201 control. We can have no growth coming back 1 2 out of that lot. 3 There are some papers that have been written by the Michigan Tissue Bank on the dosage that's required for chlostridium 5 and other bacterial forms. 6 DR. PETTEWAY: It's mostly 7 bacterial? 8 9 MS. WILSON: Exactly right, 10 bacterial. 11 DR. BOLTON: Any other questions? 12 Yes. 13 DR. SOLOMON: Thank you very much, I don't know if you will know the 14 15 answer or someone in the audience. Could you comment on of all the tissue banks that 16 17 are out there that we know of how many are 18 accredited by AATB and what percent are not accredited but still follow the AATB 19 20 standards? 21 MS. WILSON: Ellen Heck actually might be a little better at that as chairman 22

of the accreditation committee. I believe there are approximately 60 accredited banks. How many other banks there, Bob Rigney, do you have an answer?

MR. RIGNEY: Ruth could probably

give us the number that had registered with FDA at this point under the new registration requirements. We have 74 banks that are currently credited by the AATB involved in either retrieval, storage, processing and distribution, one or more of those functions.

How many other banks are out
there, it depends on how you define what a
tissue bank is. Our members who are
accredited by us retrieve and process and
distribute the majority of the tissue in the
United States. Does that answer the
question?

DR. DOPPELT: That brought up some more questions.

DR. BOLTON: Go ahead.

1 DR. DOPPELT: I was just going to 2 say, as Bob Rigney said, probably 90, 95 percent of the tissue distributed in the United States comes from AATB-accredited 5 If there are 73 or 74 accredited banks. banks there is a large discrepancy between 7 that number and the number that the FDA has as registered organizations that in one way 8 9 or another deal with tissue.

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But if you ask the question how many banks are there functioning in a similar fashion to the accredited banks, that is, they are still distributing tissue, that are not accredited, just as a guess I would probably say there are maybe another ten or twelve that are functioning in that capacity. The discrepancies are other organizations that are doing cells and so forth.

DR. BOLTON: Dr. McCulloch.

DR. McCULLOUGH: This is a

question about the irradiation and

whether all of the parts of a particular piece of tissue are adequately irradiated? I know in irradiating blood, for instance, there are different doses of radiation that actually apply to different parts of the blood bag and you have to be sure that all the dose you want actually gets to all the blood. It seems like this might be more of a problem for large pieces of bone or things like that.

MS. WILSON: Right, AATB standards state that the minimum dose is 1.5 megarads and that process should be validated as to the dosimetry of the boxes. The irradiation company that you work with you should have worked with to make sure that your boxes are equally penetrated and that your bone is penetrated.

DR. BOLTON: Any other questions? Good, we'll move on.

Our next speaker is Ellen Heck

from the Transplant Services, University of Texas and she will talk about the Eye Bank Association of America. I also understand that it is her birthday today so happy birthday, Ellen.

MS. HECK: Who gave you that information?

DR. BOLTON: We have our sources.

MS. HECK: Thank you. There are many similarities in eye banking and tissue banking but also some differences but like with tissue banking we are concerned about screening, sterility, and asepsis to arrive at what we hope is a safe yet effective product.

We really believe that the screening process begins with public and professional education because we are using a second person historian. Unlike the blood industry where you can interview the donor themselves we are getting our information secondhand, if you will, so we do want to

have an educated historian from whom we are going to be gathering the screening information as well as an expert resource in our professional and medical staff to know the sorts of questions and answers that we are looking for when we begin to do our screening process.

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The consent process can never get to that point because in our initial screening we will talk with the hospital about things such as the admitting diagnosis, the temperatures, the fluid volumes that were administered so we can do hemodilution calculations, the white blood cell counts, any high risk behaviors or infections that might be present in a potential donor before we even proceed to take a consent.

Then, of course, the consent may be declined. After that, however, if it is accepted we have some 45 in-depth questions that we will be asking the historian about

the person's medical history and their social history. Now, these comply with the EBAA guidelines that help us to reduce transmission of disease.

These include things that are applicable to the CJD. When we talk about death with neurological disease of unestablished etiology certainly we don't know to what extent we are going to get the correct answers based on the stage that an individual might be as we have heard repeatedly this morning but nevertheless we feel that these questions have helped us with both recipient safety and with technician safety as we ask these questions.

The standard goes on to specifically reference dementia. Unless it can be attributed to cardiovascular disease, brain tumor or head trauma donors with metabolic-induced dementia may be acceptable under certain consultations and the medical director may decide to use those.

excluding a number of cases that we don't truly believe are infective such as Alzheimer's Disease but we believe in doing so, because we are doing this in the field without the ability to do long-term studies and without the ability to know when someone says well, we think that grandmother may have had Alzheimer's we don't know what that's based upon in terms of a diagnosis and what extent that was so we just go ahead and rule those patients out of the pool initially.

These are the things we are asking about, loss of memory, inappropriate responses, confusion, gait changes, humanderived pituitary hormone, or dura mater.

We can prescribe the questions that are going to be asked in the field but we also need to remember that there is a certain skill involved in eliciting this information so we do a lot of training trying to get our

people to a point where they can ask these questions and know what subsequent questions to ask to get the information that they are truly seeking in order to screen this.

Again, we don't know whether they are valid until you get to late in the progression of the disease with CJD but if we do it can prevent an inappropriate retrieval. Once again, we are not confident in the diagnosis of Alzheimer's so we do rule those out in the field.

In addition to screening we do a physical assessment of the donor which has been very helpful to us in diagnosing other diseases, particularly some of the high-risk behaviors, but we don't know that it has any value for us in the CJD situation.

Following that, probably the most relied-upon screening tool that we have is serologic testing. Now, that testing may occur before procurement but most frequently is going to occur after procurement. Those

are the tests that Diane mentioned earlier
that are prescribed by the FDA or prescribed
by the EBAA and that may remove donors.

Unfortunately, at this moment we have no
such readily applicable screening test for
CJD. I wish we did. But those rule out a
number of other donors.

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Finally, we get into the processing and we may have rejections occur here. We have more medical history review. We are looking at whether anyone else participated in collecting donor tissue and getting information from them, trying to construct a complete donor pool. So we have again a lot of different opportunities to reject a donor as we go through this process.

Finally, by the time we get to final labeling and release we get to this point and hopefully we never get to the second point right down here but we have all been familiar with it because of FDA

regulations and certainly sometimes it does happen.

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But if we have done everything right here we have had seven opportunities to reject this tissue from transplant before we ever get to actual release. There is the initial review with the hospital personnel where we go over the first five or six questions. Then there is the familyobtained history where I told you that we go over at least 45 questions. There is the medical chart review. There is the testing that we do. There is the procurement review which includes really a review of all of the information that we have, the processing review, which again is brought in-house and allows several people who didn't go over it in the initial stage to go over it again, and then finally the final release of the tissue review. So we have gone through a number of steps.

necessary to provide safety is sterility or sterilization. Sterility is an issue that has been a great deal of concern to us.

About six or eight months ago Paul Brown and Nick Hogan talked to the Eye Bank

Association meeting and we talked a great deal about sterilization of instruments.

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So we want to reiterate something that Diane said about the other tissues.

This is a single set of instruments per donor. We do it a little bit differently in eye banking because we do what we call an inside and outside set of instruments. Here are the outside instruments that come in contact with the conjunctiva and the outer portion of the eye and the inside instruments and I want to particularly call your attention, if I may, to these inside instruments to these tiny little scissors right here. These are very sensitive instruments which require a great deal of sharpness and proficiency to do the proper

type of surgical technique. Now, this isolation of inside and outside instruments has been very helpful to us in controlling bacterial contamination. I don't know that it helps us with CJD.

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Many eye banks after Dr. Brown's talk went to additional sterilization, decontamination stage with their instruments and what this really amounts to is that we rinse the instruments immediately following the procurement and we bring the instruments back in a moist environment, keep them moist all the time, and then we sterilize them at 135 degrees for 30 minutes. This is the first decontamination step with the instruments.

After that we go through a cleaning process where we scrub the instruments, we check them for function, and we place them in Cidex for 30 minutes.

Following the Cidex 30-minute deactivation we rinse them and put them into a milk bath

and we rinse them with 70-percent isopropyl alcohol. We dry them, we lubricate them, and then we sterilize them a second time. That is before they would then be ready to use on an additional donor.

These instruments are already showing some corrosion and deterioration in function based on this high sterility time but we felt it was worth the extra effort and the extra sterility exposure based on what Dr. Brown had told us. He felt we were reducing our risk significantly with this step and it doesn't as yet cause us great additional cost.

We are certainly looking into disposable instruments but at the moment don't have the kind of scissors that I told you in the beginning were so important to us because the surgical removal of the tissue is a very important step in whether the tissue is functional. If you put too much stress and strain on the tissue in removing

it because you don't have the appropriate instrumentation then you may indeed damage the corneal endothelial cells that you are actually trying to transplant.

The third step is asepsis and we do aseptic procurements. Just like in the tissue bank we establish sterile fields, we use personal protective apparel, we use sterile instrument kits which we just talked about, and we try to do this in an aseptic manner, OR technique, et cetera although we do not need an OR for the retrieval of corneas.

We can set up this environment in a very limited space because obviously we are removing a very limited tissue that is fairly surface in its nature. This has been very effective in controlling contamination of bacteria and fungus and in limiting environmental exposure and technician exposure.

In the processing of corneal

tissue, which really does not under go a great deal of processing, but if we have removed a whole globe and come back to the laboratory to excise a cornea we do that with the same procedures as we would do the removal except, of course, here now we have a hood cleaning, which is a step we would not have if we were doing the procurement in situ. We do the hood cleaning, the personal protective apparel, the sterile field, the sterile instruments and the aseptic technique.

We generally clean our hoods with a bleach solution and an alcohol solution. Hoods are required to be cleaned before and after each use and are usually cleaned at regular intervals in addition to that. The majority of our hoods undergo culturing processes on monthly intervals to validate that the cleaning processes are indeed working.

We do establish a sterile field.

Notice we have a sterile instrument kit that's used for each procedure. When we come back and do the decontamination steps of these instruments they are kept in one single container so that there is no batching or mixing of instruments during the sterilization process as well.

This just shows you what happens, our personal protective apparel. Here you see a corneal scleral rim being removed.

The things that are important to us here are that we have a nice even rim, that we don't put undue tension on this as we separate it, causing loss of cells on the endothelium or damage to the tissue.

Well, our final step in processing to assure safety is labeling. All of our tissue is labeled "Single Patient

Application Only." I think it is important to consider the number of applications this might represent from a single donor because it is dramatically different from some of

the things that you have heard today.

Single patient application from a corneal donor, assuming that we had both eyes and were acceptable for donation, you would have two corneal grafts. If it was a whole eye donation you would have two scleral grafts which could result in either two grafts or up to eight grafts so that you have a maximum potential here from one corneal donor or approximately ten applications.

Finally, the graft is labeled "Not Sterile" and again for single patient use only. It is sealed with a tamper-proof seal and an individual number and labeling process so that the graft can be tracked.

Finally, when FDA speaks eye banks are used to jumping and we certainly are willing to do anything that makes our grafts more safe. But I think it's important also for you to realize that we could not complete our mission if we were not

concerned for safety. We have always been eager to do what it took to be sure that the recipients received a safe graft.

thousands of individuals each year, both those who receive the transplants and those who give the transplants, and we are conscious of this and are concerned for both. Now, these two children, this little girl is the recipient of a corneal graft. This young lady's sister died in an automobile accident and was the donor of a corneal graft. So when you are dealing with recipients and donor families like this you can't but take your mission seriously and I assure you that our commitment to safety is very serious. Thank you.

DR. BOLTON: Thank you, Ellen.

Are there questions from the committee or comments? Ermias?

DR. BELAY: One of the donor screening parameters that you describe is

getting historical information from the families, historical information on whether that donor received human growth hormone?

MS. HECK: Yes.

DR. BELAY: I always have difficulty understanding how this historical information is collected. If you take cornea as an example, the donor is dead at the time of the donation, one, and, two, the next of kin may not be available to provide the appropriate data.

In addition a good chunk of the corneas, my understanding is, are collected under what is known as legislative consent, which would mean the family is not even available to provide that kind of information.

Now, do you have any information on what proportion of, let's say, the corneal donors we actually collect that type of information on?

MS. HECK: Although at one time

that was a very high percentage of the donor population, and I think back in the '70s it may have accounted for as much as 50 percent of the donor population, it is probably down now to something closer to 15 or 20 percent.

The experience that I gave you is our experience and we collect none of our tissue without family consent and family medical-social history interview. I think you are seeing that becoming the more common trend where back in the '70s, perhaps, the medical examiner or legislative consent was more prevalent but it certainly has diminished.

In terms of getting that information from the family, if I may, we get it from the best historian available at the time. That may be a family member. It may be a close friend. It may be both a family member and a close friend. We look at multiple sources to try to do that. We also may incorporate an interview with the

primary care physician if there is a primary care physician. This is done by either 2 nursing personnel or trained transplant 3 4 personnel. 5 DR. BOLTON: When you say we collect none without family consent is that "we" the Eye Bank Association of America or 8 is that your local facility? 9 MS. HECK: That's our local facility. The Eye Bank Association of America does at this moment permit 11 12 legislative consent tissue but, again, I think the majority of members have moved 13 14 away from that. 15 DR. BELAY: This has a direct 16 bearing on the questions that we are 17 considering because most of the additional 18 criteria in the FDA guidance relies heavily on historical information provided by family 19 20 members. 21 MS. HECK: Yes. 22

DR. BOLTON: Other questions?

223 I'll just make a comment on that and that is 2 that again when you look at those potential donors that are removed via donor exclusion criteria through historical information it still will only get those that are clinical 5 and a very small percentage of those that would be pre-clinical like those that are removed for variant CJD risk or other 9 iatrogenic CJD. But those that are 10 incubating disease will still not be picked up by that so we go back to our 11 12 neuropathologists to save us in that case. 13 Yes, Dr. McCullough. 14 DR. McCULLOUGH: Can I pursue the 15 legislative consent donors? You say roughly 16 15 to 20 percent of all donations would be 17 so that essentially means that 15 to 20 18 percent of corneal donations would be 19 obtained without a medical history? 20 MS. HECK: Certainly without a

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medical examiner will be getting information and providing information to you which is helpful in constructing your donor profile.

But you will be absent that family interview piece. That's correct.

DR. McCULLOUGH: That would always occur just at the medical examiner's venue and everything else does involve a family history?

MS. HECK: The laws vary somewhat state to state. It is called the Medical Examiner and Coroner Law. If it's a coroner that releases the tissue then you would not have that advantage of a medical examiner.

I think it is worth pointing out, however, that the majority of these cases, certainly not all of them but the majority of these cases, fall into that category under age 50 that you talked about which are less likely to be manifesting the disease or have symptoms that we could track.

I know after you said the instance

<u>. Baran da kanganan da kangan da</u>

I might get it after 50 I thought maybe I should just go home and shoot myself because I have, as you heard today, passed 50 but then you said if I could hang out until 72 maybe I'd be all right so I'm thinking that one over.

But those ME cases are usually traffic accidents, violent deaths, unexpected deaths of some sort, and do fall primarily towards the lower end.

DR. McCULLOUGH: What percentage of those would have experienced head trauma?

MS. HECK: A lot of them
experience head trauma. That is an
interesting question if I may step from EBAA
to AATB because our bank does both bone,
skin, and ocular tissue. In ocular tissue
sometimes the head trauma will preclude you
from getting the cornea simply because
there's enough edema that you can't get
them.

But that certainly doesn't

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preclude me from getting bone and skin because it doesn't affect that. So head trauma, although reduced by helmet laws and other things, it's still a major source of donor tissue in this country.

DR. DeARMOND: What level of head trauma? Everybody bumps their head. What do you consider serious?

MS. HECK: Well, I'm thinking primarily of motorcycle and MVAs, motor vehicle accidents. That's the head trauma that we see mostly that's caused the fatality and there's a significant amount of that.

DR. BOLTON: David?

MR. ASHER: I'd like to clarify something about the medical standards. As I understand it, the screening questions if they detect a history of loss of memory, inappropriate response, confusion, or gait changes, those would be deferral factors but a medical director has the option of

reinstating if in the medical director's opinion those things are due to cerebral vascular disease or other known causes?

MS. HECK: That's correct.

MR. ASHER: The reason I'm concerned is that's an exact description of our last dura associated case.

MS. HECK: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the end of your statement.

MR. ASHER: That is an exact description of what happened with our last dura mater associated case. It had all those things and the person doing the medical review attributed them to cerebral vascular disease, which the donor also had.

MS. HECK: I think that over the last few months, several months and maybe the last couple of years, you find that if you get a composite of those things they are much more likely to be rejected even if you think you know what they are from.

I know certainly we have moved

that way and I believe that the majority of 1 eye banks have, too. It's when you may have one of those but not the composite of the 3 three that the medical director might be 4 likely to say I know what this is from. 5 6 MR. ASHER: Since these cases are almost certainly not autopsied on what basis 7 would the medical director make that 8 decision to reclassify such a donor? 9 10 MS. HECK: Those would primarily be made on findings in the medical chart, 11 12 previous diagnosis by consultants, things 13 that we would review by calling primary care physicians or getting information from 14 attending physicians in the hospital if 15 there's some specific documentation present 16 17 in the chart. DR. BOLTON: Other questions? 18 19 Okay, very good, Ellen. Happy birthday 20 again. 21 We will move on. I think what 22 we're going to do is we are going to take

the next two presentations. We are running about 45 minutes behind schedule. What I'd like to do is take the next two, which have to do with equipment and instrument sterilization and what have you and process validation.

Then we'll break for lunch before the industry presentations on process validation so we can get all of those in without everybody feeling the pangs of hunger and we'll come back after lunch and have those.

So our next speaker is Dr. Robert
Rohwer from the VA Medical Center at the
University of Maryland, Baltimore. Bob will
talk on "Equipment and Instruments: TSE
Agent Disinfection in Routine and
Exceptional Situations." Bob.

DR. ROHWER: I was disappointed that nobody asked Ms. Heck what the milk bath was for. I'm curious and I'll have to ask her myself.

I had the liberty of reengineering this title to suit myself so this is what we are going to discuss, disinfection and sterilization of TSE-contaminated surgical instruments. On the other hand I know of no systematic study of this issue and as a consequence we're going to have to beat around the edges of this subject a little bit.

What I'm going to do is review some of the principles of inactivation of these agents which I think are important and we will look at their application to the inactivation by sodium hydroxide and heat, which are the only two really effective inactivants that we know of. I'll mention bleach and then I'll go over the WHO recommendations for disinfection and also tell you how we go about this job in our laboratory and give you some anecdotal evidence from the laboratory that suggests that it does in fact work.

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However, I'll finish by telling you about an incident that occurred in Windsor, Canada, in which they attempted to apply these methods on a very large scale to disastrous effect so they are still things we have to do and learn about this process.

The main point I'm going to make in the beginning of this talk is that the susceptibility to an activation of TSE agents if they are looked at in a kinetic fashion are not that different from what you would expect from normal viruses, the more resistant, from the virus families or spores. On the other hand even though this is true, TSE agents are still very difficult to disinfect. The reason for that, I'll try to convince you, is not really due to the failure of the inactivants themselves but rather due to inadequate exposure of the agents to these inactivants.

What I'm going to tell you is based on some old work of myself and these

references and I highly recommend this more recent document from the WHO laying out many of the issues involved with disinfection and infection control for these agents. This document was put together as a consensus document. It involved myself, David Taylor, Paul Brown, a bunch of people, and I think it really does represent the best current thinking on this.

Now, I want to go over just the inactivation process itself so that we are all on the same wavelength when I discuss the actual data for the TSE agents. I am going to be discussing curves like this in which the TSE agent is exposed to some process, heat or chemical, for a period of time and we have the surviving fraction over here.

What's going on in an activation curve like this is that if we started with this many units of infectivity everything is happening very fast and very early in the

inactivation process. By the time we are
here on this curve we have only got 10
percent of the population left and by the

5 the population left.

Another way of looking at it is if you look on this axis down here 90 percent of the effect occurs very quickly, 10 percent in the next tiny little time interval here, 1 percent in this time interval here, .1 percent of the effect here, .01 percent here, et cetera.

time we are here we only have 1 percent of

This initial rate of inactivation describes the way 99.99 percent of the infectivity is behaving in this curve; however, in this curve right here we are describing how only one part per thousand is behaving. It is a bimodal distribution of effect.

The properties intrinsic to the agent are reflected in the initial rate of inactivation. This is basic chemistry. The

vast majority is being inactivated and the interpretation is much less complex than for the residual fraction, which is a complex function of environmental parameters much more complex but depends on the context of the agent, the milieu in which it finds itself to some extent.

Here's an example of this type of inactivation using bleach at the concentration in which it is recommended to be used on the bottle. This is not the highly effective concentration which is recommended from David Taylor's work which is 5 percent, ten times this concentration, or undiluted bleach. Nevertheless we see that we have a very rapid destruction of infectivity on contact with bleach and then a residual survival from that point forward.

We get the same kind of thing when we put conventional viruses into the same brain homogenate milieu showing you that there is a protective effect of the

bioburden of the brain homogenate itself.

These same viruses in highly purified form are killed to undetectable levels almost instantly.

The inactivant of choice in our hands has been sodium hydroxide. This is some work that Paul Brown and I did many years ago comparing Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and 263K scrapie which can be challenged at higher titers to these various concentrations of sodium hydroxide.

The main thing I want to point out is that at one normal we had inactivation to undetectable levels for both CJD and scrapie after 60 minutes of exposure but almost as good an effect from 10th normal; however it falls off dramatically when you go below this concentration. Somewhere between here and here we are losing efficacy. Also, even after 15 minutes of exposure we have done most of the work.

On the other hand this is not a

consistent finding and the reason for the inconsistencies probably has to do with the details of the experimental approach. So where it has been highlighted in yellow these are all experiments from the literature in which complete, and by "complete" I mean inactivation to no survivors given the size of the challenge that was actually assayed, these experiments represent that experience but in the same chart we also have a number of instances in which very high levels of inactivation were reached but some residual infectivity was nevertheless recovered.

A similar picture pertains for heat except the initial activation is even much more dramatic. This was a kinetic experiment looking at what used to be the standard autoclave temperature of 121 degrees centigrade. This was set up in an oil bath so samples could be taken very rapidly.

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Once they came to temperature and then cooled and then assayed what we see here is that by the time the sample got to temperature, and the ramp time here was about 30 seconds, we had 99.999 percent of the population destroyed. The surviving fraction is at the level of parts per million but it does survive and it drags out here for another 15 minutes or so.

Similar data have been developed by David Taylor using a somewhat different system in which brain macerates rather than homogenates were statically exposed to these temperature regimes here for these times and temperatures, giving the result here.

This is somewhat shocking. At first glance this looks like a shocking result in the sense that survivors, and by "survivors" I mean infectivity survived this treatment to the tune of four infections out of 13 animals inoculated under these conditions, et cetera, but if you look at

this data and plot it the same way that I plotted my previous curve these points would all fall down on this part of the curve.

The reason for that is that these are only partially effective in killing the infectivity. We are at limiting dilution and when you put it back on a chart like this it would be in the same range. So these data are entirely consistent with each other.

Well, of course, what we would like to know is what gives rise to this residual surviving population. This is where our public health problem actually is, in this material that we can't get rid of completely. A clue is these dry heat inactivation experiments that were conducted by Paul Brown about ten years ago.

Here again we have even higher temperatures than I showed you just a moment ago for ten 60-minute exposures, 160 degrees centigrade, and only getting two to three

logs of inactivation where nine logs is possible. What this is telling us is that dry heat inactivation is much, much less effective than wet heat inactivation for the destruction of these agents. Well, this is not a big surprise because there are a number of sporulating bacteria that can survive to about these levels under these same kinds of conditions.

I think it gives us a clue as to what may be going on with these surviving populations. Now, 132 degrees is a very significantly higher temperature than 121 degrees for a steam sterilization where an activation takes place in just seconds, really. On the other hand 132 degrees is only incrementally more effective than 121 degrees under dry heat sterilization conditions where an activation could take days under these particular conditions.

And the thing that we have to remember is that the surviving population is

very small. This is a very small fraction
of the starting infectivity. This is parts
per million of what we began with.

so I'm going to offer you this model which is that in this case there is a horizon line here. This is fluid down here. What I'm trying to show you here is that in a tube or a bottle or in the circumstances under which these experiments were done in the case of homogenate there is an opportunity for the material to boil as it comes to temperature and throw the infectivity on the glass where it might dry.

In the case of the macerates the macerate is forced into the tube and leaves a streak behind it which can dry as the tube heats up on the way to inactivating temperatures. And it's important to remember that in brain we have about 50 percent fat, which can form actually a layer over this which could be quite impenetrable to steam and water, especially if you think

that this is happening only at the level of parts per million.

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This leads to the next slide.

What this data show is that the infectivity is not intrinsically resistant to steam sterilization. The problem is with delivery of the inactivant and it is for that reason that we make the following recommendations.

It's very important to prevent drying.

We're very careful in the laboratory when we are done with an instrument to immerse it in water or sodium hydroxide, typically sodium hydroxide in our case, and to do that prior and during steam sterilization to make sure everything is wet and nothing can dry on the instrument.

It's very effective to combine two or more methods. This is has been demonstrated in a number of publications now, either pre-treating with sodium hydroxide followed by heat or, of course, an even more stringent situation is to put the

instrument in sodium hydroxide and then sterilize it.

These factors also contribute, we feel, to an effective sterilization.

Surfactants, homogenization, good dispersion of the material, agitation if it's possible to eliminate sanctuaries in the vessel itself. And in our experience refinement, and this is strictly anecdotal, seems to reduce the potential for protective associations and as the material becomes more and more refined it becomes more susceptible to inactivation.

Well, all of this is reflected in this WHO document which I recommended to you earlier. Basically the recommendations there are that instruments should be kept moist until cleaned and decontaminated and they should be cleaned as soon as possible. Avoid mixing these kinds of things. I'm going to leave this for you to discover on your own because it is available on the Web.

Then there is this hierarchy of recommendations for inactivation which were recommended. For disposable instruments, materials, and these types of things, they should be incinerated if at all possible. And the recommendation was even made for instruments exposed to high infectivity tissues, for example, known surgery to a CJD brain, be destroyed in this way. I'm not myself in agreement with this but it certainly is the most absolute way to go about it.

In terms of the hierarchy of heat and chemical combinations the most stringent is to immerse in sodium hydroxide, heat in an autoclave for 121 degrees for 30 minutes, clean rinse in water, and subject to routine sterilization. If the instrument won't take this then use sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for at least an hour and then transfer to water and do the same thing.

Third on the list is to immerse in

sodium hydroxide or sodium hypochlorite for an hour, remove and rinse in water, and then transfer to an open pan, heat and gravity displacement or porous load autoclave. And then finally immerse and boil in sodium hydroxide. This has been shown to be effective by David Taylor. Hypochlorite can also be used in this way though there are a lot more problems associated with hypochlorite in our opinion than sodium hydroxide with corrosion, et cetera.

In our laboratory we use the following regime. We start with a sterile instrument. We use it on infected material. We keep it wet. If it's convenient or possible to clean it or we are cleaning it anyway before we put it in the wet environment and we do that with a ChemWipe (?) or whatever, we keep it wet. We make sure it's kept immersed before it's put in sodium hydroxide overnight.

It then goes to an autoclave where

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it is cooked for 132 degrees for an hour under sodium hydroxide or for some instruments in water if they can't take this process. Then from this position, and I'm trying to indicate the loss of infectivity here by the diminution of the red in this scheme, we take it to our cleaning bath where it gets sonicated again in a detergent cleaner that is about one-tenth normal sodium hydroxide at 60 degrees and it's probably inactivating in and of its own Once it comes out of the cleaner it right. is packaged and then goes through a standard autoclave sterilization before it goes into our sterile pool and is reused.

We have some evidence that this works because we have been doing these experiments in the laboratory for the last several years looking at very low levels of infectivity associated with blood-borne TSE infectivity. In particular I'm going to show you this experiment just because I

think you will be interested in it as well.

This is new data where we inoculated a large cohort of animals, hamsters in this case, at a low concentration of infectivity and at three-week intervals we pooled the blood from 20 animals and then we inoculated 100

recipients with each pool of blood.

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We have the data on the next This is the incubation time of these slide. animals, of the animals got sick. These were the times in which we created the pools over here on the side. So what we have here are two pools containing 100 animals each with no infections at all in them. There's really no distinction between the instruments that were used here and used here. Here, just as we had expect, we started seeing cases as the disease progresses. And in fact on the next slide we get the status plotted and we see these two points without cases here and about mid-clinical disease we start seeing effect

and an increase in effect as the disease progresses.

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One more example of this is we have done plasma fractionations on endogenously infected hamster blood where we fractionated all the fractions given here out of the plasma by the cone fractionation and again reinoculated 100 animals or more in this case with each one of these fractions. And the data here, all the little dots are animals that contracted scrapie in the course of this experiment according to their incubation time here and the actual fraction that was inoculated here. But it is important that as we got farther and farther into the fractionation we see fewer and fewer cases and we never did see cases in the case of fraction 2 and fraction 5.

Well, that slide didn't make it in here. Anyway, I was just going to point out that the actual schema for fraction 2 and

fraction 5 are the end products of two branches of the cone fractionation scheme and it would make sense that the removal would be highest for those two fractions but, again, it shows you that we can actually do these experiments without crosscontamination into these types of materials.

This method that we use contrasts very strongly with the method that is typically used in a hospital setting where this part of the scheme is missing. In fact what happens is you start with a sterile instrument, you use it for surgery or whatever, and then it goes to a cleaner. This is done in a specialized washer using heat and detergents. From there it goes to a package and is sterilized in an autoclave under conventional conditions and then goes back into circulation.

So this is a far less stringent procedure; nevertheless, it is likely to be highly effective, I think, in terms of

obtaining sterile instruments for reuse.

The one thing that bothers me about it is this step right here where the cleaning step occurs before a disinfection step, which is what we have tried to achieve in the laboratory over here.

apparatus overwhelms all other contamination issues. It creates a secondary decontamination problem. If contaminated instruments are actually introduced into this machine you have a problem of the contamination of the washer and contamination of the waste stream from that washer.

This, again, has not been done in any systematic way but talking with the people who are responsible for this type of process they are adamant that this has to be done, it can't be done any other way, and these machines are adequate to the task. On the other hand I don't believe that they

should be presumed to be adequate and this should be investigated carefully.

I'm going to finish with an example in which a CJD case was identified after neurosurgery. This happened in the Hotel Dieu Grace in Windsor, Ontario, last year about this time. What happened is there was a neurosurgery on a patient. I'm not sure what sex it was. They were subsequently diagnosed with dementia on subsequent observation. A 14-3-3 CSF sample was taken and it turned out to be positive.

This patient did eventually have Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, as you will see. That, at least, is a relief. But on this discovery right here the hospital staff decided that they had to pull all of their instruments and sterilize them.

Now, they had already been through this wash cycle and sterilization cycle and the instruments that were used in the

neurosurgery had not been tracked and so
they had been mixed with the general pool
and so the hospital felt that they had to
sterilize everything. They sterilized the
entire pool at once overnight. They didn't
do any test samples and they used
autoclaving and one normal sodium hydroxide
as recommended in the WHO guideline for
this.

The next morning they had a lot of electrolysis corrosion and destruction of these instruments. There was a lot of complaining about fumes. I'm not sure where that came from but there was some chemistry that we don't experience going on in this process. In the end they estimate they destroyed about \$10 million worth of instruments.

The complete details from this incident haven't been released yet so it's hard to evaluate exactly what happened.

There were obviously chemical

incompatibilities in these mixtures that
were autoclaved and I would have to point
out that the WHO guidelines are based on
laboratory experience and they were our best
good faith recommendation for how to deal
with these agents in that type of setting.

Clearly we need to develop and validate procedures that will work for a hospital setting as well and sort out the issues. This incident could be of great value to us in terms of sorting out the factors that led to this wholesale destruction.

My concluding remark would be that the instrument washer was not considered a source of vulnerability even during the debriefing on this incident which I was invited to attend, getting very cold stares from lots of people.

Sterilization of the instruments is pointless without sterilization of the washer from my point of view and if the

washer itself is sterilizing then resterilization of the instruments was unnecessary.

I think there is one final slide.

I want to make the following point, that in terms of dealing with this episode in particular I think we can't lose track of this feature, that this was a case of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease which they identified. They might not have. He might have had the surgery. He might have died in the surgery, whatever, in which case the instruments would have been processed the way they always would have been and we would never have known the difference.

We can really only identify a minor proportion of the potential exposure to this disease and that is these cases that we defer. We have no way of identifying incubating sporadic cases, at least not yet.

For that reason I feel it's pointless to implement measures that attempt

to reduce the risk from known cases to below the irreducible risk from unidentifiable cases. It's important to find out what that irreducible risk actually is by modeling and risk assessment but we also have to maintain some realism in terms of what we are attempting to do.

The only caveat here is that this is true unless we apply a uniform higher standard to the whole process and not just apply it to point instances of contamination.

DR. BOLTON: Thank you, Bob. I think in that last slide you made the same point that I had made earlier about not being able to identify these incubating sporadic cases. There are questions. We need to hurry along so I'll try to make these brief.

Steve?

DR. DeARMOND: How do you test for residual infectivity on surgical

instruments? Is there any way to do that in a practical way?

DR. ROHWER: I think we need a paradigm because that's going to be tricky. We don't usually do neurosurgery on hamsters and mice, at least not large-scale neurosurgeries, which you would want to do in a case like this.

A paradigm has been advanced by the Weissmann group. They are using these stainless steel sutures which they then expose to infectivity and then implant in the brains of animals. We have looked at that a bit and I think it has quite a bit of promise, actually, as a way to go.

They are rods, not canulas, which means that you can control exactly what happens to the entire surface that's exposed. The animals do tolerate it quite well. So it is a way to go, I think.

I know that there is some funding for this in Europe that comes out of the EC

program, TSE Program, but I haven't heard any updates on it recently as to whether there is new data on that.

DR. BOLTON: Sue?

DR. PRIOLA: You hypothesize that this small fraction of agent which is protected in your inactivation studies might be due to protection by the high-fat content of the brain. It perhaps forms a varnish over the agent.

Have you done inactivation kinetics with infectivity from other tissues such as spleen or lymph node and do you see a similar kinetics?

DR. ROHWER: We haven't. We have not. We are looking for high levels of infectivity when we do these experiments because we are showing such high levels of inactivation. But there are lots of things like that that could be done. I mean, you could delipidate (?) the brain and do that experiment as well or you could look at

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spleen. That's a good suggestion. I think there is a huge parameter space associated with inactivation which has not been 3 explored and should be. 4 5 DR. BOLTON: Briefly. 6 DR. DeARMOND: I was just going to 7 say that have you tried sonication with lipid solvents, chloroform, methanol, acetone, something that wouldn't really 9 corrode the instruments, and then go through 10 11 the process? 12 DR. ROHWER: We have done 13 sonication with sodium hydroxide but that doesn't count. It's very effective. 14 15 DR. BOLTON: Dr. Solomon. 16 DR. SOLOMON: This is a very naïve question and we might want to save it for 17 the discussion but if you were a 18 professional organization and wanted to 19 20 develop some standards now what would you 21 recommend?

DR. ROHWER: My feeling is that

making those recommendations in the vacuum of not having, obviously, a full appreciation of the compatibility issues with the recommendations that were made in the WHO guidelines would be difficult. But in terms of looking at compatibility those experiments are much easier to do than infectivity experiments. It's a matter of putting various instruments in various combinations and various alloy combinations and that kind of thing in a pot and trying it and seeing whether you get corrosion.

That kind of thing, I think, should be done to see if we can get a handle on just what the issues actually are. We know that when we use our cheap -- not all of them -- we have a survival of the fittest program in the laboratory for surgical instruments. But we only buy cheap Pakistani stainless and some of it is very, very resistant to sodium hydroxide in heat and some of it isn't.

San Taraharan Baraharan 259 DR. BOLTON: David, the last 2 question before our next presentation. 3 DR. DeARMOND: You will be pleased to know that investigators in the FDA Center 4 5 for Devices are conducting exactly the kinds of experiments with instruments that you've mentioned. 8 DR. ROHWER: Very good. 9 DR. BOLTON: We will anxiously 10 await those results. 11 Our final presentation before lunch will be "Process Validation for 12 13 Conventional Agents" presented by Dr. Mahmood Farshid. I hope, Mahmood, I 14 didn't butcher your name too badly. 15 16 DR. FARSHID: "Mahmood" was very 17 close. It is like saying "my mood." 18 mood, your mood, good mood, bad mood. hope everybody is in a good mood. 19 20 My presentation will be a brief 21 overview of viral validation studies and also the approach that we take in evaluating 22

such studies. The product which currently requires viral validation studies falls loosely into three different categories:

Monoclonal antibodies and recombinant products produced in cell culture. These are highly characterized products and extensively tested and they have an excellent viral safety record. Blood and blood products and other human blood products, probably tissue and soft tissue and bones also fall in these categories.

But my main focus would be in the plasmaderived product where I draw most of my experience.

Also, animal-derived product which these are, for example, lymphocyte produced by rabbits or antivenin produced in horses. So it would depend on what kind of a starting material you are using the approach to the viral validation study will be somehow different.

There are some complimentary

approaches in basically reducing the risk of viral infection, so viral inactivation essentially is only one component of this multi-faceted approach which includes donor screening, donor history assessment, and written and oral questionnaire.

Donor testing, which in the case of whole blood includes testing for antibodies to HIV-1 and 2 and p24 antigen and serological tests for HCV and  $\mathrm{HB}_s\,\mathrm{A}_s$  and anti-HBc and anti-HTLV-1 and 2, and syphilis. For plasma, for instance, HTLV and Anti-HBc is not included in the test. Pharmaco-vigilance and finally in case of the pooled and plasma-derived product the last line of defense will be viral inactivation and removal and basically validating the manufacturing process for removal of this virus.

So basically the aim of viral validation is to provide evidence that their production process will effectively

inactivate or remove viruses which could

potentially be transmitted by this product.

So here we are talking about a relevant

pathogen which may be present in a starting

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material.

Also to provide indirect evidence that the production process has the capability to inactivate or remove novel or yet undetermined viruses. Basically here we use an array of viruses to cover also those who are undetermined or emerging viruses because not all viruses are screened for. For example, HGV and TTV and SLV and other viruses also will be covered by the inactivation or removal process.

This is basically a common virus clearance method. This list is by no means complete and basically is drawn, as I mentioned, from my experience with plasmaderived products. There are other methodologies which are being used. It can be divided. The viral clearance basically

includes viral inactivation and removal which inactivation could be a chemical inactivation like, for example, using a solvent detergent, which is very well known or physical inactivation like heat which we just heard about. The removal includes also chromatography or precipitation or using nanofiltration.

In evaluating the viral validation studies there are different components in the study that we need to evaluate. One will be the scale down process step. The viral validation studies not done in actual manufacturing settings and for very obvious reasons because it is not desirable from a standpoint of G&P and also is not practical because you need a huge amount of virus to do that. Therefore the laboratory model or the scaled down model of the manufacturing process is being basically designed and it will be used for the validation studies.

The other will be spiking, to do

that deliberately, the one step which needs to be validated will be spiked with high titer virus.

Finally, the reduction of that virus, either inactivation or removal, will be determined in subsequent steps. If the number of steps being validated then the reduction of clearance from these steps will be summed up and that will be basically total log reduction value for that particular process.

In evaluating the studies we look at the choice of viruses, what kind of viruses may have been used and if it is appropriate. And the design of the validation study, which is essentially validity of the scaled-down process, this is very important in order to determine that what is obtained is relevant to the actual manufacturing process.

The study should provide evidence that the scaled-down model actually is

relevant and basically mimic the actual manufacturing process. The kinetics of inactivation also needs to be shown as we saw when Dr. Rohwer showed some of the kinetics of some heating activation.

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And if it is removal we need to know the whereabouts the virus was removed. Basically the mass balance needs to be shown and determined. Also, the robustness of the process as a whole also needs to be determined and that maybe by introducing some deliberate changes in the process to see if the process as a whole is robust. Also, the limits of sensitivity of the assay used for infectivity also needs to be determined and finally the log reduction of how much log reduction is achieved in the whole process.

In terms of viral selection the viruses that can potentially be transmitted by product, basically we refer to them as a relevant virus. These are pathogenic

viruses. So the first choice will be to get the virus which is relevant. Of course, this is not always possible because some of the relevant virus do not grow in tissue culture such as Hepatitis B and Hepatitis C.

In that case we use a specific model viruses which basically are viruses which physically and chemically are similar to the relevant viruses as close as possible. In addition to that non-specific model virus also will be used. These are simply to show basically the overall capacity of the step inactivating viruses and for this purpose usually viruses which are highly resistant and small ——— viruses will be included in the panel of the viruses.

Therefore the selection of viruses basically is dependent on the nature of the starting material, if it is cell-derived or human-derived or animal-derived and for the reason that I stated because we need to be

close to the relevant viruses in this product. Also we need to consider the practicality of using these viruses, for example, availability of suitable culture system and availability of high titer stock which is necessary to do this kind of experiment. Also the availability of reliable methods for quantitation of this virus.

These are a panel of viruses that are used for doing viral validation studies in a plasma and plasma-derived product and probably can be applied to, I would say, all human-derived product if one wants to do their viral validation study.

HIV-1 is being used as a model virus for HIV-1 and 2 and also HTLV and this is required for any kind of studies which are done and any type of viral validation studies.

For Hepatitis B basically it is not modeled directly. There are some model

viruses like ---- Hepatitis B or ---Hepatitis B which could be used as model
viruses; however, in revalidation studies we
do not require any of these viruses to be
used and the capacity of a system to clear
Hepatitis B basically would be extrapolated
from looking at the panel as a whole.

For Hepatitis C there are a number of specific model viruses. Some of them are used more often. The bovine viral diarrhea virus is one which in terms of its size and genomic structure is very close to Hepatitis C and being used in the validation studies.

CMV also which is a ——— virus is larger than HCV, is more resistant in terms of inactivation, and is probably a better choice if one wants to do the inactivation studies. We encouraged the manufacturer that they can use both of them because BVDV because of its size would be better in removal and validation of removal studies and CMV is because of high resistance

probably would be better to be used in inactivations.

HAV, there is a laboratory strain of HAV which can basically be used as a relevant model for Hepatitis A and this is also because of small non-envelope viruses which can also qualify as basically being used to show the rigor of the overall capacity of the step in inactivating viruses.

Because of the presence of a number of herpes viruses inclusion of one of them in the validation studies is desirable, for example, like PRV, and that is also qualified as having one DNA virus in the panel which basically covers maybe for Hepatitis B as well, although it is a larger virus.

For B19 PPV can be used for human parvovirus B19. This is a small highly resistant ---- virus and it basically is a good virus to show overall capacity of the

inactivation or removal step and also it can be basically used as a surrogate or as a model for B19.

This is a panel of the viruses which are used for the cell line driver.

Basically the panel which we use, as I mentioned, is dependent on what kind of starting material basically is used in the manufacturing. Here the required virus is the retrovirus because the presence of this virus is endogenous in mice and hamster cell line. Also the PRV may cause latent infection in some of the cell line and that need to be there.

And ---- virus is present in a number of different cell cultures and that is included in a panel and MVM, which is also parvovirus, is a highly resistant virus and again it will show basically to determine the overall capacity of the system in clearing the viruses.

So if we look at the selection of

viruses it is intended to include the DNA and RNA viruses, both single and double stranded, lipid and non-lipid viruses should be included and in terms of their sizes it should include large, intermediate, and small size.

In term of their resistance it would be from highly resistant to inactivation to very easily inactivated. By doing so basically we cover the viruses which are undetermined or emerging viruses and that will basically increase the assurance of the overall capacity of the system to remove the viruses in general.

The other component for looking at the viral validation, as I mentioned, is the scaled down purification process which usually is one-tenth to one-hundred of the full scale. In this, as I mentioned, some data should be provided to indicate the relevancy of the small downscale to the actual manufacturing process. That is the

only way that we can determine that the result that obtains is really relevant to the actual manufacturing process.

For example, the buffers, the pH, protein concentration, and the product should be the same as full-scale manufacturing. The test material which I'll use for this kind of testing should come from actual manufacturing process. The intermediate material should come from the actual manufacturing process and put it through their scale down.

All the critical operation parameters should be kept as that has full scale, for example, bed height, flow rate, and so on and the absolute values, which I mentioned, temperature, pH, should also be kept as that of the actual manufacture.

Also, make sure that in term of product specification that the product is identical to the production scale. So basically the scaled-down models should be

substantially equivalent to the actual
manufacturing process if you want to
basically extrapolate from the result
obtained in a scaled- down model to that of

actual manufacture.

effective virus should produce significant viral kill and should be reproducible and controllable at the process scale and modelable at the laboratory scale because some processes are difficult to model; therefore, it would be difficult to determine the actual capacity of that step in clearing the virus. So modelability of that method, basically this step will be important.

And it should have minimum impact on the product yield and activity. It basically should not affect the product. It is intended to kill the viruses and should not kill or remove the product itself. It should not generate new antigens or leave

any toxic residue. It should not be mutagenic or carcinogenic.

The manufacturing process for blood-derived products should contain at least two effective steps for removal and activation of viruses and "effective" refers to one which basically produces significant viral removal or inactivation. At least one step should be effective against non-envelope viruses.

At least one stage in the production process must inactivate rather than remove viruses. So total reliance or removal may not be sufficient. The removal process is very difficult to basically model in a lab and inactivation are more robust; therefore, if total reliance on removal we ask that one inactivation step also be included.

In evaluating the result if one single step having a large effect gives more assurance of viral safety than several steps

having the same overall effect. You may get studies which show the same level of overall viral reduction. One of them may be obtained by two single steps and one may be obtained by five or six different steps.

The one which is obtained by two different steps will definitely provide more assurance, that is, more effective in basically clearing of virus.

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Even under the best of circumstances there are limitations. One needs to realize that viral validation study just provides an estimate and assurance of how the system will work and they are not absolute. The limitations include that laboratory strain may behave differently than native viruses because most of the viruses, even the relevant ones, are laboratory adopted viruses and they may behave differently as the one that they are present and why.

The source of plasma or

immunoglobulin may have neutralizing antibodies so that may affect the overall viral kill and overestimate the viral so the presence of neutralizing antibodies is a variable which needs to be considered when doing inactivation or removal. For example, in case of Hepatitis A that anti-A is usually present and in many cases is the result of over-estimation of the capacity of that particular step in killing the viruses where the killing may be as a result of the presence of a neutralizing antibody and not because of the effectiveness of that particular step. And there may exist in any virus population a fraction that is resistant to inactivation. I think this has been mentioned this morning.

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A scaled-down process may be different from full scale. Sometimes it is difficult to basically model the actual manufacturing process and there will be some differences and it is difficult to determine

how those differences are going to affect
the overall clearance. So that also needs
to be considered, that what we see is done
in the lab and is not an actual
manufacturing process. That will be another
limitation.

The total virus reduction may be overestimated because of repeated and similar process steps. The different steps that will be validated should be orthogonal. They should work by independent mechanisms in order to be acceptable to add the total viral reduction from this different step, basically to sum them up.

The ability of a step to remove viruses after repeated use may vary. This is probably true for chromatography, which the residents sometimes use repeatedly, so what you get in the beginning in the course of the validation may not be after a number of years.

That concludes my presentation.

1 Thank you.

DR. BOLTON: Thank you. Briefly, questions or comments from the committee?

DR. EPSTEIN: I just wanted to make two quick comments. Thank you, Mahmood.

about the absence of log removal and we try to develop a standard that is applicable to what we think is the pathogen burden in the product. So there's the idea of overkill relative to some upper limit of potential contamination.

Then you touched on this indirectly but when you have a series of processes it's true that we look at the summation of logs clearance. But it's also true that we more or less routinely will ask for some thru-put experimentation to show that at least for the critical steps it's valid to sum the logs reduction.

DR. BOLTON: That was a good

point, Jay. I would have made that except I'm too hungry to think about it so an excellent point. So here's what we will do. I want to cut lunch short from an hour to 45 minutes. We'll meet back here at 2:00. (Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., a luncheon recess was taken.)