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OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20544

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MEMORANDUM

DATE: May 14, 2004
TO: Judge David F. Levi, Chair
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
FROM: Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
RE: Report of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules

I. Introduction

The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules met on April 13 and 14, 2004, in Washington, D.C. The Committee approved all of the proposed amendments that had been published for comment in August 2003, including the controversial rule regarding the citation of unpublished opinions.* The Committee also removed three items from the Committee's study agenda, tentatively approved one item for publication, and, at the request of the E-Government Subcommittee, discussed a draft rule intended to protect private information in court filings.

* * * * *

II. Action Items

Several proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP") were published for comment in August 2003.

The comments received by the Advisory Committee were unusual in several respects. First, we received an extraordinarily large number of comments: 513 written comments were submitted, and 15 witnesses testified at a public hearing on April 13. By contrast, a much more extensive set of proposed amendments published in August 2000 attracted 20 written comments and no requests to testify. Second, the overwhelming majority of the comments — about 95

* At its June 2004 meeting, the Standing Rules Committee recommitted the proposed new Rule 32.1 on unpublished opinions for further study to the advisory rules committee.

percent — pertained *only* to proposed Rule 32.1 (regarding the citing of unpublished opinions).

* * * * *

Because of the unusual nature of the public comments, I will report on them somewhat differently than we have reported on public comments in the past. With respect to every proposed rule except Rule 32.1, I will provide the following: (1) a brief introduction; (2) the text of the proposed amendment and Committee Note, as approved by the Committee; (3) a description of the changes made after publication and comments; and (4) a summary of each of the public comments. With respect to proposed Rule 32.1, I will provide the same information, except that I will not individually summarize each of the 513 written comments and each of the 15 statements given at the public hearing. Instead, I will summarize the major arguments made for and against adopting Rule 32.1, and then I will identify all those who supported or opposed the rule.

As I noted, the Advisory Committee approved all of the proposed amendments for submission to the Standing Committee. Modifications were made to most of the proposed amendments and Committee Notes, but, in the Committee's view, none of the modifications is substantial enough to require republication.

**PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE***

A. Rule 4(a)(6)

1. Introduction

Rule 4(a)(6) provides a safe harbor for litigants who fail to bring timely appeals because they do not receive notice of the entry of judgments against them. A district court is authorized to reopen the time to appeal a judgment if the district court finds that several conditions have been satisfied, including that the appellant did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment within 21 days and that the appellant moved to reopen the time to appeal within 7 days after learning of the judgment's entry. The Committee proposes to amend Rule 4(a)(6) to clarify what type of notice must be absent before an appellant is eligible to move to reopen the time to appeal and to resolve a four-way circuit split over what type of notice triggers the 7-day period to bring such a motion.

2. Text of Proposed Amendment and Committee Note

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right — When Taken

1 **(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.**

2 * * * * *

3 **(6) Reopening the Time to File an Appeal.** The district
4 court may reopen the time to file an appeal for a
5 period of 14 days after the date when its order to

*New material is underlined; matter to be omitted is lined through.

2 FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

6 reopen is entered, but only if all the following
7 conditions are satisfied:

8 (A) the court finds that the moving party did not
9 receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil
10 Procedure 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or
11 order sought to be appealed within 21 days after
12 entry;

13 (B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the
14 judgment or order is entered or within 7 days
15 after the moving party receives notice under
16 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the
17 entry, whichever is earlier;

18 ~~(B) the court finds that the moving party was~~
19 ~~entitled to notice of the entry of the judgment or~~
20 ~~order sought to be appealed but did not receive~~
21 ~~the notice from the district court or any party~~
22 ~~within 21 days after entry; and~~

23 (C) the court finds that no party would be
24 prejudiced.

25 * * * * *

Committee Note

Rule 4(a)(6) has permitted a district court to reopen the time to appeal a judgment or order upon finding that four conditions were satisfied. First, the district court had to find that the appellant did not receive notice of the entry of the judgment or order from the district court or any party within 21 days after the judgment or order was entered. Second, the district court had to find that the appellant moved to reopen the time to appeal within 7 days after the appellant received notice of the entry of the judgment or order. Third, the district court had to find that the appellant moved to reopen the time to appeal within 180 days after the judgment or order was entered. Finally, the district court had to find that no party would be prejudiced by the reopening of the time to appeal.

Rule 4(a)(6) has been amended to specify more clearly what type of “notice” of the entry of a judgment or order precludes a party from later moving to reopen the time to appeal. In addition, Rule 4(a)(6) has been amended to address confusion about what type of “notice” triggers the 7-day period to bring a motion to reopen. Finally, Rule 4(a)(6) has been reorganized to set forth more logically the conditions that must be met before a district court may reopen the time to appeal.

Subdivision (a)(6)(A). Former subdivision (a)(6)(B) has been redesignated as subdivision (a)(6)(A), and one substantive change has been made. As amended, the subdivision will preclude a party from moving to reopen the time to appeal a judgment or order

only if the party receives (within 21 days) formal notice of the entry of that judgment or order under Civil Rule 77(d). No other type of notice will preclude a party.

The reasons for this change take some explanation. Prior to 1998, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) permitted a district court to reopen the time to appeal if it found “that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry.” The rule was clear that the “notice” to which it referred was the notice required under Civil Rule 77(d), which must be served by the clerk pursuant to Civil Rule 5(b) and may also be served by a party pursuant to that same rule. In other words, prior to 1998, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) was clear that, if a party did not receive formal notice of the entry of a judgment or order under Civil Rule 77(d), that party could later move to reopen the time to appeal (assuming that the other requirements of subdivision (a)(6) were met).

In 1998, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) was amended to change the description of the type of notice that would preclude a party from moving to reopen. As a result of the amendment, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) no longer referred to the failure of the moving party to receive “*such* notice” — that is, the notice required by Civil Rule 77(d) — but instead referred to the failure of the moving party to receive “*the* notice.” And former subdivision (a)(6)(B) no longer referred to the failure of the moving party to receive notice from “the *clerk* or any party,” both of whom are explicitly mentioned in Civil Rule 77(d). Rather, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) referred to the failure of the moving party to receive notice from “the *district court* or any party.”

The 1998 amendment meant, then, that the type of notice that precluded a party from moving to reopen the time to appeal was no longer limited to Civil Rule 77(d) notice. Under the 1998

amendment, *some* type of notice, in addition to Civil Rule 77(d) notice, precluded a party. But the text of the amended rule did not make clear what type of notice qualified. This was an invitation for litigation, confusion, and possible circuit splits.

To avoid such problems, former subdivision (a)(6)(B) — new subdivision (a)(6)(A) — has been amended to restore its pre-1998 simplicity. Under new subdivision (a)(6)(A), if the court finds that the moving party was not notified under Civil Rule 77(d) of the entry of the judgment or order that the party seeks to appeal within 21 days after that judgment or order was entered, then the court is authorized to reopen the time to appeal (if all of the other requirements of subdivision (a)(6) are met). Because Civil Rule 77(d) requires that notice of the entry of a judgment or order be formally served under Civil Rule 5(b), any notice that is not so served will not operate to preclude the reopening of the time to appeal under new subdivision (a)(6)(A).

Subdivision (a)(6)(B). Former subdivision (a)(6)(A) required a party to move to reopen the time to appeal “within 7 days after the moving party receives notice of the entry [of the judgment or order sought to be appealed].” Former subdivision (a)(6)(A) has been redesignated as subdivision (a)(6)(B), and one important substantive change has been made: The subdivision now makes clear that only formal notice of the entry of a judgment or order under Civil Rule 77(d) will trigger the 7-day period to move to reopen the time to appeal.

The circuits have been split over what type of “notice” is sufficient to trigger the 7-day period. The majority of circuits that addressed the question held that only *written* notice was sufficient, although nothing in the text of the rule suggested such a limitation. *See, e.g., Bass v. United States Dep’t of Agric.*, 211 F.3d 959, 963

(5th Cir. 2000). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit held that while former subdivision (a)(6)(A) did not require written notice, “the quality of the communication [had to] rise to the functional equivalent of written notice.” *Nguyen v. Southwest Leasing & Rental, Inc.*, 282 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002). Other circuits suggested in dicta that former subdivision (a)(6)(A) required only “actual notice,” which, presumably, could have included oral notice that was not “the functional equivalent of written notice.” *See, e.g., Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.*, 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir. 2000). And still other circuits read into former subdivision (a)(6)(A) restrictions that appeared only in former subdivision (a)(6)(B) (such as the requirement that notice be received “from the district court or any party,” *see Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons*, 79 F.3d 1211, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) or that appeared in neither former subdivision (a)(6)(A) nor former subdivision (a)(6)(B) (such as the requirement that notice be served in the manner prescribed by Civil Rule 5, *see Ryan v. First Unum Life Ins. Co.*, 174 F.3d 302, 304-05 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Former subdivision (a)(6)(A) — new subdivision (a)(6)(B) — has been amended to resolve this circuit split by providing that only formal notice of the entry of a judgment or order under Civil Rule 77(d) will trigger the 7-day period. Using Civil Rule 77(d) notice as the trigger has two advantages: First, because Civil Rule 77(d) is clear and familiar, circuit splits are unlikely to develop over its meaning. Second, because Civil Rule 77(d) notice must be served under Civil Rule 5(b), establishing whether and when such notice was provided should generally not be difficult.

Using Civil Rule 77(d) notice to trigger the 7-day period will not unduly delay appellate proceedings. Rule 4(a)(6) applies to only a small number of cases — cases in which a party was not notified of a judgment or order by either the clerk or another party within 21 days after entry. Even with respect to those cases, an appeal cannot be brought more than 180 days after entry, no matter what the

circumstances. In addition, Civil Rule 77(d) permits parties to serve notice of the entry of a judgment or order. The winning party can prevent Rule 4(a)(6) from even coming into play simply by serving notice of entry within 21 days. Failing that, the winning party can always trigger the 7-day deadline to move to reopen by serving belated notice.

3. Changes Made After Publication and Comments

No change was made to the text of subdivision (A) — regarding the type of notice that precludes a party from later moving to reopen the time to appeal — and only minor stylistic changes were made to the Committee Note to subdivision (A).

A substantial change was made to subdivision (B) — regarding the type of notice that triggers the 7-day deadline for moving to reopen the time to appeal. Under the published version of subdivision (B), the 7-day deadline would have been triggered when “the moving party receives or observes written notice of the entry from any source.” The Committee was attempting to implement an “eyes/ears” distinction: The 7-day period was triggered when a party learned of the entry of a judgment or order by reading about it (whether on a piece of paper or a computer screen), but was not triggered when a party merely heard about it.

Above all else, subdivision (B) should be clear and easy to apply; it should neither risk opening another circuit split over its meaning nor create the need for a lot of factfinding by district courts. After considering the public comments — and, in particular, the comments of two committees of the California bar — the Committee decided that subdivision (B) could do better on both counts. The published standard — “receives or observes written notice of the entry from any source” — was awkward and, despite the guidance of

the Committee Note, was likely to give courts problems. Even if the standard had proved to be sufficiently clear, district courts would still have been left to make factual findings about whether a particular attorney or party “received” or “observed” notice that was written or electronic.

The Committee concluded that the solution suggested by the California bar — using Civil Rule 77(d) notice to trigger the 7-day period — made a lot of sense. The standard is clear; no one doubts what it means to be served with notice of the entry of judgment under Civil Rule 77(d). The standard is also unlikely to give rise to many factual disputes. Civil Rule 77(d) notice must be formally served under Civil Rule 5(b), so establishing the presence or absence of such notice should be relatively easy. And, for the reasons described in the Committee Note, using Civil Rule 77(d) as the trigger will not unduly delay appellate proceedings.

For these reasons, the Committee amended subdivision (B) so that the 7-day deadline will be triggered only by notice of the entry of a judgment or order that is served under Civil Rule 77(d). (Corresponding changes were made to the Committee Note.) The Committee does not believe that the amendment needs to be published again for comment, as the issue of what type of notice should trigger the 7-day deadline has already been addressed by commentators, the revised version of subdivision (B) is far more forgiving than the published version, and it is highly unlikely that the revised version will be found ambiguous in any respect.

* * * * *

B. Washington’s Birthday Package: Rules 26(a)(4) and 45(a)(2)

1. Introduction

10 FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

11 Congress, or the state in which is located either the
12 district court that rendered the challenged judgment or
13 order, or the circuit clerk’s principal office.

14 * * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (a)(4). Rule 26(a)(4) has been amended to refer to the third Monday in February as “Washington’s Birthday.” A federal statute officially designates the holiday as “Washington’s Birthday,” reflecting the desire of Congress specially to honor the first president of the United States. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a). During the 1998 restyling of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, references to “Washington’s Birthday” were mistakenly changed to “Presidents’ Day.” The amendment corrects that error.

Rule 45. Clerk’s Duties

1 **(a) General Provisions.**

2 * * * * *

3 **(2) When Court Is Open.** The court of appeals is
4 always open for filing any paper, issuing and
5 returning process, making a motion, and entering an
6 order. The clerk’s office with the clerk or a deputy in

7 attendance must be open during business hours on all
8 days except Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.
9 A court may provide by local rule or by order that the
10 clerk's office be open for specified hours on
11 Saturdays or on legal holidays other than New Year's
12 Day, Martin Luther King, Jr.'s Birthday, ~~Presidents'~~
13 ~~Day~~ Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day,
14 Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day,
15 Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas
16 Day.

17 * * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (a)(2). Rule 45(a)(2) has been amended to refer to the third Monday in February as "Washington's Birthday." A federal statute officially designates the holiday as "Washington's Birthday," reflecting the desire of Congress specially to honor the first president of the United States. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 6103(a). During the 1998 restyling of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, references to "Washington's Birthday" were mistakenly changed to "Presidents' Day." The amendment corrects that error.

3. Changes Made After Publication and Comments

No changes were made to the text of the proposed amendment or to the Committee Note.

* * * * *

C. New Rule 27(d)(1)(E)

1. Introduction

The Committee proposes to add a new subdivision (E) to Rule 27(d)(1) to make it clear that the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6) apply to motion papers. Applying these restrictions to motion papers is necessary to prevent abuses — such as litigants using very small typeface to cram as many words as possible into the pages that they are allotted.

2. Text of Proposed Amendment and Committee Note**Rule 27. Motions**

1

* * * * *

2

(d) Form of Papers; Page Limits; and Number of Copies.

3

(1) Format.

4

(A) Reproduction. A motion, response, or reply

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may be reproduced by any process that yields a

6

clear black image on light paper. The paper

7

must be opaque and unglazed. Only one side of

8

the paper may be used.

9

(B) Cover. A cover is not required, but there must

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be a caption that includes the case number, the

11

name of the court, the title of the case, and a

12

brief descriptive title indicating the purpose of

13

the motion and identifying the party or parties

14

for whom it is filed. If a cover is used, it must

15

be white.

16 (C) **Binding.** The document must be bound in any
17 manner that is secure, does not obscure the text,
18 and permits the document to lie reasonably flat
19 when open.

20 (D) **Paper size, line spacing, and margins.** The
21 document must be on 8½ by 11 inch paper. The
22 text must be double-spaced, but quotations more
23 than two lines long may be indented and single-
24 spaced. Headings and footnotes may be single-
25 spaced. Margins must be at least one inch on all
26 four sides. Page numbers may be placed in the
27 margins, but no text may appear there.

28 (E) **Typeface and type styles.** The document must
29 comply with the typeface requirements of Rule
30 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Rule
31 32(a)(6).

32 * * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (d)(1)(E). A new subdivision (E) has been added to Rule 27(d)(1) to provide that a motion, a response to a motion, and a reply to a response to a motion must comply with the typeface requirements of Rule 32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Rule 32(a)(6). The purpose of the amendment is to promote uniformity in federal appellate practice and to prevent the abuses that might occur if no restrictions were placed on the size of typeface used in motion papers.

3. Changes Made After Publication and Comments

No changes were made to the text of the proposed amendment or to the Committee Note.

* * * * *

D. Cross-Appeals Package: Rules 28(c) and 28(h), new Rule 28.1, and Rules 32(a)(7)(C) and 34(d)

1. Introduction

The Appellate Rules say very little about briefing in cases involving cross-appeals. This omission has been a continuing source of frustration for judges and attorneys, and most courts have filled the vacuum by enacting local rules regarding such matters as the number and length of briefs, the colors of the covers of briefs, and the deadlines for serving and filing briefs. Not surprisingly, there are many inconsistencies among these local rules.

The Committee proposes to add a new Rule 28.1 that will collect in one place the few existing provisions regarding briefing in

cases involving cross-appeals and add several new provisions to fill the gaps in the existing rules. Each of the new provisions reflects the practice of a large majority of circuits, save one: Although all circuits now limit the appellee’s principal and response brief to 14,000 words, new Rule 28.1 will limit that brief to 16,500 words.

2. Text of Proposed Amendments and Committee Notes

Rule 28. Briefs

1

* * * * *

2

(c) **Reply Brief.** The appellant may file a brief in reply to

3

the appellee’s brief. ~~An appellee who has cross-appealed~~

4

~~may file a brief in reply to the appellant’s response to the~~

5

~~issues presented by the cross-appeal.~~ Unless the court

6

permits, no further briefs may be filed. A reply brief must

7

contain a table of contents, with page references, and a

8

table of authorities — cases (alphabetically arranged),

9

statutes, and other authorities — with references to the

10

pages of the reply brief where they are cited.

11

* * * * *

12 ~~(h) Briefs in a Case Involving a Cross-Appeal.~~ If a cross=
13 appeal is filed, the party who files a notice of appeal first
14 is the appellant for the purposes of this rule and Rules 30,
15 31, and 34. If notices are filed on the same day, the
16 plaintiff in the proceeding below is the appellant. These
17 designations may be modified by agreement of the parties
18 or by court order. With respect to appellee's cross-appeal
19 and response to appellant's brief, appellee's brief must
20 conform to the requirements of Rule 28(a)(1)~~=(11)~~. But
21 an appellee who is satisfied with appellant's statement
22 need not include a statement of the case or of the facts.

23 [Reserved]

24

* * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) has been amended to delete a sentence that authorized an appellee who had cross-appealed to file a brief in reply to the appellant's response. All rules regarding briefing in cases involving cross-appeals have been consolidated into new Rule 28.1.

Subdivision (h). Subdivision (h) — regarding briefing in cases involving cross-appeals — has been deleted. All rules regarding such briefing have been consolidated into new Rule 28.1.

Rule 28.1. Cross-Appeals

1 **(a) Applicability.** This rule applies to a case in which a
2 cross-appeal is filed. Rules 28(a)-(c), 31(a)(1), 32(a)(2),
3 and 32(a)(7)(A)-(B) do not apply to such a case, except as
4 otherwise provided in this rule.

5 **(b) Designation of Appellant.** The party who files a notice
6 of appeal first is the appellant for the purposes of this rule
7 and Rules 30 and 34. If notices are filed on the same day,
8 the plaintiff in the proceeding below is the appellant.
9 These designations may be modified by the parties'
10 agreement or by court order.

11 **(c) Briefs.** In a case involving a cross-appeal:
12 **(1) Appellant's Principal Brief.** The appellant must file
13 a principal brief in the appeal. That brief must
14 comply with Rule 28(a).

15 **(2) Appellee’s Principal and Response Brief.** The
16 appellee must file a principal brief in the cross-appeal
17 and must, in the same brief, respond to the principal
18 brief in the appeal. That appellee’s brief must comply
19 with Rule 28(a), except that the brief need not include
20 a statement of the case or a statement of the facts
21 unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the appellant’s
22 statement.

23 **(3) Appellant’s Response and Reply Brief.** The
24 appellant must file a brief that responds to the
25 principal brief in the cross-appeal and may, in the
26 same brief, reply to the response in the appeal. That
27 brief must comply with Rule 28(a)(2)–(9) and (11),
28 except that none of the following need appear unless
29 the appellant is dissatisfied with the appellee’s
30 statement in the cross-appeal:

31 **(A) the jurisdictional statement;**

32 (B) the statement of the issues;

33 (C) the statement of the case;

34 (D) the statement of the facts; and

35 (E) the statement of the standard of review.

36 (4) **Appellee's Reply Brief.** The appellee may file a
37 brief in reply to the response in the cross-appeal.

38 That brief must comply with Rule 28(a)(2)–(3) and
39 (11) and must be limited to the issues presented by the
40 cross-appeal.

41 (5) **No Further Briefs.** Unless the court permits, no
42 further briefs may be filed in a case involving a cross-
43 appeal.

44 (d) **Cover.** Except for filings by unrepresented parties, the
45 cover of the appellant's principal brief must be blue; the
46 appellee's principal and response brief, red; the
47 appellant's response and reply brief, yellow; the
48 appellee's reply brief, gray; an intervenor's or amicus

49 curiae's brief, green; and any supplemental brief, tan.
50 The front cover of a brief must contain the information
51 required by Rule 32(a)(2).

52 **(e) Length.**

53 **(1) Page Limitation.** Unless it complies with Rule
54 28.1(e)(2) and (3), the appellant's principal brief must
55 not exceed 30 pages; the appellee's principal and
56 response brief, 35 pages; the appellant's response and
57 reply brief, 30 pages; and the appellee's reply brief,
58 15 pages.

59 **(2) Type-Volume Limitation.**

60 **(A) The appellant's principal brief or the appellant's**
61 **response and reply brief is acceptable if:**
62 **(i) it contains no more than 14,000 words; or**
63 **(ii) it uses a monospaced face and contains no**
64 **more than 1,300 lines of text.**

65 (B) The appellee’s principal and response brief is
66 acceptable if:

67 (i) it contains no more than 16,500 words; or

68 (ii) it uses a monospaced face and contains no
69 more than 1,500 lines of text.

70 (C) The appellee’s reply brief is acceptable if it
71 contains no more than half of the type volume
72 specified in Rule 28.1(e)(2)(A).

73 (3) **Certificate of Compliance.** A brief submitted under
74 Rule 28.1(e)(2) must comply with Rule 32(a)(7)(C).

75 (f) **Time to Serve and File a Brief.** Briefs must be
76 served and filed as follows:

77 (1) the appellant’s principal brief, within 40 days after the
78 record is filed;

79 (2) the appellee’s principal and response brief, within 30
80 days after the appellant’s principal brief is served;

- 81 (3) the appellant’s response and reply brief, within 30
82 days after the appellee’s principal and response brief
83 is served; and
- 80 (4) the appellee’s reply brief, within 14 days after the
81 appellant’s response and reply brief is served, but at
82 least 3 days before argument unless the court, for
83 good cause, allows a later filing.

Committee Note

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have said very little about briefing in cases involving cross-appeals. This vacuum has frustrated judges, attorneys, and parties who have sought guidance in the rules. More importantly, this vacuum has been filled by conflicting local rules regarding such matters as the number and length of briefs, the colors of the covers of briefs, and the deadlines for serving and filing briefs. These local rules have created a hardship for attorneys who practice in more than one circuit.

New Rule 28.1 provides a comprehensive set of rules governing briefing in cases involving cross-appeals. The few existing provisions regarding briefing in such cases have been moved into new Rule 28.1, and several new provisions have been added to fill the gaps in the existing rules. The new provisions reflect the practices of the large majority of circuits and, to a significant extent, the new provisions have been patterned after the requirements imposed by Rules 28, 31, and 32 on briefs filed in cases that do not involve cross-appeals.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) makes clear that, in a case involving a cross-appeal, briefing is governed by new Rule 28.1, and not by Rules 28(a), 28(b), 28(c), 31(a)(1), 32(a)(2), 32(a)(7)(A), and 32(a)(7)(B), except to the extent that Rule 28.1 specifically incorporates those rules by reference.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) defines who is the “appellant” and who is the “appellee” in a case involving a cross-appeal. Subdivision (b) is taken directly from former Rule 28(h), except that subdivision (b) refers to a party being designated as an appellant “for the purposes of this rule and Rules 30 and 34,” whereas former Rule 28(h) also referred to Rule 31. Because the matter addressed by Rule 31(a)(1) — the time to serve and file briefs — is now addressed directly in new Rule 28.1(f), the cross-reference to Rule 31 is no longer necessary. In Rule 31 and in all rules other than Rules 28.1, 30, and 34, references to an “appellant” refer both to the appellant in an appeal and to the cross-appellant in a cross-appeal, and references to an “appellee” refer both to the appellee in an appeal and to the cross-appellee in a cross-appeal. Cf. Rule 31(c).

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) provides for the filing of four briefs in a case involving a cross-appeal. This reflects the practice of every circuit except the Seventh. *See* 7th Cir. R. 28(d)(1)(a).

The first brief is the “appellant’s principal brief.” That brief — like the appellant’s principal brief in a case that does not involve a cross-appeal — must comply with Rule 28(a).

The second brief is the “appellee’s principal and response brief.” Because this brief serves as the appellee’s principal brief on the merits of the cross-appeal, as well as the appellee’s response brief on the merits of the appeal, it must also comply with Rule 28(a), with the limited exceptions noted in the text of the rule.

The third brief is the “appellant’s response and reply brief.” Like a response brief in a case that does not involve a cross-appeal — that is, a response brief that does not also serve as a principal brief on the merits of a cross-appeal — the appellant’s response and reply brief must comply with Rule 28(a)(2)-(9) and (11), with the exceptions noted in the text of the rule. *See* Rule 28(b). The one difference between the appellant’s response and reply brief, on the one hand, and a response brief filed in a case that does not involve a cross-appeal, on the other, is that the latter must include a corporate disclosure statement. *See* Rule 28(a)(1) and (b). An appellant filing a response and reply brief in a case involving a cross-appeal has already filed a corporate disclosure statement with its principal brief on the merits of the appeal.

The fourth brief is the “appellee’s reply brief.” Like a reply brief in a case that does not involve a cross-appeal, it must comply with Rule 28(c), which essentially restates the requirements of Rule 28(a)(2)-(3) and (11). (Rather than restating the requirements of Rule 28(a)(2)-(3) and (11), as Rule 28(c) does, Rule 28.1(c)(4) includes a direct cross-reference.) The appellee’s reply brief must also be limited to the issues presented by the cross-appeal.

Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) specifies the colors of the covers on briefs filed in a case involving a cross-appeal. It is patterned after Rule 32(a)(2), which does not specifically refer to cross-appeals.

Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) sets forth limits on the length of the briefs filed in a case involving a cross-appeal. It is patterned after Rule 32(a)(7), which does not specifically refer to cross-appeals. Subdivision (e) permits the appellee’s principal and response brief to be longer than a typical principal brief on the merits because this brief serves not only as the principal brief on the merits of the cross-appeal, but also as the response brief on the merits of the

appeal. Likewise, subdivision (e) permits the appellant’s response and reply brief to be longer than a typical reply brief because this brief serves not only as the reply brief in the appeal, but also as the response brief in the cross-appeal. For purposes of determining the maximum length of an amicus curiae’s brief filed in a case involving a cross-appeal, Rule 29(d)’s reference to “the maximum length authorized by these rules for a party’s principal brief” should be understood to refer to subdivision (e)’s limitations on the length of an appellant’s principal brief.

Subdivision (f). Subdivision (f) provides deadlines for serving and filing briefs in a cross-appeal. It is patterned after Rule 31(a)(1), which does not specifically refer to cross-appeals.

Rule 32. Form of Briefs, Appendices, and Other Papers

1 **(a) Form of a Brief.**

2 * * * * *

3 **(7) Length.**

4 * * * * *

5 **(C) Certificate of compliance.**

6 (i) A brief submitted under Rules 28.1(e)(2) or
 7 32(a)(7)(B) must include a certificate by the
 8 attorney, or an unrepresented party, that the
 9 brief complies with the type-volume

10 limitation. The person preparing the
11 certificate may rely on the word or line
12 count of the word-processing system used to
13 prepare the brief. The certificate must state
14 either:

- 15 ● the number of words in the brief; or
- 16 ● the number of lines of monospaced
17 type in the brief.

18 (ii) Form 6 in the Appendix of Forms is a
19 suggested form of a certificate of
20 compliance. Use of Form 6 must be
21 regarded as sufficient to meet the
22 requirements of Rules 28.1(e)(3) and
23 32(a)(7)(C)(i).

24 * * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (a)(7)(C). Rule 32(a)(7)(C) has been amended to add cross-references to new Rule 28.1, which governs briefs filed

in cases involving cross-appeals. Rule 28.1(e)(2) prescribes type-volume limitations that apply to such briefs, and Rule 28.1(e)(3) requires parties to certify compliance with those type-volume limitations under Rule 32(a)(7)(C).

Rule 34. Oral Argument

1 * * * * *

2 **(d) Cross-Appeals and Separate Appeals.** If there is a
3 cross-appeal, Rule ~~28(h)~~ 28.1(b) determines which party
4 is the appellant and which is the appellee for purposes of
5 oral argument. Unless the court directs otherwise, a
6 cross-appeal or separate appeal must be argued when the
7 initial appeal is argued. Separate parties should avoid
8 duplicative argument.

9 * * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (d). A cross-reference in subdivision (d) has been changed to reflect the fact that, as part of an effort to collect within one rule all provisions regarding briefing in cases involving cross-appeals, former Rule 28(h) has been abrogated and its contents moved to new Rule 28.1(b).

3. Changes Made After Publication and Comments

The Committee adopted the recommendation of the Style Subcommittee that the text of Rule 28.1 be changed in a few minor respects to improve clarity. (That recommendation is described below.) The Committee also adopted three suggestions made by the Department of Justice: (1) A sentence was added to the Committee Note to Rule 28.1(b) to clarify that the term “appellant” (and “appellee”) as used by rules other than Rules 28.1, 30, and 34, refers to both the appellant in an appeal and the cross-appellant in a cross-appeal (and to both the appellee in an appeal and the cross-appellee in a cross-appeal). (2) Rule 28.1(d) was amended to prescribe cover colors for supplemental briefs and briefs filed by an intervenor or amicus curiae. (3) A few words were added to the Committee Note to Rule 28.1(e) to clarify the length of an amicus curiae’s brief.

* * * * *

F. Rule 35(a)

1. Introduction

Two national standards — 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and Rule 35(a) — provide that a hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered by “a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service.” Although these standards apply to all of the courts of appeals, the circuits follow two different approaches when one or more active judges are disqualified. Seven circuits follow the “absolute majority” approach (disqualified judges count in the base in considering whether a “majority” of judges have voted for hearing or rehearing en banc), while six follow the “case majority” approach (disqualified judges do not count in the base). Two circuits — the First and the Third — explicitly qualify the case majority approach by providing

that a majority of all judges — disqualified or not — must be eligible to participate in the case; it is not clear whether the other four case majority circuits agree with this qualification.

The Committee proposes amending Rule 35(a) to adopt the case majority approach.

2. Text of Proposed Amendment and Committee Note

Rule 35. En Banc Determination

1 **(a) When Hearing or Rehearing En Banc May Be**

2 **Ordered.** A majority of the circuit judges who are in
3 regular active service and who are not disqualified may
4 order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or
5 reheard by the court of appeals en banc. An en banc
6 hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not
7 be ordered unless:

8 (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or
9 maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or

10 (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional
11 importance.

12

* * * * *

Committee Note

Subdivision (a). Two national standards — 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) and Rule 35(a) — provide that a hearing or rehearing en banc may be ordered by “a majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service.” Although these standards apply to all of the courts of appeals, the circuits are deeply divided over the interpretation of this language when one or more active judges are disqualified.

The Supreme Court has never addressed this issue. In *Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.*, 374 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court rejected a petitioner’s claim that his rights under § 46(c) had been violated when the Third Circuit refused to rehear his case en banc. The Third Circuit had 8 active judges at the time; 4 voted in favor of rehearing the case, 2 against, and 2 abstained. No judge was disqualified. The Supreme Court ruled against the petitioner, holding, in essence, that § 46(c) did not provide a cause of action, but instead simply gave litigants “the right to know the administrative machinery that will be followed and the right to suggest that the *en banc* procedure be set in motion in his case.” *Id.* at 5. *Shenker* did stress that a court of appeals has broad discretion in establishing internal procedures to handle requests for rehearings — or, as *Shenker* put it, “to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the *means* whereby a majority may order such a hearing.” *Id.* (quoting *Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.*, 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953) (emphasis added)). But *Shenker* did not address what is meant by “a majority” in § 46(c) (or Rule 35(a), which did not yet exist) — and *Shenker* certainly did not suggest that the phrase should have different meanings in different circuits.

In interpreting that phrase, 7 of the courts of appeals follow the “absolute majority” approach. See Marie Leary, Defining the “Majority” Vote Requirement in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) for Rehearings En Banc in the United States Courts of Appeals 8 tbl.1 (Federal Judicial Center 2002). Under this approach, disqualified judges are counted in the base in calculating whether a

majority of judges have voted to hear a case en banc. Thus, in a circuit with 12 active judges, 7 must vote to hear a case en banc. If 5 of the 12 active judges are disqualified, all 7 non-disqualified judges must vote to hear the case en banc. The votes of 6 of the 7 non-disqualified judges are not enough, as 6 is not a majority of 12.

Six of the courts of appeals follow the “case majority” approach. *Id.* Under this approach, disqualified judges are not counted in the base in calculating whether a majority of judges have voted to hear a case en banc. Thus, in a case in which 5 of a circuit’s 12 active judges are disqualified, only 4 judges (a majority of the 7 non-disqualified judges) must vote to hear a case en banc. (The First and Third Circuits explicitly qualify the case majority approach by providing that a case cannot be heard en banc unless a majority of all active judges — disqualified and non-disqualified — are eligible to participate.)

Rule 35(a) has been amended to adopt the case majority approach as a uniform national interpretation of § 46(c). The federal rules of practice and procedure exist to “maintain consistency,” which Congress has equated with “promot[ing] the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b). The courts of appeals should not follow two inconsistent approaches in deciding whether sufficient votes exist to hear a case en banc, especially when there is a governing statute and governing rule that apply to all circuits and that use identical terms, and especially when there is nothing about the local conditions of each circuit that justifies conflicting approaches.

The case majority approach represents the better interpretation of the phrase “the circuit judges . . . in regular active service” in the first sentence of § 46(c). The second sentence of § 46(c) — which defines which judges are eligible to participate in a case being heard or reheard en banc — uses the similar expression “all circuit judges in regular active service.” It is clear that “all circuit judges in regular active service” in the second sentence does not include disqualified judges, as disqualified judges clearly cannot

participate in a case being heard or reheard en banc. Therefore, assuming that two nearly identical phrases appearing in adjacent sentences in a statute should be interpreted in the same way, the best reading of “the circuit judges . . . in regular active service” in the first sentence of § 46(c) is that it, too, does not include disqualified judges.

This interpretation of § 46(c) is bolstered by the fact that the case majority approach has at least two major advantages over the absolute majority approach:

First, under the absolute majority approach, a disqualified judge is, as a practical matter, counted as voting against hearing a case en banc. This defeats the purpose of recusal. To the extent possible, the disqualification of a judge should not result in the equivalent of a vote for or against hearing a case en banc.

Second, the absolute majority approach can leave the en banc court helpless to overturn a panel decision with which almost all of the circuit’s active judges disagree. For example, in a case in which 5 of a circuit’s 12 active judges are disqualified, the case cannot be heard en banc even if 6 of the 7 non-disqualified judges strongly disagree with the panel opinion. This permits one active judge — perhaps sitting on a panel with a visiting judge — effectively to control circuit precedent, even over the objection of all of his or her colleagues. *See Gulf Power Co. v. FCC*, 226 F.3d 1220, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 2000) (Carnes, J., concerning the denial of reh’g en banc), *rev’d sub nom. National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co.*, 534 U.S. 327 (2002). Even though the en banc court may, in a future case, be able to correct an erroneous legal interpretation, the en banc court will never be able to correct the injustice inflicted by the panel on the parties to the case. Moreover, it may take many years before sufficient non-disqualified judges can be mustered to overturn the panel’s erroneous legal interpretation. In the meantime, the lower courts of the circuit must apply — and the citizens of the circuit must conform their behavior to — an

interpretation of the law that almost all of the circuit's active judges believe is incorrect.

The amendment to Rule 35(a) is not meant to alter or affect the quorum requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 46(d). In particular, the amendment is not intended to foreclose the possibility that § 46(d) might be read to require that more than half of all circuit judges in regular active service be eligible to participate in order for the court to hear or rehear a case en banc.

3. Changes Made After Publication and Comments

No changes were made to the text of the proposed amendment. The Committee Note was modified in three respects. First, the Note was changed to put more emphasis on the fact that the case majority rule is the best interpretation of § 46(c). Second, the Note now clarifies that nothing in the proposed amendment is intended to foreclose courts from interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) to provide that a case cannot be heard or reheard en banc unless a majority of all judges in regular active service — disqualified or not — are eligible to participate. Finally, a couple of arguments made by supporters of the amendment to Rule 35(a) were incorporated into the Note.

* * * * *