Number 138                    December 2000

COURT DECISIONS  |   FLRA   |   MSPB

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).

A plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with additional evidence that proves the respondent's offered explanation is false, may support a finding of unlawful discrimination.

Petitioner Reeves was fired because of alleged errors in recording the attendance of his subordinates. He filed suit, contending he was really fired because of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended. He established his prima facie case by showing that: (1) he was a member of the protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he had held with the company; (3) he was subjected to an unfavorable employment decision (i.e., he was discharged); and (4) the employer hired from outside the protected class (a succession of people in their thirties) to replace him.

The burden shifted to the employer, which claimed Reeves was fired because of poor attendance records. Reeves then submitted evidence that his records were accurate, that specific errors attributed to him were the responsibility of others, or were not errors, and that a key official in the company had made disparaging remarks about his age.

The jury found for Reeves, but the Fifth Circuit reversed. It found that he had proved the reasons given by the employer were false, but had not proved that discrimination was the real reason for the discharge. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits as to whether a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with evidence that the employer's explanation is false, can be adequate to support a finding of intentional discrimination. Based on the specific facts of the case, the Court found there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's discrimination finding. However, it said a prima facie case and proof that the employer's reason is false will not always be enough. The facts in a particular case may show "that the defendant gave the false explanation to conceal something other than discrimination . . . ."

It is helpful to read this case, along with St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In that case, a district court found that the discharged employee's evidence had proved that the employer's explanation was untrue, but had not established that discrimination was the real reason for the discharge. The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that once the employers' reasons were discredited, they "were in no better position than if they had remained silent, offering no rebuttal" to the prima facie case. The Supreme Court firmly disagreed.

In both cases, the Court goes to some trouble to explain the significance of the evidentiary burden shifting that it originally provided for discrimination cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the party alleging discrimination must establish a prima facie case, as described in the summary above. Doing so creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination, which the employer may then rebut with evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.

However, while the "presumption" shifts the burden of going forward to the employer, the overall burden of proof "remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast"--that is, the person alleging discrimination (Rule 301, Federal Rules of Evidence, as quoted in Hicks). Even if the employer's reasons are disbelieved, there must still be something else in the evidence that supports a finding of intentional discrimination, as there was in Reeves' employer's discriminatory comments. There is no automatic rule that relieves a third party of its responsibility to review the totality of evidence presented, and make a case-specific determination.