking to changes that may have been undertaken recently, intended to address this issue.

His testimony is, specifically with respect to the integration of his work with NORTHCOM, that are some disconnects in the planning process and the developing requirements. We are struggling as a commission with what to do about that issue and that interface with NORTHCOM. And, of course, the legislation, as you know, goes so far as to propose a fairly specific remedy at NORTHCOM. And I would appreciate your, just your comments about this requirements issue and how it might be improved.

GEN. PACE: Mr. Secretary, thank you. There are two things, I think, that are underway that will help us overcome what has clearly been in my mind in the past the problem of properly identifying and resourcing.

One is what's happening on the homeland security side, underneath Secretary Chertoff's leadership. Taking a look at the kinds of problems that might come to our country, whether they be natural or manmade – what are the disasters that may come our way? Then, what capacities does the nation need to be able to respond to those catastrophes. Then, of those, what do we already have and where are the gaps? Once the gaps are identified, then who is best suited to fill those? State and federal civilian agencies, or military? And if military? Best to be done by the Guard and Reserve, or by

the active force, or by all of them. So on the support to homeland, that process is ongoing with our assistance underneath Secretary Chertoff's leadership.

Second, on the military side, the new – what we are calling force generation models, that will provide to the nation the brigade combat teams, and the like, into the future. So that the Army – let's just take the Army, active, and Reserve and Guard. The Army now is building to 48 brigade combat teams with one year out and two years back, ideally, that would allow you to have 16 active brigades at any one time. On the Guard side of the house, we'll have 28 fully manned, trained and equipped brigades. Of those 28, one year out, five years back, you'll get four to five brigades available per year. What that means, then, for those 28 combat brigades on the Guard side of the house is that you'll be able to tell them in a six-year cycle, one brigade one through 28 will come into the window of use for the nation. Whether or not they're going to be deployed will depend on the situation at hand – whether you'll be able to look out the far.

And you'll be able to then, just as we do on the active side, say okay, we're three years away from this unit being utilized. What's their equipment status? What's their personnel status? What's their training status? And be able to do all the things that you need to do and have the forcing mechanism of availability in this window – as we do in the active side – to force us to look at the resources that have been applied, both personnel and others, to insure that the Guard and the Reserve are properly getting resourced. That, combined with what I believe are the lessons learned about two years ago now – I guess it was last year – when we did not do a good enough job of getting the Guard and Reserve into the process early enough, so that not only were they properly resourced, but they knew they were going to be properly resourced.

Army and Air Force learned that lesson in the '07 process, and applied it well in the '08 process. So in '07, which was last year for the sake of the budget, when they came forward, there were concerns in the Guard and Reserve side of the house as to whether or not their Guard and Reserve issues had received proper light of day. This year, to the best of my knowledge, and I've been talking to a lot of folks to include the great guys behind me, everyone is saying, yeah, we did learn our lessons and we are paying attention to that.

So I think those three things – one, paying attention to the lessons; two, the new force generation models; and three, what Department of Homeland Security is doing will systemically cause us to look at where we are, where we should be and how we're going to close that.

MR. BALL: Well, thank you for that explanation. As Secretary Harvey referred earlier when he was here, that the budget to be released next week will show some significant movement in these areas, and specifically in the re-equipping area –

GEN. PACE: Sir, I think there's –

MR. BALL: While he didn't give us the numbers, he said he thought it would be striking to see that.

And that issue is at that core of what the chairman was addressing in terms of the four-star, three-star balance. I think we – at a time when the National Guard was part of the strategic reserve for the country and before the demands on the National Guard are what they are today, one can argue that this requirements process what not so critical in its oversight and management was not under so much intense focus.

Of course today it's an entirely different balancing act, so this gap in this Title 32 side of the House, I think, is something we've all been focused on and we find that there needs to be some remedy there. Whether we can play a role in plugging that gap remains to be seen.

GEN. PACE: Sir, I think the performance of the Guard and Reserve has clearly indicated to all of us that we would ignore their needs to the national defense peril and to the disrespect of the great Americans and their families who serve in the Guard and Reserve. We need to do this right.

I am comfortable that we have recognized what we have done wrong in the past and that we have systems in place now to make that work. Is it still going to be, in part, based on good leadership? You bet.

MR. BALL: Thank you, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Brownlee.

LES BROWNLEE: General Pace, thank you for your long service as a marine and for your services to both the vice-chairman and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

GEN. PACE: Mr. Secretary, thank you.

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you a very much – service to your country. I might point out – you mentioned some things in Goldwater-Nichols we forgot. As you recall, we had a vice chairman in the bill, but he was not a member of the Joint Chiefs.

GEN. PACE: That's right.

MR. BROWNLEE: – only when the chairman was gone could he act in any way in a Joint Chiefs – (inaudible) – and it was several years before –

MR. PUNARO: And I might add, Secretary Brownlee, as you remember, that was a 10-9 vote on the committee to put the vice-chairman in and make him the number two military officer. And, so it was a closely divided – (laughter) – I say that to anybody that's closely divided on some of these issues. Sometimes closely divided issues can work out well. (Laughter.)

MR. BROWNLEE: Anyway, I am going to back now to 1996 because at that time there was a similar provision to make the chief of the National Guard Bureau four-star and some other things. And I happened to be in that conference at the time and drafted a provision which later was acceptable, which, I think, provided for the two officers you have behind you – a major general from the Air Force and a major general from the Army – to serve as advisors on the National Guard matters and Army Reserve – and reserve matters.

So the legislative provisions that are now pending over in the Congress, some of them would repeal that legislation. And we've talked about how useful these officers might be to you and everything, but you're the person who knows. Could you comment on the usefulness of having an officer with National Guard experience, from the National Guard, and working with reserves to advise you on these matters?

GEN. PACE: I would be happy to. I value both of them very much and I would not want to lose those members of my staff, even though I do want to have the chief of the National Guard Bureau be an advisor to me. There's a difference. There's a staff function – I've got a J-1 who helps me with personnel and a J-2 who helps me with intelligence. That does not mean that they're doing the J-1 business of the services or that they're doing the intel business of the CIA, for example. But they're helping me, from a staff level, focus on my own attention on the issues that are important and helping me develop opinions and the like, which is different than advice on how to properly employ, utilize, man, equip the Guard and Reserve.

From where I stand, both are needed. Keep what you've given me and add the advisor role to the chief of the National Guard to be my advisor and, through me, to be an advisor to the secretary of Defense.

MR. BROWNLEE: I guess that says compromises work out also.

Anyway, Secretary Ball was saying that there is a difference now in what the Guard and the Reserve do today versus what they did years ago, even back to 1996. And what they're doing in their Title 10 role, deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, one can only marvel at the dedication and service of these young men and women who volunteered to serve their country, as a citizen soldier, and the burden they've carried the past several years. And, so I think of all of us – they have our whole gratitude for that, as you said.

But it does change the picture somewhat, and that's why I think we need the kind of assessment you said, you described, of the chief of the National Guard Bureau's job. But we also need an assessment of the path of these reserve component officers to senior rank because there are some obstructions in their path in the form of some kind of joint service and things like that. And I think they're getting more of it these days. But, as was indicated, we neglected them in Goldwater-Nichols the first time and we need to ensure that there is a fair path for them – when they have the talent and the capabilities and the wherewithal, that we provide a path to get there. And I'd ask any thoughts you

have on that, too. If you could provide them to the commission, we'd appreciate having them.

GEN. PACE: I think that simply stating that we want the best officer, regardless of service or component, to fill a job is very important. There are no quotas today for how many Marine three- and four-stars are going to be in joint jobs, how many Air Force – over time, as the best officers are selected, it has reached a balance. Sometimes there's more of one flavor than another, but over time it has balanced out pretty well.

I think you will have the same defect by ensuring that we state as part of our goals as a department that our senior joint billets are equally available to our Guard and Reserve officers, that they are expected to have the opportunity to compete, and, based on who the best person is, they'll be selected or not selected. I would not want to go to a quota system – I think that does damage – but I would want to emphasize the desire of the nation to have everybody have the opportunity to compete for these jobs.

MR. BROWNLEE: If we could just take a moment, could we have these two fellows – officers, I'm sorry – that we've talked about just stand and introduce themselves?

GEN. PACE: Sure, sir.

Mike?

MIKE SOMERALL (SP): Yes sir, I'm Mike Somerall (sp). I'm an adjunct National Guardsman, and I've been working with Jim for about a year and a half.

TOMMY DIKES (SP): Tommy Dikes (sp); I'm an Air Force Reservist – (off mike).

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you for your service as well, and your families, too. Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Dawson?

RHETT DAWSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and. And, Mr. Chairman, welcome. Thank you. We appreciate your appearance here today.

I wanted to go back to how you started off in this dialogue, trying to figure out where we are and where we're trying to get to. And one of the really hard parts of our conversation and the run-up to our March 1st report is this whole question of the relationship between NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau. And here you have two organizations, one of which is relatively new, NORTHCOM, and one of which – the National Guard Bureau, which predates the 1947 Act, possibly, and was not affected greatly by it, trying to get integrated together. And I've heard your caution – I've heard it

before – that we should be allergic to any notion that specifies a particular officer getting into a particular billet.

However, the legislation we're being asked to comment upon specifies, or would specify if enacted, that a National Guard individual, a general officer, serve as the deputy of NORTHCOM. And I think that this is well-intentioned, from my understanding, that it's trying to cure a perceived gap between what's happening in the homeland defense area and how it's being responded to and how responsive NORTHCOM and how aware NORTHCOM is in trying to fill that gap.

And so it's well-intentioned, and I understand your point about not wanting to be specific and wanting to find the best individual. But here's a case where there's a desire to try to jumpstart the integration process by putting in place an individual from a particular organization. And I'd like you to comment on that particular proposed provision, if you would.

GEN. PACE: Yeah, it's kind of like asking a judge if he runs a fair court, I guess, to ask a guy serving on active duty whether or not we have the capacity to pick the right person to fill the job, regardless of component. I do believe we have that capacity. The problem I have with picking the deputy job for any particular person or service is, what about the chief of staff's job, and what about the commander's job? I would not want to preclude them of being either/or, or both, or whatever.

If, for whatever reason, you got to the point where you absolutely had to say something about that, then I would pick the top tier of the organization and say, perhaps, either, at least one of, the chief of staff or the deputy commander or the commander should come from the Guard Reserve component. If you had to do that to have comfort, and we could do what we wanted to do, I would rather have that be the statement than picking a particular job, because we need to have the opportunity to grow people. And you may or may not have the exact right person to be the deputy commander, but you may have the exact right person to be the chief, or you may have the right person to be the commander, just the way that the sign wave works as people come and go at that end of their career.

So I recommend against picking any kind of quota, but if you had to, I'd make it big enough so you could allow flexibility so you could get the right people into the right jobs.

MR. DAWSON: And let me just be intrepid enough to take that one step further. Do you see some virtue of this being an assistance to you if you had the perception – not your job, but the perception that you think there is a gap in the ability to integrate well, to really advocate well within NORTHCOM – can you sympathize with that point of view and see some virtue to it?

GEN. PACE: I see the virtue from the standpoint of those on the outside looking in, wanting to make sure that we're not going to do something stupid. But if the guy on

the inside looking at it – if I happen to be Admiral Tim Keating, I am going to shoot myself in the foot if I'm not smart enough to recognize that I need a very senior guard officer on my staff. That's why he has – without being told to, the chief of staff right now is a Guard officer. That's important. It's going to be important. Right now, about 10 percent of Admiral Keating's staff are Guard and Reserve. In my opinion, that's not enough, and I'd like to see more Guard and Reserves throughout his structure – have the spaces allocated so he can hire those guys and gals so we have the opportunity for our youngsters to grow so we have more people to pick from at the high end.

So, I do understand the viewpoint that you articulate. From where I sit, it's not needed. But from where you sit, it is. And I would simply ask you to make it broad enough so we can let folks grown and not constrain whoever the best officer is assigned to be the commander, not tie his or her hands into a particular job at a particular moment.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time's expired.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Eckles?

LARRY ECKLES: General Pace, the governors have expressed concern that they aren't properly considered in departmental decisions that affect them as commanders in chief of their various states. Do you know of any mechanisms, formal or informal, employed by DOD to ensure that governors have the opportunities to present their views to senior leaders such as yourself?

GEN. PACE: It's informal right now, sir, and I think it needs to be formalized. First of all, to my knowledge, there's not a governor in the land who isn't going to pick up the telephone and call anybody he or she wants to about their troops in their state. They call the president, they call the secretary, they call whoever they want to and need to, and rightfully so do so, when their guard is being discussed for employment or not. So I don't see that as a problem.

What is the informal mechanism right now is the adjutants general of each of the states meeting several times a year with whoever Lieutenant General Blum happens to be at the time to discuss the issues of the day, and then General Blum sharing that in his statutory requirement with the Air Force and Army, but not in a formal way with the secretary of Defense and the chairman. And I think that's where we can help close that loop, by giving the chief of the Guard Bureau the direct linkages to the chairman and to the secretary in a way that puts the expectation on him that he will, in fact, take what the adjutants general is saying as their governor's opinion and desires to the chief of the Guard Bureau, to the chairman and the secretary – which does not preclude or not preclude the governors doing what they're going to do today or tomorrow, which is pick the phone up and call whoever they want to, to ensure themselves as commanders in chief of their militia that they're being heard. But I do think we can help by making the advisor relationship formal.

MR. ECKLES: Thank you, General.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Keane?

JOHN KEANE: General Pace – Pete, it's great seeing you, and I publicly thank you for your leadership, particularly when then nation's at war like we are, and the remarkable performance the troops are turning in. You and your leaders helped set the conditions for their success. And I just want to thank you publicly for who you are and what you stand for in this country, and the capable representative you are for all of them.

GEN. PACE: Thank you.

MR. KEANE: This four-star thing, I want to go back to it. It's radioactive; I realize that.

GEN. PACE: You haven't asked me the tough question –

MR. KEANE: And maybe that's why I can't stay away from it, but – General Blum and you are at odds, and I want to make sure the distinction is clear, that General Blum, when he looks at his current duties, believes it does rise to the level of a four-star, and when you look at his current duties, they do not rise to the level of a four-star. Do I have that right –

GEN. PACE: You had –

MR. KEANE: – in terms of his current duties.

GEN. PACE: You had my beliefs right. And what you're telling me is new – (audio break, tape change).

MR. KEANE: And also I thought it was pretty informative, when he looks at his duties he aligned himself, frankly, with two service chiefs in the sense that there were some correlation there. But he doesn't command any forces like our combatant commanders, and, as I took Secretary Harvey through it, Secretary Harvey organizes, mans, trains, equips, provides the doctrine and education for the Army Guard, and I'm assuming I would get the same response if the Air Force secretary was here. And while General Blum may have some input to that, he doesn't have the responsibility that the secretary and the service chiefs have.

So when I look at this, his primary duties surround a coordinating function, because he's not a commander and he doesn't have the Title 10 responsibilities that a service chief or a service secretary has. What do you think of that characterization that I just made?

GEN. PACE: I think it's accurate. That does not take away from the enormous contribution that General Blum is making to the nation right now. And, as I mentioned, I would not, given today's responsibilities, make that officer a four-star, whoever that

officer is. If, however, we add to his rucksack, and if we go through, in comparison to the other 34 who have four-stars, that's how I would make a judgment. My judgment today is that given current responsibilities, three stars is correct.

MR. KEANE: Ok, thank you.

Dealing with the requirements generation process and the frustration that many Guard leaders have that they're not able to get many of their requirements through the system – and I think their arguments – I don't want to speak for everybody here, but I know for myself they're somewhat persuasive – that there's something wrong with the system. And one of the things that they have identified is the military support we provide to the governors and to the states, and it comes under Title 32, but it's military support that we, the United States military, Department of Defense, provides to the states. And there's not a requirements generation process for that, so there's a thought that most all the requirements come from combatant commanders or from the services in the normal process. And you're more familiar than anybody is because you sat at the very top of that process.

Would there be a way that NORTHCOM – and given the fact that we truly do integrate their staff with more Guard and Reserve – could begin that requirements generation process for them, similar to what other combatant commanders do, because NORTHCOM does have some responsibilities to homeland security and homeland defense, does have some responsibilities to the states and what they're doing. It's not in their rucksack now. But is that a feasible way to begin to start this process so that there's a formalized process – he has responsibility and accountability for it and Blum and others don't have to work around the process when they don't get what they want, come over to the Congress here and bang on their door to try to get what they want – which, you know, he admits he has to do far too often.

GEN. PACE: The short answer to your question is yes. I think that's a very good place and a very good responsibility for now-Admiral Keating to have. It's not the only place that would be able to provide input to the requirements process – as I mentioned, what Secretary Chertoff is doing with NORTHCOM being on that committee, with the assistant secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense who's on the secretary's staff being part of that process – there are multiple ways to do that. But the combatant commander who we should be looking to for the primary combatant command input on operational requirements for the Guard and Reserve should be NORTHCOM. And the combatant commander who we should be looking at for manning, training, equip requirements at the joint level should be Joint Forces Command.

So, yes, we should do that; we should reinforce that with them. But we ought not to allow ourselves to think that only one of these gentlemen has the responsibility. Several do, and we should just point out – if it's not clear enough in the guidance we've given them, we should point out to them that responsibility.

MR. KEANE: Okay, one other thing. At the very top of the process is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the JROC, as you're very much aware of, and there's a thought that these requirements for the Guard and the Reserve do not get the visibility that they should, due to some constipation in the process; that we should have a Guard member as a standing member of the JROC so that the Guard's concerns in terms of requirements would be properly addressed by that body. Do you have a viewpoint on that?

GEN. PACE: I absolutely disagree with it. If there is that problem, then we should make the vice chief of staff of the Army and the vice chief of staff of the Air Force do their job. That is their job. And to the extent that the Guard and Reserve feel like they're not being represented, it is those officers' responsibility to fix it.

MR. KEANE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA LEWIS: General Pace, thank you again for your service and for taking the time to be here today. I'm going to try to be brief so my colleagues can have an opportunity. But you mentioned earlier in your testimony that the relationships for the chief of the National Guard Bureau have grown beyond that of his responsibilities to the Army and the Air Force. Along those lines, the Empowerment Act that has been introduced suggests that responsibility for drafting that charter moved from the Army and the Air Force secretaries to the secretary of Defense. I just wanted to get your views on whether or not you think that that responsibility should be placed elsewhere within the department because of the broader responsibility.

GEN. PACE: I would be fine with the secretary of Defense being tasked to do that as long as we were not overlooking the very important responsibilities, authorities of the secretary of the Air Force and the secretary of the Army. They need to be part of that process. But if you were to put the secretary of Defense on top of his two secretaries, that works for me.

MS. LEWIS: Okay, thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner McKinnon.

DAN MCKINNON: General Pace, I echo what General Keane talked about, and I can tell you, I don't know what your reputation was at the Naval Academy back in 1967, but the word I'm getting directly from there these days is that your initials of Peter Pace stand for "practically perfect," so you have a lot of admiration.

(Laughter.)

GEN. PACE: I've put a lot of money on the street to have you say that, sir. Thank you. (Laughter.) Seriously, thank you, sir.

MR. MCKINNON: I'd like to talk about economic issues. As you know, the president and the secretary of Defense have recently announced four new provisions to try assist there in the war by adding 67,000 troops and 25,000 Marines, five – surge five brigades over there with about 21,500 troops, as well as reducing the mobilization of the Guard to about a year, and on top of all that, be sure they deploy as organic units and not with a lot of cross-leveling. It's going to take some money from the Congress to do that. If you don't get the money from the Congress, how are you going to afford it? And does it come from the Guard side of the House?

GEN. PACE: I'll try to answer the question. If I didn't hear you right or you want a different approach, please tell me.

As I understand the law of the land, when this nation is war, the president of the United States has the authority to fund that war and he has the authority to get that money from whatever bins he so determines to take it. So I do believe that this president, having committed these troops to combat, also has the authority to provide the resources for them.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay, but he can't increase the pot, can he, without the approval of the Congress?

GEN. PACE: We may be talking past each other, sir, but for those troops that go into combat, the president can use the resources of the nation, regardless of how they were allocated. He can food and forage to provide the resources needed for the troops in combat. So for those going into combat, active Guard or Reserve, the president, as I understand the law of the land, can do what he needs to do to provide the resources they need.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay. Now, General Blum testified this morning that the Guard is 40 percent short – or \$40 billion short on what they need to have an 80 percent readiness ability. Secretary Harvey testified that they're going to get about – he's fenced in about \$21 billion of the 40 billion. How do you see it plan out to get the Guard whole? My understanding also is that after about 9/11 time, they were about \$100 billion short on what they needed for equipment at that time. I mean, how – we're in a war, as I see it, a real serious war, even though the public doesn't seem to understand the importance of it, and so how do we make – this is a long-term war, so how do we get the economics; how do you convince the Congress? What are we going to do to make this thing whole in a rather rapid way without a five, six year POM-type thing?

GEN. PACE: Sir, as I recall the numbers – and these are close if not exact – there is about \$15 billion – I think it's 14.7 – in the pending request to Congress to go to the depots to help repair the 40 percent of our equipment that is currently in the repair/retrofit process. In addition, in the Army budget there's another 20 billion – 20.1 I think it is –

billion to – in addition to repairing the equipment that's been used, to fill in those things that did not exist a couple of years ago.

So there's an enormous amount of money being applied to the total force with at least 20 billion of it focused on the Guard – the Guard and Reserve, excuse me – to flesh out their numbers. To my knowledge, we have asked for as much money as our depots can possibly use for their capacity, meaning there's more work to be done, but it'll probably take two years to get the work done because there's a limited amount of capacity in the depots, so we've asked for enough money to keep the depots fully churning. But we realize, at that rate, if we were to stop today doing any more damage to any more equipment, it would take two years to work off that backload of repairable equipment.

MR. MCKINNON: You mean they're maxed out today; there's no additional surge capability for the depots?

GEN. PACE: As –

MR. MCKINNON: – for reset-type repair?

GEN. PACE: We have allocated the resources that would keep the depots at maximum capacity, given numbers of shifts available and numbers of skilled workers available to work. I'm trying not to be too cute about that. I think you could go to a depot and say, if you had another 300 workers who had the skills to do this work, could you put them on the line, I think the answer to that question would be yes. What I'm saying though is for all the workers near that depot who are available to work and for the shifts that are operating, that we've asked for that amount of money.

I didn't do a very good job of telling you that story, I apologize. There is still some surge capacity in the depots, but it would require primarily shifting skilled labor from other parts of the country to those depots to increase the work.

MR. MCKINNON: When you come up to the Hill and advocate budget figures, do you sort of figure what you're going to operate on basically on what are the budgets handed to you, or do you sort of figure what the threat is and what the budget should be based on the threat? How do you make that distinction in your recommendations?

GEN. PACE: In my – well, a couple of bites at this apple. The first bite is internal to the Pentagon processes that are without constraint. If we had a perfectly blue sky and could spend all the money we wanted, what would we do? And then we put some rationality on top of that with regard to what it is that the uniformed services should reasonably request from our fellow citizens in the way of support. That number is normally provided to us by the Office of Management and Budget. We work within that number and we tell the secretary of Defense where the difference is, if any, between what we're able to do and what we'd like to do. That then becomes part of the president's decision process at OMB to decide how much more or less we're going to get allocated.

When we then go in front of Congress, we, properly, so defend the budget that's submitted, but we also then answer questions from the Congress as far as, if you had another \$3.75, what would you do with it? So we try to be as forthcoming as possible, stay inside of our lanes in the system, but also be available to answer questions from our elected representatives.

MR. MCKINNON: Ok, you know, under Kennedy – President Kennedy, they had about 9 percent GDP. It went down under Reagan to about 6 percent, and now it's down – depends on who you talk to – somewhere between 2.8 and 3.8. With the shortages that we have, and looking ahead to the threats we have ahead – I mean, it's not just the Islamic people; it's China, India, and all these other potential problems, North Korea, Iran – would you advocate a greater GDP, and if so, how much? I think this is important because equipping is really critical to the military today.

GEN. PACE: The numbers that I have in my head are that if the Congress approves this budget as submitted, it will be about 3.9 percent of what this year's GDP would be. That is historically rather modest. It is an enormous amount of money; it is historically rather modest. If you were to give me more than that, could I tell you where to spend it? Yes. If you were to give me less than that, could I tell you how to cut? Yes.

MR. MCKINNON: Okay, thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. We need to move on.

Commissioner Rowley.

WADE ROWLEY: Thank you Mr. Chairman.

General Pace, it's a great privilege for me to have your presence here today and I thank you for your time coming in this afternoon to testify before us. I'll be quick. We hear a lot about DOD's role of providing defense support to civil authorities. Two part question: What's your definition of this role, as you see it today, and is this definition widely shared and agreed upon by DOD, governors, TAGs, as well as Department of Homeland Security?

GEN. PACE: Definition of which role, Mr. Rowley? I'm sorry.

MR. ROWLEY: Our military role in civil support.

GEN. PACE: The second part is easier to answer than the first, and that's yes. And our role is to provide support to the lead federal agency inside of the United States. Almost always it'll be FEMA in support of the governor – us in support of FEMA in support of the governor. Those arrangements could change, but we very much are in support of proper civil authority inside the boundaries of the United States. And I don't know anybody who disagrees with that.

MR. ROWLEY: That's the only question I had. Thank you, General.

GEN. PACE: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Sherrard.

JAMES SHERRARD III: Sir, it's indeed a pleasure to have you join us this afternoon and I'd like acknowledge also the great contributions of your assistants, and particularly Major General Tommy Dikes (sp) has informed me today that he's going to be departing our ranks here very soon, and I would tell you it was a pleasure to serve with him and he's a great officer and will be sorely missed. No matter what he chooses to do, he'll have large smiles on his face, I'm sure, in Key Largo.

GEN. PACE: I agree with you.

MR. SHERRARD: Sir, you've touched on requirements, and I understand exactly – at least I think I understand exactly where you're coming from. But I would like to go with one particular provision that it talks about – the proposed legislation talks about, and that is that the chief of the National Guard Bureau would, in fact, identify gaps between federal and state responses for emergencies and report that to SECDEF. And my question to you, sir, is that the appropriate avenue for the chief of the National Guard Bureau – the appropriate avenue to do that? Is that the right avenue that it should go to, whoever does it, or should it be at the service levels of the Army and the Air Force to keep it in the standard PPBS cycle?

GEN. PACE: I think it's appropriate for the chief of the National Guard Bureau to have opinions, do homework – excuse me – on that. I think it's appropriate for that officer to share those opinions with the Army, Air Force, NORTHCOM, secretary of Defense. I think it's a responsibility of the commander of NORTHCOM, who is the primary combatant commander responsible for providing the military assistance to civil authorities – it his responsibility to be the advocate for filling whatever gaps there are. So the chief of the National Guard Bureau ought to have a voice in this process. But the responsibility – who do you look to as a nation to be the one voice to speak on that issue? – should be the commander of NORTHCOM.

MR. SHERRARD: Okay, and as I follow on – and I think it will be tied to based on your response here that you just gave us – there's also a discussion from the – the ability to fund those particular issues would be – I think of General Blum's comments this morning – would be something along the lines of SOCOM, where there would be special funding that could possibly be vested with the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Do you think that's appropriate or not for equipment needs that they need for the homeland mission, which, in fact, may not be able to be covered in our existing budget – or, I should say, the secretary of the Army's proposal for their budget?

GEN. PACE: I would not recommend that. And the reason I would not recommend that is that you don't know in advance what other priorities a nation has. It is the responsibility of the NORTHCOM commander to do what I just said. It's the responsibility of the PACOM commander to do it for the Pacific; the European commander to do it for Europe; all of our combatant commanders, both the regional ones and the ones who do transportation and things like that to articulate their needs. It is our responsibility as the Joint Staff and my responsibility as chairman to make sure all those voices are heard to ensure that the process that includes the deputy secretary of Defense and the vice chairman on a day-to-day basis takes those all into account.

And then it's all of our collective responsibility that we take a vote to the secretary to say, here are the gaps; here are the ones that we've been able to fill, and very importantly, Mr. Secretary, these are the things that, in this case, the Northern Commander has said he or she wants that we cannot fill and this is why, and this is why we have prioritized them outside the money that's available.

Defense – any part of the defense establishment, in the belief that – in perpetuity that that thing, whatever it is, is going to outweigh all other requirements for national defense, I think would be a structural mistake in the way we do business.

MR. SHERRARD: Thank you sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. PUNARO: Commissioner Stockton.

DONALD STOCKTON: Thank you, sir, for being with us today and sharing your expertise. I have one question. And first I'd like to say that our immediate mission of this commission is to make recommendations to Congress about the National Guard Empowerment legislation. And I want to focus on the interagency cooperation.

As you know, there are several agencies involved in homeland defense and homeland security. The National Guard Bureau and the National Guard as an entity is a very key player in this overall program, as is the Department of Homeland Security, the assistant secretary for Homeland Defense, and the White House Office of Homeland Security – all key players in our homeland. Do you perceive that there's impediments to – or obstacles for this to be a team play? And if so, how can we ensure that the National Guard capabilities are best utilized to achieve the national security objectives?

GEN. PACE: I do not see any greater impediments to the inter-agency functioning in the construct you described than I do for interagency functioning writ large, meaning that I do believe that as a nation we can and must do better at the way our interagency functions, and that the lessons that we learned over 20 years of Goldwater-Nichols enactment and the way that that drove us to valuing joint experience, joint education, et cetera, that we need to find mechanisms like that for our government that

will allow all of us to better understand what is happening in the other departments so we can better understand what's possible and also open up the doors of trust.

But I do not see any more problem inside the group that you mentioned than I do inside our government as a whole, and I think if we solve the larger interagency functioning problem, we will also solve the one you described.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, sir.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you.

Commissioner Stump.

E. GORDON STUMP: Good morning, sir. It's great to see you again and have you here testifying.

We're concentrating right now on, as we indicated, on the Guard Empowerment Act and the provisions of that. And I want to go back to the Townsend Report from the White House, and Recommendation Number 32 says DOD should consider charting the National Guard Bureau as a joint activity of the DOD, and then it lists some responsibilities. Now, that covers a couple of the provisions of the Guard Empowerment Act. One is that the DOD will be involved in the charter, and two is that the National Guard Bureau will become a joint activity.

Now, we get into the responsibilities which you alluded to earlier in some of your comments and it says, serve as a focal point in developing – this is for the National Guard Bureau – serve as a focal point in developing, managing, and integrating employment of the joint National Guard capabilities for the Joint Staff and the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the support of the combat commanders; act as a DOD channel of communication to and from National Guard of the states and territories; support all combatant commanders in developing joint operation requirements for contingency and response plans; specifically support U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, and the states and territories in developing strategy and contingency plans for homeland defense missions; and to administer Army and Air Force programs ; acquire distribute, and manage resources; plan, coordinate, and provide situation awareness and other support of the combat commanders.

Now, this was from the Townsend report. Now, would you support these recommendations?

GEN. PACE: Sir, your lips were moving faster than my ears –

MR. STUMP: I'm sorry, sir.

GEN. PACE: – so I don't know if I would support every single thing she said or not without having a chance to read it in detail and know whether or not there's any outliers there. However, the fact that the National Guard Bureau does many of the things – and should do many of the things – that are there, if not all, certainly indicates that it is, in many ways, a joint activity. Whether or not you'd call it a joint activity I think is academic, just like whether you call it a joint Navy, a joint Air Force, a joint Marine Corps, joint National Guard. The real impetus, I believe, is for those officers who serve in those jobs, for them to get the joint credit that allows them to compete for the jobs that we want them to compete for.

So, just like we have some pure Navy jobs, mostly in planning, that get joint credit, what we should do with the National Guard Bureau is take a look at the structure in the Guard Bureau and look at those ones that do those things that you just talked about, and the ones that do, make sure that they get the joint credit they deserve so that Major Pace, working at the National Guard Bureau, when he's a lieutenant colonel colonel, has credit of having worked very extensively – not because you want to give him credit, but because he did – so that when he competes to be the guy to go to NORTHCOM to head up as a colonel, or whatever the shop is he's going to head up, that he can compete for those jobs. That's what I think the impetus is and I embrace making sure that those who do joint work get joint credit.

MR. STUMP: Thank you very much, sir.

GEN. PACE: Yes sir.

MR. PUNARO: General Pace, in the little bit of time we have remaining, I want to see if we can continue the dialogue a little bit and maybe consider this in the stray voltage department, kind of thinking out loud, but – and this is not to get into a point-counterpoint on the four-star because I think it's important – as you said, it ought to be based on the duties and responsibilities.

Now, and I'm going to ask if you're willing for your two key advisors to take on a little homework assignment because what we need to do on our staff is send you a copy of the transcript, particularly General Blum's articulation of his duties, because I believe he suggested – and I could be wrong, and you can look at it and determine it – he believes that he's added a lot of rocks to his rucksack that weren't there before when that position was first established as a three-star. And you've seen these charts, and your excellent staff actually, I think, probably was working on something very similar, and he would suggest that Title 10, Title 32 stayed active duty.

This was really a chart designed to talk about the two-way advisory flow and how that needed to be improved, and you've given us a tremendous amount of insight and guidance, extremely helpful, on that subject already. But he would argue that – I don't know that he would argue this, but let me just say these are the rocks that he suggested this morning that were new, such as the state partnership program; the OCONUS counter-narcotics; NORTHCOM of course created in '02, which is a new responsibility he has to

deal with; the new ASD for homeland defense; of course, the whole creation of DHS; OCONUS counterdrug; OCONUS humanitarian ops; airport security 2001; Noble Eagle 2001; force national security events 2004; Katrina and Rita 2005; Jumpstart 2006; and, of course, his relationships with the secretary of Defense and CJCS.

Post-Goldwater-Nichols, none of this, you know, were in his rucksack when the job was established as a three-star. So the question is, when you were – what's the baseline and would you be willing to take a look at the transcript of what he said and determine whether or not those things were in the – when you said you don't think the job as currently construed warranted a four-star, but if there were additional responsibilities added to his rucksack, are these in or out right now in the judgment that you gave us? And since you don't have the benefit of seeing what he said – and I don't want to paraphrase what he said – would you be willing to have your staff take a little homework assignment on that?

GEN. PACE: Sure, but I can answer the question right now.

MR. PUNARO: All right, sir, go ahead.

GEN. PACE: My judgment, and what I said, is based on what is currently in the charter for the National Guard Bureau, written in 1947 and amended in 1956 –

MR. PUNARO: Okay.

GEN. PACE: – or '58. That's it.

MR. PUNARO: Got it.

GEN. PACE: He has done a lot of additional things –

MR. PUNARO: Right.

GEN. PACE: – that he has been enormously helpful to the country. If, in the judgment of this commission and those who are going to write the charter, most or all of those things belong in there, and other things are added, then we ought to take a look at that.

MR. PUNARO: Okay.

GEN. PACE: My judgment is based on what he is tasked to do right now.

MR. PUNARO: Right. That's why I thought the baseline was critically important, and you've really enlightened us there.

The other stray voltage is – and, you know, we need to do it just the way you described it, in my judgment, but some in the department have already made up their

minds; some in the Congress have already made up their mind. We on the commission are going to have to make a determination, you know, with the best information we have available right now, because we're kind of on a little bit of a deadline. But another stray voltage is that, because in the interests of dialogue and everybody wants to do the right thing for the country, there are those outside organizations – and everybody can make their own judgment, but there are people that do these studies for the joint staffs and OSD every day of the week and they do the flag and general officer evaluations, some of the FFRDCs; they've been at it for years. There might be one out there – and I would suggest you might consider one that the Guard Bureau would trust and have that kind of – because this isn't going to be enacted into law in the next month because the bill that's going to – the legislation that's going to consider the National Guard Empowerment Act, you know, they're going to be marking up in the May/June timeframe and it's going to be moving through the legislative process. So there's plenty of opportunity, no matter what anybody's position is right now, for the kind of deliberate, professional, thoughtful, comparative evaluation to be done, and that might be something worth considering.

GEN. PACE: Mr. Chairman, whoever does it needs to be viewed as impartial, that's for sure.

MR. PUNARO: Correct.

GEN. PACE: And I'm neither for nor against. My baseline is current law and charter and I reserve the right to take a look at whatever the new charter would look like to see how those responses will add up. Could be that you would add in all those things that you just talked about and we would still come down on three stars. Could be that all those things add up and it should be four-star. Don't know, don't want to guess sitting here, but my baseline is what he's told he should be doing, not what he's been doing.

MR. PUNARO: Okay, let me see if any other commissioners have any additional questions. Coming around.

MR. MCKINNON: Let me just ask just one here. There's been some talk about the Army Reserves and the Army Guard and about merging the two into the Guard. Have you got any thoughts on that? Save money maybe and even upgrade some of the equipment that the Reserves have? Just some of the talk and the scuttlebutt about that.

GEN. PACE: Yes, sir, I'm going to give you a knee-jerk reaction. I think that's a bad idea. The Guard serves a purpose. The Reserves serve a purpose. And I do not think we'd do the nation well to mix those two together.

MR. PUNARO: Anybody else?

MR. KEANE: General Pace, this deals with Katrina. As we all know, we had a huge catastrophe on our hands there and I think it's informed everyone that's looked at that problem and all the problems we had with the first responders being overwhelmed

and different levels of agencies and governments and the challenges that took place. But some of the challenges also dealt with forces.

And I'm wondering if there's anything that we can do to improve that. And this is my comment: When we have a catastrophic incident like that where it is a crisis because people's lives are at risk – in this case it was flooding, in another case it could be a horrific event in terms of somebody attacking us – so time is precious to us and 72, 96 hours are probably very precious in terms of trying to preserve life, so it truly is a crisis, and we're going to move – the United States, the people in America, they just watch their military go overseas and solve all sorts of problems of other people; they have a problem like this in their homeland, they expect us to come and they don't care whether we're Guard, Title 32, Reserve, Marine, Army, they don't care. All they want is, just come help us, like we've been doing for other people all over the world, and yet here we are struggling to get that done in a place as close as Louisiana.

So, that being the case, and assuming this crisis, we would probably move state forces into the area from various states because the first responders were overwhelmed, but we also would probably move federal forces, just as we had done in Katrina. In doing that, do you see any problem with federal forces being able to respond to the orders of a governor so that we could have unity of command at the operational level – and I'll come back to the tactical level – but at the operational level, so we can get unity of effort? I know we respond to a lead agency, but is there a way to make it a little clearer to that that governor who, in a sense is the commander in chief of that state, has responsibility for dealing with this crisis and now has federal forces as well as state forces to assist?

GEN. PACE: There is a way, General Keane, to do that and it's a lesson we did learn out of Katrina, even though we had 50,000 Guard and Reserve and 20,000 active show up, but there were some lessons, obviously, to be learned from that. A couple of instances since that time, what we have done is, by prior agreement between the governor of the state and the president of the United States, when the federal forces arrive, the National Guard officer on the ground is working for the governor, is dual-hatted. He's able to keep both his Title 32 and Title 10 responsibilities, and that National Guard officer, by prior agreement between the governor and the president, is also able to command the federal forces that come in.

MR. KEANE: And this is out of that joint force headquarters that each governor is going to establish? General Blum was talking about this this morning. Is that where this comes from?

GEN. PACE: Could be. It could be whoever the governor has in his state that he has appointed – if it's a JJHA (ph), commander, that works just fine. But the key right now is that before the federal troops show up, the president and the governor agree that the governor's senior military person, or Title 32, can also be dual-hatted as Title 10, so he can do both jobs.

MR. KEANE: Well, that's a great answer. That solves both the operational problem and the tactical control problem where you have federal forces and state forces on the street responding to parallel chains of commands.

GEN. PACE: Yes, sir.

MR. KEANE: Thank you.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you. And before I thank you, Mr. Chairman, let me thank again your Guard and Reserve advisors for their tremendous help.

GEN. PACE: May I – you haven't – nobody's asked me what I thought would be an interesting question.

MR. PUNARO: Oh, you know what? Actually, can I ask you – to see if you and I were thinking on the same wavelength, with your permission, can I – I forgot to say, what do you think about the head of the National Guard being a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Was that the question?

GEN. PACE: I thought you'd never ask, sir. (Laughter.)

We spent 20-plus years, first kicking and dragging our feet and then embracing jointness, as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all to get one Army, one Navy, one Air Force, one Marine Corps, one Joint Force. If you make this individual a member of the Joint Chiefs, you create two Armies and two Air Forces. You're going absolutely 100 percent counter to the thrust of Goldwater-Nichols and you will do major damage to the synergy that we've gotten. Even though we had to be dragged and pulled in that direction, we are there and we should not take a step back. So I would recommend, in the strongest terms I know how, do not do that.

MR. PUNARO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, not only for that answer but for prompting us to remember to ask the question. And, again, before I thank you, I want to thank your two advisors. Tell them to keep their cell phones on in the next couple of days because we're going to need their help as we kind of do our deliberations. Also, General Dysus (ph), when he leaves your advisory orbit, I hope you'll consider coming over and continuing to help advise us. I have to tell you, with no pay, we're a government commission, so you'll have to do it for free. (Laughter.)

Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank Lynn for your tremendous service to the nation, but more importantly, for the support you give our men and women in uniform and their families each and every day as they carry out the many difficult and challenging missions that our nation gives them each and every day. So thank you and thank you and we'll stay in close touch and continue the dialogue.

GEN. PACE: Thank you Mr. Chairman. It was an honor.

MR. PUNARO: The commission stands adjourned.

(Sounds gavel.)

(END)