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**United States Nuclear  
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Staff Practice and  
Procedure Digest**

**Commission, Appeal Board and  
Licensing Board Decisions**

**July 1972 – December 2006**

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# UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## STAFF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DIGEST

(The January 2009 Update covers Commission, Appeal Board, and Licensing Board Decisions issued from July 1, 1972 through December 2006)

### NOTE TO USERS

This is the fourteenth edition of the NRC Staff Practice and Procedure Digest. It contains a digest of significant decisions of the Commission, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel, and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel issued during the period from July 1, 1972 to December 2006), which interpret the NRC's Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2. Although the Appeal Board Panel was abolished in 1991, Appeal Board precedent may still be cited, to the extent it is consistent with more recent case law and the current rules of practice. This edition of the Digest replaces the earlier editions and revisions and includes appropriate changes reflecting the amendments to the Rules of Practice effective through December 2006.

Users of the Digest should recall that the Commission adopted a comprehensive revision to its rules of practice in 2004. See *Changes to Adjudicatory Process*, 69 Fed. Reg. 2182 (Jan. 14, 2004), corrections issued 69 Fed. Reg. 25997 (May 11, 2004). Petitions for review challenging the new rules were denied in *Citizens Awareness, Inc. v. United States*, 391 F.3d 338 (1<sup>st</sup> Cir. 2004). Although our staff has worked diligently to conform the digest to the revised rules of practice, practitioners should ensure that precedent cited in the digest is consistent with the new rules. The NRC has created several tools to aid practitioners in understanding and applying the revised Part 2. These user tools can be found at the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/adjudicatory/part2revisions.html>. These tools are provided for informational purposes only and are not a replacement for the regulations in 10 CFR Part 2.

Practitioners should also be mindful of the adoption of two additional rulemakings that affect the Rules of Practice:

*Use of Electronic Submissions in Agency Hearings:* On August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49139), the NRC published an amendment, effective October 15, 2007, to require the use of electronic submissions in all agency hearings, consistent with the existing practice for the high-level radioactive waste repository application (which is covered under a separate set of regulations). The amendments require the electronic transmission of electronic documents in submissions made to the NRC's adjudicatory boards. Although exceptions to these requirements are established to allow paper filings in limited circumstances, the NRC maintains a strong preference for fully electronic filing and service. The final rule builds upon prior NRC rules and developments in the Federal courts regarding the use of electronic submissions.

*Licenses, Certification and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants:* On August 28, 2007 (72 FR 49351), the NRC published an amendment to its regulations, effective September 27, 2007, to revise the provisions applicable to the licensing and approval processes for nuclear power plants (i.e., early site permit, standard design approval, standard design certification, combined license, and manufacturing license). These amendments clarify the applicability of various requirements to each of the licensing processes by making necessary conforming amendments throughout the NRC's regulations, including Part 2, to enhance the NRC's regulatory effectiveness and efficiency in implementing its licensing and approval processes.

The digest includes the text of several Commission policy statements bearing directly on adjudicatory practice. We have included the text of the Commission's 2008 Statement of Policy on Conduct of New Reactor Licensing Proceedings, CLI-08-07, 73 Fed. Reg. 20963 (April 17, 2008). Although this and other policy statements are important expressions of Commission policy on the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings, practitioners should be sure to follow the specific provisions of the rules of practice in 10 CFR Part 2.

This digest also includes as an Appendix a list of NRC adjudicatory decisions appealed to the courts in order to assist practitioners in tracking the case history for final NRC decisions. I appreciate the contribution of Roland Frye of the Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication who compiled the list.

The Digest is roughly structured in accordance with the chronological sequence of the nuclear facility licensing process as set forth in 10 CFR Part 2. Those decisions and subject matter which did not fit easily into that structure are dealt with in a section on "general matters." Where appropriate, particular decisions are indexed under more than one heading. Some topical headings contain no decision citations or discussion. It is anticipated that future updates to the Digest will utilize these headings.

Persons using this Digest are placed on notice that it may not be used as an authoritative citation in support of any positions before the Commission or any of its adjudicatory tribunals. Persons using this Digest are also placed on notice that it is intended for use only as an initial research tool; that it may, and likely does, contain errors; and that the user should not rely on the Digest's analyses and interpretations, but must read, analyze and rely on the user's own analysis of the cited Commission, Appeal Board and Licensing Board decisions. Neither the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, nor any of its employees, makes any expressed or implied warranty or assumes liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any material presented in the Digest.

This current edition of the Digest was prepared by the staff of the Office of the General Counsel. I want to acknowledge particularly the contribution to this effort of OGC attorney Margaret Bupp, who guided this comprehensive revision of the digest. She was ably assisted by other attorneys on our staff, including James Adler, Jerry Bonanno, Michael Spencer, Steve Hamrick, Patrick Moulding, Jason Zorn and Carol Lazar. Theresa Mayberry, Joe Gilman and Brian Newell prepared the manuscript for publication. We hope that the Digest will prove to be as useful to the members of the public as it has been to the members of the Office of the General Counsel.

We hope to publish an update to the Digest within the next year. Users of the Digest are encouraged to provide us any comments or suggestions that would improve its usefulness. You may send comments, suggestions or corrections to my attention.

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boards to use Federal or State court rooms when these facilities are available and in such cases the policy of those courts in regard to the use of cameras will be observed.

The Commission plans to reassess this policy in about six months after its hearing and appeal boards have had sufficient experience with camera coverage to determine whether it can be carried out without disruption to the proceeding or unacceptable distraction to the participants.

Dated at Washington, D.C., this 27th day of January 1978.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

SAMUEL J. CHIL,  
*Secretary of the Commission.*

[FR Doc. 78-2893 Filed 1-31-78; 8:45 am]

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[7590-01]

**CAMERA COVERAGE OF HEARINGS BEFORE  
ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARDS  
AND ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING  
APPEAL BOARDS**

**General Statement of Policy**

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has considered requests from television stations and newspapers to permit the use of cameras during proceedings before Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards. In the past the NRC has permitted cameras to be used only before and after adjudicatory sessions and during recesses. The Commission has decided that, on a trial basis, it will permit the use of television and still cameras by accredited news media under certain conditions. Cameras may be used by news media during hearings and related public proceedings before Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Boards provided they do not require additional lighting beyond that required for the conduct of the proceeding and are stationed at a fixed position within the hearing room throughout the course of the proceeding. It will continue to be the practice of the hearing and appeal

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conflicts between the NRC's responsibility to disclose information to adjudicatory boards and parties, and the NRC's need to protect investigative material from premature public disclosure. "Statement of Policy—Investigations and Adjudicatory Proceedings," 48 FR 36358 (August 10, 1983).

Those interim procedures called for the NRC staff or Office of Investigations (OI), when it felt disclosure of information to an adjudicatory board was required but that unrestricted disclosure could compromise an inspection or investigation, to present the information and its concerns about disclosure to the board *in camera*, without disclosure of the substance of the information to the other parties. A board decision to disclose the information to the parties was appealable to the Commission, and the board was not to order disclosure until the Commission addressed the matter.

That Statement of Policy was to remain in effect until the Commission received and took action on the recommendations of an internal NRC task force established to develop guidelines for reconciling these conflicts in individual cases. The Commission in that Statement also requested public comments on the propriety and desirability of *ex parte in camera* presentation of information to a board, and suggestions for any better alternatives.

The Task Force submitted its report to the Commission on December 30, 1983. A copy of that report will be placed in the Commission's Public Document Room. The Task Force approved the principles discussed in the Commission's earlier Statement of Policy, and made several recommendations intended to define specifically the responsibilities of the boards, the staff, and OI in presenting disclosure issues for resolution.

The Task Force recommended that the final Policy Statement explain that full disclosure of material information to adjudicatory boards and the parties is the general rule, but that some conflicts between the duty to disclose and the need to protect information will be inevitable. The Task Force further recommended that issues regarding disclosure to the parties be initially determined by the adjudicatory boards with provision for expedited appellate review, and that procedures for the resolution of such conflicts be established by rule. Finally, the Task Force suggested that existing board notification procedures should remain unaffected by the Policy Statement, and that those procedures and Commission

guidelines for disclosure of information concerning investigations and inspections should apply to all NRC offices. Those recommendations have been incorporated in this Statement.

In addition, two comments were submitted by members of the public.

One commenter stated that the withholding of information from public disclosure should be confined to the minimum essential to avoid compromising enforcement actions, and that appropriate representatives of each party should be allowed to participate under suitable protective orders in any *in camera* proceeding except in the most exceptional cases.

The other commenter maintained that an *in camera* presentation to the board with only one party present is undesirable and violates the *ex parte* rule. That commenter suggested an alternative of having the attorneys or authorized representatives of parties who have signed a protective agreement present at any *in camera* presentation, with appropriate sanctions for violating the protective agreement.<sup>1</sup>

The Commission, after considering these comments and the report of the Task Force, has decided that it would be appropriate, in order to better explain the Commission's policy in this area, to provide the following explanation of the conflict between the duty to disclose investigation or inspection information to the boards and parties and the need to protect that information:

All parties in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, including the NRC staff, have a duty to disclose to the boards and other parties all new information they acquire which is considered material and relevant to any issue in controversy in the proceeding. Such disclosure is required to allow full resolution of all issues in the proceeding. The Commission expects all NRC offices to utilize procedures which will assure prompt and appropriate action to fulfill this responsibility.

However, the Commission recognizes that there may be conflicts between this responsibility to provide the boards and parties with information and an investigating or inspecting office's need to avoid public disclosure for either or both of two reasons: (1) To avoid

<sup>1</sup> Both comments also included suggestions regarding matters beyond the scope of this Policy Statement, which is concerned only with establishing a procedure to handle conflicts between the duty to disclose information to the boards and parties and the need to protect that information. For instance, one suggestion was that the NRC impose a more stringent standard in deciding whether information warrants a board notification. Another recommended that the NRC improve the quality of its investigations.

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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

### Statement of Policy; Investigations, Inspections, and Adjudicatory Proceedings

On August 5, 1983, the Commission set forth interim procedures for handling

compromising an ongoing investigation or inspection; and (2) to protect confidential sources. The importance of protecting information for either of these reasons can in appropriate circumstances be as great as the importance of disclosing the information to the boards and parties.

With regard to the first reason, avoiding compromise of an investigation or inspection, it is important to informed licensing decisions that NRC inspections and investigations are conducted so that all relevant information is gathered for appropriate evaluation. Release of investigative material to the subject of an investigation before the completion of the investigation could adversely affect the NRC's ability to complete that investigation fully and adequately. The subject, upon discovering what evidence the NRC had already acquired and the direction being taken by the NRC investigation, might attempt to alter or limit the direction or the nature or availability of further statements or evidence, and prevent NRC from learning the facts. The failure to ascertain all relevant facts could itself result in the NRC making an uninformed licensing decision. However, the need to protect information developed in investigations or inspections usually ends once the investigation or inspection is completed and evaluated for possible enforcement action.

The second reason for not disclosing investigative material—to protect confidential sources—has a different basis. Individuals sometimes present safety concerns to the NRC only after being assured that their individual identity will be kept confidential. This desire for confidentiality may arise for a number of reasons, including the possibility of harassment and retaliation. Confidential sources are a valuable asset to NRC inspections and investigations. Releasing names to the parties in an adjudication after promising confidentiality to sources would be detrimental to the NRC's overall inspection and investigation activities because other individuals may be reluctant to bring information to the NRC. However, the need to protect confidential sources does not end when the investigation or inspection is completed and evaluated for possible enforcement action.

By this Policy Statement, the Commission is not attempting to resolve the conflict that may arise in each case between the duty to disclose information to the boards and parties and the need to protect that information or its source. The resolution of actual conflicts must be decided on the merits

of each individual case. However, the Commission does note that as a general rule it favors full disclosure to the boards and parties, that information should be protected only when necessary, and that any limits on disclosure to the parties should be limited in both scope and duration to the minimum necessary to achieve the purposes of the non-disclosure policy.

The purpose of this Policy Statement is to establish a procedure by which the conflicts can be resolved. The Policy Statement takes over once a determination has been made, under established board notification procedures, that information should be disclosed to the boards and public, but OI or staff believes that the information should be protected. In those cases the Commission has decided that the only workable solution to protect both interests is to provide for an *in camera* presentation to the board by the NRC staff or OI, with no party present. Any other procedure could defeat the purpose of non-disclosure and might actually inhibit the acquisition of information critical to decisions.

Allowing the other parties or their representatives to be present in all cases, even under a protective order, could breach promises of confidentiality or allow the subject of an investigation to prematurely acquire information about the investigation. We note in this regard the difficulties of attempting to prevent a party's representative from talking to his client about the relevance of the information and how to respond to it, even under a protective order.

The Commission believes that the boards, using the procedures established in this Policy Statement, can resolve most potential disclosure conflicts once they have been advised of the nature of the information involved, the status of the inspection or investigation, and the projected time for its completion. In many of the cases when the procedures in this Policy Statement are triggered by a concern for premature public disclosure, it may be possible for boards to provide for the timely consideration of relevant matters derived from investigations and inspections through the deferral or rescheduling of issues for hearing. In other instances, the boards may be able to resolve the conflict by placing limitations on the scope of disclosure to the parties, or by using protective orders.

The Commission wishes to emphasize that these procedures do not abrogate the well-established principle of administrative law that a board *may not* use *ex parte* information presented *in camera* in making licensing decisions.

These procedures are designed to allow the boards to determine the relevance of material to the adjudication, and whether that information must be disclosed to the parties, and, if disclosure is required, to provide a mechanism for case management both to protect investigations and inspections and to allow for the timely provision of material and relevant information to the parties. As such these procedures are analogous to the procedures for resolving disputes regarding discovery, *see, e.g.*, 10 CFR 2.740(c), and do not violate the prohibition in 10 CFR 2.780 against *ex parte* discussion of substantive matters at issue.

In accord with the above discussion, the Commission has decided that the procedures to be followed, where there is a conflict between the need for disclosure to the board and parties and the need to protect an investigation or inspection, will include *in camera* presentations by the staff or OI. However, because this procedure represents a departure from normal Commission procedure, it is the Commission's view that the decision should be implemented by rulemaking. Accordingly, the Commission directs the NRC staff to commence a rulemaking on the matter.

Until completion of the rulemaking, the following will control the procedures to be followed in resolving conflicts between the duty to disclose to boards and the need to protect information developed in investigation or inspection:

1. Established board notification procedures should be used by staff or OI to determine whether information in their possession is potentially relevant and material to a pending adjudicatory proceeding.<sup>2</sup> The general rule is that all information warranting disclosure to the boards and parties, including information that is the subject of ongoing investigations or inspections, should be disclosed, except as provided herein.

2. When staff or OI believes that it has a duty in a particular case to provide an adjudicatory board with information concerning an inspection or investigation, or when a board requests such information, staff or OI should provide the information to the board and parties unless it believes that unrestricted disclosure would prejudice an ongoing inspection or investigation, or reveal confidential sources. If staff or OI believes unrestricted disclosure

<sup>2</sup> While this Statement refers only to staff and OI who are the organizations principally involved, the statement will apply to any other offices of the Commission which may have the problem.



would have these adverse results, it should propose to the board and parties that the information be disclosed under suitable protective orders and other restrictions, unless such restricted disclosure would also defeat the purpose behind non-disclosure. If staff or OI believes that any disclosure, however restricted, would defeat the purpose behind non-disclosure, it shall provide the board with an explanation of the basis of its concern about disclosure and present the information to the board, *in camera*, without other parties present. A verbatim transcript of the *in camera* proceeding will be made.<sup>3</sup>

All parties should be advised by the board of the conduct and purpose of the *in camera* proceeding but should not be informed of the substance of the information presented. If, after such *in camera* presentation, a board finds that disclosure to other parties under protective order or otherwise is required (*e.g.*, withholding information may prejudice one or more parties or jeopardize timely completion of the proceedings, or the board disagrees that release will prejudice the investigation), it shall notify staff or OI of its intent to order disclosure, specifying the information to be provided, the terms of any protective order proposed, and the basis for its conclusion that prompt disclosure is required. The staff or OI shall provide the board within a reasonable period of time, to be set by the board, a statement of objections or concurrence. If the board disagrees with any objection and the disagreement cannot be resolved, the board shall promptly certify the record of the *in camera* proceeding to the Commission for resolution of the disclosure dispute, and so inform the other parties. Any licensing board decision to order disclosure of the identify of a confidential source shall be certified to the Commission for review regardless of whether OI and staff concur in the disclosure.<sup>4</sup> The board's decision shall be stayed pending a Commission decision. The record before the Commission shall consist of the transcript, the board's Notice of Intent to require disclosure and the objections of Staff or OI. Staff or OI may file a brief with the Commission within ten days of filing a statement of objections with the board. The record before the Commission, including staff or OI's

brief, shall be kept *in camera* to the extent necessary to protect the purposes of non-disclosure.

The Commission recognizes that no other party may be in a position effectively to respond to staff or OI's brief because the proceedings have been conducted *in camera*. However, in those cases where another party feels that it is in a position to file a brief, it may do so within seven days after staff or OI files its brief with the Commission.

3. Staff or OI shall notify the board and, as appropriate, the Commission, if the objection to disclosure to the parties of previously withheld information, or any portion of it, is withdrawn. Unless the Commission has directed otherwise, such information—with the exception of the identities of confidential sources—may then be disclosed without further Commission order.

4. When a board or the Commission determines that information concerning a pending investigation or inspection should not be disclosed to the parties, the record of any *in camera* proceeding conducted shall be deemed sealed pending further order. That record will be ordered included in the public record of the adjudicatory proceeding upon completion of the inspection or investigation, or upon public disclosure of the information involved, whichever is earlier, subject to any privileges that may validly be claimed under the Commission's regulations, including protection of the identify of a confidential source. Only the Commission can order release of the identify of a confidential source.

Dated at Washington, D.C. this 7th day of September, 1984.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samuel J. Chilk,

*Secretary of the Commission.*

[FR Doc. 84-24261 Filed 9-12-84; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

<sup>3</sup> Nothing in this Statement prohibits staff or OI from sharing information.

<sup>4</sup> The Commission has decided to review any licensing board decision ordering disclosure of the identify of a confidential source because of the importance to the Commission's inspection and investigation program of protecting the identity of confidential sources.

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## NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

### Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution; Policy Statement

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission.

**ACTION:** Policy statement.

**SUMMARY:** This Policy statement presents the policy of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on the use of "alternative means of dispute resolution" (ADR) to resolve issues in controversy concerning NRC administrative programs. ADR processes include, but are not limited to, settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration or combination of these processes. These processes present options in lieu of adjudicative or adversarial methods of resolving conflict and usually involve the use of a neutral third party.

**DATES:** This policy statement is effective on August 14, 1992. Because this is a general statement of policy, no prior notice or opportunity for public comment is required. However, an opportunity for comment is being provided. The period for comments expires on September 28, 1992. Comments received after this date will be considered to the extent practical; however, to be of greatest assistance to the Commission in planning the implementation of its ADR policy, comments should be received on or before this date.

**ADDRESSES:** Mail written comments to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, Deliver comments to One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.

Copies of comments received may be examined and/or copied for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW., (Lower Level), Washington, DC, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** James M. Cutchin IV, Special Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555; Telephone: (301) 504-1568.

### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

#### Background

Congress enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (Public Law 101-552) on November 15, 1990. The Act requires each Federal agency to designate a senior official as its dispute resolution specialist, to provide for the training in ADR processes of the dispute resolution specialist and certain other employees, to examine its administrative programs, and to develop, in consultation with the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS), and adopt, a policy that addresses the use of ADR and case management for resolving disputes in connection with agency programs. Although the Act authorizes and encourages the use of ADR, it does not require the use of ADR. Whether to use or not to use ADR is committed to an agency's discretion. Moreover, participation in ADR processes is by agreement of the disputants. The use of ADR processes may not be required by the agency.

#### Discussion

The Act provides no clear guidance on when the use of ADR is appropriate or on which ADR process is best to use in a given situation. However, section 581 of the Act appears to prohibit the use of ADR to resolve matters specified under the provisions of sections 2302 and 7121(c) of title 5 of the United States Code, and section 582(b) identifies situations for which an agency shall consider not using ADR. Nevertheless, numerous situations where the use of ADR to resolve disputes concerning NRC programs would be appropriate may arise. A document issued by ACUS in February 1992, entitled "The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act: Guidance for Agency Dispute Resolution Specialists," suggests that the use of ADR may be appropriate in situations involving a particular type of dispute when one or more of the following characteristics is present:

Parties are likely to agree to use ADR in cases of this type;

Cases of this type do not involve or require the setting of precedent;

Variation in outcome of the cases of this type is not a major concern;

All of the significantly affected parties are usually involved in cases of this type;

Cases of this type frequently settle at some point in the process;

The potential for impasse in cases of this type is high because of poor communication among parties, conflicts within parties or technical complexity or uncertainty;

Maintaining confidentiality in cases of this type is either not a concern or would be advantageous;

Litigation in cases of this type is usually a lengthy and/or expensive process; or

Creative solutions, not necessarily available in formal adjudication, may provide the most satisfactory outcome in cases of this type.

As the Act requires, a Dispute Resolution Specialist has been designated, NRC administrative programs have been reviewed, a policy on the use of ADR has been adopted, and the training of certain NRC employees has begun. As the Act requires, input on development of the policy has been sought from ACUS and FMCS. Although the Act does not require it, input on the policy and its implementation is being sought from the public, including those persons whose activities the NRC regulates, because the possible benefits of ADR cannot be realized without the agreement of all parties to a dispute to participate in ADR processes. Among the possible benefits of ADR are:

More control by the parties over the outcome of their dispute than in formal adjudication;

A reduction in levels of antagonism between the parties to a dispute; and

Savings of time and money by resolving the dispute earlier with the expenditure of fewer resources.

#### Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

This policy statement contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

#### Statement of Policy

This statement sets forth the policy of the Commission with respect to the use of "alternative means of dispute

resolution" (ADR)<sup>1</sup> to resolve issues in controversy concerning NRC administrative programs.

The Commission has conducted a preliminary review of its programs for ADR potential and believes that a number of them may give rise to disputes that provide opportunities for the use of ADR in their resolution. For example, as the Commission has long recognized, proceedings before its Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (ASLBs) provide opportunities for the use of ADR and case management. The Commission has encouraged its ASLBs to hold settlement conferences and to encourage parties to negotiate to resolve contentions, settle procedural disputes and better define substantive issues in dispute. The Commission also has stated that its ASLBs at their discretion should require trial briefs, prefiled testimony, cross-examination plans and other devices for managing parties' presentations of their cases, and that they should set and adhere to reasonable schedules for moving proceedings along expeditiously consistent with the demands of fairness. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, (46 FR 28533, May 27, 1981); CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452 (1981). In addition, the Commission has indicated that settlement judges may be used in its proceedings in appropriate circumstances. Rockwell International Corporation (Rocketdyne Division), CLI-90-5, 31 NRC 337 (1990).

Opportunities for the use of ADR in resolving disputes may arise in connection with programs such as those involving licensing, contracts, fees, grants, inspections, enforcement, claims, rulemaking, and certain personnel matters. Office Directors and other senior personnel responsible for administering those programs should be watchful for situations where ADR, rather than more formal processes, may appropriately be used and bring them to the attention of the NRC's Dispute Resolution Specialist. Persons who become involved in disputes with the NRC in connection with its administrative programs should be encouraged to consider using ADR to resolve those disputes where appropriate.

The Commission supports and encourages the use of ADR where

<sup>1</sup> ADR is an inclusive term used to describe a variety of joint problem-solving processes that present options in lieu of adjudicative or adversarial methods of resolving conflict. These options usually involve the use of a neutral third party. ADR processes include, but are not limited to, settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration or combinations of these processes.

appropriate. The use of ADR may be appropriate: (1) Where the parties to a dispute, including the NRC, agree that ADR could result in a prompt, equitable, negotiated resolution of the dispute; and (2) the use of ADR is not prohibited by law. The NRC's Dispute Resolution Specialist is available as a resource to assist Office Directors and other senior personnel responsible for administering NRC programs in deciding whether use of ADR would be appropriate. That individual should receive the cooperation of other senior NRC personnel: (1) In identifying information and training needed by them to determine when and how ADR may appropriately be used; and (2) in implementing the Commission's ADR policy.

The Commission believes that certain senior NRC personnel should receive training in methods such as negotiation, mediation and other ADR processes to better enable them: (1) To recognize situations where ADR processes might appropriately be employed to resolve disputes with the NRC; and (2) to participate in those processes.

The Commission recognizes that participation in ADR processes is voluntary and cannot be imposed on persons involved in disputes with the NRC. To obtain assistance in identifying situations where ADR might beneficially be employed in resolving disputes in connection with NRC programs and steps that can be taken to obtain acceptance of NRC's use of ADR, input from the public, including those persons whose activities the Commission regulates, should be solicited.

After a reasonable trial period, the Commission expects to evaluate whether use of ADR has been made where its use apparently was appropriate and whether use of ADR has resulted in savings of time, money and other resources by the NRC. The Commission will wait until some practical experience in the use of ADR has been accumulated before deciding whether specific regulations to implement ADR procedures are needed.

#### Public Comment

The NRC is interested in receiving comments from the public, including those persons whose activities the NRC regulates, on any aspect of this policy statement and its implementation. However, the NRC is particularly interested in comments on the following:

Specific issues, that are material to decisions concerning administrative programs of the NRC and that result in disputes between the NRC and persons substantially affected by those

decisions, that might appropriately be resolved using ADR processes in lieu of adjudication.

Whether employees of Federal government agencies should be used as neutrals in ADR processes or whether neutrals should come from outside the Federal government and be compensated by the parties to the dispute, including the NRC, in equal shares.

Actions that the NRC could take to encourage disputants to participate in ADR processes, in lieu of adjudication, to resolve issues in controversy concerning NRC administrative programs.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 7th day of August, 1992.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Samuel J Chilk,**

*Secretary of the Commission.*

[FR Doc. 92-19454 Filed 8-13-92; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

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**NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION****Policy on Conduct Of Adjudicatory  
Proceedings; Policy Statement**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission.

**ACTION:** Policy statement: update.

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**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory  
Commission (Commission) has  
reassessed and updated its policy on the  
conduct of adjudicatory proceedings in  
view of the potential institution of a  
number of proceedings in the next few  
years to consider applications to renew  
reactor operating licenses, to reflect  
restructuring in the electric utility  
industry, and to license waste storage  
facilities.

**DATES:** This policy statement is effective  
on August 5, 1998, while comments are  
being received. Comments are due on or  
before October 5, 1998.

**ADDRESSES:** Send written comments to:  
The Secretary of the Commission, U.S.  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
Washington, DC 20555, ATTN:  
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.  
Hand deliver comments to: 11555  
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland,  
between 7:45 am and 4:15 pm, Federal  
workdays. Copies of comments received  
may be examined at the NRC Public  
Document Room, 2120 L Street, NW,  
(Lower Level), Washington, DC.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:**  
Robert M. Weisman, Litigation Attorney,  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,  
Washington, DC 20555, (301) 415-1696.

## Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings

[CLI-98-12]

### I. Introduction

As part of broader efforts to improve the effectiveness of the agency's programs and processes, the Commission has critically reassessed its practices and procedures for conducting adjudicatory proceedings within the framework of its existing Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, primarily Subpart G. With the potential institution of a number of proceedings in the next few years to consider applications to renew reactor operating licenses, to reflect restructuring in the electric utility industry, and to license waste storage facilities, such assessment is particularly appropriate to ensure that agency proceedings are conducted efficiently and focus on issues germane to the proposed actions under consideration. In its review, the Commission has considered its existing policies and rules governing adjudicatory proceedings, recent experience and criticism of agency proceedings, and innovative techniques used by our own hearing boards and presiding officers and by other tribunals. Although current rules and policies provide means to achieve a prompt and fair resolution of proceedings, the Commission is directing its hearing boards and presiding officers to employ certain measures described in this policy statement to ensure the efficient conduct of proceedings.

The Commission continues to endorse the guidance in its current policy, issued in 1981, on the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452 (May 20, 1981); 46 FR 28533 (May 27, 1981). The 1981 policy statement provided guidance to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards (licensing boards) on the use of tools, such as the establishment and adherence to reasonable schedules and discovery management, intended to reduce the time for completing licensing proceedings while ensuring that hearings were fair and produced adequate records. Now, as then, the Commission's objectives are to provide a fair hearing process, to avoid unnecessary delays in the NRC's review and hearing processes, and to produce an informed adjudicatory record that supports agency decision making on matters related to the NRC's responsibilities for protecting public health and safety, the common defense

and security, and the environment. In this context, the opportunity for hearing should be a meaningful one that focuses on genuine issues and real disputes regarding agency actions subject to adjudication. By the same token, however, applicants for a license are also entitled to a prompt resolution of disputes concerning their applications.

The Commission emphasizes its expectation that the boards will enforce adherence to the hearing procedures set forth in the Commission's Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, as interpreted by the Commission. In addition, the Commission has identified certain specific approaches for its boards to consider implementing in individual proceedings, if appropriate, to reduce the time for completing licensing and other proceedings. The measures suggested in this policy statement can be accomplished within the framework of the Commission's existing Rules of Practice. The Commission may consider further changes to the Rules of Practice as appropriate to enable additional improvements to the adjudicatory process.

### II. Specific Guidance

Current adjudicatory procedures and policies provide a latitude to the Commission, its licensing boards and presiding officers to instill discipline in the hearing process and ensure a prompt yet fair resolution of contested issues in adjudicatory proceedings. In the 1981 policy statement, the Commission encouraged licensing boards to use a number of techniques for effective case management including: setting reasonable schedules for proceedings; consolidating parties; encouraging negotiation and settlement conferences; carefully managing and supervising discovery; issuing timely rulings on prehearing matters; requiring trial briefs, pre-filed testimony, and cross-examination plans; and issuing initial decisions as soon as practicable after the parties file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Licensing boards and presiding officers in current NRC adjudications use many of these techniques, and should continue to do so.

As set forth below, the Commission has identified several of these techniques, as applied in the context of the current Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, as well as variations in procedure permitted under the current Rules of Practice that licensing boards should apply to proceedings. The Commission also intends to exercise its inherent supervisory authority, including its power to assume part or all of the functions of the presiding officer in a

given adjudication, as appropriate in the context of a particular proceeding. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 229 (1990). The Commission intends to promptly respond to adjudicatory matters placed before it, and such matters should ordinarily take priority over other actions before the Commissioners.

#### 1. Hearing Schedules

The Commission expects licensing boards to establish schedules for promptly deciding the issues before them, with due regard to the complexity of the contested issues and the interests of the parties. The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.718 provide licensing boards all powers necessary to regulate the course of proceedings, including the authority to set schedules, resolve discovery disputes, and take other action appropriate to avoid delay. Powers granted under § 2.718 are sufficient for licensing boards to control the supplementation of petitions for leave to intervene or requests for hearing, the filing of contentions, discovery, dispositive motions, hearings, and the submission of findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Many provisions in Part 2 establish schedules for various filings, which can be varied "as otherwise ordered by the presiding officer." Boards should exercise their authority under these options and 10 CFR 2.718 to shorten the filing and response times set forth in the regulations to the extent practical in a specific proceeding. In addition, where such latitude is not explicitly afforded, as well as in instances in which sequential (rather than simultaneous) filings are provided for, boards should explore with the parties all reasonable approaches to reduce response times and to provide for simultaneous filing of documents.

Although current regulations do not specifically address service by electronic means, licensing boards, as they have in other proceedings, should establish procedures for electronic filing with appropriate filing deadlines, unless doing so would significantly deprive a party of an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the proceeding. Other expedited forms of service of documents in proceedings may also be appropriate. The Commission encourages the licensing boards to consider the use of new technologies to expedite proceedings as those technologies become available.

Boards should forego the use of motions for summary disposition, except upon a written finding that such

a motion will likely substantially reduce the number of issues to be decided, or otherwise expedite the proceeding. In addition, any evidentiary hearing should not commence before completion of the staff's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) or Final Environmental Statement (FES) regarding an application, unless the presiding officer finds that beginning earlier, e.g., by starting the hearing with respect to safety issues prior to issuance of the SER, will indeed expedite the proceeding, taking into account the effect of going forward on the staff's ability to complete its evaluations in a timely manner. Boards are strongly encouraged to expedite the issuance of interlocutory rulings. The Commission further strongly encourages presiding officers to issue decisions within 60 days after the parties file the last pleadings permitted by the board's schedule for the proceeding.

Appointment of additional presiding officers or licensing boards to preside over discrete issues simultaneously in a proceeding has the potential to expedite the process, and the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) should consider this measure under appropriate circumstances. In doing so, however, the Commission expects the Chief Administrative Judge to exercise the authority to establish multiple boards only if: (1) the proceeding involves discrete and severable issues; (2) the issues can be more expeditiously handled by multiple boards than by a single board; and (3) the multiple boards can conduct the proceeding in a manner that will not unduly burden the parties. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Private Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC \_\_\_\_ (1998).

The Commission itself may set milestones for the completion of proceedings. If the Commission sets milestones in a particular proceeding and the board determines that any single milestone could be missed by more than 30 days, the licensing board must promptly so inform the Commission in writing. The board should explain why the milestone cannot be met and what measures the board will take insofar as is possible to restore the proceeding to the overall schedule.

## 2. Parties' Obligations

Although the Commission expects its licensing boards to set and adhere to reasonable schedules for the various steps in the hearing process, the Commission recognizes that the boards will be unable to achieve the objectives of this policy statement unless the

parties satisfy their obligations. The parties to a proceeding, therefore, are expected to adhere to the time frames specified in the Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2 for filing and the scheduling orders in the proceeding. As set forth in the 1981 policy statement, the licensing boards are expected to take appropriate actions to enforce compliance with these schedules. The Commission, of course, recognizes that the boards may grant extensions of time under some circumstances, but this should be done only when warranted by unavoidable and extreme circumstances.

Parties are also obligated in their filings before the board and the Commission to ensure that their arguments and assertions are supported by appropriate and accurate references to legal authority and factual basis, including, as appropriate, citation to the record. Failure to do so may result in material being stricken from the record or, in extreme circumstances, in a party being dismissed.

## 3. Contentions

Currently, in proceedings governed by the provisions of Subpart G, 10 CFR 2.714(b)(2)(iii) requires that a petitioner for intervention shall provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact.<sup>1</sup> The Commission has stated that a board may appropriately view a petitioner's support for its contention in a light that is favorable to the petitioner, but the board cannot do so by ignoring the requirements set forth in § 2.714(b)(2). Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155 (1991). The Commission re-emphasizes that licensing boards should continue to require adherence to § 2.714(b)(2), and that the burden of coming forward with admissible contentions is on their proponent. A contention's proponent, not the licensing board, is responsible for formulating the contention and providing the necessary information to satisfy the basis requirement for the admission of contentions in 10 CFR 2.714(b)(2). The scope of a proceeding, and, as a consequence, the scope of contentions that may be admitted, is limited by the nature of the application and pertinent Commission regulations. For example, with respect to license

<sup>1</sup> "[A]t the contention filing stage[,] the factual support necessary to show that a genuine dispute exists need not be in affidavit or formal evidentiary form and need not be of the quality necessary to withstand a summary disposition motion." Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings—Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, Final Rule, 54 FR 33168, 33171 (Aug. 11, 1989).

renewal, under the governing regulations in 10 CFR Part 54, the review of license renewal applications is confined to matters relevant to the extended period of operation requested by the applicant. The safety review is limited to the plant systems, structures, and components (as delineated in 10 CFR 54.4) that will require an aging management review for the period of extended operation or are subject to an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses. See 10 CFR 54.21(a) and (c), 54.29, and 54.30. In addition, the review of environmental issues is limited by rule by the generic findings in NUREG-1427, "Generic Environmental Impact Statement (GEIS) for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants." See 10 CFR 55.71(d) and 51.95(c).

Under the Commission's Rules of Practice, a licensing board may consider matters on its motion only where it finds that a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter exists. 10 CFR 2.760a. Such authority is to be exercised only in extraordinary circumstances. If a board decides to raise matters on its own initiative, a copy of its ruling, setting forth in general terms its reasons, must be transmitted to the Commission and the General Counsel. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-24, 14 NRC 614 (1981). The board may not proceed further with sua sponte issues absent the Commission's approval. The scope of a particular proceeding is limited to the scope of the admitted contentions and any issues the Commission authorizes the board to raise sua sponte.

Currently, 10 CFR 2.714a allows a party to appeal a ruling on contentions only if (a) the order wholly denies a petition for leave to intervene (i.e., the order denies the petitioner's standing or the admission of all of a petitioner's contentions) or (b) a party other than the petitioner alleges that a petition for leave to intervene or a request for a hearing should have been wholly denied. Although the regulation reflects the Commission's general policy to minimize interlocutory review, under this practice, some novel issues that could benefit from early Commission review will not be presented to the Commission. For example, matters of first impression involving interpretation of 10 CFR Part 54 may arise as the staff and licensing board begin considering applications for renewal of power reactor operating licenses. Accordingly, the Commission encourages the licensing boards to refer rulings or certify questions on proposed contentions involving novel issues to

the Commission in accordance with 10 CFR 2.730(f) early in the proceeding. In addition, boards are encouraged to certify novel legal or policy questions related to admitted issues to the Commission as early as possible in the proceeding. The Commission may also exercise its authority to direct certification of such particular questions under 10 CFR 2.718(i). The Commission, however, will evaluate any matter put before it to ensure that interlocutory review is warranted.

#### 4. Discovery Management

Efficient management of the pre-trial discovery process is critical to the overall progress of a proceeding. Because a great deal of information on a particular application is routinely placed in the agency's public document rooms, Commission regulations already limit discovery against the staff. See, e.g., 10 CFR 2.720(h), 2.744. Under the existing practice, however, the staff frequently agrees to discovery without waiving its rights to object to discovery under the rules, and refers any discovery requests it finds objectionable to the board for resolution. This practice remains acceptable.

Application in a particular case of procedures similar to provisions in the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or informal discovery can improve the efficiency of the discovery process among other parties. The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 provide, in part, that a party shall provide certain information to other parties without waiting for a discovery request. This information includes the names and addresses, if known, of individuals likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts and copies or descriptions, including location, of all documents or tangible things in the possession or control of the party that are relevant to the disputed facts. The Commission expects the licensing boards to order similar disclosure (and pertinent updates) if appropriate in the circumstances of individual proceedings. With regard to the staff, such orders shall provide only that the staff identify the witnesses whose testimony the staff intends to present at hearing. The licensing boards should also consider requiring the parties to specify the issues for which discovery is necessary, if this may narrow the issues requiring discovery.

Upon the board's completion of rulings on contentions, the staff will establish a case file containing the application and any amendments to it, and, as relevant to the application, any NRC report and any correspondence

between the applicant and the NRC. Such a case file should be treated in the same manner as a hearing file established pursuant to 10 CFR 2.1231. Accordingly, the staff should make the case file available to all parties and should periodically update it.

Except for establishment of the case file, generally the licensing board should suspend discovery against the staff until the staff issues its review documents regarding the application. Unless the presiding officer has found that starting discovery against the staff before the staff's review documents are issued will expedite the hearing, discovery against the staff on safety issues may commence upon issuance of the SER, and discovery on environmental issues upon issuance of the FES. Upon issuance of an SER or FES regarding an application, and consistent with such limitations as may be appropriate to protect proprietary or other properly withheld information, the staff should update the case file to include the SER and FES and any supporting documents relied upon in the SER or FES not already included in the file.

The foregoing procedures should allow the boards to set reasonable bounds and schedules for any remaining discovery, e.g., by limiting the number of rounds of interrogatories or depositions or the time for completion of discovery, and thereby reduce the time spent in the prehearing stage of the hearing process. In particular, the board should allow only a single round of discovery regarding admitted contentions related to the SER or the FES, and the discovery respective to each document should commence shortly after its issuance.

### III. Conclusion

The Commission reiterates its long-standing commitment to the expeditious completion of adjudicatory proceedings while still ensuring that hearings are fair and produce an adequate record for decision. The Commission intends to monitor its proceedings to ensure that they are being concluded in a fair and timely fashion. The Commission will take action in individual proceedings, as appropriate, to provide guidance to the boards and parties and to decide issues in the interest of a prompt and effective resolution of the matters set for adjudication.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of July, 1998.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
**Annette Vietti-Cook,**  
*Assistant Secretary of the Commission.*  
[FR Doc. 98-20781 Filed 8-4-98; 8:45 am]  
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**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On June 11, 2007 (72 FR 32139), the Commission published in the **Federal Register** a request for public comment on the draft statement of policy on Conduct of New Reactor Licensing Proceedings (draft Policy Statement). The Commission received eight letters transmitting comments on the draft Policy Statement by the deadline set in the June 11, 2007, notice for receipt of comments. Commenters included a law firm (Morgan Lewis on behalf of five energy companies), a lawyer (Diane Curran), two advocacy groups, (Beyond Nuclear/ Nuclear Policy Research Institute (BN/NPRI) and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)), an industry organization (the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)), a vendor (GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy), and one individual energy company (UniStar Nuclear)(two letters). BN/NPRI endorsed Ms. Curran's comments, and UCS incorporated them by reference in the UCS comments. Similarly, GE-Hitachi and UniStar endorsed the NEI comments.

The comments fell primarily in the following three categories. First, many comments related to 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5), which permits an applicant to submit its application in two parts filed no more than eighteen months apart. The comments were primarily concerned with whether the NRC should issue a Notice of Hearing (required by 10 CFR 2.104) for each part of the application or just one Notice of Hearing when the application is complete. Second, many comments related to the NRC's consideration of applications that propose to build and operate reactors of identical design (except for site-specific elements). The comments addressed the implementation of the "design-centered review approach" in the NRC Staff's (Staff) review of the applications and the adjudicatory proceedings on the applications before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board). Third, many comments requested rulemaking to implement a variety of measures that the commenters believe desirable or necessary for the effectiveness or efficiency of the review or adjudicatory processes. Below, the Commission summarizes and responds to the comments beginning with these three categories of comments. Discussion of additional comments follows. In response to the comments, the Commission has revised the policy statement in several respects, as noted below. The Commission has also corrected the Policy Statement or added explanatory text in a few instances.

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#### **NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION**

##### **Conduct of New Reactor Licensing Proceedings; Final Policy Statement**

**AGENCY:** Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**ACTION:** Final policy statement.

**SUMMARY:** The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) is adopting a statement of policy concerning the conduct of new reactor licensing proceedings.

**DATES:** This policy statement becomes effective April 17, 2008.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** Robert M. Weisman, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone

### Comments on Notice of Hearing

*Comment:* The Commission should modify the final Policy Statement to provide that the NRC will issue a Notice of Hearing for the complete partial Combined License Application (hereinafter COLA) "as soon as practicable" after the NRC docket that portion of the COLA, unless the applicant affirmatively requests that the Notice of Hearing be issued after the entire COLA is docketed. (NEI 2, Morgan Lewis 1, UniStar 1)

The commenters state that the approach they suggest will lessen the burdens on all parties. Specifically, these commenters submit that a Notice of Hearing should be issued upon the docketing of the first part of an application submitted under 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5) so that the hearing on that portion of the application may be completed sooner, thus providing an applicant the opportunity to shorten the critical path for the licensing proceeding. These commenters also state that the proposed approach "smoothes" peak resource demands for all parties, provides for earlier public participation, would not call for different NRC staff support or different Staff or Licensing Board reviews, minimizes the likelihood of potential new issues arising late in the review process, would not affect any person's substantive rights, and is consistent with the NRC intent to publish a separate Notice of Hearing on a request for a limited work authorization (LWA). Further, these commenters indicated that docketing one part of an application and then waiting up to 18 months to issue the Notice of Hearing cannot be considered to result in issuing the notice "as soon as practicable" after docketing, as required by 10 CFR 2.104(a). These commenters also state that the draft Policy Statement approach of normally issuing only one Notice of Hearing appears to ignore NRC precedent for adjudication of safety and environmental issues on separate hearing tracks. One commenter states that issuing separate notices focuses all parties on results, not process, while another asserts that the draft Policy Statement, as written, discourages early application submission and causes delay in the licensing process.

UniStar bases its comments on its plans to submit the environmental portion of its COL application first, in accordance with § 2.101(a)(5), and provides the following additional comments. UniStar believes issuing a Notice of Hearing in connection with the first part of the application docketed provides an earlier opportunity for

public participation on environmental matters, offers the Staff an early opportunity to consider and address environmental issues unique to COLs, and lessens the potential for the NRC environmental review to be "critical path" for the UniStar application.

*NRC Response:* The NRC does not believe that an overall benefit can reasonably be predicted to derive from issuing separate Notices of Hearing for separate portions of applications filed pursuant to 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5). The assertion that issuing two Notices of Hearing will provide an applicant the opportunity to shorten the critical path for a licensing proceeding is speculative. The nature and complexity of contentions that may be raised with respect to the safety and environmental aspects of any application may vary considerably. Moreover, while an earlier, separate Notice might be advantageous to an applicant by allowing potential intervenors to raise their concerns early and thus allow the applicant more time to consider the gravity of those concerns and provide information to the staff to address them, if appropriate, we do not believe those possible advantages overcome the inefficiencies that could be introduced into the NRC's internal review and hearing processes as well as the potential burden on the resources of the advocacy community to monitor and respond to multiple Notices of Hearing.

Industry commenters assert that issuing separate notices would not impair the substantive rights of any party, and is consistent with the practice established in the LWA rule and previous licensing proceedings. The Commission agrees that no person's substantive rights would be impaired if either a single Notice of Hearing is issued on a complete application, or if two such notices are issued on parts of an application submitted under 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5). In this respect, the two procedures are equivalent. However, in the case of a request for an LWA, there is a clear potential benefit—issuance of an LWA to permit an applicant to begin certain safety-related construction activities before a COL is issued—not just a more nebulous "smoothing" out of resource demands, to balance against the potential negative impacts noted above.

The industry commenters point to a proceeding in which a Notice of Hearing was issued for a single part of an application relating solely to antitrust matters. See *Pacific Gas & Electric Co.* (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-83-2, 17 NRC 45, 47 (1983). The requirements of 10 CFR 50.33a that applied in that proceeding, however,

explicitly required submission of antitrust information in advance of the rest of the application, presumably because litigation of antitrust matters before the Licensing Boards were virtually always the lengthiest portion of a licensing proceeding. See 10 CFR 50.33a (1983). As described above, that rationale does not apply here. Similarly, the fact that in some proceedings safety and environmental matters were considered on separate tracks, based on the admitted contentions, does not present a rationale for issuing separate Notices of Hearing for such matters. Specifically, hearings on admitted safety and environmental contentions may proceed on separate tracks, if the presiding officer finds that this is warranted. The advantages derived from establishing such separate hearing tracks can be obtained without issuing separate notices for each part of an application submitted under § 2.101(a)(5).

Accordingly, the Commission does not support issuing a separate Notice of Hearing on each part of an application filed under 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5). With respect to the additional issues UniStar raises that are unique to its application, and which are summarized above, the Commission does not believe it appropriate to address such application-specific concerns in responses to comments on a generally applicable policy statement such as this one. The comments do not warrant changes in the Policy Statement.

*Comment:* Why not, in the name of efficiency and fairness, wait until the application process is complete before holding a hearing—one hearing—on a completed design and completed application for a specific reactor site? (UCS 1, Curran 2). The Commission has previously recognized the unfairness of piecemeal litigation governed by a license applicant's indecision about whether to pursue a project. The Commission should redraft its policy statement to ensure that COL hearings will be conducted in a manner that is fair to all parties (Curran 4).

In essence, the commenter is objecting to the Commission's proposal to consider exemptions to the requirements of § 2.101 if the granting of such exemptions will further the design centered review approach. The commenter indicates that such exemptions will result in issuing two rather than one Notice of Hearing on each complete application, and will overtake the Commission's stated intention to issue just one Notice of Hearing on each complete application in the absence of the advantages of the design centered review approach. The

commenters indicate that under the design-centered approach, intervenors will be forced to participate in "abstract" proceedings in order to protect their rights, and that this will waste the intervenors' resources. Further, the commenters assert that such proceedings may subject them to abusive litigation tactics, since an applicant could request consideration of one design pursuant to an exemption from § 2.101(a)(5), and then drop that design in favor of another upon filing the remaining portion of the application. They conclude that potential intervenors will not be able to prioritize the most important issues that should be raised with respect to a proposed new plant on a particular site.

**NRC Response:** The commenters misapprehend the effect of an exemption from § 2.101 that would further the design-centered review approach. Such an exemption would not result in an "abstract" application. Rather, the applicant would, in its application, request approval to construct and operate a particular facility at a particular site. Prospective intervenors will not need to guess what plant might be described in an application for a COL that could affect them, nor will they need to participate in proceedings on proposed reactors that do not affect their interests.

Further, exemptions from § 2.101 in furtherance of the design-centered review approach would not result in litigation of design matters that an individual applicant might readily change. The point of allowing such a procedure is to permit the Staff and the Licensing Board to consider the standard portions of an incomplete application submitted pursuant to an exemption from § 2.101 together with other applications involving the same design or operational information. An individual applicant obtains the benefits of participating in such a proceeding by relinquishing some of its ability to change that information.

Although the Commission notes that established doctrines of repose (*res judicata*, collateral estoppel) apply once an adjudication is finally decided, prospective intervenors need not seek to participate in proceedings unrelated to their locale by virtue of the Policy Statement provisions discussing possible exemptions from § 2.101.

With respect to the concern that an applicant might decide to substitute one design for another in an application, modify its proposal, or decline to complete or pursue an application, and thus render any hearings related to those aspects of an application moot, that possibility exists whether or not an

applicant has sought an exemption from § 2.101. For example, it may become apparent during the course of the NRC staff review that the proposed plant is not acceptable for the proposed site. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that these comments do not warrant changes to the Policy Statement.

The Commission notes that UCS, in connection with its comment, identified a confusing sentence in the draft Policy Statement to the effect that the NRC "may give notice" with respect to a complete application. This sentence has been revised to read that the NRC "will give notice" with respect to a complete application.

#### Comments on Design-Centered Review Approach

**Comment:** The proposed policy appears to relax or abandon the requirement for reliance on design certifications, allowing license applicants to depart from certified designs in license applications, and then forcing the consolidation of hearings where the applications appear to have something in common. In this respect, the policy seems intended to maximize the rigidity of design certification where intervenors' interests are at stake, and maximize flexibility where license applicants' interests are at stake. The policy should be consistent for both intervenors and applicants. (Curran 3, UCS 1, BY/NPRI)

**NRC Response:** Part 52 has never required an applicant for a COL to reference a certified design. Rather, a COL applicant has always had the option of requesting a COL for a design that is not certified under Part 52, Subpart B (a "custom" plant). See 10 CFR 52.79. Similarly, Part 52 has always provided for exemptions or departures from a certified design. See 10 CFR Part 52, Appendices A, B, C, and D, Section VIII. The draft Policy Statement offered guidance on the effect these provisions might have in the context of an adjudication consolidated to take advantage of the design-centered review approach. The design-centered review approach is an effort to encourage applicants to adopt identical approaches to issues, which should increase reliance on standard design certifications. Moreover, multiple applicants could choose the same uncertified design (*e.g.*, a gas-cooled reactor), which the NRC could review using the design-centered approach. This circumstance would be consistent with the Commission's policy encouraging greater standardization, albeit not via design certification.

With respect to whether proceedings should be consolidated, the draft Policy

Statement does not *require* consolidation. Rather, it provides, among other things, that the Chief Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP) should do so only if consolidation will not impose an undue burden upon the parties. Further, the draft Policy Statement recommends that applicants and intervenors alike agree on a lead representative. The Policy Statement does not treat intervenors and applicants inconsistently in this regard.

Finally, the draft Policy Statement does not state that consolidation is appropriate when "applications appear to have something in common." Rather, the Commission is suggesting that intervenors, applicants, and the NRC alike may save and appropriately focus resources by litigating matters relating to applications for identical designs in consolidated proceedings. Our rules of practice have long provided for the possibility of consolidation of issues and parties.

**Comment:** Encouraging generic "variances and exemptions" from certified designs and endorsing the notion that "security" considerations in reactor siting are ever "identical" from one site to another flies in the face of the commonly accepted view that each piece of land is unique. To encourage licensees to seek variances, exemptions, and generic licenses based on the premise that only components are at issue without reference to where they are located is, in a Post-9/11 world, burying one's head in the sand. If the Commission needs to encourage, under the guise of a policy statement, myriad exemptions to the new Part 52 rules, the new Part 52 rules patently need revision. (UCS 2)

**NRC Response:** The Commission of course recognizes that certain aspects of security are site-specific. The Commission has not "endorsed the notion that 'security' considerations in reactor siting are \* \* \* 'identical' from one site to another[.]" as suggested by the commenter. Nonetheless, certified designs include certain features or design elements directed to security and safeguards, and these design matters will be common at sites referencing the design certification. The Policy Statement is focused on "components" in this regard because it is focused on the design-centered approach. The Policy Statement's focus should not be read to exclude site-specific issues from the scope of NRC review. The Commission does not believe it is encouraging a "myriad" of exemptions by this Policy Statement. The Statement identifies limited circumstances under which an exemption to Part 2 may be

entertained or granted. The regulations in Part 52 have long accommodated the need for exemptions to design certification rules in defined circumstances. See 10 CFR part 52, Appendices A, B, C, and D, Section VIII.

*Comment:* The final Policy Statement should more clearly explain the parameters or necessary conditions for consolidation. (NEI 3, Morgan Lewis 4)

*NRC Response:* Whether separate proceedings should be consolidated depends on their particular circumstances, and is within the discretion of the presiding officers in the proceedings, as currently set forth in Part 2. See 10 CFR 2.317. The draft Policy Statement adequately explains how the design-centered review approach may be appropriately factored into the presiding officers' decision on consolidation. Whether two applications are sufficiently close in time to warrant consolidation depends on the particular facts involved. No modification to the Policy Statement is warranted.

*Comment:* The Commission should clarify that consolidation of hearings on identical portions of the COL application is not required to obtain the NRC staff's design-centered review. While the use of Subpart D is permissible, it is not required and should not be presumed. (NEI 4, Morgan Lewis 4)

*NRC Response:* The Commission believes that the Policy Statement already makes clear that consolidation of hearings is not required to obtain the NRC staff's design-centered review. Without consolidation of hearings, however, some of the benefits of the design-centered review approach may not be realized. Therefore, the Policy Statement presumes the use of Subpart D because the Commission believes that such use will offer benefits not otherwise available. A particular applicant's choice not to seek the use of Subpart D will mean that such benefits will not be available to that applicant.

*Comment:* The draft Policy Statement should treat COL applications that reference applications for design certification amendments in a manner comparable to COL applications that reference design certifications. (Morgan Lewis 3, NEI 5)

*NRC Response:* The draft Policy Statement explicitly discusses applications for design certification. The Commission believes that discussion also encompasses an application for an amendment to a design certification, and the Policy Statement need not be changed.

*Comment:* The Policy Statement should direct the Licensing Board to

deny a contention in a COL proceeding if the contention addresses a matter subject to a design certification rulemaking, rather than holding the contention in abeyance and denying it later upon adoption of the final design certification rule. (NEI 6)

*NRC Response:* While the approach NEI suggests is consistent with the Commission decisions cited in the draft Policy Statement, the Commission believes that an application for design certification calls for a different approach. An applicant for a COL may choose to pursue its application as a custom design if, for example, the review of an application for design certification originally referenced is delayed. In such a case, the Commission believes it inefficient to require previously admitted intervenors to justify, for a second time, admission of contentions which address aspects within the scope of the design certification rulemaking. Holding these contentions in abeyance instead of denying them resolves this problem. Accordingly, the Commission has determined to leave the Policy Statement unchanged in this regard.

*Comment:* The Commission should clarify the statement in section B.3 of the Policy Statement that "[i]f initial COL applicants referencing a particular design certification rule succeed in obtaining COLs, the Commission fully expects subsequent COL applicants to reference that design certification rule."

*NRC Response:* The Commission has clarified the sentence by stating that if the NRC grants an initial application referencing a design certification rule, the Commission believes it is likely that subsequent applications referencing that rule will be filed.

#### Comments Relating to Rulemaking

*Comment:* The NRC should ensure consistency in its rules by conforming 10 CFR 51.105, which contains mandatory findings on NEPA matters in uncontested proceedings, to 10 CFR 2.104, which does not specify the findings to be made. (Morgan Lewis 6)

*NRC response:* This proposal would involve rulemaking, which is beyond the scope of the development of this Policy Statement. Because this matter has been raised as a comment on this Policy Statement, the agency is not treating the comment as a petition for rulemaking under § 2.802. If the commenter wishes the agency to undertake such a consideration, the commenter should file such a petition. The Commission would note that the commenter's proposed change was considered in the development of the final Part 52 rulemaking, but was

rejected for several reasons. Such a change would have represented a fundamental change to the NRC's overall approach for complying with NEPA, in which the agency's record of decision consists of the presiding officer's findings with respect to NEPA, as required by Section 51.105. The Commission did not believe it made sense to modify the NRC's approach in one specific situation—the issuance of combined licenses—without considering the implications or desirability of adopting a global change to Part 51 with respect to the agency's NEPA's procedures. Moreover, the Commission believed that such a change in the NRC's NEPA compliance procedures should be subject to a notice and comment process and did not want to further delay agency adoption of a final part 52 rule.

*Comment:* The NRC should revise 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5) to permit the first part of a phased application to consist solely of the environmental report plus the general administrative information specified in § 50.33(a) through (e). It is not necessary for the NRC to have complete seismic and other siting information, plus financial and emergency planning information, to review an environmental report. (Morgan Lewis 7)

*NRC response:* First, this proposal would require a change to Commission rules, which is beyond the scope of the development of this Policy Statement. Second, with respect to the commenter's proposal that siting (which includes seismic) information is not necessary for the first part of a phased COL application (even if the rest of the first part is the environmental report), the Commission does not find persuasive this argument for omitting siting information.

The Commission requirements governing site safety are based upon the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The NRC's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review responsibilities do not expand its AEA authority, but are complementary thereto. Consequently, there is no need for a NEPA siting review absent consideration of site safety under the AEA. Regarding site safety, the information an applicant must submit to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 2.101(a)(5) addresses the suitability of the site with respect to manmade and natural hazards (including seismic information) and potential radiological consequences of postulated accidents and the release of fission products. Furthermore, the site characteristics must comply with 10 CFR part 100, "Reactor Site Criteria." Additional safety elements required in a

siting determination include information on emergency preparedness and security plans. Administrative information, including the protection of sensitive information is necessary to fulfill requirements under the AEA. The Commission considers that much of the above site safety information may be of use in informing the Commission NEPA review.

Because the commenter's suggestion that the agency undertake rulemaking has been raised as part of the comment process on this Policy Statement, the agency is not treating the comment as a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. If the commenter continues to believe the agency should consider rulemaking on this matter, the agency would suggest the commenter file such a petition.

*Comment:* The final Policy Statement should direct the NRC staff to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether generic or design-specific issues could be addressed through rulemaking. (GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy 1, NEI 10)

*NRC Response:* The Commission does not believe that a direction to the NRC staff to undertake rulemaking, which is an internal agency matter, is an appropriate subject for a policy statement. The Commission has, however, directed the NRC staff, in consultation with the Office of the General Counsel, to consider initiating rulemakings in appropriate circumstances to address issues that are generic to COL applications. See SRM COMDEK-07-0001/COMJSM-07-0001—Report of the Combined License Review Task Force (June 22, 2007) (ADAMS Accession No. ML0717601090). Accordingly, the Commission does not see any further benefit in duplicating this Commission direction in a policy statement.

*Comment:* The NRC should institute notice-and-comment rulemaking to provide for meaningful public participation in the licensing hearing process under Subpart L of Part 2, including full and fair discovery procedure and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. (UCS 3)

*NRC Response:* The Commission does not agree that its current requirements in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart L, governing discovery and cross-examination, are unfair to any potential party in an NRC adjudication, nor does the Commission believe that Part 2 fails to provide for meaningful public participation in the licensing hearing process. The Commission addressed the fairness and expected benefits of the reconstituted discovery process in Subpart L in the statement of considerations for the final 2004 revisions to Part 2. See 69 FR 2182

(January 14, 2004) upheld by *Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S.*, 391 F.3d 338 (1st Cir. 2004). The discovery process provides for mandatory disclosures by all parties of information relating to admitted contentions, and Staff preparation of a hearing file. Furthermore, cross-examination is allowed or may be allowed by the presiding officer under those circumstances in which the Commission has determined that cross-examination would be best-suited to result in the timely development of a record sufficient to inform a fair decision by the presiding officer. The commenter provided nothing other than the generalized assertion that the new procedures are unfair or would preclude meaningful public participation in the licensing hearing process. Because the commenter's suggestion that the agency undertake rulemaking has been raised as part of the comment process on this Policy Statement, the agency is not treating the comment as a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. If the commenter continues to believe the agency should consider rulemaking on this matter, the agency would suggest the commenter file such a petition.

*Comment:* The NRC should decrease the time periods in the 10 CFR part 2 Milestone Schedules to further streamline the hearing process and promote more timely hearings on ESP and COL applications, by (1) decreasing the 175 day period between issuance of the SER and final EIS and the start of the evidentiary hearing; and (2) reducing from 90 to 60 days the period for the presiding officer to issue its initial decision following the end of the evidentiary hearing. (NEI 13)

*NRC Response:* The Commission does not agree that the Model Milestones in Appendix B to 10 CFR part 2 should be modified to adopt the two changes suggested by the commenter. The 175 day time period provides for, among other things, scheduling and holding a pre-hearing conference, issuance of the presiding officer's order following the prehearing conference, mandatory disclosures, preparation of summary disposition motions, issuance of presiding officer orders on such motions, preparation of pre-filed written testimony, suggested presiding officer questions based upon the pre-filed testimony, and any motions for cross-examination together with cross-examination plans. It may well be that, with the particular parties involved or matters at issue in any individual case, the schedule can be shortened by the presiding officer. But, given the activities outlined above, the Commission does not believe that the

175 day period is unreasonable or should be significantly shortened at this time.

The Commission believes that the 90 day period provided for issuance of a presiding officer decision is reasonable, given the likelihood—as described above—that the first set of combined license application hearings may be complex and raise issues of first impression for the NRC. If, however, the issues to be addressed in an initial decision are small in number, simple in nature and lack complexity, enabling the presiding officer to issue the initial decision in a shorter period of time, the Commission expects the presiding officer to do so rather than taking the full 90 day period.

The Commission also notes that the Model Milestones were adopted on April 20, 2005 (70 FR 20457), and have yet to be applied in full in any early site permit or combined license proceeding. Hence, the NRC has yet to develop any extensive experience on their application in such proceedings. Absent some fundamental problem or error with the Model Milestones—which the commenter has not described—the Commission is unwilling to modify the Model Milestones at this time. Once the Commission has had greater experience with the conduct of combined license application hearings, the Commission will revisit the Model Milestones to see if adjustments are desirable or if a specific schedule of milestones should be established for early site permit and combined license proceedings. Because the commenter's suggestion that the agency undertake rulemaking has been raised as part of the comment process on this Policy Statement, the agency is not treating the comment as a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. If the commenter continues to believe the agency should consider rulemaking on this matter, the agency would suggest the commenter file such a petition.

#### Other Comments

*Comment:* The provisions in the draft Policy Statement (in Section B.1) regarding the finality of COL proceedings should be revised to be consistent with a recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals in which the Seventh Circuit held that if all of an intervenor's contentions are resolved by the Licensing Board, then the Board's decision is final agency action with respect to that intervenor. (Morgan Lewis 5)

*NRC Response:* The Commission agrees that the draft Policy Statement could be misinterpreted on this score. Accordingly, the Commission has modified the pertinent provision of the

Policy Statement to state that “a decision on common issues would become final agency action if it resolves a specific intervenor’s contentions in a proceeding on an individual application.”

*Comment:* It is not an insubstantial change in the rules to now state the Commission, presiding officer on any request for hearing filed under § 52.103, will, by fiat, “designate the procedures under which the proceeding shall be conducted.” A bit of rulemaking might be in order well before commencement of extraordinary hearings before the Commission. (UCS 1A) NEI recommends that the NRC identify the hearing procedures to be used in the 10 CFR 52.103(a) ITAAC compliance hearings in the near term and certainly well before the first such hearing is imminent. (NEI 8)

*NRC Response:* Section 189a.(1)(B)(iv) of the Atomic Energy Act explicitly authorizes the Commission to establish procedures for ITAAC compliance hearings. This AEA provision has been reflected in Commission rules since 1992. ITAAC compliance hearing procedures warrant in-depth consideration, which would unduly delay the issuance of the Policy Statement. The Commission believes it appropriate to first issue guidance on proceedings on COL applications, which are indeed imminent, before turning to ITAAC compliance hearings. While the Commission is not addressing ITAAC compliance hearing procedures in this Policy Statement, the Commission intends to do so “well before” the first such hearing, as both intervenor and industry commenters request. The Commission, however, does not believe it necessary to establish such procedures by rule, and retains the discretion to specify such procedures in a future policy statement or on a case-by-case basis by order.

*Comment:* The draft policy statement instructs licensing boards to tailor hearing schedules to accommodate limited work authorizations, by holding hearings on environmental matters and portions of the Safety Evaluation Report that are “relevant” to environmental matters. Given that compliance with safety regulations is the principal means by which the NRC protects the environment, it is difficult to conceive of any safety-related issues whose resolution could lawfully be considered unrelated to compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act. Therefore, the Commission should eliminate this instruction from the policy statement. (Curran 5)

*NRC Response:* The Commission agrees that the portion of the draft

Policy Statement to which the comment is addressed could be misunderstood, but disagrees with the comment’s underlying premise. Specifically, the Commission need not resolve all safety issues in order to perform the environmental evaluation required in connection with a request for an LWA. Rather, the Commission need only resolve those safety issues identified in 10 CFR 50.10 as needing resolution before the Commission may issue an LWA. The Commission has revised the Policy Statement to eliminate the ambiguity identified in the comment.

*Comment:* The final Policy Statement should incorporate the following revision: “In all proceedings, the licensing boards should formulate hearing schedules to accommodate any limited work authorization request, *unless the applicant specifically requests otherwise.*” (NEI 2A) (additional suggested text in *italics*)

*NRC Response:* The presiding officer already has the authority to modify the schedule of a proceeding consistent with fairness to all parties and the expeditious disposition of the proceeding. See 10 CFR 2.319, 2.332, and 2.334. In this regard, the presiding officer must consider the interests of all parties, as well as the overall schedule, and not just the interests of the applicant. Accordingly, the Commission declines to add the suggested language to this portion of the Policy Statement.

*Comment:* The final Policy Statement should incorporate the following revision: “Specifically, if an applicant requests [an LWA] as part of an application, the licensing board should generally schedule the hearings so as to first resolve those issues prerequisite to issuing [an LWA], *up to and including an early partial decision on the LWA.*” (NEI 2B) (additional suggested text in *italics*)

*NRC Response:* “Resolution” of issues prerequisite to issuing an LWA necessarily includes a Licensing Board decision on those issues. To add the suggested language would be redundant and possibly confusing. Accordingly, the Commission declines to add the suggested language.

*Comment:* The draft Policy Statement should provide guidance for a proceeding in which a COL application references an early site permit (ESP) application or an application for ESP amendment, comparable to guidance set forth for COL applications which reference a design certification application. (Morgan Lewis 2, NEI 5)

*NRC Response:* The Commission agrees with this comment, and has modified the Policy Statement accordingly.

*Comment:* The Commission need not delay issuance of a combined license referencing a design certification application until the certification rule is final, absent a legal prohibition. A COL license condition premised on promulgation of the DC rule could be imposed, allowing any judicial challenge to be raised in a timely manner without adversely impacting the COL. (GE-Hitachi 2, NEI 7)

*NRC Response:* As the comment recognizes, the AEA requires the NRC to make certain findings before issuing a license. While a license condition may, in some instances, impose specific design or operational requirements to allow the NRC to make the required findings, a license condition may not be used to defer the required findings beyond the issuance of the license, *e.g.*, in order to complete a rulemaking. The Commission believes that the approach proposed in the comment may be inconsistent with the AEA in this respect, and so declines to adopt it.

*Comment:* The final Policy Statement should clarify the definition of completeness in the context of whether an application is acceptable for docketing, particularly given Commission approval of the Combined License Review Task Force recommendation to extend the duration and broaden the scope of the NRC licensing acceptance reviews. (NEI 1)

*NRC Response:* The NRC staff is developing detailed guidance on this subject. Such guidance is beyond the scope of this Policy Statement and will not be addressed in it.

*Comment:* The Commission should seek legislation to eliminate mandatory uncontested hearings. (NEI 9)

*NRC Response:* The question of whether legislation on a particular matter should be sought is beyond the scope of the Policy Statement. The Commission is not modifying the Policy Statement in response to this comment.

*Comment:* The Commission should commence COL licensing hearings based on the availability of draft licensing documents where circumstances warrant. (NEI 11)

*NRC Response:* We have recently addressed this question in our decision in *Southern Nuclear Operating Co.* (Early Site Permit for Vogtle ESP Site), CLI-07-17, 65 NRC 392 (2007). In that decision, we held that the Licensing Board, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.332(d), may not commence a hearing on environmental issues before the final environmental impact statement has been issued. *Id.* at 394. Hearings may be held on safety issues, however, prior to the staff’s publication of its safety evaluation. The commenter has not

identified any reason for us to revisit that decision, which provides the basis for our position on the matter, and we decline to do so.

*Comment:* Commission policy should seek to ensure the NRC staff's timely completion of licensing reviews for new plant applications. (NEI 12)

*NRC Response:* The NRC has, for the last several years, been diligently preparing to review applications to build and operate new reactors. Part of that preparation has involved significant NRC staff effort in planning for timely reviews that assure that the agency discharges its duties under the Atomic Energy Act and NEPA. These efforts have been and continue to be reflected in the agency's Strategic Plans and budget requests, among other statements. The commenters can be assured that the NRC is committed to timely reviews provided it receives complete, high quality information from applicants.

In closing, the Commission notes that several commenters offered general statements of support or criticism of the Commission's licensing process or parts of that process. While the Commission acknowledges those comments, they do not raise any specific issue related to the Policy Statement, and no response to them is necessary.

## STATEMENT OF POLICY ON CONDUCT OF NEW REACTOR LICENSING PROCEEDINGS CLI-08-07

### I. Introduction

Because the Commission has received the first several applications for combined licenses (COLs) for nuclear power reactors and expects that several more applications for COLs will be filed within the next two years, the Commission has reexamined its procedures for conducting adjudicatory proceedings involving power reactor licensing. Such examination is particularly appropriate since the Commission will be considering these COL applications at the same time it expects to be reviewing various design certification and early site permit (ESP) applications, and the COL applications will likely reference design certification rules and ESPs, or design certification and ESP applications. Hearings related to the COL and ESP applications will be conducted within the framework of our Rules of Practice in 10 CFR part 2, as revised in 2004 and further updated in 2007 to reflect the revisions to 10 CFR part 52, and the existing policies applicable to adjudications. The Commission has, therefore, considered the differences between the licensing and construction of the first generation

of nuclear plants, which involved developing technology, and the currently anticipated plants, which may be much more standardized than previous plants.

We believe that the 10 CFR part 2 procedures, as applied to the 10 CFR part 52 licensing process, will provide a fair and efficient framework for litigation of disputed issues arising under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act) and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), that are material to applications. Nonetheless, we also believe that additional improvements can be made to our process. In particular, the guidance stated in this policy statement is intended to implement our goal of avoiding duplicative litigation through consolidation to the extent possible.

The differences between the new generation of designs and the old, including the degree of standardization, as well as the differences between the 10 CFR part 50 and 10 CFR part 52 licensing processes, have led the Commission to review its procedures for treatment of a number of matters. Given the anticipated degree of plant standardization, the Commission has most closely considered the potential benefits of the staff's conducting its safety reviews using a "design-centered" approach, in which multiple applicants would apply for COLs for plants of identical design at different sites, and of consolidation of issues common to such applications before a single Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (licensing board or ASLB). The Commission has also considered its treatment of Limited Work Authorization requests; the timing of litigation of safety and environmental issues; and the order of procedure for hearings on inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC), which are completed before fuel loading. In considering these matters, the Commission sought to identify procedural measures within the existing Rules of Practice to ensure that particular issues are considered in the agency proceeding that is the most appropriate forum for resolving them, and to reduce unnecessary burdens for all participants.

The new Commission policy builds on the guidance in its current policies, issued in 1981 and 1998, on the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings, which the Commission endorses. *Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings*, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18 (July 28, 1998), 63 FR 41872 (August 5, 1998); *Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings*, CLI-81-8, 13

NRC 452 (May 20, 1981), 46 FR 28533 (May 27, 1981). The 1981 and 1998 policy statements provided guidance to licensing boards on the use of tools, such as the establishment of and adherence to reasonable schedules, intended to reduce the time for completing licensing proceedings while ensuring that hearings were fair and produced adequate records. Since the Commission issued its previous statements, the Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2 have been revised, and licensing proceedings are now usually conducted under the procedures of Subpart L, rather than Subpart G. See "Changes to Adjudicatory Process," Final Rule, 69 FR 2182 (January 14, 2004). In addition, we have recently amended our licensing regulations in 10 CFR Parts 2, 50, 51 and 52 to clarify and improve the 10 CFR Part 52 licensing process. This statement of policy thus supplements the 1981 and 1998 statements.

With both the recent revisions to 10 CFR Part 2 and this guidance, the Commission's objectives remain unchanged. As always, the Commission aims to provide a fair hearing process, to avoid unnecessary delays in its review and hearing processes, and to enable the development of an informed adjudicatory record that supports agency decision making on matters related to the NRC's responsibilities for protecting public health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. In the context of new reactor licensing under 10 CFR part 52, members of the public should be afforded an opportunity for hearing on each genuine issue in dispute that is material to the particular agency action subject to adjudication. By the same token, however, applicants for a license should not have to litigate each such issue more than once.

The Commission emphasizes its expectation that the licensing boards will enforce adherence to the hearing procedures set forth in the Commission's Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, as interpreted by the Commission. In addition, the Commission has identified certain specific approaches for its licensing boards to consider implementing in individual proceedings, if appropriate, to minimize burdens on all parties involved. The measures suggested in this policy statement can be accomplished within the framework of the Commission's existing Rules of Practice. The Commission may consider further changes to the Rules of Practice as appropriate to enable additional improvements to the adjudicatory process.

## II. Specific Guidance

Current adjudicatory procedures and policies provide the latitude to the Commission, its licensing boards and presiding officers to instill discipline in the hearing process and ensure a prompt yet fair resolution of contested issues in adjudicatory proceedings. In the 1981 and 1998 policy statements, the Commission encouraged licensing boards to use a number of techniques for effective case management in contested proceedings. Licensing boards and presiding officers should continue to use these techniques, but should do so with regard for the new licensing processes in 10 CFR part 52 and the anticipated high degree of new plant standardization, which may afford significant efficiencies.

The Commission's approach to standardization through design certification has the potential for resolving design-specific issues in a rule, which subsequently cannot be challenged through application-specific litigation. See 10 CFR 52.63 (2007). Matters common to a particular design, however, may not have been resolved even for a certified design. For example, matters not treated as part of the design, such as operational programs, may remain unresolved for any particular application referencing a particular certified design. Further, site-specific design matters and satisfaction of ITAAC will not be resolved during design certification. The timing and manner in which associated design certification and COL applications are docketed may affect the resolution of these matters in proceedings on those applications, *e.g.*, with respect to what forum is appropriate for resolving an issue. As discussed further below, a design-centered review approach for treating such matters in adjudication may yield significant efficiencies in Commission proceedings.

As set forth below, the Commission has identified other approaches, as applied in the context of the current Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, as well as variations in procedure permitted under the current Rules of Practice that licensing boards should apply to proceedings. The Commission also intends to exercise its inherent supervisory authority, including its power to assume part or all of the functions of the presiding officer in a given adjudication, as appropriate in the context of a particular proceeding. See, *e.g.*, *Public Service Co. of New Hampshire* (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 229 (1990). The Commission intends to promptly respond to adjudicatory

matters placed before it, and such matters should ordinarily take priority over other actions before the Commissioners. We begin with the docketing of applications.

### A. INITIAL MATTERS

#### 1. Docketing of Applications

The rules in part 52 are designed to accommodate a COL applicant's particular circumstances, such that an applicant may reference a design certification rule, an ESP, both, or neither. See 10 CFR 52.79. The rules also allow a COL applicant to reference a design certification or ESP application that has been docketed but not yet granted. See 10 CFR 52.27(c) and 52.55(c). Further, we have changed the procedures in § 2.101 to address ESP, design certification, and COL applications, in addition to construction permit and operating license applications. Accordingly, a COL applicant may submit the safety information required of an applicant by §§ 52.79 and 52.80(a) and (b) apart from the environmental information required by § 52.80(c), as is now permitted by § 2.101(a)(5). In addition, we have lengthened the time allowed between submission of parts of an application under § 2.101(a)(5) from six to eighteen months.

Notwithstanding these procedures, the Commission can envision a situation in which an applicant might want to present a particular ESP or COL application for docketing in a manner not currently authorized. For example, an applicant might wish to apply for a COL for a plant identical to those of other applicants under the design-centered approach, and request application of the provisions of 10 CFR part 52, Appendix N and Part 2, Subpart D, before it has prepared the site- or plant-specific portion of the application. Such an applicant might not be prepared to submit its application as required by the rules, even considering the flexibility afforded by § 2.101(a)(5).

Under such circumstances, the Commission would be favorably disposed to the NRC staff's entertaining a request for an exemption from the requirements of § 2.101. Such an exemption request could be granted if it is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Moreover, because this is a procedural rule established for the effective and efficient processing of applications, the Commission can exercise its inherent authority to approve such exemptions based on similar considerations of effectiveness

and efficiency. The Commission strongly discourages piecemeal submission of portions of an application pursuant to an exemption unless such a procedure is likely to afford significant advantages to the design-centered review approach described in more detail below. The Commission intends to monitor requests for exemptions from the requirements of § 2.101, and to issue a case-specific order governing such matters if warranted. Whether a COL application is submitted pursuant to § 2.101 or an exemption, the first part of an application submitted should be complete before the staff accepts that part of the application for docketing. Similarly, the staff should not docket any subsequently submitted portion of the application unless it is complete.

#### 2. Notice of Hearing

As required by § 2.104(a), a Notice of Hearing on an application is to be issued as soon as practicable after the application is docketed. A Notice of Hearing for a complete COL application should normally be issued within about thirty (30) days of the staff's docketing of the application. Section 2.101(a)(5), which provides for submitting applications in two parts, does not specify when the Notice of Hearing should be issued, nor is it clear when a Notice of Hearing would be issued for an application filed in parts under an exemption from § 2.101. With two exceptions, the Commission believes it most efficient to issue a Notice of Hearing only when the entire application has been docketed. The first exception is a construction permit application submitted in accordance with § 2.101(a-1), which results in a decision on early site review. The second exception involves circumstances in which: (1) A complete application is submitted; (2) one or more other applications that identify a design identical to that described in the complete application are submitted; and (3) another application is incomplete with respect to matters other than those common to the complete application. Under such circumstances, the Commission will give notice of the hearing on the complete application, and give notice of the hearing on the other application with respect to the matters common to the complete application. The Commission determination in this regard will consider the extent to which any notice is consistent with the timely completion of staff reviews using the design-centered approach and with the efficient conduct of any required hearing, with due regard for the rights of all parties. Upon submission of information



completing the other application, the Commission would give notice of a hearing with respect to that information. Under all other circumstances, the Commission will issue a Notice of Hearing only when a complete application has been docketed in order to avoid piecemeal litigation.

### 3. Limited Work Authorizations

Section 50.10 contains provisions for limited work authorizations, which allows certain construction activities on production and utilization facilities to commence before a construction permit or combined license is issued. The Commission has redefined the term "construction" in 10 CFR 50.10, as well as the provisions governing limited work authorizations. Accordingly, we are providing additional guidance regarding limited work authorizations.

In all proceedings, the licensing boards should formulate hearing schedules to accommodate any limited work authorization request. Specifically, if an applicant requests a limited work authorization as part of an application, the licensing board should generally schedule the hearings so as to first resolve those issues prerequisite to issuing a limited work authorization. This may lead to hearings on the safety and environmental matters specified in 10 CFR 50.10 before commencement of hearings on other issues. Such considerations should be incorporated into the milestones set for each proceeding in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix B.

#### B. Treatment of Generic Issues

##### 1. Consolidation of Issues Common to Multiple Applications

The Commission believes that generic consideration of issues common to several applications may well yield benefits, both in terms of effective consideration of issues and efficiency. Such benefits would accrue not only to the staff review process, but also to litigation of such matters before the licensing board. We acknowledge that consideration of generic matters common to several applications may be possible in several contexts. For example, an applicant might seek staff review of a corporate program such as quality assurance or security that is common to several of its applications. If contentions on such a program are admitted with respect to more than one application, consolidation of such contentions before a single licensing board may result in more efficient decision making, as well as conserving the parties' resources. Licensing boards should consider consolidating

proceedings involving such matters, pursuant to an applicant's motion or pursuant to their own initiative under § 2.317(b). In addition, different applicants may seek COLs for plants of identical design at multiple sites, as in the design-centered review approach, and may therefore seek to implement the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart D. In this regard, we have amended Subpart D to Part 2 and Appendix N to 10 CFR Part 52 to provide explicit treatment of COL applications for identical plants at multiple sites.

Because we believe that the design-centered approach is the chief example of circumstances in which generic consideration of issues common to several applications may yield benefits, we discuss that approach in detail below. While much has changed since we first promulgated Subpart D in 1975, we believe many of the concepts originally underpinning Subpart D still apply today, and we presume that Subpart D procedures, as well as other applicable Rules of Practice in 10 CFR Part 2, will be applied to applications employing a design-centered review approach. Our vision for the implementation of a "design-centered" approach under the procedures of Subpart D is set forth below.

As indicated above, issues, such as those involving operational programs or design acceptance criteria,<sup>1</sup> common to several applications referencing a design certification rule or design certification application may be most effectively and efficiently treated with a single review in a "design-centered" approach and, subsequently, in a single hearing. In order to achieve such benefits, however, applicants who intend to apply for licenses for plants of identical design and request the staff to employ the design-centered review approach should submit their applications simultaneously. Subpart D nonetheless affords the licensing board discretion to consolidate applications filed close in time, if this will be more efficient and otherwise provide for a fair hearing. While not required, we believe applicants for COLs for plants of identical design should consolidate the portions of their applications containing common information into a joint submission. In doing so, each applicant would also submit the information required by §§ 50.33(a) through (e) and 50.37 and would identify the location of its proposed facility, if this information

<sup>1</sup> Design acceptance criteria are a special type of ITAAC that are used to verify the resolution of design issues for which completed design information was not provided in the design certification application.

has not already been submitted to the Commission.

Appendix N requires that the design of those structures, systems, and components important to radiological health and safety and the common defense and security described in separate applications be identical in order for the Commission to treat the applications under Appendix N and Subpart D. The Commission believes that any variances or exemptions requested from a design certification in this context should be common to all applications. In addition, while not required, the Commission encourages applicants to standardize the balance of their plants insofar as is practicable.

Subpart D provides flexibility in the hearing process. Each application will necessarily involve a separate proceeding to consider site-specific matters, and the required hearings may, as appropriate, be comprised of two (or more) phases, the sequence of which depends on the circumstances. For any of the phases, the hearings may be consolidated to consider common issues relating to all or some of the applications involved.

An applicant requesting treatment of its application under the design-centered approach may seek to submit separate portions of the application at different times, pursuant to § 2.101(a)(5) or an exemption from § 2.101, as discussed above. Under such circumstances, the Commission intends to issue a Notice of Hearing for the portion of the application to be reviewed under the design-centered approach, and a second notice limited to the portion of the application not treated under the design-centered review approach upon submission of the complete application. Such a procedure would not affect any prospective intervenor's substantive rights; i.e., members of the public will still have a right to petition for intervention on every issue material to the Commission's decision on each individual application.

The staff would review the common information in the applications, or in the joint submission, for sufficiency for docketing and, if acceptable, would docket this information as a portion of each application. Each application would be assigned a docket number in connection with the first portion of the application docketed, which could be the common submission. The applicants should designate one applicant to be the single point of contact for the staff review of this common information, and to represent the applicants before the licensing board.

Consistent with our guidance set forth above, we would expect to issue a Notice of Hearing only upon the docketing of at least one complete application that includes the common information. The Notice of Hearing will not only provide an opportunity to petition to intervene in the proceeding on the complete individual application, but will also provide such an opportunity with respect to the information common to all the applications, which would be docketed separately. Accordingly, upon issuance of such a notice, the Chief Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP or Panel) should, as is the normal practice, designate a licensing board to preside over the application-specific proceeding, and should also designate a licensing board to preside over the consolidated portions of the applications. Initially, these two licensing boards could be the same.

A person having standing with respect to one of the facilities proposed in the applications partially consolidated would be entitled to petition for intervention in the proceeding on the common information. Such a petitioner would be required to satisfy the other applicable provisions of § 2.309 with respect to the application being contested to be admitted as a party to the proceeding on the common information. Petitioners admitted as parties to such a proceeding with respect to a proposed facility for which the application remains incomplete at the time of the initial Notice of Hearing would have an opportunity to propose contentions with respect to the rest of the application upon the docketing of a complete application, but would not need to demonstrate standing a second time. Those persons granted intervention are required to designate a lead for common contentions, as required by § 2.309(f)(3); as stated above, applicants submitting common information under the design-centered approach would likewise designate a representative to appear before the licensing board. In addition, the presiding officer may require consolidation of parties in accordance with § 2.316.

The Commission is willing to consider other methods of managing proceedings involving consideration of information common to several applications. For example, the Commission does not intend to foreclose the Chief Judge of the Panel from designating a licensing board to preside over common portions of applications on the motion of the applicants, even if separate proceedings have already been convened on one or

more of the applications involved. In such a case, however, the applicants should jointly identify the common portions of their respective applications when requesting the Chief Judge to take such action. Petitioners admitted as parties to any affected proceeding would of course have the right to answer such a motion.

As stated above, upon issuance of a Notice of Hearing for a complete plant-specific application that includes information on "common issues," the Chief Judge of the Panel should designate a licensing board to preside over the plant-specific portion of each application that is then complete. Each licensing board, whether designated to consider the common issues or a specific application, should manage its respective portion of the proceedings with due regard for our 1981 and 1998 policy statements. We emphasize that the Chief Judge of the Panel should not designate another licensing board to consider specific aspects of a proceeding unless the standards we enunciated in *Private Fuel Storage, LLC* (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307, 310-11 (1998) for doing so are met. These standards are that the proceeding involve discrete and separable issues; that multiple licensing boards can handle these issues more expeditiously than a single licensing board; and that the proceeding can be conducted without undue burden on the parties. *Id.*

An initial decision by the licensing board presiding over a proceeding on a joint submission containing information common to more than one plant-specific application will be a partial initial decision for which a party may request review under § 2.341 (as is also provided in Subpart D) and which we may review on our own motion. Such a decision would become part of each initial decision in the individual application proceedings, which will become final in accordance with the regulation that applies depending on which subpart of our Rules of Practice has been applied in a proceeding on a particular application (e.g., § 2.713 under Subpart G; § 2.1210 under Subpart L). Accordingly, a decision on common issues would become final agency action if it resolves a specific intervenor's contentions in a proceeding on an individual application.

Revisions of specific applications during the review process could result in formerly common issues being referred to the licensing board presiding over a specific portion of one or more applications. These issues would be resolved in the normal course of

adjudication, but may well result in delay in final determination of the individual application.

## 2. COL Applications Referencing Design Certification and ESP Applications

With respect to a design for which certification has been requested but not yet granted, the Commission intends to follow its longstanding precedent that "licensing boards should not accept in individual license proceedings contentions which are (or are about to become) the subject of general rulemaking by the Commission." *Duke Energy Corp.* (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 345 (1999), quoting *Potomac Elec. Power Co.* (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 85 (1974). In accordance with these decisions, a licensing board should treat the NRC's docketing of a design certification application as the Commission's determination that the design is the subject of a general rulemaking. We believe that a contention that raises an issue on a design matter addressed in the design certification application should be resolved in the design certification rulemaking proceeding, and not the COL proceeding. Accordingly, in a COL proceeding in which the application references a docketed design certification application, the licensing board should refer such a contention to the staff for consideration in the design certification rulemaking, and hold that contention in abeyance, if it is otherwise admissible. Upon adoption of a final design certification rule, such a contention should be denied.

Similar considerations apply if a COL applicant references an ESP application that has not been granted. In such a case, the Licensing Board presiding over the proceeding on the COL application should refer contentions within the scope of the ESP proceeding to the Licensing Board presiding over the ESP proceeding.

An individual applicant, nonetheless, may choose to request that the application be treated as a "custom" design, and thereby resolve any specific technical matter in the context of its individual application. An applicant might choose such a course if, for example, the referenced design certification application were denied, or the rulemaking delayed. The application-specific licensing board would then consider contentions on design issues, which otherwise would have been treated in the design certification proceeding. Similarly, a COL applicant referencing a design

certification application may request an exemption from one or more elements of the requested design certification, as provided in § 52.63(b) and Section VIII of each appendix to 10 CFR Part 52 that certifies a design. As set forth in those provisions, such a request is subject to litigation in the same manner as other issues in a COL proceeding. Since the underlying element of the design may change after the exemption request is submitted, such an exemption may ultimately become unnecessary or may need to be reconsidered or conformed to the final design certification rule. Such matters would be considered by an application-specific licensing board. A licensing board considering a COL application referencing a design certification application might conclude the proceeding and determine that the COL application is otherwise acceptable before the design certification rule becomes final. In such circumstances, the license may not issue until the design certification rule is final, unless the applicant requests that the entire application be treated as a "custom" design.

COL applicants should coordinate with vendors applying for certified designs to ensure that decisions on design certification applications do not impede decisions on COL applications. If design certification is delayed, a licensing board considering common technical issues may likewise be delayed.

### 3. Subsequent Applications Referencing a Design Certification Rule

If the Commission grants initial COL applications referencing a particular design certification rule, the Commission believes it likely that subsequent COL applicants will also reference that design certification rule. In this event, the Commission would expect to develop additional processes to facilitate coordination of proceedings on such applications. We observe, however, that an issue associated with such matters as operational programs or design acceptance criteria may be resolved through the design-centered review approach for initial applications containing common information, but we do not intend to impose any resolution so obtained on subsequent COL applicants. While there is no requirement to adopt a previously-approved resolution of an issue, and subsequent applicants are free to use the most recent state-of-the-art methods to resolve such issues, we nevertheless urge such applicants to consider adopting previous resolutions in order to maximize plant standardization. If a COL applicant adopts an approach to a

technical issue previously found acceptable, no further staff review of the adequacy of the approach is necessary. Rather, the staff review should be limited to verification that the applicant has indeed adopted the previously approved approach and will properly implement it, and, for technical issues that depend on site-specific factors, that the previously-approved approach applies to the applicant's proposed facility.

### C. ITAAC

In first promulgating 10 CFR Part 52 in 1989, we determined that hearings on whether the acceptance criteria in a COL have been met (ITAAC-compliance hearings) would be held in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provisions applicable to determining applications for initial licenses, but that we would specify the procedures to be followed in the Notice of Hearing. See 10 CFR 52.103(b)(2)(i) (1990); 54 FR 15395 (April 18, 1989). In enacting the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress subsequently confirmed our authority to adopt 10 CFR Part 52, and by statute accorded us additional discretion to determine procedures, whether formal or informal, for ITAAC-compliance hearings. See Atomic Energy Act section 189a.(1)(B)(iv), 42 U.S.C. 2239(a)(1)(B)(iv). We therefore amended § 52.103(d) to provide that we would determine, in our discretion, "appropriate hearing procedures, whether informal or formal adjudicatory, for any hearing under [§ 52.103(a)]."

While we recognize that specification of procedures for the treatment of requests for hearings on ITAAC would lend some predictability to the ITAAC compliance process, we are not yet in a position to specify such procedures, since we have not approved even one complete set of ITAAC necessary for issuing a COL. Further, ITAAC-compliance hearings are likely several years distant, and we have no experience with the type and number of hearing requests that we might receive with respect to ITAAC compliance. While it may not be necessary to consider the first requests for ITAAC-compliance hearings in order for us to determine the procedures appropriate to govern such hearings, we believe it premature to specify such procedures now. In addition, the staff is now formulating guidance on the times necessary for the staff to consider different categories of completed ITAAC, and this guidance should assist licensees in scheduling and performing ITAAC so as to minimize the critical

path for staff consideration of completed ITAAC.

In view of the above considerations, we have identified one measure to lend predictability to the ITAAC compliance process: The Commission itself will serve as the presiding officer with respect to any request for a hearing filed under § 52.103. In acting as the presiding officer under these circumstances, we will make three initial determinations. First, we will decide whether the person requesting the hearing has shown, *prima facie*, that one or more of the acceptance criteria in the COL have not been, or will not be met, and the attendant public health and safety consequences of such non-conformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. Second, if we decide to grant a request for a hearing on ITAAC compliance, we will decide, pursuant to § 52.103(c), whether there will be reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety during a period of interim operation. Third, we will designate the procedures under which the proceeding shall be conducted. We have amended § 52.103 and our Rules of Practice (10 CFR 2.309, 2.310, and 2.341) to incorporate these changes.

### III. Conclusion

The Commission reiterates its longstanding commitment to ensuring that hearings are fair and produce an adequate record for decision, while at the same time being completed as expeditiously as possible. The Commission intends to monitor its proceedings to ensure that they are being concluded in a fair and timely fashion. To this end, the Commission will act in individual proceedings, as appropriate, to provide guidance to licensing boards and parties, and to decide issues in the interest of a prompt and effective resolution of the matters set for adjudication.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day of April 2008,

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

**Annette Vietti-Cook,**

*Secretary of the Commission.*

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## APPLICATIONS

### 1.0 APPLICATION FOR LICENSE/PERMIT

#### 1.1 Applicants

All co-owners of a nuclear power plant must be co-applicants for NRC licenses for the facility. To hold otherwise could place a cloud on significant areas of the NRC's regulatory authority and is not consistent with the safety considerations with which Congress was primarily concerned in the Atomic Energy Act. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 200-201 (1978). The Appeal Board's decision in Marble Hill thus overrules the Licensing Board's holding to the contrary in Omaha Public Power District (Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 2), LBP-77-5, 5 NRC 437 (1977).

#### 1.2 Renewal Applications - See Section 6.11 for Reactor License Renewal Proceedings

Applications for a renewal of a license may be filed with the NRC. 10 CFR § 2.109 provides that where an application for renewal is filed at least 30 days prior to the expiration of an existing license authorizing activities of a continuing nature, the existing license will not be deemed to expire until the renewal application has been finally determined. A construction permit is a "license" for these purposes. 10 CFR § 2.109(a)(1993). See AEA § 185, 42 U.S.C. 2235 ("[f]or all other purposes of this Act, a construction permit is deemed to be a 'license'"); see also 10 CFR § 2.4. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-10, 37 NRC 192, 202 n.38 (1993).

As part of its licensing and oversight responsibilities, the Commission may consider the adequacy of a licensee's corporate organization and the integrity of its management. The past performance of management may help indicate whether a licensee will comply with agency standards. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 120 (1995).

Because NRC regulations provide that operating license renewals do not have to furnish information regarding the onsite storage of spent fuel or high level waste disposal, low-level waste storage and disposal, and mixed waste storage and disposal, these subjects are barred as contentions. Duke Energy Corp., LBP-98-33, 48 NRC 381, 391 (1998).

For environmental issues listed in Subpart A, Appendix B of 10 CFR 51 as Category 1 issues, the Commission resolved the issues generically for all plants and those issues are not subject to further evaluation in any license renewal proceeding. See 61 Fed. Reg. 28,467 (1996). Consequently, the Commission's license renewal regulations also limit the information that the Applicant need include in its environmental report, see 10 CFR 51.171(d), and the matters the agency need consider in draft and final supplemental environmental impact statements to the GEIS. See Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 154 (2001). See generally Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear

Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 278-79 (2006).

Even when a GEIS has resolved a Category 1 issue generically, the applicant must still provide additional analysis in its Environmental Report if new significant information may bear on the applicability of the Category 1 finding at the particular plant. The Commission has identified three methods by which petitioners can petition the NRC to address significant new information that has arisen since the GEIS on Category 1 issues was finalized: (1) petitioners may seek a waiver to a rule if they possess information that may show that a generic rule would not serve its purpose at the specific plant; (2) petitioners may petition the NRC to initiate a new rulemaking process; or (3) petitioners may use the SEIS notice and comment process to request that the NRC forgo use of the suspect generic finding and suspend license renewal proceedings, pending a new rulemaking or update of the GEIS. However, the Commission treats all spent fuel accidents as generic, whatever their cause. There is to be no litigation of spent fuel accidents. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 294-95 (2006).

10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Category 2 issues are site specific and must be addressed by the applicant in its environmental report and by the NRC in its draft and final supplemental environmental impact statements for the facility. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 153 (2001). The scope of the draft and final supplemental environmental impact statement is limited to the matters that 10 CFR 51.33(c) requires the applicant to provide in its environmental report. These requirements do not include severe accident risks, but only "severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA)." 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L). The Commission, therefore, has left consideration of SAMAs as the only Category 2 issue with respect to severe accidents. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 160-161 (2001). See generally Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 279-80 (2006).

Probabilistic risk assessments are not required for the renewal of an operating license. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 159-160 (2001).

### **1.3 Applications for Early Site Review**

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Part 2 have been amended to provide for an adjudicatory early site review. See 10 CFR §§ 2.101(a-1), 2.600 to 2.606. These early site review procedures, which differ in both form and effect from those of Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 52 and Appendix Q to 10 CFR Part 52 (formerly, 10 CFR Part 50), are designed to result in the issuance of a partial initial decision with regard to site suitability matters chosen by the applicant.

An applicant who seeks early site review is not required to own the proposed power plant site. The real test for deciding on early site review is whether or not the applicant can produce the information required by regulation and necessary for an effective hearing. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125, 1136 (1981).

The Commission's early site review regulations do not require that the applicant have a "firm plan" to construct a plant at the site, but rather are meant to provide an opportunity to resolve siting issues in advance of any substantial commitment of resources. 10 CFR § 2.101(a-1), §§ 2.600 *et seq.* Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 975-976 (1981).

Three years after the Licensing Board sanctioned a limited work authorization (LWA) and before applicant had proceeded with any construction activity, applicant indicated it wanted to amend its construction permit application to focus only on site suitability issues. The Appeal Board adopted applicant's suggestion to "vacate without prejudice" the decisions of the Licensing Board sanctioning the LWA. The Appeal Board remanded the cause for proceedings deemed appropriate by the Licensing Board upon formal receipt of an early site approval application. Delmarva Power & Light Company (Summit Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-516, 9 NRC 5, 6 (1979).

#### **1.4 Application for License Transfer**

A formal application for a license transfer is not necessary where the current owner filed for bankruptcy and the transfer was arranged in the settlement agreement and was published in the Federal Register. Moab Mill Reclamation Trust (Atlas Mill Site), CLI-00-7, 51 NRC 216, 219-220 (2000).

The question in indirect transfer cases is whether the proposed shift in ultimate corporate control will affect a licensee's existing financial and technical qualifications. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 18,381 (2000). The transfer applicants need provide only information bearing on the inquiry at hand, and not more extensive information that may be required in other contexts. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129 (2000). "A license transfer proceeding is not a forum for a full review of all aspects of current plant operation." GPU Nuclear Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000), cited in Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 133 (2000).

#### **1.5 Form of Application for Construction Permit/Operating License**

##### **1.5.1 Form of Application for Initial License/Permit**

Regulations permit the filing of an application in three parts: Antitrust Information; SAR; and ER (10 CFR § 2.101). The application is initially treated as a "tendered application" pending a preliminary Staff review for completeness. 10 CFR § 2.101(a)(2).

##### **1.5.2 Form of Renewal Application for License/Permit**

(RESERVED)

## 1.6 Contents of Application

### 1.6.1 Incomplete Applications

The determination as to whether an application is sufficiently complete for docketing is for the Staff, rather than an adjudicatory board, to make. New England Power Co. (NEP, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271, 280 (1978).

A materials licensee may submit evidentiary material to supplement its license application where intervenors seek to invalidate the license because of alleged deficiencies and omissions in the license application. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-45, 32 NRC 449, 454-55 (1990). See Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-91-31, 34 NRC 29, 109-110 (1991), clarified, LBP-91-34, 34 NRC 159 (1991).

Although the Commission by no means encourages defective applications, an application which is minimally flawed is not automatically totally rejected. Further, the application may be modified or improved as NRC review goes forward. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 395 (1995). "An application need not be rejected whenever an omission or error is found." Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001).

Pending staff review of a license extension application does not constitute a fatal defect in the application and does not afford an adequate basis for a contention. Such "open items" in license applications are not unusual and are generally not a cause for concern since they must eventually be dealt with by the Staff before the license can be granted. Duke Energy Corp., LBP-98-33, 48 NRC at 381, 386-87 (1998).

It is not true that all licensee commitments must be converted into express license conditions to be enforceable. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-9, 53 NRC 232, 235-236 (2001).

For a materials license, having no final estimates, no final plan, and no final NRC Staff review indicates that the NRC staff has not yet resolved all issues material to licensing. Also, an adequate financial assurance plan is material to licensing. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 241 (2000).

### 1.6.2 Material False Statements

Under Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. § 2236), a license or permit may be revoked for material false statements in the application. The Commission depends on licensees and applicants for accurate information to assist the Commission in carrying out its regulatory responsibilities and expects nothing less than full candor from licensees and applicants. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 427 (1993).

Liability of an applicant or licensee for a material false statement in violation of Section 186a of the Atomic Energy Act does not depend on whether the applicant or licensee knew of the falsity. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 910 (1982), citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978).



Licensee remains responsible for the contents of the application even if licensee used a consultant to assist in the preparation of the application. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 429 (1993).

Intent to deceive is irrelevant in determining whether there has been a material false statement under Section 186a of the Atomic Energy Act; a deliberate effort to mislead the NRC, however, is relevant to the matter of sanctions, once a material false statement has been found. Consumer Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 915 (1982); The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-84-22, 19 NRC 1383, 1387 (1984).

In Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-324, 3 NRC 347 (1976), the Appeal Board held that:

- (1) A statement may be "false" within the meaning of Section 186 even if it is made without knowledge of its falsity - i.e., scienter is not a necessary element of a false statement under Section 186.
- (2) Information is material under Section 186 if it would have a natural tendency or capability to influence the decision of the person or body to whom it is to be submitted - i.e., the information is material if a reasonable Staff member would consider it in reaching a conclusion. The information need not be relied upon in fact.

Under Section 186a of the Atomic Energy Act, the test for materiality is whether the information is capable of influencing the decisionmaker, not whether the decisionmaker would, in fact, have relied on it. Determinations of materiality require careful, common sense judgments of the context in which information appears and the stage of the licensing process involved. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 910 (1982), citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1358 (1984); The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-84-22, 19 NRC 1383, 1408-09 (1984); Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 427-29 (1993).

The mere existence of a question or discussion about the possible materiality of information does not necessarily make the information material. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 914 (1982). The nature (e.g., physical attributes and capabilities) and status of an applicant's proposed facility are material matters in a decision whether to grant a radioactive byproduct materials license. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 428 (1993).

The Commission that it need not rely on a false statement in order for it to be material, nor must the statement in fact induce the agency to grant an application. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 428 (1993).

For each alleged misrepresentation, section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2236), requires that the Board be apprised of the following as precisely as possible: (1) what was said, (2) in what context the statement existed, (3) the proof that the statement was inaccurate or incomplete, (4) when (if applicable) the statement was corrected, and (5) whether the Board should be concerned about the length of delay between the statement and when it was corrected. This will require proof of the time line of actual events, demonstrating not only that they occurred but also when they occurred. In addition, the Board will require that the proof offered will make some allowance for inaccuracies in expression, understanding, and memory. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-94-37, 40 NRC 288, 303-04 (1994).

In Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480 (1976), the Commission affirmed the Appeal Board's rulings supra and, in addition, held that silence (omissions) as to material facts regarding issues of major importance to licensing decisions is included in the Section 186 phrase "material false statement" since such an interpretation will effectuate the health and safety purposes of the Act. Thus, the sanctions of Section 186 apply not only to affirmative statements but to omissions of material facts important to health and safety.

A "material false statement" under Section 186a of the Atomic Energy Act encompasses omissions as well as affirmative statements. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 911 (1982), citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480, 489 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1357 (1984). The Commission has indicated, however, that it is reconsidering its views on what constitutes a material false statement in this regard. See 49 Fed. Reg. 8583, 8584 (1984).

Information concerning a licensee's or applicant's intent to deceive may call into question its "character," a matter the Commission is authorized to consider under Section 182 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232a, or its ability and willingness to comply with Agency regulations, as Section 103b, 42 U.S.C. § 2133b, requires. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 915 n.25 (1982).

False statements, if proved, could signify lack of management character sufficient to preclude an award of an operating license, at least as long as responsible individuals retained any responsibilities for the project. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1297 (1984), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-13, 19 NRC 659, 674-75 (1984), and Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69, 70 (1983).

A deliberate false statement or withholding of material information would warrant the imposition of a severe sanction. Not only are material false statements and omissions punishable under Sections 234 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act, but deliberate planning for such statements or concerns on the part of applicants or licensees would be evidence of bad character that could warrant adverse licensing action even where

those plans are not carried to fruition. When parties and their attorneys engage in conduct which skirts close to the line of improper conduct, they are running a grave risk of serious sanction if they cross that line. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69, 70 (1983).

The penalties that flow from making a false statement to a presiding officer and the NRC staff, including the possibility of criminal violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and agency enforcement actions, can be sufficient to ensure compliance without the additional step of incorporating into a decision a list of commitments that an applicant has clearly acknowledged it accepts and will fulfill. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-9, 53 NRC 232, 410 (2001), citing Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-898, 28 NRC 36, 41 n.20 (1988) (holding that there was no need to incorporate applicant commitment in order given potential Staff enforcement).

## **1.7 Docketing of License/Permit Application**

If the application is found to be complete, a docket number will be assigned and the applicant and other appropriate officials notified. 10 CFR § 2.101(a)(3).

## **1.8 Notice of License/Permit Application**

### **1.8.1 Publication of Notice in Federal Register**

The Federal Register Act (44 U.S.C. § 1508) provides that a publication of a notice in the Federal Register constitutes notice to all persons residing in the United States. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), LBP-82-1, 15 NRC 37, 40 (1982).

One may be charged with notice of matters published in the Federal Register. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7 (1980). (**Note** - The Appeal Board expressly declined to reach the question of whether the Federal Register notice bound the petitioners to its terms. *Id.* at 10).

The notice to parties wishing to intervene in hearings before the Commission published in the Federal Register is notice to all the world. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1085 (1982).

In Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-445, 6 NRC 865 (1977), it was held that, while 10 CFR § 2.104(a) requires that notice of hearing initiating a construction permit proceeding be published in the Federal Register at least 30 days prior to commencement of hearing, it does not require that such notice establish the time, place and date for all phases of the evidentiary hearings. However, in an unpublished opinion issued on December 12, 1977, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held that the interpretation of the notice requirements by the Appeal Board in Yellow Creek was

erroneous and that at least 30 days prior public notice of the time, place and date of hearing must be provided.

There appears to be no requirement that the rights of interested local governmental bodies to be made parties to a proceeding be spelled out in the notice of opportunity for hearing. Thus, a notice of opportunity for hearing is not defective simply because it fails to state the right of an interested governmental body to participate in a proceeding. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-37, 8 NRC 575, 585 (1978).

### **1.8.2 Amended Notice After Addition of New Owners**

(RESERVED)

### **1.8.3 Notice on License Renewal**

(RESERVED)

## **1.9 Staff Review of License/Permit Application**

An ASLB has ruled that the Staff has a right to continue to meet privately with parties even though a hearing has been noticed, and that, while an ASLB has supervisory authority over Staff actions that are part of the hearing process, it has no such authority with regard to the Staff's review process. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Montague Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-75-19, 1 NRC 436 (1975).

The Staff has adopted a meeting policy which is reflected in NRC Management Directive 3.5, "Attendance at NRC Staff Sponsored Meetings" (April 2007).

Note that 10 CFR § 2.102 explicitly provides that the Staff may request any one party to a proceeding to confer informally with the Staff during the Staff's review of an application.

In the absence of a demonstration that meetings were deliberately being scheduled with a view to limiting the ability of intervenors' representatives to attend, the imposition of hard and fast rules would needlessly impair the Staff's ability to obtain information. The Staff should regard the intervenor's opportunity to attend as one of the factors to be taken into account in making its decisions on the location of such meetings. Fairness demands that all parties be informed of the scheduling of such meetings at the same time. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-82-41, 16 NRC 1721, 1722-23 (1982).

Adjudicatory boards lack the power to direct the Staff in the performance of its independent responsibilities and, under the Commission's regulatory scheme, boards cannot direct the Staff to suspend review of an application, preparation of an environmental impact statement or work, studies or analyses being conducted or planned as part of the Staff's evaluation of an application. New England Power Co. (NEP, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271, 278-79 (1978).

The Staff produces, among other documents, the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and the Draft and Final Environmental Statements (DES and FES). The studies and

analyses which result in these reports are made independently by the Staff, and Licensing Boards have no rule or authority in their preparation. The Board does not have any supervisory authority over that part of the application review process that has been entrusted to the Staff. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 48-49 (1983), citing New England Power Co. (NEP Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271 (1978). See Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 206-07 (1978).

It is up to the Staff to decide its priorities in the review of applications. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233, 238 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514, 517 (1980). However, where a Licensing Board finds that the Staff cannot demonstrate a reasonable cause for its delay in submitting environmental statements, the Board may issue a ruling noting the unjustified failure to meet a publication schedule and then proceed to hear other matters or suspend proceedings until the Staff files the necessary documents. The Board, sua sponte or on motion of one of the parties, may refer the ruling for review. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 207 (1978).

One aspect of the NRC role in regulating nuclear power plants is to provide criteria forming the engineering baseline against which licensee system designs, including component specifications, are judged for adequacy. It has not been the Staff's practice to certify that any particular components are qualified for nuclear service, but, rather, it independently reviews designs and analyses, qualification documentation and quality assurance programs of licensees to determine adequacy. This review approach is consistent with the NRC's responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5801 et seq.). Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 426 (1978).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1), the NRC must find, prior to the issuance of a license for the full-power operation of a nuclear power reactor, that the state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-83-16, 17 NRC 1006, 1008 (1983); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1063-64 (1983); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1094 n.22 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-737, 18 NRC 168, 172 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 506 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 29 (1986); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-22, 24 NRC 685, 693-94 (1986), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-857, 25 NRC 7, 12 (1987).

The NRC is not required to make a new finding on the-adequacy of emergency preparedness plans for the issuance of a renewed nuclear power reactor operating license. 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1), 56 Fed. Reg. 64943, 64966-67 (Dec. 13, 1991). In accordance with Section 50.47(a)(2), the Commission is to base its finding on a review

of FEMA's "findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented", and on a review of the NRC Staff assessment of applicant's onsite emergency plans. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1094 n.22 (1983); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1063-64 (1983); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-754, 18 NRC 1333, 1334-1335 (1983), affirming, LBP-83-71, 18 NRC 1105 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 652 (1985); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-22, 24 NRC 685, 693 (1986), aff'd sub nom. on other grounds, Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987). However, 10 CFR 50.47(a)(2) does not mandate that a Board's finding on the adequacy of an emergency plan must be based on a review of FEMA findings and determinations. Since 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(2) also provides that any other information available to FEMA may be considered in assessing the adequacy of an emergency plan, a Board may rely on such evidence, properly admitted into the hearing record, when FEMA findings and determinations are not available. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515, 531-32 (1988). In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on a question of the adequacy of an emergency plan. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 378 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(2); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 655 (1985); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899, 910 (1985); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-86-11, 23 NRC 294, 365 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 499 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 239 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-32, 28 NRC 667, 714 (1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-924, 30 NRC 331 (1989); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 397, 624 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299 (1991). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129, 139 n.38 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-924, 30 NRC 331, 360 (1989). The presumptive validity of FEMA findings does not depend upon the presentation of testimony by FEMA witnesses. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 437 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299 (1991).

If the Staff determines that the cumulative radiological impacts of a license applicant's proposed project will be inimical to the public health and safety, it must take steps to address those impacts by imposing license conditions that avoid such harm, or, if such mitigating measures would be unavailing, deny the license application. Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 60 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006).

A Staff review of an application is an aid to the Commission in determining if a hearing is needed in the public interest. Without the Staff's expert judgment the Commission probably cannot reach an informed judgment on the need for a hearing in the public interest. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233, 235 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

In an operating license proceeding (with the exception of certain NEPA issues), the applicant's license application is in issue, not the adequacy of the Staff's review of the application. An intervenor is thus free to challenge directly an unresolved generic safety issue by filing a proper contention, but it may not proceed on the basis of allegations that the Staff has somehow failed in its performance. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983). See Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-91-31, 34 NRC 29, 108-109 (1991), clarified, LBP-91-34, 34 NRC 159 (1991), aff'd, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 121 (1995).

#### **1.10 Withdrawal of Application for License/Permit/Transfer**

10 CFR § 2.107(a) provides, in part, that “[t]he Commission...may, on receiving a request for withdrawal of an application, deny the application or dismiss it with prejudice. If the application is withdrawn prior to issuance of a notice of hearing, the Commission shall dismiss the proceeding. Withdrawal of an application after the issuance of a notice of hearing shall be on such terms as the presiding officer may prescribe.” See Dairyland Power Cooperative (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-88-15, 27 NRC 576, 581 (1988).

A Licensing Board has no jurisdiction to impose conditions on the withdrawal of an application for an operating license where the applicant has filed a motion to terminate the operating license proceeding prior to the Board's issuance of a notice of hearing on the application. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-37, 24 NRC 719, 724 (1986), citing 10 CFR § 2.107(a). See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-91-36, 34 NRC 193, 195 (1991). A notice of hearing is only issued after a Board considers any requests for hearing and intervention petitions which may have been submitted, and makes a determination that a hearing is warranted. Thus, the notice of receipt of an application for an operating license, notice of proposed action, and notice of opportunity for hearing are not functionally the notice of hearing referred to in 10 CFR § 2.107(a). Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-37, 24 NRC 719, 723-24 (1986).

Where a party has prevailed or is about to prevail, an unconditional withdrawal cannot be approved. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-8281, 16 NRC 1128, 1135 (1982).

While Section 2.107 is phrased primarily in terms of requests for withdrawal of an application by an applicant, the Commission itself has entertained such requests made by other parties to a construction permit proceeding, Consumers Power Company (Quanicasse Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-29, 8 AEC 10 (1974), and has indicated that such a request is normally to be directed to, and ruled upon by, the Atomic Safety and

Licensing Board presiding in the proceeding. Consumers Power Company (Quanicassee Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-37, 8 AEC 627, n.1 (1974). Thus, it appears that a Licensing Board has the authority, under 10 CFR § 2.107, to consider a motion to compel withdrawal of an application filed by a party other than the applicant.

The filing of an application to construct a nuclear power plant is wholly voluntary. The decision to withdraw an application is a business judgment. The law on withdrawal does not require a determination of whether the decision is sound. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-83-2, 17 NRC 45, 51 (1983).

Where an applicant abandons its construction of a nuclear facility and requests that the construction permit proceeding be terminated prior to resolution of issues raised on appeal from the initial decision authorizing construction, fundamental fairness dictates that termination of the proceedings be accompanied by a vacation of the initial decision on the ground of mootness. Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-596, 11 NRC 867, 869 (1980); United States Department of Energy (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-755, 18 NRC 1337, 1338-1339 (1983), vacating LBP-83-8, 17 NRC 158 (1983).

Withdrawal of a license transfer application also moots an adjudicatory proceeding on the proposed transfer. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-00-9, 51 NRC 293, 294 (2000).

The terms prescribed at the time of withdrawal must bear a rational relationship to the conduct and legal harm at which they are aimed. The record must support any findings concerning the conduct and harm in question. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1134 (1982), citing LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976); 5 Moore's Federal Practice §41.05(1) at 41-58.

Intervenors have standing to seek a dismissal with prejudice or to seek conditions on a dismissal without prejudice to the exact extent that they may be exposed to legal harm by a dismissal. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-8281, 16 NRC 1128, 1137 (1982).

A Licensing Board has substantial leeway in defining the circumstances in which an application may be withdrawn but the withdrawal terms set by the Board must bear a rational relationship to the conduct and legal harm at which they are aimed. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 974 (1981); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-83-2, 17 NRC 45, 49 (1983).

Under 10 CFR § 2.107(a), withdrawal of an application after the issuance of a notice of hearing shall be on such terms as the presiding officer may prescribe. However, to make a serious case for conditions, the Intervenors reasonably can be held to an obligation to offer some indication of their objective. The proponent of litigation always bears the burden of explaining which direction the litigation will take. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma site), CLI-95-2, 41 NRC 179, 191-93 (1995).

The applicant for a license bears the cost of Staff work performed for its benefit, whether or not it withdraws its application prior to fruition. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority



(North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125, 1137 (1981).

The antitrust information required to be filed under 10 CFR § 50.33a is part of the permit application; therefore, any applicant who wishes to withdraw after filing antitrust information, must comply with the Commission's rule governing withdrawal of license applications (10 CFR § 2.107(a)), even if a hearing on the application had not yet been scheduled. To instead file a Notice of Prematurity and Advice of Withdrawal is an impermissible unilateral withdrawal, and the filing will be treated as a formal request for withdrawal under 10 CFR § 2.107(a). Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), CLI-82-5, 15 NRC 404, 405 (1982).

With regard to design changes affecting an application, where there is a fairly substantial change in design not reflected in the application, the remedy is not summary judgment against the applicant, nor is withdrawal and subsequent refiling of the application necessarily required. Rather, an amendment of the application is appropriate. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877 (1974).

#### **1.10.1 Withdrawal Without Prejudice**

An applicant may withdraw its application without prejudice unless there is legal harm to the intervenors or the public. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1134 (1982), citing LeCompte v. Mr. Chip. Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976). The Board may attach reasonable conditions on a withdrawal without prejudice to protect intervenors and the public from legal harm. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1134 (1982), citing LeCompte v. Mr. Chip. Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 1976).

Where a decommissioning plan submitter withdraws its plan and the proceedings are dismissed without prejudice to allow for possible future resubmission, and the applicant does later submit a new decommissioning plan, the Board may decide, out of fairness and based upon the totality of the circumstances, to allow an intervenor in the original proceeding to intervene in the new proceeding without filing a new hearing request. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground Site), LBP-05-25, 62 NRC 435, 440-41 (2005).

The possibility of another hearing, standing alone, does not justify either a dismissal with prejudice or conditions on a withdrawal without prejudice. That kind of harm, the possibility of future litigation with its expenses and uncertainties, is the consequence of any dismissal without prejudice. It does not provide a basis for departing from the usual rule that a dismissal should be without prejudice. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1135 (1982), citing Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1, 19 (1936); 5 Moore's Federal Practice 41.05(1) at 41-72 to 41-73 (2nd ed. 1981); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-83-2, 17 NRC 45, 50 (1983).

In the circumstances of a mandatory licensing proceeding, the fact that the motion for withdrawal comes after most of the hearings should not operate to bar a withdrawal

without prejudice where the applicant has prevailed or where there has been a nonsuit as to particular issues. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1136 (1982).

Where a motion for leave to withdraw a license application without prejudice has been filed with both an Appeal Board and a Licensing Board, it is for the Licensing Board, if portions of the proceeding remain before it, to pass upon the motion in the first instance. As to whether withdrawal should be granted without prejudice, the Board is to apply the guidance provided in Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967 (1981) and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125 (1981). Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-668, 15 NRC 450, 451 (1982)

A Board may authorize the revocation of a Limited Work Authorization and the withdrawal of an application without prejudice after determining the adequacy of the applicant's site redress plan and clarifying the responsibilities of the applicant and Staff in the event that an alternate use for the site is found before redress is completed. United States Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), LBP-85-7, 21 NRC 507 (1985).

### **1.10.2 Withdrawal With Prejudice**

Following a request to withdraw an application the Board may dismiss the case "without prejudice," signifying that no disposition on the merits was made; or "with prejudice," suggesting otherwise. (10 CFR § 2.107(a), 10 CFR § 2.321 (formerly 2.721(d))). A dismissal with prejudice requires some showing of harm to either a party or the public interest in general and requires careful consideration of the circumstances, giving due regard to the legitimate interests of all parties. It is well settled that the prospect of a second lawsuit or another application does not provide the requisite quantum of legal harm to warrant dismissal with prejudice. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125, 1132, 1135 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 973, 978-979 (1981); Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-8281, 16 NRC 1128, 1134 (1982), citing Fed.R. Civ.P. 41(a)(1), (2); LeCompte v. Mr. Chip Inc., 528 F.2d 601, 603 (5th Cir. 1976), citing 5 Moore's Federal Practice, §41.05 (2d ed. 1981).

General allegations of harm to property values, unsupported by affidavits or unrebutted pleadings, do not provide a basis for dismissal of an application with prejudice. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-43, 20 NRC 1333, 1337 (1984), citing Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125, 1133-34 (1981), Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 979 (1981).

Allegations of psychological harm from the pendency of the application, even if supported by the facts, do not warrant the dismissal of an application with prejudice. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-43, 20 NRC 1333, 1337-1338 (1984), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766 (1983).

The Commission has the authority to condition the withdrawal of a license application on such terms as it thinks just. See 10 CFR 2.107(a). However, dismissal with prejudice is a severe sanction which should be reserved for those unusual situations which involve substantial prejudice to the opposing party or to the public interest in general. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-662, 14 NRC 1125, 1132-1133 (1981); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-33, 20 NRC 765, 767-768 (1984); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-99-27, 50 NRC 45, 51 (1999).

#### **1.11 Abandonment of Application for License/Permit**

When the applicant has abandoned any intention to build a facility, it is within the Licensing Board's power to dismiss the construction permit application. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-605, 12 NRC 153, 154 (1980).

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## 2.0 PREHEARING MATTERS

### 2.1 Scheduling of Hearings

(See Section 3.3)

### 2.2 Necessity of Hearing

A person requesting a hearing must make some threshold showing that a hearing would be necessary to resolve opposing and supported factual assertions. Kerr-McGee Corporation (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-82-2, 15 NRC 232, 245, 256 (1982), aff'd sub nom, City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983).

The objectives of the NRC adjudicatory procedures and policies are threefold: to provide a fair hearing process, to avoid unnecessary delays in the NRC's review and hearing process, and to produce an informed adjudicatory record that supports agency decisionmaking on public health and safety, the common defense and security, and the environment. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 38 (2001).

There is no general right to a hearing for a hearing's sake. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273, 282 (2001).

Atomic Energy Act Section 189a(1), which provides the opportunity to request a hearing to any person whose interest may be affected by a proceeding, confers hearing rights on licensees as well as on interested members of the public. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47, 53-54 (1992).

Once a notice of opportunity for hearing has been published and a request for a hearing has been submitted, the decision as to whether a hearing is to be held no longer rests with the Staff but instead is transferred to the Commission or an adjudicatory tribunal designated to preside in the proceeding. Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-80-26, 12 NRC 367, 371 (1980); ALAB-618, 12 NRC 551 (1980).

The Commission's summary disposition rule (10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly 2.749)) gives a party a right to an evidentiary hearing only where there is a genuine issue of material fact and the party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law. An important effect of this principle is that applicants for licenses may be subject to substantial expense and delay when genuine issues have been raised, but are entitled to an expeditious determination, without need for an evidentiary hearing on all issues which are not genuine. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-8, 15 NRC 299, 301 (1982).

An adjudication need not necessarily involve a hearing. "Adjudication" includes any agency process for the formulation of an order. An order may be developed in a licensing process, i.e. an agency process respecting the modification of a license. Licensees can request a hearing on such an order; the fact that they may not makes the proceeding no less an adjudication. All Power Reactor Licensees and Research



Reactor Licensees who Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel, CLI-05-06, 61 NRC 37, 41 (2005).

### 2.2.1 Materials License Hearings

Constitutional due process does not require a formal adjudicatory hearing for a materials licensing case where the intervenors have not specified any health, safety, and environmental concerns which constitute liberty or property interests subject to due process protection, where the issues can be evaluated fully and fairly without using formal trial-type procedures, and where formal hearing procedures would add appreciably to the government's administrative burden. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Sequoyah UF6 to UF4 Facility), CLI-86-17, 24 NRC 489, 495-498 (1986).

Current NRC environmental regulations do not specify what type of hearing may be required for any Staff environmental finding regarding a materials license action. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Sequoyah UF6 to UF4 Facility), CLI-86-17, 24 NRC 489, 498 (1986).

The Staff may issue an amendment to a materials license without providing prior notice of an opportunity for a hearing. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-18, 31 NRC 559, 574 (1990).

There is no statutory entitlement to a formal on-the-record hearing under the Atomic Energy Act or NRC regulations with regard to materials licensing actions. Kerr-McGee Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-82-21, 16 NRC 401, 402 (1982); aff'd sub nom. City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983). Rockwell International Corp. (Energy Systems Group Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-21), CLI-83-15, 17 NRC 1001, 1002 (1983).

Section 193 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, requires a formal on-the-record hearing for the initial licensing of a uranium enrichment facility.

### 2.2.2 Operating License/Amendment Hearings

In the Seabrook operating license proceeding, the intervenors sought to litigate contentions involving the low-power testing even though the record had already closed. On appeal, the intervenors argued that the Licensing Board violated their right to a hearing on all issues material to the granting of a full-power operating license, Atomic Energy Act § 189a, by requiring that the intervenors' contentions meet the standards for reopening the record, 10 CFR § 2.326(a) (formerly 2.734(a)). The Appeal Board affirmed the Licensing Board decision, noting that: (1) although the intervenors labeled their contentions "low-power testing contentions", they actually raised issues which involved generic operational questions about plant readiness for full-power operation which could have been raised when the hearing began, Seabrook, supra, 32 NRC at 233-34, 240-41; and (2) while low-power testing is material to the operation of a licensed facility, it is not material to the initial issuance or grant of a full-power license, Seabrook, supra, 32 NRC at 234-37.

A licensee request to suspend the antitrust conditions in its operating license is a license amendment within the meaning of § 189a(1) of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) which provides a hearing to any person whose interest may be affected by any

proceeding for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 238-39 (1991), aff'd in part and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47, 53-54 (1992). The NRC Staff's initial technical and legal assessment of a license amendment application and its determination concerning the propriety of the request cannot substitute for the adjudicatory hearing to which the licensee would otherwise be entitled under AEA § 189a. Perry and Davis-Besse, supra, 34 NRC at 239, aff'd in part and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47, 60 (1992).

### 2.2.3 Hearings on Exemptions

An exemption from the regulations, standing alone, is not an action for which section 189 of the AEA requires an opportunity for a hearing. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-00-5, 51 NRC 90, 96 (2000) (exemption concerning security plan). An exemption from regulations generally requiring cask certification before a utility as general licensee could begin construction of casks did not require a hearing under AEA section 189. Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1517 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1159 (1995). A temporary exemption from a rule does not alter the license and thereby constitute a license amendment requiring an opportunity for hearing. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516, 1520-21 (1st Cir. 1989). See also Duke Power Co. v. NRC, 770 F.2d 386, 389 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1985) (noting that parties agreed no amendment involved in exemption request).

For there to be any statutory right to a hearing on the granting of an exemption, such a grant must be an integral part of a proceeding for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending of any license or construction permit under the Atomic Energy Act. U.S. Dep't of Energy, et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 421 (1982). Where an exemption request was directly related to the initial license application, contentions on the propriety of the exemption were permissible subject for a hearing on the application. Private Fuel Storage LLC, CLI-01-12, 53 NRC 459 (2001).

### 2.2.4 License Transfer Hearings

Atomic Energy Act § 189a(1) does not require a pre-effectiveness hearing on an application to transfer control of a license. However, as a matter of discretion, the Commission may direct the holding of a pre-effectiveness hearing if a proposed transfer of control raises potentially significant public health and safety issues. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-4, 35 NRC 69, 76-79 (1992).

Section 189a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act requires the Commission to offer an opportunity for a hearing for certain kinds of proceedings, including those involving the "transfer of control" over licensed facilities. In order to trigger hearing rights under the "transfer of control" provision of § 189a.(1)(A), there must actually be a license transfer. Where a corporate merger did not propose to change either operating or possession authority, there was no direct license transfer. Similarly, where the same parent company would indirectly control the licensee – both before and after the proposed merger – there was no indirect license transfer. Therefore, the proceeding did not involve a "transfer of control," and no hearing rights attached. Amergen Energy Co.,

LLC (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-05-25, 62 NRC 572, 573-74 (2005).

## **2.2.5 Hearings On Miscellaneous Matters**

### **Part 52 Combined Operating License**

The Commission may grant a request for a post-construction hearing on a Part 52 combined construction permit and operating license from any person who makes a prima facie showing that (1) one or more of the acceptance criteria in the combined license have not been, or will not be met, and (2) the specific operational consequences of nonconformance that would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety. 10 CFR § 52.103(a),(b), 57 Fed. Reg. 60975, 60978 (Dec. 23, 1992). See Nuclear Information Resource Service v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir 1992).

### **Enforcement Order**

Where complainants were denied a hearing after they had alleged a failure of the Director to take stronger action, the Appeal Board, in upholding the denial, noted that the Director's decision in no way restricted the authority of the ASLB to further restrict or even deny the license for operation of the facility. Further, it was not grounds for a hearing that, if a hearing was not immediately held on the Director's decision, the money spent on the plant would later influence the Licensing Board's decision. Houston Lighting and Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-32, 12 NRC 281, 288-290 (1980); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1264 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

### **Agreement State Transfer**

Before entering into or amending an agreement to transfer to a State its regulatory control over Atomic Energy Act § 11e(2) byproduct material, the NRC must provide notice and an opportunity for a public hearing where the State's proposed regulatory standards for the byproduct material differ from the Commission's standards for such material. Atomic Energy Act § 274o. A formal adjudicatory hearing is not required. Notice and comment procedures are sufficient for determining whether the proposed State standards, evaluated generally and not as applied to specific sites, are equivalent to, or more stringent than, the corresponding Commission standards. State of Illinois, CLI-90-9, 32 NRC 210, 215-16 (1990), reconsid. denied, CLI-90-11, 32 NRC 333 (1990).

### **Confirmatory Action Letter**

A Confirmatory Action Letter whereby the applicants voluntarily ceased low-power testing and agreed to obtain NRC Staff approval prior to resuming operations is not a suspension within the meaning of Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, and does not give the intervenors the right to a hearing. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 275-76 (1989), aff'd, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990).

## **2.3 Location of Hearing**

### **2.3.1 Public Interest Requirements Affecting Hearing Location**

(RESERVED)

### **2.3.2 Convenience of Litigants Affecting Hearing Location**

(See Section 3.3.5.2)

## **2.4 Issues for Hearing**

(See Sections 3.4 to 3.4.6)

## **2.5 Notice of Hearing**

10 CFR 2.105(a) requires that the Commission issue a notice of proposed action - also called a notice of opportunity for hearing - only with respect to an application for a facility license, an application for a license to receive radioactive waste for commercial disposal, an application to amend such licenses where significant hazards considerations are involved, or an application for "any other license or amendment as to which the Commission determines that an opportunity for public hearing should be afforded." A materials license amendment does not fall into any of these categories. Kerr-McGee Corporation (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-82-2, 15 NRC 232, 245 (1982), aff'd sub nom. City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983). Nor do actions involving the shipping and transport of radioactive components taken by an applicant in anticipation of decommissioning, provided those activities do not violate 10 CFR § 50.59(a)(1). Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95 (1994). A Person cannot intervene in a proceeding before the issuance of a "notice of hearing" or a "notice of proposed action," which is a prerequisite to the initiation of a proceeding. Petitions filed prior to this issuance are "clearly premature" and may be rejected by the Secretary. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-12, 59 NRC 237, 239-40 (2004).

### **2.5.1 Contents of Notice of Hearing**

Operating license proceedings start with the notice of proposed action (10 CFR § 2.105) and are separate from prior proceedings. Thus, a Licensing Board in a construction permit hearing may not order that certain issues be tried at the OL proceeding. Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514, 517 (1980). A Licensing Board does not have the power to explore matters beyond those which are embraced by the notice of hearing for the particular proceeding. This is a holding of general applicability. Portland General Electric Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287, 289-290 n.6 (1979); Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170-171 (1976). See also Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 426 (1980); Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailey

Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 565 (1980); Tulsa Gamma Ray, Inc., LBP-90-42, 32 NRC 387, 388 (1990).

A notice of hearing must correspond to the agency's statutory authority over a given matter; it cannot confer or broaden that jurisdiction to matters expressly proscribed by law. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-661, 14 NRC 1117, 1123 (1981).

### **2.5.2 Adequacy of Notice of Hearing**

One receiving filings in a proceeding is charged with reading and knowing matters therein which might affect his rights. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7, 13 (1980).

Where an original notice of hearing is too narrowly drawn, a requirement in a subsequent notice that those who now seek to intervene state that they did not intervene before because of limitations in the original notice was not improper. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7, 10 (1980).

The notice of hearing in an enforcement proceeding must provide adequate notice of (1) the alleged violations and (2) the specific regulatory provisions upon which the Staff seeks to impose a civil penalty. Tulsa Gamma Ray, Inc., LBP-90-43, 32 NRC 390, 391-92 (1990), citing 5 U.S.C. § 554(b)(3).

Even in the absence of any constructive notice of when an intervention petition must be filed, the possibility remains that an intervenor had actual notice of the pendency of an enforcement proceeding and failed to make a timely intervention request following that notice. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54, aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

Where a petitioner sought to have a license-termination proceeding dismissed due to improper and insufficient notice, the Commission found notice to be adequate (and renote not necessary) where 1) the Federal Register notice was clear enough to alert the petitioner as well as the local government (evidenced by the fact that both organizations had submitted documents, including the petitioner's timely hearing request, that indicated awareness of the subject and timing contained in the notice) that their interests were potentially affected and 2) other persons with similar interests would have recognized the purpose of the notice and responded appropriately, or at least would have reviewed the underlying documents that provided further information on the substance of the notice and were referenced in the associated series of Federal Register notices. See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-04-28, 60 NRC 412, 415 (2004).

### **2.5.3 Publication of Notice of Hearing in Federal Register**

In Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-445, 6 NRC 865 (1977), it was held that, while 10 CFR § 2.104(a) requires that notice of hearing initiating a construction permit proceeding be published in the Federal Register at least 30 days prior to commencement of hearing, it does not require that such notice

establish time, place and date for all phases of the evidentiary hearings. However, in an unpublished opinion issued on December 12, 1977, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi held that the interpretation of the notice requirements by the Appeal Board in Yellow Creek was erroneous and that at least 30 days prior public notice of the time, place and date of hearing must be provided.

The Federal Register Act expressly provides that such publication of a notice in the Federal Register constitutes notice to "all persons residing within the States of the Union" (44 U.S.C. 1508). See Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947). See also Long Island Lighting Company (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631 (1975); Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP-79-21, 10 NRC 183, 191-192 (1979).

In an operating license amendment proceeding, the Licensing Board ruled that the law required the NRC to publish once in the Federal Register notice of its intention to act on the application for amendment to the operating license. Turkey Point, supra, LBP-79-21, 10 NRC at 192.

Publication in the Federal Register of conditions on intervention is notice as to all of those conditions, and one cannot excuse a failure to meet those conditions by a claimed lack of knowledge. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7, 10 (1980).

#### **2.5.4 Requirement to Renotify**

Where a full-term operating license proceeding had been delayed by a lengthy NRC Staff review and the original notice of the opportunity for a hearing had been issued ten years earlier, a Licensing Board found it necessary to renotify the opportunity for a hearing. Rochester Gas and Electric Corp. (R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-83-73, 18 NRC 1231, 1233 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-539, 9 NRC 422 (1979) wherein the Appeal Board opined that a hearing notice issued "perhaps 5 to 10 years" earlier is "manifestly stale". The renotice cannot limit the scope of contentions to those involving design changes or those based on new information. The new notice must allow the raising of any issues which have not been previously heard and decided. See Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 386-387 (1979). However, the Commission did not re-notify the Watts Bar Unit 1 license when it came before the Commission in 1995. At that time, the Commission did not provide a further notice of opportunity for hearing, notwithstanding the fact that the original notice was published some 20 years before the application was granted. Although no challenge was made to the Commission's actions in issuing the license at that time, some letters raising concerns or objections to the Watts Bar operating license were treated as 10 CFR § 2.206 requests. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), DD-96-11, 44 NRC 69; DD-96-10, 44 NRC 54 (1996).

The Commission rejected the request of an intervenor who had withdrawn from the Comanche Peak operating license proceeding to re-notify for hearing the issuance of the Unit 2 operating license. The original notice was issued in 1979, the intervenor withdrew in 1982, and the remaining issues in controversy were settled by the remaining intervenor in 1988. After being denied late intervention to re-enter the

proceeding in 1988, the Commission rejected the withdrawn intervenor's subsequent request to renote the Unit 2 proceeding in 1993 when the license was about to issue, a request the Commission treated as a petition for late intervention. Texas Utilities Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Elec. Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1 & CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156 (1993).

The Licensing Board rejected conclusory assertions that changes to an application required renoticing in Private Fuel Storage LLC, LBP-98-29, 48 NRC 286, 301(1998).

## **2.6 Prehearing Conferences**

Prehearing conference matters are governed generally by 10 CFR § 2.329 (formerly 2.751a, 2.752).

Where a party has an objection to the scheduling of the prehearing phase of a proceeding, he must lodge such objection promptly. Late requests for changes in scheduling will not be countenanced absent extraordinary unexpected circumstances. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-377, 5 NRC 430 (1977).

A party seeking to be excused from participation in a prehearing conference should present its justification in a request filed before the date of the conference. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-488, 8 NRC 187, 191 (1978).

### **2.6.1 Transcripts of Prehearing Conferences**

Prehearing conferences may be reported stenographically or by other means. 10 CFR § 2.329(d) (formerly 2.751a(c), 2.752(b)).

A Licensing Board must make a good faith effort to determine whether the facts support a party's motion to correct the transcript of a prehearing conference. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-839, 24 NRC 45, 51 (1986).

### **2.6.2 Prehearing Conference Order**

#### **2.6.2.1 Effect of Prehearing Conference Order**

A prehearing conference order may describe action taken at the conference, schedule further actions, describe stipulations agreed to, identify key issues, provide for discovery and the like. The order will control the subsequent course of proceedings unless modified for cause. 10 CFR § 2.329(e) (formerly 2.751a(d), 2.752(c)).

#### **2.6.2.2 Objections to Prehearing Conference Order**

Objections to the prehearing conference order may be filed by a party within 5 days after service of the order. Parties may not file replies to such objections unless the presiding officer so directs. 10 C.F.R. § 2.329(e).

### **2.6.2.3 Appeal from Prehearing Conference Order**

Since a prehearing conference order is interlocutory in nature, it is not generally appealable except with regard to matters for which interlocutory appeal is provided. In this vein that portion of a prehearing conference order which grants or wholly denies a petition for leave to intervene is appealable under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly 2.714a). Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424 (1973).

## **2.7 Television Coverage of Prehearing Conferences**

(See Section 6.32)

## **2.8 Conference Calls**

Both prior to the start of a hearing and sometimes during recesses thereof, it may become necessary for the Board to communicate quickly with the parties. In this vein, the practice has grown up of using telephone conference calls. Such calls should not be utilized unless all parties participate except in the case of the most dire necessity. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-313, 3 NRC 94, 96 (1976). If any rulings are made, the Licensing Board must make and enter a written order reflecting the ruling directly thereafter. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-334, 3 NRC 809, 814-815 (1976).

Where a party informs an adjudicatory board that it is not interested in a matter to be discussed in a conference call between the board and the other litigants, that party cannot later complain that it was not consulted or included in the conference call. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 269 n.63 (1978).

## **2.9 Prehearing Motions**

### **2.9.1 Prehearing Motions Challenging ASLB Composition**

Disqualification of a designated presiding officer or a designated member of the ASLB is covered generally by 10 CFR § 2.313(b) (formerly 2.704).

In Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-101, 6 AEC 60 (1973), the Appeal Board listed the circumstances under which a board member is subject to disqualification. Those circumstances include situations in which:

- (1) the board member has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in the results of the case;
- (2) the board member has a personal bias against a participant;
- (3) the board member has served in a prosecutory or investigative role with regard to the same facts as are in issue;
- (4) the board member has prejudged factual -- as distinguished from legal or policy -- issues;
- (5) the board member has engaged in conduct which gives the appearance of personal bias or prejudgment of factual issues.



A litigant may move for disqualification of any board member who, by word or deed, has manifested a conflict of interest or a bias covered by the above listing.

10 C.F.R. 2.313(b) is meant to ensure both the integrity and appearance of integrity of the Commission's formal hearing process. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-9, 47 NRC 326 (1998).

### **2.9.1.1 Contents of Motion Challenging ASLB Composition**

In Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-172, 7 AEC 42 (1974), the Appeal Board summarized the requirements for disqualification motions as follows:

- (1) motions must be accompanied by affidavits establishing a basis for the charge;
- (2) motions must be filed in a timely manner, citing Consumers Power Co., ALAB-101, *supra*; Commonwealth Edison Co. (LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-73-8, 6 AEC 169 n.1 (1973);
- (3) motions for disqualification, as with all other motions, must be served on all parties or their attorneys, citing 10 CFR §§ 2.302(b), 2.323(a) (formerly 2.701(b), 2.730(a)).

The requirement of an affidavit must be met even if the basis for the motion is founded on matters of public record. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-225, 8 AEC 379 (1974).

### **2.9.1.2 Evidence of Bias in Challenges to ASLB Composition**

The Commission applies a "very high threshold for disqualification" to recusal motions. For a member to be disqualified, it must be shown that his "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."

Although no specific guidelines can be set as to the type or quantum of evidence sufficient to support a disqualification motion, it is clear that the mere fact that a Board issued a large number of unfavorable or even erroneous rulings with respect to a given party is not evidence of bias. To establish bias, something more must be shown than that the presiding officials decided matters incorrectly; to be wrong is not necessarily to be partisan. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 246 (1974).

Nor is an alleged institutional bias sufficient for disqualification. Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-164, 6 AEC 1143 (1973).

### **2.9.1.3 Waiver of Challenges to ASLB Composition**

If a party has reason to believe that there are grounds for disqualification, he must raise the question at the earliest possible moment. Failure to move for disqualification as soon as the information giving rise to such a claim comes to light amounts to a waiver of the objection. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 385 (1974); Northern Indiana Public Service Co., ALAB-224, *supra*; Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-

101, 6 AEC 60, 64 (1973); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Atlantic Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-5, 7 NRC 147, 149 (1978).

## 2.9.2 Motions

The listing of a document on a privilege log is the “occurrence or circumstance” that triggers the 10-day period of 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a) for a motion challenging the asserted privilege. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-33, 62 NRC 828, 837 (2005).

The consultation requirement of 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b) does not extend the 10-day filing requirement of 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a). Id. at 837.

## 2.10 Intervention

### 2.10.1 General Policy on Intervention

Public participation through intervention is a positive factor in the licensing process and that intervenors perform a valuable function and are to be complimented and encouraged. See, e.g., Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 18 n.9 (1975); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-243, 8 AEC 850, 853 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-229, 8 AEC 425 (1974); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222 (1974). Nonetheless, the statutory mandate does not confer the automatic right of intervention upon anyone. The Commission may condition the exercise of that right upon the meeting of reasonable procedural requirements. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 469 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).

To obtain a hearing, a petitioner must demonstrate ‘an interest affected by the proceeding’ – i.e., standing – and submit at least one admissible contention. State of Alaska Dep’t of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 405 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 272 (2006).

The strict contention rule serves multiple functions, including: (1) A means of focus of the hearing process on real disputes that can be resolved in adjudication. For example, a petitioner cannot demand an adjudicatory hearing to attack generic requirements or regulations or to express general grievances regarding NRC policies. (2) The requirement of detailed pleadings gives all parties in the proceedings notice regarding a petitioner’s grievances, giving each party a good sense of the claims they will either support or oppose. (3) The rule helps ensure that adjudicatory hearings are triggered only by petitioners able to provide minimum factual and legal foundations in support of their contentions. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 273 (2006). The Commission requires intervenors to provide a clear statement of the basis for contentions, as well as supporting information and references to documents and sources that serve to establish the validity of the contention. Notice pleading is not

sufficient. Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 118-19 (2006).

It is the Commission's general rule that, to establish individual standing, persons seeking to intervene must identify themselves. See generally Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 389-400 (1979); Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., CLI-99-12, 49 NRC 347, 357 (1999). The general need for such identification should be obvious. If the Commission does not know who the petitioners are, it is usually difficult or impossible for the licensee to effectively question, and for us to ultimately determine, whether petitioners as individuals have "personally" suffered or will suffer a "distinct and palpable" harm that constitutes injury in fact - a determination required for a finding of standing. Dellums v. NRC, 863 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See generally Atomic Energy Act, § 189a, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a); 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (d) (formerly 2.1205(e)(1), (2)).

The policy on intervention in enforcement cases is more limited than in other proceedings. In order to intervene, a petitioner must show that the proceeding, usually limited to whether the facts in the case are true and support the remedy selected, affects an interest of the petitioner's, and also, generally, must oppose enforcement of the selected remedy. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-03-23, 58 NRC 372, 379 (2003). See also Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-03-26, 58 NRC 396, 401 (2003).

### **2.10.2 Intervenor's Need for Counsel**

The NRC's Rules of Practice permit non-attorneys to appear and represent their organizations in agency proceedings. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1247 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

As a rule, pro se petitioners will be held to less rigid standards for pleading, although a totally deficient petition will be rejected. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-136, 6 AEC 487 (1973); Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., CLI-99-12, 49 NRC 347, 354 (1999). While there is no requirement that an intervenor be represented by counsel in NRC proceedings, there are some indications that the regulations do not contemplate representation of a party by a non-lawyer and that any party who does not appear pro se must be represented by a lawyer. See 10 CFR § 2.314(a), (b) (formerly 2.713(a), (b)); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-474, 7 NRC 746, 748 (1978); Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-440, 6 NRC 642, 643 n.3 (1977); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), Licensing Board Order of October 8, 1976 (unpublished). As the Three Mile Island and Cherokee cases cited amply demonstrate, however, any requirement that only lawyers appear in a representative capacity is usually waived, either explicitly or implicitly, as a matter of course.

Insofar as organizations are concerned, 10 C.F.R. § 2.314(b) clearly limits representation to either an attorney or a member, and it can logically be read as precluding representation by an attorney and a member at the same time. But it does not appear to bar representation by a member throughout a proceeding if, at some earlier time during the proceeding, an attorney has made an appearance for the

organization. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-79-17, 9 NRC 723, 724 (1979).

Following the withdrawal of its lead counsel on the eve of its hearing, an intervenor has an affirmative duty to request a postponement. A Board is not required to order a postponement *sua sponte*. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-802, 21 NRC 490, 498 (1985).

### 2.10.3 Petitions to Intervene

Intervention is covered generally in 10 CFR §§ 2.309, 2.311 (formerly 2.714, 2.714a).

Assuming there exists an NRC proceeding on the issues of concern to a petitioner, that petitioner must satisfy the minimum requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) which governs intervention in NRC proceedings. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95 (1994).

A petition for leave to intervene must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised. 10 CFR 2.309 (f); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-90-6, 31 NRC 85, 88, 89, 90 (1990); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-33, 34 NRC 138, 140 (1991); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95 (1994). The burden is on the petitioner to satisfy these requirements. 10 CFR 2.325 (formerly 2.732); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 331 (1983); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-87-2, 25 NRC 32, 34 (1987). A prospective petitioner has an affirmative duty to demonstrate that it has standing in each proceeding in which it seeks to participate since a petitioner's status can change over time and the bases or its standing in an earlier proceeding may no longer apply. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 162-63 (1993). A petitioner may seek to rely on prior demonstrations of standing if those prior demonstrations are (1) specifically identified and (2) shown to correctly reflect the current status of the petitioner's standing. *Id.*

An intervention petition must, under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714(a)(2)), set forth with particularity certain factors regarding the petitioner's interest in the proceeding and address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR § 2.309(d)(1) (formerly 2.714(d)). Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-81-31, 14 NRC 959, 960 (1981); Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), CLI-81-32, 14 NRC 962, 963 (1981).

Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act does not provide an unqualified right to a hearing. The Commission is authorized to establish reasonable regulations on procedural matters like the filing of petitions to intervene and on the proffering of contentions. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1045 (1983), citing BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Easton Utilities Commission v. AEC, 424 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Intervention is not available where there is no pending "proceeding" of the sort specified in section 189a. State of New Jersey (Department of Law and Public Safety's Requests Dated October 8, 1993), CLI-93-25, 38 NRC 289, 292 (1993).

Simply because a filing is labeled a petition to intervene does not prevent the presiding officer from treating it as a request to initiate a hearing if this, in fact, is what the petitioner is seeking. Illinois Power Co. and Soyland Power Cooperative (Clinton Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-97-4, 45 NRC 125, 126 n.1 (1997), citing Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 5 (1996).

Intervention in NRC licensing adjudications whether formal or informal generally arises in one of three ways: (1) an individual seeks to intervene on his or her own behalf; (2) an organization seeks to intervene to represent the interests of one or more of its members; or (3) an organization seeks to intervene on its own. Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., LBP-99-12, 49 NRC 155, 158 (1999).

The right of interested persons to intervene as a party in a licensing proceeding stems from the Atomic Energy Act, not from NEPA, and is covered in AEA § 189 and 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 6 (2001).

There is nothing in 10 CFR § 2.309 or the case law interpreting that rule which permits Licensing Boards to exclude certain groups because of their opinions on nuclear power, either generally or as related to specific plants, nor is there a Commission rule prescribing the conduct of any party (other than licensees or others subject to its regulatory jurisdictions) outside adjudicatory proceedings. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2); Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-82-15, 16 NRC 27, 31, 32 (1982).

The testimony of experts sponsored by petitioner may make a valuable contribution to the record, but the merits of that testimony need not be decided in order to admit a petitioner as a party. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-117B, 16 NRC 2024, 2029 (1982).

While it is true that a petitioning organization must disclose the name and address of at least one member with standing to intervene so as to afford the other litigants the means to verify that standing exists, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 389-400 (1979), there is no requirement that the identification of such a member or members be made in the petition to intervene or in an attached affidavit. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project 1), LBP-83-59, 18 NRC 667, 669 (1983). In the first instance, the decision as to whether to grant or deny a petition to intervene or a request for a hearing lies with the Licensing Board. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-73-16, 6 AEC 391 (1973).

In past operating license cases, petitions to intervene were sometimes considered and ruled upon by an ASLB especially appointed for that purpose, and a separate ASLB conducted separate proceedings if intervention were permitted. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-400, 5 NRC 1175, 1177-78 (1977). In construction permit cases, a single ASLB usually performed both tasks. See Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424 n.2 (1973).

In NRC proceedings in which a hearing is not mandatory but depends upon the filing of a successful intervention petition, an "intervention" Licensing Board has authority only

to pass upon the intervention petition. If the petition is granted, thus giving rise to a full hearing, a second Licensing Board, which may or may not be composed of the same members as the first Board, is established to conduct the hearing. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-23, 8 NRC 71, 73 (1978). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-30-A, 14 NRC 364, 366 (1981), citing Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-400, 5 NRC 1175 (1977).

In ruling on a petition to intervene, the Licensing Board must consider, inter alia, the nature of petitioner's right under the Atomic Energy Act to be made a party to the proceeding, the nature and extent of petitioner's property, financial or other interest in the proceeding, and the possible effect of any Order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interests. 10 CFR § 2.309(d) (formerly 2.714(d)); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Projects No. 3 and No. 5), LBP-77-16, 5 NRC 650 (1977). Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 103 (2006). See also Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 33-34 (2006) (failure to comply with pleading requirements for late filings constitutes sufficient grounds for rejecting intervention and hearing requests).

The ASLB must make specific determinations as to whether the petition is proper and meets the requirements for intervention and must articulate in reasonable detail the basis for its determination. Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-105, 6 AEC 181 (1973); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-104, 6 AEC 179 (1973). See Rockwell International Corp. (Rocketdyne Division), ALAB-925, 30 NRC 709, 722 (1989) (rulings on intervention petitions should be in writing), aff'd, CLI-90-5, 31 NRC 337, 341 (1990).

### **2.10.3.1 Pleading Requirements**

Under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714), a petition to intervene must:

- (1) be in writing (2.309(a));
- (2) specification of the contentions which the person seeks to have litigated in the hearing (2.309(a));
- (3) set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in the matter, the manner in which that interest may be affected by the proceeding, and the reasons why the petitioner should be permitted to intervene with particular reference to the petitioner's right to be made a party under the Atomic Energy Act, the nature and extent of petitioner's property, financial or other interest in the proceeding, and the possible effect of any order entered in the proceeding on petitioner's interest (2.309(d)).

Under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) and 10 CFR § 2.309 (f) (formerly 2.714(b)) an intervention petition must not only set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner and how that interest may be affected by the proceeding, but must also include the bases for each contention, sufficiently detailed and specific to demonstrate that the issues raised are admissible and that further inquiry is

warranted. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-82-4, 15 NRC 199, 206 (1982). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-9, 23 NRC 273, 277 (1986); Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-22, 64 NRC 229, 234-35 (2006). Intervenors are not asked to prove their case at the contention stage, or to provide an exhaustive list of possible bases, but simply to provide sufficient alleged factual or legal bases to support the contention, and to do so at the outset. However, the Commission's contention rules do not allow using reply briefs to provide, for the first time, the necessary threshold support for contentions. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 623 (2004).

In BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld various aspects of 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714), including the requirement that contentions be specified, and the requirement that the basis for contentions be set forth.

Petitions drawn by counsel experienced in NRC practice must exhibit a high degree of specificity. In contrast, Licensing Boards are to be lenient in this respect for petitions drawn pro se or by counsel new to the field or to the bar. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station), ALAB-279, 1 NRC 559, 576-577 (1975). For a more recent case acknowledging that a pro se petitioner for intervention should not be held to the same standards of clarity and precision to which a lawyer might reasonably be expected to adhere in the petition to intervene, see Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-78-24, 8 NRC 78, 82 (1978).

Although a totally deficient pleading may not be justified on the basis that it was prepared without the assistance of counsel, a pro se petitioner is not "to be held to those standards of clarity and precision to which a lawyer might reasonably be expected to adhere." Public Service Electric and Gas Company (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-136, 6 AEC 487, 489 (1973), cited in Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 546 (1980); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 578 (1982).

Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act does not provide a non-discretionary right to a hearing on all issues arguably related to an acknowledged enforcement problem, without regard to the scope of the enforcement action actually proposed or taken. In order to be granted leave to intervene, one must demonstrate an interest affected by the action, as required by 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714). Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-82-16, 16 NRC 44, 45 (1982), citing BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Where critical information has been submitted to the NRC under a claim of confidentiality and was not available to the petitioners when framing their issues, the Commission has deemed it appropriate to defer ruling on the admissibility of an issue until the petitioner has had an opportunity to review this information and submit a properly documented issue. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000).

### 2.10.3.2 Defects in Pleadings

Although the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309 must ultimately be met, every benefit of the doubt should be given to the potential intervenor in order to obviate dismissal of an intervention petition because of inarticulate draftsmanship or procedural or pleading defects. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-8, 39 NRC 116 (1994). As such, petitioners will usually be permitted to amend petitions containing curable defects. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-146, 6 AEC 631 (1973). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 40 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 195 (1991); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 15 (1994). A Licensing Board itself has no duty to recast contentions offered by a petitioner to make them acceptable under the regulations. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 406 (1974); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1660 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-4, 49 NRC 185, 197 (1999).

Pro se petitioners will be held to less rigid standards of clarity and precision with regard to the petition to intervene. Nevertheless, a totally deficient petition will be rejected. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-136, 6 AEC 487, 489 (1973).

The value of having local governments participate in proceedings can justify holding local government intervention petitioners to less stringent pleading standards than those to which an ordinary petitioner would be held. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 69-70 (2005).

The obvious intent of the procedural requirements on contentions is to ensure the identification of bona fide litigative issues. A concern has been expressed in Commission adjudicatory directives about not utilizing pleading "niceties" to exclude parties who have a clear, albeit imperfectly stated, interest. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-8, 39 NRC 116, 120 (1994), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 649 (1979). Parties who appear before the Commission bear responsibility for any possible misapprehension of their position caused by the inadequacies of their briefs. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 143 n.17 (1993).

Where a petitioner has not expressly requested a hearing on its petition, but where it seems clear from the petition as a whole that a hearing is what the petitioner desires, the Commission will not dismiss that petition solely on the basis of such a technical pleading defect. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 5 (1996).

Petitioners must follow NRC requirements in filing pleadings seeking a hearing. For an organization, these include a statement as to whom it represents, a sworn



statement as to where the represented individuals reside or how far they reside from the alleged threat, and a plausible scenario concerning how they may suffer health or safety consequences. International Uranium Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-12, 46 NRC 1, 6 (1997).

The Commission does not consider the exceeding of a page limit to be an error so great that it merits sanctioning especially when the offending counsel immediately corrected the error once attention was brought to it. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 244 (2000).

Intervention petitions and requests for hearing cannot properly raise antitrust issues and health and safety issues in the same proceedings. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-1, 13 NRC 27, 32 (1981).

### **2.10.3.3 Time Limits/Late Petitions**

The Commission's regulations at 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)) provide that nontimely filings of petitions to participate as a party will not be entertained absent a determination that the petition should be granted based upon a balancing of eight (previously five) factors. (See 2.10.3.3.3 for the factors). The factors involving the availability of other means to protect petitioner's interest and the ability of other parties to represent petitioner's interest are entitled to less weight than the other factors. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-92, 16 NRC 1376, 1381, 1384 (1982); Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 887 (1984), citing Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1767 (1982). See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 74 (1992).

If the lateness of a Petition to intervene is not egregious, and will not cause substantial delay to the parties, those considerations will outweigh the fact that the balance of the factors required under 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) tips slightly against the petitioner. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-74, 16 NRC 981, 985 (1982), citing Duke Power Co. (Amendment to Materials License SNM - 1773 - Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 150 (1979).

It is within the presiding officer's discretion to permit an intervenor to make a belated lateness showing. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54, aff'd on other grounds, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

The exclusion from a proceeding of persons or organizations who have slept on their rights does not offend any public policy favoring broad citizen involvement in nuclear licensing adjudications. Assuming that such a policy finds footing in Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a), it must be viewed in conjunction with the equally important policy favoring the observance of established time limits. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 396 n.37 (1983).

Late intervention is possible until issuance of a full-power license. Therefore, issuance of a low-power license does not bar late intervention. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 160 (1993).

A person seeking a discretionary hearing after the expiration of the time period for filing intervention petitions should either address the late intervention and reopening criteria or explain why they do not apply. Texas Utilities Electric Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1, 3-4 (1993).

Presentation of new arguments in support of contentions at a prehearing conference improper and may be barred on lateness grounds. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 476 (2006).

#### **2.10.3.3.1 Time for Filing Intervention Petitions**

A Person cannot intervene in a proceeding before the issuance of a "notice of hearing" or a "notice of proposed action," which is a prerequisite to the initiation of a proceeding. Petitions filed prior to this issuance are "clearly premature" and may be rejected by the Secretary. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-12, 59 NRC 237, 239-40 (2004).

With regard to antitrust matters, petitions to intervene or requests for hearing must be filed not later than the time specified in the notice for hearing or as provided by the Commission, the presiding officer or the Licensing Board designated to rule on petitions and/or requests for hearing, or as provided in 10 CFR § 2.102(d)(3); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42, 18 NRC 112, 116 (1983).

For an intervenor who wishes to become a party to a hearing to protect its interest in seeing that the Staff enforcement order challenged in a proceeding is sustained, the matter adversely affecting the petitioner's interest is not the "order," with which it agrees, but the agency's "proceeding" relative to that order, which carries the potential for overturning or modifying the order in derogation of the petitioner's interest. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54; aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

The filing of an intervention petition is considered complete on the date it is deposited in the mail, not when it is actually postmarked. 10 CFR § 2.302(c) (formerly 2.701(c)). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 205-206 (1992).

The award of an operating license effectively terminates the operating license proceeding and any construction permit amendment proceedings. Anyone who subsequently challenges the issuance of the operating license or seeks the suspension of the license should not file a petition for late intervention, but instead, must file a petition, 10 CFR § 2.206, requesting that the Commission initiate enforcement action pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 67, 77-78 (1992). Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam

Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 160 (1993); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 36 n.4 (2006).

#### **2.10.3.3.1.A Timeliness of Amendments to Intervention Petitions**

On issues arising under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), a petitioner must file contentions based on the applicant's environmental report, but may amend its contentions or file new contentions pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii) if there are data or conclusions in the draft or final environmental impact statements that are significantly different from the data or conclusions in the applicant's documents. By definition, an amended contention may include additional issues outside the scope of the contention as originally admitted. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-20, 62 NRC 523, 533 (2005).

#### **2.10.3.3.2 Sufficiency of Notice of Time Limits on Intervention**

Although the Appeal Board has stated that it would leave open the question as to whether Federal Register notice without more is adequate to put a potential intervenor on notice for filing intervention petitions, Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-148, 6 AEC 642, 643 n.2 (1973), the Board tacitly assumed that such notice was sufficient in Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-341, 4 NRC 95 (1976) (claims by petitioner that there was a "press blackout" and that he was unaware of Commission rules requiring timely intervention will not excuse untimely petition for leave to intervene).

Publication of notice in the Federal Register is deemed notice to all. Once notice is published, no party or potential intervenor may claim ignorance of the contents of the notice, including time limits. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-03-24, 58 NRC 383, 389 (2003).

If the only agency issuance providing constructive notice of a filing deadline for hearing requests is a Staff enforcement order issued in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.202(a)(3) that, by its terms, is not applicable to persons who wish to intervene in support of the order, then an intervention petition filed by such a person cannot be deemed untimely for failing to meet an appropriately noticed filing deadline. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54; aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

Even though there is no Federal Register notice of an amendment application, the fact the amendment was placed in a local public document room (LPDR) created for a facility provides an enhanced opportunity for access to licensing information that should be taken into account in analyzing the timeliness of an intervention petition. It is reasonable to expect that, from time to time, those in the area of the facility who may have an interest in the proceeding, would visit the LPDR to check on its status. At the same time, nonparty status to a proceeding is a pertinent factor in assessing the frequency of such visits. A non party would not be expected to visit the LPDR as often as a party given the need to travel to

the LPDR in order to see the files. With this in mind, one LPDR trip a month by a nonparty to monitor a proceeding seems reasonable. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-3, 49 NRC 40, 47 (1999).

There is nothing in either the Commission's Rules of Practice or its jurisprudence that empowers members of its Staff to breathe new life into an opportunity for hearing that is already confronted with the passage of the filing deadline that established that opportunity. General Electric Co. (Vallecitos Nuclear Center), LBP-00-3, 51 NRC 49, 50 (2000).

### **2.10.3.3 Consideration of Untimely Petitions to Intervene**

Section 10 CFR 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)) provides that nontimely petitions to intervene or requests for hearing will not be considered absent a determination that the petition or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the following factors:

- (1) good cause, if any, for failure to file on time;
- (2) the nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding;
- (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial or other interest in the proceeding;
- (4) the possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest;
- (5) the availability of other means for protecting the petitioner's interests;
- (6) the extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties;
- (7) the extent to which petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding; and
- (8) the extent to which petitioner's participation might reasonably assist in developing a sound record.

Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-74, 16 NRC 981, 984 (1982); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-82-96, 16 NRC 1408, 1429 (1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 331 n.3 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 390 n.3 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.309 (c); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1170 n.3 (1983); Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 883 (1984); General Electric Co. (GETR Vallecitos), LBP-84-54, 20 NRC 1637, 1643-1644 (1984); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-24, 22 NRC 97, 98 n.3 (1985), affirmed, ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-9, 23 NRC 273, 278 n.6 (1986); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605, 608-609 (1988), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348 (1989), aff'd sub nom., Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1990); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 76 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co.

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 246-47, 253-54 (1991), aff'd in part on other grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 69 (1992); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-3, 49 NRC 40, 46 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-8, 51 NRC 146, 153 (2000); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-03-23, 58 NRC 372, 378 (2003); Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-22, 64 NRC 229, 234 n. 7 (2006).

The Commission can summarily reject a petition for late intervention that fails to address the eight factor test set forth in 10 CFR § 2.309 (a)(1)(i)-(viii) or the standing requirements in 10 CFR § 2.309(d)(1) (formerly 2.714(d)(1)). Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-11, 37 NRC 251, 255 (1993); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 281-282 (2000). See also Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 33-34 (2006) (failure to comply with pleading requirements for late filings constitutes sufficient grounds for rejecting intervention and hearing requests).

The burden of proof is on the petitioner. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-16, 51 NRC 320, 325 (2000). Thus, a person who files an untimely intervention petition must affirmatively address the [eight] lateness factors in his petition, regardless of whether any other parties in the proceeding raise the tardiness issue. Even if the other parties waive the tardiness of the petition, a Board, on its own initiative, will review the petition and weigh the [eight] lateness factors. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461, 466 n.22 (1985).

A late petitioner's obligation to affirmatively address the [eight] lateness factors is not affected by the extent of the tardiness. However, the length of the delay, whether measured in days or years, may influence a Board's assessment of the lateness factors. Pilgrim, supra, ALAB-816, 22 NRC at 468 n.27.

A late petitioner who fails to address the [eight] lateness factors in his petition does not have a right to a second opportunity to make a substantial showing on the lateness factors. However, a Board, as a matter of discretion, may give a late petitioner such an opportunity. Pilgrim, supra, 22 NRC at 468.

A late intervenor may be required to take the proceeding as it finds it. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 402 (1983), citing Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 276 (1975). Licensing Boards have very broad discretion in their approach to the balancing process required under 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)). Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North

Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98 (1976). Given this wide latitude with regard to untimely petitions to intervene, a Licensing Board has the discretion to permit intervention, even though an acceptable excuse for the untimely filing is not forthcoming, if other considerations warrant its doing so. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8, 22 (1977).

A Licensing Board has no latitude to admit a new party, i.e., an "eleventh hour" intervenor, to a proceeding as the hearing date approaches in circumstances where: (1) the extreme tardiness in seeking intervention is unjustified; (2) the certain or likely consequence would be prejudice to other parties as well as delaying the progress of the proceeding, particularly attributable to the broadening of issues; and (3) the substantiality of the contribution to the development of the record which might be made by that party is problematic. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-643, 13 NRC 898, 900 (1981). See also Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 82-83 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991).

The [eight] (formerly five) factors listed in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)) are to be considered in determining whether to allow late intervention. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-671, 15 NRC 508, 509 (1982); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-54, 16 NRC 210, 213-214 (1982); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348, 353 (1989). Newly acquired standing by moving to the vicinity of a plant is not alone enough to justify belated intervention. Nor does being articulate show a contribution can be made in developing the record. Other parties having the same interest weigh against allowing late intervention. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-582, 11 NRC 239, 241 (1980).

A petitioner whose late-filed petition to intervene has met the [eight]-part test of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c)(1) need not meet any further late-filing qualifications to have its contentions admitted. It is not to be treated differently than a petitioner whose petition to intervene was timely filed. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), LBP-84-17A, 19 NRC 1011, 1015 (1984).

The key policy consideration for barring late intervenors is one of fairness, viz., "the public interest in the timely and orderly conduct of our proceedings." Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 648-649 (1979), citing Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 275 (1975).

Non-parties, participating under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)), need not comply with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) that mandate that intervenors either file their contentions in a timely fashion or show cause for their late intervention. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 688 (1981).

While the late filing of documents is not condoned, a petitioner acting pro se is not always expected to meet the same high standards to which the Commission holds entities represented by lawyers. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-01-8, 53 NRC 204, 207-208 (2001). See also Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-14, 63 NRC 568, 581 (2006).

Until the parties to a proceeding that oppose a late intervention petition suggest another forum that appears to promise a full hearing on the claims petitioner seeks to raise, a petitioner need not identify and particularize other remedies as inadequate. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1767 n.6 (1982).

A Commission direction to the presiding officer to consider the admissibility of a particular late-filed matter does not preclude the presiding officer from giving the same consideration to other late-filed information submitted by a petitioner relevant to that matter. Cf. Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-526, 9 NRC 122, 124 (1979) (in remand proceeding on management capability issue, additional petitioners' attempt to seek late intervention to participate on that issue must be assessed under late-intervention criteria). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 24 (1996).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1), even if a late filing intervenor cannot show good cause for the late filing, the Board must still balance all of the relevant factors to determine whether the late-filed petition should be granted. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 65 (2005).

Where no good excuse is tendered for the tardiness, the petitioner's demonstration on the other factors must be particularly strong. Duke Power Company (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), ALAB-431, 6 NRC 460, 462 (1977) and cases there cited. See also Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 887 (1984); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 577 (1982), citing Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. and New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 275 (1975). Absent a showing of good cause for late filing, an intervention petitioner must make a "compelling showing" on the other factors stated in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) governing late intervention. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982), citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 894 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Fairfield United Action v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605, 610 (1988), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348 (1989), aff'd sub nom., Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1990); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 246-47 (1991), aff'd in part on other

grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 73-75 (1992). Petitioner satisfies the [fifth] and [sixth] parts of the [eight] late intervention criteria in 10 CFR § 2.309 (c)(1)(i)-(viii) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v)) when there is currently no proceeding, assuming arguendo that the petitioner has standing, because there will generally be no other means by which that petitioner can protect its interest and because there is currently no proceeding, there will be no other party to represent petitioner's interest. See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 165 (1993); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-03-23, 58 NRC 372, 378 (2003).

In determining how compelling a showing a petitioner must make on the other factors, a Licensing Board need not attach the same significance to a delay of months as to a delay involving a number of years. The significance of the tardiness, whether measured in months or years, will generally depend on the posture of the proceeding at the time the petition surfaces. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1173 (1983), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 398-399 (1983). See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-92-19, 36 NRC 98, 106 (1992).

A satisfactory explanation for failure to file on time does not automatically warrant the acceptance of a late-filed intervention petition. The additional factors specified under 10 CFR § 2.309(c) must also be considered. However, where a late filing of an intervention petition has been satisfactorily explained, a much smaller demonstration with regard to the other factors of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) is necessary than would otherwise be the case. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-78-24, 8 NRC 78, 83 (1978).

A party who was dismissed from a proceeding for failing to respond, without good cause, to Board orders reactivating the proceeding, must satisfy the criteria for untimely petitions to intervene in order to be readmitted. General Electric Co. (GETR Vallecitos), LBP-84-54, 20 NRC 1637, 1642-1643 (1984).

Because the participation of a late-filing local government petitioner was expected to be particularly valuable to the proceedings, the Board found the balance of factors to favor allowing the local government to intervene despite the local government's inability to show good cause for the delay. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 68-69 (2005).

[Note: Section 2.309 requires that the petition to intervene or request for hearing include a specification of the contentions that the petitioner proposes for litigation. This differs from the former provisions of Part 2 that permitted a petitioner to file a supplement to his or her petition to intervene with a list of contentions which the petitioner sought to have litigated in the hearing. The new practice of requiring contentions to be filed at time of the petition/request does not obviate the concept of late-filed contentions discussed in section 2.10.5.5.



### 2.10.3.3.3.A Factor #1—Good Cause for Late Filing

Good cause for the petitioner's late filing is the first, and most important element of 2.309 (c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-2, 51 NRC 77, 79 (2000); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 NRC 551, 564 (2005).

It has been held that even if a petitioner fails to establish good cause for the untimely petition, the other factors must be examined, Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631 (1975), although the burden of justifying intervention on the basis of the other factors is considered to be greater when the petitioner fails to show good cause. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273 (1975); USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383 (1976); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-289, 1 NRC 395, 398 (1975); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-9, 23 NRC 273, 279 (1986); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-26, 36 NRC 191 (1992).

The first factor of those specified in 10 CFR § 2.309 (c)(1) is whether there exists "good cause, if any, for the failure to file on time." Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-595, 11 NRC 860, 862 (1980). In considering the "good cause" factor, the Appeal Board pointed out that a strong excuse for lateness will attenuate the showing necessary on the other factors of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c). Puget Sound Power & Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-523, 9 NRC 58, 63 (1979). See also Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8, 22 (1977), affirmed, CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939 (1978).

The first and principal test for late intervention is whether a petitioner has demonstrated "good cause" for filing late. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-3, 49 NRC 40, 49 (1999). In addressing the good-cause factor, a petitioner must explain not only why it failed to file within the time required, but also why it did not file as soon thereafter as possible. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322 (1994). Lacking a demonstration of "good cause" for lateness, a petitioner is bound to make a compelling showing that the remaining factors nevertheless weigh in favor of granting the late intervention and hearing request. 39 NRC at 329.

The burden of showing good cause is on the late petitioner. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-82-96, 16 NRC 1408, 1432 (1982).

Although a concrete definition as to what constitutes "good cause" has not been established, certain excuses for delay have been held to be insufficient to justify late filing. For example, in Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station, Unit 2), LBP-74-63, 8 AEC 330 (1974), aff'd, ALAB-238, 8 AEC 656 (1974), it was held that neither the fact that the corporate citizens' group seeking to intervene was not chartered prior to the cutoff date for filing, nor the fact that the applicant changed its application by dropping one of the two units it intended to build, gave good cause for late filing. Similarly, claims by a petitioner that there was a "press blackout" and that he was unaware of the Commission's rules requiring timely intervention will not excuse an untimely petition for leave to intervene. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-341, 4 NRC 95 (1976), nor will failure to read the Federal Register. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-11, 13 NRC 420, 423 (1981), citing New England Power and Light Co. (NEP Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-18, 7 NRC 932, 933-934 (1978); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 79 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991). Similarly a petitioner's failure to read carefully the governing procedural regulations does not constitute good cause for accepting a late-filed petition. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 223 (1999). See also Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 33 (2006) (late-filed because petitioner initially believed another agency was the appropriate forum). The showing of good cause is required even though a petitioner seeks to substitute itself for another party. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 796 (1977).

Licensing Boards and Appeal Boards have both considered various excuses to determine whether they constitute "good cause." Newly-acquired organizational existence does not constitute good cause for delay in seeking intervention. Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-526, 9 NRC 122, 124 (1979), cited in Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570 (1980) and South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-11, 13 NRC 420, 423 (1981); and Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 887 (1984); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 80-81 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991). Nor does preoccupation with other matters afford a basis for excusing a nontimely petition to intervene. Poor judgment or imprudence is not good cause for late filing. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-16, 9 NRC 711, 714 (1979). The Appeal Board did not accept as an excuse for late intervention the claim that petitioner, a college organization, could not meet an August petition deadline because most of its members were away from school during the summer and hence unaware of developments in the case. Such a consideration does not relieve an organization from making the necessary arrangements to insure that its interest is protected in its members' absence.

On the other hand, new regulatory developments and the availability of new information may constitute good cause for delay in seeking intervention. Duke Power Company (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 -- Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 148-149 (1979). See also Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570, 572-573 (1980).

In evaluating intervention petitions to determine whether the requisite specificity exists, whether there has been an adequate delineation of the basis for the contentions, and whether the issues sought to be raised are cognizable in an individual licensing proceeding, Licensing Boards will not appraise the merits of any of the assertions contained in the petition. But when considering untimely petitions, Licensing Boards are required to assess whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of good cause for failure to file on time. In doing so, Boards must necessarily consider the merits of claims going to that issue. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 948-949 (1978).

The availability of new information may provide good cause for late intervention. The test is when the information became available and when the petitioner reasonably should have become aware of the information. The petitioner must establish that 1) the information is new and could not have been presented earlier, and 2) the petitioner acted promptly after learning of the new information. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 69-73(1992). See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 164-65 (1993). Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-22, 64 NRC 229, 234 (2006).

Newly arising information has long been recognized as providing "good cause" for acceptance of a late contention. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 577 (1982), citing Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. (Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-72-75, 5 AEC 13, 14 (1972); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570, 574 (1980), appeal dismissed, ALAB-595, 11 NRC 860 (1980). Before admitting a contention based on new information, factors must be balanced such as the intervenor's ability to contribute to the record on the contention and the likelihood and effects of delay should the contention be admitted. However, in balancing those factors, the same weight given to each of them is not required. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 577 (1982), citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895 (1981).

The Licensing Board will not accept a petitioner's claim of excuse for late intervention where the petitioner failed to uncover and apply publicly available information in a timely manner. Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 886 (1984), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42,

18 NRC 112, 117, aff'd, ALAB-743, 18 NRC 38i (1983); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 79 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991).

Confusing and misleading letters from the Staff to a prospective pro se petitioner for intervention, and failure of the Staff to respond in a timely fashion to certain communications from such a petitioner, constitute a strong showing of good cause for an untimely petition. Wisconsin Public Service Corporation (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-78-24, 8 NRC 78, 81-82 (1978). And where petitioner relied to its detriment on Staff's representations that no action would be immediately taken on licensee's application for renewal, elementary fairness requires that the action of the Staff could be asserted as an estoppel on the issue of timeliness of petition to intervene, and the petition must be considered even after the license has been issued. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (Cobalt-60 Storage Facility), LBP-82-24, 15 NRC 652, 658 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, ALAB-682, 16 NRC 150 (1982).

Petitioners proceeding pro se will be shown greater leeway on the question of whether they have demonstrated good cause for lateness than petitioners represented by counsel. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), LBP-03-23, 58 NRC 372, 378 (2003).

A petitioner's claim that it was lulled into inaction because it relied upon the State, which later withdrew, to represent its interests does not constitute good cause for an untimely petition. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 796 (1977). See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605, 609 (1988), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348 (1989), aff'd sub nom., Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1990). A petitioner who has relied upon a State participating pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.315 (c) (formerly 2.715(c)) to represent her interests in a proceeding cannot rely on her dissatisfaction with the State's performance as a valid excuse for a late-filed intervention petition where no claim is made that the State undertook to represent her interests specifically, as opposed to the public interest generally. Duke Power Company (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-440, 6 NRC 642 (1977). See also South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-11, 13 NRC 420, 423 (1981); Comanche Peak, supra, 28 NRC at 610 (a petitioner's previous reliance on another party to assert its interests does not by itself constitute good cause), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348 (1989), aff'd sub nom., Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1990); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 80 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991). Nor will an explanation that full-time domestic and other responsibilities was the reason for filing an intervention petition almost three years late suffice. Cherokee, supra.

Just as a petitioner may not rely upon interests being represented by another party and then justify an untimely petition to intervene on the others' withdrawal, so a petitioner may not rely on the pendency of another

proceeding to protect its interests and then justify a late petition on that reliance when the other petition fails to represent those interests. A claim that petitioner believed that its concerns would be addressed in another proceeding will not be considered good cause. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), LBP-82-1, 15 NRC 37, 39-40 (1982); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-117B, 16 NRC 2024, 2027 (1982). It must be established that petitioners were furnished erroneous information on matters of basic fact and that it was reliance upon that information that prompted their own inaction. Palo Verde, supra, 16 NRC at 2027-2028.

Employees of an applicant or licensee are not exempt from the Commission's procedural rules. Thus, an employee's mere assertions of fears of retaliation from the employer do not establish good cause for late intervention. To encourage employees to raise potentially significant safety concerns or information, Section 211 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a), prohibits employer retaliation against any employee who commences or participates in any manner in an NRC proceeding. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 77-79 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991).

Absent a showing of good cause for a very late filing, an intervention petitioner must make a "compelling showing" on the other factors stated in 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)) governing late intervention. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982), citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 894 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Fairfield United Action v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 246-47 (1991), aff'd in part on other grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 73-75 (1992). See also Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1764 (1982), citing Grand Gulf, supra, 16 NRC at 1730; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB 743, 18 NRC 387, 397 (1983); General Electric Co. (GETR Vallecitos), LBP-84-54, 20 NRC 1637, 1645 (1984); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 207 (1993); State of New Jersey (Department of Law and Public Safety's Requests Dated October 8, 1993), CLI-93-25, 38 NRC 289, 296-97 (1993); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-8, 51 NRC 146, 154 (2000); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-14, 51 NRC 301, 310 (2000).

A petitioner who fails to show good cause for filing late may not always be required to make a compelling showing on the four remaining factors of 10 CFR § 2.309(c). Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-92-19, 36 NRC 98, 105-106 (1992).

The “good cause” element of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)) was deemed fulfilled when the counsel for the intervening party demonstrated by a careful accounting of her schedule that she submitted the pleading in question within a reasonable amount of time. The licensing board particularly noted the late date on which the Staff provided the intervenors with needed documents, and the busy schedule of counsel. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-19, 52 NRC 85, 92 (2000).

A local government trying to show good cause for late filing an intervention petition cannot successfully argue that it had no constructive notice of the proposed license transfers at issue, where its legislature had already demonstrated through legislative action that it had early actual notice of the proposed transfer. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 65 (2005).

**2.10.3.3.3.B Factor #2-Nature of the Requestor’s/Petitioner’s Right Under the Act to Be Made a Party to the Proceeding**

[Reserved]

**2.10.3.3.3.C Factor #3-Nature and Extent of the Requestor’s/Petitioner Property, Financial or Other Interest in the Proceeding**

[Reserved]

**2.10.3.3.3.D Factor #4-Possible Effect of Any Order That May Be Entered in the Proceeding on the Requestor’s/Petitioner’s Interest**

[Reserved]

**2.10.3.3.3.E Factor #5–Other Means for Protecting Petitioner’s Interests**

With regard to the fifth factor - other means to protect petitioner's interest - the question is not whether other parties will adequately protect the interest of the petitioner, but whether there are other available means whereby the petitioner can itself protect its interest. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631 (1975).

The fifth factor in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) points away from allowing late intervention if the interest which the petitioner asserts can be protected by some means other than litigation. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-82-96, 16 NRC 1408, 1433 (1982).

The fifth factor in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)), whether other means exist to protect the petitioner’s interests, was not satisfied when the petitioner was able to take his concerns to a state judicial forum and was able to voice his concerns in a separate NRC licensing proceeding. Private Fuel

Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-23, 52 NRC 114, 121-122 (2000).

The suggestion that an organization could adequately protect its interest by submitting a limited appearance statement gives insufficient regard to the value of participational rights enjoyed by parties - including the entitlement to present evidence and to engage in cross-examination. Similarly, assertions that the organization might adequately protect its interest by making witnesses available to a successful petitioner or by transmitting information in its possession to appropriate State and local officials are without merit. Duke Power Company (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 -- Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 150 n.7 (1979).

A petition under 10 CFR § 2.206 for a show cause proceeding is not an adequate alternative means of protecting a late petitioner's interests. The Section 2.206 remedy cannot substitute for the petitioner's participation in an adjudicatory proceeding concerned with the grant or denial ab initio of an application for an operating license. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1175-1176 (1983). See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 81 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 495-96 (1991). After all, despite the long history of §2.206, the number of successful petitions brought under that section is extremely small. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 67 (2005).

Participation of the NRC Staff in a licensing proceeding is not equivalent to participation by a private intervenor. WPPSS, id. By analogy, the availability of nonadjudicatory Staff review outside the hearing process generally does not constitute adequate protection of a private party's rights when considering factor [five] under 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)). Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 384 n.108 (1985). But see Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 21-22 (1986).

#### **2.10.3.3.F Factor #6—Extent Petitioner's Interests Will Be Represented By Existing Parties**

With regard to the [sixth] factor of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)), the extent to which petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties, the fact that a successful petitioner has advanced a contention concededly akin to that of a late petitioner does not necessarily mean that the successful petitioner is both willing and able to represent the late petitioner's interest. Duke Power Company (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 - Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 150 (1979). See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-92-19, 36 NRC 98, 109 (1992).

The Licensing Board in Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP-79-21, 10 NRC 183, 195 (1979) has expressed the view that NRC practice has failed to provide a clear cut answer to the question of whether the [sixth] factor, the extent to which the petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties, is applicable when there are no intervening parties and no petitioners other than the latecomer, and a hearing will not be held if the late petitioner is denied leave to intervene. The Licensing Board reviewed past Licensing Board decisions on this question:

- (1) In St. Lucie and Turkey Point the Licensing Board decided that the [sixth] factor was not directly applicable, noting that without the petitioner's admission there would be no other party to protect petitioner's interest. Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 and Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4), LBP-77-23, 5 NRC 789, 800 (1977).
- (2) In Summer the Licensing Board acknowledged uncertainty as to the applicability of factor [six], but indicated that if the factor were applicable it would be given no weight because of the particular circumstances of that case. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-78-6, 7 NRC 209, 213-214 (1978).
- (3) In Kewaunee, the Board concluded that petitioners' interest would not be represented absent a hearing and decided that the [sixth] factor weighed in favor of admitting them as intervenors. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-78-24, 8 NRC 78, 84 (1978).

The Licensing Board ultimately ruled that the Commission intended that all [eight] factors of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c) (formerly 2.714(a)) should be balanced in every case involving an untimely petition. Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Units 3 and 4), LBP-79-21, 10 NRC 183, 195 (1979). The Board also ruled that in the circumstances where denial of a late petition would result in no hearing and no parties to protect the petitioner's interest, the question, "To what extent will Petitioners' interest be represented by existing parties?" must be answered, "None." The [sixth] factor therefore, was held to weigh in favor of the late petitioners. Id.

In balancing the factors in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)), the Licensing Board may take into account the petitioner's governmental nature as it affects the extent to which petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties, although the petitioner's governmental status in and of itself will not excuse untimely petitions to intervene. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20 (1976).

A local government's overriding, paramount interest in, and responsibility for, emergencies that impact its territory mean that a private party cannot "represent" that government's interest in emergency planning by filing an



emergency planning contention of its own. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 67-68 (2005).

In weighing the [sixth] factor, a board will not assume that the interests of a late petitioner will be adequately represented by the NRC Staff. The general public interest, as interpreted by the Staff, may often conflict with a late petitioner's private interests or perceptions of the public interest. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1174-1175 n.22 (1983). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-80, 18 NRC 1404, 1407-1408 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-9, 23 NRC 273, 279 (1986). Contra Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2), LBP-82-1, 15 NRC 37, 41 (1982). However, the fact that it is likely that no one will represent a petitioner's perspective if its hearing request is denied is in itself insufficient for the Commission to excuse the untimeliness of the request. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 329 (1994).

#### **2.10.3.3.3.G Factor #7—Extent Participation Will Broaden Issues or Delay the Proceeding**

The seventh factor of 10 CFR § 2.309 (c)(1), potential for delay, is also of immense importance in the overall balancing process. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 402 (1983). While this factor is particularly significant, it is not dispositive. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383 (1976). In considering the factor of delay, the magnitude of threatened delay must be weighed since not every delay is intolerable. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-9, 5 NRC 474 (1977). In addition, in deciding whether petitioners' participation would broaden the issues or delay the proceeding, it is proper for the Licensing Board to consider that the petitioners agreed to allow issuance of the construction permit before their antitrust contentions were heard, thereby eliminating any need to hold up plant construction pending resolution of those contentions. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8, 23 (1977).

An untimely intervention petition need not introduce an entirely new subject matter in order to "broaden the issues" for the purposes of 10 CFR § 2.309(c); expansion of issues already admitted to the proceeding also qualifies. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 891 (1981).

The mere fact that a late petitioner will not cause additional delay or a broadening of the issue does not mean that an untimely petition should necessarily be granted. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 798 (1977). However, from the standpoint of precluding intervention, the delay factor is extremely important and the later the petition to intervene, the more likely it is that the petitioner's participation

will result in delay. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-476, 7 NRC 759, 762 (1978). The question is whether, by filing late, the petitioner has occasioned a potential for delay in the completion of the proceeding that would not have been present had the filing been timely. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1180 (1983).

In the instance of a very late petition, the strength or weakness of the tendered justification may thus prove crucial. The greater the tardiness, the greater the likelihood that the addition of a new party will delay the proceeding -- e.g., by occasioning the relitigation of issues already tried. Although the delay factor may not be conclusive, it is an especially weighty one. Project Management Corporation (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 394-95 (1976); Puget Sound Power & Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-552, 10 NRC 1, 5 (1979).

The [seventh] factor includes only that delay which can be attributed directly to the tardiness of the petition. Jamesport, supra, ALAB-292, 2 NRC at 631; South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-11, 13 NRC 420, 425 (1981).

Where there is no pending proceeding, the [seventh] factor for late intervention, the potential for delay if the petition is granted, weighs heavily against petitioner because granting the request will result in the establishment of an entirely new formal proceeding, not just the alteration of an already established hearing schedule. See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 167 (1993).

Holding a hearing on an export license application at a point when the NRC has had in its hands for two months the views of the Executive Branch that the proposed export would not be inimical to the common defense and security would undoubtedly "broaden" the issues and substantially "delay" the Commission's final decision on the fuel export application. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 330 (1994).

Where there is little practical value to be gained from expediting the proceeding, the fact that a participant's participation would "broaden the issues" or "delay the proceeding" is less significant. Thus, in a license renewal proceeding where the existing license will not expire for over a decade and where the Staff's safety review is still several months from its due date for completion, the broadening/delaying factor carried only minimal weight. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 68 (2005).

#### **2.10.3.3.3.H Factor #8--Ability of Petitioner to Assist in Developing Record**

When an intervention petitioner addresses the 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(viii) (formerly 2.714(a)(3)) criterion for late intervention requiring a showing of how its participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record, it should set out with as much particularity as possible the precise issues it plans to cover, identify its prospective witnesses, and summarize their proposed testimony. See generally South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 894 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Fairfield United Action v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-12, 28 NRC 605, 611 (1988), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Citizens for Fair Utility Regulation v. NRC, 898 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1990); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 74-75 (1992). Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 165-66 (1993).

It is the petitioner's ability to contribute sound evidence rather than asserted legal skills that is of significance in determining whether the petitioner would contribute to the development of a sound record. Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-17, 19 NRC 878, 888 (1984), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-671, 15 NRC 508, 513 n.14 (1982).

Vague assertions regarding petitioner's ability or resources are insufficient. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1766 (1982), citing Grand Gulf, supra, 16 NRC at 1730.

As to the [eight] factor with regard to "assistance in developing the record," a late petitioner placing heavy reliance on this factor and claiming that it has substantial technical expertise in this regard should present a bill of particulars in support of such a claim. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-476, 7 NRC 759, 764 (1978). At the same time, it is not necessary that a petitioner have some specialized education, relevant experience or ability to offer qualified experts for a favorable finding on this factor to be made. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-78-6, 7 NRC 209, 212-213 (1978).

The ability to contribute to the development of a sound record is an even more important factor in cases where the grant or denial of the petition will also decide whether there will be any adjudicatory hearing. There is no reason to grant an inexcusably late intervention petition unless there is cause to believe that the petitioner not only proposes to raise at least one substantial safety or environmental issue, but is also able to make a worthwhile contribution on it. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1180-1181 (1983). See also Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1422 (1977).

When determining a late-filing petitioner's ability to assist in developing the adjudicatory record, the Board should look at not only the petitioner's initial petition, but also any subsequent filings or oral demonstrations by the petitioner the indicating a commitment to participate and contribute. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 68 (2005).

#### **2.10.3.3.4 Appeals from Rulings on Late Intervention**

Two considerations play key roles in deliberations on appeals from rulings on untimely intervention. The first is the Commission's admonition in Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 275 (1975), that 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)) was purposely drafted with the idea of "giving the Licensing Boards broad discretion in the circumstances of individual cases." Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1171 (1983). See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 395-396 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995, 1000 n.13 (1984). Consequently, a decision granting a tardy intervention petition will be reversed only where it can fairly be said that the Licensing Board's action was an abuse of the discretion conferred by Section 2.309(c). Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98 (1976). The second consideration flows from the principle that the propriety of the Board's action must be measured against the backdrop of the record made by the parties before it. Accordingly, on review the facts recounted in the papers supporting the petition to intervene must be credited to the extent that they deal with the merits of the issues. Insofar as the facts relate to the excuse for untimely filing, where they are not controverted by opposing affidavits they must be taken as true. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8, 13 (1977). In view of all of this, the chances of overturning a Licensing Board's finding that intervention, although late, would be valuable are slight. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-223, 8 AEC 241 (1974).

On appeal, factual and legal components of the analysis underlying the Licensing Board's conclusion in reviewing Board decisions on untimely intervention petitions may be closely scrutinized. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 885 (1981).

Until a determination is made that intervenor has proffered a litigable contention, a presiding officer's ruling that the petitioner has established its standing is not so final as to be appealable under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly 2.714a). Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54; aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

In a decision vacating a Licensing Board's grant of late intervention because the grant was based on improper criteria, the Appeal Board refused to examine whether the petitioner had met the regulatory requirements for intervention (i.e.,

10 CFR § 2.309). Puget Sound Power & Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-523, 9 NRC 58, 63-64 (1979), petition for review denied, Puget Sound Power & Light Co. (Skagit Nuclear Project, Units 1 and 2), unreported, (January 16, 1980).

#### **2.10.3.3.5 Mootness of Petitions to Intervene**

Where the Commission was in the process of ruling on an untimely petition to intervene, when the applicant moved to amend its application and conclude the proceeding, the petition to intervene was dismissed as moot. Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-34, 12 NRC 407, 408 (1980).

Mootness is not necessarily dependent upon a party's views that its claims have been satisfied but, rather, occurs when a justiciable controversy no longer exists. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-19\*, 42 NRC 191, 195 (1995).

Generally, the plain language of a contention will reveal whether the contention is (1) a claim of omission, (2) a specific substantive challenge to an application, or (3) a combination of both. In some cases, it may be necessary to examine the language of the contention bases to determine the scope of the contention. In the first situation, where a contention alleges the omission of particular information or an issue from an application, and the information is supplied later by the applicant, the contention is moot. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-16, 63 NRC 737, 742 (2006).

When a Licensing Board holds that the sole contention in a proceeding is moot, the mandatory disclosure process for that contention (10 C.F.R. §§ 2.336 and 2.1203) is terminated. *Id.* at 745.

#### **2.10.3.4 Amendment of Petition Expanding Scope of Intervention**

In order to expand the scope of a previously filed petition to intervene, an intervenor carries the burden of persuading the Licensing Board that the information upon which the expansion is based: (a) was objectively unavailable at the time the original petition was filed, and (b) had it been available, the petition's scope would have been broader. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-73-31, 6 AEC 717, appeal dismissed as interlocutory, ALAB-168, 6 AEC 1155 (1973).

#### **2.10.3.5 Withdrawal of Petition to Intervene**

Where only a single intervenor is party to a licensing proceeding, its withdrawal serves to bring the proceeding to an end. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Receipt of Material from Tonawanda, New York), LBP-00-11, 51 NRC 178, 180 (2000); Florida Power & Light, Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-91-13, 34 NRC 185, 188 n.1 (1999); Public Service Co. of Colorado (Fort St. Vrain Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation); Boston Edison Co. and Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-99-17, 49 NRC 372, 373 (1999). Where there is more than one intervenor in a case, the

withdrawal of one does not terminate the proceeding. However, according to NRC procedure, it does serve to eliminate the withdrawing party's contention from litigation. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 382 (1985). See also Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 391-92 (1976); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 430-31 (1990), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990). Accordingly, in the absence of prior timely adoption by another intervenor, those contentions can be preserved for further consideration only if an intervenor shows that the issues are admissible under the late-filing standards of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-6, 49 NRC 114, 118 (1999). Acceptance of contentions at the threshold stage of a licensing proceeding does not validate them as cognizable issues for litigation independent of their sponsoring intervenor. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-36, 14 NRC 1111, 1113-14 (1981); South Texas, *supra*, 21 NRC at 383; Seabrook, *supra*, 31 NRC at 430-31, aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990).

The test that should be applied to determine whether one intervenor may be permitted to adopt contentions that no longer have a sponsor when the sponsoring intervenor withdraws from the proceeding, is the [eight]-factor test ordinarily used to determine whether to grant a nontimely request for intervention, or to permit the introduction of additional contentions by an existing intervenor after the filing date. South Texas, *supra*, 21 NRC at 381-82. See 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)(1), (b)). For a detailed discussion of the [eight]-factor test, see Section 2.10.3.3.3)

A party that voluntarily withdraws from a proceeding that was later resolved by a settlement agreement must satisfy the late intervention standards before seeking to reopen the record of that proceeding. Texas Utilities Electric Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1 (1993)

Safety or environmental matters which may be left as outstanding issues by a withdrawing intervenor may be raised by a Board sua sponte or be subject to nonadjudicatory resolution by the NRC Staff. South Texas, *supra*, 21 NRC at 383 n.100. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units 1, 2, and 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 189-90 (1976).

Voluntary withdrawal of a petition to intervene is without prejudice to reinstate the petition, although reinstatement can only be done on a showing of good cause. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-73-41, 6 AEC 1057 (1973).

Where an intervenor withdraws from a proceeding with prejudice, an issue sponsored solely by that intervenor is also dismissed, but without prejudice. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decommissioning), LBP-00-30, 52 NRC 335, 362 (2000).

Where a lay person sought to withdraw both as an individual intervention petitioner and as the person on whom an organization relied for standing, a Licensing Board denied the motion to withdraw as the basis for the organization's standing in order to

give the petitioner an opportunity to reconsider, since granting the motion would lead to dismissal of the entire proceeding. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-16, 31 NRC 509, 514 (1990). The organizational intervenor was subsequently dismissed from the proceeding when the individual upon whom it relied for standing was terminated from his employment in the geographical zone of interest of the plant, thereby losing the basis for his standing. Although the organization earlier had been given ample opportunity to establish its standing on other grounds, it failed to do so. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-24, 32 NRC 12, 14-15 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521 (1991).

Although the Appeal Board in the South Texas proceeding was concerned that a blanket stricture on the later adoption of a withdrawing party's contentions would complicate litigation and settlement by encouraging "nominal" contention co-sponsorship at a proceeding's outset, see Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 384 (1985), that consideration is not implicated when, as is apparent from its previous late-filed pleading seeking to adopt all other Intervenor's contentions, an Intervenor sought early on to impose those complexities in this proceeding and failed to make the appropriate arguments. Under the circumstances, no reason exists to provide a second bite at the apple, especially when the Intervenor's ultimate justification is based on no more than the "trusted others to vigorously pursue" line of argument rejected in South Texas. See id. at 382-83. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-6, 49 NRC 114, 118 (1999).

#### **2.10.3.6 Intervention in Antitrust Proceedings**

In addition to meeting the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309, a petitioner seeking to intervene in an antitrust proceeding must:

- (1) describe the situation allegedly inconsistent with the antitrust laws which is the basis for intervention;
- (2) describe how that situation conflicts with the policies underlying the Sherman, Clayton or Federal Trade Commission Acts;
- (3) describe how that situation would be created or maintained by activities under the proposed license;
- (4) identify the relief sought; and
- (5) explain why the relief sought fails to be satisfied by license conditions proposed by the Department of Justice.

Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-1, 13 NRC 27, 32 (1981) (and cases cited therein). Note that for antitrust intervention, Catawba implies that the interest of a ratepayer or consumer of electricity may be within the zone of interests protected by Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act. The petitioner, however, must still demonstrate that an injury to its interests would be the proximate result of anticompetitive activities by the applicant or licensee and such injury must be more than remote and tenuous. Id. at 13 NRC 30-32; Wolf Creek, ALAB-279 supra.

The most critical requirement of an antitrust intervention petition is an explanation of how the activities under the license would create or maintain an anticompetitive situation. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-665,

15 NRC 22, 29 (1982), citing Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-279, 1 NRC 559, 574-575 (1975) and Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3), CLI-73-25, 6 AEC 619, 621 (1973).

When neither the Attorney General nor the NRC Staff has discerned antitrust problems warranting review under Section 105c of the AEA, potential antitrust problems must be shown with reasonable clarity to justify granting a petition that would lead to protracted antitrust litigation involving a pro se petitioner. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-13, 7 NRC 583, 595 (1978).

Although Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act encourages petitioners to voice their antitrust claims early in the licensing process, reasonable late requests for antitrust review are not precluded so long as they are made concurrent with licensing. Licensing Boards must have discretion to consider individual claims in a way which does justice to all of the policies which underlie Section 105c and the strength of particular claims justifying late intervention. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

Late requests for antitrust review hearings may be entertained in the period between the filing of an application for a construction permit -- the time when the advice of the Attorney General is sought -- and its issuance. However, as the time for issuance of the construction permit draws closer, Licensing Boards should scrutinize more closely and carefully the petitioner's claims of good cause. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978). The criteria of 10 CFR § 2.309(c) for late petitioners are as appropriate for evaluation of late antitrust petitions as in health, safety and environmental licensing, but Section 2.309(c) criteria should be more stringently applied to late antitrust petitions, particularly in assessing the good cause factor. *Id.* Where an antitrust petition is so late that relief will divert from the licensee needed and difficult-to-replace power, the Licensing Board may shape any relief granted to meet this problem. *Id.*

Where a late petition for intervention in an antitrust proceeding is involved, the special factors set forth within 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 714(a)(1)) must be balanced and applied before petitions may be granted; the test becomes increasingly vigorous as time passes. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-81-28, 14 NRC 333, 338, 342 (1981). See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 246-47, 253-54 (1991), aff'd in part on other grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992).

#### **2.10.4 Interest and Standing for Intervention**

“A petitioner’s standing, or right to participate in a Commission licensing proceeding, is grounded in section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (a)(1)(A), which requires the NRC to provide a hearing ‘upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding’.” Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 61 (2002). See also Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-04-5, 59 NRC 52, 56 (2004); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And



Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 269-70 (2006); Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 103 (2006)..

Standing is not a mere legal technicality, it is, in fact, an essential element in determining whether there is any legitimate role for a court or an agency adjudicatory body in dealing with a particular grievance. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 331-32 (1994). Burden for proving standard rests with the petitioner. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky Gaseous Diffusion Plant), DD-01-3, 54 NRC 305, 308 (2001); citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-00-5, 51 NRC 90, 98 (2000).

In making a standing determination, a presiding officer is to "construe the [intervention] petition in favor of the petitioner." Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta Georgia), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 115 (1995). See also Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 414 (2001); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 158 (1996). Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 87, 92 (1998). Molycorp, Inc. (Washington, Pennsylvania, Temporary Waste Storage & Site Decommissioning Plan), LBP-00-10, 51 NRC 163, 168 (2000).

In Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-333, 3 NRC 804 (1976), the Appeal Board certified the following questions to the Commission:

- (1) Should standing in NRC proceedings be governed by "judicial" standards?
- (2) If no "right" to intervene exists under whatever standing rules are found to be applicable, what degree of discretion exists in a Board to admit a petitioner anyway?

The Commission's response to the certified question is contained in Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976). Therein, the Commission ruled that judicial concepts of standing should be applied by adjudicatory boards in determining whether a petitioner is entitled to intervene as of right under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act. As to the second question referred by the Appeal Board, the Commission held that Licensing Boards may, as a matter of discretion, grant intervention in domestic licensing cases to petitioners who are not entitled to intervene as of right under judicial standing doctrines but who may, nevertheless, make some contribution to the Proceeding. In the absence of a clear misapplication of the facts or misunderstanding of law, the Licensing Board's judgment at the pleading stage that a party has crossed the standing threshold is entitled to substantial deference. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 47-48 (1994). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 14 (2001). The standing requirement arises from the hearing authorization in section 189a(1) of the Atomic Energy Act, providing a hearing "upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected" by a proceeding (emphasis supplied). Quivira Mining Company (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 262 (1997), aff'd, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff'd sub nom; see also Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and Entergy

Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 133 (2001); Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 145-146 (2001).

Both the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations permit intervention only by a "person whose interest may be affected." The term "person" in this context includes corporate environmental groups which may represent members of the group provided that such members have an interest which will be affected. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-322, 3 NRC 328 (1976). Standing to intervene as a matter of right does not hinge upon a petitioner's potential contribution to the decisionmaking process. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98 (1976); see generally Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9 (1994). Nevertheless, a petitioner's potential contribution has a definite bearing on "discretionary intervention." See Section 2.10.3.3.3.C.

Standing to intervene, unlike the factual merits of contentions, may appropriately be the subject of an evidentiary inquiry before intervention is granted. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-27, 8 NRC 275, 277 n.1 (1978); Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc., (Sheffield, Illinois, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 744 (1978); Georgia Power Company, et al., Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-92-38, 36 NRC 394 (1992); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 83 (1993).

If there is nothing in an intervening party's petition indicating that the party possesses special knowledge or that the party will present significant information not already available to and considered by the Commission, then a discretionary hearing would impose unnecessary burdens on the participants without assisting the Commission in making its statutory findings under the AEA. Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-00-16, 52 NRC 68, 72 (2000).

"There is no question that, in an operating license proceeding, the question of a potential intervenor's standing is a significant one. For if no petitioner for intervention can satisfactorily demonstrate standing, it is likely that no hearing will be held." Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-37, 8 NRC 575, 582 (1978).

In Commission practice, a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens will not result in a distinct and palpable harm sufficient to support standing. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 333 (1983), citing Transnuclear Inc., CLI-77-24, 6 NRC 525, 531 (1977); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-87-2, 25 NRC 32, 34-35 (1987); Envirocare of Utah, Inc., LBP-92-8, 35 NRC 167, 174 (1992). See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 248-49 (1991), aff'd in Part on other grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC

47 (1992); Nuclear Management Co., LLC (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant), LBP-05-31, 62 NRC 735, 746 (2005)..

Assertions of broad public interest in (a) regulatory matters, (b) the administrative process, and (c) the development of economical energy resources do not establish the particularized interest necessary for participation by an individual or group in NRC adjudicatory processes. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 28 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 192 (1991); Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-98-10, 47 NRC 333 (1998).

Economic interest as a ratepayer does not confer standing in NRC licensing proceedings. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 n.4 (1983); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-24, 22 NRC 97, 98, affirmed on other grounds, ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461 (1985); Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 313, 315 (1989); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 30 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 193 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 437, 443 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-26, 33 NRC 537, 544, 546 (1991), reconsid. denied, LBP-91-32, 34 NRC 132 (1991). Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-37, 36 NRC 370, 374 (1992).

In assessing whether a petitioner has set forth a sufficient “interest” within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act and the agency’s regulations to intervene as a matter of right in a licensing proceeding, the Commission has long applied contemporaneous judicial concepts of standing. Atlas Corporation (Moab, Utah), LBP-00-4, 51 NRC 53, 55 (2000); See, e.g., Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 115 (1995); Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613-14 (1976); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 62 (2002). The Commission generally defers to a Presiding Officer’s finding on standing, as the Presiding Officer has a greater familiarity than the Commission with the precise allegations and nuances in the factual record before him. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-02-10, 55 NRC 251, 254 (2002).

“The Commission generally defers to the Presiding Officer’s determinations regarding standing, absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-18, 54 NRC 27, 31 (2001); citing International Uranium (USA) Corp. CLI-98-6, 47 NRC 116, 118 (1998); Georgia Institute of Technology, CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 116 (1995).

#### **2.10.4.1 Judicial Standing to Intervene**

Judicial concepts of standing will be applied in determining whether a petitioner has sufficient interest in a proceeding to be entitled to intervene as a matter of right under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 47 (1994); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 13 (1994); U.S. Dept. of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 363 (2004); see also Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., LBP-94-33, 40 NRC 151 (1994); Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-96-22, 44 NRC 138, 140-41 (1996); Quivira Mining Company (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 262 (1997), *aff'd*, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), *aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC*, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-22, 48 NRC 149, 153 (1998). See, also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 6 (2001).

The Commission has held that contemporaneous judicial concepts should be used to determine whether a petitioner has standing to intervene. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-83-45, 18 NRC 213, 215 (1983), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 80 (1993); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 13 (1994); Gulf States Utilities Co., et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31; *aff'd*, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994); Babcock and Wilcox Co. (Pennsylvania Nuclear Services Operations, Parks Township, Pennsylvania), LBP-94-4, 39 NRC 47 (1994); Quivira Mining Company (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 262 (1997), *aff'd*, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), *aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC*, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 87, 91 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 322-23 (1999); Department of the Army (Aberdeen Proving Ground), LBP-99-38, 50 NRC 227, 229 (1999).

Because agencies are not constrained by Article III, nor are they governed by judicially-created standing doctrines restricting access to federal courts, the criteria for establishing administrative standing may permissibly be less demanding than the criteria for judicial standing. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

Judicial concepts of standing require a showing that (a) the action sought in a proceeding will cause "injury-in-fact," and (b) the injury is arguably within the "zone of interests" protected by statutes governing the proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 332 (1983); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 13-14 (1994); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 47 (1994); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone

Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 87 (1998); Cabot Performance Materials, LBP-00-13, 51 NRC 284, 289 (2000).

In order to establish standing, a petitioner must show: (1) that he has personally suffered a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact; (2) that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action; and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Dellums v. NRC, 863 F.2d 968, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Shoreham-Wading River Central School District v. NRC, 931 F.2d 102, 105 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1507 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Michigan v. U.S., 994 F.2d 1197, 1203 (6th Cir. 1993); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 266-68 (1991); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 71-72; Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95 (1994); Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 115 (1995); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-04-5, 59 NRC 52, 57 n. 16 (2004).

A contemporary delineation of those concepts appeared in Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1163 (1997)(citing Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)), where the Court observed that constitutional minimum standards of standing are that (1) the plaintiff suffer injury in fact, both actual or imminent; (2) there is a causal connection between the injury and the conduct in question; and (3) the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable decision. Quivira Mining Corporation (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 262 (1997), aff'd, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999); GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202 (2000); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 292 (2000); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 13 (2001); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 62 (2002).

Contemporaneous judicial concepts of standing require that a petitioner demonstrate that it will suffer an "injury in fact," that there be a causal connection between the alleged injury and the action complained of, and the injury be redressed by a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167-68 (1997). In addition, the petitioner must meet the "prudential" requirement that the complaint arguably falls within the zone of interests of the governing law. Id. at 175. See also Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 103 (2006).

As a line of Supreme Court cases makes clear, redressability is an essential element of standing. To establish standing, a petitioner must not only allege actual injury "fairly traceable" to the defendants' actions, it must also show the likelihood that the injury would be "redressed" if the petitioner obtains the relief requested. This requirement is grounded in the provision in article III of the constitution that limits jurisdiction to "cases and controversies." Where an alleged injury does not stem directly from the challenged governmental action, but instead involves predicting the actions of third parties not before the court, the difficulty of showing redressability is particularly great. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7,

39 NRC 322, 331 (1994); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-22, 48 NRC 149 (1998).

The redressability element of standing requires a party to show that its claimed actual or threatened injury could be cured by some action of the tribunal. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 14 (2001).

Judicial standing permitted to challenge rule on dry cask storage for petitioners living nearby and asserting harm to their aesthetic interests and their physical health and that the value of his or her property will be diminished by the storage of nuclear waste in the VSC-24 casks at Palisades. Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1509 (6th Cir. 1995). Judicial standing to challenge rule on reporting requirement, even though comment was made on earlier “prescriptive” versus later “performance-based” rule. Reyblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

It generally is the practice for participants making factual claims regarding the circumstances that establish standing to do so in affidavit form that is notarized or includes a declaration that the statements are true and are made under penalty of perjury. Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Facility), LBP-97-9, 45 NRC 414, 427 n.4 (1997).

Where a petitioner does not satisfy the judicial standards for standing, intervention could still be allowed as a matter of discretion. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 333 (1983); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-12, 37 NRC 355, 358 (1993).

Merely because a petitioner may have had standing in an earlier proceeding does not automatically grant standing in subsequent proceedings, even if the scope of the earlier and later proceedings is similar. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-92-27, 36 NRC 196, 198 (1992), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-92-4, 35 NRC 114, 125-26 (1992).

The fact that the petitioner is an intervenor with respect to the same issue in another proceeding does not give him standing to intervene for the purpose of protecting himself from adverse precedent in the proceeding in question. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-304, 3 NRC 1, 4 (1976).

Where there are two ongoing proceedings involving the same facility, an intervenor in the first proceeding need not reiterate its statement of standing in the second proceeding but may instead rely on its standing in the earlier proceeding. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-23, 42 NRC 215, 217 (1995).

A petitioner's standing in a non-NRC proceeding is insufficient to establish standing in an NRC proceeding, at least in the absence of a showing of the equivalence of applicable standards and an overlap of relevant issues. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-29, 32 NRC 89, 91 (1990).

Under certain circumstances, petitioners who participated in an earlier NRC proceeding will not be required to establish again their interests to participate in a subsequent, separate NRC proceeding involving the same facility. Thus, an organization which participated in an earlier proceeding as the representative of one of its members who resided in close proximity to the facility was conditionally granted leave to intervene in a subsequent, separate proceeding involving the same facility even though the organization failed to append affidavits to its intervention petition establishing the residence of its member. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-33, 34 NRC 138, 141 (1991). But see Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-92-27, 36 NRC 196, 198 (1992).

Where a license amendment grants a co-licensee precisely the relief which the co-licensee seeks as a party to a pending proceeding, the co-licensee loses its standing to assert its claim in the proceeding. Nuclear Fuel Services and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), LBP-82-36, 15 NRC 1075, 1083 (1982).

Those persons who would have standing to intervene in new construction permit hearings, which would be required if good cause could not be shown for an extension of an existing construction permit, would have standing to intervene in [extension proceedings] to show that no good cause existed and, consequently, that new construction permit hearings would be required to complete construction. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), LBP-80-22, 12 NRC 191, 195, affirmed, ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 563-565 (1980).

The ultimate merits of the case have no bearing on the threshold question of standing. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 15 (2001).

If an intervenor has established standing in a prior proceeding involving the same facility, there is no need for the intervenor to establish standing in a later proceeding. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground), LBP-04-01, 59 NRC 27, 29 (2004).

However, "a prospective petitioner has an affirmative duty to demonstrate that it has standing in each proceeding in which it seeks to participate since a petitioner's status can change over time and the bases or its standing in an earlier proceeding may no longer obtain. We would acknowledge that, in certain situations, a petitioner may seek to rely on prior demonstrations of standing if those prior demonstrations are (1) specifically identified and (2) shown to correctly reflect the current status of the petitioner's standing." Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 N.R.C. 156, 163 (1993); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52, NRC 129, 132-33 (2000).

#### 2.10.4.1.1 "Injury-In-Fact" and "Zone of Interest" Tests for Standing to Intervene

Although the Commission's Pebble Springs ruling (CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610) permits discretionary intervention in certain limited circumstances, it stresses that, as a general rule, the propriety of intervention is to be examined in the light of judicial standing principles. The judicial principles referred to are those set forth in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Such standards require a showing that (1) the action being challenged could cause injury-in-fact to the person seeking to establish standing, and (2) such injury is arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute governing the proceeding. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach, Unit 1), CLI-80-38, 12 NRC 547 (1980); Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610 (1976); Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. and N.Y. State Energy Research and Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), LBP-82-36, 15 NRC 1075, 1083 (1982); Philadelphia Electric Company (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1431, 1432 (1982), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 612-13 (1976); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282, 316 (1985); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-24, 22 NRC 97, 98 n.6 (1985), affirmed on other grounds, ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461 (1985); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation, LBP-91-5, 33 NRC 163, 165, 166 (1991); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-28, 33 NRC 557, 559 (1991), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 266-68 (1991). Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5 (1993); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 80 (1993); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 13 (1994); International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-21, 46 NRC 273, 274 (1997); Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185 (1998); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 292 (2000).

Two tests must be satisfied to acquire standing: (1) petitioner must allege "injury-in-fact" (that some injury has occurred or will probably result from the action involved); (2) petitioner must allege an interest "arguably within the zone of interest" protected by the statute. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-74, 16 NRC 981, 983 (1982), citing Warth v. Selden, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 113 (1979); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 428 (1984); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-96-1, 43 NRC 19 (1996); International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-14, 46 NRC 55 (1997); Quivira Mining Co. (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, NM), CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power



Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-22, 48 NRC 149 (1998); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 270 (2006).

The existence of judicial standing hinges upon a demonstration of a present or future injury-in-fact that is arguably within the zone of interests protected by the governing statute(s). International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill) LBP-01-15, 53 NRC 344, 347 (2001).

To constitute an adequate showing of injury-in-fact within a cognizable sphere of interest, "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable. A plaintiff must allege that he has or will in fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged agency action, not that he can imagine circumstances in which he could be affected by the agency's action." International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill) LBP-01-15, 53 NRC 344, 349 (2001) citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688-89 (1973).

No injury-in-fact can result where no new activity is proposed. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-04-01, 59 NRC 1, 4 (2004).

A petitioner must allege an "injury-in-fact" which must be within the "zone of interests" protected by the Atomic Energy Act or the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-83-45, 18 NRC 213, 215 (1983). See Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 313, 315 (1989); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 443, 444 (1991). A hearing petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the various injuries alleged to occur to its AEA-protected health and safety interests or its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)-protected environmental interests satisfy the three components of the injury in fact requirement. Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 81 (1993). Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., LBP-99-12, 49 NRC 155, 158 (1999).

In order to establish the factual predicates for the various standing elements, when legal representation is present, it is generally necessary for the individual to set forth any factual claims in a sworn affidavit. Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., LBP-99-12, 49 NRC 155, 158 (1999). Petitioners allegations regarding its increased risk, supported by two detailed affidavits and other evidentiary exhibits, are sufficiently concrete and particular to pass muster for standing. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 215 (1999).

The Commission applies judicial tests of "injury-in-fact" and "arguably within the zone of interest" to determine standing. "Injury" as a premise to standing must come from an action, in contrast to failure to take an action. One who claims that an Order in an enforcement action should have provided for more extensive relief does not show injury from relief granted and thus does not have standing to contest the order. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 439 (1980). Maine Yankee

Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-04-5, 59 NRC 52, 57-58 (2004).

In addressing the matter of standing in a decommissioning proceeding, to establish "injury in fact" it must be shown how any alleged harmful radiological, environmental, or other legally cognizable effects that will arise from activities under the decommissioning plan at issue will cause injury to each individual or organizational petitioner or, in the case of an organization relying upon representational standing, the members it represents. Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-24, 36 NRC 149, 153 (1992).

A petitioner must allege an "injury-in-fact" which he will suffer as a result of a Commission decision. He may not derive standing from the interests of another person or organization, nor may he seek to represent the interests of others without their express authorization. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-21, 30 NRC 325, 329-30 (1989); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 147 (2001).

Under certain circumstances, even if a current proceeding is separate from an earlier proceeding, the Commission may refuse to apply its rules of procedure in an overly formalistic manner by requiring that petitioners participating in the earlier proceeding must again identify their interests to participate in the current proceeding. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-95-14, 42 NRC 5, 7 (1995) (citing Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-91-33, 34 NRC 138 (1991)).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.1 "Injury in Fact" Test**

A petitioner who supports an application must, of course, show the potential for injury-in-fact to its interests before intervention can be granted. Such a petitioner must particularize a specific injury that it or its members would or might sustain should the application it supports be denied or should the license it supports be burdened with conditions or restrictions. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 743 (1978).

For purposes of assessing injury in fact (or any other aspect of standing), a hearing petitioner's factual assertions, if uncontroverted, must be accepted. Apollo, 37 NRC at 82. In evaluating a petitioner's claims of injury in fact, care must be taken to avoid "the familiar trap of confusing the standing determination with the assessment of petitioner's case on the merits." Apollo, 37 NRC at 82, citing City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 912 F.2d 478, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 117 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1992); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54, 68 (1994), aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 15 (2001).

The test is a cognizable interest that might be adversely affected by one or another outcome of the proceeding. No interest is to be presumed. There

must be a concrete demonstration that harm could flow from a result of the proceeding. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 743 (1978). The alleged injury, which may be either actual or threatened, must be both concrete and particularized, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical." As a result, standing has been denied when the threat of injury is too speculative. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 72 (1994).

"[I]njury-in-fact cannot be asserted on the footing of nothing more than a broad interest-shared with many others - in environmental preservation."  
International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-3, 55 NRC 35, 39 (2002), citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1972). The Commission has likewise determined that a general interest in 'law observance' is insufficient to establish injury-in-fact. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-3, 55 NRC 35, 39 (2002), citing Ten Applications for Low-Enriched Uranium Exports to EURATOM Member Nations, CLI-77-24, 6 NRC 525, 531 (1997) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).

It is not necessary that every injury asserted by petitioners be sufficiently concrete to satisfy these requirements; it is enough if some of the injuries claimed are, or result in, clearly adverse effects on petitioners. Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1507 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env'tl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 31 (1999). An injury in fact must be "actual," "direct," and "genuine," but need not have already occurred. Potential or imminent injury is sufficient; there need only be a real possibility of concrete harm to a petitioner's interest as a result of the proceeding. Quivira Mining Corporation (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 265 (1997), aff'd, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

A petitioner must establish a causal nexus between the alleged injury and the challenged action. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-92-4, 35 NRC 114, 122 (1992); Apollo, supra, 37 NRC at 81; Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-22, 48 NRC 149, 155 (1998); Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-98-27, 48 NRC 271, 276 (1998); Molycorp, Inc. (Washington, Pennsylvania, Temporary Waste Storage & Site Decommissioning Plan), LBP-00-10, 51 NRC 163, 167 (2000). When a petitioner is challenging the legality of government regulation of someone else, injury in fact as it relates to factors of causation and redressability is "ordinarily `substantially more difficult' to establish." Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 81 n.20 (1993).

In the case of an amendment to an existing and already licensed facility with ongoing operations, a petitioner's challenge must show how that amendment will cause a distinct new harm or threat that is separate and apart from already licensed activities. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa

Uranium Mill), CLI-01-21, 54 NRC 247, 251 (2001), citing International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), 54 NRC 27 (2000); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-99-4, 49 NRC 185, 192 (1999). “Conclusory allegations about potential radiological harm from the facility in general, which are not tied to the specific amendment at issue, are insufficient to establish standing.” International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-21, 54 NRC 247, 251 (2001).

It must be demonstrated that the injury is fairly traceable to the proposed action. Such a determination is not dependent on whether the cause of the injury flows directly from the challenged action, but whether the chain of causation is plausible. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 75 (1994); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-98-27, 48 NRC 271 (1998); Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 105 (2006). It must be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Sequoyah Fuels, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC at 76; Pa’ina, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC at 105..

In connection with an export application involving a one-time export, under armed guard, of a limited quantity of plutonium oxide, petitioners did not establish a nexus between the agency’s actions and their alleged injury because the alleged harm — the attack or diversion of nuclear material by terrorist organizations – does not result from the grant or denial of the export license; rather, the remote potential for harm is dependent on the unlawful intervening acts of unknown third parties, and “the Commission’s responsibility for considering the possibility of diversion as one aspect of protecting the common defense and security of the United States does not establish that diversion would cause any concrete personal or direct harm to petitioners which would entitle them to a voice in its proceedings.” U.S. Dep’t of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 365-366 (2004) (quoting Edlow Int’l Co. (Agent for the Government of India on Application to Export Special Nuclear Material), CLI-76-6, 3 NRC 563, 577 (1976)).

To attain standing, petitioners should show a plausible way in which activities licensed by the challenged amendment would injure them. The injury must be due to the amendment and not to the license itself, which was granted previously. The injury must occur to individuals whose residence is demonstrated in the filing and whom the organizations are authorized to represent. Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-10, 45 NRC 429, 431 (1997).

A claim that an applicant has violated or will violate the law does not create a presumption of standing, without some showing that the violation could harm the petitioner. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-18, 54 NRC 27, 30 (2001).

To establish the requisite "injury-in-fact" for standing, a petitioner must have a "real stake" in the outcome, that is, a genuine, actual, or direct stake, but not necessarily a substantial stake in the outcome. An organization meets this

requirement where it has identified one of its members who possesses the requisite standing. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 447-448 (1979).

For a case holding that a petitioner cannot assert the rights of third parties as a basis for intervention, see Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 387, *aff'd*, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978) (mother attempted to assert the rights of her son who attended medical school near a proposed facility).

A statement of asserted injury which is insufficient to found a valid contention may well be adequate to provide a basis for standing. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 115 (1979); Sequoia Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decommissioning), LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386, 394 (1999).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.1.A Future/Hypothetical/Academic Injury**

An alleged future injury which is realistically threatened and immediate, and not merely speculative, may establish standing to intervene. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-92-4, 35 NRC 114, 123 (1992). See Envirocare of Utah, Inc., LBP-92-8, 35 NRC 167, 178-79 (1992); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 74 (1994).

An abstract, hypothetical injury is insufficient to establish standing to intervene. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 252 (1991), *aff'd in part on other grounds and appeal denied*, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992); International Uranium Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-98-6, 47 NRC 116 (1998).

A petitioner who supports an application must, of course, show the potential for injury-in-fact to its interests before intervention can be granted. Such a petitioner must particularize a specific injury that it or its members would or might sustain should the application it supports be denied or should the license it supports be burdened with conditions or restrictions. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 743 (1978).

A petitioner need not establish that injury will inevitably result from the proposed action to show an injury in fact, but only that it may be injured in fact by the proposed action. Gulf States Utilities Co., et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31, *aff'd*, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994).

Purely academic interests are not encompassed by 10 CFR § 2.309(c) which states that any person whose interest is affected by a proceeding shall file a written petition for leave to intervene. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-52, 16 NRC 183, 185

(1982). See generally, CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616 (1981), (guidelines for Board). A mere academic interest in the outcome of a proceeding will not confer standing. The petitioner must allege some injury that has or will occur from the action taken as a result of the proceeding. Skagit/Hanford, *supra*, 15 NRC at 743.

Concern that “bad precedent” may be set in a proceeding that could impact the petitioner’s ability to contest similar matters in another proceeding is a “generalized grievance” that is “too academic” to provide the requisite injury in fact needed for standing as of right. See Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 248-49 (1991), aff’d on other ground, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992), petition for review dismissed, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995). General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 159 (1996).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.B Economic/Competitive Injury**

A petitioner who suffers only economic injury (i.e., harm to competition), lacks standing to bring a NEPA-based challenge to agency action. International Uranium (USA) (Receipt of material from Tonawanda, New York), CLI-98-23, 48 NRC 259 (1998); Quivira Mining Co. (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, NM), CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998); both decisions were sustained on review in Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Department of the Army, LBP-99-38, 50 NRC 227, 230 (1999); International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Materials License Amendment), CLI-00-4, 51 NRC 88 (2000) (Affirming two dismissals on basis that “competitor” injury is insufficient as ground for standing to intervene in adjudicatory process).

Although competitive injury may constitute injury in fact in an NRC licensing proceeding, a party relying for its standing on such injury must also demonstrate that it arguably falls within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the AEA or NEPA. Quivira Mining Corporation (Ambrose Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 262 (1997), aff’d, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff’d sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

For antitrust purposes, the interest of a ratepayer or consumer of electricity is not necessarily beyond the zone of interests protected by Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act. However, the petitioner must still demonstrate that an injury to its economic interests as a ratepayer would be the proximate result of anticompetitive activities by the licensee. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-13, 7 NRC 583, 592-593 (1978).

For an amendment authorizing transfer of 20% of the ownership of a facility, allegations that a petitioner would “receive” only 80% of the electricity produced by the plant rather than the 100% “assumed in the ‘NEPA balance’” were insufficient to give standing as a matter of right because it was an economic injury outside the zone of interests to be

protected and the NEPA cost-benefit analysis considers the overall benefits to society rather than benefits to an isolated portion. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 390-90, aff'd, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978).

A claim of insufficient funds to ensure safe operation and shutdown, posing a threat of radiological harm to a co-owners interest in a facility, as a result of thin capitalization, inability to fund operation's because of potential litigation liability and financial insulation of shareholders from potential costs is sufficient to establish standing. GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 194 (2000).

For the views of various Appeal Board members on whether a petitioner has the requisite interest where he has an economic interest which competes with nuclear power in generating electricity, see the three opinions in Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631 (1975).

In a license amendment proceeding to allow two electric cooperatives to become co-owners of a nuclear plant, interests of a petitioner which stemmed from membership in the cooperative ("loss of equity," "threat of bankruptcy," "higher rates," "cost of replacement power," or "loss of property taxes") were insufficient to support standing as a matter of right. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 386, aff'd, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978).

Economic injury to ratepayers is not sufficient to confer standing upon State Commissions to challenge proposed license revocation because such injury results from termination of the project and not Commission "action," and because such injury cannot be redressed by favorable Commission action. Northern States Power Company (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), CLI-80-36, 12 NRC 523, 526-527-(1980) (views of Chairman Ahearn and Commissioner Hendrie).

NRC's interpretation of the AEA to preclude intervention by competitor who alleged only economic injury was reasonable, regardless of whether proposed intervenor could meet judicial standing requirements, in view of Act's purpose of increasing private competition, and regulatory burdens that granting such standing would impose on the agency. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72, 77-8 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.1.C Health and Safety/Environmental Injury**

A petitioner has not shown any reasonable nexus between himself or herself and any purported radiological impacts when, despite assertions about potential facility-related airborne and waterborne radiological contacts, he or she has not delineated these with enough concreteness to establish some impact on him that is sufficient to provide him or her with standing. By not providing any information that indicates whether water-related activities are being conducted upstream or downstream from a facility and by describing other activities only using vague terms such as

“near,” “close proximity,” or “in the vicinity” of the facility at issue, the petitioner fails to carry his or her burden of establishing the requisite “injury in fact.” Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Facility), LBP-97-9, 45 NRC 414, 425-26 (1997).

Allegations that a plant will cause radiologically contaminated food which a person may consume are too remote and too generalized to provide a basis for standing to intervene. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1449 (1982); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-24, 22 NRC 97, 98, affirmed on other grounds, ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461 (1985).

A request to transfer operating authority under a full power license for a power reactor may be deemed an action involving “clear implications for the offsite environment,” for purposes of determining threshold injury. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-16, 38 NRC 25, 35 (1993).

An alleged injury to health and safety, shared equally by all those residing near a reactor, can form the basis for standing. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1434 (1982).

Relative to a threshold standing determination, even minor radiological exposures resulting from a proposed license activity can be enough to create the requisite injury in fact. See Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 70, aff’d, CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 246-48 (1996). General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 158 (1996); North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-98-23, 48 NRC 157, 162-63 (1998); Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 104 (2006).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.D Injury to Legal and/or Constitutional Rights**

An alleged injury to a purely legal interest is sufficient to support standing. Thus, a petitioner derived standing by alleging that a proposed license amendment would deprive it of the right to notice and opportunity for hearing provided by § 189a of the Atomic Energy Act. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-90-15, 31 NRC 501, 506 (1990), reconsid. denied, LBP-90-25, 32 NRC 21 (1990). But see Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-92-4, 35 NRC 114, 123-26 (1992), where the Licensing Board in a subsequent Perry license amendment proceeding declined to follow the ruling of the previous Perry board, (LBP-90-15 and LBP-90-25), supra. The Perry Board (LBP-92-4) held that § 189a of the Atomic Energy Act does not give a petitioner an absolute right to intervene in NRC proceedings, and only grants participation rights to a petitioner who has first established standing. An assertion of a procedural right to participate in NRC proceedings as an end in itself is insufficient to establish standing without a demonstration of a causal nexus with a substantive regulatory



injury. But this was subsequently overturned by Commission in CLI-93-21 which essentially affirmed the earlier Perry decision and found that standing may be based upon the alleged loss of a procedural right, as long as the procedure at issue is designed to protect against a threatened concrete injury, and the loss of rights to notice, opportunity for a hearing and opportunity for judicial review constitute a discrete injury. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-93-21, 38 NRC 87, 93-94 (1993).

A claim of personal injury that allegedly resulted from mismanagement would not result from the proposed extension of the construction permit completion date. Nor is such an injury protected under the AEA or NEPA. This grievance is in the area of employment rights and would not be redressed by a decision favorable to petitioners. A desire to expose alleged mismanagement is not an injury-in-fact and does not enhance petitioners position for standing. Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al., (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-37, 36 NRC 370, 375 (1992).

An individual alleging that violation of constitutional provisions by governmental actions based on a statute will cause him identifiable injury should have standing to challenge the constitutionality of those actions. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1445 (1982), citing Chicano Police Officer's Association v. Stover, 526 F.2d 431, 436 (10th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 994 (1976), holding on standing reaffirmed, 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977); 3 K. Davis Administrative Law Treatise 22.08, at 240 (1958).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.E Injury Due to Proximity to a Facility**

A petitioner may base its standing upon a showing that his or her residence, or that of its members, is within the geographical zone that might be affected by an accidental release of fission products. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 443 (1979). See also Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 78 (1979). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 270 (2006). Close proximity has always been deemed enough standing alone, to establish the requisite interest for intervention. The incremental risk of reactor operation for an additional 13-15 years is sufficient to invoke the presumption of injury in fact for persons residing within 10 to 20 miles of the facility. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5 (1993). In such a case the petitioner does not have to show that his concerns are well-founded in fact, as such concerns are addressed when the merits of the case are reached. Distances of as much as 50 miles have been held to fall within this zone. Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-522, 9 NRC 54, 56 (1979); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 410, 429 (1984), citing

South Texas, *supra*, 9 NRC at 443-44; Enrico Fermi, *supra*, 9 NRC at 78; Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 n.4 (1977); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-18, 9 NRC 728, 730 (1979); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, LBP-06-23, 64 NRC at 270.

An intervention petitioner who resides near a nuclear facility need not show a causal relationship between injury to its interest and the licensing action being sought in order to establish standing. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (Cobalt-60 Storage Facility), ALAB-682, 16 NRC 150, 153 (1982), citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-522, 9 NRC 54, 57 n.5 (1979); Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 287 (1995).

In an operating license amendment proceeding, a petitioner cannot base his or her standing simply upon a residence or visits near the plant, unless the proposed action quite obviously entails an increase potential for offsite consequences. It is incumbent upon the petitioner to provide some "plausible chain of causation," some scenario suggesting how the license amendments would result in a distinct new harm or threat. A petitioner cannot seek to obtain standing in a license amendment proceeding simply by enumerating the proposed license changes and alleging without substantiation that the charges will lead to offsite radiological consequences. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-4, 49 NRC 185, 191 (1999); see also Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-02-02-14, 56 NRC 15, 26 (2002).

Petitioners may have standing if they reside close enough to a planned project so that there is reasonable apprehension of injury. When the staff delays issuance of the full license that is applied for, it is an indication of the reasonableness of petitioners' apprehensions of injury. Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261 (1998); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 146-147 (2001).

"A petitioner may base its standing upon a showing that his or her residence, or that of its members, is 'within the geographical zone that might be affected by an accidental release of fission products.' Louisiana Power and Light Company (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-125, 6 AEC 371, 371 n.6 (1973)." Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 78 (1979). Distances of as much as 50 miles have been held to fall within this zone. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 n.4 (1977) (50 miles); Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 193 (1973) (40 miles); Fermi, *supra* (35 miles); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station,

Unit 2), LBP-03-3, 57 NRC 45, 61-63 (2003)(finding that petitioner living 2 miles from plant demonstrated requisite potential impact by proposed license amendments, while petitioner living 23 miles away did not).

Residence or activities within 10 miles of a facility (and in one case 17 miles from a facility) have been found sufficient to establish standing in a case involving the proposed expansion in capacity of a spent fuel pool. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118 (1987); see also Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452-454-55 (1988), aff'd, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29-31 (1999). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-00-2, 51 NRC 25 (2000).

A petitioner which bases its standing on its proximity to a nuclear facility must describe the nature of its property or residence and its proximity to the facility, and should describe how the health and safety of the petitioner may be jeopardized. Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 315 (1989).

A petitioner who resides far from a facility cannot acquire standing to intervene by asserting the interests of a third party who will be near the facility but who is not a minor or otherwise under a legal disability which would preclude his own participation. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473, 474 n.1 (1978).

The Licensing Board refused to allow intervention on the basis of the possibility of petitioners' consuming produce, meat products, or fish originating within 50 miles of the site. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), LBP-79-7, 9 NRC 330, 336 (1979).

A petitioner owning and renting out farmland 10 to 15 miles from the site and visiting the farm occasionally was held not to meet standing requirements. WPPSS, supra, 9 NRC at 336-338.

One living 26 miles from a plant cannot claim, without more, that his aesthetic interests are harmed. Conjectural interests do not provide a basis for standing. Nor does economic harm or one's status as a ratepayer provide a basis for standing. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-582, 11 NRC 239, 242, 243 n.8 (1980).

Intervenors who fail to provide specific information regarding either the geographic proximity or timing of their visits will only complicate matters for themselves. In many instances, a lack of specificity will be sufficient to reject claims of standing. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 324 (1999); Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., CLI-99-12, 49 NRC 347, 355 (1999).

A bare claim that a challenged reactor license amendment will impact the health, safety and financial interests of petitioners who reside within 50 miles of the facility fails to “set forth with particularity” a statement that could grant standing. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-00-5, 51 NRC 90, 98 (2000).

Although residence within 50 miles is not an explicit requirement for intervention by right, that limit is consistent with precedent. Without a showing that a plant has a far greater than ordinary potential to injure outside a 50 mile limit, a person has a weak claim to the protection of a full adjudicatory proceeding; rulemaking or lobbying Congress are available to protect public interests of a general nature. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 178-179 (1981); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 102 (1994); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 149 (2001).

However, the fact that a petitioner may reside within a 50-mile radius of a facility will not always be sufficient to establish standing to intervene. A Board will consider the nature of the proceeding, and will apply different standing considerations to proceedings involving construction permits or operating licenses than to proceedings involving license amendments. Thus, in a license amendment proceeding involving an existing facility's fuel pool, a Board denied intervention to a petitioner who resided 43 miles from the facility because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the risk of injury from the fuel pool extended that far from the facility. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-85-24, 22 NRC 97, 98-99 (1985), affirmed on other grounds, ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461 (1985). But see, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 213 (1992) [Intervention granted to petitioners residing within 1 to 3 miles after demonstrating the potential for injury from corrective redesign of the spent fuel pool].

A petitioner's residence within 50 miles of a nuclear facility was insufficient, by itself, to establish standing to intervene in an exemption proceeding where the exemption at issue involved the protection of workers in the facility and did not have the clear potential for offsite consequences affecting the general population. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-21, 30 NRC 325, 329-30 (1989); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-91-4, 33 NRC 153, 156-57 (1991) (proposed license amendments involved potential offsite safety consequences). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 29, 30 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 193, 194 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 437 (1991); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-92-4, 35 NRC 114, 122 (1992); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 129-130 (1992);

Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 212-214 (1992); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-22, 48 NRC 149 (1998); Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-98-27, 48 NRC 271 (1998).

Residence more than 75 miles from a plant will not alone establish an interest sufficient for standing as a matter of right. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1447 (1982), citing Dairyland Power Cooperative (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor), ALAB-497, 8 NRC 312, 313 (1978); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Units 1 and 2), ALAB-397, 5 NRC 1143, 1150 (1977).

Although an 'obvious potential for offsite consequences' may be sufficient to show standing, it is not in itself sufficient to support an admissible contention. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-11, 58 NRC 47, 93 (2003).

A presumption of standing based on geographic proximity may be applied in cases involving nonpower reactors where there is a determination that the proposed action involves a significant source of radioactivity producing an obvious potential for offsite consequences. Whether and at what distance a petitioner can be presumed to be affected must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature of the proposed action and the significance of the radioactive source. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 116 (1995); Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 105-106 (2006). This proximity presumption may apply if the petitioner lives within, or otherwise has frequent contacts with, the zone of possible harm from the nuclear reactor or other source of radioactivity. Pa'ina, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC at 105 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 146 (2001), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3 (2001)).

Where a petitioner claimed that the 10 C.F.R. § 51.22 categorical exclusion (providing that no EA or EIS need be prepared) for irradiators was inapplicable because of special circumstances unique to the proposed location of the irradiator, and where the Board found it to be a plausible claim that placing an irradiator in a location subject to the specified risks (e.g., aircraft crashes, tsunamis, and hurricanes) would present an obvious potential for offsite consequences, the Board found that the petitioner (whose members the parties agreed were otherwise appropriately proximate to the proposed site) had standing under the geographical proximity presumption. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 106-107 (2006).

A Licensing Board disagreed that the Commission's decision in Exelon Generation Co. & PSEG Nuclear, LLC (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-26, 62 NRC 577, 580-83 (2005) stands for

the proposition that a categorical exclusion (such as 10 C.F.R. § 51.22(c)(14)(vii) for irradiators) precludes the possibility of a petitioner's proximity standing based on obvious potential for offsite consequences. The Board asserted that the Peach Bottom ruling involved a merger and license transfer governed by 10 C.F.R. § 50.80, and it noted that although license transfers, like irradiators, are categorically excluded from NEPA review pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 51.22(c) except when special circumstances are present, the Commission made no mention in the Peach Bottom decision of a categorical exclusion, nor did it suggest that such a determination would be dispositive of the issue for proximity standing. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 106 n.27 (2006).

The potential for offsite consequences was "obvious" because TVA sought, through a technical specification change, to "add tens of millions of curies of highly combustible radioactive gas to the already significant core inventory" at the reactors. Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-02-02-14, 56 NRC 15, 25 (2002).

Residence within 30-40 miles of a reactor site has been held to be sufficient to show the requisite interest in raising safety questions. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-146, 6 AEC 631, 633-634 (1973); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-125, 6 AEC 371, 372 n.6 (1973); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 190, 193, reconsid. den., ALAB-110, 6 AEC 247, aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 454-55 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988). Similarly, a person whose base of normal, everyday activities is within 25 miles of a nuclear facility can fairly be presumed to have an interest which might be affected by reactor construction and/or operation. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222, 226 (1974). A petitioner must affirmatively state his place of residence and the extent of his work activities which are located within close proximity to the facility. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-91-2, 33 NRC 42, 47 (1991). A person who regularly commutes past the entrance of a nuclear facility while conducting normal activities is presumed to have the requisite interest for standing. Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-90-3, 31 NRC 40, 45 (1990). Moreover, persons who allege that they use an area whose recreational benefits may be diminished by a nuclear facility have been found to possess an adequate interest to allow intervention. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-73-10, 6 AEC 173 (1973). On the other hand, it is proper for a Board to dismiss an intervention petition where the intervenor changes residence to an area not in the proximity of the reactor and totally fails to assume any significant participatory role in the proceeding. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-358, 4 NRC 558 (1976).

The initial issue in deciding a question of “proximity standing” is whether the kind of action at issue, when considered in light of the radioactive sources at the plant, justifies a presumption that the licensing action “could plausibly lead to the offsite release of radioactive fission products from . . . the . . . reactors.” The petitioner carries the burden of making this showing. If the petitioner fails to show that a particular licensing action raises an “obvious potential for offsite consequences,” then the standing inquiry reverts to a “traditional standing” analysis of whether the petitioner has made a specific showing of injury, causation, and redressability. In a license transfer case, the Commission concluded that the risks associated with the transfer of the non-operating, 50% ownership interest in a power reactor were de minimis and therefore justified no “proximity standing” at all. Exelon Generation Co., LLC and PSEG Nuclear, LLC (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-26, 62 NRC 577, 581 (2005).

The “proximity presumption” used in reactor construction and operating license proceedings should also apply to reactor license renewal proceedings. For construction permit and operating license proceedings, the NRC recognizes a presumption that persons who live, work or otherwise have contact within the area around the reactor have standing to intervene if they live within close proximity of the facility (e.g. 50 miles). Reactor license extension cases should be treated similarly because they allow operation of a reactor over an additional period of time during which the reactor can be subject to some of the same equipment failure and personnel error as during operations over the original period of the license. Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1,2, and 3), LBP-98-33, 48 NRC 381, 385 n.1 (1998).

In an adjudicatory hearing regarding decommissioning plans, a hearing petition or supplementary petition which fails to allege any concrete or particularized injury that would occur as a result of the transportation of reactor materials or components to a low-level waste facility, does not satisfy the “injury in fact” prong. In addition, a petition fails to demonstrate “injury in fact” which only alleges that a petitioner’s members live “close” to transportation routes that will be used for shipments of reactor materials and components to a low-level waste facility and does not identify those routes or explain how “close” to those routes the petitioner’s members actually live. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 100-02 (1994).

Where the Licensing Board rests its finding of standing on a combination of (a) the petitioners’ proximity to the licensed facility, (b) petitioners’ everyday use of the area near the reactor, and (c) the decommissioning effects described in the Commission’s 1988 GEIS, the Commission determined that it was reasonable for the Board to find “that some, even if minor, public exposures can be anticipated” and “will be visited” on petitioners’ members. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 248 (1996).

In non-reactor cases there is no presumption of standing based upon geographic proximity, absent a determination that the proposed action

involves a significant source of radioactivity producing an obvious potential for offsite consequences. Whether and at what distance a petitioner can be presumed to be affected must be judged on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the nature of the proposed action and the significance of the radioactive source. Where there is no obvious potential for radiological harm at a particular distance frequented by a petitioner, it becomes the petitioner's burden to show a specific and plausible means of how the challenged action may harm him or her. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-05-11, 61 NRC 309, 311 (2005).

In a proceeding reviewing an extended power uprate application, an organization had representational standing where its representative members each lived within 15 miles of the plant. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 553-54 (2004).

Proximity alone does not suffice to show standing in materials licensing cases, and would apply only in actions involving a significant source of radioactivity producing an obvious potential for offsite consequences. To show standing in a license amendment case, a petitioner must show some new or increased harm, threat, injury, or risk resulting from the amendment, separate and apart from continuing activities under the existing license and amendments. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-01-8, 53 NRC 204, 218 (2001). See also Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., CLI-04-13, 59 NRC 244, 248 (2004). How close a petitioner must live to the source for this "proximity plus" presumption to come into play depends on the danger posed by the source at issue. CFC Logistics, Inc., LBP-03-20, 58 NRC 311, 318 (2003). The analysis will look to (1) proximity, (2) the presence at the facility of a "significant source" of radioactivity, and (3) the "obvious potential" of the source's radioactivity to cause offsite harm. CFC Logistics, Inc., LBP-04-24, 60 NRC 475, 487 (2004).

In a materials license renewal proceeding under 10 CFR Part 30, as in construction permit and operating license proceedings under 10 CFR Part 50, the Appeal Board suggested that proximity to a large source of radioactive material is sufficient to establish the requisite interest for standing to intervene. Whether a petitioner's stated concern is in fact justified must be left for consideration when the merits of the controversy are reached. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (Cobalt-60 Storage Facility), ALAB-682, 16 NRC 150, 154 (1982). See generally, LBP-82-24, 15 NRC 652 (1982), (decision reversed regarding petitioner's request to intervene). But see International Uranium Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-98-6, 47 NRC 116 (1998). However, postcards and letters from individuals allegedly living near nuclear fuel element manufacturing and fuel element decladding facilities which make only vague and generalized allusions to danger or potential injury from radiation do not constitute a proper intervention statement. Rockwell International Corp. (Energy Systems Group Special Materials License No. SNM-21), LBP-83-65, 18 NRC 774, 777 (1983). More recent cases reject proximity to the site alone as a basis for standing. See Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo,



Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 83 (1993) (refusing to apply any presumption based on proximity and denying standing of petitioner residing within one eighth and within two miles of the facility). See also Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Facility), LBP-97-9, 45 NRC 414, 426 (1997) (petitioner must assert reasonable nexus between himself and purported radiological impacts). Even though a license is conditional so that certain activities may not take place without further staff approval, the scope of the license is not narrowed. A petitioning party has standing to request a hearing if any of the activities under the license would cause injury. Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261 (1998).

The fact that a member of a citizens' group lived twenty miles from a site was not sufficient to grant the group standing to intervene in a proceeding for an amendment to a materials license held by the site. U.S. Department of Army (Army Research Laboratory), LBP-00-21, 52 NRC 107 (2000). Mere geographical proximity to potential transportation routes is insufficient to confer standing; instead, section 2.309 petitioners must demonstrate a causal connection between the licensing action and the injury alleged. There is authority that indicates that to establish injury in fact, it is not necessary to proffer radiation impacts that amount to a regulatory violation. However, simply showing the potential for any radiological impact, no matter how trivial, is not sufficient to meet the requirement of showing a distinct and palpable harm under the first standing element. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413, 434 (2002), aff'd, CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1 (2003). See also U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 364-66 (2004), where an application involving a one-time export, under armed guard, of a limited quantity of plutonium oxide was distinguished from the line of Commission decisions discussing the proximity presumption and involving permanent or long-term licensed facilities. The Commission in CLI-04-17 also noted in a footnote that "[M]ere geographical proximity to potential transportation routes is insufficient to confer standing; instead...Petitioners must demonstrate a causal connection between the licensing action and the injury alleged." Id. at 364 n.11 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413, 434 (2002)).

In a case where petitioners challenged an export license to export weapons-grade plutonium oxide to France, and argued standing in part because of proximity to cross-country shipments of the plutonium, the Commission stated (via dicta in a footnote) that the NRC's jurisdiction to license DOE exports of special nuclear material under AEA § 54d does not extend to any aspects of DOE's domestic transportation of such material. Therefore, it was unclear that denial of DOE's proposed export license would redress or avoid the harm that Petitioners asserted for standing purposes – i.e., DOE's transportation of the plutonium oxide near petitioners' residences. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 366 n.13 (2004).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.1.F Injury Due to Failure to Prepare an EIS**

Failure to produce an environmental impact statement in circumstances where one is required has been held to constitute injury - indeed, irreparable injury. Palisades, supra, 10 NRC at 115-116. Persons residing within the close proximity to the locus of a proposed action constitute the very class which an impact statement is intended to benefit. Palisades, supra, 10 NRC at 116.

There is no 50-mile presumption for determining areas in which environmental impacts must be evaluated. The standing requirement for showing injury in fact has always been significantly less than for demonstrating an acceptable contention. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 248-49 (1993).

An organization has established standing by asserting that the Commission's decision not to prepare an environmental impact statement of the alleged de facto decommissioning of the Shoreham facility would injure the organization's ability to disseminate information which is essential to its organizational purpose and is within the zone of interests protected by the National Environmental Policy Act. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 435-36 (1991). The organization's alleged injury also was sufficient to establish standing in the Shoreham possession-only license proceeding where the organization asserted that the application for a possession-only license was another step in the alleged de facto decommissioning of the Shoreham facility. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-26, 33 NRC 537, 541-43 (1991), reconsid. denied, LBP-91-32, 34 NRC 132 (1991). The organization is not required to suffer direct environmental harm in order to establish standing. The organization's alleged injury to its informational purpose is a cognizable injury under NEPA as long as there is a reasonable risk that environmental harm may occur. Shoreham, supra, 34 NRC at 135-36, citing City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Licensing Board in the Rancho Seco possession-only license proceeding has held that the alleged injury to an organization's ability to disseminate information is insufficient by itself to establish standing. There must also be a showing of a specific cognizable injury. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-30, 34 NRC 23, 27-28 (1991). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-92-2, 35 NRC 47, 57-61 (1992), aff'd, Environmental and Resources Conservation Organization v. NRC, 996 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1993) (Table); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 128 (1992).

A statement of asserted injury which is insufficient to found a valid contention may well be adequate to provide a basis for standing. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 115 (1979). Failure to produce an environmental impact statement in circumstances where required has been held to constitute

injury - indeed, irreparable injury. Palisades, supra, 10 NRC at 115-116. Persons residing within the close proximity to the locus of a proposed action constitute the very class which an impact statement is intended to benefit. Palisades, supra, 10 NRC at 116. If petitioners fail to respond to a presiding officer's reasonable and clearly articulated requests for more specific information regarding petitioners' claims of standing, the presiding officer is justified in rejecting the petitions for intervention. International Uranium Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-98-6, 47 NRC 116 (1998).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.1.G Injury Due to Property Interest**

The Atomic Energy Act authorizes the Commission to accord protection from radiological injury to both health and property interests. Thus, a genuine property interest in a home situated near a planned uranium enrichment facility, even though the owner did not occupy the home, was sufficient to accord the petitioner standing, given that the home is located within the same distance already found sufficient as a basis to accord actual residents standing to intervene. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-05-11, 61 NRC 309, 311 (2005).

#### **2.10.4.1.1.2 "Zone of Interests" Test**

With respect to "zone of interest," the Appeal Board, in Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98, 103 n.6 (1976), rejected the contention that the Atomic Energy Act includes a "party aggrieved" provision which would require for standing purposes simply a showing of injury-in-fact. The Commission agreed with this analysis in its Pebble Springs decision. As such, zone of interest requirements are not met simply by invoking the Atomic Energy Act but must be satisfied by other means.

"In order to assess whether an interest is within the 'zone of interests' of a statute, it is necessary to 'first discern the interests 'arguably . . . to be protected' by the statutory provision at issue,' and 'then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected by the agency action are among them.'" U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky), CLI-01-23, 54 NRC 267, 272-273 (2001), (citing National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank, 522 U.S. 479, 492 (1998)).

The directness of a petitioner's connection with a facility bears upon the sufficiency of its allegations of injury-in-fact, but not upon whether its interests fall within the zone of interest which Congress was protecting or regulating. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98 (1976).

The Atomic Energy Act and its implementing regulations do not confer standing but rather require an additional showing that interests sought to be protected arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the Act. Virginia Electric & Power Co., ALAB-342 supra; accord, Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-27,

4 NRC 610 (1976); Cabot Performance Materials, LBP-00-13, 51 NRC 284, 288 (2000).

Injuries to a petitioner for intervention arising from the actions of parties other than the applicant (in this case, the State and its Governor) do not fall within the zones of interest arguably protected by the respective statutes that govern a licensing proceeding. The injury of which the petitioner complained was not a result of the disputed application. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-23, 52 NRC 114, 124 (2000).

Nuclear expert and citizens group who sought to challenge NRC reporting requirements (for performance-based containment leakage rate testing by nuclear power plants) fell within the zone of interests of the AEA because they arguably need access to information relating to successful as well as failed tests in order to exercise their rights under the AEA's hearing provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)(1)(A), and the § 2.206 petition provision. Reytblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The Atomic Energy Act authorizes the Commission to accord protection from radiological injury to both health and property interests. See AEA, §§ 103b, 161b, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(b), 2201(b). Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 48 (1994).

As the AEA protects not only human health and safety from radiologically caused injury but also the owner's property interests in their facility, persons or entities who own (or co-own) on NRC-licensed facility plainly have an AEA protected interest in license proceedings involving their facility. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 216 (1999).

While potential loss of business reputation is a cognizable "injury-in-fact," an interest in protecting business reputation and avoiding possible damage claims is not arguably within the zone of interest which the Act seeks to protect or regulate. Virginia Electric & Power Co., ALAB-342, supra (business reputation of reactor vessel component fabricator clearly would be injured if components failed during operation; however, fabricator's interest in protecting his reputation by intervening in hearing on adequacy of vessel supports was not within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the Atomic Energy Act).

The economic interest of a ratepayer is not sufficient to allow standing to intervene as a matter of right since concern about rates is not within the scope of interests sought to be protected by the Atomic Energy Act. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 128 (1977); Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1420-1421 (1977); Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426 (1977); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-17, 5 NRC 657 (1977); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-91-4, 33 NRC 153, 158 (1991); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear

Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 130-31 (1992); Texas Utilities Electric Company, et al. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-37, 36 NRC 370, 374 (1992). Nor is such interest within the zone of interests protected by the National Environmental Policy Act. Portland General Electric Company (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-333, 3 NRC 804 (1976).

A person's interest as a taxpayer does not fall within the zone of interests sought to be protected by either the Atomic Energy Act or the National Environmental Policy Act. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 (1977); Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 315 (1989).

Economic injury gives standing under the National Environmental Policy Act only if it is environmentally related. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 (1977); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-17, 33 NRC 379, 39091 (1991); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-92-2, 35 NRC 47, 56-57 (1992), aff'd, Environmental and Resources Conservation Organization v. NRC, 996 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1993) (Table); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 131 (1992). See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-292, 2 NRC 631, 640 (1975); Quivira Mining Co. (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, NM), CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998) and International Uranium (USA) (Receipt of material from Tonawanda, New York), CLI-98-23, 48 NRC 259, 264 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

The courts have not resolved the issue of whether an individual who suffers economic injury as a result of a Board's decision to bar him from working in a certain job would be within the zone of interests protected by the Atomic Energy Act. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282, 316 (1985). See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALAB-670, 15 NRC 493, 506 (1982) (concurring opinion of Mr. Rosenthal), vacated as moot, CLI-82-18, 16 NRC 50 (1982).

Antitrust considerations to one side, neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the National Environmental Policy Act includes in its "zone of interests" the purely economic personal concerns of a member/ratepayer of a cooperative that purchases power from a prospective facility co-owner. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473, 474-475 (1978). See also Puget Sound Power & Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-26, 15 NRC 742, 744 (1982).

General economic concerns are not within the proper scope of issues to be litigated before the boards. Concerns about a facility's impact on local utility rates, the local economy, or a utility's solvency, etc., do not provide an adequate basis for standing of an intervenor or for the admission of an intervenor's contentions. Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel

Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 94 n.64 (1993). Such economic concerns are more appropriately raised before state economic regulatory agencies. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 2), CLI-84-6, 19 NRC 975, 978 (1984); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1190 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-789, 20 NRC 1443, 1447 (1984). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 30 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 194 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 437, 443 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-26, 33 NRC 537, 544, 546 (1991), reconsid. denied, LBP-91-32, 34 NRC 132 (1991); Quivira Mining Corporation (Ambrosia Lake Facility, Grants, New Mexico), LBP-97-20, 46 NRC 257, 271 (1997), aff'd, CLI-98-11, 48 NRC 1 (1998), aff'd sub nom. Envirocare, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

#### **2.10.4.1.2 Standing of Organizations to Intervene**

In order to establish organizational standing, an organization must allege: (1) that the action will cause an "injury in fact" to either (a) the organization's interests or (b) the interests of its members; and (2) that the injury is within the "zone of interests" protected by either the AEA. A party may intervene as of right only when he asserts his own interests under either the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA) or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and not when he asserts interests of third persons. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 102 n.10 (1994); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 68-69 (1996); aff'd, in part, CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235 (1996); Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-98-12, 47 NRC 343 (1998). A petitioning organization has standing to request a hearing if any of the activities under the license may cause injury to its interests or to one of its members. Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261 (1998).

A party may intervene as of right only when he asserts his own interests under either the Atomic Energy Act or NEPA, and not when he asserts interests of third persons. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418, 1421 (1977). Commission practice requires each party to separately establish standing. 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616, 623 (1981). An organization may meet the injury-in-fact test for standing in one of two ways. It may demonstrate an effect upon its organizational interest, or it may allege that its members, or any of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justifiable case had the members themselves brought suit. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 646 (1979); Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 112-113 (1979); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261 (1998); North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-98-23,

48 NRC 157 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998); Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185 (1988). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118 (1987). To determine whether an organization's individual members have standing a petitioner must allege (1) a particularized injury, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 323 (1999). Thus, a corporate environmental group has standing to intervene and represent members who have an interest which will be affected. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-322, 3 NRC 328 (1976). Note, however, that a member's mere "interest in the problem" without a showing that the member will be affected is insufficient to give the organization standing. Allied General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), ALAB-328, 3 NRC 420 (1976). An organization does not have independent standing to intervene in a licensing proceeding merely because it asserts an interest in the litigation. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-74, 16 NRC 981, 983 (1982), citing Allied General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), ALAB-328, 3 NRC 420, 422 (1976). An organization seeking to intervene in its own right must demonstrate a palpable injury-in-fact to its organizational interests that is within the scope of interests of the Atomic Energy Act or the National Environmental Policy Act. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521, 528-530 (1991). In this vein, for national environmental groups, standing is derived from injury-in-fact to individual members. South Texas, *supra*, 9 NRC at 647, citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). However, an organization specifically empowered by its members to promote certain of their interests has those members' authorization to act as their representative in any proceeding that may affect those interests. Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-700, 16 NRC 1329, 1334 (1982); see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 342-345 (1977); Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-536, 9 NRC 402, 404 n.2 (1979); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 395-396 n.25 (1979); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-94-19, 40 NRC 9, 13-15 (1994); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998). A member's authorization may be presumed when the sole or primary purpose of the organization is to oppose nuclear power in general or the facility at bar in particular. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-33, 34 NRC 138, 140-41 (1991).

To have standing, an organization must show injury either to its organizational interests or to the interests of members who have authorized it to act for them. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1437 (1982), citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739-740 (1972); Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-7920, 10 NRC 108, 113 (1979); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-29,

32 NRC 89, 91-92 (1990). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-17, 33 NRC 379, 389 (1991).

An organization must, in itself, and through its own membership, fulfill the requirements for standing. Skagit/Hanford, supra, 16 NRC at 984, citing Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 613 (1976).

“[T]he petitioning organization must demonstrate that the interests it seeks to protect are germane to its purposes and that neither the claim it asserts nor the relief it requests requires the participation of an individual member in the proceeding”. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 413-14 (2001).

Absent express authorization, an organization which is a party to an NRC proceeding may not represent persons other than its own members. Since there are no Commission regulations allowing parties to participate as private attorneys general, an organization acting as an intervenor may not claim to represent the public interest in general in addition to representing the specialized interests of its members. In this vein, a trade association of home heating oil dealers cannot be deemed to represent the interests of employees and customers of the dealers. Similarly, an organization of residents living near a proposed plant site cannot be deemed to represent the interests of other residents who are not members. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-77-11, 5 NRC 481 (1977); Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-74, 16 NRC 981, 984 (1982), citing Shoreham, *supra*, 5 NRC at 481, 483. An organization lacked standing to litigate the consequences of a possible accident in a research laboratory where the health risks from the accident would be confined within the laboratory and the organization had not demonstrated that any of its members were workers inside the laboratory. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-30, 32 NRC 95, 103 (1990).

#### **2.10.4.1.2.1 Organizational Standing**

A petitioner cannot assert injury-in-fact to itself as an organization based upon nothing more than a broad interest—shared with many others—in the preservation of the environment. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972). Nor can standing be founded upon a petitioner’s stated strong organizational interest in compliance with the dictates of federal and state laws and regulations. International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill) LBP-01-15, 53 NRC 344, 348 (2001); Ten Applications for Low-Enriched Uranium Exports to EURATOM Member Nations, CLI-77-24, 6 NRC 525, 531 (1977), citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 333 (1983).

An organization must demonstrate a discrete institutional injury to the organization itself. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-21, 54 NRC 247, 252 (2001); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-



06-23, 64 NRC 257, 271 (2006). General environmental and policy interests are insufficient to confer organizational standing. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-21, 54 NRC 247, 252 (2001).

Where an organization is to be represented in an NRC proceeding by one of its members, the member must demonstrate authorization by that organization to represent it. Fermi, *supra*, 8 NRC at 583. See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-29, 32 NRC 89, 92 (1990); Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 115 (1995).

If an official of an organization has the requisite personal interests to support an intervention petition, her signature on the organization's petition for intervention is enough to give the organization standing to intervene. However the organization is not always necessarily required to produce an affidavit from a member or sponsor authorizing it to represent that member or sponsor. The organization may be presumed to represent the interests of those of its members or sponsors in the vicinity of the facility. (Where an organization has no members, its sponsors can be considered the equivalent to members where they financially support the organization's objectives and have indicated a desire to be represented by the organization.) Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-25, 15 NRC 715, 728-729, 734-736 (1982).

An organization seeking intervention need not demonstrate that its membership had voted to seek intervention on the matter raised by a submitted contention, and had authorized the author of the intervention petition to represent the organization. Duke Power Company (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 -- Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 151 (1979). Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 206-207 (1992) [the effect of ratification by a principal of its agent's previous acts is to adopt those acts as the principal's own as of the time the agent acted].

Where the petitioner organization's membership solicitation brochure demonstrates that the organization's sole purpose is to oppose nuclear power in general and the construction and operation of nuclear plants in the northwest in particular, mere membership by a person with geographic standing to intervene, without specific representational authority, is sufficient to confer standing. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-83-16, 17 NRC 479, 482 (1983). See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-33, 34 NRC 138, 140-41 (1991).

An organization which bases its standing upon the interests of its sponsors must: (1) identify at least one sponsor who will be injured; (2) describe the nature of that injury; and (3) provide an authorization for the organization to represent the sponsor in the proceeding. Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 314 (1989).

To establish injury-in-fact, an organization must show a causal relationship between the alleged injury to its sponsor and the proposed licensing activity. Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-90-3, 31 NRC 40, 43-44 (1990); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261 (1998); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 87 (1998); Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-02-02-14, 56 NRC 15, 23 (2002).

#### **2.10.4.1.2.2 Representational Standing**

Where an organization asserts a right to represent the interests of its members, “judicial concepts of standing” require a showing that: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests that the organization seeks to protect are germane to its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires an individual member to participate in the organization’s lawsuit. Longstanding NRC practice also requires an organization to demonstrate that at least one of its members has authorized it to represent the member’s interests. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 323 (1999). See also Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 103-104 (2006).

An organization seeking representational standing must demonstrate how at least one of its members may be affected by the licensing action, must identify that member by name and address, and must show that the organization is authorized by that member to request a hearing on the member’s behalf. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37 (2000). See GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202 (2000); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 271 (2006).

There is a presumption of standing where an organization raises safety issues on behalf of a member or members residing in close proximity to a plant. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 115 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118 (1987); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 87, 93-94 (1998). The petitioning organization must identify the members whose interests it represents, and state the members’ places of residence and the extent of the members’ activities located within close proximity to the plant. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-91-4, 33 NRC 153, 158 (1991).

An individual satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement of standing by showing that his or her residence is within the geographical area that might be affected by an accidental release of fission products. The Commission’s “rule of thumb” for this zone of possible harm is that persons who reside within a 50

mile radius of the facility at issue are presumed to have standing. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-7, 63 NRC 188, 195 (2006).

Thus, for representational standing, a group must identify at least one of its members by name and address and demonstrate how that member may be affected (such as by activities on or near the site) and show (preferably by affidavit) that the group is authorized to request a hearing on behalf of the member. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 646-47 (1979). Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-96-22, 44 NRC 138, 141 (1996); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261, 271 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998); North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-98-23, 48 NRC 157, 159, 163 (1998); GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202 (2000). The group must show that the amendment may injure the group, or someone the group is authorized to represent. International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-14, 46 NRC 55, 57 (1997); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 293 (2000); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 293 (2000), citing Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 163 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202 (2000).

To establish the requisite "injury-in-fact" for standing, a petitioner must have a "real stake" in the outcome, a genuine, actual, or direct stake, but not necessarily a substantial stake in the outcome. An organization meets this requirement where it has identified one of its members who possesses the requisite standing. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 447-448 (1979). See Dellums v. NRC, 863 F.2d 968, 972-73 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

An organization depending upon injury to the interests of its members to establish standing, must provide with its petition identification of at least one member who will be injured, a description of the nature of that injury, and an authorization for the organization to represent that individual in the proceeding. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1437 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 390-96 (1976); Combustion Engineering, Inc. (Hematite Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-89-23, 30 NRC 140, 149 (1989); Northern States Power Co. (Pathfinder Atomic Plant), LBP-89-30, 30 NRC 311, 313, 315-16 (1989); Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-18, 31 NRC 559, 565 (1990); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 29 (1991); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation, LBP-91-5, 33 NRC 163, 166 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-91-7, 33 NRC 179, 192-93 (1991); Long Island Lighting

Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-91-23, 33 NRC 430, 434 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-91-26, 33 NRC 537, 541 (1991), reconsid. denied, LBP-91-32, 34 NRC 132 (1991). The alleged injury-in-fact to the member must be within the purpose of the organization. Curators, supra, 31 NRC at 565-66.

It is not necessary for the individual on whom organizational standing is based to be conversant with, and able to defend, each and every contention raised by the organization in pursuing his interest. Litigation strategy and the technical details of the complex prosecution of a nuclear power intervention are best left to the resources of the organizational petitioners. WPPSS, supra, 17 NRC at 485.

A petitioner's identification of four organizational members whose interests have allegedly been injured or might be injured by actions taken in relation to the decommissioning process does not satisfy the "injury in fact" prong of the organizational standing test where those members live near the proposed site for the disposal of reactor materials and components and not near the site of the nuclear power plant from which the materials are to be removed. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 101-02 (1994).

The identity of specific individual members of a petitioner organization whose interests are being represented by that organization is not viewed as an integral and material portion of the petition to intervene. Any change in membership, therefore, does not require an amendment of the petition. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project 1), LBP-83-59, 18 NRC 667, 669 (1983).

Once a member has been identified sufficiently to afford verification by the other parties and the petition to intervene has been granted, it is presumed that the organizational petitioner continues to represent individual members with standing to intervene who authorize the intervention. It is doubtful that the death or relocation outside the geographical zone of interest of the only named members upon whom standing was based would defeat this presumption and require a further showing of standing. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project 1), LBP-83-59, 18 NRC 667, 669 (1983).

#### **2.10.4.1.2.2.A The Person an Organization Seeks to Represent Must Be a "Member" and Have Given "Authorization"**

A group does not have standing to assert the interest of plant workers, where it has no such workers among its members. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 11-12 (1993).

An organization was denied representational standing where the person on whom it based its standing was not an individual member of the organization, but instead was serving as the representative of another

organization. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521, 530-31 (1991).

If individuals relied upon to establish representational standing for an organization fail to indicate they are members of that organization, their proximity to the facility cannot be used as a basis for representational standing. See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4) ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521, 530-31 (representational standing not present when individual relied on for standing is not organization member, but only representative of another organization), aff'd, CLI-91-13, 34 NRC 185 (1991). General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 159 n.11 (1996).

The petition of an organization to intervene must show that the person signing it has been authorized by the organization to do so. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 77 (1979). However, another Licensing Board granted an intervention petition filed by the highest ranking organizational officer without express authority from the organization. The Board was willing to infer the general authority of the officer to act on behalf of the organization to further its mission and purposes, pending official approval from the organization. The Board noted that the organization's subsequent filing of an intervention petition ratified the earlier petition filed by its officer. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 206-207 (1992).

An organization seeking to obtain standing in a representative capacity must demonstrate that a member has in fact authorized such representation. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 444 (1979), aff'd, ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644 (1979); Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 77 (1979); Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 113 (1979); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-82-52, 16 NRC 183, 185 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377 (1979); see generally, CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616 (1981), (Guidelines for Board); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-54, 16 NRC 210, 216 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377 (1979); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 411 (1984); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-7, 25 NRC 116, 118 (1987); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-29, 32 NRC 89, 92 (1990); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 30 (1991); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 72 (1994); International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-14, 46 NRC 55, 57 (1997). Where the affidavit of the member is devoid of any statement that

he wants the organization to represent his interests, it is unwarranted for the Licensing Board to infer such authorization, particularly where the opportunity was offered to revise the document and was ignored. Beaver Valley, supra, 19 NRC at 411.

#### **2.10.4.1.2.2.B Timing of Membership**

A petitioner organization cannot amend its petition to satisfy the timeliness requirements for filing without leave of the Board to include an affidavit executed by someone who became a member after the due date for filing timely petition. WPPSS, supra, 17 NRC at 483.

An organization cannot meet the "interest" requirement for standing by acquiring a new member considerably after the deadline for filing of intervention petitions who meets the "interest" requirement, but who has not established good cause for the out-of-time filing. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), LBP-79-7, 9 NRC 330, 335 (1979)

#### **2.10.4.1.2.3 Governments/Indian Tribes and Organizational Standing**

Although a member of a group with an interest in a proceeding must normally authorize the group to represent his or her interests to achieve standing for the group, such explicit authorization is not necessary in the case of a State representing as sovereign the interests of a number of its citizens. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decommissioning) LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386, 394 (1999) citing Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26, 33 (1998). A state does not need to establish standing when attempting to intervene in a proceeding for a facility located within the state. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 553 (2004).

When a state advises a licensing board that a proceeding involves a facility within its borders, the licensing board shall not require further demonstration of standing. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-7, 63 NRC 188, 194 (2006).

State standing stems from its responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizenry and its proprietary interest in the natural resources within its boundaries. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-03-29, 58 NRC 442, 448 (2003); see also Fansteel, Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-03-22, 58 NRC 363, 367 (2003).

A state does not need the explicit authorization of its citizens to represent them in a proceeding. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decommissioning) LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386, 391 n.10 (1999) citing International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Receipt of Material from Tonawanda, New

York), LBP-98-21, 48 NRC 137, 145 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142 (1998).

As the Commission has recognized in a somewhat different context, the strong interest that a governmental body has in protecting the individuals and territory that fall under its sovereign guardianship establishes an organizational interest for standing purposes. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26, 33 (1998); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 29 (1999).

As the owner of streams, lakes, air, and property on or near the site, Oklahoma has catalogued a number of asserted injuries to those interests resulting from alleged pollution and discharges emanating as a result of the SRSDP. That such pollution or those discharges may conform to regulatory criteria is not controlling for standing purposes—the State’s interests will nevertheless be affected by the SRSDP. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decommissioning) LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386, 395 (1999) citing Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Facility), LBP-97-9, 45 NRC 414, 425 (1997); General Public Utilities Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 158 (1996).

Where the New York State Attorney General has had involvement with the New York Public Service Commission’s license transfer proceeding regarding the same parties at issue here, he does not have to establish standing to participate in the hearing. He may participate in a manner analogous to a participating government under 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)), if a hearing is granted, because the Commission has long recognized the benefits of participation in NRC proceedings by representatives of interested states, counties, and municipalities. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 344-45 (1999).

Local government entities, such as school districts or townships, have standing to intervene in a license transfer case when the township is the locus of the power plant because it is in a position analogous to that of an individual living or working within a few miles of the plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 294-295 (2000).

A local government with jurisdiction over a geographical area that will admittedly be affected by a reactor’s operations – but which does not actually contain the reactor – does nonetheless have standing in a license renewal adjudication regarding the reactor. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 66-67 (2005).

10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) does not give all governmental or quasi-governmental entities the right to participate in NRC adjudicative proceedings as full parties. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-98-12, 47 NRC 343 (1998), aff’d, CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185 (1998).

Indian Tribes, however, have been permitted to intervene as an entity, without demonstrating that a particular tribe member has an interest and wishes to be represented by the tribe. They also have participated in the more routine manner of identifying a tribe member who has individual standing but wishes representation. Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-96-22, 44 NRC 138, 141 (1996).

A legislator lacks standing to intervene on behalf of the interests of his constituents who live near a nuclear facility. However, the legislator may participate in a proceeding in a private capacity if he can establish his own personal standing. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (Hematite Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-89-23, 30 NRC 140, 145 (1989); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-35, 36 NRC 355, 358, n. 9 (1992).

#### **2.10.4.1.3 Standing to Intervene in Export Licensing Cases**

In Edlow International Co., CLI-76-6, 3 NRC 563 (1976), the Commission dealt with the question as to whether the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club could intervene as of right and demand a hearing in an export licensing case. The case involved the export of fuel to India for the Tarapur project. The petitioners contended that at least one member of the Sierra Club and several members of NRDC lived in India and thus would be subject to any hazards created by the reactor.

In rejecting the argument that there was a right to intervene, the Commission stated:

If petitioners allege a concrete and direct injury their claim of standing is not impaired merely because similar harm is suffered by many others. However, if petitioners' asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction'. 3 NRC at 576. The Commission held that the alleged interests were de minimis (3 NRC at 575), noting that, while in domestic licensing cases claims of risk that were somewhat remote have been recognized as forming a basis for intervention, Section 189a of the Act (42 U.S.C. § 2239(a)) would not be given such a broadly permissive reading (3 NRC at 571) in export licensing cases.

Consistent with its decision in Edlow International Co., CLI-76-6, 3 NRC 563 (1976), the Commission has held that a petitioner is not entitled to intervene as a matter of right where its petition raises abstract issues relating to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and protection of the national security. The petitioner must establish that it will be injured and that the injury is not a generalized grievance shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. In the Matter of Ten Applications, CLI-77-24, 6 NRC 525, 531 (1977); Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.15% Enriched Uranium), CLI-94-1, 39 NRC 1 (1994); Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-98-10, 47 NRC 333, 336 (1998). Nevertheless, the Commission may, in its discretion, direct further public proceedings if it determines that such proceedings would be in the public



interest even though the petitioner has not established a right under Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act to intervene or demand a public hearing. Id. at 532. See also Braunkohle Transport. UZA (Import of South African Uranium Ore Concentrate), CLI-87-6, 25 NRC 891, 893 (1987), citing 10 CFR § 110.84(a).

The contention that a major Federal action would have a significant environmental impact on a foreign nation is not cognizable under NEPA, and cannot support intervention. Babcock & Wilcox (Application for Considerations of Facility Export License), CLI-77-18, 5 NRC 1332, 1348 (1977).

Judicial precedents will be relied on in deciding issues of standing to intervene in export licensing. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Export to South Korea), CLI-80-30, 12 NRC 253, 258 (1980). The Commission, throughout its history, has applied judicial standing tests to its export licensing proceedings. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 331 (1994).

Institutional interests in disseminating information and educating the public do not establish a claim of right under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act for purposes of standing because it would not constitute an interest affected by the proceeding. There must be a causal nexus between the refusal to allow standing and the inability to disseminate information. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Export to South Korea), CLI-80-30, 12 NRC 253, 259 (1980).

Commission regulations in 10 CFR § 110.84(a)(1) provide that if a petitioner is not entitled to an AEA section 189a hearing as a matter of right because of a lack of standing, the Commission will nevertheless consider whether such a hearing would be in the public interest and would assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations required by the AEA. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 333 (1994).

Organization's institutional interest in providing information to the public and the generalized interest of its membership in minimizing danger from proliferation are insufficient for to confer standing on the organization under section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Transnuclear, Inc., CLI-94-1, 39 NRC 1, 5 (1994). See, Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-00-16, 52 NRC 68, 72 (2000). See also Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-15, 49 NRC 366, 367-368 (1999); Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-98-10, 47 NRC 333, 336 (1998); U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 364 (2004).

#### **2.10.4.1.4 Standing to Intervene in License Transfer Proceedings**

As part of a petitioner's required demonstration of standing for intervention in a license transfer proceeding, the petitioner must show it "has suffered [or will suffer] a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statute [and that this] injury can fairly be traced to the challenged action (the approval of the license transfer). FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Power Station, Unit 1; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-06-2,

63 NRC 9, 13-14 (2006) (quoting Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 6 (1996).

Local government entities, such as school districts or townships, have standing to intervene in a license transfer case when the township is the locus of the power plant because it is in a position analogous to that of an individual living or working within a few miles of the plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 294-295 (2000).

The Commission has granted standing in license transfer proceedings to petitioners who raised similar assertions and who were authorized to represent members living or active quite close to the site. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 293-294 (2000), citing Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 163-64 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000); Northern States Power Co., (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-19, 52 NRC 135, 135 (2000).

Employees who work inside a nuclear power plant should ordinarily be accorded standing as long as the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the license transfer. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 294 (2000).

A petitioner's involvement – both personal and through organizations – in numerous activities related to a particular nuclear power plant was not enough to demonstrate injury to his financial, property, or other interests. Therefore the petitioner had not demonstrated “traditional standing.” “Proximity standing” differs from “traditional standing” in that the petitioner claiming it need not make an express showing of harm. Rather, “proximity standing” rests on the presumption that an accident associated with the nuclear facility could adversely affect the health and safety of people working, living, or regularly engaging in activities offsite but within a certain distance of that facility. In ruling on claims of “proximity standing,” the Commission determines the radius beyond which it believes there is no longer an “obvious potential for offsite consequences” by “taking into account the nature of the proposed action and the significance of the radioactive source” (footnotes omitted). A situation where a corporate merger would not have resulted in changes to the physical plant, operating procedures, design basis accident analysis, management, or personnel at a nuclear power plant, and all merger activity occurred several corporate levels above the current licensee, the Commission held that associated license transfer raised no “obvious potential for offsite consequences.” Therefore, the petitioner's presumed claim of “proximity standing” lacked merit. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-05-25, 62 NRC 572, 573-74 (2005); see also Exelon Generation Co., LLC and PSEG Nuclear, LLC (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-26, 62 NRC 577, 579-83 (2005).

The initial issue in deciding a question of “proximity standing” is whether the kind of action at issue, when considered in light of the radioactive sources at the plant, justifies a presumption that the licensing action “could plausibly lead to the offsite release of radioactive fission products from . . . the . . . reactors.” The petitioner carries the burden of making this showing. If the petitioner fails to show that a particular licensing action raises an “obvious potential for offsite consequences,” then the standing inquiry reverts to a “traditional standing” analysis of whether the petitioner has made a specific showing of injury, causation, and redressability. In a license transfer case, the Commission concluded that the risks associated with the transfer of the non-operating, 50% ownership interest in a power reactor were de minimis and therefore justified no “proximity standing” at all. *Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station*, CLI-05-26, 62 NRC at 581.

In a license transfer proceeding, the Commission found a petitioner’s “highly general comment” that it and its members “compete with [the entities involved in the transfer] for generation ... services” to be too vague and general to show a real potential for injury sufficient for standing. Petitioners failed to explain how their distribution, generation, and transmission rights would be adversely affected in connection with certain antitrust license conditions that they claimed would allegedly be rendered unenforceable by the license transfer. *FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co.* (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Power Station, Unit 1; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-06-2, 63 NRC 9, 16 (2006) (citing *GPU Nuclear, Inc.* (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 203 (2000); *Pac. Gas and Elec. Co.* (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 337 (2002)).

#### **2.10.4.2 Discretionary Intervention**

The presiding officer may consider a request for discretionary intervention when at least one requestor/petitioner has established standing and at least one admissible contention has been admitted so that a hearing will be held. In determining whether discretionary intervention should be permitted, the Commission has indicated that the Licensing Board should be guided by the following factors, among others:

- (1) Weighing in favor of allowing intervention --
  - (i) The extent to which the requestor’s/petitioner’s participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record.
  - (ii) The nature and extent of the requestor’s/petitioner’s property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding.
  - (iii) The possible effect of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor’s/petitioner’s interest.
- (2) Weighing against allowing intervention --
  - (i) The availability of other means whereby requestor’s/petitioner’s interest will be protected.
  - (ii) The extent to which the requestor’s/petitioner’s interest will be represented by existing parties.
  - (iii) The extent to which requestor’s/petitioner’s participation will inappropriately broaden or delay the proceeding.

Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 616 (1976). These six factors were originally developed in case law, but are now codified at 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(e)(1)-(2). See Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-16, 63 NRC 708, 715-16 (2006). Of these criteria, the most important weighing in favor of discretionary intervention is whether the person seeking discretionary intervention has demonstrated the capability and willingness to contribute to the development of the evidentiary record, even though they cannot show the traditional interest in the proceeding. The most important factor weighing against discretionary intervention is the potential to appropriately broaden or delay the proceeding.

The discretionary intervention doctrine comes into play only in circumstances where standing to intervene as a matter of right has not been established. Duke Power Company (Oconee Nuclear Station and McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 148 n.3 (1979).

Although under our rules the “standing” requirement does not apply to petitions for discretionary intervention, the “admissible contention” requirement does. Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-16, 63 NRC at 719-20.

The Commission has broad discretion to allow intervention where it is not a matter of right. Such intervention will not be granted where conditions have already been imposed on a licensee, and no useful purpose will be served by that intervention. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 442 (1980).

Under the six-factor test for discretionary intervention, a primary consideration is the first factor of assistance in developing a sound record. See Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-27, 4 NRC 610, 617 (1976); see also Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-16, 63 NRC at 716; General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 160 (1996).

For discretionary intervention, the burden of convincing the Licensing Board that a petitioner could make a valuable contribution lies with the petitioner. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 745 (1978). Considerations in determining the petitioner's ability to contribute to development of a sound record include:

- (1) a petitioner's showing of significant ability to contribute on substantial issues of law or fact which will not be otherwise properly raised or presented;
- (2) the specificity of such ability to contribute on those substantial issues of law or fact;
- (3) justification of time spent on considering the substantial issues of law or fact;
- (4) provision of additional testimony, particular expertise, or expert assistance;
- (5) specialized education or pertinent experience.

Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-1, 13 NRC 27, 33 (1981) (and cases cited therein). See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-24, 32 NRC 12, 16-17 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521, 532 (1991). Where a petitioner failed to respond to a

Licensing Board order seeking clarification following presentation of evidence casting shadow on his purported qualifications, the Board was entitled to conclude that a petitioner would not help to create a sound record, and that the veracity of his other statements were suspect, leading to denial of his petition. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 457-458 (1979).

The primary factor to be considered is the significance of the contribution that a petitioner might make. Pebble Springs, *supra*. Thus, foremost among the factors listed above is whether the intervention would likely produce a valuable contribution to the NRC's decisionmaking process on a significant safety or environmental issue appropriately addressed in the proceeding in question. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-413, 5 NRC 1418 (1977). *See also* Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473, 475 n.2 (1978); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 131-32 (1992); Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-02-02-14, 56 NRC 15, 28 (2002). The need for a strong showing as to potential contribution is especially pressing in an operating license proceeding where no petitioners have established standing as of right and where, absent such a showing, no hearing would be held. Watts Bar, *supra*, 5 NRC at 1422. Where there are no intervenors as of right, a Licensing Board will determine whether a discernible public interest would be served by ordering a hearing based on a grant of discretionary intervention. Envirocare of Utah, Inc., LBP-92-8, 35 NRC 167, 183-84 (1992).

Discretionary intervention is meant to ensure a sound adjudicatory record, not simply to provide a second representative to assist (allegedly) ill-represented parties. Granting discretionary intervention based on an admitted party's purported lack of knowledge and experience, as opposed to the petitioner's relevant knowledge and experience, constitutes legal error. Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-16, 63 NRC at 723.

As to the second and third factors to be considered with regard to discretionary intervention (the nature and extent of property, financial or other interests in the proceeding and the possible effect any order might have on the petitioner's interest), interests which do not establish a right to intervention because they are not within the "zone of interests" to be protected by the Commission should not be considered as positive factors for the purposes of granting discretionary intervention. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 388, *aff'd*, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978).

In order for the Commission to grant a discretionary hearing in an export license proceeding, a petitioner must reflect in its submissions that it would offer something in a hearing that would generate significant new information or insight about the challenged action. The offer of "new evidence" that consists of documents that have already been in the public domain for some time does not meet the criteria for the grant of a discretionary hearing. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 334 (1994).

For a case in which the Commission's discretionary intervention rule was applied, see Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-363, 4 NRC 631 (1976), where, despite petitioner's lack of judicial standing, intervention was permitted based upon petitioner's demonstration of the potential significant contribution it could make on substantial issues of law and fact not otherwise raised or presented and a showing of the importance and immediacy of those issues.

Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility, LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 94 n.66 (1993) (If a hearing petitioner does not request permission to intervene in a proceeding as a matter of discretion, see Pebble Springs, CLI-76-27, 4 NRC at 614-17, it is not necessary to determine whether it could be afforded such intervention).

### **2.10.5 Contentions of Intervenors**

Contentions constitute the method by which the parties to a licensing proceeding frame issues under NRC practice, similar to the use of pleadings in their judicial counterparts. Such contentions may be amended or refined as a result of additional information gained by discovery. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-25, 14 NRC 241, 243 (1981). In proving its claim, a petitioner is not limited to the specific facts relied on to have its contention accepted, as long as the additional facts are material to the contention. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 20-21 (1993).

In order to be admissible, a contention must comply with every requirement listed in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1). U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground Site), LBP-06-27, 64 NRC 438 (2006).

"[A] contention must have a basis in fact or law and ... it must entitle a petitioner to relief." Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 3), LBP-02-5, 55 NRC 131, 141 (2002). Neither the Commission's Rules of Practice nor the pertinent statement of consideration puts an absolute or relative limit on the number of contentions that may be admitted to a licensing proceeding. See 10 CFR § 2.309(f) (formerly 2.714(a), (b)); 69 FR 2182, Jan. 14, 2004. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-706, 16 NRC 1754, 1757 (1982). The Commission, presiding officer or the ASLB will grant the request/petition if it determines that the requestor/petitioner has standing under the standing provisions of 2.309(d) and has proposed at least one admissible contention.

Note that a State participating as an "interested State" under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) need not set forth in advance any affirmative contentions of its own. Project Management Corporation (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 392-393 (1976). However, government entities seeking to litigate their own contentions are held to the same pleading rules as everyone else. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 NRC 551, 567-68 (2005).

Since a mandatory hearing is not required at the operating license stage, Licensing Boards should "take the utmost care" to assure that the "one good contention rule" is met in such a situation because, absent successful intervention, no hearing need be

held. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8, 12 (1976). See also Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-183, 7 AEC 222, 226 n.10 (1974).

Where intervenors have been consolidated, it is not necessary that a contention or contentions be identified to any one of the intervening parties, so long as there is at least one contention admitted per intervenor. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 687 (1981).

A Licensing Board should not address the merits of a contention when determining its admissibility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1654 (1982), citing Allens Creek, supra, 11 NRC at 542; Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 34 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 541 (1986); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 933 (1987); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-26, 28 NRC 440, 446 (1988), reconsidered on other grounds, LBP-89-6, 29 NRC 127 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29 (1989), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990); Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222, 228 (9th Cir. 1988). See Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1292 (1984), citing Allens Creek, supra, 11 NRC 542; Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, 216 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, CLI-74-12, 7 AEC 203 (1974); and Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 244-45 (1973). What is required is that an intervenor state the reasons for its concern. Seabrook, supra, citing Allens Creek, supra.

Determining whether a contention is adequately supported by a concise allegation of the facts or expert opinion is not a hearing on the merits. A petitioner does not have to prove its contention at the admissibility stage. However, supporting material provided by a petitioner, including those portions of the material that are not relied upon, is subject to Board scrutiny. The contention admissibility standard is less than is required at the summary disposition stage. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), LBP-05-28, 62 NRC 585, 596-97 (2005).

A contention about a matter not covered by a specific rule need only allege that the matter poses a significant safety problem. That would be enough to raise an issue under the general requirement for operating licenses [10 CFR § 50.57(a)(3)] for finding of reasonable assurance of operation without endangering the health and safety of the public. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982).

Petitioners who have established their standing to present a contention that seeks modification or rejection of a nuclear facility decommissioning plan so as to avoid health and safety or environmental injury to the public also can pursue any contention alleging such modification/rejection relief based on circumstances such as purported

occupational exposure to facility workers from decommissioning activities. See CLI-96-1, 43 NRC at 6. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 70 (1996).

The basis for a contention may not be undercut, and the contention thereby excluded, through an attack on the credibility of the expert who provided the basis for the contention. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-98, 16 NRC 1459, 1466 (1982), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).

Orange County expressly approved the final language of its admitted environmental contention. The County should not now be heard to complain that the contention as admitted was too narrow. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 390 (2001).

#### **2.10.5.1 Scope of Contentions**

The subject matter of all contentions is limited to the scope of the proceeding delineated by the Commission in its hearing notice and referral order delegating to the Licensing Board the authority to conduct the proceeding. See, Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 151 (2001).

The issue sought to be raised by a contention must fall within the scope of the issues specified in the Notice of Opportunity for Hearing. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 411-12 (1991), appeal denied on other grounds, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273, 339 (2001).

The scope of permissible contentions is normally bounded by the scope of the proceeding itself. On remand from the Commission, however, the scope of issues is confined to issues identified by the Commission. Beyond that, however, an intervenor may seek to file late-filed contentions, subject to a balancing of the [eight] factors set forth in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)), within the scope of the entire proceeding. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 206 (1993).

In a license amendment proceeding, a petitioner's contentions must focus on the issues identified in the notice of hearing, the amendment application, and the Staff's environmental responsibilities relating to the application. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 282 (1991). A petitioner's allegation that a prior Licensing Board ruling is erroneous is a request for reconsideration and is not a proper subject for a contention. Shoreham, supra. 34 NRC at 282; Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-98-28, 48 NRC 279 (1998).

When determining for any reason the scope of a contention, one looks not only to the contention itself but also to the basis or bases provided for the contention. The bases clarify the "reach" and "focus" of a contention, which may not be changed absent an appropriate amendment to a contention. In other words, the basis or



bases originally offered in support of a contention, together with the issue(s) stated in the contention itself, establish a sort of “envelope” within which information will be considered to be within the “reach” or “focus” of a contention and therefore relevant in litigation of the contention. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-04-12, 59 NRC 388, 391 (2004) (characterizing Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-28, 56 NRC 373, 379 (2002) and Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-899, 28 NRC 93, 97 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991)).

Thus, if in preparing for an evidentiary hearing on a contention, an intervenor becomes aware of information that it may wish to present as evidence in the hearing, such information would—even if not specifically stated in the original contention and bases—be relevant if it falls within the “envelope,” “reach,” or “focus” of the contention when read with the original bases offered for it. If it falls outside such ambit, then an amended contention would be necessary in order for the new information to be considered relevant and admissible. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-04-12, 59 NRC 388, 391 (2004) (characterizing Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-28, 56 NRC 373, 379 (2002) and Pub. Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-899, 28 NRC 93, 97 (1988), aff’d sub nom. Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991)).

Where an intervenor has provided additional specific information that falls within the ambit of its original admitted contention, it is not really an “amendment” at all. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-04-12, 59 NRC 388, 391 (2004). [The Board in LBP-04-12 also commented in a footnote that the principle would apply to information that any party wished to submit as evidence in a proceeding, not just an intervenor. Id. at 391 n.3. Both aspects of the Board’s decision could be considered dicta because the Board went on to address the late-filing standards and implied that those standards had been satisfied by the intervenor.]

In order to determine the scope of an otherwise admissible contention, a Board will consider the contention together with its stated bases to identify the precise issue which the intervenor seeks to raise. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-899, 28 NRC 93, 97 & n.11 (1988).

#### **2.10.5.2 Pleading Requirements for Contentions**

In BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld, in part, the pleading requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) governing petitions to intervene. Specifically, the Court ruled that:

- (a) the requirement that contentions be specified does not violate Section 189(a) of the Act; and
- (b) the requirement for a basis for contentions is valid.

Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-75, 16 NRC 986, 993 (1982), citing BPI v. Atomic Energy Commission, 502 F.2d 424, 428-429 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804, 21 NRC 587, 591 n.5 (1985).

10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(ii)) now specifically requires a petitioner to provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support its proposed contention, together with references to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware, and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those facts or expert opinion. There is no regulatory requirement that an intervenor supply all the bases known at the time he files a contention.

What is required is the filing of bases on which the intervenor intends to rely.

Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-22, 40 NRC 37, 39 (1994). The petitioner also must provide sufficient information to establish the existence of a genuine dispute with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1)(v) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)). See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-9121, 33 NRC 419, 422-24 (1991), appeal dismissed, CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63 (1992); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155-56 (1991); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64-68 (2002); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-35, 34 NRC 163, 166, 169-170, 175-76 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 279 (1991); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338 (1991); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-28, 36 NRC 202, 214 (1992); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 142 (1993); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 205 (1993); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 49 (2004). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 555 (2004).

Failure of a proposed contention to meet any one of the requirements in 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1)(iii), (iv), (vi) is grounds for dismissal. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 NRC 551, 567-68 (2005).

It is well established in NRC proceedings that a reply cannot expand the scope of the arguments set forth in the original hearing request. Replies must focus narrowly on the legal or factual arguments first presented in the original petition or raised in answers to it. New bases for a contention cannot be introduced in a reply brief, or any other time after the date the original contentions are due, unless the petitioner meets the late-filing criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(c), (f)(2). While a petitioner need not introduce at the contention phase every document on which it will rely in a

hearing, if the contention as originally plead did not cite adequate documentary support, a petitioner cannot remediate the deficiency by introducing in the reply documents that were available to it during the time frame for initially filing contentions. Nuclear Management Company, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant), CLI-06-17, 63 NRC 727, 732 (2006).

The "raised Threshold" for contentions must be reasonably applied and is not to be mechanically construed. Rules of practice are not to be applied in an "overly formalistic" manner. Rancho Seco, 38 NRC at 206.

"[W]here federal courts permit considerably less-detailed 'notice pleadings', the Commission requires far more to plead a contention." Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-39, 54 NRC 497, 505 (2001); Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 108 (2006).. Agency procedural requirements simply raising the threshold for admitting some contentions as an incidental effect of regulations designed to prevent unnecessary delay in the hearing process are reasonable. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1047 (1983). The contention pleading requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) are meant to "focus litigation on concrete issues and result in a clearer and more focused record for decision." Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 108 (2006) (quoting 69 Fed. Reg. 2182, 2202 (Jan. 14, 2004)). Accordingly, contention admissibility is "strict by design." Pa'ina, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC at 108 (quoting Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 358 (2001), petition for reconsid. denied, CLI-02-1, 55 NRC 1 (2002)).

All that is required for a contention to be acceptable for litigation is that it be specific and have a basis. Whether or not the contention is true is left to litigation on the merits in the licensing proceeding. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 551 n.5 (1983), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1193 n.39 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 694 (1985). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 23-24 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 282 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 411 (1991), appeal denied, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991).

The petitioner has the burden of bringing contentions meeting the pleading requirements. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 422 (2001). The licensing board may not supply missing information or draw inferences on behalf of the petitioner. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 422 (2001).

The factual support necessary to show that a genuine dispute exists need not be in formal evidentiary form, nor be as strong as that necessary to withstand a summary

disposition motion. What is required is "a minimal showing that material facts are in dispute, thereby demonstrating that an 'inquiry in depth' is appropriate." Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 51 (1994) (citing Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings -- Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989), quoting Connecticut Bankers Association v. Board of Governors, 627 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The basis and specificity requirements are particularly important for contentions involving broad quality assurance and quality control issues. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 634 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1740-41 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 89 (1983).

Technical perfection is not an essential element of contention pleading. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-3, 53 NRC 84, 99 (2001).

It is not essential that pleadings of contentions be technically perfect. The Licensing Board would be reluctant to deny intervention on the basis of skill of pleading where it appears that the petitioner has identified interests which may be affected by a proceeding. Houston Lighting and Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-549, 9 NRC 644, 650 (1979).

It is neither Congressional nor Commission policy to exclude parties because the niceties of pleading were imperfectly observed. Sounder practice is to decide issues on their merits, not to avoid them on technicalities. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 116117 (1979); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 860 (1987), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987). However, a party is bound by the literal terms of its own contention. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 709 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 505 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 208 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 242 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 545 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 816 (1986); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277, 284 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-6, 27 NRC 245, 254 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-892, 27 NRC 485 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 371-372 & n.310 (1991); North Atlantic Energy Service Corporation (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), LBP-98-23, 48 NRC 157, 166 (1998).

Pro se intervenors are not held in NRC proceedings to a high degree of technical compliance with legal requirements and, accordingly, as long as parties are sufficiently put on notice as to what has to be defended against or opposed, specificity requirements will generally be considered satisfied. However, that is not to suggest that a sound basis for each contention is not required to assure that the proposed issues are proper for adjudication. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-83-5, 17 NRC 134, 136 (1983).

Originality of framing contentions is not a pleading requirement. Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683, 689 (1980).

The contention admissibility requirements demand a level of discipline and preparedness on the part of petitioners, who must examine the publicly available material and set forth their claims and the support for their claims at the outset. The need for parties to adhere to the Commission's pleading standards and for the Board to enforce those standards are paramount. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-04-25, 60 NRC 223, 224-25 (2004), recons. den. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619 (2004).

#### **2.10.5.2.1 Bases for Contentions**

The purposes of the basis-for-contention requirement are: (1) to help assure that the hearing process is not improperly invoked, for example, to attack statutory requirements or regulations; (2) to help assure that other parties are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose; (3) to assure that the proposed issues are proper for adjudication in the particular proceeding - i.e., generalized views of what applicable policies ought to be are not proper for adjudication; (4) to assure that the contentions apply to the facility at bar; and (5) to assure that there has been sufficient foundation assigned for the contentions to warrant further explanation. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-10, 23 NRC 283, 285 (1986), citing Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974). See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 931-33 (1987); Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222, 227-28 (9th Cir. 1988).

Relevance is not the only criterion for admissibility of a contention. 10 CFR § 2.309 requires that the bases for each contention must be set forth with reasonable specificity. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-82-108, 16 NRC 1811, 1821 (1982). See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 181-84 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 617, 627 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-15, 22 NRC 184, 187 (1985); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-8, 23 NRC 182, 188 (1986); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three

Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-10, 23 NRC 283, 285 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 541 (1986); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-21, 23 NRC 849, 851 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 230 (1986); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 842, 847 (1987), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 930 (1987); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-24, 26 NRC 159, 162, 165 (1987), aff'd, ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 456 (1987), remanded, Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-877, 26 NRC 287, 292-94 (1987); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 455, 458 (1988), aff'd, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29, 45-47 (1989) (documents cited by intervenors did not provide adequate bases for proposed contention), vacated in part and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990). A long and detailed list of omissions and problems does not, without more, provide a basis for believing that there is a safety issue. Discovered problems are not in themselves grounds for admitting a contention. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75A, 18 NRC 1260, 1263 n.6 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 725 (1985). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 240 (1986).

A contention that simply alleges that some general, nonspecific matter ought to be considered does not provide the basis for an admissible contention. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 246 (1993).

Although an 'obvious potential for offsite consequences' may be sufficient to show standing, it is not in itself sufficient to support an admissible contention. Fansteel Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-03-13, 58 NRC 96 (2003).

A Licensing Board has defined the failure to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute on a material issue of fact as a failure to provide any factual evidence or supporting documents that produce some doubt about the adequacy of a specified portion of applicant's documents or that provide supporting reasons that tend to show that there is some specified omission from applicant's documents. The intervention petitioner in this case did not advance an independent basis for any of its contentions, and instead relied on alleged omissions and errors in the applicant's documents and analyses. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-16, 31 NRC 509, 515, 521 & n.12 (1990), citing 10 CFR §§ 2.309(f)(1)(v) and (vi) (formerly 2.714(b) (2)(ii) and (iii)).

The bases for a contention need not originate with the petitioner. Thus a petitioner seeking to challenge the adequacy of an application may base its contention on information contained in an NRC Staff letter to an applicant which requests additional information based on a regulatory guide citation. However, in order for the contention to be admissible, the petitioner must provide an adequate explanation of how alleged deficiencies support its contention and provide additional information in support. Louisiana Energy Services L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338-339 (1991). See Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 136 (1992), appeal granted in part and remanded, CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135 (1993).

A simple reference to a large number of documents does not provide a sufficient basis for a contention. An intervenor must clearly identify and summarize the incidents being relied upon, and identify and append specific portions of the documents. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1741 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-76-10, 3 NRC 200, 216 (1976); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 240-41 (1989).

In pleading for the admission of a contention, an intervenor is not required to prove the contention, but must allege at least some credible foundation for the contention. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 457 (1987), remanded, Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-21, 54 NRC 33, 47-48 (2001). Under the Commission's contention rule, intervenors are not asked to prove their case, or to provide an exhaustive list of possible bases, but simply to provide sufficient alleged factual or legal bases to support the contention, and to do so at the outset. However, the Commission's contention rules do not allow using reply briefs to provide, for the first time, the necessary threshold support for contentions. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 623 (2004).

Contentions must be based on a genuine material dispute, not the possibility that petitioners, if they perform their own analyses, may ultimately disagree with the application. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 480 (2006).

A basis for a contention is set forth with reasonable specificity if the applicants are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know, at least generally, what they will have to defend against or oppose, and if there has been sufficient foundation assigned to warrant further exploration of the proposed contention. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 34 (1984), citing Peach Bottom, supra, 8 AEC at 20-21; Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1742 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241

(1986). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-942, 32 NRC 395, 427-28 (1990).

In some cases, the Commission or Board has admitted contentions based on claims of poor licensee character or integrity. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 365 (2001). To form the basis for an admissible contention, allegations of management improprieties or lack of "integrity" must be of more than historical interest: they must relate directly to the proposed licensing action. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 365 (2001). Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 120 (1995). Management issues must be directly germane to the challenged licensing action to serve as the basis for an admissible contention. In determining whether to grant a license, it is proper for a licensing board to evaluate whether the applicant, as presently organized and staffed, can provide reasonable assurance of candor, willingness, and ability to follow NRC regulations. A finding that an applicant's current management is unfit would be cause to deny a license. However, no genuine dispute with regard to a material issue of fact or law is raised where an intervenor relies on the existence of past violations, but then fails to present any information indicating that any person or procedure associated with those past violations will be employed at, or involved with, the proposed facility. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), LBP-05-28, 62 NRC 585, 618-19 (2005).

The basis with reasonable specificity standard requires that an intervenor include in a safety contention a statement of the reason for his contention. This statement must either allege with particularity that an applicant is not complying with a specified regulation, or allege with particularity the existence and detail of a substantial safety issue on which the regulations are silent. In the absence of a "regulatory gap," the failure to allege a violation of the regulations or an attempt to advocate stricter requirements than those imposed by the regulations will result in a rejection of the contention, the latter as an impermissible collateral attack on the Commission's rules. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758).

The Commission has stated that the safety issue in any licensing proceeding involves the adequacy of the applicant's license application, not the NRC staff's safety evaluation. Contentions on the adequacy of content of an SEC are not recognized. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground Site), LBP-06-27, 64 NRC 438, 456 (2006).

Serious violations or other incidents may form the basis for a contention challenging the adequacy of management of a facility. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 297 (1995).

A Licensing Board will deny, without prejudice, a basis for a contention which involves an issue that is already under consideration by the Commission Staff. It would be premature for a Licensing Board to litigate an issue when a Commission determination might make the issue moot. Louisiana Energy



Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 341 (1991).

It is a well-established principle relative to safety-related matters that the adequacy of the application, not the adequacy of the Staff's review or evaluation, e.g., its SER, is the focus for a proper contention. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-3, 53 NRC 84, 97 (2001). The adequacy of the manner in which the Staff conducts its review of a technical/safety matter is outside the scope of Commission proceedings. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-11, 58 NRC 47, 66 (2003).

A licensing board will also deny a basis for a contention which involves an inchoate plan of the Licensee. The contended issue must be a part of the current licensing basis that is docketed and in effect. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-14, 55 NRC 278, 293 (2002), citing, 10 C.F.R. § 54.29(a). In Duke Energy Corp., the Commission denied the admission of a MOX contention when the licensee had a contractual arrangement to purchase MOX fuel, but the proposed MOX fuel production facility remained unbuilt and was in the early stages of contested NRC licensing proceeding. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-14, 55 NRC 278, 292 (2002).

Contentions that are based on projected changes to a license, not currently before the NRC in any proceeding or application, are not sufficient to support admission of a contention. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-14, 55 NRC 278, 294 (2002).

Verification by the NRC Staff that a licensee complies with preapproved design or testing criteria is a highly technical inquiry not particularly suitable for hearing. Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 5 (2006) (citing Private Fuel Storage, LLC (Independent Storage Installation), CLI-03-8, 58 NRC 11, 20 & n.25 (2003)).

The fact that the Office of Investigation and the Office of Inspector and Auditor are investigating otherwise unidentified allegations is insufficient basis for admitting a contention. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-21, 23 NRC 849, 858 (1986).

The bare pendency of an investigation does not reflect that there is a substantive problem, or that there has been any violation, or that there even exists an outstanding significant safety issue, and thus cannot serve as a valid basis for a contention. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-9, 37 NRC 433, 446 (1993).

Pending future developments that would overrule controlling Commission precedent, Boards have held a contention (or portion thereof) relying on an argument that a controlling Commission decision was wrongly decided to be inadmissible. See, e.g., Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 113-14 (2006)

(ruling on NEPA terrorism contention based on Commission precedent despite the pendency of a Circuit Court of Appeals review of an analogous issue).

The mere fact that NRC Staff has issued RAIs during its license application review does not indicate that the application is deficient, as RAIs are a common and expected feature of the review process. Safety Light Corp., LBP-04-25, 60 NRC 516, 525-26 (2004) (citing Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 336 (1999)). See also Nuclear Management Co., LLC (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant), CLI-06-6, 63 NRC 161, 164 (2006).

A contention that seeks to litigate a matter that is the subject of an agency rulemaking is not admissible. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-01, 51 NRC 1, 5 (2000); See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142, 179, reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, LBP-98-10, 47 NRC 288, aff'd on other grounds, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998). A contention attacking a Commission rule or regulation is inadmissible, and that inadmissibility bar applies to contentions proffering, for example, additional or stricter requirements than those that are imposed by the regulation. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-01-35, 54 NRC 403, 422 (2001).

To read the agency's hearing notice, which found a categorical exclusion applicable to an application, as thus preventing contentions challenging the use of such categorical exclusions (as authorized by 10 C.F.R. § 51.22) would be tantamount to ruling that the agency need not comply with its own regulations. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 109 n.38 (2006) (citing, e.g., Fort Stewart Schools v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 654 (1990)).

A Board admitted a contention based on the argument that NEPA analysis requires an explanation of the applicability of a categorical exclusion where a petitioner has alleged special circumstances necessitating an environmental review; the Staff and applicant had not negated the contention because they did not explain the applicability of that categorical exclusion in the specified circumstances, or provide a basis to conclude that the alleged circumstances were actually considered as part of the adoption of the categorical exclusion. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 108-112 & 108 n.36 (2006) (citing Alaska Center for the Environment v. U.S. Forest Service, 189 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Steamboaters v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 759 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985); Wilderness Watch & Public Employees for Envi. Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Once a contention has been admitted, Intervenor may litigate a new basis for the admitted contention (falling within the scope of the contention) without meeting the five-pronged test for a late-filed contention. The test for admitting the new basis is whether it is timely to consider the new basis, in light of its seriousness and of the timeliness with which it has been raised. The more serious the safety implications of the proposed new basis, the less important delay in presenting the

basis. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-22, 40 NRC 37, 39 (1994).

The test to be applied to determine whether to admit for litigation a new basis for an admitted contention is "whether the motion [to admit the contention] was timely and whether it presents important information regarding a significant issue." Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1296 (1984); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-27, 40 NRC 103, 105 (1994).

General fears or criticisms of past practices of the nuclear industry or the applicant are not appropriate bases for contentions unless there is reason to suspect the specific procedures or safety-related tests used in a proposed demonstration program which requires a license amendment. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-55, 14 NRC 1017, 1026 (1981).

Where the laws of physics deprive a proposed contention of any credible or arguable basis, the contention will not be admitted. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-16, 19 NRC 857, 870 (1984), *aff'd*, ALAB-765, 19 NRC 645, 654 n.13 (1984); *compare* Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).

Whether or not a basis for contentions has been established must be decided by considering the contentions in the context of the entire record of the case up to the time the contentions are filed. Thus, when an application for a license amendment is itself incomplete, the standard for the admission of contentions is lowered, because it is easier for petitioners to have reasons for believing that the application has not demonstrated the safety of the proposed procedures for which an amendment is sought. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853 (1981).

A contention may be found valid where it "substitut[es] an active event for what was previously only a hypothetical scenario," even where the new contention shares common elements with contentions that were already rejected. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-02-5, 55 NRC 131, 138-139 (2002).

Complexity of additional administrative controls has previously been found to constitute an admissible contention in the face of numerous alleged cited incidents and violations, albeit in a construction-period recapture proceeding where the adequacy of a quality assurance/quality control program was in issue. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 14-21 (1993). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-00-2, 51 NRC 25, 34 (2000).

#### **2.10.5.2.2 Specificity of Contentions**

Reasonable specificity requires that a contention include a reasonably specific articulation of its rationale. If an applicant believes that it can readily disprove a

contention admissible on its face, the proper course is to move for summary disposition following its admission, not to assert a lack of specific basis at the pleading stage. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2070-2071 (1982).

Particularly in the context of dealing with pro se petitioners, a finding regarding a contention's specificity should include consideration of the contention's bases. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-899, 28 NRC 93, 97 (1988) (both contention and stated bases should be considered when question arises regarding admissibility of contention). General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 162 (1996).

The Commission's pleading requirements differ from pleading requirements in Article III courts because "notice pleadings" are not permitted. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 219 (1999). Rather, the Commission insists on detailed descriptions of the petitioner's position on issues going to both standing and the merits. Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., CLI-99-12, 49 NRC 347, 353 (1999); GPU Nuclear, Inc., et al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 203 (2000).

Contentions must give notice of facts which petitioners desire to litigate and must be specific enough to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-82-52, 16 NRC 183, 188-190, 193 (1982); see generally, CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616 (1981) (guidelines for Board). The petitioner is not required to provide an exhaustive discussion in its proffered contention, so long as it meets the Commission's admissibility requirements. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 108 (2006).

The Commission's Rules of Practice do not require that a contention be in the form of a detailed brief; however, a contention, alleging an entire plan to be inadequate in that it fails to consider certain matters, should be required to specify in some way each portion of the plan alleged to be inadequate. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-75, 16 NRC 986, 993 (1982).

The provisions of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(1)(ii),(v), and (vi) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii)) were specifically added by the Commission "to raise the threshold bar for an admissible contention," and prohibit "notice pleading, with the details to be filled in later" and "vague, un[-]particularized contentions." Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 334, 338 (1999); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273 (2001).

Under 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1)(vi) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)), if an application contains disputed information or omits required information, the petitioner normally must specify the portions of the application that are in dispute or are incomplete. However, a petitioner need not refer to a particular portion of the

licensee's application when the licensee neither identified, nor was obligated to identify, the disputed issue in its application. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-16, 38 NRC 25, 41 (1993). See Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-05-15, 61 NRC 365, 381 (2005).

When a broad contention (though apparently admissible) has been admitted at an early stage in the proceeding, intervenors should be required to provide greater specificity and to particularize bases for the contention when the information required to do so has been developed. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-28, 20 NRC 129, 131 (1984).

An intervention petitioner has an ironclad obligation to examine the publicly available documentary material pertaining to the facility in question with sufficient care to enable the petitioner to uncover any information that could serve as the foundation for a specific contention. Neither Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act nor Section 2.309 of the Rules of Practice permits the filing of a vague, unparticularized contention, followed by an endeavor to flesh it out through discovery against the applicant or Staff. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 468 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 412 (1984), citing Catawba, supra, 16 NRC at 468. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-35, 34 NRC 163, 175-76 (1991). In Catawba, supra, the Board dealt with the question of whether the intervenor had provided sufficient information to support the admission of its contentions. An Appeal Board has rejected an applicant's claim that Catawba imposes on an intervenor the duty to include in its contentions a critical analysis or response to any applicant or NRC Staff positions on the issues raised by the contentions which might be found in the publicly available documentary material. Such detailed answers to the positions of other parties go, not to the admissibility of contentions, but to the actual merits of the contentions. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627, 62931 (1988). The "ironclad obligation" of a petitioner to examine publicly available documentary evidence in support of its contentions applies only to information in support of a contention. A requirement also to examine contrary publicly available documentary evidence would unduly exacerbate the considerable threshold that a petitioner must already meet under the current revised contention rules. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 22 n.29 (1993).

If, at the contentions stage of litigation, an intervenor offers no specific causes for spent fuel pool accidents other than the seven-step scenario admitted by the Board, the intervenor cannot later transform vague references to potential spent fuel pool catastrophes into litigable contentions. See Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 333-35 (1999) (NRC's "strict contention rule" requires "detailed pleadings"). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 390 (2001).

Under section 2.309(f)(1)(vi) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)), a contention is inadmissible where it fails to contain sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the Applicant on a material issue of law or fact and does not include references to the specific portions of the application that Petitioners may dispute. Texas Utilities Company, et al., (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-37, 36 NRC 370, 384 (1992). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 576 (2004).

It is not the Board's responsibility to search through pleadings or other materials to uncover arguments and support never advanced by the petitioners themselves; boards may not infer unarticulated bases for contentions. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 457 (2006).

The Commission should not be expected to sift unaided through earlier briefs filed before the Licensing Board in order to piece together and discern the intervenors' particular concern or the grounds for their claim. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 15 (2001); (citing Hydro Resources Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 46 (2001)).

A contention filed in an application proceeding to extend the completion date of a construction permit is not admissible where it does not directly challenge the Applicant's alleged good-cause justification for the delay. Petitioners' allegations of corporate wrongdoing do not show that a genuine dispute exists with Applicant on its justification for the delay. Texas Utilities Company, et al., (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-37, 36 NRC 370, 384 (1992).

A claim that a statute or regulation requires a technical specification to remain a part of an operating license is an indispensable element of any contention challenging the relocation of material from a plant's technical specifications to a licensee controlled document because there can only be a right to a hearing or future changes to such material if there is a statutory or regulatory requirement that such matters be included in the plant's technical specifications in the first place. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273, 282 (2001).

### **2.10.5.3 Response to Contentions**

Prior to entertaining any suggestion that a contention not be admitted, the proponent of the contention must be given some chance to be heard in response. The petitioners cannot be required to have anticipated in the contentions themselves the possible arguments their opponents might raise as grounds for denying admission of those proffered contentions. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521, 525 (1979); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 83 n. 17 (1996); rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235.

Although the Rules of Practice do not explicitly provide for the filing of either objections to contentions or motions to dismiss them, each presiding board must fashion a fair procedure for dealing with such objections to contentions as are filed.

The cardinal rule of fairness is that each side must be heard. Allens Creek, *supra*, 10 NRC at 524.

#### **2.10.5.3.1 Reply Briefs**

In Commission practice, and in litigation practice generally, new arguments may not be raised for the first time in a reply brief. The reply brief should be narrowly focused on the legal or logical arguments presented in the applicant/licensee or NRC staff answer. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-04-25, 60 NRC 223, 225 (2004), recons. den. by Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619 (2004).

#### **2.10.5.4 Material Used in Support of Contentions**

While it may be true that the important document in evaluating the adequacy of an agency's environmental review is the agency's final impact statement, a petitioner for intervention may look to the Applicant's Environmental Report for factual material in support of a proposed contention. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 303 (1979). A petitioner must file contentions based on any environmental issues raised by the applicant's Environmental Report. However, the petitioner may be permitted to file new or amended contentions based on new information contained in subsequent NRC environmental documents. 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(2) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)), 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33180 (August 11, 1989), as corrected, 54 Fed. Reg. 39728 (Sept. 28, 1989). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 154 (1993). Such new information, though, must "differ significantly" from the information provided in the Environmental Report, and these differences must be "material" to the outcome of the proceeding. Further, the new or amended contention must satisfy the usual substantive admissibility requirements under § 2.309(f)(1). Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 163 (2005).

Where a petitioner seeks to file new or amended contentions arising out of new information derived from sources other than Staff-created NEPA documents, the petitioner must satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii), as well as the usual substantive requirements for admissibility of contentions. Despite differences in regulatory language, analysis under § 2.309(f)(2)(i-iii) is to be conducted in the same manner as analysis under § 2.309(f)(2) of new or amended contentions based upon new information from Staff-created NEPA documents. Therefore, the new information must be materially different from the information that was previously available, and the ordinary contention admissibility criteria of § 2.309(f)(1) must be satisfied as well. Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 160-61 (2005).

The specificity and basis requirements for a proposed contention under 10 CFR § 2.309(f) (formerly 2.714(b)) can be satisfied where the contention is based upon allegations in a sworn complaint filed in a judicial action and the applicable passages therein are specifically identified. This holds notwithstanding the fact that the allegations are contested. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1292-94 (1984).

An intervenor can establish a sufficient basis for a contention by referring to a source and drawing an assertion from that reference. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1740 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 548-49 (1980). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 69-70 (1989), aff'd, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991); see also Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-21, 38 NRC 143, 146 (1993).

Like NRC NUREGs and Regulatory Guides, NRC guidance documents are routine agency policy pronouncements that do not carry the binding effect of regulations. International Uranium (USA) Corp., CLI-00-1, 51 NRC 9, 19 (2000).

A document put forth by an intervenor as supporting the basis for a contention is subject to scrutiny, both for what it does and does not show. When a report is the central support for a contention's basis, the contents of that report in its entirety is before the Board and, as such, is subject to Board scrutiny, both as to those portions of the report that support an intervenor's assertions and those portions that do not. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, 90 (1996); rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235 (1996).

Attaching a document in support of a contention without any explanation of its significance does not provide an adequate basis for a contention. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-10, 47 NRC 288, 298-99 (1988).

A petitioner's imprecise reading of a reference document, or typographical errors in that document, cannot serve to generate an issue suitable for litigation. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 300 (1995). A petitioner is obligated to provide the analyses and supporting evidence showing why its bases support its contention. A licensing board may not make factual inferences on a petitioner's behalf. Id. at 305.

However, where a contention is based on a factual underpinning in a document which has been essentially repudiated by the source of that document, a Licensing Board will dismiss the contention if the intervenor cannot offer another independent source of information on which to base the contention. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-872, 26 NRC 127, 136 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 241 (1989).

An intervention petitioner may rely upon an NRC Staff regulatory guide to support a contention alleging that an application is deficient. The petitioner must provide an adequate explanation of how alleged inadequacies support its contention and provide additional information in support. It is insufficient for a petitioner to merely refer to a Staff letter to an applicant which requests additional information based on



a regulatory guide citation. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 338-339, 347, 354 (1991). Furthermore, it is well established that NUREG's and Regulatory Guides, by their very nature, serve merely as guidance and cannot prescribe requirements. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 98, 100 (1995). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 424 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004) ("Guidance documents are, by nature, only advisory. They need not apply in all situations and do not themselves impose legal requirements on licensees."). Nor does the NRC's review of regulations governing a particular issue serve as a basis for a particular contention concerning that issue. A petitioner's differing opinion as to what applicable regulations should (but do not) require also cannot serve as a basis for a contention. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 303 (1995).

A petitioner is not permitted to incorporate massive documents by reference as the basis for, or a statement of, his contentions. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-76-10, 3 NRC 209, 216 (1976).

#### **2.10.5.5 Timeliness of Submission of Contentions**

Where a contention challenges the omission of particular information or an issue from an application, and the information is later supplied by the applicant or considered by the Staff in a draft EIS, the contention is moot. Without requiring submission of a new or amended contention, the original "omission" contention could be transformed into a broad series of disparate claims. This approach would, in turn, circumvent NRC contention pleading standards and defeat the contention rule's purposes: (1) providing notice to the opposing party of the issues that will be litigated; (2) ensuring that at least a minimal factual or legal foundation exists for the different claims that have been alleged; and (3) ensuring there exists an actual genuine dispute with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-28, 56 NRC 373, 383 (2002), clarifying CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1 (2002). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-04-7, 59 NRC 259, 263 (2004).

Where a contention of omission that is the sole contention in the proceeding has been rendered moot and no other motions remain pending, an order dismissing the contention ordinarily would terminate the proceeding. However, the Commission has instructed that when a contention of omission has been rendered moot, the intervenor – if it wishes to raise specific challenges regarding the new information – may timely file a new contention that addresses the admissibility factors in 10 C.F.R. 2.309 (f)(1). Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-16, 63 NRC 737, 744 (2006).

The Atomic Safety Licensing Board decided that the time to file a contention tolls when sufficient information is reasonably available on which to base the contention. The intervenor State of Utah claimed its NEPA contentions were timely, as they were filed within 30 days of the issuance of the Staff's DEIS. However, the Board found that sufficient information on which to base the intervenor's contention was known to the intervenor many months prior to the issuance of the Staff's DEIS. The Board decided that the intervenor's time to submit contentions tolled when the

information first became available, and not later when the Staff issued its DEIS. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-27, 52 NRC 216 (2000).

The question of when a new or amended contention must be filed in order to meet the late filing standard of 10 C.F.R. 2.309 - and specifically the critical criteria concerning "good cause" for late filing - calls for a judgment about when the matter is sufficiently factually concrete and procedurally ripe to permit the filing of a contention.

The Licensing Board's general authority to shape the course of a proceeding, 10 CFR § 2.319(g) (formerly 2.718(e)), will not be utilized as the foundation for the Board's acceptance of a late-filed contention. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1290 (1984).

A party seeking to add a new contention after the close of the record must satisfy both standards for admitting a late-filed contention set forth in 10 CFR § 2.309 and the criteria, as established by case law, for reopening the record, Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1136 (1983), citing Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-39, 16 NRC 1712, 1715 (1982), despite the fact that nontimely contentions raise matters which have not been previously litigated. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 663 (1983), citing Diablo Canyon, *supra*, 16 NRC at 1714-15.

A licensing board need not address in any particular order whether a late-filed contention meets the basis and specificity requirements and satisfies late-filed contention requirements so long as both are addressed. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-9, 37 NRC 433, 436-37 (1993).

Generally, in dealing with a late-filed contention, a presiding officer first analyzes the question of the issue's admissibility under the late-filing factors in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)). Then, to the degree the balancing process mandated by that provision supports admission of the contention, the presiding officer goes on to determine whether the issue statement merits admission under the specificity and basis standards set forth in section 2.309(f). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-01, 51 NRC 1,5 (2000).

In considering the admissibility of late-filed contentions, the Licensing Board must balance the [eight] factors specified in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)) for dealing with nontimely filings. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear station), LBP-79-22, 10 NRC 213, 214 (1979); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 725 (1985). In addition, late-filed contentions filed on subsequently issued NRC environmental review documents are subject to the [eight] factor test set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v)). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-12, 37 NRC 355, 359-360 (1993).

To be accepted, a late-filed contention must satisfy not only the late-filed factors but also the requirements for contentions. A licensing board need not address these considerations in any particular order, although both are required for admissibility. Analyzing the contention requirements first permits a board to determine whether or not a significant health and safety or environmental question is being advanced, thus assisting the board in considering lateness factor (viii), the contribution to an adequate record to be made by the intervenor. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 207 (1993).

The determination whether to accept a contention that was susceptible of filing within the period prescribed by the Rules of Practice on an untimely basis involves a consideration of all [eight] 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) factors and not just the reason, substantial or not as the case may be, why the petitioner did not meet the deadline. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 470 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).

The proponent of a late contention should affirmatively address the [eight] factors and demonstrate that, on balance, the contention should be admitted. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 578 (1982), citing Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-615, 12 NRC 350, 352 (1980).

If a petitioner fails to address the criteria in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) that govern late filed contentions, a petitioner does not meet its burden to establish the admissibility of such contentions. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-98-26, 48 NRC 232, 241 (1998); Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-98-25, 48 NRC 325, 347 n.9 (1998).

10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)) requires that all the factors enumerated in that regulation should be applied to late-filed contentions even where the licensing-related document, upon which the contentions are predicated, was not available within the time prescribed for filing timely contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42, 18 NRC 112, 116 (1983); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 82 (1985), citing Catawba, CLI-83-19 supra, 17 NRC at 1045; Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-94-11, 39 NRC 205, 207 (1994). The Commission has held that any refiled contention would have to meet the [eight]-factor test of 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)), if not timely filed, even if the specifics could not have been known earlier because the documents on which they were based had not yet been issued. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-83-66, 18 NRC 780, 796 (1983), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-13, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).

A Board must perform this balancing of the lateness factors, even where all the parties to the proceeding have waived their objections and agreed, by stipulation, to the admission of the late-filed contention. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 251 (1986). See Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power station), ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461, 466 (1985).

The required balancing of factors is not obviated by the circumstances that the proffered contentions are those of a participant that has withdrawn from the proceeding. South Texas, supra, 16 NRC at 1367, citing Gulf states Utilities Co. (River Bend station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 795-98 (1977).

In balancing the lateness factors, all factors must be taken into account; however, there is no requirement that the same weight be given to each of them. South Texas, supra, 16 NRC at 1367, citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895 (1981); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1292 (1984). A Board is entitled to considerable discretion in the method it employs to balance the lateness factors. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 631 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98, 107 (1976).

The admissibility of a late-filed contention must be determined by a balancing of all of the late intervention factors in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)). Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-23, 18 NRC 311, 312 (1983).

Even where an applicant does not comply with a standing order to serve all relevant papers on the Board and parties, the admissibility of an intervenor's late-filed contention directed toward such papers must be determined by a balancing of all the factors. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-765, 19 NRC 645, 657 (1984), overruling in part, LBP-84-16, 19 NRC 857, 868 (1984).

NRC staff activities that occur after issuance of a notice of opportunity for hearing are not grounds for the Board to extend the deadline that the notice provides for filing contentions. A party seeking to file contentions after the notice's deadline in such circumstances must, therefore, either file a timely motion for leave to file a new contention—showing, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2), that the staff's activities engendered materially different information that was not previously available—or satisfy the NRC's rules governing late-filed contentions. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 577-78 (2004).

NRC could adopt, without resort to notice-and-comment rulemaking, "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test, in lieu of a "good cause" test, to assess requests for extensions of time in which to file contentions in nuclear power plant license renewal proceedings. The new rule was procedural since it merely altered the standard for enforcement of filing deadlines and did not purport to regulate or limit the interested party's substantive rights. National Whistleblower Center v. NRC, 208 F.3d 256, 262-63 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

The Commission's regulations at 10 C.F.R. 2.309(f)(2) provide for the filing of new or amended contentions only with the leave of the presiding officer, and upon a showing of three factors: (1) the information upon which the amended or new contention is based was not previously available; (2) the information upon which the

amended or new contention is based is materially different than information previously available; and (3) the amended or new contention has been submitted in a timely fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information. If new and materially different information becomes available during the processing of the application, and a petitioner promptly files a new contention based on this new information, the contention is admissible, assuming that it also satisfied the general contention admissibility standards contained in 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-14, 63 NRC 568, 572 (2006).

If a contention satisfies the timeliness requirement of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(2)(iii), then, by definition, it is not subject to 10 CFR 2.309(c), which specifically applies to non-timely filings. The three (f)(2) factors are not mere elaborations on the “good cause” factor of section 2.309(c)(1)(i), since “good cause” to file a non-timely contention may have nothing to do with the factors set forth in (f)(2). Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-14, 63 NRC at 573.

A new or amended contention may be timely for purposes of 10 CFR 2.309(f)(2)(iii) if the new and material information was revealed in a piecemeal fashion, and where the foundation for the contention is not reasonably available until the later pieces fall into place. In such cases, the licensing board must determine when, as a cumulative matter, the separate pieces of the information puzzle were sufficiently in place to make the particular concerns readily apparent. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-14, 63 NRC at 579. [Note: Section 2.309 requires that the petition to intervene or request for hearing include a specification of the contentions that the petitioner proposes for litigation. This differs from the former provisions of Part 2 that permitted a petitioner to file a supplement to his or her petition to intervene with a list of contentions which the petitioner sought to have litigated in the hearing. The new practice of requiring contentions to be filed at time of the petition/request does not obviate the concept of late-filed contentions discussed below.]

#### **2.10.5.5.1 Factor #1—Good Cause for Late Filing**

A late filed contention must meet the requirements concerning good cause for late filing pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)). Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-90, 16 NRC 1359, 1360 (1982); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-91, 16 NRC 1364, 1366-67 (1982); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42, 18 NRC 112, 117 (1983).

Considerable importance generally has been attributed to factor one -- “good cause” for late filing -- in that a failure to meet this factor enhances considerably the burden of justifying the other factors. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 24 (1996). Among the other four “late-filing” factors, factors [eight] and [seven] -- contribution to a sound record and broadening issues/delay in the proceeding -- generally have been considered as having the most significance in proceedings in which there are no other parties or ongoing related proceedings. See Shoreham, ALAB-743, 18 NRC at 399, 402; see also South Texas, LBP-82-91, 16 NRC at 368. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 25

(1996); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-29, 48 NRC 286 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-6, 49 NRC 114, 119 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-7, 49 NRC 124, 128 (1999).

In evaluating the admissibility of a late-filed contention, the first and foremost factor in this appraisal is whether good cause exists that will excuse the late-filing of the contention. See Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 244 (1986). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 44 (2004). And the good cause element has two components that may impact on a presiding officer's assessment of the timeliness of a contention's filing: (1) when was sufficient information reasonably available to support the submission of the late-filed contention; and (2) once the information was available, how long did it take for the contention admission request to be prepared and filed. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-99-3, 49 NRC 40, 46-48 (assessing late-filing factors relative to petition to intervene), aff'd, CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318 (1999). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-13, 53 NRC 319, 324 (2001).

Under 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)), good cause may exist for a late-filed contention if it: (1) is wholly dependent upon the content of a particular document; (2) could not therefore be advanced with any degree of specificity in advance of the public availability of that document; and (3) is tendered with the requisite degree of promptness once that document comes into existence and is amenable to rejection on the strength of a balancing of all five of the late intervention factors set forth in that section. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-737, 18 NRC 168, 172 n:4 (1983), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1045 (1983); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating station, Unit 1), LBP-84-1, 19 NRC 29, 31 (1984). See also Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-89-16, 29 NRC 508, 514 (1989). When a licensing-related document becomes available, an intervenor must file promptly its contentions based on that document. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 70 (1989), aff'd, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 333-337 (D.C. cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991). However, an intervenor is not required to file contentions based upon a draft licensing-related document. West Chicago, supra, 29 NRC at 514.

In considering the extent to which the petitioner had shown good cause for filing supplements out-of-time, the Licensing Board recognized that the petitioner was appearing pro se until just before the special prehearing conference. Petitioner's early performance need not adhere rigidly to the Commission's standards and, in this situation, the Board would not weigh the good cause factor as heavily as it might otherwise. Florida Power and Light Company (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 and 4), LBP-79-21, 10 NRC 183, 190 (1979).

An intervenor cannot establish good cause for filing a late contention when the information on which the contention is based was publicly available several months prior to the filing of the contention. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 628-629 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 21 (1986).

Withdrawal of one party has been held not to constitute good cause for the delay of a petitioner in seeking to substitute itself for the withdrawing party, or, comparably, to adopt the withdrawing party's contentions. South Texas, supra, 16 NRC at 1369, citing Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 796-97 (1977). The same standards apply to an existing intervenor seeking to adopt the abandoned contentions of another intervenor as to a "newly arriving legal stranger." South Texas, supra, 16 NRC at 1369. However, if under the circumstances of a Particular case, there is a sound foundation for allowing one entity to replace another, it can be taken into account in making the "good cause" determination under 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)). Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 384 (1985), citing River Bend, supra, 6 NRC at 796.

Generally a "good cause" finding based on "new information" can be resolved by a straightforward inquiry into when the information at issue was available to the petitioner. In some instances, however, the answer to the "good cause" factor may involve more than looking at the dates on the various documents submitted by the petitioners. Instead, the inquiry turns on a more complex determination about when, as a cumulative matter, the separate pieces of the new information "puzzle" were sufficiently in place to make the particular concerns espoused reasonably apparent. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 26 (1996).

The appearance of information for the first time in a document not available when contentions initially were to be filed would satisfy the "good cause for delay" aspect of the late-filed contention criteria, assuming the proposed contention was filed shortly after the information became available. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 255 (1996). However, see Duke Power Co., (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1045, 1048 (1983) (unavailability of licensing-related document does not establish good cause for late filing of a contention if information was publicly available early enough to provide the basis for the timely filing of that contention). Power Authority of the State of New York (James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-01-4, 53 NRC 121, 127 (2001).

When 'new information' does not, because of its proprietary status, become available to an intervenor until after the time for filing contentions generally has elapsed, good cause for late filing would be demonstrated, assuming the contention is filed shortly after the information becomes available. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 69 (1983); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-01-4, 53 NRC 121, 132 (2001).

The fact that petitioners raise an argument to support admission of a contention for the first time late in a proceeding is not necessarily fatal where the argument rests significantly on a licensee document prepared after the petitioner submitted its original contention and where petitioners promptly bring it to the adjudicator's attention. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 255 (1996).

The institutional unavailability of a licensing-related document does not establish good cause for filing a contention late if information was publicly available early enough to provide the basis for the timely filing of that contention. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1045, 1048 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42, 18 NRC 112, 117 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-30, 20 NRC 426, 436-37 (1984); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 84-85 (1985). Section 189a of the Act is not offended by a procedural rule that simply recognizes that the public's interest in an efficient administrative process is not properly accounted for by a rule of automatic admission for certain late-filed contentions. Catawba, *supra*, 17 NRC at 1046. *See* Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 82 (1985), citing Catawba, CLI-83-19, *supra*, 17 NRC at 1045-47. *Cf.* BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. cir. 1974).

Section 189a of the AEA does not require the Commission to give controlling weight to the good cause factor in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1)(i) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)(i)) in determining whether to admit a late-filed contention based on licensing documents which were not required to be prepared early enough to provide a basis for a timely-filed contention. The unavailability of those documents does not constitute a showing of good cause for admitting a late-filed contention when the factual predicate for that contention is available from other sources in a timely manner. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1043 (1983).

The appearance of a newspaper article is not sufficient grounds for the late-filing of a contention about matters that have been known for a long time. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-11, 15 NRC 348 (1982). Compare, LBP-82-53, 16 NRC 196, 200-01 (1982) (Up-to-date journals demonstrate good cause) and LBP-82-15, 15 NRC 555, 557 (1982).

A submitted document, while perhaps incomplete, may be enough to require contentions related to it to be filed promptly. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 69 (1983).

A contention based on a Draft Environmental statement (DES) which contains no new information relevant to the contention, lacks good cause for late filing. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-79, 16 NRC 1116, 1118 (1982).

An intervenor who has previously submitted timely contentions may establish good cause for the late filing of amended contentions by showing that the



amended contentions: restate portions of the earlier timely-filed contentions; and were promptly filed in response to a Commission decision which stated a new legal principle. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Unit 1), LBP-86-36A, 24 NRC 575, 579 (1986), aff'd, ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 923 (1987).

The finding of good cause for the late filing of contentions is related to the total previous unavailability of information. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 69 (1983).

Ordinarily, it is sufficient to show good cause for lateness when a showing that the Staff's environmental review documents significantly differ from the applicant's environmental report. However, a petitioner may be able to meet the late-filed contention requirements without a showing that the Staff's environmental review documents significantly differ from the applicant's environmental report by presenting significant new evidence not previously available. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-12, 37 NRC 355, 359-360 (1993). The fact that a party previously raised an issue in a comment regarding EIS scoping does not excuse the party from contention timeliness rules when later challenging the EIS itself. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 45 (2004).

The Atomic Safety Licensing Board decided that, notwithstanding that an intervenor state's contentions were based on the Staff's draft environmental impact statement, the intervenor still bore the burden of demonstrating that the late contentions merited submission. The Board cited the Commission's decisions and statements in the Federal Register that, although 10 CFR § (2.309(f)(2) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)) permits contentions based on an applicant's environmental report to be amended if new or conflicting data are later presented in a final environmental impact statement or a supplement to the draft environmental impact statement, this does not alter the standards of 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1) (formerly 2.714(a)). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-28, 52 NRC 226 (2000). See also Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983); 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,172 (1989). However, an ASLB has held that if a contention is timely under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(ii), it is contradictory to rule that the intervenor must also satisfy the eight additional factors for nontimely filings found in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-32, 62 NRC 813, 821 (2005).

Before a contention is excluded from consideration, the intervenor should have a fair opportunity to respond to applicant's comments. When an intervenor files a late contention and argues that it has good cause for late filing because of the recent availability of new information, intervenor should have the chance to comment on applicant's objection that the information was available earlier. Intervenors should be permitted to reply to the opposition to the admission of a late filed contention. The principle that a party should have an opportunity to respond is reciprocal. When intervenor introduces material that is entirely new, applicant will be permitted to respond. Due process requires an opportunity to

comment. If intervenors find that they must make new factual or legal arguments, they should clearly identify the new material and give an explanation of why they did not anticipate the need for the material in their initial filing. If the explanation is satisfactory, the material may be considered, but applicant will be permitted to respond. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-89, 16 NRC 1355, 1356 (1982); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-94-11, 39 NRC 205, 206 (1994), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521, 524 (1979).

The fact that a party may have delayed the filing of a contention in the hopes of settling the issue without resorting to litigation in an adjudicatory proceeding does not constitute good cause for failure to file on time. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 245 (1986).

Informal negotiations among parties, even under a Board's aegis, is not an adequate substitute for a party's right to pursue its legitimate interest in issues in formal adjudicatory hearings. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1191 (1985).

Where good cause for a late filing is demonstrated, the other factors are given lesser weight. Midland, supra, 16 NRC at 589; Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75A, 18 NRC 1260, 1261 (1983); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1292 (1984).

Relative to the other late-filing factors, in the absence of good cause there must be a compelling showing on the remaining elements, of which factors five and six-availability of other means to protect the petitioner's interest and extent of representation of petitioner's interests by other parties - are to be given less weight than factors eight and seven - assistance in developing a strong record and broadening the issues/delaying the proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-13, 53 NRC 319, 324 (2001).

Where good cause for failure to file on time has not been demonstrated, a contention may still be accepted, but the burden of justifying acceptance of a late contention on the basis of the other factors is considerably greater. Even where the factors are balanced in favor of admitting a late-filed contention, a tardy petitioner without a good excuse for lateness may be required to take the proceeding as he finds it. South Texas, supra, 16 NRC at 1367, 1368, citing Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. and N.Y.S. Atomic and Space Development Authority (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 275, 276 (1975).

#### **2.10.5.5.2 Factor #2-Nature of the Requestor's/Petitioner's Right Under the Act to Be Made a Party to the Proceeding**

[Reserved]

### **2.10.5.5.3 Factor #3-Nature and Extent of the Requestor's/Petitioner Property, Financial or Other Interest in the Proceeding**

[Reserved]

### **2.10.5.5.4 Factor #4-Possible Effect of Any Order That May Be Entered in the Proceeding on the Requestor's/Petitioner's Interest**

[Reserved]

### **2.10.5.5.5 Factor #5-Other Means Available to Protect the Petitioner's Interests**

With respect to the [fifth] factor of 10 CFR § 2. 309(c)(1) (availability of other means of protecting late petitioners' interest) and the [sixth] factor (the extent to which late petitioners' interest will be represented by existing parties), the applicants in Zimmer, supra, 10 NRC at 215, claimed that the Staff would represent the public interest and by inference, late petitioners' interest as well. The Licensing Board ruled that although the Staff clearly represents the public interest, it cannot be expected to pursue all issues with the same diligence as an intervenor would pursue its own issue. Moreover, unless an issue was raised in a proceeding, the Staff would not attempt to resolve the issue in an adjudicatory context. Applicants' reliance on the Staff review gave inadequate consideration to the value of a party's pursuing the participational rights afforded it in an adjudicatory hearing. Zimmer, supra, 10 NRC at 215; Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-80, 18 NRC 1404, 1407-1408 (1983); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-9, 21 NRC 524, 527-528 (1985); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 629 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986). See Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 384 n.108 (1985); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1173-77 (1983); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899, 914 (1985).

When considering the [fifth] factor of 10 CFR §2.309(c)(1), the availability of other means to protect an intervenor's interests, a Board may only inquire whether there are other forums in which the intervenor itself might protect its interests. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-9, 21 NRC 524, 528 (1985), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-671, 15 NRC 508, 513 n.13 (1982).

In determining what other means are available to protect a petitioner's interest, a board will consider the issues sought to be raised, the relief requested, and the stage of the proceeding. There may well be no alternative to providing a petitioner with an opportunity to participate in an adjudicatory hearing. However, in some circumstances, such as where the proposed contention deals with routinely filed post licensing reports by an applicant, a

10 CFR 2.206 petition may be sufficient to protect the petitioner's interests. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 21-22 (1986).

Late contentions filed by a city did not overlap a contention of another intervenor which had already been accepted in the proceeding. The representative of a private party cannot be expected to represent adequately the presumably broader interests represented by a governmental body. Zimmer, supra, 10 NRC at 216 n.4, citing Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273, 275 (1975).

When there are no other available means to protect a petitioner's interests, that factor and the factor of the extent to which other parties would protect that interest are entitled to less weight than the other factors enumerated in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)). Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-83-42, 18 NRC 112, 118 (1983); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-9, 21 NRC 524, 528 (1985), citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 629 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 245 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-3, 25 NRC 71, 75 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 70 (1989), aff'd, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 333-337 (D.C. cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-1, 31 NRC 19, 34 (1990), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-936, 32 NRC 75 (1990); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-8, 51 NRC 146, 154 (2000).

#### **2.10.5.5.6 Factor #6—Extent Petitioner's Interests are Represented By Existing Parties**

A petitioner who otherwise has standing can put forth any contention that would entitle that petitioner to the relief it seeks, see CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 6 (1996). Therefore, in deciding whether to admit a late-filed contention the petitioner otherwise would be entitled to litigate, the fact that the petitioner's contentions focus primarily on matters that will protect the interests of others does not mean the petitioner's "interest" should be afforded short shrift in assessing the late-filing factors of whether other means or other parties will protect the petitioner's interests. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 30 (1996).

A Petitioner's interest can adequately be protected or represented by another party where Petitioner's interest as a co-owner of a nuclear facility are, by Petitioner's own description, identical to those of a party that is also a co-owner. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 223 (1999).

In analyzing the [sixth] criteria for admitting a late filed contention, the extent to which a petitioner's interest will be represented by existing parties, the analysis will favor the petitioner where there are no other parties involved in the proceeding that could represent the petitioner's interests. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 3), LBP-02-5, 55 NRC 131, 141 (2002).

#### **2.10.5.5.7 Factor #7–Extent Participation Will Broaden Issues or Delay the Proceeding**

The [seventh] criteria for admission of a late-filed contention requires a board to determine whether the proceeding, and not the issuance of a license or the operation of a plant, will be delayed. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 23 (1986); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 29-30 (1996). In addition the [seventh] criteria - broadening the issues/delaying the proceeding - clearly does not weigh in favor of admission when the contentions otherwise would not be part of the proceeding because of the sponsoring intervenor's withdrawal. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-6, 49 NRC 114, 119 (1999).

The admission of any new contention may broaden and delay the completion of a proceeding by increasing the number of issues which must be considered. A Board may consider the following factors which may minimize the impact of the new contention: how close to the scheduled hearing date the new contention was filed; and the extent of discovery which had been completed prior to the filing of the new contention. A Board will not admit a new contention which is filed so close to the scheduled hearing date that the parties would be denied an adequate opportunity to pursue discovery on the contention. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 630-631 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 889 (1981).

In evaluating the extent to which admission of a late-filed contention would delay the proceeding, a Board must determine whether, by filing late, the intervenor has occasioned a potential for delay in the completion of the proceeding that would not have been present had the filing been timely. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 927 (1987).

A Board may refuse to admit a late-filed contention where it determines that the contention is so rambling and disorganized that any attempt to litigate the contention would unduly broaden the issues and delay the proceeding. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75A, 18 NRC 1260, 1262-1263 (1983).

In evaluating the potential for delay, it is improper for the Board to balance the significance of the late-filed contention against the likelihood of delay. Such a

balancing of factors is made in the overall evaluation of all the criteria for the admission of a late-filed contention. Braidwood, *supra*, 23 NRC at 248.

An intervenor's voluntary withdrawal of other, unrelated contentions may not be used to counterbalance any delays which might be caused by the admission of a late-filed contention. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 248 (1986).

Where the delay in filing contentions is great and the issues are serious, the seriousness of an issue does not imply that the party raising it is somehow forever exempted from the Rules of Practice. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 663 (1983).

#### **2.10.5.5.8 Factor #8—Ability of Petitioner to Assist in Developing Record**

Ability to contribute to the record is relevant to the admissibility of late-filed contentions. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-37, 18 NRC 52, 56 n.5 (1983). An intervenor should specify the precise issues it plans to cover, identify its prospective witnesses, and summarize their proposed testimony. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 246 (1986), citing Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-3, 25 NRC 71, 75 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 70 (1989), *aff'd*, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), *remanded*, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 333-337 (D.C. Cir. 1991), *appeal dismissed as moot*, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991). An intervenor must demonstrate special expertise concerning the subjects which it seeks to raise. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-1, 31 NRC 19, 35-36 (1990), *aff'd on other grounds*, ALAB-936, 32 NRC 75 (1990). An intervenor need not present expert witnesses or indicate what testimony it plans to present if it has established its ability to contribute to the development of a sound record in other ways. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-80, 18 NRC 1404, 1408 n.14 (1983). *See also* Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1182-1183 (1983).

With regard to late-filing factor [eight] - assistance in developing a sound record - when legal issues are a focal point of a late-filed contention, the need for an extensive showing regarding witnesses and testimony may be less compelling. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-7, 49 NRC 124, 129 (1999).

Nevertheless, an intervenor should provide specific information from which a Board can infer that the intervenor will contribute to the development of a sound record on the particular issue in question. An intervenor's bare assertion of past effectiveness in contributing to the development of a sound record on other issues in the current proceeding and in past proceedings is insufficient. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-

813, 22 NRC 59, 85 (1985), citing WPPSS, *supra*, 18 NRC at 1181, and Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1730 (1982). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power station), ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29, 40-41 (1989), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990).

In assessing the “late-filing” factor of assistance in developing a sound record, the need to conduct discovery no doubt may excuse a lack of specificity about potential witnesses’ testimony in those nontechnical cases where any testimonial evidence likely will come from licensee employees or contractors. See Comanche Peak, ALAB-868, 25 NRC at 925-26. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 28-29 (1996).

In analyzing the [eighth] criteria for admitting a late filed contention, if an intervenor has previously provided assistance earlier in a proceeding, there is a presumption weighing in favor of the petitioner that the petitioner’s participation can reasonably be expected to once again assist in developing a sound record. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-02-5, 55 NRC 131, 140-141 (2002).

In determining an intervenor's ability to assist in the development of a sound record, it is erroneous to consider the performance of counsel in a different proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241, 246-47 (1986). Contra Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 926-27 (1987).

The extent to which the petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record is only meaningful when the proposed participation is on a significant, triable issue. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-84-30, 20 NRC 426, 440 (1984).

The extent to which an intervenor may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record is the most significant of the factors to be balanced with respect to late-filed contentions, at least in situations where litigation of the contention will not delay the proceeding. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-9, 21 NRC 524, 528 (1985).

#### **2.10.5.6 Contentions Challenging Regulations**

Contentions challenging the validity of NRC regulations are inadmissible under the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758). Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683, 692-93 (1980); Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-784, 20 NRC 845, 846 (1984); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 544 (1986). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-89-1, 29 NRC 5, 18 (1989); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo

Verde Nuclear Generating station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 410 (1991), appeal denied, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 156 (1991) (petitioner may not attack the testing methodology specified in a regulation, but may attack new proposed performance requirements); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-29, 48 NRC 286, 296 (1998). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273, 286 (2001).

The assertion of a claim in an adjudicatory proceeding that a regulation is invalid is barred as a matter of law. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 2), ALAB-456, 7 NRC 63, 65 (1978).

Under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758), the Commission has withheld jurisdiction from Licensing Boards to entertain attacks on the validity of Commission regulations in individual licensing proceedings except in certain "special circumstances." Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 88-89 (1974); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-33, 22 NRC 442, 444 (1985). 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758) sets out those special circumstances which an intervenor must show to be applicable before a contention attacking the regulations will be admissible. Further, 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758) provides for certification to the Commission of the question of whether a rule or regulation of the Commission should be waived in a particular adjudicatory proceeding where an adjudicatory board determines that, as a result of special circumstances, a prima facie showing has been made that application of the rule in a particular way would not serve the purposes for which the rule was adopted and, accordingly, that a waiver should be authorized. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-37, 8 NRC 575, 584-585 (1978); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 546 (1986).

Intervenors are authorized to file a petition for a waiver of a rule, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly 2.758). It is not, however, enough merely to allege the existence of special circumstances; such circumstances must be set forth with particularity. The petition should be supported by proof, in affidavit or other appropriate form, sufficient for the Licensing Board to determine whether the petitioning party has made a prima facie showing for waiver. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2073 (1982).

A petitioner in an individual adjudication cannot challenge generic decisions made by the Commission in rulemakings. Thus, general attacks on the agency's competence and regulations are not admissible issues in license transfer proceedings. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 165-166 (2000). See also North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 217 (1999).

A contention presents an impermissible challenge to the Commission's regulations by seeking to impose requirements in addition to those set forth in the regulations. See Shoreham, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC at 395; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire



(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1656 (1982); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 159 (2001).

Although Commission regulations may permit a board in some situations to approve minor adjustments to Commission-prescribed standards, a board will reject as inadmissible a contention which seeks major changes to those standards. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 147-48 (1986) (intervenors sought major expansion of the emergency planning zone), rev'd in part, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383, 395 (1987) (the Appeal Board incorrectly admitted contentions which involved more than just minor adjustments to the emergency planning zone). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 507 n.48 (1986).

When a Commission regulation permits the use of a particular analysis or technique, a contention which asserts that a different analysis or technique should be utilized is inadmissible because it attacks the Commission's regulations. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit No. 1), LBP-83-76, 18 NRC 1266, 1273 (1983).

A contention must be rejected where: it constitutes an attack on applicable statutory requirements; it challenges the basic structure of the Commission's regulatory process or is an attack on the regulations; it is nothing more than a generalization regarding the intervenor's views of what applicable policies ought to be; it seeks to raise an issue which is not proper for adjudication in the proceeding; or it does not apply to the facility in question; or it seeks to raise an issue which is not concrete or litigable. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1035 (1982), citing Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 20-21 (1974); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75A, 18 NRC 1260, 1263 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-83-76, 18 NRC 1266, 1268-1269 (1983); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-13, 47 NRC 360, 365 (1998); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 151 (2001).

That orders impose requirements in addition to those imposed by the regulations does not create a genuine dispute as to whether compliance with the regulations fails to comport with the "no undue risk" standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2077 (Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954). As a general matter, compliance with applicable NRC regulations ensures that public health and safety are adequately protected in areas covered by the regulations. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-19, 60 NRC 5 at 9, 12 (2004).

#### **2.10.5.7 Contentions Involving Generic Issues/Subject of Rulemaking**

Before a contention presenting a generic issue can be admitted, the intervenor must demonstrate a specific nexus between each contention and the facility that is the subject of the proceeding. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-15, 15 NRC 555, 558-59 (1982); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-24, 26

NRC 159, 165 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 456-57 n.7 (1987), remanded on other grounds, Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988).

Licensing Boards should not accept in individual licensing cases any contentions which are or are about to become the subject of general rulemaking. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-655, 14 NRC 799, 816 (1981); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 86 (1985). Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 345. They appear to be permitted to accept "generic issues" which are not and are not about to become the subject of rulemaking, however. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974). See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-76, 18 NRC 1266, 1271 (1983). In order for a party or interested State to introduce such an issue into a proceeding, it must do more than present a list of generic technical issues being studied by the Staff or point to newly issued Regulatory Guides on a subject. There must be a nexus established between the generic issue and the particular permit or application in question. To establish such a nexus, it must be shown that (1) the generic issue has safety significance for the particular reactor under review, and (2) the fashion in which the application deals with the matter is unsatisfactory or the short term solution offered to the problem under study is inadequate. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 773 (1977); Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-82-103, 16 NRC 1603, 1608 (1982), citing River Bend, supra, 6 NRC at 773; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1657 (1982); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 418, 420 (1984), citing River Bend, supra, 6 NRC at 773, and Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, NRC 245, 248 (1978).

Contentions challenging NRC regulations or determinations made by the NRC during the rulemaking process are inadmissible. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 38-39 (2004).

While a Licensing Board should not accept contentions that are or are about to become the subject of general rulemaking, where a contention has long since been admitted and is still pending when notice of rulemaking is published, the intent of the Commission determines whether litigation of that contention should be undertaken. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak steam Electric station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-51, 14 NRC 896, 898 (1981), citing Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974).

Where the Commission has explicitly barred Board consideration of the subject of a contention on which rulemaking is pending, the Board may not exercise jurisdiction over the contention. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-11, 15 NRC 348, 350 (1982). Where the Commission has held its own decision whether to review an Appeal Board opinion in abeyance pending its decision whether or not to initiate a further rulemaking, and has instructed the Licensing Boards to defer consideration of the issue, a contention involving the

issue is unlitigable and inadmissible. Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 417-18 (1984), citing Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974).

A brief suspension of consideration of a contention will not be continued when it no longer appears likely that the Commission is about to issue a proposed rule on the matter which was the subject of the contention. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-42, 14 NRC 842, 846-847 (1981).

Parties interested in litigating unresolved safety issues must do something more than simply offer a checklist of unresolved issues; they must show that the issues have some specific safety significance for the reactor in question and that the application fails to resolve the matters satisfactorily. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 889 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-84-11, 20 NRC 1 (1984), citing Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 772-73 (1977).

Contentions which constitute a general attack upon the methods used by the NRC Staff to insure compliance with regulations, without raising any issues specifically related to matters under construction, are not appropriate for resolution in a particular licensing proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683, 690 (1980).

In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-1A, 15 NRC 43 (1982), the Licensing Board rejected the applicant's contention that Douglas Point, supra, requires dismissal whenever there is pending rulemaking on a subject at issue. The Board distinguished Douglas Point on several grounds: (1) In Douglas Point, there were no existing regulations on the subject, while in Perry, regulations do exist and continue in force regardless of proposed rulemaking; (2) The issue in Perry --whether Perry should have an automated standby liquid control system (SLCS) given the plant's specific characteristics -- is far more specific than the issues in Douglas Point (i.e., nuclear waste disposal issues); (3) The proposed rules recommend a variety of approaches on the SLCS issue requiring analysis of the plant's situation, so any efforts by the Board to resolve the issue would contribute to the analysis; (4) The Commission did not bar consideration of such issues during the pendency of its proposed rulemaking, as it could have. Unless the Commission has specifically directed that contentions be dismissed during pendency of proposed rulemaking, no such dismissal is required.

In order to posit a contention that requires the analysis of an action violating a specific technical specification, a petitioner would have to make some particularized demonstration that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the applicant will act contrary to the terms of such a requirement. See General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 164 (1996); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-99-25, 50 NRC 25, 34 (1999).

#### **2.10.5.8 Contentions Challenging Absent or Incomplete Documents**

Section 2.309(f)(2) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)) requires that a petitioner file its initial contentions based on an applicant's environmental report. A petitioner can "amend those contentions or file new contentions if there are data or conclusions in the NRC draft of final environmental impact statement . . . or any supplements relating thereto, that differ significantly from the data or conclusions in the applicant's document" Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-21, 52 NRC 261, 264 (2000), n.6, citing Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 4 (1997).; Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-20, 62 NRC 523, 526, 533 (2005); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 251 (1993).

At the contention formulation stage of the proceeding, an intervenor may plead the absence or inadequacy of documents or responses which have not yet been made available to the parties. The contention may be admitted subject to later refinement and specification when the additional information has been furnished or the relevant documents have been filed. Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683 (1980). Note, however, that the absence of licensing documents does not justify admission of contentions which do not meet the basis and specificity requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309. That is, a non-specific contention may not be admitted, subject to later specification, even though licensing documents that would provide the basis for a specific contention are unavailable. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB 687, 16 NRC 460 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983). Where there is no local public document room in an area near a facility, and where a petitioner for intervention unsuccessfully seeks information from a local NRC office, a licensing board may judge the adequacy of a proposed contention on the basis of available information. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 297-98 (1995).

Rulings on contentions concerning undeveloped portions of emergency plans may be deferred. To admit such contentions would be to risk unnecessary litigation. But to deny the contentions would unfairly ignore the insufficient development of these portions. Fairness and efficiency seem to dictate that rulings on such contentions be deferred. The objectives of such deferrals are to encourage negotiation, to avoid unnecessary litigation, and to make necessary litigation as focused as possible. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-18, 19 NRC 1020, 1028 (1984). Cf. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 775-76 (1983).

When information is not available, there will be good cause for filing a contention based on that information promptly after the information becomes available. However, the [eight] late-filing factors must be balanced in determining whether to admit such a contention filed after the initial period for submitting contentions. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 69 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1190 (1985).

The admission of a contention does not require anticipation of the contents of a document that has not been filed. A contention may address any current deficiency of the application, providing the contention is specific. Perry, supra, 16 NRC at 1469.

Should the subsequent issuance of the SER lead to a change in the FSAR and thereby modify or moot a contention based on that document, that contention can be amended or promptly disposed of by summary disposition or a stipulation. However, the possibility that such a circumstance could occur does not provide a reasonable basis for deferring the filing of safety-related contentions until the Staff issues its SER. Catawba, supra, 17 NRC at 1049.

NRC has the burden of complying with NEPA. The adequacy of the NRC's environmental review as reflected in the adequacy of a DES or FES is an appropriate issue for litigation in a licensing proceeding. Because the adequacy of those documents cannot be determined before they are prepared, contentions regarding their adequacy cannot be expected to be proffered at an earlier stage of the proceeding before the documents are available. That does not mean that no environmental contentions can be formulated before the Staff issues a DES or FES. While all environmental contentions may, in a general sense, ultimately be challenges to the NRC's compliance with NEPA, factual aspects of particular issues can be raised before the DES is prepared. Just as the submission of a safety-related contention based on the FSAR is not to be deferred simply because the Staff may later issue an SER requiring a change in a safety matter, so too, the Commission expects that the filing of an environmental concern based on the applicant's environmental report will not be deferred simply because the Staff may subsequently provide a different analysis in its DES. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1049 (1983). See 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(2) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)(iii)), 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33180 (August 11, 1989), as corrected, 54 Fed. Reg. 39728 (Sept. 28, 1989).

Contentions initially framed as challenges to the substance of the applicants Environmental Report analysis may not necessarily require a late-filed revision or substitution relative to the Staff's DEIS or FEIS. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-26, 54 NRC 199, 208 (2001). However, significant changes in the nature of the alleged NEPA imperfection, from one comprehensive information omission to an imperfection based on deficient analysis of the subsequent information provided by the Staff may warrant a late-filed revision or substitution. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-26, 54 NRC 199, 208 (2001).

Where a contention challenges the omission of particular information or an issue from an application, and the information is later supplied by the applicant or considered by the Staff in a draft EIS, the contention is moot. Without requiring submission of a new or amended contention, the original "omission" contention could be transformed into a broad series of disparate claims. This approach would, in turn, circumvent NRC contention pleading standards and defeat the contention rule's purposes: (1) providing notice to the opposing party of the issues that will be litigated; (2) ensuring that at least a minimal factual or legal foundation exists for the different claims that have been alleged; and (3) ensuring there exists an actual genuine dispute with the applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Duke Energy

Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-28, 56 NRC 373, 383 (2002), clarifying CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1 (2002). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-04-7, 59 NRC 259, 263 (2004). Something obviously is different than nothing, so the availability of new information on an issue where there previously was none, fulfills the requirement that late contentions be based on “materially different information” in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(ii). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-32, 62 NRC 813, 820 (2005).

It is well recognized that where a contention based on an applicant’s environmental report is superceded by the subsequent issuance of an environmental impact statement or a response to a request for additional information, the contention must be disposed of or modified. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-9, 63 NRC 433, 444 (2006).

Generally, the plain language of a contention will reveal whether the contention is (1) a claim of omission, (2) a specific substantive challenge to an application, or (3) a combination of both. In some cases, it may be necessary to examine the language of the contention bases to determine the scope of the contention. In the first situation, where a contention alleges the omission of particular information or an issue from an application, and the information is supplied later by the applicant, the contention is moot. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-16, 63 NRC 737, 742 (2006).

Where a contention of omission that is the sole contention in the proceeding has been rendered moot and no other motions remain pending, an order dismissing the contention ordinarily would terminate the proceeding. However, the Commission has instructed that when a contention of omission has been rendered moot, the intervenor – if it wishes to raise specific challenges regarding the new information – may timely file a new contention that addresses the admissibility factors in 10 C.F.R. 2.309 (f)(1). Oyster Creek, LBP-06-16, 63 NRC at 744.

A contention that alleges omission of a seismic and structural analysis becomes moot, and must be dismissed, when the applicant provides such an analysis. To challenge the substance of the applicant’s analysis, the intervenor must file a new or amended contention pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-05-24, 62 NRC 429, 431-32 (2005).

#### **2.10.5.9 Contentions re Adequacy of Security Plan**

The adequacy of a nuclear facility's physical security plan may be a proper subject for challenge by intervenors in an operating license proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2), CLI-80-24, 11 NRC 775, 777 (1980); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 949 (1974). The adequacy of an applicant's physical security plan is also a permissible issue in an operating license renewal proceeding. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 288 (1995).

An intervenor may not introduce a contention which questions the adequacy of an applicant's security plan "against the effects of (a) attacks and destructive acts, including sabotage, directed against the facility by an enemy of the United States, whether a foreign government or other person, or (b) use or deployment of weapons incident to U.S. defense activities." Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-27, 22 NRC 126, 135-36, 138 (1985), citing 10 CFR § 50.13. However, section 50.13 does not preclude intervenors from challenging whether security systems satisfy governing security requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 73. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 292 (1995).

NEPA does not require a terrorism review, and that an EIS is not the appropriate format in which to address the challenges of terrorism. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1, 6-7 (2003).

A request for an exemption under 10 CFR § 73.5 does not constitute a license amendment, so a hearing under Section 189 of the AEA is not required. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-00-5, 51 NRC 90, 96 (2000).

Where an intervenor seeking to challenge an applicant's security plan does not produce a qualified expert to review the plan and declines to submit to a protective order, its vague contentions must be dismissed for failure to meet conditions that could produce an acceptably specific contention. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-51, 16 NRC 167, 177 (1982); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-13, 47 NRC 360, 366 (1998).

Admission of a contention involving a security plan does not transform the security plan into a public document. Licensing Boards may adopt appropriate protective measures to preclude public release of information concerning such a plan. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 292 (1995).

The applicable design-basis threats against which an applicant must protect appear in 10 CFR § 73.1, to the extent referenced in sections applicable to particular types of reactors. The design-basis threat for research reactors includes "radiological sabotage." Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Ga.), LBP-95-6, 41 NRC 281, 292-93 (1995). The security plan for certain research reactors, insofar as it protects against radiological sabotage, may be modified to account for special circumstances. 10 CFR § 73.60(f). Id.

An intervenor may not challenge orders issued to [Part 72] licensees until such an order specifically applies to the licensee involved in the instant proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-5, 57 NRC 233, 235 (2003).

Orders directed to individual facilities cause no change to the regulations and create no new review standard for other licensees or applicants, even if the orders had imposed requirements on each facility then in the category. Therefore, orders

issued in light of the 9/11 attacks did not create a de facto change in the 10 C.F.R. § 73.1 design basis threat for Category I facilities, and the intervenor's contention challenging the requested license amendment was rejected. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-19, 60 NRC 5 at 10-12 (2004).

#### **2.10.5.10 Defective Contentions**

Where contentions are defective, for whatever reason, Licensing Boards have no duty to recast them to make them acceptable under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 406 (1974).

The contention pleading criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (f)(1) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)) are mandatory and must be scrupulously followed. As the Commission has stated with respect to these regulatory provisions, "[i]f any one of these requirements is not met, a contention must be rejected." Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149, 155 (1991); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64 (2002); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273 (2001); Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-21, 54 NRC 33, 47 (2001). Failure to submit at least one admissible contention is grounds for dismissing the petition under 10 CFR § 2.309(a)(1) (formerly 2.714(b)(1)). Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 64 (2002). Where a licensing board holds that a contention is inadmissible for failing to meet more than one of the requirements specified in § 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi), a petitioner's failure to address each ground for the board's ruling is sufficient justification for the Commission to reject the petitioner's appeal. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631, 638 (2004).

However, although a Licensing Board is not required to recast contentions to make them acceptable, it also is not precluded from doing so. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna steam Electric station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 295-296 (1979). See also Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-19, 33 NRC 397, 406-408, 412-413 (1991), appeal denied on other grounds, CLI-91-12, 34 NRC 149 (1991). The Palo Verde Licensing Board erred by inferring a basis for the petitioners' contention when the petitioners failed to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.309(f) (formerly 2.714(b)(2)) to clearly state the basis for its contention and to provide sufficient information to support its contention. Palo Verde, supra, 34 NRC at 155-56.

A contention's proponent must be afforded the opportunity to be heard in response to objections to the contention. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-8, 39 NRC 116, 119 (1994), citing Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521, 525 (1979).



It is the responsibility of the intervenor, not the Licensing Board, to provide the necessary information to satisfy the basis requirement for the admission of its contentions. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-942, 32 NRC 395, 416-417 (1990). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Stations, Units 2 and 3), LBP-01-10, 53 NRC 273, 286 (2001).

A Licensing Board has consolidated otherwise inadmissible contentions with properly admitted contentions involving the same subject matter where such consolidation would not require the applicant to mount a defense that is substantially different or expanded from that which would be required by the admitted contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-89-1, 29 NRC 5, 33-34 (1989).

A contention that seeks to litigate a matter that is the subject of an agency rulemaking is not admissible. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-01, 51 NRC 1, 5 (2000); See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142, 179, reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, LBP-98-10, 47 NRC 288, aff'd on other grounds, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) interpreted agency jurisprudence as reflecting a general reluctance to base the dismissal of contentions on pleading or other procedural defects, including defects of timing. At the same time, the ASLB judged that the Commission expects its presiding officers to set schedules, expects that parties will adhere to those schedules, and expects that presiding officers will enforce compliance with those schedules. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-28, 52 NRC 226 (2000)(citing Sequoyah Fuels Corp., (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-8, 39 NRC 116, 120 (1994); Yankee Atomic Electrical Co., (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 5 (1996); Statement of Policy on Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 21 (1998)).

Extraneous matters such as preservation of rights, statements of intervention, and directives for interpretation which accompany an **intervenor's list** of contentions will be disregarded as contrary to the Commission's Rules of Practice. Commonwealth Edison Company (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683, 689-690 (1980).

Consistent with the analogous agency rules regarding contentions filed by intervenors, issues that would constitute "defenses" to an enforcement order are subject to dismissal under the appropriate circumstances. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 334 n.5 (1994); citing Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 33 n.4 (1994).

#### **2.10.5.11 Discovery to Frame Contentions**

A petitioner is not entitled to discovery to assist him in framing the contentions in his petition to intervene. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating

Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 192, reconsid. den., ALAB-110, 6 AEC 247, aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973).

An intervenor may not file a vague contention and place the burden upon the applicants and Staff to obtain further details through discovery. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-942, 32 NRC 395, 426-27 (1990).

#### **2.10.5.12 Stipulations on Contentions**

[RESERVED]

#### **2.10.6 Conditions on Grants of Intervention**

10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly 2.714(f)) empowers a Licensing Board to condition an order granting intervention on such terms as may serve the purposes of restricting duplicative or repetitive evidence and of having common interests represented by a single spokesman. 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly 2.715a) deals with the general authority to consolidate parties in construction permit or operating license proceedings. Duke Power Company (Oconee Nuclear Station and McGuire Nuclear Station), ALAB-528, 9 NRC 146, 150 n.9 (1979).

#### **2.10.7 Reinstatement of Intervenor After Withdrawal**

A voluntary withdrawal of intervention is "without prejudice" in that it does not constitute a legal bar to the later reinstatement of the intervention upon the intervenor's showing of good cause. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-73-41, 6 AEC 1057 (1973). The factors to be considered in the good cause determination are generally the same as those considered under 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)) with primary emphasis on the delay of the proceeding, prejudice to other parties and adequate protection of the intervenor's interests. Grand Gulf, supra.

#### **2.10.8 Rights of Intervenor at Hearing**

In an operating license proceeding (with the exception of certain NEPA issues), the applicant's license application is in issue, not the adequacy of the Staff's review of the application. An intervenor in an operating license proceeding is free to challenge directly an unresolved generic safety issue by filing a proper contention, but it may not proceed on the basis of allegations that the Staff has somehow failed in its performance. Concomitantly, once the record has closed, generic safety issue may be litigated directly only if standards for late-filed contentions and reopening the record are met. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

The rules cannot legitimately be read as requiring that, once an intervenor is represented by counsel, that counsel be the party's sole representative in the proceeding. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-28, 17 NRC 987, 994 (1983).

When a party is permitted to enter a case late, it is expected to take the case as it finds it. It follows that when a party that has participated in a case all along simply changes

representatives in midstream, knowledge of the matters already heard and received into evidence is imputed to it. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1246 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

An intervenor's status as a party in a proceeding does not of itself make it a spokesman for others. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-34, 24 NRC 549, 550 n.1 (1986), aff'd, ALAB-854, 24 NRC 783 (1986), citing Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-556, 10 NRC 30, 33 (1979).

Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 863, 867-68 (1974), aff'd in pertinent part, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975). However, that does not elevate the intervenor's status to that of co-sponsor of the contentions. The Commission's regulations require that, at the outset of a case, each intervenor submit "a list of the contentions which it seeks to have litigated." 10 CFR § 2.309(a) (formerly 2.714(b)). It follows from this that one intervenor may not introduce affirmative evidence on issues raised by another intervenor's contentions. Prairie Island, supra, 8 AEC at 869 n.17; Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 383 n.102 (1985).

Contentions left without a sponsor due to the withdrawal of one intervenor may be adopted by another intervenor upon satisfaction of the [eight]-factor balancing test. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 381-82 (1985). See 10 CFR § 2.309 (c). For a detailed discussion of the [eight] factor test, See Section 2.10.5.5.

A contention which has been joined by two joint intervenors may not be withdrawn without the consent of both joint intervenors. Either of the joint intervenors may litigate the contention upon the other intervenor's withdrawal of sponsorship for the contention. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-22, 24 NRC 103, 106 (1986).

The contention rules explicitly provide the option for petitioners to "adopt" other petitioners' contentions, thus providing an avenue of participation for any party in connection with any of the contentions proffered by another participant. However, the contention rules do not provide an unconstrained right for a party to cross-examine and submit proposed findings on all other parties' contentions, regardless of whether the contentions were ever adopted. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 626-27 (2004).

An intervenor in an operating license proceeding may not proceed on the basis of allegations that the Staff has somehow failed in its performance; at least when the evidence shows that the alleged inadequate Staff review did not result in inadequacies in the analyses and performance of the applicant. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 565 n.29 (1983), citing Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

#### **2.10.8.1 Burden of Proof**

A licensee generally bears the ultimate burden of proof. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265, 1271 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 2.325 (formerly 2.732). But intervenors must give some basis for further inquiry. Three Mile Island, supra, 16 NRC at 1271, citing Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Alleghany Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 340 (1980). See Section 3.7.

Although 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) imposes on a petitioner the burden of going forward with a sufficient factual basis, it does not shift the ultimate burden of proof from the applicant to the petitioner. Section 50.82(e) of 10 C.F.R. expressly requires that decommissioning be performed in accordance with the regulations, including the ALARA rule in 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 249 (1996).

The proponent of the need for an evidentiary hearing bears the burden of establishing that need, but the staff bears the ultimate burden to demonstrate its compliance with NEPA in its EA determination that an EIS is not necessarily relative to a license amendment request. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 249 (2001).

An intervenor has the burden of going forward with respect to issues raised by his contentions. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163, 191 (1975); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 388-89 (1974). For a more detailed discussion, see Section 3.7.2.

While an applicant has the ultimate burden of proof on any issues upon which a hearing is held, hearings are held on only those issues that an intervenor brings to the fore. The burden of going forward on any issues that make it to the hearing process is on the intervenor which is pursuing that issue. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-05-12, 61 NRC 319, 326 (2005), aff'd Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403 (2005)..

In decommissioning cases there is a presumption that the licensee's choice of decommissioning alternatives is reasonable. It is, therefore, petitioners' burden to show "extraordinary circumstances" rebutting this presumption. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 252 (1996).

## **2.10.8.2 Presentation of Evidence**

### **2.10.8.2.1 Affirmative Presentation by Intervenor/Participants**

Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 869 n.17, reconsid. den., ALAB-252, 8 AEC 1175 (1974), aff'd, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975). This rule does not apply to an interested State participating under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)). Such a State may produce evidence on issues not raised by it. Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 392-93 (1976).

### 2.10.8.2 Consolidation of Intervenor Presentations

A Licensing Board, in permitting intervention, may consolidate intervenors for the purpose of restricting duplicative or repetitive evidence and argument. 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly, § 2.714(f)). In addition, parties with substantially similar interests and contentions may be ordered to consolidate their presentation of evidence, cross-examination and participation in general pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly 2.715a). An order consolidating the participation of one party with the others may not be appealed prior to the conclusion of the proceeding. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-496, 8 NRC 308-309 (1978); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-52A, 18 NRC 265, 272-73 (1983), citing Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 455 (1981). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1601 (1985); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-9, 47 NRC 261, 284 (1998).

Only parties to a Commission licensing proceeding may be consolidated. Petitioners who are not admitted as parties may not be consolidated for the purposes of participation as a single party. 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly 2.715a); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616, 623 (1981).

Where intervenors have filed consolidated briefs they may be treated as a consolidated party; one intervenor may be appointed lead intervenor for purposes of coordinating responses to discovery, but discovery requests should be served on each party intervenor. It is not necessary that a contention or contentions be identified to any one of the intervening parties, so long as there is at least one contention admitted per intervenor. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 687 (1981).

The Commission has issued a policy statement relating to consolidation of intervenors and the conduct of licensing proceedings. Pursuant to that Commission guidance, consolidation should not be ordered when it will prejudice the rights of any intervenor; however, in all appropriate cases, single, lead intervenors should be designated to present evidence, conduct cross-examination, submit briefs, and propose findings of fact, conclusions of law, and argument. Except where other intervenors' interests will be prejudiced or upon a showing that the record will be incomplete, those activities should not be performed by such other intervenors. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 455 (1981).

### 2.10.8.3 Cross-Examination by Intervenor

An intervenor may engage in cross-examination of witnesses dealing with issues not raised by him if the intervenor has a discernible interest in resolution of those issues. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 867-68 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-2, 21 NRC 24, 32 (1985), vacated

as moot, ALAB-842, 24 NRC 197 (1986). Licensing Boards must carefully restrict and monitor such cross-examination, however, to avoid repetition. Prairie Island, supra, 1 NRC 1.

In general, the intervenor's cross-examination may not be used to expand the number or boundaries of contested issues. Prairie Island, supra, 8 AEC 857. For a further discussion, see Section 3.13.1.

#### **2.10.8.4 Intervenor's Right to File Proposed Findings**

An intervenor may file proposed findings with respect to all issues whether or not raised by his own contentions. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 863 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-2, 21 NRC 24, 32 (1985), vacated as moot, ALAB-842, 24 NRC 197 (1986).

A Board in its discretion may refuse to rule on an issue in its initial decision if the party raising the issue has not filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981).

The right to file proposed findings of fact in an adjudication is not unlawfully abridged unless there was prejudicial error in refusing to admit the evidence that would have been the subject of the findings. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-11, 15 NRC 1383, 1384 (1982).

When statements in applicant's proposed findings, which are based on applicant statements by witnesses under oath before the presiding officer or as part of its application, indicate a willingness to comply with all or a portion of specific, nationally recognized consensus standards, little purpose would be served in repeating the terms of these commitments as license conditions (or as presiding officer directives). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 410 (2000), citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 423-24 (1980).

#### **2.10.8.5 Attendance at/Participation in Prehearing Conferences/Hearings**

An intervenor seeking to be excused from a prehearing conference should file a request to this effect before the conference date. Such a request should present the justification for not attending. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-488, 8 NRC 187, 190-91 (1978). For a discussion of a party's duty to attend hearings, see Section 3.6.

Where an intervenor indicates its intention not to participate in the evidentiary hearing, the intervenor may be held in default and its admitted contentions dismissed although the Licensing Board will review those contentions to assure that they do not raise serious matters that must be considered. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), LBP-76-7, 3 NRC 156, 157 (1976). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 429-31 (1990), aff'd in part, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990).

Notwithstanding cases suggesting that a presiding officer must undertake a review of an issue subject to dismissal because of a party default to ensure there are no serious matters that require consideration, see Pilgrim, LBP-76-7, 3 NRC at 157; see also Seabrook, LBP-90-12, 31 NRC at 431, such an evaluation must be tempered by the Commission's admonition that a presiding officer should, on its own initiative, engage in the consideration of health, safety, environmental, or common defense and security matters outside the scope of admitted contentions only in "extraordinary circumstances" and then in accordance with the appropriate procedural dictates, which includes Commission referral of any decision to look into such matters. See Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 22-23 (1998).

An appropriate sanction for willful refusal to attend a Prehearing Conference is dismissal of the petition for intervention. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-13, 33 NRC 259, 262-63 (1991); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-92-3, 35 NRC 107, 109 (1992). In the alternative, an appropriate sanction is the acceptance of the truth of all statements made by the applicant or the NRC Staff at the Special Prehearing Conference. Application of that sanction would also result in dismissal. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-82-108, 16 NRC 1811, 1817 (1982).

A Licensing Board is not expected to sit idly by when parties refuse to comply with its orders. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly 2.718), a Licensing Board has the power and the duty to maintain order, to take appropriate action to avoid delay and to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly 2.707), the refusal of a party to comply with a Board order relating to its appearance at a proceeding constitutes a default for which a Licensing Board may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1928 (1982).

As part of a presiding officer's duty to maintain order and to take appropriate action to avoid delay and regulate the course of a hearing and the conduct of the parties, a licensing board is expected to take action when parties, for whatever reason, fail to comply with scheduling and other orders. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-5, 51 NRC 64, 67 (2000); See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1928 (1982).

A party may not be heard to complain that its rights were unjustly abridged after having purposefully refused to participate. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1935 (1982).

Dismissal of a party is the ultimate sanction applicable to an intervenor. Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), LBP-82-101, 16 NRC 1594, 1595-1596 (1982), citing Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2), LBP-76-7, 3 NRC 156 (1976).

#### **2.10.8.6 Pleadings and Documents of Intervenors**

An intervenor may not disregard an adjudicatory board's direction to file a memorandum without first seeking leave of the board. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-488, 8 NRC 187 (1978).

If an error or omission is noted by a litigant in a document that it has served and/or filed, the proper procedure is to file a document that is clearly marked as an amended or corrected version of the pleading, and to accompany that amended pleading with a motion requesting leave to substitute the amended pleading for the original. Such a motion should also fully explain the differences between the amended pleading and the original, as well as the circumstances justifying the filing of the amended pleading. Failure to follow such a procedure will ordinarily result in the second pleading being stricken. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), LBP-05-28, 62 NRC 585, 593 (2005).

## **2.10.9 Cost of Intervention**

### **2.10.9.1 Financial Assistance to Intervenors**

Congress has barred the use of appropriated monies to pay the expenses of, or otherwise compensate, parties intervening in NRC regulatory or adjudicatory proceedings. Pub. L. No. 102-377, Title V, § 502, 106 Stat. 1342 (1992), 5 U.S.C. § 504 note. This law made permanent the proscription against such funding that had been attached to NRC appropriations bills for several previous years. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 97-88, Title V, § 502, 95 Stat. 1148 (1981) and Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 101(9), 96 Stat. 1135 (1982).

Prior to adoption of this bar, the Commission had considered financial assistance to intervenors, even in the absence of express statutory authority to do so. Although a Comptroller General opinion had suggested that the Commission might do so under certain circumstances, see Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Financial Assistance to Participants in Commission Proceedings), CLI-76-23, 4 NRC 494 (1976), a judicial decision overruled a later related Comptroller General opinion involving another agency. Green County Planning Board v. FPC, 559 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). On this basis, in part, funding for intervenors was denied in Exxon Nuclear Co., (Low Enriched Uranium Exports of EURATOM Member Nations), CLI-77-31, 6 NRC 849 (1977). The Commission indicated that it favored funding intervenors but noted Congress had precluded such funding in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-19, 11 NRC 700 and CLI-80-20, 11 NRC 705 (1980). The Commission had authorized free transcripts in adjudicatory proceedings on an application for a license or an amendment thereto in prior Commission rules, 10 CFR §§ 2.708(d), 2.712(f) and 2.750(c), 45 Fed. Reg. 49535 (July 25, 1980), but those rules were suspended in the face of the legislative bar on intervenor funding. See 46 Fed. Reg. 13681 (Feb. 24, 1981).

The Commission does not have the authority to require the utility-applicants to themselves fund intervention nor to assess fees for that purpose where the service to be performed is for intervenors' benefit and is not one needed by the Commission to discharge its own licensing responsibilities. See Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. NRC, 601 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1102 (1980). See also



National Cable Television Association Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1978); Federal Power Commission v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-40, 16 NRC 1717 (1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1273 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-807, 21 NRC 1195, 1212 (1985), citing Pub. L. No. 98-360, 98 Stat. 403 (1984). See Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-625, 13 NRC 13, 14-15 (1981).

Ordinarily parties are to bear their own litigation expense; a claim for litigation costs under the "private attorney general" theory must have a statutory basis. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-81, 16 NRC 1128, 1139 (1982), citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240, 269; 44 L.Ed.2d 141; 95 S. Ct. 1612 (1975).

#### **2.10.9.2 Intervenors' Witnesses**

The Appeal Board has indicated that where an intervenor would call a witness but for the intervenor's financial inability to do so, the Licensing Board may call the witness as a Board witness and authorize NRC payment of the usual witness fees and expenses. The decision to take such action is a matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection. If the Board calls such a witness as its own, it should limit cross-examination to the scope of the direct examination. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-382, 5 NRC 603, 607-608 (1977). This decision is of questionable weight in view of the developments pertaining to intervenor funding discussed in section 2.9.9.1.

#### **2.10.10 Appeals by Intervenors**

If a presiding officer denies a petition to intervene, the action is appealable within ten days of service of the order. 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 (formerly 2.714a and 2.1205(o)). Commission rules, as set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.306 (formerly 2.710), add five days to filing deadlines when service is by mail. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-02-13, 55 NRC 269, 272 (2002). See also Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., CLI-04-13, 59 NRC 244, 248 (2004).

Despite the substantial deference given to presiding officers in determining standing, such decisions are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-02-13, 55 NRC 269, 273 (2002).

An intervenor may seek appellate redress on all issues whether or not those issues were raised by his own contentions. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 863 (1974).

#### **2.10.11 Intervention in Remanded Proceedings**

The Licensing Board was "manifestly correct" in rejecting a petition requesting intervention in a remanded proceeding where the scope of the remanded proceeding had been limited by the Commission, and the petition for intervention dealt with matters outside that scope. The Licensing Board had limited jurisdiction in the proceeding and

could consider only what had been remanded to it. Carolina Power and Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-526, 9 NRC 122, 124 n.3 (1979).

## **2.11 Nonparty Participation - Limited Appearance and Interested States**

### **2.11.1 Limited Appearances in NRC Adjudicatory Proceedings**

Although limited appearers are not parties to any proceeding, statements by limited appearers can serve to alert the Licensing Board and the parties to areas in which evidence may need to be adduced. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. (Duane Arnold Energy Center), ALAB-108, 6 AEC 195, 196 n.4 (1973).

#### **2.11.1.1 Requirements for Limited Appearance**

The requirements for becoming a limited appearer are set out in 10 CFR § 2.315 (formerly 2.715). Based upon that section, the requirements for limited appearances are generally within the discretion of the presiding officer in the proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616, 623 (1981).

#### **2.11.1.2 Scope/Limitations of Limited Appearances**

Under 10 CFR § 2.315(a) (formerly 2.715(a)), the role of a limited appearer is restricted to making oral or written statements of his position on the issues within such limits and on such conditions as the Board may fix.

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.315(a) (formerly 2.715(a)), limited appearance statements may be permitted at the discretion of the presiding officer, but the person admitted may not otherwise participate in the proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-25, 18 NRC 327, 333 (1983).

A limited appearance statement is not evidence and need only be taken into account by the Licensing Board to the extent that it may alert the Board or parties to areas in which evidence may need to be adduced. Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. ALAB-108, supra, (dictum).

The purpose of limited appearance statements is to alert the Licensing Board and parties to areas in which evidence may need to be adduced. Such statements do not constitute evidence, and accordingly, the Board is not obligated to discuss them in its decision. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1087 n.12 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.315(a) (formerly 2.715(a)); Iowa Electric Light and Power Co. (Duane Arnold Energy Center), ALAB-108, 6 AEC 195, 196 n.4 (1973).

A person who makes a limited appearance before a Licensing Board may not appeal from that Board's decision. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-454, 7 NRC 39 (1978).

#### **2.11.2 Participation by Nonparty Interested States and Local Governments**

State agencies may choose to participate either as a party under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 (d)(2) (formerly 2.714) or as an interested state under 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)). To participate under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(d)(2) (formerly 2.714), a state agency must satisfy the same standards as an individual petitioner except that a state agency that wishes to be a party in a proceeding for a facility located within its boundaries need not address the standing requirements under 10 CFR 2.309(d)(1). Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-96-22, 44 NRC 138, 141 (1996).

Under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)), an interested State may participate in a proceeding even though it is not a party. In this context, the Board must afford representatives of the interested State the opportunity to introduce evidence, interrogate witnesses and advise the Commission. In so doing, the interested State need not take a position on any of the issues. Even though a State has submitted contentions and intervened under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714), it may participate as an "interested State" under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) on issues in the proceeding not raised by its own contentions. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383 (1976); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601, 617 (1982). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1079 (1982), citing Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977). However, once a party is admitted as an interested State under Section 2.315(c), it may not reserve the right to intervene later under Section 2.309 with full party status. petition to intervene under the provisions of the latter section must conform to the requirements for late filed petitions. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2) and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-25, 15 NRC 715, 723 (1982).

A Licensing Board may require the representative of an interested State to indicate in advance of the hearing the subject matter on which it wishes to participate, but such a showing is not a prerequisite of admission under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)). Indian Point, supra, 15 NRC at 723.

A State participating as an interested State may appeal an adjudicatory board's decision so that an interested State participating under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) constitutes the sole exception to the normal rule that a nonparty to a proceeding may not appeal from the decision in that proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-454, 7 NRC 39 (1978).

Section 274(l) of the Atomic Energy Act confers a right to participate in licensing proceedings on the State of location for the subject facility. However, 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) of the Commission's Rules of Practice extends an opportunity to participate not merely to the State in which a facility will be located, but also to those other States that demonstrate an interest cognizable under Section 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)). Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc. (Nuclear Fuel Recovery and Recycling Center), ALAB-447, 6 NRC 873 (1977). See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-74-32, 8 AEC 217 (1974).

Although a State seeking to participate as an "interested State" under Section 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) need not state contentions, once in the proceeding it must comply

with all the procedural rules and is subject to the same requirements as parties appearing before the Board. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977); Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-82-103, 16 NRC 1603, 1615 (1982), citing River Bend, *supra*, 6 NRC at 768. Nevertheless, the Commission has emphasized that the participation of an interested sovereign State, as a full party or otherwise, is always desirable in the NRC licensing process. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-25, 6 NRC 535 (1977). A State's participation may be so important that the State's desire to be a party to Commission review may be one factor to consider in determining whether the State should be permitted to participate in the Commission review, even though the State has not fully complied with the requirements for such participation. *Id.*

A State has no right to participate in administrative appeals when it has not participated in the underlying hearing. The Commission will deny a State's extremely untimely petition to intervene as a non-party interested State which is filed on the eve of the Commission's licensing decision. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-20, 24 NRC 518, 519 (1986), *aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. NRC*, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987).

A governmental body must demonstrate a genuine interest in participating in the proceeding. A Licensing Board denied a municipality permission to participate as an interested State in a reopened hearing where the municipality failed to: file proposed findings of fact; comply with a Board Order to indicate with reasonable specificity the subject matters on which it desired to participate; appear at an earlier evidentiary hearing; and specify its objections to the Staff reports which were the focus of the reopened hearing. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-24, 24 NRC 132, 136 (1986).

The mere filing by a State of a petition to participate in an operating license application pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) as an interested State is not cause for ordering a hearing. The application can receive a thorough agency review, outside of the hearing process, absent indications of significant controverted matters or serious safety or environmental issues. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-83-45, 18 NRC 213, 216 (1983); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-84-6, 19 NRC 393, 426 (1984), citing Northern States Power Co. (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), CLI-80-36, 12 NRC 523, 527 (1980).

Although a State has a statutory right to a reasonable opportunity to participate in NRC proceedings, it may not seek to appeal on issues it did not participate in below, or seek remand of those issues. However, the State is given an opportunity to file a brief *amicus curiae*. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-583, 11 NRC 447 (1980).

A late decision by the Governor of a State to participate as representative of an interested State can be granted, but the Governor must take the proceeding as he finds it. He cannot complain of rulings made or procedural arrangements settled prior to his participation. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-600, 12 NRC 3, 8 (1980); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-13, 17 NRC 469, 471-72 (1983),

citing 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-6, 11 NRC 148, 151 (1980).

An interested State that has elected to litigate issues as a full party under 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly 2.714) is accorded the rights of an "interested State" under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) as to all other issues. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-9, 17 NRC 403, 407 (1983), citing Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 392-93 (1976). **[NOTE: This decision reflects "old Part 2" and may not reflect current caselaw after Part 2 was amended on January 14, 2004]**

The plain terms of 10 CFR 2.315(c) allow government entities to claim "interested state" participation only if they are not already admitted as parties under 10 CFR 2.309. The contention rules explicitly provide the option for petitioners to "adopt" other petitioners' contentions, thus providing an avenue of participation for any party in connection with any of the contentions proffered by another participant. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 626-27 (2004).

10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) authorizes an interested State to introduce evidence with respect to those issues on which it has not taken a position. However, at the earliest possible date in advance of the hearing, an interested State must state with reasonable specificity those subject areas, other than its own contentions, in which it intends to participate. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 407.

The presiding officer may require an interested governmental entity to indicate with reasonable specificity, in advance of the hearing, the subject matters on which it desires to participate. However, once the time for identification of new issues by even a governmental participant has passed, either by schedule set by the Board or by circumstances, any new contention thereafter advanced by the governmental participant must meet the test for nontimely contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1140 (1983). See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601, 617 (1982).

An interested State, once admitted to a proceeding, must observe the procedural requirements applicable to other participants. Every party, however, may seek modification for good cause of time limits previously set by a Board. Moreover, good cause, by its very nature, must be an ad hoc determination based on the facts and circumstances applicable to the particular determination. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-26, 17 NRC 945, 947 (1983).

Although an interested State must observe applicable procedural requirements, including time limits, the facts and circumstances which would constitute good cause for extending the time available to a State may not be coextensive with those warranting that action for another party. States need not, although they may, take a position with respect to an issue in order to participate in the resolution of that issue. Reflecting political changes which uniquely bear upon bodies such as States, a State's position on an issue (and the degree of its participation with respect to that issue) might understandably change during the course of a Board's consideration of the issue. The Commission itself has recognized such factors, and it has permitted States to participate even where contrary to a procedural requirement which might bar another

party's participation. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-26, 17 NRC 945, 947 (1983), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-77-25, 6 NRC 535 (1977); See 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)).

A county does not lose its right to participate as an interested governmental agency pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly 2.715(c)) because it has elected to participate as a full intervenor on specified contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1139 (1983), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-19, 15 NRC 601, 617 (1982).

Any governmental participant seeking to advance a late contention or issue, whether or not it be a participant already in the case or one seeking to enter, must satisfy the criteria for late-filed contentions as well as the criteria for reopening the record. Shoreham, supra, 17 NRC at 1140.

A State's status as an interested State does not confer upon it any special power to adopt contentions which have been abandoned by their sponsor. A State must observe the procedural requirements applicable to other participants. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 430-31 (1990), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990).

## **2.12 Discovery**

### **2.12.1 Time for Discovery**

A potential intervenor has no right to seek discovery prior to filing his petition to intervene. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Koshkonong Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-45, 8 AEC 928 (1974); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, reconsid. den., ALAB-110, 6 AEC 247, aff'd, CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241 (1973). See also BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Discovery on the subject matter of a contention in a licensing proceeding can be obtained only after the contention has been admitted to the proceeding. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1263 (1982). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-25, 28 NRC 394, 396 (1988) (the scope of a contention is determined by the literal terms of the contention, coupled with its stated bases), reconsid. denied on other grounds, LBP-88-25A, 28 NRC 435 (1988).

A Licensing Board denied an applicant's motion for leave to commence limited discovery against persons who had filed petitions to intervene (at that point, nonparties). The Board entertained substantial doubt as to its authority to order the requested discovery, but denied the motion specifically because it found no necessity to follow that course of action. The Board discussed at length the law relating to the prohibition found in 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(1) (formerly 2.740(b)(1)) against discovery beginning prior to the prehearing conference provided for in 10 CFR § 2.329 (formerly 2.751a). Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-37, 8 NRC 575, 577-584 (1978).

Applicants are entitled to prompt discovery concerning the bases of contentions, since a good deal of information is already available from the FSAR and other documents early in the course of the proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-30-A, 14 NRC 364, 369 (1981).

The fact that late intervention has been permitted should not disrupt established discovery schedules since a tardy petitioner with no good excuse must take the proceeding as he finds it. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (West Valley Reprocessing Plant), CLI-75-4, 1 NRC 273 (1975).

When a Licensing Board holds that the sole contention in a proceeding is moot, the mandatory disclosure process for that contention (10 C.F.R. §§ 2.336 and 2.1203) is terminated. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-16, 63 NRC 737, 745 (2006).

Under 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(1) (formerly 2.740(b)(1)), discovery is available after a contention is admitted and may be terminated a reasonable time thereafter. Litigants are not entitled to further discovery as a matter of right with respect to information relevant to a contention which first surfaces long after discovery on that contention has been terminated. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-24, 19 NRC 1418, 1431-32 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59 (1985). However, an Appeal Board held that a Licensing Board abused its discretion by denying intervenors the opportunity to conduct discovery of new information submitted by the applicant and admitted by the Board on a reopened record. The Appeal Board found that, although there might have been a need to conduct an expeditious hearing, it was improper to deny the intervenors the opportunity to conduct any discovery concerning the newly admitted information where it was not shown that the requested discovery would delay the hearing. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 160-61 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987).

The Commission has expressly advised the Licensing Boards to see that the licensing process moves along at an expeditious pace, consistent with the demands of fairness, and the fact that a party has personal or other obligations or fewer resources than others does not relieve the party of its hearing obligations. Nor does it entitle the party to an extension of time for discovery absent a showing of good cause, as judged by the standards of 10 CFR § 2.307 (formerly 2.711). Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-18, 15 NRC 598, 599 (1982).

Under normal circumstances, motions for a stay of discovery should be filed with the licensing board rather than the Commission. See 10 CFR § 2.323(a) (formerly 2.730(a)). The Commission has the authority to exercise its "inherent supervisory powers over adjudicatory proceedings" and to address the stay motion itself, rather than either dismiss it or refer it to the licensing board. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 7 n.1 (1994) (citing Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-91-15, 34 NRC 269, 271 (1991), reconsideration denied, CLI-92-6, 35 NRC 86 (1992)).

A party seeking to extend discovery beyond a deadline may obtain an extension on the discovery period only by showing that there is good cause shown for why the deadline

was not met. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-16, 39 NRC 257, 260-61 (1994).

A party is not excused from compliance with a Board's discovery schedule simply because of the need to prepare for a related state court trial. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-46, 22 NRC 830, 832 (1985).

Though the period for discovery may have long since terminated, at least one Appeal Board decision seems to indicate that a party may obtain discovery in order to support a motion to reopen a hearing provided that the party demonstrates with particularity that discovery would enable it to produce the needed materials. Vermont Yankee Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 524 (1973). But see Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-7, 21 NRC 1104, 1106 (1985) and Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 6 (1986) where the Commission has made it very clear that a movant seeking to reopen the record is not entitled to discovery to support its motion.

The question of Board management of discovery was addressed by the Commission in its Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 455-456 (1981). The Commission stated that in virtually all cases individual Boards should schedule an initial conference with the parties to set a general discovery schedule immediately after contentions have been admitted. A Licensing Board may establish reasonable deadlines for the completion of discovery. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-79, 18 NRC 1400, 1401 (1983), citing Statement of Policy, supra, 13 NRC at 456. Although a Board may extend a discovery deadline upon a showing of good cause, a substantial delay between a discovery deadline and the start of a hearing is not sufficient, without more, to reopen discovery. Perry, supra, 18 NRC at 1401.

An intervenor who has agreed to an expedited discovery schedule during a prehearing conference is considered to have waived its objections to the schedule once the hearing has started. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-15, 22 NRC 184, 185 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 251 (1986).

### **2.12.2 Discovery Rules**

In general, the discovery rules as between all parties except the Staff follow the form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in formal adjudicatory proceedings. The legal authorities and court decisions pertaining to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide appropriate guidelines for interpreting NRC discovery rules. Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), LBP-77-13, 5 NRC 489 (1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 494-95 (1983), citing Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 760 (1975).

If there is no NRC rule that parallels a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the Board is not restricted from applying the Federal rule. While the Commission may have chosen to adopt only some of the Federal rules of practice to apply to all cases, it need not be



inferred that the Commission intended to preclude a Licensing Board from following the guidance of the Federal rules and decisions in a specific case where there is no parallel NRC rule and where that guidance results in a fair determination of an issue. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 497.

Rule 26(b)(4) differentiates between experts whom the party expects to call as witnesses and those who have been retained or specially employed by the party in preparation for trial. The Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules explain that discovery of expert witnesses is necessary, particularly in a complex case, to narrow the issues and eliminate surprise, but that purpose is not furthered by discovery of non-witness experts. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 497; Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-7, 23 NRC 177, 178-79 (1986) (discovery of a non-witness expert permitted only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances). The filing of an affidavit as part of a non-record filing with a Licensing Board does not make an individual an expert witness. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-18, 25 NRC 945, 947 (1987).

A party may seek discovery of another party without the necessity of Licensing-Board intervention. Where, however, discovery of a nonparty is sought (other than by deposition), the party must request the issuance of a subpoena under Section 2.702. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 690 (1979).

Only those State agencies which are parties in NRC proceedings are required to respond to requests under 10 CFR § 2.707 (formerly 2.741) for the production of documents. In order to obtain documents from non-party State agencies, a party must file a request for a subpoena pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.702 (formerly 2.720). Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-1, 21 NRC 11, 21-22 (1985), citing Stanislaus, supra, 9 NRC at 683.

Applicants are entitled to discovery against intervenors in order to obtain the information necessary for applicant to meet its burden of proof. This does not amount to shifting the burden of proof to intervenors. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 338 (1980).

Each co-owner of a nuclear facility has an independent responsibility, to the extent that it is able, to provide a Licensing Board with a full and accurate record and with complete responses to discovery requests. The majority owner must keep the minority owners sufficiently well informed so that they can fulfill their responsibilities to the Board. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-27, 26 NRC 228, 230 (1987).

Intervenor may not directly seek settlement papers of the applicant through discovery. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that offers of settlement and conduct and statements made in the course of settlement negotiations are not admissible to prove the validity of a claim. 10 CFR § 2.338 (formerly 2.759) states a policy encouraging settlement of contested proceedings and requires all parties and boards to try to carry out the settlement policy. Requiring a party to produce its settlement documents because they are settlement documents would be inconsistent

with this policy. Florida Power & Light Company (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 183-184 (1979).

A plan to seek evidence primarily through discovery is a permissible approach for an intervenor to take. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1943 (1982).

Lack of knowledge is always an adequate response to discovery. A truthful "don't know" response is not sanctionable as a default in making discovery. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1945, 1945 n.3 (1982).

Discovery of the foundation upon which a contention is based is not only clearly within the realm of proper discovery, but also is necessary for an applicant's preparation for hearing. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 494 (1983); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-86-4, 23 NRC 75, 81 (1986).

A party's need for discovery outweighs any risk of harm from the potential release of information when the NRC Staff has indicated that no ongoing investigation will be jeopardized, when all identities and identifying information are excluded from discovery; and when all other information is discussed under the aegis of a protective order. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-53, 18 NRC 282, 288 (1983), reconsideration denied, LBP-83-64, 18 NRC 766, 768 (1983), affirmed, ALAB-764, 19 NRC 633 (1984).

Although a Demand for Information issued by the NRC is an important event that may affect an individual's career, the pendency of such a demand is not a reason to postpone a scheduled deposition. Where the individuals involved have known about the facts of the case for years, further preparation is not necessary for them to tell the truth. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-14, 39 NRC 251 (1994).

#### **2.12.2.1 Construction of Discovery Rules**

For discovery between parties other than the Staff, the discovery rules are to be construed very liberally. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-185, 7 AEC 240 (1974); Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-61, 14 NRC 1735, 1742 (1981).

Where a provision of the NRC discovery rules is similar or analogous to one of the Federal rules, judicial interpretations of that Federal rule can serve as guidance for interpreting the particular NRC rule. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-37, 8 NRC 575, 581 (1978).

#### **2.12.2.2 Scope of Discovery**

The scope of discovery is usually quite broad, as indicated on the face of NRC rules. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 421 n.14 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004) (referencing 10 C.F.R. § 2.740(b)(1) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.705(b)(1)]).

The test as to whether particular matters are discoverable is one of "general relevancy." This test will be easily satisfied unless it is clear that the evidence sought can have no possible bearing on the issues. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-185, 7 AEC 240 (1974). While the "general relevancy" test is fairly liberal, it does not permit the discovery of material far beyond the scope of issues to be considered in a proceeding. Thus, parties may obtain discovery only of information which is relevant to the controverted subject matter of the proceeding, as identified in the prehearing order, or which is likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. This rule applies as much to Part 70 licenses for special nuclear material as to Part 50 licenses for construction of utilization facilities. Allied General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Fuel Receiving and Storage Station), LBP-77-13, 5 NRC 489 (1977). However, when a lawyer has asked questions that are properly within the scope of the proceeding, objections to letting the witness answer are an obstruction to the discovery process. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-15, 39 NRC 254, 263 (1994).

A motion to compel discovery need not seek information which would be admissible per se in an adjudicatory proceeding. The motion need only request information which reasonably could lead to admissible evidence. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-92-3A, 35 NRC 110, 111-112 (1992).

An intervenor may obtain information about other reactors in the course of discovery. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-102, 16 NRC 1597, 1601 (1982).

An intervenor's motion which sought to preserve deficient components which the Applicant was removing from its plant was denied because the motion did not comply with the requirements for (1) a stay, or (2) a motion for discovery, since it did not express an intention to obtain information about the components. The questions raised in the intervenor's motion, including the possible need for destructive evaluation of the components, were directed to the adequacy and credibility of the applicant's evidence concerning the components. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-32, 22 NRC 434, 438 n.6 (1985).

In general, the discovery tools are the same as or similar to those provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Commission's regulations permit depositions and requests for production of documents between intervenors and applicants without leave of the Commission and without any showing of good cause (10 CFR §§ 2.706, 2.707 (formerly 2.740a, 2.741)). The regulations (10 CFR § 2.706 (formerly 2.740b)) specifically provide for interrogatories similar to those addressed by Rule 33 of the Federal Rules, although such interrogatories are not available for use against nonparties. The scope of discovery under the Commission's Rules of Practice is similar to discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-78-20, 7 NRC 1038, 1040 (1978).

Since written answers to interrogatories under oath as provided by 10 CFR § 2.706 (formerly 2.740(b)) are binding upon a party and may be used in the same manner as depositions, the authority of the person signing the answers to, in fact, provide

such answers may be ascertained through discovery. Statements of counsel in briefs or arguments are not sufficient to establish this authority. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-78-20, 7 NRC 1038, 1045 (1978).

If a party has insufficient information to answer interrogatories, a statement to that effect fulfills its obligation to respond. If the party subsequently obtains additional information, it must supplement its earlier response to include such newly acquired information, 10 CFR § 2.705 (e) (formerly 2.740(c)). Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-18, 11 NRC 906, 911 (1980).

To determine subject matter relevance for discovery purposes, it is first necessary to examine the issue involved. In an antitrust proceeding, a discovery request will not be denied where the interrogatories are relevant only to proposed antitrust license conditions and not to whether a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws exists. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), LBP-78-20, 7 NRC 1038, 1040 (1978).

In evaluating an intervenor's discovery request for guidance documents, the fact that the applicant did not rely on the documents is not controlling; if the guidance documents are indeed generic and clarify governing regulatory requirements, they could be relevant for supporting an intervenor's contentions. See Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 423 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004).

At least one Licensing Board has held that, in the proper circumstances, a party's right to take the deposition of another party's expert witness may be made contingent upon the payment of expert witness fees by the party seeking to take the deposition. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-18, 5 NRC 671, 673 (1977).

Intervenor has the burden of demonstrating that the benefit of a deposition of a seriously ill person outweighs the burden, given the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-24, 40 NRC 83, 85 (1994).

The lawyer of an ill individual sought as subject of a deposition may not assert that the deposition would impose an undue burden unless the proposed subject seeks to be protected or there is some reason to question the rationality behind the persons's willingness to be deposed. Vogtle, supra, 40 NRC at 86. The Licensing Board establishes conditions under which a voluntary agreement may be reached concerning the deposition of a seriously ill individual. Id.

Based on 10 CFR § 2.702(d) and 2.706(a)(8) (formerly 2.720(d) and § 2.740a(h)), fees for subpoenas and the fee for deponents, respectively, are to be paid by the party at whose instance the subpoena was issued, and the deposition was held. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.706(a)(4) (formerly 2.740a(d)), objections on questions of evidence at a deposition are simply to be noted in short form, without argument. The relief of a stay of a hearing to permit deposition of witnesses is inappropriate in

the absence of any allegation of prejudice. Each party to an NRC proceeding is not required to convene its own deposition if it seeks to question a witness as to any matter beyond the scope of those issues raised on direct by the party noticing the deposition. No party has a proprietary interest in a deposition; therefore, no party has a proprietary interest in a subpoena issued to a deponent. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-47, 15 NRC 1538, 1544-1546 (1982).

The Licensing Board, as provided by 10 CFR 2.705(b)(2), may and should, when not inconsistent with fairness to all parties, limit the extent or control the sequence of discovery to prevent undue delay or imposition of an undue burden on any party. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 147-148 (1979); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 7 (1994). Thus, a Licensing Board may issue a protective order which limits the representatives of a party in a proceeding who may conduct discovery of particular documents. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-870, 26 NRC 71, 75 (1987).

Consistent with Board management of discovery under 10 CFR 2.319(g) (formerly 2.718(e)), discovery may be limited to the admitted bases of a contention during the first phase of a proceeding. After the hearing on the first phase, the Board can determine whether it has a complete record for decision or whether further discovery is necessary. [The actual scope of a contention may be broader than its specifically pleaded bases.] Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-15, 38 NRC 20 (1993).

A party is only required to reveal information in its possession or control. A party need not conduct extensive independent research, although it may be required to perform some investigation to determine what information it actually possesses. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 334 (1980). This holding has been codified in the Rules of Practice at 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(5) (formerly 2.740(b)(3)) which also prohibits the use of interrogatories which request a party to explain the reasons why the party did not use alternative data, assumptions, and analyses in developing its position on a matter in the proceeding. 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33181 (August 11, 1989).

A party is not required to search the record for information in order to respond to interrogatories where the issues that are the subject of the interrogatories are already defined in the record and the requesting party is as able to search the record as the party from whom discovery is requested. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-18, 25 NRC 945, 948 (1987).

### **2.12.2.3 Requests for Discovery During Hearing**

Requests for background documents from a witness, to supply answers to cross-examination questions which the witness is unable to answer, cannot be denied solely because the material had not been previously requested through discovery. However, it can be denied where the request will cause significant delay in the hearing and the information sought has been substantially supplied through other

testimony. Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-340, 4 NRC 27 (1976).

#### 2.12.2.4 Privileged Matter

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(1) (formerly 2.740(b)(1)), parties may generally obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter in the proceeding. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not themselves directly applicable to practice before the Commission, judicial interpretations of a Federal Rule can serve as guidance for the interpretation of a similar or analogous NRC discovery rule. By choosing to model Section 2.705(b) (formerly 2.740(b)) after Federal Rule 26(b), without incorporating specific limitations, the Commission implicitly chose to adopt those privileges which have been recognized by the Federal Courts. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1157.

The existence of a privileged matter is in tension with the concept of civil discovery. Therefore, most privileges are qualified, rather than absolute. Courts frequently engage in a fact-driven balancing in order to decide if an asserted privilege should trump a party's interest in discovery. The greater the interest protected by the privilege, the more compelling the need and other circumstances must be to overcome it. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 376-77 (2006).

As under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, privileged or confidential material may be protected from discovery under Commission regulations. To obtain a protective order (10 CFR § 2.705(c)), it must be demonstrated that:

- (1) the information in question is of a type customarily held in confidence by its originator;
- (2) there is a rational basis for having customarily held it in confidence;
- (3) it has, in fact, been kept in confidence; and
- (4) it is not found in public sources.

Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-327, 3 NRC 408 (1976). See also Section 6.23.3.

The claimant of a privilege must bear the burden of proving that it is entitled to such protection, including pleading it adequately in its response. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1153 (1982), citing In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 495 (1983); see also United States v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (1996).

The party asserting the privilege regarding document sought in administrative agency investigation must establish the essential elements of the privilege. United States v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (1996). See Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1153. Intervenors' mere assertion that the material it is withholding constitutes attorney work product is insufficient to meet that burden. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 495. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-93-3, 37 NRC 64, 69 (1993).

A party objecting to the production of documents on grounds of privilege has an obligation to specify in its response to a document request those same matters which it would be required to set forth in attempting to establish "good cause" for the issuance of a protective order, i.e., there must be a specific designation and description of (1) the documents claimed to be privileged, (2) the privilege being asserted, and (3) the precise reasons why the party believes the privilege to apply to such documents. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1153 (1982); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1942 (1982).

Claims of privilege must be specifically asserted with respect to particular documents. Privileges are not absolute and may or may not apply to a particular document, depending upon a variety of circumstances. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1153, citing United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, reh'q denied, 688 F.2d 840 (1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1927 (1984); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981).

Under NRC rules, it is not clear when a balancing of interests is required before permitting disclosure of a report that is claimed to contain trade secrets or privileged or confidential commercial or financial information. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure clearly permit a balance. See Fed R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7). NRC rules include a comparable balancing test, see 10 CFR § 2.705(c)(1)(vi) (formerly 2.740(c)(6)), but this test is subject to the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly 2.790). In particular, the balancing test appears to be overridden by section 2.390(b)(6). Cf. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-24, 11 NRC 775 (1980) (access by intervenors to security plan permitted subject to protective order). Even though INPO reports to the NRC fall within the FOIA exemption for commercial or financial information obtained from a person privileged or confidential as set forth under NRC rules in 10 CFR § 2.390(a)(4), Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993), they may be provided under a protective order in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(6). Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-13, 38 NRC 11, 14-16 (1993).

Even where a First Amendment or common law privilege is found applicable to a party or nonparty resisting discovery, that privilege is not absolute. A Licensing Board must balance the value of the information sought to be obtained with the harm caused by revealing the information. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-53, 18 NRC 282, 288 (1983), reconsideration denied, LBP-83-64, 18 NRC 766, 768 (1983), aff'd, ALAB-764, 19 NRC 633, 641 (1984).

It is not sufficient for a party asserting certain documents to be privileged from discovery to await a motion to compel from the party seeking discovery prior to the asserting party setting forth its assertions of privilege and specifying those matters which it claims to be privileged. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1153.

#### **2.12.2.4.1 Attorney-Client Privilege**

The attorney-client protects from discovery confidential communications from a client to an attorney made to enable the attorney to provide informed legal advice. The privilege is applicable when a corporation is the client. Georgia

Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 185 (1995).

The purpose of the rule has been described as to protect "[s]ubject matter that relates to the preparation, strategy, and appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of an action, or to the activities of the attorneys involved, rather than to the underlying evidence . . . ." Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-93-3, 37 NRC 64, 68-69 (1993)(citing 4 Moore's Federal Practice ¶26.64[I] (2d ed. 1191), at 26-349.

Statements from an attorney to the client are privileged only if the statements reveal, either directly or indirectly, the substance of a confidential communication by the client. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1158 (1982), citing In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill. 1980). An attorney's involvement in, or recommendation of, a transaction does not place a cloak of secrecy around all incidents of such a transaction. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1158, citing Fischel, 557 F.2d at 212.

The attorney-client privilege does not protect against discovery of underlying facts from their source, merely because those facts have been communicated to an attorney. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1158, citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981), Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 188 (1995).

The attorney-client privilege may not be asserted where there is a conflict of interests between various clients represented by the same attorney. There is no attorney-client relationship unless the attorney is able to exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of the interests of a client. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-50, 20 NRC 1464, 1468-1469 (1984), citing Rule 1.7 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

Interrogatories that seek the disclosure of the factual bases and legal requirements that underlie contentions constitute proper discovery of the intervenor so long as the interrogatories do not seek the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the proceeding." 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(4) (formerly 2.740(b)(2)). This rule was adopted from Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Where an NRC rule of practice is based on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, judicial interpretations of that federal rule can serve as guidance for the interpretation of the analogous rule. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-93-3, 37 NRC 64, 68-69 (1993) (citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 494-95 (1983). See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1159-62 (1982).

When a claim of attorney-privilege is made for a document containing a simple report of facts, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board may examine the document further in order to ascertain whether granting privilege to the document is consistent with the purposes of the attorney-privilege. Georgia Power Co.



(Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP 95-15, 42 NRC 51 (1995); rev'd on other grounds CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181 (1995).

Proof at a hearing that clients had been "hounded" or otherwise improperly treated could overcome claim of privilege, either under the work product privilege or the attorney-client privilege. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-18, 38 NRC 121, 125-126 (1993).

To claim the attorney-client privilege, it must be shown that: (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom a communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with the communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client, (b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) legal assistance in some legal proceeding, and (d) not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-70, 18 NRC 1094, 1098 (1983), citing United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).

The fact that a document is authored by in-house counsel, rather than by an independent attorney is not relevant to a determination of whether such a document is privileged. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1158 (1982), citing O'Brien v. Board of Education of City School District of New York, 86 F.R.D. 548, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

To invoke the attorney-client privilege, a party must demonstrate that there was: (1) a communication between client and counsel, which (2) was intended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) made for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice. U.S. v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2nd Cir. 1996).

The attorney-client privilege is only available as to communications revealing confidences of the client or seeking legal advice. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1158, citing SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn.), interlocutory appeal dismissed, 534 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1976). Even if some commonly known factual matters were included in the discussion, or non-legal advice was exchanged, where the primary purpose of a meeting was the receipt of legal advice, the entire contents thereof are protected by privilege. Midland, supra, 18 NRC at 1103, citing Barr Marine Products Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 635 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).

An attorney's representation, that all communications between the attorney and the party were for the purpose of receiving legal advice, is sufficient for an assertion of attorney-client privilege. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-53, 18 NRC 282, 285 (1983), reconsideration denied, LBP-83-64, 18 NRC 766 (1983).

Communications from the attorney to the client should be privileged only if it is shown that the client had a reasonable expectation in the confidentiality of the statement; or, put another way, if the statement reflects a client communication that was necessary to obtain informed legal advice [and] which might not have been made absent the privilege. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1159, citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufacturing Co. v. Kaplan, 90 F.R.D. 21, 28 (N.D. Ill. 1980).

Where legal advice is sought from an attorney in good faith by one who is or is seeking to become a client, the fact that the attorney is not subsequently retained in no way affects the privileged nature of the communications between them. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-70, 18 NRC 1094 (1983).

The attorney-client privilege was not waived by the presence of third persons at a meeting between client and attorney, where the situation involved representatives of two joint clients seeking advice from the attorney of one such client about common legal problems. Midland, supra, 18 NRC at 1100.

Where the date of a meeting, its attenders, its purpose, and its broad general subject matter are revealed, the attorney-client privilege was not waived as to the substance of the meeting. Midland, supra, 18 NRC at 1102.

Key to application of the attorney-client privilege is a showing that the communication was made for the corporation to obtain legal advice, that it was made confidentially, and that it was not disseminated beyond those with a need to know. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 187 (1995).

Under appropriate circumstances, the attorney-client privilege may extend to certain communications from employees to corporate counsel. However, not every employee who provides a privileged communication is thereby a "client" represented by corporate counsel, or a "party" to any pending legal dispute, for purposes of ABA Disciplinary Rule 7-104. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-31, 18 NRC 1303, 1305 (1983), citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn, supra, did not overturn the well-established principle that counsel should be at liberty to approach witnesses for an opposing party. Catawba, supra, 18 NRC at 1305, citing Vega v. Bloomsburgh, 427 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1977).

When the client is a corporation the attorney-client privilege applies to communications by any corporate employee regardless of position when the communications concern matters within the scope of the employee's corporate duties and the employee is aware that the information is being furnished to enable the attorney to provide legal advice to the corporation. Georgia Power Co. et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-18, 38 NRC 121, 124 (1993), citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).

Not every communication by an employee to counsel is privileged. Communications made for business or personal advice are not covered by the privilege. Privileged communication concerns matters within the scope of the

employee's duties. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 187 (1995).

When the client is a corporation, the power to waive the attorney-client privilege rests with the corporation's management and is normally exercised by its officers and directors. Vogle, LBP-93-18, 38 NRC 121, 126 (1993) supra, citing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 89-3 and 89-4, John Doe 89-129 v. Under Seal, 902 F.2d. 244, 248 (4th Cir. 1990).

Drafts of canned testimony not yet filed by a party are not subject to discovery. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-75-28, 1 NRC 513, 514 (1975).

#### **2.12.2.4.2 Identity of Confidential Informants**

See "Protecting the Identity of Allegers and Confidential Sources; Policy Statement," 61 Fed. Reg. 25924 (May 23, 1996).

An interrogatory seeking the identity and professional qualifications of persons relied upon by intervenors to review, analyze and study contentions and issues in a proceeding and to provide the bases for contentions is proper discovery. Such information is not privileged and is not a part of an attorney's work product even though the intervenor's attorney solicited the views and analyses of the persons involved and has the sole knowledge of their identity. General Electric Company (Vallecitos Nuclear Center, General Electric Test Reactor), LBP-78-33, 8 NRC 461, 464-468 (1978).

The Government enjoys a privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons furnishing information about violations of law to officers charged with enforcing the law. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957), cited in Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-639, 13 NRC 469, 473 (1981). This applies not only in criminal but also civil cases, In re United States, 565 F.2d 19, 21 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Bell v. Socialist Workers Party, 436 U.S. 962 (1978), and in Commission proceedings as well, Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-16, 4 AEC 435, affirmed by the Commission, 4 AEC 440 (1970); 10 CFR § 2.709(e), 2.390(a)(7) (formerly 2.744(d), 2.790(a)(7)); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-714, 17 NRC 86, 91 (1983); and is embodied in FOIA, 5 USC 552(b)(7)(D). The privilege is not absolute; where an informer's identity is (1) relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or (2) essential to a fair determination of a cause (Rovario, supra) it must yield. However, the Appeal Board reversed a Licensing Board's order to the Staff to reveal the names of confidential informants (subject to a protective order) to intervenors as an abuse of discretion, where the Appeal Board found that the burden to obtain the names of such informants is not met by intervenor's speculation that identification might be of some assistance to them. To require disclosure in such a case would contravene NRC policy in that it might jeopardize the likelihood of receiving future similar reports. South Texas, supra.

There may be a limited privilege for the identity of individuals who have expressly asked or been promised anonymity in coming forward with information

concerning safety-related problems at a nuclear plant. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-59, 16 NRC 533, 537 (1982).

When the NRC Staff seeks the disclosure of the identities of sources of information alleging public health and safety violations at a facility, the Staff must explore any possible alternative means of obtaining the requested information from the individuals in order to protect their confidentiality and to minimize the intrusion into their First Amendment association rights. Richard E. Dow, CLI-91-9, 33 NRC 473, 479-80 (1991), citing *United States v. Garde*, 673 F. Supp. 604, 607 (D.D.C. 1987).

In determining whether or not to issue a protective order to protect the confidentiality or to limit the disclosure of the identities of prospective witnesses, a Board will weigh the benefit of encouraging the testimony of such witnesses against the detriment of inhibiting public access to that information and the cumbersome procedures necessitated by a protective order. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-40, 22 NRC 759, 763 (1985).

Even where an informer's qualified privilege exists, it will fail in light of the Board's need for the particular information in informed decisionmaking. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-59, 16 NRC 533, 538 (1982).

Security plans are not "classified," and are discoverable in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.390(d) (formerly 2.790(d)). However, they are sensitive documents and are not to be made available to the public at large. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1402 (1977). See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-92-15A, 36 NRC 5, 11 (1992). In order to discover such plans, (1) the moving party must demonstrate that the plan or a portion of it is relevant to the party's contentions; (2) the release of the plant security plan must usually be subject to a protective order; and (3) no witness may review the plan until he is first qualified as an expert with sufficient competence to evaluate it. *Id.* Only those portions of a security plan which are both relevant and necessary for the litigation of a party's contentions are subject to discovery. *Id.* at 1405.

#### **2.12.2.4.3 FOIA Exemptions—Executive/Deliberative Process Privilege**

FOIA does not establish new government privileges against discovery. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 121 (1980).

The Commission's rules on discovery have incorporated the exemptions contained in the FOIA. *Id.*; David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 380 (2006).

If information would be withholdable under FOIA, then it must be analyzed according to the three factors in 10 C.F.R. § 2.709(d), and in the case of the deliberative process privilege, the overriding need test. This analysis will

determine whether or not the information is discoverable. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 380 (2006).

Section 2.390 of the Rules of Practice is the NRC's promulgation in obedience to the Freedom of Information Act. Id. at 120. The Commission, in adopting the standards of Exemption 5, and "necessary to a proper decision" as its document privilege standard under 10 CFR § 2.709(e) (formerly 2.744(d)), has adopted traditional work product/executive privilege exemptions from disclosure. Id. at 123. The Government is no less entitled to normal privilege than is any other party in civil litigation. Id. at 127.

The executive or deliberative process privilege protects from discovery governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1341 (1984), citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197 (1994); Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-33, 62 NRC 828, 843 (2005). A government decision-maker will not be compelled to testify about the mental processes and methods by which a decision was made, unless there is a clear showing of misconduct or wrongdoing. Franklin Savings Association v. Ryan, 922 F.2d 209, 211-212 (4th Cir. 1991), citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).

Documents compiled in investigations and inspections whose production could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings may be exempt from disclosure under 10 CFR § 2.390(a)(7)(i) (formerly 2.790(a)(7)(i)). This privilege protects investigatory files, including factual materials, from disclosure in order to prevent harm to either ongoing or contemplated investigations, or to prospective enforcement actions. The Commission itself may invoke the privilege. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 200-201 (1994). Vermont Yankee, LBP-05-33, 62 NRC at 843.

The deliberative process privilege applies to information that is both predecisional and deliberative. A document is predecisional if it was prepared before the adoption of an agency decision and specifically prepared to assist the decisionmaker in arriving at his or her decision. Communications are deliberative if they reflect a consultative process. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197-98 (1994); David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 381 (2006). See also Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 91 (2006).

Purely factual material is generally not protected by the deliberative process privilege, but there are exceptions to this rule. If a factual matter is inextricably linked with deliberative sections of documents such that the disclosure of the

factual material would reveal government deliberations, the factual material is protected by the privilege. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 382 (2006).

The executive privilege may be invoked in NRC proceedings. Shoreham, *supra*, 19 NRC at 1333, citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-16, 7 AEC 313 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-33, 4 AEC 701 (1971); Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197 (1994).

Discussions between Staff members concerning the adequacy and completeness of the application, the potential need for requests for additional information (RAIs), and the adequacy of RAI responses may be protected by the deliberative process privilege. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 93 (2006). Likewise, internal staff communications concerning the appropriate wording and scope of a license condition are deliberative because they contain opinions of individual Staff members and do not necessarily represent part of the NRC's final policy decision concerning the sufficiency of an application. *Id.* at 94. Similarly, Staff recommendations and opinions about whether a license condition should be imposed are protected because they are intended to assist the NRC in reaching a final decision on the appropriateness of a particular condition. *Id.* at 95.

An agency's decision to assert the deliberative process privilege over a document, while not requiring the personal review of the actual head of the agency, must at least be made by a senior person, such as the head of the department having control over the requested information. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-33, 62 NRC 828, 843 (2005). This person must have both expertise and an overview-type perspective concerning the balance between the agency's duty of disclosure versus its need to conduct frank internal debate without the chilling effect of public scrutiny. #140 at 846-47. However, the Board does not require a specific privilege invocation process, or a specific level of senior executive to assert the privilege. *Id.* at 849. The requirement that a Division Director or other high-ranking official make the agency decision to assert the deliberative process privilege does not mean that such high-ranking individuals be involved in the deliberation reflected in the privileged document. *Id.* at 846.

Documents shielded by executive privilege remain privileged even after the decision to which they pertain may have been effected, since disclosure at any time could inhibit the free flow of advice including analysis, reports, and expression of opinion within the agency. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1164 (1982), citing Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 360 (1979); Vermont Yankee, LBP-05-33, 62 NRC at 851-52.

The executive privilege is a qualified privilege, and does not attach to purely factual communications, or to severable factual portions of communications, the disclosure of which would not compromise military or state secrets. Shoreham,

supra, 16 NRC at 1164, citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973); Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 (D. Del. 1975); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC 1221, 1225 (1983); See also Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 91 (2006). The executive privilege does apply where purely factual material is inextricably intertwined with privileged communications or the disclosure of the factual material would reveal the agency's decisionmaking process. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1342 (1984), citing Russell v. Dep't of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197 (1994). Staff communications that summarize the applicable review procedures or report on the status of a matter are factual in nature and are not protected by the privilege. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 93 (2006) (citing EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973)).

The executive privilege protects both intra-agency and interagency documents and may even extend to outside consultants to an agency. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1346 (1984), citing Lead Industries Ass'n v. OSHA, 610 F.2d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 1979).

Communications that fall within the protection of the privilege may be disclosed upon an appropriate showing of need. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1164, citing United States v. Leggett and Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658-659 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC 1221, 1225 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1341 (1984), citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung, supra, 40 F.R.D. at 327. See also Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 91 (2006).

10 C.F.R. § 2.336(b)(5) requires deliberative process privilege logs to contain "sufficient information for assessing the claim of privilege. An inadequate privilege log is particularly problematic in Subpart L proceeding, where no other discovery is allowed, because without sufficient information as to what makes the document "deliberative," the challenger must shoot in the dark and face a substantive answer by the withholder, without the right of reply. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-05-33, 62 NRC 828, 839-40 (2005)

In determining the need of a litigant seeking the production of documents covered by the executive privilege, an objective balancing test is employed, weighing the importance of documents to the party seeking their production and the availability elsewhere of the information contained in the documents against the Government interest in secrecy. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1164-1165 (1982), citing United States v. Leggett and Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658-659 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC 1221, 1225 (1983); Long

Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1341 (1984); Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197 (1994). Vermont Yankee, LBP-05-33, 62 NRC at 844.

In balancing the need for deliberative process documents against the government's interest in nondisclosure, courts have considered various factors, including: (1) the relevance of the evidence sought to be protected; (2) the availability of other evidence; (3) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved; (4) the role of the government in the litigation; and (5) the possibility of future timidity by government employees who will be forced to recognize that their secrets are violable. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-3, 63 NRC 85, 91-92 (2006) (citing In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 577, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); In re Supoena Duces Tecum, 145 F.3d 1422, 1423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1998); In re Subpoena Served upon the Comptroller of the Currency, 967 F.2d 630, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Paul F. Rothstein & Susan Crump, Federal Testimonial Privileges § 5:10 (2d ed. 2005)). The importance of the evidence to the case is generally determinative in this balancing, and the first two factors – relevance and the availability of other evidence – focus on the importance of the evidence. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-3, 63 NRC at 92. If the documents at issue are not relevant, then, as a matter of law, a showing of sufficient need is not possible. Id. (citing U.S. v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389-91 (7th Cir. 1993)). Even if a draft document is relevant and important, once the final version of the document becomes available, the need for the draft (or comments suggesting changes to a draft) may become moot or minimal. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-3, 63 NRC at 92 (citing, e.g., Missouri v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 147 F.3d 708, 711 (8th Cir. 1998); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1345 (1984)).

The burden is upon the claimant of the executive privilege to demonstrate a proper entitlement to exemption from disclosure, including a demonstration of precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of governmental communications. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1144, 1165, citing Smith v. FTC, 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1016 (D. Del 1975); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1341 (1984).

It is appropriate to look to cases decided under Exemption 5 of the FOIA for guidance in resolving claims of executive privilege in NRC proceedings related to discovery, so long as it is done using a common-sense approach which recognizes any differing equities presented in such FOIA cases. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1163-1164 (1982).

A claim of executive privilege is not waived by participation as a litigant in the proceeding. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1164.

The privilege against disclosure of intragovernmental documents containing advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations is a part of the broader executive privilege recognized by the courts. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1164,



citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705-711 (1974); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-72, 18 NRC 1221, 1226-1227 (1983).

The executive privilege is not limited to policymaking, but may attach to the deliberative process that precedes most decisions of government agencies. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-773, 19 NRC 1333, 1341 (1984), citing Russell v. Dep't of the Air Force, 682 F.2d 1045, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The purpose behind the privilege is to encourage frank discussions within the Government regarding the formulation of policy and the making of decisions. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1164, citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 181 (3rd Cir. 1973); David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 380 (2006).

Where an NRC regulation expressly requires that a party produce a particular type of deliberative document, this regulatory requirement will override the general deliberative process privilege with respect to the type of document in question. U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), LBP-05-27, 62 NRC 478, 518-19 (2005).

Courts are not generally willing to compel disclosure of deliberative materials, even if an individual's due process rights are at stake, unless some particularly compelling interest is at stake. The Commission and the former Appeal Board has recognized the strength of interest in deliberative process and have rarely ordered the disclosure of such materials. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 391 (2006).

#### **2.12.2.4.4 FOIA Exemptions-Personal Privacy Privilege**

The reason behind the personal privacy privilege is that unsubstantiated allegations of criminal activity against individuals should not be publicly disseminated. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 393 (2006).

#### **2.12.2.4.5 FOIA Exemptions-Proprietary Information**

Because 10 C.F.R. § 2.790 [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.390] embodies the standards of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the agency looks for guidance to the plentiful federal case law on that exemption, although that case law does not bind the Commission. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 163, 172 (2005). Under Exemption 4, the current generally accepted legal definition of "confidential" is information whose disclosure is likely to (1) impair the government's future ability to obtain necessary information; or (2) impair other government interests such as compliance, program efficiency and effectiveness, and the fulfillment of an agency's statutory mandate; or (3) cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained. Id. at 163-64 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 180 F.3d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh'g en banc denied, No. 98-5251 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 1999); Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir 1992)

(en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993), approving on this ground but rev'g and vacating on other grounds, 830 F.2d 278, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 7-10 (1st Cir. 1983). The federal courts (and now the Commission) have interpreted the third prong to require a showing of (a) the existence of competition and (b) the likelihood of substantial competitive injury. PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 164, 171 (citing CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). While federal court decisions are divided on the question as to what constitutes "competitive injury," the Commission has adopted the broader of two interpretations, finding that interpretation to be closer to the heart of Exemption 4 and § 2.790 [now § 2.390]; this position concludes that such injury can flow from either competitors or noncompetitors (such as customers and suppliers). PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 164 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 180 F.3d at 306; Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n, 547 F.2d at 687; Cont'l Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 519 F.2d 31, (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)).

#### **2.12.2.4.6 Waiver of a Privilege**

In determining whether a party's inadvertent disclosure of a privileged document constitutes a waiver of the privilege, a Board will consider the adequacy of the precautions taken initially to prevent disclosure, whether the party was compelled to produce the document under a Board-imposed expedited discovery schedule, the number of documents which the party had to review, and whether the party, upon learning of the inadvertent disclosure, promptly objected to the production of the document. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-1, 21 NRC 11, 19-20 (1985).

Privilege against non-disclosure deemed waived where documents have been produced in public forum, e.g., to the NRC in a section 2.206 proceeding, for an investigation, or to the Congress. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-11, 37 NRC 469, 475 (1993).

#### **2.12.2.5 Access to Classified, Safeguards, or Other Security-Related Information**

A sensible application of need-to-know doctrine starts with the traditional discovery rules and then narrows their breadth to take account of the sensitive nature of security information. Such information warrants tight control and enhanced precautions. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 422 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004). The need-to-know 'indispensability' standard is properly defined by reference to the discovery standard, with appropriate balancing of the public safety and other factors unique to the case. Id.

The Commission expects Boards and the NRC Staff to take a hard look at requests for sensitive security documents to make sure disclosure is truly useful in litigating admitted contentions, and not simply an exercise of curiosity or of a party's hope that something useful may turn up. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station,

Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 422 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004).

Where security-related guidance documents are applicable to an entirely different type of facility than the one at issue in a particular proceeding, it is not 'indispensable' for an intervenor to obtain those documents in discovery related to litigation of security issues, particularly if the guidance documents constitute classified information. See Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 425 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004).

#### **2.12.2.6 Protective Orders**

When a protective order is in place, parties in federal court must carry a heavy burden to show entitlement to privacy-based withholding of otherwise-discoverable documents. David Geisen, LBP-06-25, 64 NRC 367, 387 (2006).

In using protective information, "those subject to the protective order may not corroborate the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of outside information by using protected information gained through the hearing process." Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-600, 12 NRC 3, 6 (1980).

An affidavit in support of a corporation's request for a protective order is insufficient where it does not establish the basis for the affiant's personal knowledge (if any) respecting the basis for the protective order - - that is, the policies and practices of the corporation with regard to preserving the confidentiality of information said to be proprietary in nature. The Board might well disregard the affidavit entirely on the ground that it was not shown to have been executed by a qualified individual. While it may not be necessary to have the chief executive officer of the company serve as affiant, there is ample warrant to require that facts pertaining to management policies and practices be presented by an official who is in a position to attest to those policies and practices (and the reasons for them) from personal knowledge. Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-555, 10 NRC 23, 28 (1979). In North Anna, the Appeal Board granted a protective order request but explicitly declined to find that the corporation requesting the order had met its burden of showing that the information in question was proprietary and entitled to protection from public disclosure under the standards set forth in Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-327, 3 NRC 408 (1976). No party had objected to the order, and the Appeal Board granted the order in the interest of obtaining the requested information without untoward further delay. However, its action should not be taken as precedent for future cases in which relief might be sought from an adjudicatory board based upon affidavits containing deficiencies as described above. North Anna, supra, 10 NRC at 28.

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.705(h)(2) (formerly 2.740(f)(2)), the Board is empowered to make a protective order as it would make upon a motion pursuant to Section 2.705(c) (formerly 2.740(c)), in ruling upon a motion to compel made in accordance with Section 2.740(f). Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1152 (1982).

In at least one instance, a Licensing Board deemed it unnecessary to act on a motion for a protective order where a timely motion to compel is not filed. In such a case, the motion for protective order will be deemed granted and the matter closed upon the expiration of the time for filing a motion to compel. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1952 (1982).

Where a demonstration has been made that the rights of association of a member of an intervenor group in the area have been threatened through the threat of compulsory legal process to defend contentions, the employment situation in the area is dependent on the nuclear industry, and there is no detriment to applicant's interests by not having the identity of individual members of petitioner publicly disclosed, the Licensing Board will issue a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the names of members of the organizational petitioner. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-83-16, 17 NRC 479, 485-86 (1983).

A movant seeking a grant of confidentiality with regard to its identity must demonstrate the harm which it could suffer if its identity is disclosed. Joseph J. Macktal, CLI-89-12, 30 NRC 19, 24 (1989), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-13, 30 NRC 27 (1989); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 77 (1992).

Licensing and Appeal Boards assume that protective orders will be obeyed unless a concrete showing to the contrary is made. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-764, 19 NRC 633, 643 n. 14 (1984); see Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-53, 18 NRC 282, 287-88 (1983), reconsideration denied, LBP-83-64, 18 NRC 766, 769 (1983), citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-735, 18 NRC 19, 25 (1983). One who violates such orders risks "serious sanction". Midland, supra, 18 NRC at 769. A Board may impose sanctions to remedy the harm resulting from a party's violation of a protective order, and to prevent future violations of the order. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-28, 28 NRC 537, 541 (1988).

#### **2.12.2.7 Work Product**

To be privileged from discovery by the work product doctrine, as codified in 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(4) (formerly 2.740(b)(2)), a document must be both prepared by an attorney, or by a person working at the direction of an attorney, and prepared in anticipation of litigation. Ordinary work product, which does not include the mental impressions, conclusions, legal theories, or opinions of the attorney (or other agent), may be obtained by an adverse party upon a showing of "substantial need of materials in preparation of the case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Opinion work product is not discoverable, so long as the material was in fact prepared by an attorney or other agent in anticipation of litigation, and not assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1162 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units

1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 495 (1983); U.S. v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2nd Cir. 1996). See Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-7, 23 NRC 177, 179 (1986) (documents required by NRC regulations are discoverable even though attorneys may have assisted in preparing the documents in anticipation of litigation). An intervenor's mere assertion that the material it is withholding constitutes attorney work product is insufficient to meet the burden of proving it is entitled to protection from discovery. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 495.

In the absence of unusual circumstances, a corporate party cannot immunize itself from otherwise proper discovery merely by using lawyers to make file searches for information required to answer an interrogatory. Houston Lighting & Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-5, 9 NRC 193, 195 (1979).

Drafts of testimony are not covered by the attorney work product privilege. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-63, 14 NRC 1768, 1793-1794 (1981).

Although a report prepared by a party's non-witness experts qualifies for the work product privilege, a Licensing Board may order discovery of those portions of the report which are relevant to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B determinations concerning the causes of deficiencies in the plant. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-20, 25 NRC 953, 957 (1987).

A qualified work product immunity extends over material gathered or prepared by an attorney for use in litigation, either current or reasonably anticipated at a future time. Although the privilege is not easily overridden, a party may gain discovery of such material upon a showing of a substantial need for the material in the preparation of its case and an inability to obtain the material by any other means without undue hardships. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-50, 20 NRC 1464, 1473-1474 (1984), citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(4) (formerly 2.740(b)(2)).

Even if a document is prepared in part in anticipation of adjudication, the work product privilege will not protect the document if, irrespective of the adjudicatory process, the document would have been prepared anyway in essentially similar form. Thus, a draft license application prepared in part in anticipation of the license application adjudicatory process was not protected by work product privilege, as a license application is a necessary prerequisite for obtaining a license, regardless of whether there is to be adjudication over the application. U.S. Department of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), LBP-05-27, 62 NRC 478, 519-20 (2005).

#### **2.12.2.8 Updating Discovery Responses**

The requirements for updating discovery responses are set forth in 10 CFR § 2.705(e). Generally, a response that was accurate and complete when made need not be updated to include later acquired information with certain exceptions set forth in Section 2.705(e) (formerly 2.740(e)). Of course, an adjudicatory board may impose the duty to supplement responses beyond that required by the regulations.

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.705(e), the obligation to update discovery responses ends upon issuance by the Licensing Board of a ruling terminating that aspect of the proceeding to which the discovery relates. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-01-1, 53 NRC 75, 80 (2001).

### 2.12.2.9 Interrogatories

Interrogatories must have at least general relevancy, for discovery purposes, to the matter in controversy. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-25, 14 NRC 241, 243 (1981).

Interrogatories will not be rejected solely on the number of questions. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 330-335 (1980). However, Licensing Boards may limit the number of interrogatories in accordance with the Commission's rules. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 455-456 (1981).

Numbers alone do not determine the propriety of interrogatories. While a Board is authorized to impose a limit on interrogatories, the rules do not do so of their own force. In the absence of specific objections there is no occasion to review the propriety of interrogatories individually. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1941 (1982).

An intervenor must come forward with evidence "sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further" to insure that its contentions are explored at the hearing. Interrogatories designed to discover what, if any, evidence underlies an intervenor's own contentions are not out of order. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1942 (1982).

Interrogatories served to determine the "regulatory basis" or "legal theory" for a contention are appropriate and important. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982).

Answers should be complete in themselves; the interrogating party should not need to sift through documents or other materials to obtain a complete answer. Instead, a party must specify precisely which documents cited contain the desired information. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-67, 16 NRC 734, 736 (1982), citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-678, 15 NRC 1421, n.39 (1982); 4A Moore's Federal Practice 33.25(1) at 33-129-130 (2d ed. 1981); Martin v. Easton Publishing Co., 85 F.R.D. 312, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1980).

To the extent the interrogatory seeks to uncover and examine the foundation upon which an answer to a specific interrogatory is based, it is proper, particularly where it relates to the interrogatee's own contention. Interrogatories which inquire into the basis of a contention serve the dual purposes of narrowing the issues and preventing surprise at trial. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 493-94 (1983); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-86-4, 23 NRC 75, 81 (1986).

### 2.12.3 Discovery Against the Staff

Discovery against the Staff is on a different footing than discovery in general. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-634, 13 NRC 96, 97-98 (1981); Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 323 (1980). Discovery against the NRC Staff is not governed by the general rules but, instead, is governed by special provisions of the regulations. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-9, 37 NRC 433, 452-53 (1993); see 10 CFR 2.709.

With respect to requests for admissions addressed to the Staff, the Staff stands on the same footing as any party. Neither 10 CFR § 2.708 (formerly 2.742) nor any other section of the regulations provides for any different treatment of the Staff. The Board also found that Rule 36(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is helpful in interpreting the Commission's rules concerning admissions. That rule states that the court may permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission when the presentation of the merits of the action will be served thereby. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-26, 40 NRC 93, 95-96 and n.4 (1994).

Depositions of named NRC Staff members may be required only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-4, 13 NRC 216 (1981); 10 CFR § 2.709(a)(1) (formerly 2.720(h)(2)); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-92-3A, 35 NRC 110, 112 (1992). Factors considered in such a showing include whether: disclosure of the information is necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding; the information is not reasonably obtainable from another source; there is a need to expedite the proceeding. Id. at 223, citing Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-16, 7 AEC 313 (1974).

According to provisions of 10 CFR § 2.709(a)(2) (formerly 2.720), interrogatories against the Staff may be enforced only upon a showing that the answers to be produced are necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 119 (1980).

With respect to interrogatories asked of the Staff, the Staff is not required to answer interrogatories unless this Licensing Board finds: (1) answers to the interrogatories are necessary to the determination of this case, and (2) answers to the interrogatories are not reasonably attainable from any other source. Vogtle, supra, 40 NRC at 94-95 (citing 10 CFR § 2.705(a)(2) (formerly 2.720(h)(2)(ii)); compare 10 CFR § 2.706(b)(1) (formerly 2.740b(a))).

The Staff must respond to interrogatories requesting the names of Staff involved in issuing a Notice of Violation. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-31, 40 NRC 137, 143 (1994).

Document requests against the Staff must be enforced where relevancy has been demonstrated unless production of the document is exempt under 10 CFR § 2.390. In that case, and only then, must it be demonstrated that disclosure is necessary to a proper decision in the matter. Palisades, supra. Even if a relevant document is exempt from disclosure pursuant to section 2.390(a), the document must still be

released if it is necessary to a proper decision in the proceeding and not reasonably obtainable from another source. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 197 (1994).

The Licensing Board weighed several factors related to the Staff's motion to defer discovery of certain documents related to an ongoing investigation. In limiting the extent of the deferral, the Board used a balancing test comprised of four factors: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of the right to a prompt proceeding, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant of a delay in the civil proceeding. It applied the Commission's guidance that these elements are guides "in balancing the interests of the claimant and the Government to assess whether the basic due process requirement of fairness has been satisfied in a particular case." Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-22, 38 NRC 189, 193 (1993) (citing Oncology Services Corp., CLI-93-17, 38 NRC 44, 51 (1993), quoting United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 565 (1983)).

The NRC Staff is not required to compile a list of criticisms of a proposal nor to formulate a position on them in response to an interrogatory. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 2), LBP-82-113, 16 NRC 1907, 1908 (1982).

It is appropriate to require the Staff to answer requests for admissions concerning the truth of findings in its own report, which contains important collateral facts. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-31, 40 NRC 137, 140-41 (1994). It is also appropriate to require the Staff to release segregable facts on which decisions have been made, even if those facts are contained in predecisional documents. Facts that are inextricably intertwined with opinions in predecisional documents need not be released. Georgia Power, et al., 40 NRC at 142.

FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is acting as a consultant to the NRC in emergency planning matters; therefore, its employees are entitled to limitations on discovery afforded NRC consultants by 10 CFR § 2.709 (formerly 2.720(h)(2)(i)). Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-61, 18 NRC 700, 701 (1983).

Provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding between FEMA and NRC qualify FEMA as an NRC consultant for purposes of 10 CFR § 2.709 (formerly 2.720(h)(2)(i)). Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-61, 18 NRC 700, 704 (1983).

#### **2.12.4 Responses to Discovery Requests**

It is an adequate response to any discovery request to state that the information or document requested is available in public compilations and to provide sufficient information to locate the material requested. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-79-8, 10 NRC 141, 147-148 (1979). This holding has been codified at 10 CFR § 2.705(b)(1) (formerly 2.740(b)(1)). 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33181 (August 11, 1989).

A party's response to an interrogatory is adequate if it is true and complete, regardless of whether the discovering party is satisfied with the response. However, where a



party's response is inconsistent with the party's previous statements and assertions made to the Staff, a Board will grant a motion to compel discovery. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-25, 28 NRC 394, 397-99 (1988), reconsid. denied, LBP-88-25A, 28 NRC 435 (1988).

An applicant is entitled to prompt answers to interrogatories inquiring into the factual bases for contentions and evidentiary support for them, since intervenors are not permitted to make skeletal contentions and keep the bases for them secret. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-52, 14 NRC 901, 903 (1981), citing Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317 (1980); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-86-4, 23 NRC 75, 81-82 (1986). An intervenor's failure to timely answer an applicant's interrogatories is not excused by the fact that the delay in answering the interrogatories might not delay the remainder of the proceeding. West Chicago, supra, 23 NRC at 82.

Answers to interrogatories should be complete in themselves. The interrogating party should not need to sift through documents or other materials to obtain a complete answer. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-678, 15 NRC 1400, 1421 n.39 (1982), citing 4A Moore's Federal Practice 33.25(1) at 33-129-130 (2d ed. 1981).

10 CFR § 2.705(b)(1) (formerly 2.740(b)(1)) provides in part that:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the proceeding ... including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.

Answers to interrogatories or requests for documents which do not comply with this provision are inadequate. Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-61, 14 NRC 1735, 1737-1738 (1981).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.707(d) (formerly 2.741(d)), a party upon whom a request for the production of documents is served is required to serve, within 30 days, a written response stating either that the requested inspection will be permitted or stating its reasons for objecting to the request. A response must state, with respect to each item or category, either that inspection will be permitted or that the request is objectionable for specific reasons. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-82, 16 NRC 1144, 1152 (1982).

A Board may require a party, who has been served with a discovery request which it believes is overly broad, to explain why the request is too broad and, if feasible, to interpret the request in a reasonable fashion and supply documents (or answer interrogatories) within the realm of reason. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-41, 22 NRC 765, 768 (1985).

A request for documents should not be deemed objectionable solely because there might be some burden attendant to their production. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at

1155. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.705(f)(1) (formerly 2.740(f)(1)), failure to answer or respond shall not be excused on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the person or party failing to answer or respond has applied for a protective order pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.705(c) (formerly 2.740(c)). A party is not required to seek a protective order when it has, in fact, responded by objecting. An evasive or incomplete answer or response shall be treated as a failure to answer or respond. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 1152.

Where intervenors have filed consolidated briefs they may be treated as a consolidated party; one intervenor may be appointed lead intervenor for purposes of coordinating responses to discovery, but discovery requests should be served on each party intervenor. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 687-688 (1981).

The involvement of a party's attorneys in litigation or other professional business does not excuse noncompliance with, nor extend deadlines for compliance with, discovery requests or other rules of practice, and is an inadequate response to a motion to compel discovery. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-30-A, 14 NRC 364, 373 (1981).

### **2.12.5 Compelling Discovery/Subpoenas**

Discovery can be compelled where the person against whom discovery is sought resists (See 10 CFR § 2.705(f) (formerly 2.740(f))). Subpoenas may also issue pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.702 (formerly 2.720).

In the first instance, no one appears to be immune from an order compelling discovery. The ACRS, for example, has been ordered to provide materials which it declined to provide voluntarily. Virginia Electric Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-16, 7 AEC 313 (1974). Nevertheless, where discovery is resisted by a nonparty (discovery against nonparties impliedly permitted under language of 10 CFR § 2.702(f), 2.705(c) (formerly 2.720(f), 2.740(c))), a greater showing of relevance and materiality appears to be necessary, and a party seeking discovery must show that:

- (1) information sought is otherwise unavailable; and
- (2) he has minimized the burden to be placed on the nonparty.

Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-122, 6 AEC 322 (1973); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-118, 6 AEC 263 (1973). Moreover, Licensing Boards have, on occasion, shown reluctance to enforce the discovery rules to the letter against intervenors. See, e.g., Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-74, 8 AEC 669 (1974).

Section 2.705(f) (formerly 2.740(f)) like its counterpart in the last sentence of Rule 37(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from which the Commission's provision was copied, applies exclusively to situations where a person or party totally fails to respond to a set of interrogatories or document request. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-94-38, 40 NRC 309, 310 (1994) citing 8 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291 at 809-10 (1970).

Section 2.702 (formerly 2.740) of the NRC's Rules of Practice, under which subpoenas are issued, is not founded upon the Commission's general rulemaking powers; rather, it rests upon the specific authority to issue subpoenas duces tecum contained in Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, the rule of FMC v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Company, 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964) that agency discovery rules cannot be founded on general rulemaking powers does not come into play. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 694 (1979). See also OIA Investigation, CLI-89-11, 30 NRC 11, 14-15 (1989), aff'd sub nom. U.S. v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539 (1st Cir.1989).

The federal courts generally will enforce an administrative subpoena if: (1) the agency can articulate a proper purpose for issuing the subpoena; (2) the information sought by the subpoena is reasonably relevant to the purpose of the investigation; and (3) the subpoena is not too definite. The Commission can establish a proper purpose for issuing a subpoena by showing that the matter under investigation implicates public health and safety concerns in matters involving nuclear materials. U.S. v. Oncology Services Corp., 60 F.3d 1015, 1020 (3rd Cir. 1995); United States v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996); U.S. v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1989); Five Star Products, Inc. and Construction Products Research, Inc., CLI-93-23, 38 NRC 169, 177-178 (1993). The courts may deny enforcement of the subpoena if it is shown by firm evidence that: the subpoena was issued for an improper purpose, such as bad faith or harassment; or enforcement of the subpoena would infringe upon the right to freedom of association by compelling a private organization to reveal the identities of its existing members, subjecting them to harassment, and discouraging the recruitment of new members. U.S. v. Comley, 890 F.2d 539, 542-44 (1st Cir. 1989).

The Commission may enforce a subpoena against a contractor or a subcontractor of a licensee to investigate alleged unlawful discrimination. Five Star Products, supra; see also, Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-527, 9 NRC 126 (1979).

The information sought by an administrative subpoena need only be "reasonably relevant" to the inquiry at hand. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 695 (1979); United States v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996).

Subpoenas must be issued in good faith, and pursuant to legitimate agency investigation. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island, Unit 2), CLI-80-22, 11 NRC 724, 729 (1980).

The district court must enforce agency subpoenas unless information is plainly incompetent and irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the agency. U.S. v. Oncology Services Corp., 60 F.3d 1015, 1020 (3rd Cir. 1995).

The referral of matters to the Department of Justice for criminal proceedings, which are separate and distinct from matters covered by subpoenas issued by the Director of Office of Inspection and Enforcement, does not bar the Commission from pursuing its general health and safety and civil enforcement responsibilities through issuance of subpoena. Section 161(c) of Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(c). Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island, Unit 2), CLI-80-22, 11 NRC 724, 725 (1980).

10 CFR § 2.702(a) (formerly 2.720(a)) contemplates ex parte applications for the issuance of subpoenas. Although the Chairman of the Licensing Board “may require a showing of general relevance of the testimony or evidence sought,” he is not obligated to do so. The matter of relevance can be entirely deferred until such time as a motion to quash or modify the subpoena raises the question of relevance. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 698 n.22 (1979).

A Licensing Board is required to issue a subpoena if the discovering party has made a showing of general relevance concerning the testimony or evidence sought. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 279 (1987).

Section 2.702(f) (formerly 2.720(f)) of the Rules of Practice specifically provides that a Licensing Board may condition the denial of a motion to quash or modify a subpoena duces tecum “on just and reasonable terms.” That phrase is expansive enough in reach to allow the imposition of a condition that the subpoenaed person or company be reimbursed for document production costs. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 698-699 (1979).

The Commission denied a motion to quash a Staff subpoena where the subpoenaed individual simply alleged that the records sought by the subpoena contained information of Staff misconduct. Richard E. Dow, CLI-91-9, 33 NRC 473, 478-79 (1991).

Generally, document production costs will not be awarded unless they are found to be not reasonably incident to the conduct of a respondent’s business. Stanislaus, supra, 9 NRC at 702.

Where a party has filed objections to one or more interrogatories or document requests or set forth partial, albeit incomplete, answers in a discovery response, the last sentence of section 2.705(h) (formerly 2.740(f)) has no applicability. The proper procedure in such a situation is for the party opposing the discovery to await the filing of a motion to compel and then respond to that motion. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-94-38, 40 NRC 309, 310 (1994).

Under 10 CFR § 2.705(h), the presiding officer of a proceeding will rule upon motions to compel discovery which set forth the questions contained in the interrogatories, the responses of the party upon whom they were served, and arguments in support of the motion to compel discovery. An evasive or incomplete answer or response to an interrogatory shall be treated as a failure to answer or respond. Houston Lighting & Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-5, 9 NRC 193, 194-195 (1979).

Specific objections must be made to the alleged inadequacy of discrete responses. South Texas, supra, 9 NRC at 195.

A discovering party is entitled to direct answers or objections to each and every interrogatory posed. Objections should be plain enough and specific enough so that it can be understood in what way the interrogatories are claimed to be objectionable. General objections are insufficient. The burden of persuasion is on the objecting party to show that the interrogatory should not be answered, that the information called for is

privileged, not relevant, or in some way not the proper subject of an interrogatory. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1944 (1982).

A motion to compel is required under the rules to set forth detailed bases for Board action, including arguments in support of the motion. 10 CFR § 2.705(h) (formerly 2.740(f)). This means that relief will only be granted against a party resisting further discovery when the movant gives particularized and persuasive reasons for it. Generalized claims that answers are evasive or that objections are unsubstantial will not suffice. The movant must address each interrogatory, including consideration of the objection to it, point by point. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1950 (1982).

#### **2.12.5.1 Compelling Discovery From ACRS and ACRS Consultants**

Although 10 CFR § 2.709 (formerly 2.720) does not explicitly cover consultants for advisory boards like the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), it may fairly be read to include them where they have served in that capacity. Therefore, a party seeking to subpoena consultants to the ACRS may do so but must show the existence of exceptional circumstances before the subpoenas will be issued. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-519, 9 NRC 42, 42 n.2 (1979).

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is an independent federal advisory committee that is not under the Staff's control. In the context of an uncontested ("mandatory") hearing, a Board may ask the Staff to produce relevant ACRS documents that it has reviewed but should not ask the Staff to obtain additional ACRS documents that it has not reviewed. Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Sys. Energy Res., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site; Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), CLI-06-20, 64 NRC 15, 25-26 (2006).

#### **2.12.5.2 Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Discovery Orders**

10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly 2.707) authorizes the presiding officer to impose various sanctions on a party for its failure to, among other things, comply with a discovery order. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-56, 18 NRC 421, 433 (1983). Those sanctions include a finding of facts as to the matters regarding which the order was made in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly 2.707), the failure of a party to comply with a Board's discovery order constitutes a default for which a Board may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-29A, 17 NRC 1121, 1122 (1983); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-86-4, 23 NRC 75, 80 (1986).

A Licensing Board may dismiss the contentions of an intervenor who has failed to respond to an applicant's discovery requests, particularly where the intervenor has failed to file a response to the applicant's motion for summary disposition. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 810 (1986). An intervenor's alleged poor preparation of a contention and a related motion for summary

disposition, as distinguished from the intervenor's failure to respond at all to discovery requests, does not warrant the dismissal of the intervenor's contention. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-89-35, 30 NRC 677, 679 (1989), vacated and reversed on other grounds, ALAB-944, 33 NRC 81 (1991).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly 2.707), an intervenor can be dismissed from the proceeding for its failure to comply with discovery orders. Northern States Power Co. (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), LBP-77-37, 5 NRC 1298 (1977); Offshore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-75-67, 2 NRC 813 (1975); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Atlantic Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-75-62, 2 NRC 702 (1975).

Intervenors were dismissed from a proceeding when the Board determined that: the intervenors had engaged in a willful, bad faith strategy to obstruct discovery; the intervenors' actions and omissions prejudiced the applicant and the integrity of the adjudicatory process; and the imposition of lesser sanctions earlier in the proceeding had failed to correct the intervenors' actions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-24, 28 NRC 311, 375-77 (1988), rev'd in part and vacated in part, ALAB-902, 28 NRC 423 (1988), review denied and stay denied, CLI-88-11, 28 NRC 603 (1988). Where multiple Licensing Boards are presiding over different portions of an operating license proceeding, an individual Licensing Board's authority to order the dismissal of a party applies only to the hearing over which it has jurisdiction, and does not extend to those portions of the proceeding pending before the other Licensing Boards. A party who seeks the dismissal of another party from the entire proceeding must request the sanction of dismissal from each of the Boards before which different parts of the proceeding are pending. Shoreham, supra, 28 NRC at 428-30, review denied and stay denied, CLI-88-11, 28 NRC 603 (1988). On directed certification from the Appeal Board of the intervenors' appeal of their dismissal as parties by the OL-3 Licensing Board (which issued LBP-88-24, supra), the Commission determined that the intervenors' conduct before the Licensing Board warranted their dismissal as parties from all proceedings pending before the Commission. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-89-2, 29 NRC 211, 231-32 (1989).

A licensee's motion for sanctions against an intervenor for failure to comply with discovery requests poses a three part consideration: (1) due process for the licensee; (2) due process for the intervenor; and (3) an overriding consideration of the public interest in a complete evidentiary record. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-80-17, 11 NRC 893, 897 (1980).

Counsel's allegations of certain problems as excuses for intervenor's failure to provide discovery did not justify reconsideration of the Board's imposition of sanctions for such failure, where such allegations were expressly dealt with in the Board's order compelling discovery. Nor can an intervenor challenge the sanctions on the grounds that other NRC cases involved lesser sanctions, where the intervenor has willfully and deliberately refused to supply the evidentiary bases for its admitted contentions. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-5, 15 NRC 209, 213-214 (1982). See, however, ALAB-678, 15 NRC 1400 (1982), reversing the Byron Licensing Board's dismissal of intervenor

for failure to comply with discovery orders on the ground that such a sanction was too severe in the circumstances.

The sanction of dismissal from an NRC licensing proceeding is to be reserved for the most severe instances of a participant's failure to meet its obligations. In selecting a sanction, Licensing Boards are to consider the relative importance of the unmet obligation; its potential harm to other parties or the orderly conduct of the proceeding; whether its occurrence is an isolated incident or a part of a pattern of behavior; the importance of the safety or environmental concerns raised by the party and all of the circumstances. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-678, 15 NRC 1400 (1982), citing Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1947 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-20A, 17 NRC 586, 590 (1983), citing Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-719, 17 NRC 387, 392 (1983); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (Kress Creek Decontamination), LBP-85-48, 22 NRC 843, 848-49 (1985); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-86-4, 23 NRC 75, 80-81 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-24, 28 NRC 311, 365-68 (1988); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-89-2, 29 NRC 211, 223 (1989).

The refusal of any party to make its witnesses available to participate in the prehearing examinations is an abandonment of its right to present the subject witness and testimony. An intervenor's intentional waiver of both the right to cross-examine and the right to present witnesses amounts to an effective abandonment of their contention. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1935, 1936 (1982).

Although failure to comply with a Board order to respond to interrogatories may result in adverse findings of fact, the Board need not decide what adverse findings to adopt until action is necessary. When another procedure has been adopted requiring intervenors to shoulder the burden of going forward on a motion for summary disposition, it may be appropriate to await intervenor's filing on summary disposition, before deciding whether or not to impose sanctions for failure to respond to interrogatories pursuant to a Board order. Sanctions only will be appropriate if failure to respond prejudices applicant in the preparation of its case. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-10, 15 NRC 341, 344 (1982).

Where an intervenor has failed to comply with discovery requests and orders, the Licensing Board may alter the usual order of presentation of evidence and require an intervenor that would normally follow a licensee, to proceed with its case first. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1245 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). See Northern States Power Co. (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), LBP-77-37, 5 NRC 1298, 1300-01 (1977), cited with approval in Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 338 (1980); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station,

Units 1 and 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 188 (1978); 10 CFR § 2.324 (formerly 2.731).

### 2.12.6 Appeals of Discovery Rulings

A Licensing Board order granting discovery against a third party is a final order for which appellate review may be sought; an order denying such discovery is interlocutory, and an appeal is not permitted. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-122, 6 AEC 322 (1973); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-116, 6 AEC 258 (1973).

Motions to reconsider Board Orders must be made promptly, generally within 10 days of the date of issuance. In some cases, even shorter filing deadlines will be imposed. Once the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration has run, the Board's rulings become the law of the case and may not subsequently be challenged successfully. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-16, 39 NRC 257, 259 (1994).

Interlocutory review of a discovery order is warranted when the alleged harm would be immediate and could not be redressed through future review of a final decision of the licensing board. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 193 (1994).

A discovery order entered against a nonparty is a final order and thus is appealable. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-550, 9 NRC 683, 686 n.1 (1979); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-764, 19 NRC 633, 636 n.1 (1984).

Typically, discovery orders can be reviewed on appeal following a final judgment. A claim of privilege is not alone sufficient to justify interlocutory review. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 184 (1995).

Earlier caselaw suggests that where a nonparty desires to appeal a discovery order against him, the proper procedure is for such person to enter a special appearance before the Licensing Board and then file an appropriate appeal. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-311, 3 NRC 85 (1976).

To establish reversible error from the curtailment of discovery procedures, a party must demonstrate that such curtailment made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence. Implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery was impossible. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 869 (1975). The Appeal Board refused to review a discovery ruling referred to it by a Licensing Board when the Board below did not explain why it believed Appeal Board involvement was necessary, where the losing party had not indicated that it was unduly burdened by the ruling and where the ruling was not novel. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-438, 6 NRC 638 (1977). The aggrieved party must make a strong showing that the impact of the discovery order upon that party or upon the public interest is indeed "unusual."

Questions about the scope of discovery concern matters which are particularly within a trial board's competence and appellate review of such rulings is usually best conducted



at the end of case. Pennsylvania Power & Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 321 (1980).

## **2.12.7 Discovery in High-Level Waste Licensing Proceedings**

### **2.12.7.1 Pre-Licene Application Licensing Board**

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.1010, a Pre-License Application Licensing Board is authorized to resolve questions concerning: access to the Licensing Support Network (LSN); the entry of documentary material into the LSN; discovery requests; and the development and operation of the LSN.

### **2.12.7.2 Licensing Support Network (Formerly Licensing Support System)**

The Licensing Support Network (LSN) is an electronic information management system, established pursuant to Subpart J of 10 CFR Part 2, which will contain the documentary material generated by the participants in the high-level waste licensing proceeding as well as NRC orders and decisions related to the proceeding. In June 2004 the Commission updated the rules on the LSN and established basic requirements and standards for submission of adjudicatory materials to the electronic docket for the HLW repository licensing proceeding, addressed the issue of reducing unnecessary loading of duplicate documents into the system, addressed obligations of LSN participants to update their documentary material, and addressed provisions on material that could be excluded from the LSN. Licensing Proceeding for a High-Level Radioactive Waste Geologic Respository; Licensing Support Network, Submissions to the Electronic Docket, 69 Fed. Reg. 32836 (June 14, 2004).

Under regulations governing the High Level Waste Repository proceedings, parties must make available to the Licensing Support Network (LSN) any document that is both “documentary material” and a “circulated draft.” According to 10 C.F.R. § 2.1001, “documentary material” includes (1) documents upon which the applicant will rely, (2) relevant information known to, possessed by, or developed by the applicant but that does not support the applicant’s position, and (3) relevant reports and studies, which includes basic documents relevant to licensing. A circulated draft, according to § 2.1001, is “a nonfinal document circulated for supervisory concurrence or signature in which the original author or others in the concurrence process have non-concurred.” U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), LBP-05-27, 62 NRC 478, 496, 503 (2005) (holding that a July 2004 Department of Energy Draft license application must be made available to the LSN).

The regulatory requirement to make available all documentary material pursuant to 2.1003(a) implies a good faith standard by which DOE must, on the date it chooses to certify its document production, have in good faith made every reasonable effort to make all of its documentary material available. Factors to be considered in determining whether the good faith standard has been met include the time DOE has had to produce such documents, the purpose and importance of DOE’s production obligation, and DOE’s status and financial ability. U.S. Dept. of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), LBP-04-20, 60 NRC 300, 314-315 (2004).

The certification requirement set forth in 10 CFR § 2.1009(b) requires that DOE complete the privilege review of its documents and make the full text of all nonprivileged documents available before it can certify that it has made all documents available. High Level Waste Repository, LBP-04-20, 60 NRC at 319.

When document production occurs pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.1003, documents created after a reasonable cutoff date might not be included in the initial document production. High Level Waste Repository, LBP-04-20, 60 NRC at 325.

The duty to supplement document production pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.1003(e) is not a mechanism for DOE to submit documents created before its initial certification. The duty to supplement only applies to documents created after the certification date, thus DOE cannot rely on this provision to certify their production even though it had not yet completed its review. High Level Waste Repository, LBP-04-20, 60 NRC at 327.

Subpart J requires participants to make their documentary material electronically available in or via the LSN. However, being “in the LSN” means that a documentary material must be indexed on the central LSN site to that its integrity and stability is assured and it can be accessed via the single, consistent central LSN site search engine. Merely making documentary material available by loading it onto the participant’s own server and making the material available for indexing by the LSNA does not satisfy this requirement. High Level Waste Repository, LBP-04-20, 60 NRC at 330-33.

DOE’s 10 CFR § 2.1009(b) certification letter was facially deficient because it excluded the word “all” before “documents submitted to the CACI.” 2.1003 requires that “all documents” be made available, and the certification letter must so indicate. High Level Waste Repository, LBP-04-20, 60 NRC at 339.

A draft document must be placed on the LSN when it has received a non-concurrence satisfying the definition of “circulated draft” set forth in 10 CFR § 2.1001. The heart of the definition of circulated draft is the meaning of non-concurrence. The 3 elements of non-concurrence include: (1) A non-concurrence must be part of a formalized process; (2) a non-concurrence must be unresolved, with the original author or others in the concurrence process in disagreement with the final product; and (3) the decision-making on the document must be completed. Thus, for purposes of availability on the LSN, in order for documentary material to be considered to be a “circulated draft,” it must have received a non-concurrence in a formalized process and the decision-making on the document must be complete. U.S. Department of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), CLI-06-5, 63 NRC 143, 158-59 (2006).

Subpart J does not treat drafts of the license application for the high level waste facility at Yucca Mountain as either Class 1 or Class 2 documentary material thus requiring they be made available on the Licensing Support Network. High Level Waste Repository, CLI-06-5, 63 NRC at 150-52. Similarly, a draft of the license application for the high level waste facility at Yucca Mountain is not a Class 3 circulated draft report or study under Subpart J, and should not be made available on the Licensing Support Network. Id. at 157.

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## 3.0 HEARINGS

### 3.1 Licensing Board

#### 3.1.1 General Role/Power of Licensing Board

Normally, the Licensing Board is charged with compiling a factual record in a proceeding, analyzing the record, and making a determination based upon the record. The Commission will assume these functions of the Licensing Board only in extraordinary circumstances. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project Nos. 3 & 5), CLI-77-11, 5 NRC 719, 722 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-8, 19 NRC 1154, 1155 (1984).

The licensing board performs the important task of judging factual and legal disputes between parties, but it is not an institution trained or experienced in assessing the investigatory significance of raw evidence. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-95-16, 42 NRC 221, 225 (1995).

A Licensing Board is not merely an evidence gathering body. Rather, it has the responsibility for appraising ab initio the record developed before it and for formulating the agency's initial decision based on that appraisal. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319, 322 (1972). Licensing Boards have a duty not only to resolve contested issues, but to articulate in reasonable detail the basis for the course of action chosen. A Board must do more than reach conclusions; it must confront the facts. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1087 n.12 (1983), citing, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 41 (1977). See also Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 811 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-857, 25 NRC 7, 14 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515, 533-34 (1988) (a Board is not required to make explicit findings if its decision otherwise articulates in reasonable detail the basis for its determinations). However, a Licensing Board is not required to refer specifically to every proposed finding. Limerick, supra, 25 NRC at 14.

A decisionmaking body must confront the facts and legal arguments presented by the parties and articulate the reasons for its conclusions on disputed issues, i.e., take a hard look at the salient problems. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 366 (1983), citing, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 41 (1977), aff'd, CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1 (1978), aff'd sub nom., New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 836 (1984), affirming in part (full power license for Unit 1), LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756 (1982).

A Licensing Board is not required to do independent research or conduct de novo review of an application in a contested proceeding, but may rely upon uncontradicted Staff and applicant evidence. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 334-35 (1973); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station), ALAB-83, 5 AEC 354, (1972), aff'd, UCS v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The Licensing Board has the right and duty to develop a full record for decisionmaking in the public interest. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-87, 16 NRC 1195, 1199 (1982).

“If the rulings on the admission of contentions or the admitted contentions themselves raise novel legal or policy admissions, the Licensing Board should refer or certify such rulings or questions to the Commission on an interlocutory basis.” Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-20, 54 NRC 211, 213 (2001).

Licensing Boards are authorized to certify questions or refer rulings to the Commission. 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.319(l), 2.323(f) (formerly 2.718(i), 2.730(f)); Cf. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-28, 17 NRC 987, 989 n.1 (1983).

When new information is submitted to the Licensing Board, it has the responsibility to review the information and decide whether it casts sufficient doubt on the safety of a facility. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-52, 18 NRC 256, 258 (1983).

A Licensing Board may conduct separate hearings on environmental, and radiological health and safety issues. Absent persuasive reasons against segmentation, contentions raising environmental questions need not be heard at the health and safety stage of a proceeding notwithstanding the fact they may involve public health and safety considerations. Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-18, 11 NRC 906, 908 (1980).

It is impractical to delay licensing proceeding to await ASME action. The responsibility of the Board is to form its own independent conclusions about licensing issues. Regulations that reference the ASME code were not intended to give over the Commission's full rulemaking authority to a private organization on an ongoing basis; nor is a private organization intended to become the authority concerning criteria necessary to the issuance of a license. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-33, 18 NRC 27, 35 (1983).

As a general principle multiple boards should not be established if it would likely result in duplicative work or conflicting rulings. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., supra, at 312.

A Board may express its preliminary concerns based on its review of early results from an applicant's intensive review program which seeks to verify the design and construction quality assurance of the facility. The Board's expression of its concerns during an early stage of the program may enable the applicant to modify its program in order to address more effectively the Board's concerns and questions. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-20, 23 NRC 844, 845 (1986).

If an intervenor cannot present his case, the proper method to institute a proceeding by which the NRC would conduct its own investigation is to request action under 10 CFR § 2.206. It is not the Board's function to assist intervenors in preparing their cases and



searching for their expert witnesses. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-84, 16 NRC 1183, 1186 (1982). A Licensing Board is not an intervenor's advocate and has no independent obligation to compel the appearance of an intervenor's witness. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 215 (1986).

Licensing Boards have the authority to call witnesses of their own, but the exercise of this discretion must be reasonable and like other Licensing Board rulings, is subject to appellate review. A Board may take this extraordinary action only after (1) giving the parties to the proceeding every fair opportunity to clarify and supplement their previous testimony, and (2) showing why it cannot reach an informed decision without independent witnesses. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-710, 17 NRC 25, 27-28 (1983).

Contractual disputes among electric utilities regarding, for example, interconnection and transmission provisions, rates for electric power and services, cost-sharing agreements, are matters that do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board and should properly be addressed to FERC or state agencies that regulate electric utilities. Gulf States Utilities Co., et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31; aff'd, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994).

A Licensing Board may appoint a special assistant to act as a settlement judge, consistent with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.322 (formerly 2.722). Cameo Diagnostic Center, Inc., LBP-94-13, 39 NRC 249 (1994).

Board adjudication of contentions is only appropriate insofar as those contentions present actual, live controversies. If the Board determines that a contention does not, in fact, present a live controversy – for instance, because all parties involved seek the same result – the Board must refrain from adjudicating it. Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, NM 87313), LBP-05-17, 62 NRC 77, 91-92 (2005).

### **3.1.1.1 Role and Authority of the Chief Judge**

The Chief Administrative Judge of the Licensing Board Panel is empowered to 1) establish two or more licensing boards to hear and decide discrete portions of a licensing proceeding; and 2) determine which portions will be considered by one board as distinguished from another. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-916, 29 NRC 434 (1989); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307, 311 (1998).

The Commission expects the Chief Judge to exercise his authority to establish multiple boards only when: 1) the proceeding involves discrete and separable issues; 2) the issues can be more expeditiously handled by multiple boards than by a single board; and 3) the multiple boards can conduct the proceeding in a manner that will not unduly burden the parties. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., supra, at 311.

### 3.1.2 Scope of Jurisdiction of Licensing Board

#### 3.1.2.1 Jurisdiction Grant From Commission

A Licensing Board has only the jurisdiction and power which the Commission delegates to it. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167 (1976); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-825, 22 NRC 785, 790 (1985); Public Service Co. of Indiana and Wabash Valley Power Association (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-37, 24 NRC 719, 725 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-7, 27 NRC 289, 291 (1988). See also Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.; Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2, Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-23, 15 NRC 647, 649 (1982); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-89-35, 30 NRC 677, 680 (1989), vacated and reversed on other grounds, ALAB-944, 33 NRC 81 (1991). Nevertheless, it has the power in the first instance to rule on the scope of its jurisdiction when it is challenged. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-321, 3 NRC 293, 298 (1976), aff'd, CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 646 (1983), citing, Duke Power Co. (Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-591, 11 NRC 741, 742 (1980); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (Kress Creek Decontamination), ALAB-867, 25 NRC 900, 905 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 67 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991). Once a board determines it has jurisdiction, it is entitled to proceed directly to the merits. Zimmer, supra, 18 NRC at 646, citing, Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-597, 11 NRC 870, 873 (1980).

Presiding officer has only the jurisdiction delegated by the Commission, generally made via hearing or hearing opportunity notice. Fansteel Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-03-13, 58 NRC 96, 100 (2003).

The NRC possesses the authority to change its procedures on a case-by-case basis with timely notice to the parties involved. National Whistleblower Center v. NRC, 208 F.3d 256, 262 (D.C. Cir. 2000) quoting City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 647 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 40 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1974)).

A Licensing Board's jurisdiction is defined by the Commission's notice of hearing. Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 426 (1980); Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 565 (1980); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-79-24, 10 NRC 226, 298 (1979); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-825, 22 NRC 785, 790 (1985). See Alfred J. Morabito (Senior Operator License for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-87-23, 26 NRC 81, 84 (1987); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-881, 26 NRC 465, 476 (1987); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-89-15, 29 NRC 493, 504, 506 (1989); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-1, 33 NRC 15, 20-21 (1991).

A Licensing Board generally can neither enlarge nor contract the jurisdiction conferred by the Commission. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-825, 22 NRC 785, 790 (1985), citing, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-235, 8 AEC 645, 647 (1974) Three Mile Island, *supra*, 26 NRC at 476; Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-19, 30 NRC 55, 58, 59-60 (1989).

Where certain issues sought to be raised by an intervenor are not fairly within the scope of the issues for the proceeding as set forth in the Commission's notice of hearing, such additional issues are beyond the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board to decide. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 2), LBP-78-31, 8 NRC 366, 370-371 (1978); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-825, 22 NRC 785, 790-91 (1985). See Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-91-41, 34 NRC 332, 337-338, 344-345 (1991).

The five notices and orders by which authority may be delegated to a Licensing Board include an order to initiate enforcement action (10 CFR § 2.202); an order calling for a hearing on imposition of civil penalties (10 CFR § 2.205(e)); a notice of hearing on an application for which a hearing must be provided (10 CFR § 2.104); a notice of opportunity for a hearing on an application not covered by 10 CFR § 2.104 (10 CFR § 2.105); and notice of opportunity for a hearing on antitrust matters (10 CFR § 2.102(d)(3)).

Absent special circumstances, a Licensing Board may consider *ab initio* whether it has power to grant relief that has been specifically sought of it. Every tribunal possesses inherent rights and duties to determine in the first instance its own jurisdiction. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-591, 11 NRC 741, 742 (1980). Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 71 n. 13 (2006).

The regulation permitting the Board to enter protective orders, 10 C.F.R. § 2.705 (formerly §2.740), is procedural and may not be read to enlarge the Licensing Board's authority into areas that the Commission has clearly assigned to other offices. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-95-16, 42 NRC 221, 226 (1995).

The effect of a Policy Statement of the Commission that deprives a Board of jurisdiction, is to prohibit that Board from inquiring into the procedural regularity of the policy statement. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-69, 16 NRC 751 (1982).

When a proceeding is pending both before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board and the Commission (in its reviewing capacity), and where the Licensing Board has previously issued a Notice of Hearing, jurisdiction to consider Licensee's motion to withdraw its application and terminate the proceedings lies in the first instance with the Licensing Board. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.107. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-99-22, 49 NRC 481, 483 (1999).

A Licensing Board which has been authorized to consider only the question of whether fundamental flaws were revealed by an exercise of an applicant's emergency plan does not also have the authority to retain jurisdiction to determine whether the flaws have been corrected. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-7, 27 NRC 289, 291 (1988).

Challenging a Commission rule falls outside the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board; however, "there are other avenues through which Petitioners may seek relief, including filing an enforcement petition under 10 CFR § 2.206, a rule making petition under 10 CFR § 2.802, or a request to the Commission under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758) to make an exception or waive a rule based upon 'special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding ... such that ... the rule ... would not serve the purposes for which [it] was adopted'" Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 63 (2002).

Where a Licensing Board has already dismissed a case, it no longer has jurisdiction over the matter. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 35 (2006) (citing Phila. Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-823, 22 NRC 773, 775 (1985)).

Even if the licensing board's jurisdiction to hear a matter is in question, and has yet to be resolved, nothing prevents the Board from suggesting to the parties that they try to reach a settlement, as such a settlement could involve petitioner withdrawing its initiating papers, thereby rendering moot the issue of the Board's jurisdiction. Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 71 n. 13 (2006).

Where a Licensing Board has already dismissed a case, it no longer has jurisdiction over the matter. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 35 (2006)(citing Phila. Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-823, 22 NRC 773, 775 (1985)).

### **3.1.2.1.1 Effect of Commission Decisions/Precedent**

Where a matter has been considered by the Commission, it may not be reconsidered by a Board. Commission precedent must be followed. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 463-65 (1980); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-21, 23 NRC 849, 859, 871-72 (1986). Pending future developments that would overrule controlling Commission precedent, Boards have held a contention (or portion thereof) relying on an argument that a controlling Commission decision was wrongly decided to be inadmissible. See, e.g, Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 113-14 (2006) (ruling on NEPA terrorism contention based on Commission precedent despite the pendency of a Circuit Court of Appeals review of an analogous issue).

Pursuant to its inherent supervisory authority, the Commission may issue orders expediting Board proceedings and suggesting time frames and schedules.

Although the Commission expects such guidance to be followed to the maximum extent feasible, the Licensing Board may deviate from the proposed schedule when circumstances require. Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2), CLI-98-15, 48 NRC 45, 52 (1998).

Licensing Boards are capable of fairly judging a matter on a full record, even where the Commission has expressed tentative views. Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 4-5 (1980).

Licensing Boards are bound to comply with directives of a higher tribunal, whether they agree with them or not. The same is true with respect to Commission review of Appeal Board action and judicial review of agency action. Any other alternative would be unworkable and would unacceptably undermine the rights of the parties. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-710, 17 NRC 25, 28 (1983). See also Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, NM 87313), LBP-05-17, 62 NRC 77, 87-88 (2005) (applying Law of the Case doctrine to reach same conclusion with regard to rulings by different tribunals in different phases of a case, though noting that “changed circumstances or public interest factors” may sometimes dictate less rigid adherence to a ruling of a higher tribunal in a previous phase of the case).

Promulgation of new regulations that occurs after a Commission decision based upon the old regulations does not exempt the Board, during a later phase of the same case, from following that Commission decision where the new regulations do not apply retroactively to the issue at hand. Unless the new regulations apply retroactively—which generally will not be the case—“law of the case” doctrine requires the Board to follow the prior Commission decision. Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-05-26, 62 NRC 442, 462 (2005).

The Commission has inherent supervisory power over the conduct of adjudicatory proceedings, including the authority to provide guidance on the admissibility of contentions before Licensing Boards. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2); Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-82-15, 16 NRC 27, 34 (1982), citing, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 516-517 (1977). See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-2, 33 NRC 61, 74 (1991), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461 (1991); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-15, 34 NRC 269, 271 (1991) (the Commission directed the Licensing Board to suspend consideration of certain issues), reconsid. denied, CLI-92-6, 35 NRC 86 (1992); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-13, 36 NRC 79, 85 (1992). Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Sys. Energy Res., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site; Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), CLI-06-20, 64 NRC 15, 21 (2006) (citing, e.g., Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-21, 60 NRC 21, 27 (2004)).

If a licensee files for bankruptcy, the Commission may step in to secure, to the maximum extent possible, assets to be used eventually remediate a contaminated site, including intervening in bankruptcy proceedings and entering into settlement. Moab Mill Reclamation Trust (Atlas Mill Site), CLI-00-7, 51 NRC 216, 224 (2000).

### **3.1.2.2 Authority in Construction Permit Proceedings Distinguished from Authority in Operating License Proceedings**

A Licensing Board's powers are not coextensive with that of the Commission, but are based solely on delegations expressed or necessarily implied in regulation or in other Commission direction. A Licensing Board is not delegated authority to and cannot order a hearing in the public interest under 10 CFR § 2.104(a). The notice constituting a construction permit Licensing Board does not provide a basis for it to order a hearing on whether an operating license should be granted. A construction permit Licensing Board's jurisdiction will usually terminate before an operating license application is filed. Thus, it probably never could be delegated authority to determine whether a hearing on the operating license application is needed in the public interest. Similarly, the general authority of a Licensing Board to condition permits or licenses provides no basis for it to initiate other adjudicatory proceedings. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18 (1980), reconsidered, ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

In operating license proceedings, as distinguished from those involving construction permits, the role of NRC adjudicatory boards is quite limited insofar as uncontested matters are concerned. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 366, 370-71 (1978).

A Licensing Board for an operating license proceeding does not have general jurisdiction over the already authorized ongoing construction of the plant for which an operating license application is pending, and it cannot suspend the previously issued construction permit. An intervenor wishing to halt such construction must file a petition under 10 CFR § 2.206 with the appropriate Commission official. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-674, 15 NRC 1101, 1103 (1982). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 870-871 (1984). A member of the public may challenge an action taken under 10 CFR § 50.59 (changes to a facility) only by means of a petition under 10 CFR § 2.206. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 101 n.7 (1994).

#### **3.1.2.2.A Scope of Authority in Construction Permit Proceedings**

A Licensing Board is limited in the types of actions it may take in a construction permit proceeding. Although it may impose conditions on the granting of a construction permit, it may not require the applicant to submit a different application. In a review of alternate sites, for example, a Licensing Board is not authorized to suggest or select preferable alternate sites or to require the applicant to reapply for a construction permit at a specified new site. The Board may only accept or reject the site proposed in the application or accept it with certain conditions. Given the limited number of appropriate responses to a construction permit application, a Licensing Board should deny a construction

permit on the grounds of availability of preferable alternate sites only when the alternate site is obviously superior to the proposed site. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977).

In Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-381, 5 NRC 582, 589-91 (1977), the Appeal Board determined that a second Licensing Board, constituted after an initial decision in a construction permit proceeding had been issued and the jurisdiction of the original Licensing Board had terminated, lacks authority to grant a petition for untimely intervention unless specifically delegated this authority by the Commission's regulations or one of the five notices or orders discussed in Section 3.1.2.1., supra. The Appeal Board reasoned that Commission regulations providing for the automatic termination of the jurisdiction of the original Licensing Board revealed a policy for reasonable, timely termination of litigation. This policy would be frustrated if the second Licensing Board could, merely by its creation, reactivate and "inherit" the expired authority of the original Board. Since a Licensing Board has no independent authority to initiate adjudicatory proceedings (*Id.* at 592), and since the requisite authority was neither "inherited" nor specifically granted the second Board, that Board lacked authority to grant an untimely petition for intervention. Thus, the mere designation of a Licensing Board to entertain a petition does not in itself confer the requisite authority to grant the petition. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-389, 5 NRC 727 (1977). As a corollary, a Licensing Board cannot order a hearing in the absence of a pending construction permit or operating license proceeding, or some other proceeding which might arise upon the issuance of one of the five notices or orders listed above. South Texas, supra, 5 NRC at 592; Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 & 2) (Turkey Point, Units 3 & 4), LBP-77-23, 5 NRC 789 (1977). A Licensing Board is vested with the power to dismiss an application with prejudice. See 10 CFR § 2.107(a). Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 974 (1981).

A Licensing Board is required to issue an initial decision in a case involving an application for a construction permit even if the proceeding is uncontested. United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-761, 19 NRC 487, 489 (1984), citing, 10 CFR § 2.104(b)(2) and (3).

In the context of the Board's mandatory hearing responsibilities, the terms "consider" and "determine" shall be viewed as essentially synonymous. However, the Board's review of contested matters should differ than its review of uncontested matters. Review of contested matters should be much more in-depth than review of uncontested matters. With regard to uncontested portions of hearings, a Licensing Board should inquire whether the NRC Staff has performed an adequate review and reached conclusions reasonably supported by logic and fact. The Board's review should not be cursory, but should instead probe the Staff's findings by asking appropriate questions and by requiring additional information when needed. The Staff's technical and factual findings are not open to Board reconsideration unless the Board finds the Staff review inadequate or its findings lacking. Exelon Generation Co., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 64 NRC 460, 471 n. 19, 473-74 (2006).

10 C.F.R. §§ 51.105(a)(1)(3) and 2.104(b)(3) outline the three NEPA-related matters that Licensing Boards must address. The Commission has stated that boards should treat the regulatory requirements in these sections as applicable to the uncontested portion of a hearing. The Commission has stated that the Licensing Boards must conduct their own analysis on uncontested, baseline NEPA questions, but that boards should not second-guess the NRC Staff's technical or factual findings. There should be no exceptions to this rule, unless a Licensing Board finds that the Staff's review is incomplete or that the Staff's findings are not supported by the record. Clinton ESP Site, LBP-06-28, 64 NRC at 471-71, 483.

10 C.F.R. § 2.104(b)(2) sets forth safety issues that are relevant to construction permits, but not all of the issues listed are relevant for an Early Site Permit (ESP) Proceeding. Clinton ESP Site, LBP-06-28, 64 NRC at 472.

### **3.1.2.2.B Scope of Authority in Operating License Proceedings**

Where the Commission's notice of hearing is general and only refers to the application for an operating license, a Licensing Board has jurisdiction to consider all matters contained in the application, regardless of whether the matters were specifically listed in the notice of hearing. Catawba, *supra*, 22 NRC at 791-92 (application for an operating license contained proposal for spent fuel storage).

A Board can authorize or refuse to authorize the issuance of an operating license. It does not, however, have general jurisdiction over the already authorized on-going construction of the plant for which an operating license application is pending, and it cannot suspend such a previously issued permit. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1086 (1982), *citing*, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-674, 15 NRC 1101, 1102-03 (1982).

A Licensing Board is not authorized to order an applicant for an operating license to pursue options and alternatives to its application, such as the abandonment of an entire unit of a plant. The Board must consider the application as it has been presented. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 884 (1984).

A Licensing Board which has been granted jurisdiction to preside over an operating license proceeding does not have jurisdiction to consider issues which may be raised by potential applications for operating license amendments. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-19, 25 NRC 950, 951 (1987) reconsideration denied, LBP-87-22, 26 NRC 41 (1987), both vacated as moot, ALAB-874, 26 NRC 156 (1987).

A Licensing Board for an operating license proceeding is limited to resolving matters that are raised therein as legitimate contentions by the parties or by the Board *sua sponte*. 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-674, 15 NRC 1101, 1102-03 (1982), *citing*, Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2, & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power



Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1933 (1982), citing, 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-750, 18 NRC 1205, 1216 (1983); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 545 (1986); Dairyland Power Cooperative (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-88-15, 27 NRC 576, 579 (1988). Specifically, the Board's jurisdiction is limited to a determination of findings of fact and conclusions of law on matters put into controversy by the parties to the proceeding or found by the Board to involve a serious safety, environmental or common defense and security question. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1969-70 (1982); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-830, 23 NRC 59, 60 & n.1 (1986), vacating, LBP-86-3, 23 NRC 69 (1986).

There is no automatic right to adjudicatory resolution of environmental or safety questions associated with an operating license application. See Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8, 9 (1976). The Commission's regulations limit operating license proceedings to "matters in controversy among the parties" or matters raised on a Licensing Board's own initiative sua sponte. 10 CFR §§ 2.104(c), 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a). Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 382 (1985).

A hearing is not mandatory on an operating license, but where a Board is convened it may look at all serious matters it deems merit further exploration. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227, 229-31 (1980). Where a Licensing Board has jurisdiction to consider an issue, a party to a proceeding before that Board must first seek relief from the Board; if the Licensing Board is clearly without jurisdiction, there is no need to present the matter to it for decision. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-6, 13 NRC 443, 446 (1981), citing, Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4), CLI-79-5, 9 NRC 607 (1979).

An operating license proceeding is not intended to provide a forum for the reconsideration of matters originally within the scope of the construction permit proceeding. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804, 21 NRC 587, 591 (1985).

In an operating license proceeding, the Commission's regulations limit an adjudicatory board's finding to the issues put into contest by the parties. See 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a). A board is not required to make, and, under the regulations cannot properly make, the ultimate finding comparable to that required in a construction permit proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

The Licensing Board may assert jurisdiction over Part 70 material licensing issues raised in conjunction with an ongoing Part 50 licensing proceeding where the Part 70 materials license is integral to the project undergoing licensing consideration. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1

and 2), LBP-84-16, 19 NRC 857, 862-65 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-765, 19 NRC 645, 650-51 (1984), citing, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2), CLI-76-1, 3 NRC 73, 74 (1976).

In a previously uncontested operating license proceeding, a Licensing Board has the jurisdiction to entertain a late-filed petition to intervene and to decide the issues raised by it until the Commission exercises its authority to license full power operation. The Board's jurisdiction does not terminate until the time the Commission issues a final decision or the time expires for Commission certification of record. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-92, 16 NRC 1376, 1380-1381 (1982).

In operating licensing proceedings as to radiological safety matters, the Board is to decide those issues put in controversy by the parties. In addition, the Board must require evidence and resolution of any significant safety matter of which it becomes aware regardless of whether the parties choose to put the matter in controversy. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 524-25 (1973); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358, 362 (1973).

A Licensing Board has authorized the issuance of a full power operating license for the Seabrook facility even though several emergency planning issues remanded by the Appeal Board and a number of intervenors' motions for the admission of new contentions were still pending before the Licensing Board. The Board believed that the issuance of a full power operating license prior to the resolution of these open matters was appropriate where the Board determined that none of the open matters involved significant safety or regulatory matters which would undermine the Board's ultimate conclusion that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook facility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-33, 30 NRC 656, 657-58 (1989), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 378 & n.331 (1991), citing, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 330-32 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Commission conducted an immediate effectiveness review pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.764), and determined that the Licensing Board's authorization of the issuance of a full power operating license should be allowed to take effect. The Commission denied the intervenors' motion for relief in the nature of mandamus on the ground that there was no clear, nondiscretionary duty on the part of the Licensing Board to delay full power authorization pending the completion of remand proceedings or resolution of all pending matters. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 229-231 (1990).

### **3.1.2.3 Scope of Authority in Uncontested Proceedings (“Mandatory Hearings”)**

A balance must be struck between Board leeway to perform its ‘truly independent’ review, and burdens on the NRC Staff. A “mandatory hearing” board must narrow its inquiry to those topics or sections in Staff documents that it deems most important and should concentrate on portions of the documents that do not on their face adequately explain the logic, underlying facts, and applicable regulations and

guidance. [It serves no purpose for the Staff to produce volumes of documents and information supporting facts and conclusions that are of small importance and are beyond dispute. It likewise serves no purpose for the Staff to produce copies of every document used in its review when the Board cannot possibly read through every one, let alone scrutinize them.] Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Sys. Energy Res., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site; Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), CLI-06-20, 64 NRC 15, 21-22 (2006). Boards in mandatory hearings should be able to look to the Staff for assistance in understanding the basis for each major finding in the SER and EIS and in identifying appropriate areas of inquiry. Id. at 21.

A mandatory hearing Board request that the Staff produce a comprehensive, freshly prepared, narrative report covering the entire SER and FEIS would require an unnecessary duplication of effort; instead, mandatory hearing Boards should review the Staff documents (together with additional materials requested), and then tailor requests for additional information to those areas for which the Boards need additional information in order to understand the Staff's review documents. Id. at 23. However, mandatory hearing Boards, if they choose, may require the Staff to provide indexes as a device to simplify the Board's review of the Staff's documents. Id.

It is reasonable for a mandatory hearing Board, in order to help focus its review, to request certain information concerning the Staff's use of regulatory guidance – in particular, if a regulatory guide was used and not referred to in the SER and EIS, or if a potentially applicable guide was not used. Id. at 23.

Mandatory hearing Boards may probe the Staff for additional testimony or record material when necessary to ascertain whether the Staff had reasonable bases for the Staff's final determinations. However, an uncontested, mandatory hearing need not, and should not, commence with a requirement that the Staff identify, explain, and resolve its preliminary differences of opinion (i.e., by producing the Staff's predecisional documents). Exceptional circumstances should not be presumed. Id. at 25. Because the Board's role in an uncontested proceeding is somewhat analogous to the function of an appellate court, applying the 'substantial evidence' test, the Board need not demand all possible views and facts be put into the record or presume preliminary views to raise matters of controversy about the bases for the final Staff determinations. Rather, the "boards should decide simply whether the safety and environmental record is 'sufficient.'" Id.

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is an independent federal advisory committee that is not under the Staff's control. While a mandatory hearing Board may ask the Staff to produce relevant ACRS documents that it has reviewed, the Board should not ask the Staff to obtain additional ACRS documents that it has not reviewed, as it is not clear that they are germane given that the Board's review is intended to ensure that the Staff's conclusions have "reasonable support in logic and fact." Id. at 25-26.

#### **3.1.2.4 Scope of Authority in License Amendment Proceedings**

A Licensing Board's power in a license amendment proceeding is limited by the scope of the proceeding. Thus, in considering an amendment to transfer part

ownership of a facility, a Licensing Board held that questions concerning the legality of transferring some ownership interest in advance of Commission action on the amendment was outside its jurisdiction and should be pursued under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B (dealing with enforcement) instead. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 386 (1978).

In a license amendment proceeding, a Licensing Board has only limited jurisdiction. The Board may admit a party's issues for hearing only insofar as those issues are within the scope of matters outlined in the Commission's notice of hearing on the licensing action. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-739, 18 NRC 335, 339 (1983), citing, Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287, 289 n.6 (1979) and Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170-71 (1976). A Licensing Board only has jurisdiction over those matters which are within the scope of the amendment application. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-19, 28 NRC 145, 152-53 (1988).

A claim that a license amendment applicant's current license should be revoked due to violations of that license is an enforcement matter that is outside the scope of the license amendment proceeding. Safety Light Corp., LBP-04-25, 60 NRC 516, 529-30 (2004).

### **3.1.2.5 Scope of Authority to Rule on Petitions and Motions**

Merely by having been constituted, a Licensing Board has authority to entertain petitions (10 CFR § 2.309(a)) (formerly § 2.714(a)). To grant a petition, however, the Licensing Board must have been given the requisite authority specifically, either under Commission regulations or through one of the five notices or orders issued in relation to the proceeding in question.

A 10 CFR Part 70 materials license is an "order" which under 10 CFR § 2.318(b) (formerly § 2.717(b)) may be "modified" by a Licensing Board delegated authority to consider a 10 CFR Part 50 operating license. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-79-24, 10 NRC 226, 228 (1979).

A Licensing Board has jurisdiction to review an order of the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation which relates to a matter which could be admitted as a late-filed contention in a pending proceeding. The order does not have to be related to a currently admitted contention in the proceeding. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-19, 28 NRC 145, 150-52 (1988), citing, 10 CFR §2.318(b) (formerly § 2.717(b)).

Licensing Boards lack authority to consider a motion for an Order to Show Cause pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202 and 2.206. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-80-15, 11 NRC 765, 767 (1980).

Licensing Boards also lack authority to consider claims for damages. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-80-15, 11 NRC 765, 767 (1980).

In NRC proceedings in which a hearing is not mandatory but depends on the filing of a successful intervention petition, an "intervention" Licensing Board has authority only to pass upon intervention petitions. If a petition is granted, thus giving rise to a full hearing, a second Licensing Board, which may or may not be composed of the same members as the first Board, is established to conduct the hearing. Wisconsin Electric Power Company (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-23, 8 NRC 71, 73 (1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-30-A, 14 NRC 364, 366 (1981). Thus, an "intervention" hearing board established solely for the purpose of passing on petitions to intervene does not have the additional authority to proceed beyond that assignment and to entertain filings going to the merits of matters in controversy between the petitioners and the applicant. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-400, 5 NRC 1175, 1177-78 (1977); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-91-18, 33 NRC 394, 395-96 (1991). An "intervention" board cannot, for example, rule on motions for summary disposition. Stanislaus, 5 NRC at 1177-1178.

A Licensing Board may entertain a request for declaratory relief. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-321, 3 NRC 293, 298 (1976), aff'd, CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977). This power stems from the fact that the Commission itself may grant declaratory relief under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554(e), and delegate that power to presiding officers. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c)(9). Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977). In this vein, Licensing Boards have the authority to issue declaratory orders to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Projects 3 & 5), LBP-77-15, 5 NRC 643 (1977). A Licensing Board has utilized the following test to determine whether a genuine controversy exists sufficient to support the issuance of a declaratory order: (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again. Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-89-11, 29 NRC 306, 314-16 (1989), citing, SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 109 (1978), quoting, Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam).

A Licensing Board established for an operating license proceeding has authority to consider materials license questions where matters regarding a materials license bear on issues in the operating license application. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-79-24, 10 NRC 226, 228 (1979).

If a Licensing Board determines that a participation agreement prohibiting the flow of electricity in interstate commerce is inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the Board may impose license conditions despite a Federal court injunction prohibiting participant from violating the agreement. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 577 (1979).

The power to grant an exemption from the regulations has not been delegated to Licensing Boards and such Boards, therefore, lack the authority to grant exemptions. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-77-35, 5 NRC 1290, 1291 (1977).

A licensing board has authority to condition termination on the licensee's payment of fees and costs to the intervenors but the prospect of a second proceeding, standing alone, is not legally cognizable harm that would warrant payment of fees and costs. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-99-27, 50 NRC 45, 51 (1999).

Where the Staff has acted to modify or withdraw a previously issued order during the pendency of an adjudicatory proceeding regarding that order or to enter into an agreement to take such actions to settle a proceeding, its actions are subject to review by the presiding officer. Oncology Services Corp., LBP-94-2, 39 NRC 11 (1994).

A presiding officer has jurisdiction to consider a timely motion for reconsideration filed after the issuance of an initial decision but before the timely filing of appeals. The Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 93-95 (1995). But, unless a Licensing Board takes action on a motion seeking reconsideration or clarification of a decision disposing of all matters before it, the Board does not retain jurisdiction normally lost, and the motion is effectively denied. Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), LBP-83-15, 17 NRC 476, 477 (1983).

A reconstituted Licensing Board is legally competent to rule on all matters within its jurisdiction, including a party's objections to any orders issued by the original Licensing Board prior to the reconstitution of the Board. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-38A, 24 NRC 819, 821 (1986).

A Licensing Board does not have the jurisdiction to refer NRC examination cheaters for criminal prosecution, nor does it have authority over formulation of generic Staff procedures for administering NRC examinations. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 302, 372 (1982).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board may not place itself in the position of deciding whether the NRC Staff should be permitted to refer information obtained through discovery to NRC investigatory staff offices. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-95-16, 42 NRC 221, 225 (1995).

### **3.1.2.6 Scope of Authority to Reopen the Record**

If a Licensing Board believes that circumstances warrant reopening the record for receipt of additional evidence, it has discretion to take that course of action. Where the Board was faced with an insufficient record for summary disposition, and knew of a document which had not been introduced into evidence which would support summary disposition, it was not improper to request submission of the document in support of a motion for summary disposition. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 752 (1977).

A Licensing Board is empowered to reopen a proceeding at least until the issuance of its initial decision, but no later than either the filing of an appeal or the expiration of the period during which the Commission can exercise its right to review the record. See 10 CFR §§ 2.318(a), 2.713(a), 2.319(m), 2.341 (formerly §§ 2.717(a),

2.760(a), 2.718(j), 2.786); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-699, 16 NRC 1324, 1326, 1327 (1982); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-12, 17 NRC 466, 467 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-25, 17 NRC 681, 683 (1983); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 646 (1983), citing, Three Mile Island, supra, 16 NRC at 1324. Until an appeal from an initial decision has been filed, jurisdiction to rule on a motion to reopen lies with the Licensing Board. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-726, 17 NRC 755, 757 (1983); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 646 (1983). Where no appeal from an initial decision has been filed within the time allowed and the period for sua sponte review has not expired, jurisdiction to rule on a motion to reopen lies with the Licensing Board. Limerick, supra, 17 NRC at 757.

The Licensing Board lacks the jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen the record after a petition to review a final order has been filed. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-00-25, 52 NRC 355, 357 (2000), n.3, citing, Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-726, 17 NRC 755 (1983); cf. Curators of the University of Missouri (TRUMP-S Project), CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 93-94 (1995).

An adjudicatory board does not have jurisdiction to reopen a record with respect to an issue when finality has attached to the resolution of that issue. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the Board has another discrete issue pending before it. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-513, 8 NRC 694, 695 (1978).

Until a license has actually been issued, the Commission (as opposed to the Licensing Board) retains jurisdiction to reopen a closed case. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 35-36 (2006) (citing Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1 (1993); Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-1, 35 NRC 1 (1992)).

### **3.1.2.7 Scope of Authority to Rule on Contentions**

The Commission's delegation of authority to a Licensing Board to conduct any necessary proceedings pursuant to 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart C includes the authority to permit an applicant for license amendment to file contentions in a hearing requested by other parties even though the applicant may have waived its own right to a hearing. There are no specific regulations which govern the filing of contentions by an applicant. However, since an applicant is a party to a proceeding, it should have the same rights as other parties to the proceeding, which include the right to submit contentions, 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly § 2.714), and the right to file late contentions under certain conditions, 10 CFR § 2.309(a) (formerly § 2.714(a)). Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-84-42, 20 NRC 1296, 1305-1307 (1984).

Where a Licensing Board has retained jurisdiction following issuance of initial decision to conduct further proceedings, it has jurisdiction to consider the admissibility of new contentions which are not related to any matter previously litigated. Zimmer, supra, 17 NRC at 467.

Pursuant to § 2.309(a)-(f) (formerly § 2.714(a)), a Licensing Board is not authorized to admit conditionally, for any reason, a contention that falls short of meeting specificity requirements. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 467 (1982), vacated in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).

Failure to meet the standards for admitting late-filed contentions does not, under NRC rules, leave the Board free to impose an array of sanctions of varying severity. On the contrary, under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)), the rules specify that impermissibly late-filed contentions “will not be entertained.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 7 (2001).

Jurisdiction to rule on the admission of contentions, which were filed prior to final agency action and which have never been litigated, rests with the Licensing Board. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-58, 18 NRC 640, 646 (1983).

An intervenor's failure to particularize certain contentions or even, arguendo, to pursue settlement negotiations, when taken by itself, does not warrant the out-of-hand dismissal of intervenors' proposed contentions. There is a sharp contrast between an intervenor's refusal to provide information requested by another party on discovery, even after a Licensing Board order compelling its disclosure, and the asserted failure of intervenors to take advantage of additional opportunity to narrow and particularize their contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-75, 16 NRC 986, 990 (1982).

### **3.1.2.8 Authority of Licensing Board to Raise Sua Sponte Issues**

A Licensing Board has the power to raise sua sponte any significant environmental or safety issue in operating license hearings, although this power should be used sparingly in OL cases. 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-8, 21 NRC 516, 519 (1985). The Board's independent responsibilities under NEPA may require it to raise environmental issues not raised by a party. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-380, 5 NRC 572 (1977).

The Board has the prerogative, under the regulations, to consider raising serious issues sua sponte and the responsibility of reviewing materials filed before it to determine whether the parties have brought such an issue before. This is particularly necessary when an issue is excluded from the proceeding because it has not been properly raised rather than because it has been rejected on its merits. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-79, 16 NRC 1116, 1119 (1982).



Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a) and the Commission's Memorandum dated June 30, 1981, a Licensing Board may raise a safety issue sua sponte when sufficient evidence of a serious safety matter has been presented that would prompt reasonable minds to inquire further. Very specific findings are not required since they could cause prejudgment problems. The Board need only give its reasons for raising the problem. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36, 14 NRC 691, 697 (1981).

Having found that adjudication of contentions was not "required in the public interest" during its review of a proposed settlement agreement, the Board concluded that settlement of those same contentions did not raise serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security concerns warranting sua sponte review under 10 C.F.R. § 2.340(a). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-18, 63 NRC 830, 843-44 (2006).

The regulations limiting the Board's authority to raise sua sponte issues restrict its right to consider safety, environmental or defense matters not raised by parties but do not restrict its responsibility to oversee the fairness and efficiency of proceedings and to raise important procedural questions on its own motion. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-24A, 15 NRC 661, 664 (1982).

Because Boards may raise important safety and environmental issues sua sponte, they should review even untimely contentions to determine that they do not raise important issues that should be considered sua sponte. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-19B, 15 NRC 627, 631-32 (1982).

A Licensing Board's inherent power to shape the course of a proceeding should not be confused with its limited authority under 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a) to shape the issues of the proceeding.

The latter is not a substitute for or a means to accomplish the former. Sua sponte authority is not a case management tool. Accordingly, the apparent need to expedite a procedure or monitor the Staff's progress in identifying and/or evaluating potential safety or environmental issues are not factors that authorize a Board to exercise its sua sponte authority. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-36, 14 NRC 1111, 1113 (1981).

The incompleteness of Staff review of an issue is not in itself sufficient to satisfy the standard for sua sponte review. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-8, 21 NRC 516, 519 (1985), citing, Comanche Peak, supra, 14 NRC at 1114. However, a Board may take into account the pendency and likely efficacy of NRC Staff non-adjudicatory review in determining whether or not to invoke its sua sponte review authority. South Texas, supra, 21 NRC at 519-523, citing, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-20, 16 NRC 109 (1982), reconsideration denied, CLI-83-4, 17 NRC 75 (1983), and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-75, 18 NRC 1254 (1983).

A Board decision to review a proposal concerning the withholding of a portion of the record from the public is an appropriate exercise of Board authority and is not subject to the sua sponte limitation on Board authority. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-5A, 15 NRC 216 (1982) and LBP-82-12, 15 NRC 354 (1982). Because exercise of this authority does not give rise to a sua sponte issue, notification of the Commission is not required.

The Board's authority to consider substantive issues is limited by the sua sponte rule, but the same limitation does not apply to its consideration of procedural matters, such as confidentiality issues arising under 10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790). While it would not always be appropriate for the Board to take up proprietary matters on its own, where the Board finds the Staff's review unsatisfactory, sua sponte review of those matters may be necessary. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-6, 15 NRC 281, 288 (1982).

A Board may raise a procedural question, such as whether a portion of its record should be treated as proprietary or released to the public, regardless of whether the full scope of the question has been raised by a party. Point Beach, supra.

Information that will help the Board decide whether to raise a sua sponte issue should be made available to the Board. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-9, 15 NRC 339, 340 (1982).

Board inquiries related to admitted contentions do not create sua sponte matters requiring notification of the Commission. That the Board gives advance notification to a party that related questions may be asked does not convert those questions into sua sponte issues requiring notification of the Commission. Nor is notification required when a Board has already completed action on a procedural matter and no further obligation has been imposed on a party. The sua sponte rule is intended to preclude major, substantive inquiries not related to subject matter already before the Board, not minor procedural matters. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-12, 15 NRC 354, 356 (1982).

NRC regulations give an adjudicatory board the discretion to raise on its own motion any serious safety or environmental matter. See 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a). This discretionary authority necessarily places on the board the burden of scrutinizing the record of an operating license proceeding to satisfy itself that no such matters exist. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983). See Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-611, 12 NRC 301, 309 (1980). An adjudicatory board's decision to exercise its sua sponte authority must be based on evidence contained in the record. A board may not engage in discovery in an attempt to obtain information upon which to establish the existence of a serious safety or environmental issue. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 7 (1986).

A Licensing Board may, under 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a), raise and decide, sua sponte, a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter, should it determine such a serious issue exists. The limitations

imposed by regulation on a Board's review of a matter not in contest (and therefore not subject to the more intense scrutiny afforded by the adversarial process) do not override a Board's authority to invoke 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a). The Commission may, however, on a case-by-case basis relieve the Boards of any obligation to pursue uncontested issues. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1112 and n.58 (1983), citing, Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 248 n.7 (1978).

A Licensing Board has ruled that exercise of its sua sponte authority to examine certain serious issues is not dependent on either (1) the presence of any party to raise or pursue those issues in the proceeding, or (2) the particular stage of the proceeding. Thus, the Licensing Board determined that it could properly retain jurisdiction over an intervenor's admissible contentions even though the intervenor had been dismissed from the proceeding prior to the issuance of a notice of hearing. Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-32, 32 NRC 181, 185-86 (1990), overruled, CLI-91-13, 34 NRC 185, 188-89 (1991). The Commission made clear that a Licensing Board does not have the authority to raise a sua sponte issue in an operating license or operating license amendment proceeding where all parties in the proceeding have withdrawn or been dismissed. If the Board believes that serious safety issues remain to be addressed, it should refer those issues to the NRC Staff for review. Turkey Point, supra, 34 NRC at 188-89.

The NRC's regulations do not contain provisions conferring jurisdiction on Licensing Boards to impose fines sua sponte. The powers granted to a Licensing Board by 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718) to conduct a fair and impartial hearing according to law, to take appropriate action to avoid delay, and to maintain order do not include the power to impose a civil penalty. 10 CFR § 2.205(a) confers the authority to institute a civil penalty proceeding only upon the NRC's Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, and the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement. A Licensing Board becomes involved in a civil penalty proceeding only if the person charged with a violation requests a hearing. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-31, 16 NRC 1236, 1238 (1982); see 10 CFR § 2.205(f). It is appropriate for the Board to address issues concerning the confidentiality of a portion of its record, regardless of whether the issue was raised by a party. Such an action is within the Board's general authority to respond to a "proposal" that a document be treated as proprietary and is not a prohibited sua sponte action of the Board. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-5A, 15 NRC 216, 220 (1982); LBP-82-6, 15 NRC 281 (1982); and LBP-82-12, 15 NRC 354 (1982).

### **3.1.2.9 Expedited Proceedings; Timing of Rulings**

Commission policies seek to instill discipline in the hearing process and ensure a prompt yet fair resolution of contested issues in adjudicatory proceedings. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 381 (2001), (citing, Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18 (1998)); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-27,

54 NRC 385, 390-91 (2001). This is in keeping with the Administrative Procedure Act's directive that agencies should complete hearings and reach a final decision "within a reasonable time". Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 381 (2001), (citing, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c)).

The Commission may authorize the Board to use appropriate procedural devices to expedite a decision. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-5, 57 NRC 279, 284 (2003), declining review of LBP-03-04, 57 NRC 69 (2003).

Licensing Boards have broad discretion regarding the appropriate time for ruling on petitions and motions filed with them. Absent clear prejudice to the petitioner from a Licensing Board's deferral of a decision on a pending motion, an Appeal Board is constrained from taking any action since the standard of review of a Licensing Board's deferral of action is whether such deferral is a clear abuse of discretion. Detroit Edison Company (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426 (1977).

A Licensing Board has authority under 10 CFR § 2.307(a) (formerly § 2.711(a)) to extend or lessen the times provided in the Rules for taking any action. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-574, 11 NRC 7, 13 (1980). However, the Commission discourages extensions of deadlines absent extreme circumstances, for fear that an accumulation of seemingly benign deadline extensions will in the end substantially delay the outcome of the case. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-1, 49 NRC 1, 1 (1999).

As a general matter, when expedition is necessary, the Commission's Rules of Practice are sufficiently flexible to permit it by ordering such steps as shortening, even drastically in some circumstances, the various time limits for the party's filings and limiting the time for, and type of, discovery. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1263 (1982), citing, 10 CFR § 2.307 (formerly § 2.711; Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 251 (1986).

Procedures for expediting a proceeding, however, should not depart substantially from those set forth in the Rules of Practice, and steps to expedite a case are appropriate only upon a party's good cause showing that expedition is essential. Point Beach, supra, 16 NRC at 1263, citing, 10 CFR § 2.307 (formerly § 2.711).

Under extraordinary circumstances, it is appropriate for the Licensing Board to address questions to an applicant even before formal action has been completed concerning admission of an intervenor into a license amendment proceeding. These questions need not be considered sua sponte issues requiring notification of the Commission. The Board may also authorize a variety of special filings in order to expedite a proceeding and may even grant petitioners the right to utilize discovery even before they are admitted as parties. However, special sensitivity must be shown to intervenor's procedural rights when the cause for haste in a proceeding was a voluntary decision by the applicant concerning both the timing and content of its request for a license amendment. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.

(Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-39, 14 NRC 819, 821, 824 (1981); LBP-81-55, 14 NRC 1017 (1981).

Under exceptional circumstances, Board questions may precede discovery by the parties. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-44, 14 NRC 850, 851 (1981).

When time pressures cause special difficulties for intervenors, discovery against intervenors may be restricted in order to prevent interference with their preparation for a hearing. A presiding officer has discretionary power to authorize specially tailored proceedings in the interest of expedition. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-46, 14 NRC 862, 863 (1981).

When quick action is required on a license amendment, it is appropriate to interpret petitioner's safety concerns broadly and to admit a single broad contention that will permit wide-ranging discovery within the limited time without the need to decide repeated motions for late filing of new contentions. But the contentions must still relate to the license amendment which is requested. Petitioner may not challenge the safety of activities already permitted under the license. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-45, 14 NRC 853, 860 (1981).

Though the Board may admit a single broad contention in the interest of expedition, its liberal policy towards admissions may be rescinded when the time pressure justifying it is relieved. However, issues already raised under the liberal policy are not retroactively affected by its rescission. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-19A, 15 NRC 623, 625 (1982).

In Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2); Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-12A, 15 NRC 515 (1982), the intervention petitioner filed a motion requesting permission to observe the emergency planning exercise scheduled to be held two days later for the Indian Point Facility. The Licensing Board ruled that, although 10 CFR § 2.707 (formerly § 2.741) directs that a party first seek discovery of this sort from another party and that only after a 30-day opportunity to respond can the party apply to the Board for relief, in this case, strict adherence to the rule would not be required. Where, as here, the exigencies of the case do not permit a 30-day response period, procedural delicacy will not be allowed to frustrate the purpose of the hearing -- especially where no party is seriously disadvantaged by expediting the action. Indian Point, 15 NRC at 518. Furthermore where the issue of adequacy of emergency planning was clearly an issue to be fully investigated and the observations of the potential intervenors the next day would be useful to the Board in its deliberations, the Board would deny licensee's request for stay and certification to the Commission, since to grant these motions would render the issue moot. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2); Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-12B, 15 NRC 523, 525 (1982).

### **3.1.2.10 Licensing Board's Relationship with the NRC Staff**

A Licensing Board may not delegate its obligation to decide issues in controversy to the Staff. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 &

2), ALAB-298, 2 NRC 730, 737 (1975); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-2, 19 NRC 36, 210 (1984), (rev'd on other grounds, ALAB-793, 20 NRC 1591, 1627 [1984]), citing, Perry, supra, 2 NRC at 737.

The rule against delegation applies even to issues a Licensing Board raises on its own motion in an operating license proceeding. Byron, supra, 19 NRC at 211, citing, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3), CLI-74-28, 8 AEC 7, 8-9 (1974). The rule against delegation applies, in particular, to quality assurance issues. Byron, supra, 19 NRC at 212, citing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358 (1973). However, where there is nothing remaining to be adjudicated on a quality assurance issue, the adequacy of a 100 percent reinspection of a contractor's work may be delegated to the Staff to consider post-hearing. Byron, supra, 19 NRC at 216-17.

On the other hand, with respect to emergency planning, the Licensing Board will accept predictive findings and post-hearing verification by Staff of the formulation and implementation of aspects of emergency plans. Byron, supra, 19 NRC at 212, 251-52, citing, Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1103-04 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 569, 594 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 318, 346, 347, 348-349, 361-362 (1991). With respect to emergency planning it is "established NRC practice that, where appropriate, the Licensing Board may refer minor safety matters not pertinent to its basic findings to the NRC staff for posthearing resolution, and may make predictive findings regarding emergency planning that are subject to posthearing verification." Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-96-8, 44 NRC 107, 108 (1996), citing Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 331 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991). But only matters not material to the basic findings necessary for issuance of a license may be referred to the NRC staff for post hearing resolution -- e.g., minor procedural or verification questions. The "posthearing" approach should be employed sparingly and only in clear cases. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-96-8, 44 NRC 107, 108 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In a construction permit proceeding, the Licensing Board has a duty to assure that the NRC Staff's review was adequate even as to matters which are uncontested. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 774 (1977). In this vein, a more recent case reiterating the rule that a Licensing Board may not delegate its obligation to decide significant issues to the NRC Staff is Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 318 (1978).

A Licensing Board does not have the power, under 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718) or any other regulation, to direct the Staff in the performance of its independent responsibilities. New England Power Co. (NEP, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271, 279-80 (1978); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1263 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). See Rockwell International Corp.

(Rocketdyne Division), ALAB-925, 30 NRC 709, 721-22 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-90-5, 31 NRC 337 (1990). See also U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground), LBP-05-9, 61 NRC 218, 222 (2005) (citing Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 74 (2004)) (In materials licensing proceedings conducted under informal procedural rules, a presiding officer's jurisdiction does not extend to superintending the Staff's discharge of its review functions). Thus, unless the Commission has made an extraordinary grant of power to the Board, the Board has no jurisdiction over the Staff's nonadjudicatory functions. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 71 (2004).

Whether a Board may modify an order or action of the Staff depends on the relationship of the order to the subject matter of a pending proceeding. If closely related, a Staff order may not be issued, or is subject to a stay until resolution of the contested issue. If far removed from the subject matter of a pending proceeding, a Staff order should not be considered by the Board. Finally, there are matters which are properly the subject of independent Staff action, but which bear enough relationship to the subject matter of a pending proceeding that review by the Licensing Board is also appropriate. Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. and N.Y. State Energy Research and Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), LBP-82-36, 15 NRC 1075, 1082 (1982), citing, Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-79-24, 10 NRC 226, 229-230 (1979).

Issues relating to NRC Staff compliance with and implementation of a Licensing Board order, rather than the order itself, should be presented to the Licensing Board in the first instance, rather than to the Appeal Board. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-684, 16 NRC 162, 165 (1982).

The docketing and review activities of the Staff are not under the supervision of the Licensing Board. Only in the most unusual circumstances should a Licensing Board interfere in the review activities of the Staff. Philadelphia Electric Company (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-23, 10 NRC 220, 223-24 (1979). See also Jefferson Proving Ground, LBP-05-9, 61 NRC at 222 (citing Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 74 (2004)) (In materials licensing proceedings conducted under informal procedural rules, a presiding officer's jurisdiction does not extend to superintending the Staff's discharge of its review functions).

The Staff produces, among other documents, the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and the Draft and Final Environmental Statements (DES and FES). The studies and analyses which result in these reports are made independently by the Staff, and Licensing Boards have no rule or authority in their preparation. The Board does not have any supervisory authority over that part of the application review process that has been entrusted to the Staff. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 48-49 (1983), citing, New England Power Co. (NEP Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271 (1978). See Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 206-07 (1978).

In a materials license proceeding conducted under informal procedural rules, where the Staff delayed its technical review of a decommissioning-related proposal

pending a licensee's submission of relevant information requested by the Staff, a presiding officer found that he was foreclosed from either calling upon the Staff to justify its approach or directing the Licensee to furnish a full explanation regarding its default in furnishing to the Staff the information sought from it. Jefferson Proving Ground, LBP-05-9, 61 NRC at 222.

In a materials license proceeding conducted under informal procedural rules, where the presiding officer expressed concern about extended delay in a licensee's submission of a decommissioning plan, the presiding officer commented in dicta that he had not undertaken examination of the license to determine whether the Licensee might be in violation of some license condition (related to decommissioning), because any inquiry along those lines would be in the first instance the responsibility of the Office of Enforcement. Id. at 222 n.3.

The decision whether to approve a plan for construction during the period in which certain design engineering and construction management, and possibly construction responsibilities, are being transferred from one contractor to another is initially within the province of the NRC Staff. But because of the safety significance of the work to be performed, and its clear bearing on whether, or on what terms, a project should be licensed, and on the resolution of certain existing contentions, consideration of the adequacy of, and controls to be exercised by, the applicants and NRC Staff over such work falls well within the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-54, 14 NRC 918, 919-20 (1981).

Adjudicatory boards do not possess the authority to direct the holding of hearings following the issuance of a construction permit, nor have boards been delegated the authority to direct the Staff in the performance of its administrative functions. Adjudicatory boards concerned about the conduct of the Staff's functions should bring the matter to the Commission's attention or certify the matter to the Commission. As part of its inherent supervisory authority, the Commission has the authority to direct the Staff's performance of administrative functions, even over matters in adjudication. Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 and 4), CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514, 516-17 (1980). Cf. Jefferson Proving Ground, LBP-05-9, 61 NRC at 219, 223-24 (calling Commission's attention to status of a materials licensing proceeding where the presiding officer found the Staff's review was not moving forward). Ordinarily, Licensing Boards should not decide whether a given action significantly affects the environment without the record support provided by the Staff's environmental review. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312, 330 (1981).

Where the Staff scheduled a closed meeting with a license amendment applicant to discuss the applicant's security submittal, the Board lacked jurisdiction to order the Staff to grant access to the meeting to a hearing petitioner's representatives. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 74 (2004).

Where the Licensing Board finds that the Staff cannot demonstrate a reasonable cause for its delay in submitting environmental statements, the Board may issue a ruling noting the unjustified failure to meet a publication schedule and then proceed



to hear other matters or suspend proceedings until the Staff files the necessary documents. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 207 (1978).

A Licensing Board should not call upon independent consultants to supplement an adjudicatory record except in that most extraordinary situation in which it is demonstrated that the Board cannot otherwise reach an informed decision on the issue involved. Part 2 of 10 CFR gives the Staff a dominant role in assessing the radiological health and safety aspects of facilities involved in licensing proceedings. Before an adjudicatory board resorts to outside experts of their own, they should give the NRC Staff every opportunity to explain, correct and supplement its testimony. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140, 1146, 1156 (1981), review declined, CLI-82-10, 15 NRC 1377 (1982).

Applying the criteria of Summer, supra, 14 NRC at 1156, 1163, a Licensing Board determined that it had the authority to call an expert witness to focus on matters the Staff had apparently ignored in a motion for summary disposition of a health effects contention. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 442-43 (1984), reconsid. on other grounds, LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984).

After an order authorizing the issuance of a construction permit has become final agency action, and prior to the commencement of any adjudicatory proceeding on any operating license application, the exclusive regulatory power with regard to the facility lies with the Staff. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-381, 5 NRC 582 (1977). Under such circumstances, an adjudicatory board has no authority with regard to the facility or the Staff's regulation of it. In the same vein, after a full term, full power operating license has been issued and the order authorizing it has become final agency action, no further jurisdiction over the license lies with any adjudicatory board. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-451, 6 NRC 889, 891 n.3 (1977); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-408, 5 NRC 1383, 1386 (1977); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 386, aff'd, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978).

For a Licensing Board to accept unsupported NRC Staff statements would be to abrogate its ultimate responsibility and would be substituting the Staff's judgment for its own. On ultimate issues of fact, the Board must see the evidence from which to reach its own independent conclusions. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-114, 16 NRC 1909, 1916 (1982).

It is the Commission's policy that the NRC Staff has primary responsibility for technical fact-finding on uncontested matters. Licensing Boards should defer to the NRC Staff on such uncontested matters unless the Staff's review was incomplete or inadequately explained in the record. Exelon Generation Co., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 64 NRC 460, 492 (2006).

Should a Staff review demonstrate the need for corrective action, the decision on the adequacy of such a corrective action is one that the Licensing Board may not delegate. Case law suggests that even in cases where a Board resolves an issue in

an applicant's favor leaving the Staff to perform what is believed to be a confirmatory review, the Staff should inform the Board should it discover that corrective action is warranted. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 520 n.21 (1983).

A licensing board faced with a NEPA review by the Staff must independently determine such questions as whether the NEPA process has been complied with, what the final balance of competing factors is, and whether the license or permit should be issued. In doing so, however, the Board must not undertake its own independent research or duplicate staff analysis that has already been done. The Board may only second guess the Staff's underlying technical or factual findings where the Board determines that either (1) the Staff review was incomplete or (2) the record does not sufficiently explain the Staff's findings. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 45 (2005).

A Board's urging of settlement discussions and its suggestion of a possible route to settlement, even when the Board's jurisdiction over the matter is in question, is not an impermissible Board direction to the Staff regarding how the Staff is to perform its nonadjudicatory regulatory functions. By urging settlement and suggesting a possible approach, the Board is merely making a non-binding suggestion to the Staff; it is in no way "directing" the Staff to settle the case or to do so in a particular manner. Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 72 n. 14 (2006)

### **3.1.2.11 Licensing Board's Relationship with States and Other Agencies (including CEQ)**

The requirements of State law are for State bodies to determine, and are beyond the jurisdiction of NRC adjudicatory bodies. Northern States Power Company (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), ALAB-464, 7 NRC 372, 375 (1978), citing, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 748 (1977). In this case, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission decided that some of the applicants were "foreign corporations" and could not construct the Tyrone facility. Although the Appeal Board would not question the State's ruling, it remanded the case to reconsider financial and technical qualifications in light of the changes in legal relationships of the co-applicants that resulted from the State determination. See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 899 (1985).

In the absence of a controlling contrary judicial precedent, the Commission will defer to a State Attorney General's interpretation of State law concerning the designation of representatives of a State participating in an NRC proceeding as an interested State. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-862, 25 NRC 144, 148 (1987).

The Commission lacks the authority to disqualify a State official or an entire State agency based on an assertion that they have prejudged fundamental issues in a proceeding involving the transfer of jurisdiction to a State to regulate nuclear waste products. A party must pursue such due process claims under State law. State of Illinois (Section 274 Agreement), CLI-88-6, 28 NRC 75, 88 (1988).

A Licensing Board does not have jurisdiction in a construction permit proceeding under the Atomic Energy Act to review the decision of the Rural Electrification Administration to guarantee a construction loan to a part owner of the facility being reviewed. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 267-68 (1978).

It would be improper for a Licensing Board to entertain a collateral attack upon any action or inaction of sister Federal agencies on a matter over which the Commission is totally devoid of any jurisdiction. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1991 (1982). Thus, a Licensing Board refused to review whether FEMA complied with its own agency regulations in performing its emergency planning responsibilities. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 499 (1986). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-89-1, 29 NRC 5, 18-19 (1989).

As an independent regulatory agency, the Commission does not consider itself legally bound by substantive regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277, 284 n.5 (1987); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 461 (1987), remanded on other grounds, Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222, 228-29 (9th Cir. 1988).

Although the Commission will take cognizance of activities before other legal tribunals when the facts so warrant, it should not delay its licensing proceedings or withhold a license merely because some other legal tribunal might conceivably take future action which may later impact upon the operation of a nuclear facility. Palo Verde, supra, 16 NRC at 1991, citing, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952, 958 n.5 (1978); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Koshkonong Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-45, 8 AEC 928, 930 (1974); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units and 3), ALAB-171, 7 AEC 37, 39 (1974); and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 748 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 900 (1985); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-46, 22 NRC 830, 832 & n.9 (1985), citing, Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 884-85 (1984); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (Kress Creek Decontamination), LBP-85-48, 22 NRC 843, 847 (1985).

The occurrence of concurrent proceedings before a state regulatory agency is not a sufficient ground for suspension of a reactor license transfer proceeding, when the state agency is reviewing a license transfer under a different statutory authority than the NRC (and its conclusion would therefore not be dispositive of issues before the NRC) and when an insufficient explanation of financial burden reduction on the parties has not been fully explained. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 344 (1999).

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, NRC regulates most uses of source material, including depleted uranium, in the U.S. and U.S. territories. However, NRC does not regulate most of the activities conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, including, for example, testing performed at DOE test sites, or battlefield and direct support activities thereof involving source material by the armed forces outside of U.S. territories. Therefore, NRC did not regulate the testing performed at DOE's Nevada Test Site, nor did it regulate the military use of DU munitions in Operation Desert Storm, Serbia, Okinawa, or Kosovo. NRC cannot grant the petition or take any other regulatory action with respect to military activities that it does not regulate. U.S. Department of Defense Users of Depleted Uranium, DD-01-1, 53 NRC 103, 104 (2001).

Where a statute is administered by several different agencies, courts do not defer to any one agency's particular interpretation. Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. NRC, 194 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

While the Commission agrees that CEQ's regulations are entitled to substantial deference where applicable, the CEQ regulations apply only to federal actions to which NEPA applies. In adopting the CEQ regulations, the Commission stated that the NRC is not bound by those portions of the CEQ's NEPA regulations that have some substantive impact on the way in which the Commission performs its regulatory functions. 49 Fed. Reg. 9352 (Mar. 12, 1984); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-02, 33 NRC 61 (1991).

At least one court has held that CEQ guidelines are not binding on the NRC if not expressly adopted. Limerick Ecology Action, Inc. v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719, 725, 743 (3rd Cir. 1989).

### **3.1.2.12 Conduct of Hearing by Licensing Board**

The Commission has issued a Statement of Policy on the Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452 (1981), which provides guidance to Licensing Boards on the timely completion of proceedings while ensuring a full and fair record. Specific areas addressed include: scheduling of proceedings; consolidation of intervenors; negotiations by parties; discovery; settlement conferences; timely rulings; summary disposition; devices to expedite party presentations, such as pre-filed testimony outlines; round-table expert witness testimony; filing of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law; and scheduling to allow prompt issuance of an initial decision in cases where construction has been completed.

Consistency with the Commission's Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings requires that in general delay be avoided, and specifically that a Board obtain Commission guidance when it becomes apparent that such guidance will be necessary. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-21, 17 NRC 593, 604 (1983).

A Licensing Board has considerable flexibility in regulating the course of a hearing and designating the order of procedure. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 727 (1985), citing, 10 CFR § 2.319(g), 2.324 (formerly § 2.718(e), 2.731). See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1245-46

(1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). Although the Commission's Rules of Practice set forth a general schedule for the filing of proposed findings, a Licensing Board is authorized to alter that schedule or to dispense with it entirely. Limerick, supra, 22 NRC at 727, citing, 10 CFR § 2.712(a) (formerly § 2.754(a)).

The procedures set forth in the Rules of Practice are the only ones that should be used (absent explicit Commission instructions in a particular case) in any licensing proceeding. Point Beach, supra, 16 NRC at 1263, citing, 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718).

A Board must use its powers to assure that the hearing is focused upon the matters in controversy and that the hearing process is conducted as expeditiously as possible, consistent with the development of an adequate decisional record. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1152 (1984). A Board may limit cross-examination, redirect a party's presentation of its case, restrict the introduction of reports and other material into evidence, and require the submittal of all or part of the evidence in written form as long as the parties are not thereby prejudiced. Shoreham, supra, 20 NRC at 1151-1154, 1178.

The scope of cross-examination and the parties that may engage in it in particular circumstances are matters of Licensing Board discretion. Public Service Co. of Indiana Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), Boards may issue a wide variety of procedural orders that are neither expressly authorized nor prohibited by the rules. They may permit intervenors to contend that allegedly proprietary submissions should be released to the public. They may also authorize discovery or an evidentiary hearing that is not relevant to the contentions but is relevant to an important pending procedural issue, such as the trustworthiness of a party to receive allegedly proprietary material. In addition, they may defer depositions to allow both parties to have equal access to extensive evidence which might be adverse to the deponent. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-8, 37 NRC 292, 299-301 (1993). However, discovery and hearings not related to contentions are of limited availability. They may be granted, on motion, if it can be shown that the procedure sought would serve a sufficiently important purpose to justify the associated delay and cost. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-2, 15 NRC 48, 53 (1982).

While a Licensing Board should endeavor to conduct a licensing proceeding in a manner that takes account of special circumstances faced by any participant, the fact that a party may possess fewer resources than others to devote to the proceeding does not relieve that party of its hearing obligations. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1261 n.29 (1982), citing, Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 730 (1985); General Public Utilities Nuclear

Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-14, 23 NRC 553, 558 (1986).

A Commission-ordered discretionary proceeding before a Licensing Board held to resolve issues designated by the Commission, although adjudicatory in form, was not an "on-the-record" proceeding within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act. Therefore, in admitting and formulating contentions and sub-issues and determining order of presentation, the Board would not be bound by 10 CFR Part 2. As to all other matters, 10 CFR Part 2 would control. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 2), Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-81-1, 13 NRC 1, 5 n.4 (1981), clarified, CLI-81-23, 14 NRC 610, 611 (1981).

In order that a proper record is compiled on all matters in controversy, as well as sua sponte issues raised by it, a hearing board has the right and responsibility to take an active role in the examination of witnesses. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 893 (1981); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-802, 21 NRC 490, 498-499 (1985). Although a Board may exercise broad discretion in determining the extent of its direct participation in the hearing, the Board should avoid excessive involvement which could prejudice any of the parties. Perry, *supra*, 21 NRC at 499. This does not mean that a Licensing Board should remain mute during a hearing and ignore deficiencies in the testimony. A Board must satisfy itself that the conclusions expressed by expert witnesses on significant safety or environmental questions have a solid foundation. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 741 (1985), *citing*, South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140, 1156 (1981), review declined, CLI-82-10, 15 NRC 1377 (1982).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), the Licensing Board has the duty to conduct a fair and impartial hearing under the law, which includes the responsibility to impose upon all parties to a proceeding the obligation to disclose all potential conflicts of interest. Fundamental fairness clearly requires disclosure of potential conflicts so as to enable the Board to determine the materiality of such information. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-73, 16 NRC 974, 979 (1982). *See also* Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-8, 37 NRC 292, 299-301 (1993).

A Board may refer a potential conflict of interest matter to the NRC General Counsel, who is responsible for interpreting the NRC's conflict of interest rules. Once the matter has been handled in accordance with NRC internal procedures, a Board will not review independently either the General Counsel's determination on the matter or the judgment on whether any punitive measures are required. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-803, 21 NRC 575, 583-584 (1985).

The Commission also outlined examples of sanctions a Licensing Board may impose on a participant in a proceeding who fails to meet its obligations. A Board can warn the offending party that its conduct will not be tolerated in the future, refuse to consider a filing by that party, deny the right to cross-examine or present evidence, dismiss one or more of its contentions, impose sanctions on its counsel,

or in severe cases dismiss the party from the proceeding. In selecting a sanction, a Board should consider the relative importance of the unmet obligation, potential for harm to other parties or the orderly course of the proceedings, whether the occurrence is part of a pattern of behavior, the importance of any safety or environmental concerns raised by the party, and all of the circumstances (13 NRC 452 at 454). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1928 (1982), citing, Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-26, 36 NRC 191, 194-95 (1992).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly § 2.707), the Licensing Board is empowered, on the failure of a party to comply with any prehearing conference order, "to make such orders in regard to the failure as are just." The just result, where intervenors have not fully availed themselves of an opportunity to further particularize their contentions, is to simply rule on intervenors' contentions as they stand, dismissing those proposed contentions which lack adequate bases and specificity. Shoreham, supra, 16 NRC at 990; Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804, 21 NRC 587, 592 (1985).

### **3.1.2.12.1 Powers/Role of Presiding Officer**

The presiding officer has the duty to conduct a fair and impartial hearing, to maintain order and to take appropriate action to avoid delay. Specific powers of the presiding officer are set forth in 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718). While the Licensing Board has broad discretion as to the manner in which a hearing is conducted, any actions pursuant to that discretion must be supported by a record that indicates that such action was based on a consideration of discretionary factors. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978).

A presiding officer has the authority to rule in the first instance on questions regarding the existence and scope of jurisdiction. Fansteel Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-03-13, 58 NRC 96, 100 (2003).

In a complex proceeding, it is not unfair for the presiding officer to permit parties to rectify fatal deficiencies in their initial written presentations by posing additional written questions to the parties. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-12, 52 NRC 1, 4 (2000).

§ 1204(b) allows the presiding officer to permit cross examination upon motion of a party if the P.O. finds that cross examination is necessary for development of an adequate record.

The presiding officer may encourage the parties to reach a settlement. However, the presiding officer may not participate in any private and confidential settlement negotiations among the parties. Any settlement conference conducted by the presiding officer pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319(b) (formerly § 2.1209(c)) must be open to the public, absent compelling circumstances. Rockwell, supra, 30 NRC at 720-21, aff'd, CLI-90-5, 31 NRC 337, 339-340 (1990).

The presiding officer in a Subpart L informal adjudatory proceeding, who was concerned about an incomplete hearing file, ordered the Staff to include in the hearing file any NRC report (including inspection reports and findings of violation) and any correspondence between the NRC and the licensee during the previous 10 years which the intervenors could reasonably believe to be relevant to any of their admitted areas of concern. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-22, 31 NRC 592, 593 (1990), 10 CFR § 2.1203 (formerly § 2.1231(b)). The presiding officer further directed the Staff to serve all such relevant documents on the parties, since there was no local public document room and the burden on the Staff to provide a copy of publicly available documents to the intervenors' attorney was minuscule. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-27, 32 NRC 40, 42-43 (1990).

Where the Presiding Officer has reviewed an extensive record in detail, with the assistance of a technical advisor, the Commission is generally disinclined to upset his findings and conclusions, particularly on matters involving fact-specific issues or where the affidavits or submissions of experts must be weighed. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 45, 46 (2001). Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 2 (2006).

Exercising his or her general authority to simplify and clarify the issues, a presiding officer can recast what a petitioner sets out as two contentions into one. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 22 (1996). See also Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), LBP-04-14, 60 NRC 40, 57 (2004).

A Presiding Officer lacks authority to adopt a "policy" that invalidates a Commission regulation. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 59 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006).

### **3.1.3 Quorum Requirements for Licensing Board Hearing**

In Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-222, 8 AEC 229 (1974), the Appeal Board attempted to establish elaborate rules to be followed before a Licensing Board may sit with a quorum only, despite the fact that 10 CFR § 2.321(c) (formally § 2.721(d)) requires only a chairman and one technical member to be present. The Appeal Board's ruling in ALAB-222 was reviewed by the Commission in CLI-74-35, 8 AEC 374 (1974). There, the Commission held that hearings by quorum are permitted according to the terms of 10 CFR § 2.321(c) (formally § 2.721(d)) and that inflexible guidelines for invoking the quorum rule are inappropriate. At the same time, the Commission indicated that quorum hearings should be avoided wherever practicable and that absence of a Licensing Board member must be explained on the record (8 AEC 374 at 376).

### **3.1.4 Disqualification of a Licensing Board Member**

#### **3.1.4.1 Motion to Disqualify Adjudicatory Board Member**

The rules governing motions for disqualification or recusal are generally the same for the administrative judiciary as for the judicial branch itself, and the Commission has followed that practice. Suffolk County and State of New York Motion for



Disqualification of Chief Administrative Judge Cotter (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-29A, 20 NRC 385, 386 (1984), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-9, 15 NRC 1363, 1366 (1982); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd. Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), CLI-98-9, 47 NRC 326, 331 (1998).

The general requirements for motions to disqualify are discussed in Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-172, 7 AEC 42 (1974). Based on that discussion and on cases dealing with related matters:

- (1) all disqualification motions must be timely filed. Commonwealth Edison Co. (LaSalle County Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-73-8, 6 AEC 169 (1973); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-101, 6 AEC 60 (1973). In particular, any question of bias of a Licensing Board member must be raised at the earliest possible time or it is waived. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 384-386 (1974); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 247 (1974); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-749, 18 NRC 1195, 1198 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-751, 18 NRC 1313, 1315 (1983), reconsideration denied, ALAB-757, 18 NRC 1356 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-777, 20 NRC 21, 32 (1984). The posture of a proceeding may be considered in evaluating the timeliness of the filing of a motion for disqualification. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-20, 20 NRC 1061, 1081-1082 (1984); Seabrook (ALAB-757), supra, 18 NRC at 1361.
- (2) a disqualification motion must be accompanied by an affidavit establishing the basis for the charge, even if founded on matters of public record. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center), ALAB-225, 8 AEC 379 (1974); Shoreham, supra, 20 NRC at 23, n.1; Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-8515, 22 NRC 184, 185 n.3 (1985).
- (3) a disqualification motion, as with all other motions, must be served on all parties or their attorneys. 10 CFR §§ 2.302(b), 2.323(a) (formerly §§ 2.701(b), 2.730(a)).

Disqualification of a Licensing Board member, either on his own motion or on motion of a party, is addressed in 10 CFR § 2.313 (formerly § 2.704). Strict compliance with Section 2.313(b)(2) (formerly § 2.704(c)) is required. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-630, 13 NRC 84, 86 (1981). A motion to disqualify a member of a Licensing Board is determined by the individual Board member rather than by the full Licensing Board. Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-759, 19 NRC 13, 21 n.26 (1984); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-748, 18 NRC 1184, 1186 n.1 (1983), citing, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-6, 11 NRC 411 (1980). In those cases where a party's motion for disqualification of a Board member is denied and the Board member

does not recuse himself, Section 2.313(b)(2) (formerly 2.704(c)) explicitly requires that the Licensing Board refer the matter to the Appeal Board or the Commission. Allens Creek, supra, 13 NRC at 86; Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-494, 8 NRC 299, 301 n.3 (1978); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-749, 18 NRC 1195, 1198 (1983); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd. Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), CLI-98-9, 47 NRC 326 (1998).

The Appeal Board has stressed that a party moving for disqualification of a Licensing Board member has a manifest duty to be most particular in establishing the foundation for its charge as well as to adhere scrupulously to the affidavit requirement of 10 CFR § 2.313(b)(2) (formerly § 2.704(c)). Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), ALAB-497, 8 NRC 312, 313 (1978). See also Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-672, 15 NRC 677, 680 (1982).

Nevertheless, as to the affidavit requirement, the Appeal Board has held that the movant's failure to file a supporting affidavit is not crucial where the motion to disqualify is founded on a fact to which the Licensing Board itself had called attention and is particularly narrow thereby obviating the need to reduce the likelihood of an irresponsible attack on the Board member in question through use of an affidavit. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-494, 8 NRC 299, 301 n.3 (1978).

An intervenor's status as a party to a proceeding does not of itself give it standing to move for disqualification of a Licensing Board member on another group's behalf. Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-556, 10 NRC 30, 32-33 (1979); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-748, 18 NRC 1184, 1187 (1983). However, a party requesting disqualification may attempt to establish by reference to a Board member's overall conduct that a pervasive climate of prejudice exists in which the party cannot obtain a fair hearing. A party may also attempt to demonstrate a pattern of bias by a Board member toward a class of participants of which it is a member. Seabrook, supra, 18 NRC at 1187-1188. See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-749, 18 NRC 1195, 1199 n.12 (1983).

#### **3.1.4.2 Grounds for Disqualification of Adjudicatory Board Member**

The aforementioned rules (3.1.4.1) with respect to motions to disqualify apply, of course, where the motion is based on the assertion that a Board member is biased. Although a Board member or the entire Board will be disqualified if bias is shown, the mere fact that a Board issued a large number of unfavorable or even erroneous rulings with respect to a particular party is not evidence of bias against that party. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 246 (1974); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-5, 21 NRC 566, 569 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 721, 726 n.60 (1985). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-29, 28 NRC 637, 641 (1988), *aff'd*, ALAB-907, 28 NRC 620 (1988). Rulings and findings made in the course of a proceeding are not in themselves

sufficient reasons to believe that a tribunal is biased for or against a party. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903, 923 (1981).

Standing alone, the failure of an adjudicatory tribunal to decide questions before it with suitable promptness scarcely allows an inference that the tribunal (or a member thereof) harbors a personal prejudice against one litigant or another. Puget Sound Power and Light Company (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-556, 10 NRC 30, 34 (1979).

The disqualification of a Licensing Board member may not be obtained on the ground that he or she committed error in the course of the proceeding at bar or some earlier proceeding. Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), ALAB-614, 12 NRC 347, 348-49 (1980).

In the absence of bias, an Appeal Board member who participated as an adjudicator in a construction permit proceeding for a facility is not required to disqualify himself from participating as an adjudicator in the operating license proceeding for the same facility. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-11, 11 NRC 511 (1980).

An administrative trier of fact is subject to disqualification if:

- (1) he has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in a result;
- (2) he has a personal bias against a participant;
- (3) he has served in a prosecutive or investigative role with regard to the same facts as are in issue;
- (4) he has prejudged factual - as distinguished from legal or policy - issues; or
- (5) he has engaged in conduct which gives the appearance of personal bias or prejudgment of factual issues.

Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal site), ALAB-494, 8 NRC 299, 301 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), ALAB-777, 20 NRC 21, 34 (1984), citing, Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-759, 19 NRC 13, 20 (1984), quoting Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-101, 6 AEC 60, 65 (1973).

The fact that a member of an adjudicatory tribunal may have a crystallized point of view on questions of law or policy is not a basis for his or her disqualification. Shoreham, supra, 20 NRC at 34, citing, Midland, supra, 6 AEC at 66; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power station, Unit 1), LBP-88-29, 28 NRC 637, 641 (1988), aff'd, ALAB-907, 28 NRC 620 (1988).

In its decision in Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-9, 15 NRC 1363, 1365-67 (1982), the Commission made clear that Licensing Board members are governed by the same disqualification standards that apply to Federal judges. Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 20. The current statutory foundation for the disqualification standards is found in 28 U.S.C., Sections 144 and 455. Section 144 requires a Federal judge to step aside if a party to the proceeding files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against that party or in favor of an adverse party. Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 20. Section 455(a) imposes an

objective standard which is whether a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would be led to the conclusion that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 21-22; Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd. Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), CLI-98-9, 47 NRC 326, 331 (1998).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), a judge must disqualify himself in circumstances where, inter alia, he served in private practice as a lawyer in the "matter in controversy." In accord with 28 U.S.C. § 455(e), disqualification in such circumstances may not be waived. Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 21.

In applying the disqualification standards under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2), the Appeal Board concluded that, in the instance of an adjudicator versed in a scientific discipline rather than in the law, disqualification is required if he previously provided technical services to one of the parties in connection with the "matter in controversy." Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 23. To determine whether the construction permit proceeding and the operating license proceeding for the same facility should be deemed the same "matter" for 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(2) purposes, the Appeal Board adopted the "wholly unrelated" test, and found the two to be sufficiently related that the Licensing Board judge should have recused himself. Hope Creek, supra, 19 NRC at 24-25.

An administrative trier of fact is subject to disqualification for the appearance of bias or prejudgment of the factual issues as well as for actual bias or prejudgment. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-672, 15 NRC 677, 680 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, CLI-82-9, 15 NRC 1363, 1364-1365 (1982); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-5, 21 NRC 566, 568 (1985); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd. Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), CLI-98-9, 47 NRC 326 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), LBP-98-11, 47 NRC 302, 330-331 (1998).

Disqualifying bias or prejudice of a trial judge must generally stem from an extra-judicial source even under the objective standard for recusal which requires a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Preliminary assessments, made on the record, during the course of an adjudicatory proceeding, based solely upon application of the decision-maker's judgment to material properly before him in the proceeding, do not compel disqualification as a matter of law. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-9, 15 NRC 1363, 1364-1365 (1982), citing, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); Commonwealth Edison Co. (La Salle County Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-73-8, 6 AEC 169, 170 (1973); In Re International Business Machines Corporation, 618 F.2d 923, 929 (2d Cir. 1980); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-748, 18 NRC 1184, 1187 (1983). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-749, 18 NRC 1195, 1197 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-751, 18 NRC 1313, 1315 (1983), reconsideration denied, ALAB-757, 18 NRC 1356 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 721 (1985).

The fact that a Board member's actions are erroneous, superfluous, or inappropriate does not, without more, demonstrate an extrajudicial bias. Matters are extrajudicial when they do not relate to a Board member's official duties in a case. Rulings, conduct, or remarks of a Board member in response to matters which arise in administrative proceedings are not extrajudicial. Seabrook (ALAB-749), *supra*, 18 NRC at 1200. See also Seabrook (ALAB-748), *supra*, 18 NRC at 1188; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-29, 28 NRC 637, 640-41 (1988), *aff'd*, ALAB-907, 28 NRC 620, 624 (1988).

A judge will not be disqualified on the basis of: occasional use of strong language toward a party or in expressing views on matters arising from the proceeding; or actions which may be controversial or may provoke strong reactions by parties in the proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-5, 21 NRC 566, 569 (1985); Limerick, *supra*, 22 NRC at 721; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-29, 28 NRC 637, 641 (1988), *aff'd*, ALAB-907, 28 NRC 620, 624 (1988).

A letter from a Board judge expressing his opinions to a judge presiding over a related criminal case did not reflect extrajudicial bias since the contents of the letter were based solely on the record developed during the NRC proceeding. The factor to consider is the source of the information, not the forum in which it is communicated. Three Mile Island, *supra*, 21 NRC at 569-570. Such a letter does not violate Canon 3A(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from commenting publicly about a pending or impending proceeding in any court. Canon 3A(6) applies to general public comment, not the transmittal of specific information by a judge to another court. Three Mile Island, *supra*, 21 NRC at 571. Such a letter also does not violate Canon 2B of the Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from lending the prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others and from voluntarily testifying as a character witness. Canon 2B seeks to prevent a judge's testimony from having an undue influence in a trial. Three Mile Island, *supra*, 21 NRC at 570.

Membership in a national professional organization does not perforce disqualify a person from adjudicating a matter to which a local chapter of the organization is a party. Sheffield, *supra*, 8 NRC at 302.

#### **3.1.4.3 Improperly Influencing an Adjudicatory Board Decision**

Where a Licensing Board has been subjected to an attempt to improperly influence the content or timing of its decision, the Board is duty-bound to call attention to that fact promptly on its own initiative. On the other hand, a Licensing Board which has not been subjected to attempts at improper influence need not investigate allegations that such attempts were contemplated or promised. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 102 (1977).

#### **3.1.5 Resignation of a Licensing Board Member**

The Administrative Procedure Act requirement that the official who presides at the reception of evidence must make the recommendation or initial decision (5 U.S.C. § 554(d)) includes an exception for the circumstance in which that official becomes

"unavailable to the agency." When a Licensing Board member resigns from the Commission, he becomes "unavailable" (10 CFR § 2.313(c) (formerly § 2.704(d)). Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 101 (1977). Resignation of a Board member during a proceeding is not, of itself, grounds for declaring a mistrial and starting the proceedings anew. Id. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977) was affirmed generally and on the point cited herein in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1978).

"Unavailability" of a Licensing Board member is dealt with generally in 10 CFR § 2.313(c) (formerly § 2.704(d)).

## **3.2 Export Licensing Hearings**

### **3.2.1 Scope of Export Licensing Hearings**

The export licensing process is an inappropriate forum to consider generic safety questions posed by nuclear power plants. Under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the Commission, in making its export licensing determinations, will consider non-proliferation and safeguards concerns, and not foreign health and safety matters. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Export to South Korea), CLI-80-30, 12 NRC 253, 260-61 (1980); General Electric Co. (Exports to Taiwan), CLI-81-2, 13 NRC 67, 71 (1981).

The focus of section 134 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is on discouraging the continued use of high-enriched uranium as reactor fuel and not its per se prohibition. Transnuclear, Inc., CLI-94-1, 39 NRC 17 (1994); Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-98-10, 47 NRC 333 (1998).

### **3.2.2 Standing to Intervene in Export License Hearings**

The Commission has applied judicial standing tests to its export licensing proceedings. Transnuclear, Inc., (Export of Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-15, 49 NRC 366, 367 (1999).

An organization's institutional interest in providing information to the public and the generalized interest of its membership in minimizing danger from proliferation are insufficient to confer standing as a matter of right under section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Transnuclear, Inc., (Export of Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-15, 49 NRC 366, 367 (1999). See also U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 364 (2004).

### **3.2.3 Hearing Requests**

A discretionary hearing is not warranted where such a hearing would impose unnecessary burdens on participants and would not provide the Commission with additional information needed to make its statutory determinations under the AEA. Transnuclear, Inc., (Export of Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-15, 49 NRC 366, 368 (1999).

### 3.3 Hearing Scheduling Matters

#### 3.3.1 Scheduling of Hearings

As a general rule, scheduling is a matter of Licensing Board discretion which will not be interfered with absent a "truly exceptional situation". Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-295, 2 NRC 668 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-293, 2 NRC 660 (1975).

An ASLB has general authority to regulate the course of a licensing proceeding and may schedule hearings on specific issues pending related developments on other issues. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-371, 5 NRC 409 (1977). In deciding whether early hearings should be held on specific issues, the Board should consider:

- (1) the likelihood that early findings would retain their validity;
- (2) the advantage to the public interest and to the litigants in having early, though possibly, inconclusive, resolution of certain issues;
- (3) the extent to which early hearings on certain issues might occasion prejudice to one or more litigants, particularly in the event that such issues were later reopened because of supervening developments.

Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539 (1975); accord Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975).

It is the Board's duty to set and adhere to reasonable schedules for the various steps in the hearing process, with the expectation that the parties will comply with the scheduling orders set forth in the proceeding and that the Board will take appropriate action against parties who fail to comply. Washington Public Power Supply System (Washington Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-00-18, 52 NRC 9, 13 (2000) (citing Statements of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 21-22 (1998)).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) interpreted agency jurisprudence as reflecting a general reluctance to base the dismissal of contentions on pleading defects or procedural defects, including defects of timing. At the same time, the ASLB judged that the Commission expects its presiding officers to set schedules, expects that parties will adhere to those schedules, and expects that presiding officers will enforce compliance with those schedules. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-28, 52 NRC 226 (2000) (citing Sequoia Fuels Corp., (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-8, 39 NRC 116, 120 (1994); Yankee Atomic Electrical Co., (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 5 (1996); Statement of Policy on Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 21 (1998)).

An ASLB may not schedule a hearing for a time when it is known that a technical member will be unavailable for more than one half of one day unless there is no reasonable alternative to such scheduling. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-222, 8 AEC 229, 238 (1974).

Generally speaking, Licensing Boards determine scheduling matters on the basis of representations of counsel about projected completion dates, availability of necessary information, and adequate opportunities for a fair and thorough hearing. The Board would take a harder look at an applicant's projected completion date if it could only be met by a greatly accelerated schedule, with minimal opportunities for discovery and the exercise of other procedural rights. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-8A, 17 NRC 282, 286-87 (1983).

Where the Licensing Board finds that the Staff cannot demonstrate a reasonable cause for its delay in submitting environmental statements, the Board may issue a ruling noting the unjustified failure to meet a publication schedule and then proceed to hear other matters or suspend proceedings until the Staff files the necessary documents. The Board, sua sponte or on motion of one of the parties, may refer the ruling to the Appeal Board. If the Appeal Board affirms, it would certify the matter to the Commission. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 207 (1978).

While a hearing is required on a construction permit application, operating license hearings can only be triggered by petitions to intervene, or a Commission finding that such a hearing would be in the public interest. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 26 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980). Licensing Boards have no independent authority to initiate adjudicatory proceedings without prior action of some other component of the Commission. 10 CFR 2.104(a) does not provide authority to a Licensing Board considering a construction permit application to order a hearing on the yet to be filed operating license application. Shearon Harris, supra, ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 27-28 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980). Section 2.104(a) of the Commission's Rules of Practice contemplates determination of a need for a hearing in the public interest on an operating license, only after application for such a license is made. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 27-28 (1980); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

A Licensing Board's denial of a request for a schedule change will be overturned only on finding that the Board abused its discretion by setting a schedule that deprives a party of its right to procedural due process. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-719, 17 NRC 387, 391 (1983), citing, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1260 (1982), quoting, Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 188 (1978); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 95 (1986).

The bifurcation of proceedings to address environmental and safety issues (with resolution of environmental matters potentially occurring months later, after public meetings) is a normal accouterment of any hearing process involving NEPA, and license applicants at the NRC assume the risk of imposition of these additional burdens. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 5 (2006).



### 3.3.1.1 Public Interest Requirements re Hearing Schedule

In matters of scheduling, the paramount consideration is the public interest. The public interest is usually served by as rapid a decision as is possible consistent with everyone's opportunity to be heard. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539 (1975).

To fulfill its obligation under the Administrative Procedure Act to decide cases within a reasonable time, the Commission established expedited procedures for the conduct of the 1988 Shoreham emergency planning exercise proceeding in order to minimize the delays resulting from the Commission's usual procedures, while still preserving the rights of the parties. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-88-9, 28 NRC 567, 569-70 (1988), citing, Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Findings under 10 CFR § 2.104(a) on a need for a public hearing on an application for an operating license in the public interest cannot be made until after such application is filed. Such finding must be based on the application and all information then available. While the Commission can determine that a hearing on an operating license is needed in the public interest, a Licensing Board could not. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 26-28 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

### 3.3.1.2 Convenience of Litigants re Hearing Schedule

Although the convenience of litigants is entitled to recognition, it cannot be dispositive on questions of scheduling. Allied General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671, 684-685 (1975); Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539 (1975).

A licensee's indecision should not dictate the scope and timing of the hearing process. It is sensible to decide the most time-sensitive issues first, but it is unacceptable to simply decline to reach other questions about an already-issued license. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 39 (2001).

Nevertheless, ASLB action in keeping to its schedule despite intervenors' assertions that they were unable to prepare for cross-examination or to attend the hearing because of a need to prepare briefs in a related matter in the U.S. Court of Appeals has been held to be an error requiring reopening of the hearing. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-249, 8 AEC 980 (1974).

### 3.3.1.3 Adjourned Hearings

(RESERVED)

### 3.3.2 Postponement of Hearings

#### 3.3.2.1 Factors Considered in Hearing Postponement

Where there is no immediate need for the license sought, the ASLB decision as to whether to go forward with hearings or postpone them should be guided by the three factors listed in the Douglas Point case; namely:

- (1) the likelihood that findings would retain their validity;
- (2) the advantage to the public and to litigants in having early, though possibly inconclusive, resolution;
- (3) the possible prejudice arising from an early hearing.

Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539 (1975).

“The Commission’s longstanding practice has been to limit orders delaying proceedings to the duration and scope necessary to promote the Commission’s dual goals of public safety and timely adjudication.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 381 (2001); see also Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-27, 54 NRC 385, 389 (2001).

The fact that a party has failed to retain counsel in a timely manner is not grounds for seeking a delay in the commencement of hearings. Offshore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-75-67, 2 NRC 813, 816 (1975).

A Licensing Board has considered the following factors in evaluating an NRC Staff motion to stay the commencement of a show cause proceeding involving the Staff’s issuance of an immediately effective license suspension order: 1) the length of the requested stay; 2) the reasons for requesting the stay; 3) whether the licensee has persistently asserted its rights to a prompt hearing and to other procedural means to resolve the matter; and 4) the resulting prejudice to the licensee’s interests if the stay is granted. Finlay Testing Laboratories, Inc., LBP-88-1A, 27 NRC 19, 23-26 (1988), citing, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).

A motion to suspend the proceeding pending resolution in state court of a state agency’s determination concerning site suitability is appropriate in a situation where a particular course of action by an Applicant is being challenged under state law. Whether the particular course of action is a violation of state law is a question for state authorities to determine, not a question for which a Licensing Board is an appropriate arbiter. Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-96-26, 44 NRC 406, 409 (1996).

The Commission historically has been reluctant to suspend pending adjudications to await developments in other proceedings, but situations may arise where efficiencies might be gained from suspending an adjudication due to the presence of overlapping issues in multiple NRC proceedings. Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Site), LBP-00-4, 51 NRC 53 (2000).

The mere possibility that proceedings will be mooted by another agency’s decision is not sufficient reason to postpone reviewing the application. Private Fuel Storage,

L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 383 (2001). “However, the Commission will postpone adjudicatory matters in the unusual cases where moving forward would clearly amount to a waste of resources.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 383 (2001). “The Commission disfavors suspending proceedings where the relief is not narrowly tailored to the goal of promoting adjudicatory efficiency.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-26, 54 NRC 376, 383 (2001). “It has not been [the Commission’s] general policy to place proceedings on hold simply because one or more other regulatory agencies might ultimately deny a necessary permit or approval. Instead, absent extraordinary reasons for delay, the NRC acts as promptly as practicable on all applications it receives.” Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-04-14, 59 NRC 250, 254 (2004).

The Commission is reluctant to suspend pending adjudications in order to await outcome of other proceedings. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-27, 54 NRC 385, 390 (2001). For example, the Commission did not hold adjudications in abeyance pending the results of an ongoing reexamination of its rules in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-27, 54 NRC 385, 390 (2001), see Interim Statement of Policy and Procedure, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,559 (Oct. 10, 1979).

The conclusion of a licensing proceeding need not await the outcome of a final rulemaking petition...’as every license the Commission issues is subject to the possibility of additional requirements. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-4, 57 NRC 273, 277 (2003).

### **3.3.2.2 Effect of Plant Deferral on Hearing Postponement**

The deferral of a plant which has been noticed for hearing does not necessarily mean that hearings should be postponed. At the same time, an ASLB does have authority to adjust discovery and hearing schedules in response to such deferral. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Koshkonong Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-75-2, 1 NRC 39 (1975). Note also that the adjudicatory early site review procedures set forth in 10 CFR Part 2 provide a means by which separate, early hearings may be held on site suitability matters despite the fact that the proposed plant and related construction permit proceedings have been deferred.

### **3.3.2.3 Sudden Absence of ASLB Member at Hearing**

When there is a sudden absence of a technical member, consideration of hearing postponement must be made, and if time permits, the parties' views must be solicited before a postponement decision is rendered. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-222, 8 AEC 229 (1974).

Note that in Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-35, 8 AEC 374 (1974), the Commission reviewed ALAB-222. While the Commission was not in total agreement with the Appeal Board's setting of inflexible guidelines for invoking the quorum rule, it agreed in principle with the Appeal Board's view that all

three ASLB members must participate to the maximum extent possible in evidentiary hearings. As such, it appears that the above guidance from ALAB-222 remains in effect.

#### **3.3.2.4 Time Extensions for Case Preparation Before Hearing**

In view of the disparity between the Staff and applicant on the one hand and intervenors on the other with regard to the time available for review and case preparation, the Appeal Panel has been solicitous of intervenors' desires for additional time for case preparation. See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-212, 7 AEC 986, 992-93 (1974). At the same time, a party's failure to have as yet retained counsel does not provide grounds for seeking a delay in proceedings. Offshore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-75-67, 2 NRC 813 (1975). Moreover, a party must make a timely request for additional time to prepare its case; otherwise, it may waive its right to complain. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 188-89 (1978). More recently, too, both the Commission and the Appeal Board have made it clear that the fact that a party may possess fewer resources than others to devote to a proceeding does not relieve that party of its hearing obligations. See Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 454 (1981); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1261 n.29 (1982).

The Appeal Board granted Staff's request for an extension of a deadline for filing written testimony but called the matter to the attention of the Commission, which has supervisory authority over the Staff. In granting the extension, made as a result of the Staff's inability to meet the earlier deadline due to assignment of Staff to Three Mile Island related matters, the Board rejected the intervenor's suggestion that it hold a hearing to determine the reasons for, and reasonableness of, the extension request. Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-553, 10 NRC 12 (1979).

Where time extensions have been granted, the original time period is not material to a determination as to whether due process has been observed. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 467 (1980).

In considering motions for extensions of time the Commission's construction of "good cause" to require a showing of "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" constitutes a reasonable means of avoiding undue delay in a license renewal proceeding, and for assuring that the proceeding is adjudicated promptly, consistent with the goals set forth in the Commission's Policy Statements and the APA. Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-98-25, 48 NRC 325, 342 (1998).

#### **3.3.3 Scheduling Disagreements Among Parties**

Parties must lodge promptly any objections they may have to the scheduling of the prehearing phase of a proceeding. Late requests for changes in scheduling will not be

countenanced absent extraordinary unexpected circumstances. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-377, 5 NRC 430 (1977).

### **3.3.4 Appeals of Hearing Date Rulings**

As a general rule, scheduling is a matter of ASLB discretion. Scheduling decisions will not be reviewed absent a "truly exceptional situation" which warrants interlocutory consideration. Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-295, 2 NRC 668 (1975); Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-293, 2 NRC 660 (1975). Since the responsibility for conduct of the hearing rests with the presiding officer pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) and 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), a Licensing Board's scheduling decision will not be examined except where there is a claim that such decision constituted an abuse of discretion and amounted to a denial of procedural due process. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 188 (1978); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1260 (1982); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 379 (1985); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 74 & n.68, 83 (1985).

With regard to claims of insufficient time to prepare for a hearing, even if a party is correct in its assertion that the Staff received an initial time advantage in preparing testimony as a result of scheduling, it must make a reasonable effort to have the procedural error corrected (by requesting additional time to respond) and not wait to use the error as grounds for appeal if the party disagrees with the decision on the merits. A party is entitled to a fair hearing, not a perfect one. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 188-89 (1978).

Although, absent special circumstances, Licensing Board scheduling determinations were not reviewed absent a claim of deprivation of due process, the former Appeal Board would, on occasion, review a Licensing Board scheduling matter when that scheduling appears to be based on the Licensing Board's misapprehension of an Appeal Board directive. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-468, 7 NRC 464, 468 (1978).

### **3.3.5 Location of Hearing**

(RESERVED)

#### **3.3.5.1 Public Interest Requirements re Hearing Location**

(RESERVED)

#### **3.3.5.2 Convenience of Litigants Affecting Hearing Location**

As a matter of policy, most evidentiary hearings in NRC proceedings are conducted in the general vicinity of the site of the facility involved. In generic matters, however, when the hearing encompasses distinct, geographically separated facilities and no relationship exists between the highly technical questions to be heard and the particular features of those facilities or their sites, the governing consideration in

determining the place of hearing should be the convenience of the participants in the hearing. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-566, 10 NRC 527, 530-531 (1979).

### 3.3.6 Consolidation of Hearings and of Parties

Consolidation of hearings is covered generally by 10 CFR § 2.317 (formerly § 2.716). Consolidation of parties is covered generally by 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly § 2.715a).

A Board, on its own initiative, may consolidate parties who share substantially the same interest and who raise substantially the same questions, except when such action would prejudice one of the intervenors. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 501 (1986), citing, 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly § 2.715a) and Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 455 (1981). See also Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), LBP-04-14, 60 NRC 40, 71 (2004) (stating that presiding officers possess authority under 10 C.F.R. § 2.319 to eliminate duplicative or cumulative evidence and arguments by consolidating parties and/or designating lead parties to represent interests held in common by multiple groups).

Consolidation is primarily discretionary with the Boards involved. Taking into account the familiarity of the Licensing Boards with the issues most likely to bear on a consolidation motion, the Commission will interpose its judgment in consolidation cases only in the most unusual circumstances. Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-26, 4 NRC 608 (1976). See Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-13, 36 NRC 79, 89 (1992).

Under 10 CFR § 2.317 (formerly § 2.716), consolidation is permitted if found to be conducive to the proper dispatch of the Board's business and to the ends of justice. Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, Operating License and Show Cause), LBP-81-31, 14 NRC 375, 377 (1981). See Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-92-13A, 35 NRC 205, 205-206 (1992) (a 10 CFR 2, Subpart G proceeding and a 10 CFR 2, Subpart L proceeding were consolidated as a Subpart G proceeding), explained, LBP-92-16A, 36 NRC 18, 19-22 (1992).

A Board need not consolidate related hearings where parties are not identical and scheduling differences are extensive. That some factual or legal questions may overlap the proceedings is fortuitous, not legally controlling. Molycorp, Inc. (Washington, Pennsylvania, Temporary Waste Storage & Site Decommissioning Plan), LBP-00-10, 51 NRC 163, 172 (2000).

Nothing forces the Commission or the parties to continue down the "somewhat tortured path" created by addressing a multisite license in a single proceeding, especially if the applicant only intends to use one site. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 242-43 (2000).

Pursuant to [2.319] the Board may hold a challenge to a license amendment in abeyance when the amendment is the first of three that once all are submitted and approved, represent a new licensee activity. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., LBP-03-1, 57 NRC 9, 12-15 (2003).

The Commission may in its own discretion order the consolidation of two or more export licensing proceedings, and may utilize 10 CFR § 2.317 (formerly § 2.716) as guidance for deciding whether or not to take such action. Edlow International Co. (Agent for the Government of India on Application to Export Special Nuclear Materials), CLI-77-16, 5 NRC 1327, 1328-1329 (1977). Note, however, that persons who are not parties to either of two adjudicatory proceedings have no standing to have those proceedings consolidated under Section 2.317 (formerly Section 2.716). Id. at 1328. Where proceedings on two separate applications are consolidated, the Commission may explicitly reserve the right to act upon the applications at different times. Edlow International Co. (Agent for the Government of India on Application to Export Special Nuclear Materials), CLI-78-4, 7 NRC 311, 312 (1978). See also Braunkohle Transport, USA (Import of South African Uranium Ore Concentrate), CLI-87-6, 25 NRC 891, 894 (1987).

### **3.3.7 In Camera Hearings**

Procedures for in camera hearings are discussed in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227 (1980).

Where a party to a hearing objects to the disclosure of information and makes out a prima facie case that the material is proprietary in nature, it is proper for an adjudicatory board to issue a protective order and conduct an in camera session. If, upon consideration, the Board determined that the material was not proprietary, it would order the material released for the public record. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-807, 21 NRC 1195, 1214-15 (1985). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-196, 7 AEC 457, 469 (1974).

No reason exists for an in camera hearing on security grounds where there is no showing of some incremental gain in security from keeping the information secret. Duke Power Co. (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773, Transportation of Spent Fuel from Oconee Nuclear Station for Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station), CLI-80-3, 11 NRC 185, 186 (1980).

Because the party that seeks disclosure of allegedly proprietary information has the right to conduct cross-examination in camera, no prejudice results from an adjudicatory board's use of this procedure. Three Mile Island, supra, 21 NRC at 1215.

Following issuance of a protective order enabling an intervenor to obtain useful information, a Board can defer ruling on objections concerning the public's right to know until after the merits of the case are considered; if an intervenor has difficulties due to failure to participate in in camera sessions, these cannot affect the Board's ruling on the merits. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-55, 14 NRC 1017, 1025 (1981).

### **3.4 Issues for Hearing**

A Licensing Board does not have the power to explore matters beyond those which are embraced by the notice of hearing for the particular proceeding. This is a holding of general applicability. Portland General Electric Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant),

ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287, 289-90 n.6 (1979); Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-316, 3 NRC 167, 170-71 (1976). See also Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 565 (1980); Commonwealth Edison Company (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 426 (1980); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-83-76, 18 NRC 1266, 1269, 1286 (1983).

A NRC licensing proceeding is not an open forum for discussing the country's need for energy and spent fuel storage. NRC's regulations provide procedures for qualified applicants to obtain licenses for safely operated nuclear facilities. If an applicant believes he is qualified to operate a nuclear storage or reprocessing facility, he must comply with those prescribed licensing procedures. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-7, 59 NRC 111, 112 (2004).

The judgment of a Licensing Board with regard to what is or is not in controversy in a proceeding being conducted by it is entitled to great respect. Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-419, 6 NRC 3, 6 (1977).

The Commission has limited the scope of litigation on emergency preparedness exercises to a consideration of whether the results of an exercise indicate that emergency plans are fundamentally flawed. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 31-33 (1993).

Emergency planning implementing procedures - the how-to and what-to-do details of the plan- should not become the focus of the adjudicatory process. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 406-07 (2000), citing, Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1106-07 (1983); Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 140-42 (1995).

The Commission has accepted question of whether the applicants' financial assurance arrangement is lawful under C.F.R. § 50.75 as genuine disputes of law and fact admissible at a hearing. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 302 (2000). Other issues which have been recognized as appropriate in a hearing on a license transfer are whether NRC approval of the transfers will deprive the Commission of authority to require the applicant to conduct remediation under decommissioning, and whether, under those circumstances, the applicant would no longer have access to the decommissioning trust for remediation it would need to complete. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 307 (2000).

The fundamental question in reviewing an intervenor's challenge to an ISFSI applicant's financing plan is whether it departs from governing regulations, the Commission's controlling order on financial qualifications (CLI-00-13), and sound financial sense. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 139 (2004).

The issue of management capability to operate a facility is better determined at the time of the operating license application, than years in advance on the basis of preliminary plans.



Carolina Power Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

The integrity or character of a licensee's management personnel bears on the Commission's ability to find reasonable assurance that a facility can be safely operated. Lack of either technical competence or character qualifications on the part of a licensee or applicant is sufficient grounds for the revocation of a license or the denial of a license application. In making determinations about character, the Commission may consider evidence bearing upon the licensee's candor, truthfulness, willingness to abide by regulatory requirements, and acceptance of responsibility to protect public health and safety. However, not every licensing action throws open an opportunity to engage in an inquiry into the "character" of the licensee. There must be some direct and obvious relationship between the character issues and the licensing action in dispute. The issue of character is a proper matter for inquiry in a license transfer proceeding. Georgia Power Company, et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-16, 38 NRC 25 (1993). See also Piping Specialists, Inc. 36 NRC 156, 163, n.5 (1992); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-4, 49 NRC 185, 189 (1999).

Findings under 10 CFR § 2.104(a) on a need for a public hearing on issues involved in an application for an operating license cannot be made until after such application is filed. Such finding must be based on the application and information then available. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

Since the Appendix I (of 10 CFR 50) rule itself does not specify health effects, and there is no evidence that the purpose of the Appendix I rulemaking was to determine generally health effects from Appendix I releases, it follows that health effects of Appendix I releases must be litigable in individual licensing proceedings. Public Service Company of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-31, 12 NRC 264, 276 (1980). See also Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 2); Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit No. 3), LBP-82-105, 16 NRC 1629, 1641 (1982), citing, Black Fox, supra, 12 NRC at 264.

Upon certification the Commission held that in view of the fact that the TMI accident resulted in generation of hydrogen gas in excess of hydrogen generation design basis assumptions of 10 CFR § 50.44, hydrogen gas control could be properly litigated under Part 100. Under Part 100, hydrogen control measures beyond those required by 10 CFR § 50.44 would be required if it is determined that there is a credible loss-of-coolant accident scenario entailing hydrogen generation, hydrogen combustion, containment breach or leaking, and offsite radiation doses in excess of Part 100 guidelines values. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island, Unit No. 1), CLI-80-16, 11 NRC 674, 675 (1980). See also Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-103, 16 NRC 1603, 1609 (1982), citing, Three Mile Island, supra, 11 NRC at 675.

Whether non-NRC permits are required is the responsibility of bodies that issue such permits, not the NRC. Thus, the issue of whether or not a party has obtained other appropriate permits is not admissible in a Licensing Board hearing. Hydro Resources, Inc. (2929 Coors Rd., Suite 101, Albuquerque, NM 87120), CLI-98-16, 48 NRC 119, 120 (1998).

A genuine scientific disagreement on a central decisional issue is the type of matter that should ordinarily be raised for adversarial exploration and eventual resolution in the adjudicatory context. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-715, 17 NRC 102, 105 (1983). See Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480, 491 (1976), aff'd sub nom. Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. NRC, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1978); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 912-13 (1982), review declined, CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69 (1983).

The Commission may entirely eliminate certain issues from operating license consideration on the ground that they are suited for examination only at the earlier construction permit stage. Short of that, the Commission has considerable discretion to provide by rule that only issues that were or could have been raised by a party to the construction permit proceeding will not be entertained at the operating license stage except upon such a showing as "changed circumstances" or "newly discovered evidence." Commission practice, however, has been to determine the litigability of issues at the operating license stage with reference to conventional res judicata and collateral estoppel principles. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 354 (1983), citing, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 696-97 (1982).

It is not a profitable use of adjudicatory time to litigate the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methodology used on the chance that different methodology would identify a new problem or substantially modify existing safety concerns. If it is known that a problem exists which would be illustrated by a change in PRA methodology, that problem can be litigated directly; there is no need to modify the PRA to consider it. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-39, 18 NRC 67, 73 (1983).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f)(2), the sufficiency vel non of the transferee's supplemental funding does not constitute grounds for a hearing; and the parent company guarantee is supplemental information and not material to the financial qualifications determination. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 299-300 (2000), citing, Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 175 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 205 (2000).

Petitioner can challenge the transferee's cost and revenue projections if the challenge is based on sufficient facts, expert opinion, or documentary support. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), citing, Oyster Creek, CLI-00-5, 51 NRC at 207-08.

The Commission does not require "absolute certainty" in financial forecasts. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), citing, North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 20, 221-22. Challenges by interveners to financial qualifications "ultimately will prevail only if [they] can demonstrate relevant certainties significantly greater than those that usually cloud business outlooks." Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), quoting, Seabrook, CLI-99-6, 49 NRC at 222.

Subpart C calls for “specificity” in pleadings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), n.23, citing, Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 131-32 (2000). However, where critical information has been submitted to the NRC under a claim of confidentiality and was not available to the petitioners when framing their issues, the Commission has deemed it appropriate to defer ruling on the admissibility of an issue until the petitioner has had an opportunity to review this information and submit a properly documented issue.

New licensees must meet all the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 concerning emergency planning and preparedness. For the issue to be admissible at a license transfer hearing, the petitioner must allege with supporting facts that the new licensee is likely to violate the NRC’s emergency planning rules. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 317 (2000).

A plant’s proximity to various cities, towns, entertainment centers, and military facilities is not relevant to the question whether to approve the license transfer to that plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 317 (2000).

The Commission no longer conducts antitrust reviews in license transfer proceedings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 318 (2000), citing, Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168, 174 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000); Texas Gas and Electric Cp (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, “Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification,” 56 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000).

The Commission has denied a petitioner’s request to arrange for an independent analysis of plants’ conditions based on historical problems in NRC’s region I since such an inquiry would go considerably beyond the scope of the license transfer proceeding. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 318 (2000), citing, Vermont Yankee, CLI-00-20, 52 NRC at 171 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000); Final Rule, “Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process,” 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989).

The scope of a license renewal proceeding will not include issues litigated at the initial licensing proceeding absent a material change in circumstance affecting the original determination of the issue or some differentiation of other sites from the one already litigated. Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-03-27, 58 NRC 408, 416 (2003).

### **3.4.1 Intervenor’s Contentions - Admissibility at Hearing**

Contentions are like Federal court complaints; before any decision that a contention should not be entertained, the proponent of the contention must be given some chance to be heard in response. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

Unit 1), LBP-81-18, 14 NRC 71, 73 (1981), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521 (1979).

A contention concerning the health effects of radon emissions will be admitted only if the documented opinion of one or more qualified authorities is provided to the Licensing Board that the incremental (health effects of) fuel cycle-related radon emissions will be greater than those determined in the Appeal Board proceeding. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1454 (1982), citing, Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-654, 14 NRC 632, 635 (1981).

Where the only NEPA matters in controversy are legal contentions that there has been a failure to comply with NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51, the Board may rule on the contentions without further evidentiary hearings, making use of the existing evidentiary record and additional material of which it can take official notice. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-60, 14 NRC 1724, 1728 (1981).

When considering admission of new intervenor contentions based on new regulatory requirements, the Licensing Board must find a "nexus" between the new requirements and the particular facility involved in the proceeding, and that the contentions raise significant issues. The new contentions need not be solely related to contentions previously admitted, but may address themselves to the new requirements imposed. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-5, 13 NRC 226, 233-34 (1981).

New environmental contentions based on the NRC's Staff draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) are permitted if data or conclusions in the DEIS differ significantly from the applicant's environmental report. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-21, 52 NRC 261, 264 (2000), n. 6, citing, Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 4 (1997).

Petitioner can challenge the transferee's cost and revenue projections if the challenge is based on sufficient facts, expert opinion, or documentary support. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), citing, Oyster Creek, CLI-00-6, 51 NRC at 207-08.

As a general rule, Licensing Boards should not accept in individual license proceedings contentions which are (or about to become) the subject of general rulemaking by the Commission. As a corollary, certain issues included in an adjudicatory proceeding may be rendered inappropriate for resolution in that proceeding because the Commission has taken generic action during the pendency of the adjudication. There may nonetheless be situations in which matters subject to generic consideration may also be evaluated on a case-by-case basis where such evaluation is contemplated by, or at least consistent with, the approach adopted in the rulemaking proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 889-90 (1983), aff'd, CLI-84-11, 20 NRC 1 (1984).

Intervenor maintains that the Board erred in refusing to consider its argument that the Licensee must seek a construction permit to use the piping and equipment that were abandoned in the early 1980's. The Board ruled that the construction permit claim was not a part of Intervenor's admitted contention and cannot be admitted unless it fulfills the late-filing standards set out in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c) (formerly § 2.714(a)). See LBP-00-12, 51 NRC at 281. Because Intervenor made no effort to address the late-filing standards, the Board precluded further consideration of the issue. See id. at 281-82. We agree with the Board. Intervenor was inexcusably late in attempting to introduce its construction permit claim. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 391-92 (2001).

### **3.4.2 Issues Not Raised by Parties (Also see Section 3.1.2.7)**

A Licensing Board may, on its own motion, explore issues which the parties themselves have not placed in controversy. 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a); Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976). This power, however, is not a license to conduct fishing expeditions and, in operating license proceedings, should be exercised sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances where the Board concludes that a serious safety or environmental issue remains. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3), CLI-74-28, 8 AEC 7 (1974); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-24, 14 NRC 614, 615 (1981); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899, 915 n.2 (1985).

When a Licensing Board in an operating license proceeding considers issues which might be deemed to be raised sua sponte by the Board, it should transmit copies of the order raising such issues to the Commission and General Counsel in accordance with the Secretary's memo of June 30, 1981. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-54, 14 NRC 918, 922-923 (1981).

The Licensing Board may be alerted to such serious issues not raised by the parties through the statements of those making limited appearances. See Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. (Duane Arnold Energy Center), ALAB-108, 6 AEC 195, 196 n.4 (1973).

Pursuant to authority granted under 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a), the presiding officer in an operating license proceeding may examine matters not put into controversy by the parties only where he or she determines that a serious safety, environmental or common defense and security matter exists. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-24, 14 NRC 614, 615 (1981); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 25 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987).

The Commission has directed that when a Licensing Board raises an issue sua sponte in an operating license proceeding, it must issue a separate order making the requisite findings, briefly state its reasons for raising the issue, and forward a copy of the order to the OGC and the Commission. Comanche Peak, CLI-81-24, supra; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 25 (1987). A Licensing Board may raise a safety issue sua sponte when

sufficient evidence of a serious safety matter has been presented that reasonable minds could inquire further. Very specific findings are not required since they could cause prejudgment problems. The Board need only give its reasons for raising the problem. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36, 14 NRC 691, 697 (1981).

In an operating license proceeding where a hearing is convened as a result of intervention, the Licensing Board will resolve all issues raised by the parties and any issues which it raises sua sponte. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976). The decision as to all other matters which need to be considered prior to issuance of the operating license is the responsibility of the NRC Staff alone. Indian Point, supra, 3 NRC at 190; Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-181, 7 AEC 207, 209 n.7 (1974); Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26, 20 NRC 53, 58 (1984). Once the Licensing Board has resolved all contested issues and any sua sponte issues, the NRC Staff then has the authority to decide if any other matters need to be considered prior to the issuance of an operating license. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-23, 14 NRC 159 (1981). The mere acceptance of a contention does not justify a Board's assuming that a serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter exists or otherwise relieve it of the obligation under 10 CFR § 2.340(a) (formerly § 2.760a) to affirmatively determine that such a situation exists. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-36, 14 NRC 1111, 1114 (1981).

In a construction permit proceeding, the Licensing Board has a duty to assure that the NRC Staff's review was adequate, even as to matters which are uncontested. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 774 (1977).

The fact that the Staff may be estopped from asserting a position does not affect a Board's independent responsibility to consider the issue involved. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-268, 1 NRC 383 (1975).

An adjudicatory board's examination of unresolved generic safety issues, not put into controversy by the parties, is necessarily limited to whether the Staff's approach is plausible, and whether the explanations given for support of continued safe operation of the facility are sufficient on their face. Northern States Power Company (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-620, 12 NRC 574, 577 (1980).

Arguments not raised by intervenors in their written presentations, but raised in the affidavits of intervenor expert witnesses, were not considered by the Presiding Officer and were deemed to have been waived. Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, NM 87313), LBP-05-17, 62 NRC 77, 98-99 n. 14 (2005).

### **3.4.3 Issues Not Addressed by a Party**

The parties must be given an opportunity, at oral hearing or by written pleadings, to produce relevant evidence concerning abuses of Commission regulations and adjudicatory process, but if a party fails to formally tender such evidence, the Licensing

Board should not engage in its own independent and selective search of the record. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-657, 14 NRC 967, 978 (1981).

While an applicant has the ultimate burden of proof on any issues upon which a hearing is held, hearings are held on only those issues that an intervenor brings to the fore. The burden of going forward on any issues that make it to the hearing process is on the intervenor which is pursuing that issue. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-05-12, 61 NRC 319, 326 (2005), aff'd Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403 (2005).

Although it is incumbent upon a part to act to protect its rights, there is no bar to a licensing board taking every precaution to be sure that, after a ruling is made, there is not even a possibility that its full import may be misunderstood. Therefore, although the board was only required to rule on the scope of the hearing, it could also have gone on to define more precisely and expressly the outlines of, and limits upon, the issues. PFS, LBP-05-12, 61 NRC at 329.

#### **3.4.4 Separate Hearings on Special Issues**

Pursuant to a Licensing Board's general power to regulate the course of a hearing under 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), such Boards have the authority to consider, either on their own or at a party's request, a particular issue separately from and prior to other issues that must be decided in a proceeding. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539, 544 (1975). Indeed, multiple contentions can be grouped and litigated in separate segments of the evidentiary hearing so as to enable the Licensing Board to issue separate partial initial decisions, each of which decides a major segment of the case. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1136 (1983).

In a special proceeding, where the Commission has specified the issues for hearing, a Licensing Board is obliged to resolve all such issues even in the absence of active participation by intervenors. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1263 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

A request for a low-power license does not give rise to an entire proceeding separate and apart from a pending full-power operating license proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-82-39, 16 NRC 1712, 1715 (1982), citing, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361 (1981).

The Appeal Board's holding in Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-277, 1 NRC 539 (1975), that any early findings made by a Licensing Board, in circumstances where the applicant had disclosed an intent to postpone construction for several years, would be open to reconsideration "only if supervening developments or newly available evidence so warrant", does not support a later Licensing Board's action in imposing a similar limitation on the right to raise issues which were not encompassed by the early

findings. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 386-387 (1979), reconsid. denied, ALAB-539, 9 NRC 422 (1979).

The Chief Judge of the Licensing Board Panel is empowered to establish multiple boards only when: 1) the proceeding involves discrete and separable issues; 2) the issues can be more expeditiously handled by multiple boards than by a single board; and 3) multiple boards can conduct the proceedings in a manner that will not unduly burden the parties. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307, 311 (1998); Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18 (1998).

### **3.4.5 Construction Permit Extension Proceedings**

Section 185 of the AEA, 42 U.S.C. §2235, provides that a construction permit will not expire and no rights under the permit will be forfeited unless two circumstances are present: (1) the facility is not completed, and (2) the latest date for completion has passed. If construction is complete, no further extension of the completion date is required. Comanche Peak, CLI-93-10, 37 NRC at 201. Commission regulations provide that the substantial completion of a facility's construction satisfies the AEA's requirements regarding completion of the facility. See 10 CFR §§ 50.56 and 50.57(a)(1) (1993). Comanche Peak, CLI-93-10, 37 NRC at 201 n.35.

The filing of a timely request for an extension of the completion date maintains the construction permit in force by operation of law and, accordingly, the licensee may lawfully continue construction activities pending a final determination of its application. Comanche Peak, CLI-93-10, 37 NRC at 201, 202 (1993).

An applicant who fails to file a timely request for an extension of its construction permit and allows the permit to expire does not automatically forfeit the permit. The Commission has held that a construction permit does not lapse until the Commission has taken affirmative action to complete the forfeiture. The Commission will consider and may grant an untimely application for an extension of the construction permit, without requiring the initiation of a new construction permit proceeding. However, the applicant must still establish good cause for an extension of its permit. In addition, the applicant is not entitled to continue its construction activities after the expiration date of its permit and prior to any extension of its permit. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-4, 23 NRC 113, 120 & nn. 4-5 (1986).

A licensee's substantial completion of construction, lawfully undertaken during the pendency of petitioner's challenge to a construction extension request, renders moot any controversy over further extension of the completion date in the construction permit. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-10, 37 NRC 192, 200 (1993).

Unless an applicant is responsible for delays in completion of construction and acted in a dilatory manner (i.e., intentionally and without a valid purpose), a contested construction permit extension proceeding is not to be undertaken at all. Moreover, even if a properly framed contention leads to such a proceeding and is proven true, the Atomic Energy Act and implementing regulations do not erect an absolute bar to



extending the permit. A judgment must still be made as to whether continued construction should nonetheless be allowed. WPPSS, supra, ALAB-722, 17 NRC at 553.

#### **3.4.5.1 Scope of Construction Permit Extension Proceedings**

The focus of any construction permit extension proceeding is to be whether "good cause" exists for the requested extension. Determination of the scope of an extension proceeding should be based on "common sense" and the "totality of the circumstances," more specifically whether the reasons assigned for the extension give rise to health and safety or environmental issues which cannot appropriately abide the event of the environmental review-facility operating license hearing. A contention cannot be litigated in a construction permit extension proceeding when an operating license proceeding is pending in which the issue can be raised; and, prior to the operating license proceeding, a contention having nothing whatsoever to do with the causes of delay or the permit holder's justifications for an extension cannot be litigated in a construction permit proceeding. In seeking an extension, a permit holder must put forth reasons, founded in fact, that explain why the delay occurred and those reasons must, as a matter of law, be sufficient to sustain a finding of good cause. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project Nos. 1 and 2), CLI-82-29, 16 NRC 1221, 1227, 1229-30 (1982), citing, Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. (Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-129, 6 AEC 414 (1973); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558 (1980). See Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1189 (1984).

The NRC's inquiry will be into reasons that have contributed to the delay in construction and whether those reasons constitute "good cause" for the extension; the same limitation to apply to any interested person seeking to challenge the request for an extension. The most "common sense" approach to the interpretation of Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR § 50.55 is that the scope of a construction permit extension proceeding is limited to direct challenges to the permit holder's asserted reasons that show "good cause" justification for the delay. WPPSS, supra, 16 NRC at 1228-1229; Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 550-51 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 2), CLI-846, 19 NRC 975, 978 (1984); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-4, 23 NRC 113, 121 (1986).

The only question litigable in a construction permit extension proceeding -- whether the licensee has demonstrated "good cause" for the extension -- is no longer of legal interest after the licensee has lawfully completed construction under the permit and requires no further extension of the completion date. Comanche Peak, supra, CLI-93-10, 37 NRC at 204.

Proceedings on construction permit extensions are limited in scope to challenges to the licensee's asserted "good cause" for the extension, and are not an avenue to challenge a pending operating license. Comanche Peak, supra, CLI-93-10, 37 NRC at 205.

The scope of review for construction period recapture proceedings may be broader than that for license renewal, inasmuch as the Commission issued a new rule (10 C.F.R. Part 54) for license renewal specifically spelling out and limiting the scope of such proceedings. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 13-14 (1993).

A permit holder may establish good cause for delays by showing a need to correct deficiencies which resulted from a previous corporate policy to speed construction by intentionally violating NRC requirements. The permit holder must also show that the previous policy has since been discarded and repudiated. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-15, 24 NRC 397, 403 (1986).

An intentional slowing of construction because of a temporary lack of financial resources or a slower growth rate of electric power than had been originally projected would constitute delay for a valid business purpose. WPPSS, supra, LBP-84-9, 19 NRC at 504, aff'd, ALAB-771, 19 NRC at 1190.

The Licensing Board should not substitute its judgment for that of the applicant in selecting one among a number of reasonable business alternatives. It is not the Board's mission to superintend utility management when it makes business judgments for which it is ultimately responsible. WPPSS, supra, ALAB-771, 19 NRC at 1190-91, citing, Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-475, 7 NRC 752, 757-58 (1978).

#### **3.4.5.2 Contentions in Construction Permit Extension Proceedings**

The test for determining whether a contention is within the scope of a construction permit extension proceeding is a two-pronged one. First, the construction delays at issue have to be traceable to the applicant. Second, the delays must be "dilatatory." If both prongs are met, the delay is without "good cause." WPPSS, supra, CLI-82-29, 16 NRC at 1231; ALAB-722, 17 NRC at 551; Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-84-9, 19 NRC 497, 502 (1984), aff'd, ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1189 (1984).

"Dilatatory conduct" in the sense used by the Commission in defining the test for determining whether a contention is within the scope of a construction permit extension proceeding means the intentional delay of construction without a valid purpose. WPPSS, supra, ALAB-722, 17 NRC at 552; WPPSS, supra, LBP-84-9, 19 NRC at 502, aff'd, ALAB-771, 19 NRC at 1190.

Intervenors in a construction permit extension proceeding may only litigate those issues that (1) arise from the reasons assigned to the requested extension, and (2) cannot abide the operating license proceeding. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), LBP-80-31, 12 NRC 699, 701 (1980); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-41, 15 NRC 1295, 1301 (1982).

Contentions having no discernible relationship to the construction permit extension are inadmissible in a permit extension proceeding; a show-cause proceeding under 10 CFR § 2.206 is the exclusive remedy. Northern Indiana Public Service Co.

(Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), LBP-81-6, 13 NRC 253, 254 (1981), citing, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558 (1980); Shoreham, supra, 15 NRC at 1302; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 2), CLI-84-6, 19 NRC 975, 979 (1984).

An intervenor's concerns about substantive safety issues are inadmissible in a construction permit extension proceeding. Such concerns are more appropriately raised in an operating license proceeding or in a 10 CFR 2.206 petition for NRC Staff enforcement action against the applicant. Comanche Peak, supra, 23 NRC at 121 & n.6, 123.

A consideration of the health, safety or environmental effects of delaying construction cannot be heard at the construction permit extension proceeding but must await the operating license stage. WPPSS, supra, LBP-84-9, 19 NRC at 506-07, aff'd, ALAB-771, 19 NRC at 1189.

There is no basis in the Atomic Energy Act or in the regulations for challenging the period of time in the requested extension on the grounds that the period requested is too short. WPPSS, supra, LBP-84-9, 19 NRC at 506, aff'd, ALAB-771, 19 NRC at 1191.

In a construction period recapture proceeding, implementation of maintenance and surveillance programs may be challenged, even though the paper programs are not being modified. Irrespective of how comprehensive a program may appear on paper, it will be essentially without value unless it is timely, continuously, and properly implemented. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 19 (1993) (citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-106, 6 AEC 182, 184 (1973)).

Numerous, repetitious cited violations or other incidents may form the basis for a contention questioning the adequacy of a maintenance or surveillance program, even though none of the individual violations or other incidents rises to the level of a serious safety issue. When sufficient repetitive or similar incidents are demonstrated, aggregation and/or escalation of sanctions may be in order. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., supra, LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 19 (1993).

#### **3.4.6 Motion to Strike**

A motion to strike is the appropriate mechanism for seeking the removal of information from a pleading or other submission that is "irrelevant," or in the context of summary dispositions, portions of a filing or affidavit that contain technical arguments based on questionable competence. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-05-20, 62 NRC 187, 228 (2003).

#### **3.4.7 Result of Withdrawal of a Party**

When a party withdraws from a proceeding, the issues solely sponsored by it are normally dismissed from the proceeding. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-01-5, 53 NRC 136, 137 (2001).

A co-sponsored issue need not be dismissed as a result of the withdrawal of one of the sponsoring parties. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-01-5, 53 NRC 136, 137 (2001).

A participant is free to withdraw a request for a licensing action without presiding officer approval. Such an action generally moots the proceeding. Fansteel Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-03-13, 58 NRC 96, 102 (2003).

### **3.5 Summary Disposition**

#### **3.5.1 Applicability of Federal Rules Governing Summary Judgment**

Decisions arising under the Federal Rules may serve as guidelines to Licensing Boards in applying 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749). Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982), citing Perry, supra, 6 NRC at 754; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 878-879 (1974). Subsequent decisions of Licensing Boards have analogized 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749) to Rule 56 to the extent that the Rule applied in the cases in question. See, e.g., Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 787 n.51 (1978); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-75-10, 1 NRC 246, 247 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877, 878 (1974); Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 121 (2006) (citing Advanced Med. Sys., Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993)). (See also 5.8.5) Further, because the Commission's summary disposition rules borrow extensively from Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it has long been held that federal court decisions interpreting and applying like provisions of Rule 56 are appropriate precedent for the Commission's rules. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 449 n.167 (1995) citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977). Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-05-4, 61 NRC 71, 79 (2005). Thus, pursuant to Rule 56(c) and by analogy the Commission's summary disposition rule, "[o]nly disputes facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 449 n.167 (1995), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

#### **3.5.2 Standard for Granting/Denying a Motion for Summary Disposition**

Under the Rules of Practice, 10 CFR Part 2, a motion for summary disposition should be granted if the Licensing Board determines, with respect to the question at issue, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law. 10 CFR § 2.710(d)(2) (formerly § 2.749(d)).

Under the concept of summary disposition (or summary judgment), the motion is granted only where the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, where it is quite clear what the truth is and where there is no genuine issue of material fact that remains for trial. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-73-29, 6 AEC 682, 688 (1973); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-23, 49 NRC 485, 491 (1999); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 384 (2001). A contention will not be summarily dismissed where the Licensing Board determines that there still exist controverted issues of material fact. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-34, 14 NRC 637, 640-41 (1981). Admission as a party to a Commission proceeding based on one acceptable contention does not preclude summary disposition nor guarantee a party a hearing on its contentions. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1258 n.15 (1982), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550 (1980). Section 2.710 (formerly Section 2.749), like Rule 56, is a procedural device to be used as part of a screening mechanism for eliminating unnecessary consideration of assertions which do not involve factual controversy. Use of summary disposition to resolve tenuous issues raised in petitions to intervene has been encouraged by the Commission and the Appeal Board. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13 NRC 75, 77 (1981); Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424-25 (1973); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 246 (1973); Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981). If the issue is demonstrably insubstantial, it should be decided pursuant to summary disposition procedures to avoid unnecessary and possibly time-consuming hearings. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-81-48, 14 NRC 877, 883 (1981), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542 (1980).

Summary disposition is a useful tool for resolving contentions that, after discovery is completed are shown by undisputed facts to have nothing to commend them, but it is not a tool for trying to convince a Licensing Board to decide genuine issues of material fact that warrant resolution at a hearing. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-39, 54 NRC 497, 509 (2001). Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 121.

Once an applicant has submitted a motion that makes a proper showing for summary disposition, the litmus test of whether or not to grant the summary disposition motion is whether Intervenor has presented a genuine issue as to any material fact that is relevant to its allegation that could lead to some form of relief. Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-94-37, 40 NRC 288 (1994).

The Commission has encouraged the use of summary disposition to resolve contentions where an intervenor has failed to establish that a genuine issue exists. Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982), citing, Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-73-12, 6 AEC 241, 242 (1973), aff'd sub nom. BPI v. AEC, 502 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-590, 11 NRC 542, 550-551 (1980); Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-130, 6 AEC 423, 424-425 (1973).

A Licensing Board will deny intervenors' motion for summary disposition where the intervenors have not raised any litigable issues because of their failure to submit admissible contentions. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-38, 30 NRC 725, 741 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-949, 33 NRC 484, 490 n.19 (1991).

If there is any possibility that a litigable issue of fact exists or any doubt as to whether the parties should have been permitted or required to proceed further, the motion must be denied. General Electric Co. (GE Morris Operation Spent Fuel Storage Facility), LBP-82-14, 15 NRC 530, 532 (1982); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 449 n.167) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). As the Board rules on such a motion, all statements of material facts required to be served by the moving party must be deemed to be admitted, unless controverted by the statement required to be served by the opposing party. 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749). Motions for summary disposition under Section 2.710 (formerly 2.749) are analogous to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To defeat a motion for summary disposition, an opposing party must present facts in an appropriate form. Conclusions of law and mere arguments are not sufficient. The asserted facts must be material and of a substantial nature, not fanciful or merely suspicious. Where neither an answer opposing the motion nor a statement of material fact has been filed by an intervenor, and where Staff and applicants have filed affidavits to show that no genuine issue exists, the motion for summary judgment will not be defeated. Texas Utilities Generating Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-17, 15 NRC 593, 595-96 (1982). Even though the summary disposition opponent is entitled to all reasonable inferences, it must, in the face of well-pled undisputed material facts, provide something more than suspicious or bald assertions as the basis for a material factual dispute. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-40, 54 NRC 526, 536 (2001). The legal standards governing motions for summary disposition pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749) were reiterated by the Commission in Advanced Medical Systems, Inc., CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102-03 (1993), reconsideration denied, CLI-93-24, 38 NRC 187 (1993); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 239-40 (1993).

A grant of summary disposition is proper where the pleadings and affidavits on file "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a decision as a matter of law." 10 CFR § 2.710(d)(2) (formerly § 2.749(d)). Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-660, 14 NRC 987, 1003 (1981), citing, Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451 (1980); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 208 (1985); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 310 (1985); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas

Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 632 (1986); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-86-27, 24 NRC 255, 261 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-26, 26 NRC 201, 212, 216 (1987), reconsid. denied, LBP-87-29, 26 NRC 302 (1987); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-12, 27 NRC 495, 498, 506 (1988); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-27, 28 NRC 455, 475 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-9, 28 NRC 271, 272-73 (1989); All Chemical Isotope Enrichment, Inc., LBP-90-26, 32 NRC 30, 36-38 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-44, 32 NRC 433, 447 (1990); Rhodes-Sayre & Associates, Inc., LBP-91-15, 33 NRC 268, 271-72 (1991). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact and evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993); Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC Licensed Activities), LBP-95-7, 41 NRC 323, 329 (1995). Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 121 (citing Advanced Med. Sys., CLI-93-22, 38 NRC at 102).

The Commission's summary disposition rule (10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749)) gives a party a right to an evidentiary hearing only where there is a genuine issue of material fact. Cameo Diagnostic Centre, Inc., LBP-94-34, 40 NRC 169 (1994). An important effect of this principle is that applicants for licenses may be subject to substantial expense and delay when genuine issues have been raised, but are entitled to an expeditious determination, without need for an evidentiary hearing on all issues which are not genuine. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-8, 15 NRC 299, 301 (1982).

On its face, 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749) provides a remedy only with regard to matters which have not already been the subject of an evidentiary hearing in the proceedings at bar, but which are susceptible of final resolution on the papers submitted by the parties in advance of any such hearing. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-554, 10 NRC 15, 19 (1979).

The regulations do not require merely the showing of a "material issue of fact" or an "issue of fact." They require a genuine issue of material fact. To be genuine, the factual record, considered in its entirety, must be enough in doubt so that there is a reason to hold a hearing to resolve the issue. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-46, 18 NRC 218, 223 (1983). Absent any probative evidence supporting the claim, mere assertions of a dispute as to material facts does not invalidate the licensing Board's grant of summary disposition. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 309-310 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-2, 55 NRC 20, 30 (2002); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 449 n.167) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

While summary judgment is generally not appropriate, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules, where credibility of witness determinations are necessary, witness testimony that lacks an adequate basis will not suffice to preclude summary judgment.

Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-05-4, 61 NRC 71, 81 (2005).

### 3.5.3 Burden of Proof With Regard to Summary Disposition Motions

Based on judicial interpretations of Rule 56, the burden of proof with respect to summary disposition is upon the movant who must demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 102 (1993); Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982), citing, Adickes v. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 417 (1986); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 632 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-30, 24 NRC 437, 445 (1986); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-27, 28 NRC 455, 460, 461-62 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-31, 28 NRC 652, 665 (1988); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-90-4, 31 NRC 54, 67, 69 (1990), *aff'd*, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492 (1991); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 361 (1994); Cameo Diagnostic Centre, Inc., LBP-94-34, 40 NRC 169, 171 (1994), citing Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-31, 50 NRC 147, 152 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-42, 50 NRC 295, 301 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-6, 51 NRC 101, 112 (2000). Summary disposition is not appropriate when the movant fails to carry its burden setting forth all material facts pertaining to its summary disposition motion. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-95-10, 41 NRC 460, 466 (1995). Thus, if a movant fails to make the requisite showing, its motion may be denied even in the absence of any response by the proponent of a contention. La Crosse, *supra*, 16 NRC at 519. See Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 435 (1984), *reconsid. den. on other grounds*, LBP-8415, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984).

The moving party fails to meet its burden when the filings demonstrate the existence of a genuine material fact, when the evidence introduced does not show that the nonmoving party's position is a sham, when the matters presented fail to foreclose the possibility of a factual dispute, or when there is an issue as to the credibility of the moving party's evidentiary material. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 122 (2006).

Agency caselaw indicates that a summary disposition opponent is entitled to the favorable inferences that may be drawn from any evidence submitted. See Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 361, *aff'd*, CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55 (1994). Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 121-22 (citing Advanced Med. Sys., Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993)). This authority, however, does not relieve the opposing party from the responsibility, in the face of well pled undisputed material facts, of providing something more than suspicions or bald



assertions as the basis for any purported material factual disputes. See Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 306-07 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (table). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-35, 50 NRC 180, 194 (1999).

When a proper showing for summary disposition has been made by the movant, the party opposing the motion must aver specific facts in rebuttal. Where the movant has satisfied his initial burden and has supported his motion by affidavit, the opposing party must proffer countering evidential material or an affidavit explaining why it is impractical to do so. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32A, 17 NRC 1170, 1174 n.4 (1983). If the presiding officer determines from affidavits filed by the opposing party that the opposing party cannot present by affidavit the facts essential to justify its opposition, the presiding officer may order a continuance to permit such affidavits to be obtained or may take other appropriate action. 10 CFR § 2.710(c) (formerly § 2.729(c)). Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 103 n.16 (1993). Prior NRC inspection reports that conclude that at the time of an inspection there were no regulatory violations found do not in themselves raise a genuine issue of material fact. The failure by the NRC to detect a violation does not necessarily prove the negative that no violation existed. The NRC inspectors are not omniscient, and limited NRC resources preclude careful review of all but a fraction of the licensed activity. Advanced Medical Systems, supra, CLI-93-22 at 108.

All material facts set forth in the motion and not adequately controverted by the response are deemed to be admitted. 10 CFR § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)). Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-3, 17 NRC 59, 61 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-26, 26 NRC 201, 225 (1987), reconsid. denied, LBP-87-29, 26 NRC 302 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 422-23 (1990); Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-91-9, 33 NRC 212, 216 & n.15, 218 (1991), aff'd, CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98 (1993); Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-05-4, 61 NRC 71, 79 (2005). A party opposing the motion may not rely on a simple denial of material facts stated by the movant but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue. Bare assertions or general denials are insufficient. 10 CFR § 2.710(b) (formerly § 2.749(b)); Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102 (1993); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171, 195 (2002); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-2, 55 NRC 20, 30 (2002); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 632-33 (1986); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 93 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-30, 24 NRC 437, 445 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-26, 26 NRC 201, 212, 216 (1987), reconsid. denied, LBP-87-29, 26 NRC 302 (1987); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-12, 27 NRC 495, 498, 504-06 (1988); Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-90-17, 31 NRC 540, 542 & n.5 (1990). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-24, 33 NRC 446, 451

(1991), aff'd, CLI-92-8, 35 NRC 145 (1992). The opposing party must controvert any material fact properly set out in the statement of material facts that accompanies a summary disposition motion or the fact will be deemed admitted. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 102-03 (1993).

When the movant has satisfied its initial burden and has supported its motion by affidavit, the opposing party must either proffer rebuttal evidence or submit an affidavit explaining why it is impractical to do so. Where a party opposing the motion is unable to file affidavits in opposition in the time available, he may file an affidavit showing good reasons for his inability to make a timely response in which case the Board may refuse summary disposition or grant a continuance to permit proper affidavits to be prepared. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 103 (1993). 10 CFR § 2.710(c) (formerly § 2.749(c)). A party which seeks to conduct discovery to respond to a summary disposition motion must file an affidavit which identifies the specific information it seeks to obtain and shows how that information is essential to its opposition to the summary disposition motion. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-8, 35 NRC 145, 152 (1992).

If intervenors present evidence or argument that directly and logically challenges the basis for summary disposition, creating a genuine issue of fact for resolution by the Board, then summary disposition cannot be granted. On the other hand, if intervenors' facts are fully and satisfactorily explained by other parties, without any direct conflict of evidence, then intervenors will have failed to show the presence of a genuine issue of material fact. However, after finishing the process of reviewing facts contained in the intervenor's response, the Board must also examine the motion to see whether the movant's unopposed findings of fact establish the basis for summary disposition. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-114, 16 NRC 1909, 1913 (1982).

The party filing the summary disposition motion has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. The opposing party must append to its response a statement of material facts about which there exists a genuine issue to be heard. If the responding party does not adequately controvert material facts set forth in the motion, the party faces the possibility that those facts may be deemed admitted. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-23, 49 NRC 485, 491 (1999). Given the respondent's burden to counter the movant's assertions and statement of material facts, the Board may consider the respondent's failure to directly contradict these proffered assertions if the Board believes it is well within the respondent's power to do so, when judging the reliability of the movant's assertions. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-2, 55 NRC 20, 30-31 (2002). If the evidence before the Board does not establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, then the motion must be denied even if there is no opposing evidence. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977). Nevertheless, a party opposing a motion cannot rely on a simple denial of the movant's material facts, but must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.710(b) (formerly § 2.749(b)). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-18, 44 NRC 86, 92-93 (1996). "The party opposing summary disposition must make a sufficient

showing of each element of the case on which it has the burden of proof. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-02-10, 55 NRC 236, 239 (2002), citing, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 273 (1986).

The fact that the NRC staff may agree with the factual or technical positions of a party's motion for summary disposition, either informally or in a formal document such as an SER, does not "resolve" the dispute or mean that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 124.

Even if no party opposes a motion for summary disposition, the movant's filings must still establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. An intervenor that does respond to a motion for summary disposition but that fails to file the required "separate statement" should be no worse off than one who fails to respond at all. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-3, 17 NRC 59, 62 (1983).

Nonetheless, where a proponent of a contention fails to respond to a motion for summary disposition, it does so at its own risk; for, if a contention is to remain litigable, there must at least be presented to the Board a sufficient factual basis "to require reasonable minds to inquire further." La Crosse, *supra*, 16 NRC at 519-20, citing, Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 340 (1980); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1325 n.3 (1983); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-93-12, 38 NRC 5 (1993). To meet this burden, the movant must eliminate any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co. Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1954); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-81-48, 14 NRC 877, 883 (1981). See also Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 121 ("Summary disposition may be granted only if the truth is clear." (citing Poller, 368 U.S. at 467)). The record and affidavits supporting and opposing the motion must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-36, 7 AEC 877 (1974) and cases cited therein at pp. 878-879. Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 519 (1982), citing, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962); Crest Auto Supplies, Inc. v. Ero Manufacturing Co., 360 F.2d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 1966); United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 22 v. Roncco, 314 F.2d 186, 188 (10th Cir. 1963); Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 208 (1985); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 310 (1985); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 417 (1986); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 632 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-91-24, 33 NRC 446, 450 (1991), *aff'd*, CLI-92-8, 35 NRC 145 (1992). The opposing party need not show that he would prevail on the issues but only that there are genuine issues to be tried. American Manufacturers Mut.

Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting - Paramount Theaters, Inc., 388 F.2d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1967); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 418 (1986). The fact that the party opposing summary disposition failed to submit evidence controverting the disposition does not mean that the motion must be granted.

A petitioner asserted numerous statements of fact, none of which were deemed to show any genuine dispute of law or fact existed. These included a statement as to the identity of certain state officials, statements about the actions and policies of the Utah Legislature and the Governor, statements about the petitioner's proposed ISFSI (which was not the subject of the licensing proceeding), and the petitioner's claims for monetary damages arising from actions taken by the State of Utah. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-23, 52 NRC 114, 125-26 (2000).

### **3.5.4 Contents of Motions for/Responses to Summary Disposition**

The general requirements as to contents of motions for summary disposition and responses thereto are set out in 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749).

Under the NRC Rules of Practice, there is required to be annexed to a motion for summary disposition a "separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends that there is no genuine issue to be heard." Dairyland Power Cooperative (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 520 (1982), citing, 10 CFR § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)). Where such facts are properly presented and are not controverted, they are deemed to be admitted. La Crosse, supra, 16 NRC at 520; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-26, 26 NRC 201, 225 (1987), reconsid. denied, LBP-87-29, 26 NRC 302 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 422-23 (1990); Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-91-9, 33 NRC 212, 216 & n.15, 218 (1991); Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) LBP-94-37, 40 NRC 288, 293-94 (1994) citing, Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 239-40 (1993); see Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 305 (1985).

As to affidavits in support of a motion for a summary disposition, a document submitted with a verified letter in which the attestation states that the person is "duly authorized to execute and file this information on behalf of the applicants" is not sufficient to make the document admissible into evidence pursuant to § 2.710(b) (formerly § 2.749(b)). An affidavit must be submitted by a person to show he is competent to testify to all matters discussed in the document. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 755 (1977). See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 500-501 (1991).

Although 10 CFR § 2.710(b) (formerly § 2.749(b)) does not expressly require that the affidavit be based on a witness' personal knowledge of the material facts, a Board will require a witness to testify from personal knowledge in order to establish material facts which are legitimately in dispute. This requirement applies as well to expert witnesses

who, although generally permitted to base their opinion testimony on hearsay, may only establish those material facts of which they have direct, personal knowledge. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 418-419 (1986).

Movant's papers which are insufficient to show an absence of an issue of fact, cannot premise a grant of summary judgment. Similarly, a response opposing a motion for summary judgment must have a statement of material facts. Mere allegations and denials will not suffice, but there must be a showing of genuine issues of fact. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13 NRC 75, 78 (1981); Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451 (1980); Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981); 10 CFR § 2.710(b) (formerly § 2.749(b)); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 229, 231 (1985); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 417 (1986); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-88-23, 28 NRC 178, 182 (1988). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-88-31, 28 NRC 652, 662-65 (1988). In that connection, it would frequently not be sufficient for an opponent to rely on quotations from or citations to published work of researchers who have apparently reached conclusions at variance with the movant's affiants. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 436 (1984), reconsid. den. on other grounds, LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984).

The failure of a party to file in its motion for summary disposition a separate statement of the "material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be heard," as required by 10 C.F.R. § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)), while asserting in its reply that its statement of undisputed facts actually appears in its brief, is arguably a procedural defect that warrants denial of summary disposition. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and 3), LBP-02-10, 55 NRC 236, 240 (2002).

Answers to interrogatories can be used to counter evidentiary material proffered in support of a motion for summary disposition, but only if they are made on the basis of personal knowledge, over facts that would be admissible as evidence, and are made by a respondent competent to testify to those facts. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-32A, 17 NRC 1170, 1175 (1983).

An opponent's allegation of missing information without a showing of its materiality is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary disposition. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-89-35, 30 NRC 677, 687-88 (1989), vacated and reversed, ALAB-944, 33 NRC 81, 140-48 (1991).

The hearsay nature of an investigator's interview report with a witness does not bar its consideration in deciding whether to grant summary disposition, particularly in the absence of any evidence suggesting the report's inherent unreliability or any material objection to the statement of facts recounted in the interview report. Advanced Medical

Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 306-07 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

The NRC staff's subsequent decision to rescind an enforcement order does not constitute an admission that disputed facts remained regarding the sufficiency of the order when issued. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 306 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

Based on the record, in Gulf States, the Board concluded that the question of whether bankruptcy courts will adequately fund nuclear facilities to ensure safety constitutes a disputed factual question for which summary disposition is inappropriate. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-95-10, 41 NRC 460, 471 (1995).

One possible answer to a motion for summary disposition is the assertion that discovery is needed to respond fully to the motion. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-8, 35 NRC 145, 152 (1992). Such a request generally should be made in a pleading supported by an affidavit. See id. See also General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 166 n.20 (1996). The functional equivalent of such a filing may be the statements of counsel during a prehearing conference outlining the discovery needed to support the party's case. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8 (1996).

In responding to a statement filed in support of a motion for summary disposition, a party who opposes the motion may only address new facts and arguments presented in the statement. The party may not raise additional arguments beyond the scope of the statement. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-30, 24 NRC 437, 439 n.1 (1986).

In an action challenging a civil penalty for violations of both the Commission's regulations and the facility's license condition, the Board held prior NRC inspection reports that conclude that at the time of an inspection there were no regulatory violations found do not in themselves raise a genuine issue of material fact. The failure by the NRC to detect a violation does not necessarily prove the negative that no violation existed. The NRC inspectors are not omniscient, and limited NRC resources preclude careful review of all but a fraction of the licensed activity. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 107-08 (1993).

For purposes of summary disposition, health effects contentions have been differentiated from other contentions. An opponent of summary disposition in the health effects area must have some new (post-1975) and substantial evidence that casts doubt on the BEIR estimates. Furthermore, he must be prepared to present that evidence through qualified witnesses at the hearing. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 437 (1984), reconsid. den., LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984), citing, Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-31, 12 NRC 264, 277 (1980).

Similarly, where a licensee opposing summary disposition in an enforcement proceeding does not contest occurrence of the essential facts contained in signed statements or reports of interview of former licensee employees, general objections to the Staff's reliance on such documents or bald assertions that the employees were "disgruntled" workers are insufficient to show a concrete, material issue of fact that would defeat summary disposition. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 306-07 (1984), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

In opposing summary disposition by seeking to establish the existence of a genuine dispute regarding a material factual issue, a party must present sufficiently probative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (evidence that is "merely colorable" or is "not significantly probative" will not preclude summary judgment). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-18, 44 NRC 86 n. 9 (1996). Further, a party's bald assertion, even when supported by an expert, will not establish a genuine material factual dispute. See United States v. Various Slot Machines on Guam, 658 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1981) (in the context of summary judgment motion, an expert must back up his opinion with specific facts) see also McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (expert's study based on "unsupported assumptions and unsound extrapolation" cannot be used to support summary judgment motion). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-18, 44 NRC 86, 103 (1996). A party that had discovery following the filing of the dispositive motion generally cannot interpose claims based on a lack of information as the valid basis for a genuine material factual dispute. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-18, 44 NRC 86, 101-102 (1996).

### **3.5.5 Time for Filing Motions for Summary Disposition**

Summary disposition motion must be filed no later than 20 days after the close of discovery. 10 CFR § 2.710(a).

A Licensing Board convened solely to rule on petitions to intervene lacks the jurisdiction to consider filings going to the merits of the controversy. Consequently, such a Board cannot entertain motions for summary disposition. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-400, 5 NRC 1175, 1177-78 (1977). The filing of such motions must, therefore, await the appointment of a hearing board.

In Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-8, 15 NRC 299, 336 (1982), the Board permitted late filing of affidavits in support of a motion for summary disposition where: (1) blizzard conditions and misunderstandings as to late filing requirements existed; (2) no serious delay in the proceedings resulted; and (3) the testimony and affidavits submitted were particularly helpful and directly relevant to the safety of the spent fuel pool amendment being sought.

10 CFR § 2.710(d)(1) (formerly § 2.749) permits a Board to deny summarily motions for summary disposition which occur shortly before a hearing where the motion would require the diversion of the parties' or the Board's resources from preparation for the hearing. The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-82-93, 16 NRC 1391, 1393 (1982).

A presiding officer typically will not consider a motion for summary disposition at the same time he is making a determination about the admissibility of a contention. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-15, 44 NRC 8, 38 (1996).

### **3.5.6 Time for Filing Responses to Summary Disposition Motions**

Section 2.710(a) (formerly 2.749(a)) requires that responses to motions for summary disposition be filed within 20 days after service of the motion. But see Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-32, 22 NRC 434, 436 (1985) (the Licensing Board extended the time period for the Applicants' response to an intervenor's motion for summary disposition where the Applicants, pursuant to a Management Plan to resolve design and quality assurance issues, were gathering information to establish the adequacy and safety of the plant).

A party who seeks an extension of the time period for the filing of its response to a motion for summary disposition should not merely assert the existence of potential witnesses who might be persuaded to testify on its behalf. A party should provide some assurances that the potential witnesses will appear and will testify on pertinent matters. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-872. 26 NRC 127, 143 (1987).

A movant for summary disposition is generally prohibited from filing a reply to another party's answer to the motion. 10 CFR § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)). However, pursuant to its general authority under 10 CFR § 2.319(g) (formerly § 2.718(e)), a Licensing Board may lift the prohibition if the movant can establish a compelling reason or need to file a reply. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-26, 26 NRC 201, 204 (1987), reconsid. denied, LBP-87-29, 26 NRC 302 (1987). See Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 499-500 (1991). Cf. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 123 n.10 (2006) (pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(c), although there is no right of reply to an answer to a motion for summary disposition, if such an answer included a plainly and factually incorrect allegation, the moving party could request an opportunity to respond and to correct the record).

### **3.5.7 Role/Power of Licensing Board in Ruling on Summary Disposition Motions**

With the consent of the parties, the Board may adopt a somewhat more lenient standard for granting summary disposition than is provided under 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749). For example, the Board may grant summary disposition whenever it decides that it can arrive at a reasonable decision without benefit of a hearing. That test would permit the Board to grant summary disposition under some circumstances in which it would otherwise be required to find that there is a genuine issue of fact requiring trial. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-25, 19 NRC 1589, 1591 (1984).

The proponent of the motion must still meet his burden of proof to establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 753-54 (1977); Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and



2), LBP-81-8, 13 NRC 335, 337 (1981); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-27A, 22 NRC 207, 208 (1985); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 310 (1985); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 633 (1986). The Board's function, based on the filing and supporting material, is simply to determine whether genuine issues exist between the parties. It has no role to decide or resolve such issues at this stage of the proceeding. The parties opposing such motions may not rest on mere allegations or denials, and facts not controverted are deemed to be admitted. Since the burden of proof is on the proponent of the motion, the evidence submitted must be construed in favor of the party in opposition thereto, who receives the benefit of any favorable inferences that can be drawn. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 361 (1994).

When conflicting expert opinions are involved, summary disposition is rarely appropriate. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 122 (2006) (citing, e.g., Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 2005)). Differences among experts may occur at different factual levels: either about disputed baseline observations, or about the ultimate facts or inferences to be drawn even where baseline facts may be uncontested. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 122 (citing Private Fuel Storage (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-39, 54 NRC 497, 509 (2001)). Factual disputes of this nature are to be resolved at an evidentiary hearing, where the Board has the opportunity to examine witnesses, probe the documents, and weigh the evidence. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-5, 63 NRC at 122. However, this rule would not apply if an expert asserts a factual and technical position that is so patently incorrect or absurd (e.g., that the world is flat) that a presiding officer must reject that position as constituting a genuine dispute. Id. at 125 n.13.

When a trial court considers a motion for summary disposition involving conflicting expert testimony, the court must focus on each opinion's "principles and methodology" to ensure it is sufficiently grounded in factual basis, but it is not the court's role to determine which experts are more correct. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-39, 54 NRC 497, 510 (2001), (citing, Kannankeril v. Terminix International, 128 F.3d 802, 807 (3d Cir. 1997)); Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 632 F. Supp. 1225, 1243 (D. Del. 1986), *aff'd on other ground*, 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987); Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 122 (2006).. The above holdings apply to the licensing boards, even though the licensing boards have the dual function of ruling on summary disposition motions and then becoming the trier of fact. This dual role does not allow licensing boards to combine both functions in one step. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-39, 54 NRC 497, 510 (2001).

The Board may not dictate to any party the manner in which it presents its case. The Board may not substitute its judgment for the parties' on the merits of their case in order to summarily dismiss their motions, but it must deal with the motions on the merits before reaching a conclusion. UCLA Research Reactor, *supra*, 16 NRC at 1394, 1395.

A presiding officer need consider only those purported factual disputes that are “material” to the resolution of the issues raised in a summary disposition motion. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (factual disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-18, 44 NRC 86, 99 (1996).

In an interesting approach seeking to avoid relitigation of matters considered in a prior proceeding concerning the same reactor, a Licensing Board invited motions for summary disposition which rely on the record of the prior proceeding. In response, the intervenor was expected to indicate why the prior record was inadequate and why further proceedings might be necessary. The Licensing Board planned to take official notice of the record in the prior proceeding and render a decision as to whether further evidentiary hearings were necessary. General Electric Co. (GETR Vallecitos), LBP-85-4, 21 NRC 399, 408 (1985).

Where the existing record is insufficient to allow summary disposition, it is not improper for a Licensing Board to request submission of additional documents which it knows would support summary disposition and to consider such documents in reaching a decision on a summary disposition motion. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 752 (1977).

When summary disposition is requested before discovery is completed, the Board may deny the request either upon a showing of the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or upon a showing that there is good reason for the Board to defer judgment until after specific discovery requests are made and answered. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-55, 14 NRC 1017, 1021 (1981).

A summary disposition decision that an allegation presents no genuine issue of fact may preclude admission of a subsequent, late-filed contention based on the same allegation. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-19B, 15 NRC 627, 631632 (1982).

In dicta, a Board commented that it is an abuse of the adjudicatory process to use a motion for summary disposition as a subterfuge for the filing of interrogatories, requests for admission, or other discovery (which are generally not permitted in Subpart L proceedings); as a mechanism for exhausting an impecunious litigant; or for any other extraneous purpose. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 128 n.15 (2006).

### **3.5.7.1 Operating License Hearings**

A Board may grant summary disposition as to all or any part of the matters involved in an operating license proceeding. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 634 (1986), citing, 10 CFR § 2.710(a) (formerly § 2.749(a)). In a construction permit proceeding, summary disposition may only be granted as to specific subordinate issues and may not be granted as to the ultimate issue of whether the permit should be authorized. 10 CFR § 2.710(d) (formerly § 2.749(d)).

In an operating license proceeding, where significant health and safety or environmental issues are involved, a Licensing Board should grant a motion for summary disposition only if it is convinced from the material filed that the public health and safety or the environment will be satisfactorily protected. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-81-2, 13 NRC 36, 40-41 (1981), citing, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741 (1977); 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 633 (1986).

In an operating license proceeding, summary disposition on safety issues should not be considered or granted until after the Staff's Safety Evaluation Report and the ACRS letter have been issued. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-20, 5 NRC 680, 681 (1977).

### **3.5.7.2 Construction Permit Hearings**

While, as a general rule, summary disposition can be granted in nearly any proceeding as to nearly any matter for which there is no genuine issue of material fact, there is an exception under NRC Practice. In construction permit hearings, summary disposition may not be used to determine the ultimate issue as to whether the CP will be granted. 10 CFR § 2.710(d) (formerly § 2.749(d)). See Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-80-15, 11 NRC 765, 767 (1980).

The limitation on summary disposition in a construction permit proceeding does not apply in a construction permit amendment proceeding. Summary disposition may be granted in a CP amendment proceeding where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that warrants a hearing and the moving party is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of law. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1188 and n.14 (1984).

### **3.5.7.3 Amendments to Existing Licenses**

Summary disposition may be used in license amendment proceedings where a hearing is held with respect to the amendment. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-191, 7 AEC 417 (1974). See, e.g., Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-79-14, 9 NRC 557, 566-567 (1979); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 310 (1985).

### **3.5.8 Summary Disposition: Mootness**

Where a contention challenges an omission by an applicant, and the applicant has since remedied this omission through responses to Staff requests for additional information, summary disposition of the contention on mootness grounds is appropriate. Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 182 (2005).

When summary disposition is being sought based on a contention's mootness in light of revised information submitted by an applicant in response to NRC Staff requests for additional information (RAI), a summary disposition motion is not premature because the information was not incorporated into a license application amendment until after the disposition motion was filed. Regardless of the situation prior to the submission of the application amendment, given there is no material dispute that the application currently contains RAI information, nothing precludes the entry of summary disposition. Private Fuel Storage, LLC, LBP-99-23, 49 NRC 485, 493 (1999).

When summary disposition is being sought based on a contention's mootness in light of revised information submitted by the applicant, a challenge to the validity of the revised information does not support the notion there is a controversy, factual or otherwise, regarding the existing contention so that summary disposition is inappropriate; instead, this is an argument in favor of a new contention. Private Fuel Storage, LLC, LBP-99-23, 49 NRC 485, 493 (1999).

### **3.5.9 Content of Summary Disposition Order**

In granting summary judgment, the Licensing Board should set forth the legal and factual bases for its action. Where it has not, the record will be examined and see if there are any genuine issues. Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 453 n.4 (1980).

An evidentiary hearing would be necessary only if a genuine issue of material fact were in dispute. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-22, 38 NRC 98, 119-20 (1993).

### **3.5.10 Appeals from Rulings on Summary Disposition**

As is the case under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules, a denial of a motion for summary disposition is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Generating Station, Unit 3), ALAB-220, 8 AEC 93 (1974); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-85-29, 22 NRC 300, 331 (1985). This applies as well to denials of partial summary disposition. Waterford, cited in Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-641, 13 NRC 550, 551 (1981). An order granting summary disposition of an intervenor's sole contention is not interlocutory since the consequence is intervenor's dismissal from the proceeding. As such, it is immediately appealable. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13 NRC 75, 77 n.2 (1981). An order summarily dismissing some, but not all, of an intervenor's contentions which does not have the effect of dismissing the intervenor from the proceeding is interlocutory in nature and an appeal must await the issuance of an initial decision. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-736, 18 NRC 165 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-807, 21 NRC 1195, 1198 n.3 (1985); Turkey Point, supra, 22 NRC at 331.

Where a Licensing Board has not set forth the legal and factual basis for its action on a summary judgment motion, the Appeal Board will examine the record to see if there are any genuine issues. Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 453 n.4 (1980).

Reluctance to certify a Licensing Board's summary disposition decision to the Commission, claiming that it is a ruling as a matter of law, is outweighed by both the fact that there are often factual elements and also the Commission's admonition that "boards are encouraged to certify novel legal or policy questions relating to admitted issues to the Commission as early as possible in the proceeding." Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-6, 51 NRC 101, 136 (2000).

### **3.6 Other Dispositive Motions/Failure to State a Claim**

Commission Rules of Practice make no provision for motions for orders of dismissal for failing to state a legal claim. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do in Rule 12(b)(6), and Licensing Boards occasionally look to federal cases interpreting that rule for guidance. In the consideration of such dismissal motions, which are not generally viewed favorably by the courts, all factual allegations of the complaint are to be considered true and to be read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 365 (1994).

### **3.7 Attendance at and Participation in Hearings**

An intervenor may not step in and out of participation in a particular issue at will. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-288, 2 NRC 390, 393 (1975). According to one Licensing Board, an intervenor who raises an issue and then refuses to actively participate in the hearing may lose his right to appeal the Licensing Board's decision. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), LBP-76-7, 3 NRC 156 (1976). See Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-851, 24 NRC 529, 530 (1986), citing, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 907 (1982), review declined, CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69 (1983). A party's total failure to assume a significant participational role in a proceeding (e.g., his failure to appear at hearings and to file proposed findings), at least in combination with other factors militating against his being retained as a party, will, upon motion of another party, result in his dismissal from the proceeding. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-358, 4 NRC 558, 560 (1976).

If an intervenor "walks out" of a hearing, it is nevertheless proper for the Licensing Board to proceed in his absence. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 251 (1975); 10 CFR § 2.320(b) (formerly § 2.707(b)). The best practice in such a situation is for the Board to make thorough inquiry as to the issues raised by the absent intervenor despite his absence. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-242, 8 AEC 847, 849 (1974).

A party seeking to be excused from participation in a prehearing conference should present its justification in a request presented before the date of the conference. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-488, 8 NRC 187, 191 (1978).

The appropriate sanction for willful refusal to attend a prehearing conference is dismissal of the petition for intervention. In the alternative, an appropriate sanction is the acceptance of the truth of all statements made by the applicant or the Staff at the prehearing conference. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-82-108, 16 NRC 1811, 1817 (1982).

Where an intervenor indicates its intention not to participate in the evidentiary hearing, the intervenor may be held in default and its admitted contentions dismissed although the Licensing Board will review those contentions to assure that they do not raise serious matters that must be considered. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), LBP-76-7, 3 NRC 156, 157 (1976). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 429-31 (1990), aff'd in part, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990).

Where an issue is remanded to the Licensing Board and a party did not previously participate in consideration of that issue, submitting no contentions, evidence or proposed findings on it and taking no exceptions to the Licensing Board's disposition of it, the Licensing Board is fully justified in excluding that party from participation in the remanded hearing on that issue. Status as a party does not carry with it a license to step in and out of consideration of issues at will. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 268-69 (1978).

A participant in an NRC proceeding should anticipate having to manipulate its resources, however limited, to meet its obligations. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-719, 17 NRC 387, 394 (1983), citing, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-666, 15 NRC 277, 279 (1982); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-566, 10 NRC 527, 530 (1979); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-14, 23 NRC 553, 559 (1986).

### **3.8 Burden and Means of Proof**

A licensee generally bears the ultimate burden of proof. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-697, 16 NRC 1265, 1271 (1982), citing, 10 CFR § 2.325 (formerly § 2.732). This is also true for a Part 2, Subpart K proceeding. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 254-55 (2000). But intervenors must give some basis for further inquiry. Three Mile Island, supra, 16 NRC at 1271.

The ultimate burden of proof in a licensing proceeding on the question of whether a permit or license should be issued is upon the applicant. But where one of the other parties to the proceeding contends that, for a specific reason the permit or license should be denied, that party has the burden of going forward with evidence to buttress that contention. Once the party has introduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the applicant, which as part of its overall burden of proof, must provide a sufficient rebuttal to satisfy the Board that it should reject the contention as a basis for denial of the permit or license. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford steam Electric station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1093 (1983), citing, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 345 (1973); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford steam Electric station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 56 (1985). See Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-315, 3 NRC 101, 103

(1976); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 15-16 (1990).

Government entities have the same burdens in proving their cases in NRC licensing proceedings as private entities. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), LBP-97-7, 45 NRC 265, 271 (1997).

Where the Licensing Board directed an intervenor to proceed with its case first because of the intervenor's failure to comply with certain discovery requests and Board orders, the alteration in the order of presentation did not shift the burden of proof. That burden has been and remains on the licensee. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1245 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

Under Commission practice, the applicant for a construction permit or operating license always has the ultimate burden of proof. 10 CFR § 2.325 (formerly § 2.732). The degree to which he must persuade the board (burden of persuasion) should depend upon the gravity of the matters in controversy. Virginia Electric & Power Company (North Anna Power station, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 17, n.18 (1975).

An applicant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the off-site emergency plan complies with Commission rules and guidance. The burden must be carried whether or not the applicant is primarily responsible for carrying out a particular aspect of the plan. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77, 16 NRC 1096, 1099 (1982), citing, 10 CFR § 2.325 (formerly § 2.732).

An applicant has the burden of proving, prior to the issuance of a full-power license, that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in an emergency. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 518 (1986), citing, 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(1). However, an applicant is not required to prove and reprove essentially unchallenged factual elements of its case. An intervenor may not merely assert a need for more current information without having raised any questions concerning the accuracy of the applicant's submitted facts. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-857, 25 NRC 7, 13 (1987).

There is some authority to the effect that in show cause proceedings for modification of a construction permit, the burden of going forward is on the Staff or intervenor who is seeking the modification since such party is the "proponent of an order." Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-54, 8 AEC 112 (1974).

With respect to motions, the moving party has the burden of proving that the motion should be granted and he must present information tending to show that allegations in support of his motion are true. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. (Indian Point Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-77-2, 5 NRC 13 (1977).

The movant challenging a Staff determination to make an enforcement order immediately effective bears the burden of going forward to demonstrate that the order, and the Staff's determination that it is necessary to make the order immediately effective, are not supported by "adequate evidence" within the meaning 10 C.F.R. § 2.202(c)(2)(i), but the Staff has the ultimate burden of persuasion on whether this standard has been met.

Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 215-16 (1996), (citing, 55 Fed. Reg. 27,645, 27646 (1990); St Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc. (d.b.a. St. Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc., and Fisher Radiological Clinic), LBP-92-34, 36 NRC 317, 321-22 (1992)); Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D. (Upper Montclair, New Jersey), LBP-97-15, 46 NRC 60, 61 (1997). (See General Matters-Immediate Effectiveness Review).

The general rule that the applicant carries the burden of proof does not apply with regard to alternate site considerations. For alternate sites, the burden of proof is on the Staff and the applicant's evidence in this regard cannot substitute for an inadequate analysis by the Staff. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating station, Unit 2), ALAB-479, 7 NRC 774, 794 (1978).

The applicant carries the burden of proof on safety issues. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1048 (1983), citing, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-283, 2 NRC 11, 17 (1975).

An applicant who challenges the Staff's denial of his application for an operator's license has the burden of proving that the Staff incorrectly graded or administered the operator examination. If the applicant establishes a prima facie case that the Staff acted incorrectly, then the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the Staff. Alfred J. Morabito (Senior Operator License for Beaver Valley Power station, Unit 1), LBP-87-23, 26 NRC 81, 84 (1987).

Applicants for a certificate of registration for a sealed source using cesium-137 chloride in caked powder form for proposed use in an irradiator held to be governed by 10 C.F.R. Part 36 must meet its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 720 (1985); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-99-30, 50 NRC 77, 100 (1999); Graystar, Inc., LBP-01-7, 53 NRC 168, 180 (2001).

### **3.8.1 Duties of Applicant/Licensee**

A licensee of a nuclear power plant has a great responsibility to the public, one that is increased by the Commission's heavy dependence on the licensee for accurate and timely information about the facility and its operation. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1208 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 48, 51 (1985).

The NRC is dependent upon all of its licensees for accurate and timely information. The Licensee must have a detailed knowledge of the quality of installed plant equipment. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 712 (1980); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 910 (1982), citing, Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 418 (1978); Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-677, 15 NRC 1387 (1982).

In general, if a party has doubts about whether to disclose information, it should do so, as the ultimate decision with regard to materiality is for the decisionmaker, not the parties. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 914 (1982).



The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with applicant and with NRC Staff to extent Staff supports the applicant's position. Parties saddled with this burden typically proceed first and then have the right to rebut the case presented by their adversaries. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-566, 10 NRC 527, 529 (1979). Because the licensee, rather than the Staff, bears the burden of proof in a licensing proceeding, the adequacy of the Staff's safety review is, in the final analysis, not determinative of whether the application should be approved. Consequently, it would be pointless for the presiding officer to rule upon the adequacy of the Staff's review. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 121 (1995).

### 3.8.2 Intervenor's Contentions - Burden and Means of Proof

It has long been held that an intervenor has the burden of going forward, either by direct evidence or by cross-examination, as to issues raised by his contentions. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163, 191 (1975); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1008, reconsid. den., ALAB-166, 6 AEC 1148 (1973), remanded on other gnds., CLI-74-2, 7 AEC 2, aff'd, ALAB-175, 7 AEC 62 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 345 (1973); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-20A, 17 NRC 586, 589 (1983).

Where an intervenor raises a particular contention challenging a licensee's ability to operate a nuclear power plant in a safe manner, the intervenor necessarily assumes the burden of going forward with the evidence to support that contention. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1245 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

An intervenor must come forward with sufficient evidence to require reasonable minds to inquire further, and it has an obligation to reveal pursuant to a discovery request what the evidence is. That requirement is not obviated by an intervenor's strategic choice to make its case through cross-examination. Seabrook, supra, 17 NRC at 589.

This requirement has, on occasion, been questioned by the courts in those situations in which the information is in the hands of the Staff and/or applicant. See, e.g., York Committee for a Safe Environment v. NRC, 527 F.2d 812 at n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

The scope of the "burden of going forward" rule has also been questioned by the courts. In Aeschliman v. NRC, 547 F.2d 622, 628 (D.C. Cir, 1976), the Court of Appeals indicated that an intervenor, in commenting on a draft EIS, need only bring sufficient attention to an issue "to stimulate the Commission's consideration of it" in order to trigger a requirement that the NRC consider whether the issue should receive detailed treatment in an EIS. The court stated that this test does not support the imposition of the burden of an affirmative evidentiary showing. Id. at n.13. Aeschliman was reversed in this regard by the U.S. Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Therein, the Court held that it is "incumbent upon intervenors who wish to participate to structure their participation so that it is meaningful, so that it alerts the agency to the intervenors' position and contentions." Id. at 553. The Court found that the NRC's use of "a threshold test,"

requiring intervenors to make a "showing sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further," was well within the agency's discretion. Id. at 554. See also Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 957 (1982), citing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978).

While the outlines of an intervenor's burdens with respect to its contentions may not be fully defined, it is clear that the Commission's rules do not preclude an intervenor from building its case defensively, on the basis of cross-examination. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 389 (1974); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-137, 6 AEC 491, 504-505 (1973).

The "threshold test," restored by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. N.R.D.C., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), goes only to the matter of the showing necessary to initiate an inquiry into a specific alternative which an intervenor (or prospective intervenor) thinks should be explored, and not to the placement of the burden of proof once such an inquiry actually has been undertaken in an adjudicatory context. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 489 n.8 (1978).

In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-10, 15 NRC 341, 344 (1982), the Board required intervenors to file a Motion Concerning Litigable Issues, by which the burden of going forward on summary disposition (but not the burden of proof) was placed on the intervenors. However, applicant and Staff would have to respond and intervenors reply. Thereafter, the standard for summary disposition would be the same as required under the rules. This special procedure was appropriate because time pressures had caused the Board to apply a lax standard for admission of contentions, depriving applicants of full notice of the contentions in the proceeding, and because applicants had already shown substantial grounds for summary disposition of all contentions in the course of a hearing that had already been completed. The Motion for Litigable Issues was intended to parallel the Motion for Summary Disposition in all but one respect--that intervenor was required to file first and to come forward with evidence indicating the existence of genuine issues of fact before applicant had to file a summary disposition motion. Applicant retained the burden of proof demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of fact, just as it would if it had originated the summary disposition process by its own motion. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-88, 16 NRC 1335, 1339 (1982).

### **3.8.3 Specific Issues - Means of Proof**

#### **3.8.3.1 Exclusion Area Controls**

The applicant must demonstrate constant total control of the entire exclusion area except for roads and waterways. As to those, only a showing of post-accident control is necessary. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-268, 1 NRC 383, 393-395 (1975). Note also that in certain situations there may be very narrow stretches of land (e.g., a narrow

strand of beach below the mean high tide line) the lack of total control of which might readily be viewed as de minimus. Where such a de minimus situation exists, strict application of the constant total control requirements may be inappropriate. Id. at 394-395.

### 3.8.3.2 Need for Facility

NEPA implicitly requires that a proposed facility exhibit some benefit to justify its construction or licensing. In the case of a nuclear power plant, the plant arguably has no benefit unless it is needed. Thus, a showing of need for the facility is apparently required to justify the licensing thereof. This need can be demonstrated either by a showing that there is a need for additional generating capacity to produce needed power or by a showing that the nuclear plant is needed as a substitute for plants that burn fossil fuels that are in short supply. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 353-354 (1975). See also Kansas Gas and Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 327 (1978). A plant may also be justified on the basis that it is needed to replace scarce natural gas as an ultimate energy resource ("i.e., to satisfy residential and business energy requirements now being directly met by natural gas"). Wolf Creek, 7 NRC at 327. In evaluating a utility's load forecast, "the most that can be required is that the forecast be a reasonable one in the light of what is ascertainable at the time made." Wolf Creek, 7 NRC at 328. Because of the uncertainty involved in predicting future demand and the serious consequences of not having generating capacity available when needed, an isolated forecast which is appreciably lower than all others in the record may be accepted only if the Board finds that the isolated ground." Wolf Creek, 7 NRC at 332.

Prior to rule changes precluding the consideration of need for power in operating license adjudications, it was held that a change in the need for power at the operating license stage must be sufficiently extensive to offset the environmental and economic costs of construction before it may be raised as a viable contention. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-35, 14 NRC 682, 684 (1981). Under the current rules, need for power now may be litigated in operating license proceedings only if it is shown, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758), that special circumstances warrant waiver of the rules prohibiting litigation of need for power. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-35, 20 NRC 887, 889-890 (1984), citing, 10 CFR 51.53(c); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 84 (1985).

The substitution theory, whereby the need for a nuclear power facility is based on the need to substitute nuclear-generated power for that produced using fossil fuels, has been upheld as providing an adequate basis on which to establish need for the facility. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 97-98 (1st Cir. 1978).

Considerable weight should be accorded the electrical demand forecast of a State utilities commission that is responsible by law for providing current analyses of probable electrical demand growth and which has conducted public hearings on the subject. A party may have the opportunity to challenge the analysis of such

commission. Nevertheless, where the evidence does not show that such analysis is seriously defective or rests on a fatally flawed foundation, no abdication of NRC responsibilities under NEPA results from according conclusive effect to such a forecast. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-490, 8 NRC 234, 240-241 (1978).

It is reasonable, in projecting market supply and demand, to rely upon the public statements of market participants, particularly those whose interests do not appear to coincide with the applicant. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), LBP-05-13, 61 NRC 385, 439 (2005). The willingness of potential customers to purchase an applicant's product is the best evidence of the applicant's ability to enter the market. Id. at 443-44 (regarding an applicant which had entered into contracts constituting a majority of the applicant's expected production capacity during the first ten years of production).

The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that there is little doubt that under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), State public utility commissions or similar bodies are empowered to make the initial decision regarding the need for power. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). But this Commission's responsibilities regarding need for power have their primary roots in NEPA rather than the AEA. NEPA does not foreclose the placement of heavy reliance on the judgment of local regulatory bodies charged with the duty of insuring that the utilities within their jurisdiction fulfill the legal obligations to meet customer demands. Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit No. 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 388-389 (1978).

### **3.8.3.3 Burden and Means of Proof in Interim Licensing Suspension Cases**

Several cases have set forth the requirements as to burden of proof and burden of going forward in interim licensing suspension cases. These rulings were promulgated in the context of the Commission's General Statement of Policy on the Uranium Fuel Cycle (41 Fed. Reg. 34707, Aug. 16, 1976) but presumably would be applicable in similar contexts that may arise in the future.

In a motion by intervenors for suspension of a construction permit in such a situation, the applicant for the CP has the burden of proof. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-349, 4 NRC 235 (1976); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-346, 4 NRC 214 (1976). An applicant faced with such a motion stands in jeopardy of having the motion summarily granted where he does not make an evidentiary showing or even address the relevant factors bearing on the propriety of suspension in his response to the motion. Id. The applicant also has the burden of going forward with evidence. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-348, 4 NRC 225 (1976). This burden of going forward is not triggered by a motion to suspend a CP which fails to state any reason which might support the grant of the motion. Id. On the other hand, the Board's duty to entertain the motion and the applicant's duty to go forward is triggered where the motion contains supporting reasons "sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further." Id.

### **3.8.3.4 Availability of Uranium Supply**

In considering the extent of uranium resources, a Board should not restrict itself to established resources which have already been discovered and evaluated in terms of economic feasibility but should consider, in addition, "probable" uranium resources which will likely be available over the next 40 years. The Board should also consider the total number of reactors "currently in operation, under construction, and on order" rather than the number reasonably expected to be operational in the time period under consideration since future reactors will not be licensed unless there is sufficient fuel for them as well as previously licensed reactors. Kansas Gas and Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 323-25 (1978). See also Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977) and ALAB-317, 3 NRC 175 (1976).

In order to establish the availability of an uranium supply, a construction permit applicant need not demonstrate that it has a long-term contract for fuel. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-347, 4 NRC 216, 222 (1976).

### **3.8.3.5 Environmental Costs**

(RESERVED)

#### **3.8.3.5.1 Cost of Withdrawing Farmland from Production**

The environmental cost of withdrawing farmland is "deemed to be the costs of the generation (if necessary) of an equal amount of production on other land." Kansas Gas and Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 335 (1978). The Appeal Board specifically rejected the analytical approach in which the lost productivity is compared to available national cropland resources as "an 'empty ritual' with a predetermined result" since this approach will always lead to the conclusion that withdrawal will have an insignificant impact. Id. (See also 6.16.6.1.1)

### **3.8.3.6 Alternate Sites Under NEPA**

To establish that no suggested alternative site is "obviously superior" to the proposed site, there must be either (1) an adequate evidentiary showing that the alternative sites should be generically rejected or (2) sufficient evidence for informed comparisons between the proposed site and individual alternatives. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 498 (1978).

### **3.8.3.7 Management Capability**

Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission is authorized to consider a licensee's character or integrity in deciding whether to continue or revoke its operating license. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1207 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). A licensee's ethics and technical proficiency are both legitimate areas of inquiry insofar as consideration of the licensee's overall management

competence is at issue. Three Mile Island, supra, 19 NRC at 1227; Piping Specialists, Inc., et al (Kansas City Missouri), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, 153 (1992).

Candor is an especially important element of management character because of the Commission's heavy dependence on an applicant or licensee to provide accurate and timely information about its facility. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 48, 51 (1985), citing, Three Mile Island, supra, 19 NRC at 1208; Piping Specialists, Inc., et al (Kansas City Missouri), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156 (1992).

Another measure of the overall competence and character of an applicant or licensee is the extent to which the company management is willing to implement its quality assurance program. Waterford, supra, 22 NRC at 15 n.5, citing, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-106, 6 AEC 182, 184 (1973). A Board may properly consider a company's efforts to remedy any construction and related QA deficiencies. Ignoring such remedial efforts would discourage companies from promptly undertaking such corrective measures. Waterford, supra, 22 NRC at 15, 53 n.64, citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 371-74 (1985).

Areas of inquiry to determine if a utility is capable of operating a facility are outlined in Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit no. 1), CLI-80-5, 11 NRC 408 (1980); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18 (1980), reconsidered, ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-13, 19 NRC 659 (1984).

False statements, if proved, could signify lack of management character sufficient to preclude an award of an operating license, at least as long as responsible individuals retained any responsibilities for the project. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1297 (1984), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-13, 19 NRC 659, 674-75 (1984), and Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69, 70 (1983).

The generally applicable standard for licensee character and integrity is whether there is reasonable assurance that the licensee has the character to operate the facility in a manner consistent with the public health and safety and NRC requirements. To decide that issue, the Commission may consider evidence of licensee behavior having a rational connection to safe operation of the facility and some reasonable relationship to licensee's candor, truthfulness, and willingness to abide by regulatory requirements and accept responsibility to protect public health and safety. In this regard, the Commission can rest its decision on evidence that past inadequacies have been corrected and that current licensee management has the requisite character. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-9, 21 NRC 1118, 1136-37 (1985).

Like "negligence," the standard of "reasonable management conduct" requires considerable judgement by the trier of fact. As there is no precedent directly on point regarding lack of reasonable management conduct by a non-expert manager, it is appropriate, therefore, for the Licensing Board to be very careful not to apply a

standard that is too demanding and that benefits too much from hindsight. Piping Specialists, Inc., et al (Kansas City Missouri), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, 166, n.13 (1992).

### **3.9 Burden of Persuasion (Degree of Proof)**

For an applicant to prevail on each factual issue, its position must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-763, 19 NRC 571, 577 (1984), review declined, CLI-84-14, 20 NRC 285 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 720 (1985). See Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 360 (1978), reconsideration denied, ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459 (1978); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 405 n.19 (1976).

The burden of persuasion (degree to which a party must convince the Board) should be influenced by the "gravity" of the matter in controversy. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 17 n.18 (1975).

A Licensing Board has utilized the clear and convincing evidence standard with regard to findings concerning the falsification and manipulation of test results by a licensee's personnel because such findings could result in serious injuries to the reputations of the individuals involved. The Board also believed that a more stringent evidentiary standard was justified where the events in question allegedly occurred seven or eight years before the hearing and the memories of the witnesses had faded. Inquiry Into Three Mile Island Unit 2 Leak Rate Data Falsification, LBP-87-15, 25 NRC 671, 691 (1987). Compare Piping Specialists, Inc. and Forrest L. Roudebush, LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, 186 (1992).

#### **3.9.1 Environmental Effects Under NEPA**

It is not necessary that environmental effects be demonstrated with certainty. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-254, 8 AEC 1184, 1191-92 (1975).

It is appropriate to focus only on whether a partial interim action will increase the environmental effects over those analyzed for the full proposed action where there is no reasonable basis to foresee that the full action will not be permitted in the future. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 629 n.76 (1983).

### **3.10 Stipulations**

10 CFR § 2.330 (formerly § 2.753) permits stipulation as to facts in a licensing proceeding. Such stipulations are generally encouraged. See, e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-74-2, 7 AEC 2, 3 n.1 (1974). However, in the NEPA context, Licensing Boards retain an independent obligation to assure that NEPA is complied with and its policies protected despite stipulations to that effect. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3), CLI-75-14, 2 NRC 835, 838 (1975).

### 3.11 Official Notice of Facts

Under 10 CFR § 2.337(f) (formerly § 2.743(i)), official notice may be taken of any fact of which U.S. Courts may take judicial notice. In addition, Licensing Boards may take official notice of any scientific or technical fact within the knowledge of the NRC as an expert body. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.337(f) (formerly § 2.743(i)), the Commission may take official notice of publicly available documents filed in the docket of a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission proceeding. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235 (1996). In any event, parties must have the opportunity to controvert facts which have been officially noticed.

Pursuant to this regulation, Licensing and Appeal Boards have taken official notice of such matters as:

- (1) a statement in a letter from the AEC's General Manager that future releases of radioactivity from a particular reactor would not exceed the lowest limit established for all reactors at the same site. Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2), LBP-74-25, 7 AEC 711, 733 (1974);
- (2) Commission records, letters from applicants and materials on file in the Public Document Room to establish the facts with regard to the Ginna fuel problem as that problem related to an appeal in another case. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 2), ALAB-75, 5 AEC 309, 310 (1972);
- (3) portions of a hearing record in another Commission proceeding involving the same parties and a similar facility design. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-5, 7 AEC 82, 92 (1974);
- (4) a statement, set forth in a pleading filed by a party in another Commission proceeding, of AEC responses to interrogatories propounded in a court case to which the agency was a party. Catawba, supra, 7 AEC at 96;
- (5) Staff reports and WASH documents. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-74-22, 7 AEC 659, 667 (1974);
- (6) ACRS letters on file in the Public Document Room. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 332 (1973);
- (7) the existence of an applicant's Federal Water Pollution Control Act Section 401 certificate. Washington Public Power Supply System (Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-113, 6 AEC 251, 252 (1973).

In most of these cases, the basis for taking official notice was that the document or material noticed was within the knowledge of the Commission as an expert body or was a part of the public records of the Commission (See, e.g., cases cited in items 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 supra).

In the same vein, it would appear that nothing would preclude a Licensing Board from taking official notice of reports and documents filed with the agency by regulated parties, provided that parties to the proceeding are given adequate opportunity to controvert the matter as to which official notice is taken. See, e.g., Market Street Ry Co. v. Railroad



Commission of California, 324 U.S. 548, 562 (1945) (agency's decision based in part on officially noticed monthly operating reports filed with agency by party); State of Wisconsin v. FPC, 201 F.2d 183, 186 (1952), cert. den., 345 U.S. 934 (1953) (regulatory agency can and should take official notice of reports filed with it by regulated company).

The Commission may take official notice of a matter which is beyond reasonable controversy and which is capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-2, 33 NRC 61, 74-75 (1991), citing, Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 147 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976), reconsid. denied on other grounds, CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461 (1991).

10 CFR § 2.337(f) (formerly § 2.743(i)) requires that the parties be informed of the precise facts as to which official notice will be taken and be given the opportunity to controvert those facts. Moreover, it is clear that official notice applies to facts, not opinions or conclusions. Consequently, it is improper to take official notice of opinions and conclusions. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point, Unit 2), LBP-74-26, 7 AEC 758, 760 (1974). While official notice is appropriate as to background facts or facts relating only indirectly to the issues, it is inappropriate as to facts directly and specifically at issue in a proceeding. K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, § 15.08.

Official notice of information in another proceeding is permissible where the parties to the two proceedings are identical, there was an opportunity for rebuttal, and no party is prejudiced by reliance on the information. Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (Cobalt-60 Storage Facility), ALAB-682, 16 NRC 150, 154 n.3 (1982), citing, United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 527-530 (1945); 10 CFR 2.337(f) (formerly 2.743(i)).

The use of officially noticeable material is unobjectionable in proper circumstances. 10 CFR § 2.337(f) (formerly § 2.743(i)). Interested parties, however, must have an effective chance to respond to crucial facts. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 350 (1983), citing, Carson Products Co. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 453, 459 (5th Cir. 1979).

A Licensing Board will decline to take official notice of a matter which is initially presented in a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law since this would deny opposing parties the opportunity under 10 CFR § 2.337(a) (formerly § 2.734(c)) to confront the facts noticed. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-13, 27 NRC 509, 565-66 (1988).

Absent good cause, a Licensing Board will not take official notice of documents which are introduced for the first time as attachments to a party's proposed findings of fact. In order to be properly admitted as evidence, such documents should be offered as exhibits before the close of the record so that the other parties have an opportunity to raise objections to the documents. Inquiry Into Three Mile Island Unit 2 Leak Rate Data Falsification, LBP-87-15, 25 NRC 671, 687-88 (1987).

The Commission's reference to various documents in the background section of an order and notice of hearing does not indicate that the Commission has taken official notice of such documents. A party who wishes to rely upon such documents as evidence in the

hearing should offer the documents as exhibits before the close of the record. Three Mile Island Inquiry, *supra*, 25 NRC at 688-89.

A Licensing Board will not take official notice of State law. Thus, if a party wishes to base proposed findings on a State's regulations, such regulations must be offered and accepted as an exhibit. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 525, 549 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299 (1991).

### 3.12 Evidence

10 CFR §§ 2.337 and 2.711 (formerly § 2.743) generally delineates the types and forms of evidence which will be accepted and, in some cases must be submitted in NRC licensing proceedings.

Generally, testimony is to be pre-filed in writing before the hearing. Pre-filed testimony must be served on the other parties at least 15 days in advance of the hearing at which it will be presented, though the presiding officer may permit introduction of testimony not so served either with the consent of all parties present or after they have had a reasonable chance to examine it. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B), ALAB-367, 5 NRC 92 (1977). Note, however, that where the proffering party gives an exhibit to the other parties the night before the hearing and then alters it over objection at the hearing the following day, it is error to admit such evidence since the objecting parties had no reasonable opportunity to examine it. *Id.*

Parties in civil penalty proceedings are exempt from the general requirement for filing prefiled written direct testimony. Tulsa Gamma Ray, Inc., LBP-91-25, 33 NRC 535, 536 (1991), citing, 10 CFR § 2.711(d) (formerly § 2.743(b)(3)). Prepared testimony, while generally used in licensing proceedings, is not required in certain enforcement proceedings. 10 C.F.R. 2.711(d) (formerly 2.743(b)(3)). Conam Inspection, Inc. (Itasca, IL), LBP-98-2, 47 NRC 3, 5 (1998). However, a Licensing Board may require the filing of prefiled written direct testimony in an enforcement proceeding pursuant to its authority to order depositions to be taken and to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants. Piping Specialists, Inc. LBP-92-7, 35 NRC 163, 165 (1992).

Technical analyses offered in evidence must be sponsored by an expert who can be examined on the reliability of the factual assertions and soundness of the scientific opinions found in the documents. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 367 (1983), citing, Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 477 (1982). See also Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 754-56 (1977); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 494 n.22 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-891, 27 NRC 341, 350-51 (1988). A Licensing Board may refuse to accept an expert witness' prefiled written testimony as evidence in a licensing proceeding in absence of the expert's personal appearance for cross-examination at the hearing. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1088 n.13

(1983). See generally 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-27, 4 AEC 652, 658-59 (1971).

### 3.12.1 Rules of Evidence

While the Federal Rules of Evidence are not directly applicable to NRC proceedings, NRC adjudicatory boards often look to those rules for guidance. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 365 n.32 (1983). See generally Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 475 (1982).

#### 3.12.1.1 Admissibility of Evidence

Evidence is admissible if it is relevant, material, reliable and not repetitious. 10 CFR § 2.337(a), 2.711(e) (formerly § 2.743(c)). Under this standard, the application for a permit or license is admissible upon authentication. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-83, 5 AEC 354, 369 (1972), aff'd sub nom., Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence in NRC licensing proceedings is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 365 (1983), citing, Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).

A determination on materiality will precede the admission of an exhibit into evidence, but this is not an ironclad requirement in administrative proceedings in which no jury is involved. The determinations of materiality could be safely left to a later date without prejudicing the interests of any new party. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-520, 9 NRC 48, 50 n.2 (1979).

The opinions of an expert witness which are based on scientific principles, acquired through training or experience, and data derived from analyses or by perception are admissible as evidence. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 720 & n.52 (1985). See Fed. R. Evid. 702; McGuire, supra, 15 NRC at 475.

In order for expert testimony to be admissible, it need only (1) assist the trier of fact, and (2) be rendered by a properly qualified witness. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1091 (1983). See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 475 (1982); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1602 (1985).

A Licensing Board may refuse to accept an expert witness' prefiled written testimony as evidence in a licensing proceeding in the absence of the expert's personal appearance for cross-examination at the hearing. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1088 n.13 (1983). See generally 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718); Pacific Gas and Electric

Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-27, 4 AEC 652, 658-659 (1971).

The fact that a witness is employed by a party, or paid by a party, goes only to the persuasiveness or weight that should be accorded the expert's testimony, not to its admissibility. Waterford, supra, 17 NRC at 1091; Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-39, 22 NRC 755, 756 (1985).

The Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) is conditionally admissible as substantive evidence, but once portions of the FSAR are put into controversy, applicants must present one or more competent witnesses to defend them. San Onofre, supra, 17 NRC at 366.

Prepared testimony may be struck where the witness lacks personal knowledge of the matters in the testimony and lacks expertise to interpret facts contained therein. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor Atlanta, Georgia), LBP-96-10, 43 NRC 231, 232-33 (1996).

### **3.12.1.1 Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence**

Hearsay evidence is generally admissible in administrative proceedings. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 366 (1983); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 411-12 (1976); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-802, 21 NRC 490, 501 n.67 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 279 (1987).

There is still a requirement, however, that the hearsay evidence be reliable. For example, a statement by an unknown expert to a nonexpert witness which such witness proffers as substantive evidence is unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B), ALAB-367, 5 NRC 92 (1977). In addition to being reliable, hearsay evidence must be relevant, material and not unduly repetitious, to be admissible under 10 CFR § 2.337(a) (formerly § 2.743(c)). Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 477 (1982). Although the testimony of an expert witness which is based on work or analyses performed by other people is essentially hearsay, such expert testimony is admissible in administrative proceedings if its reliability can be determined through questioning of the expert witness. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 718 (1985).

In considering a motion for summary disposition, a Board will require a witness to testify from personal knowledge in order to establish material facts which are legitimately in dispute. This requirement applies as well to expert witnesses who, although generally permitted to base their opinion testimony on hearsay, may only establish those material facts of which they have direct, personal knowledge. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-12, 23 NRC 414, 418-19 (1986).

The fact that the NRC Staff's charges in support of an enforcement order may be "hearsay" allegations does not provide sufficient reason to dismiss those claims ab initio. See Oncology Services Corp., LBP-93-20, 38 NRC 130, 135 n.2 (1993) (hearsay evidence generally admissible in administrative hearing if reliable, relevant, and material). Rather, so long as those allegations are in dispute, the validity and sufficiency of any "hearsay" information upon which they are based generally is a matter to be tested in the context of an evidentiary hearing in which the Staff must provide adequate probative evidence to carry its burden of proof. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 31 (1994).

#### **3.12.1.2 Hypothetical Questions**

Hypothetical questions may be propounded to a witness. Such questions are proper and become a part of the record, however, only to the extent that they include facts which are supported by the evidence or which the evidence tends to prove. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-334, 3 NRC 809, 828-29 (1976).

#### **3.12.1.3 Reliance on Scientific Treatises, Newspapers, Periodicals**

An expert may rely on scientific treatises and articles despite the fact that they are, by their very nature, hearsay. Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-340, 4 NRC 27 (1976). The Appeal Board in Clinton left open the question as to whether an expert could similarly rely on newspapers and other periodicals.

An expert witness may testify about analyses performed by other experts. If an expert witness were required to derive all his background data from experiments which he personally conducted, such expert would rarely be qualified to give any opinion on any subject whatsoever. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 718 (1985), citing, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319, 332 (1972).

#### **3.12.1.4 Off-the-Record Comments**

Obviously, nothing can be treated as evidence which has not been introduced and admitted as such. In this vein, off-the-record ex parte communications carry no weight in adjudicatory proceedings and cannot be treated as evidence. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 191 (1978).

#### **3.12.1.5 Presumptions and Inferences**

With respect to safeguards information, the Commission has declined to permit any presumption that a party who has demonstrated standing in a proceeding cannot be trusted with sensitive information. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-40, 18 NRC 93, 100 (1983).

In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) finding will constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability of emergency planning. Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-61, 18 NRC 700, 702 (1983), citing, 10 CFR § 50.47(a)(2).

When a party has relevant evidence within his control which he fails to produce, it may be inferred that such evidence is unfavorable to him. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 498 (1978).

Although the testimony of a public official working for a government agency may be entitled to a presumption (albeit rebuttable) that public officials are presumed to have performed their official duties in a proper manner, this presumption does not apply where the official is not operating in a traditional governmental capacity but rather as an official of a regulated entity operated by a government unit. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), LBP-97-7, 45 NRC 265, 271 (1997).

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the NRC does not presume that a licensee will violate agency regulations whenever the opportunity arises. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-9, 53 NRC 232, 235 (2001); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 405 (2000).

#### **3.12.1.6 Government Documents**

NRC adjudicatory boards may follow Rule 902 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, waiving the need for extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a precondition to admitting official government documents to allow into evidence government documents. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-520, 9 NRC 48, 49 (1979).

#### **3.12.2 Status of ACRS Letters**

Section 182(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and 10 CFR § 2.337(g) (formerly § 2.743(g)) of the Commission's Rules of Practice require that the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) letter be proffered and received into evidence. However, because the ACRS is not subject to cross-examination, the ACRS letter cannot be admitted for the truth of its contents, nor may it provide the basis for any findings where the proceeding in which it is offered is a contested one. Arkansas Power & Light Co. (Arkansas Nuclear-1, Unit 2), ALAB-94, 6 AEC 25, 32 (1973).

The contents of an ACRS report are not admissible in evidence for the truth of any matter stated therein as to controverted issues, but only for the limited purpose of establishing compliance with statutory requirements. A Licensing Board may rely upon the conclusion of the ACRS on issues that are not controverted by any party. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 367 and n.36 (1983). See also Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 340 (1973).

A Licensing Board may rely upon conclusions of the ACRS on issues that are not controverted by any party. However, the contents of an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) report cannot, of itself, serve as an underpinning for

findings on health and safety aspects of licensing proceedings. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 518 (1983), citing, Arkansas Power and Light Co. (Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2), ALAB-94, 6 AEC 25, 32 (1973).

The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) is an independent federal advisory committee that is not under the Staff's control. In the context of an uncontested ("mandatory") hearing, a Board may ask the Staff to produce relevant ACRS documents that it has reviewed but should not ask the Staff to obtain additional ACRS documents that it has not reviewed, as it is not clear that they are germane given that the Board's review is intended to ensure that the Staff's conclusions have "reasonable support in logic and fact." Exelon Generation Co., LLC; Sys. Energy Res., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site; Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), CLI-06-20, 64 NRC 15, 25-26 (2006).

### **3.12.3 Presentation of Evidence by Intervenors**

An intervenor may not adduce affirmative evidence on an issue that he has not raised himself unless and until he amends his contentions. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 869 n.17 (1974). Nevertheless, an intervenor may cross-examine a witness on those portions of his testimony which relate to matters that have been placed in controversy by any party to the proceeding as long as the intervenor has a discernible interest in the resolution of the particular matter. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975), affirming, ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 867-888 (1974).

An intervenor which has failed to present allegedly relevant information during direct examination of a witness in a Licensing Board proceeding may not assert that the information nevertheless should be considered on appeal since it could have been elicited during cross-examination. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 387 n.49 (1990).

### **3.12.4 Evidentiary Objections**

Objections to particular evidence or the manner of presentation thereof must be made in a timely fashion. Failure to object to evidence bars the subsequent taking of exceptions to its admission. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-335, 3 NRC 830, 842 n.26 (1976); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 554 n.56 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299 (1991). To preserve a claim of error on an evidentiary ruling, a party must interpose its objection and the basis therefore clearly and affirmatively. If a party appears to acquiesce in an adverse ruling and does not insist clearly on the right to introduce evidence, the Appeal Board will not find that the evidence was improperly excluded. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 362 n.90 (1978).

### 3.12.5 Statutory Construction; Weight

"Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the language of the statute itself] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The Supreme Court recently has gone even further, indicating that, when the words of a statute are unambiguous, no further judicial inquiry into legislative history of the language is permissible. Ohio Edison Company, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company and Toledo Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 301 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

If an NRC regulation is legislative in character, the rules of interpretation applicable to statutes will be equally germane to determining that regulation's meaning. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-95-17, 42 NRC 137, 143.

Where a regulation leaves a term undefined, the Board in attempting to define it will look first to the plain meaning of the term, then to the structure of the regulation, and finally, if appropriate, to the regulatory history. U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), LBP-05-27, 62 NRC 478, 506 (2005).

When regulatory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to resort to the regulatory history of the provision. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 259 (2000).

Where the meaning of a regulation is clear and obvious, the regulatory language is conclusive and we may not disregard the letter of the regulation. We must enforce the regulation as written. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-95-17, 42 NRC 137, 145.

The Licensing Board may not read unwarranted meanings into an unambiguous regulation even to support a supposedly desirable policy that is not effectuated by the regulation as written. To discern regulatory meaning, we are not free to go outside the express terms of an unambiguous regulation to extrinsic aids such as regulatory history. Aids to interpretation only can be used to resolve ambiguity in an equivocal regulation, never to create it in an unambiguous one. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-95-17, 42 NRC 137, 145.

The Board will not look to a regulation's Statements of Consideration for help in defining terms where the Board can interpret the regulation satisfactorily simply by utilizing the plain meaning of those terms and where the statement of consideration language cited is not actually aimed at clarifying the disputed terms. U.S. Department of Energy (High-Level Waste Repository), LBP-05-27, 62 NRC 478, 511-12 (2005).

The "best source of legislative history" is the congressional reports on a particular bill. See Alabama Power Co., 692 F.2d. at 1368. Perry, Davis-Besse, supra, 36 NRC at 302, aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Statement of witnesses during a congressional hearing that are neither made by a member of Congress nor referenced in the relevant committee report are normally to



be accorded little, if any, weight. See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 n. 13 (1986). Perry, Davis-Besse, 36 NRC at 302 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

A legislative body will be afforded a large measure of deference in its choice of which aspects of a particular evil it wishes to eliminate. See e.g. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981). Perry, Davis-Besse, 36 NRC at 307 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

#### **3.12.5.1 Due Process**

An equal protection challenge to an economic classification is reviewed under the rational basis standard, which requires that any classifications established in the challenged statute must rationally further a legitimate government objective. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 120 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12 (1992). Perry, Davis-Besse, 36 NRC at 306 (1992), aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

#### **3.12.5.2 Bias or Prejudgment, Disqualification**

In reviewing an agency decision allegedly subject to bias, including improper legislative influence, the independent assessment of an adjudicatory decision-maker regarding the merits of the parties' legal (as opposed to factual) positions will attenuate any earlier impropriety. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. FPC, 563 F.2d 588, 611-12 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1062 (1978). Perry, Davis-Besse, 36 NRC at 308 (1992), aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

### **3.13 Witnesses at Hearing**

Because of the complex nature of the subject matter in NRC hearings, witness panels are often utilized. It is recognized in such a procedure that no one member of the panel will possess the variety of skills and experience necessary to permit him to endorse and explain the entire testimony. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-379, 5 NRC 565, 569 (1977).

The testimony and opinion of a witness who claims no personal knowledge of, or expertise in, a particular aspect of the subject matter of his testimony will not be accorded the weight given testimony on that question from an expert witness reporting results of careful and deliberate measurements. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-15, 7 NRC 642, 647 n.8 (1978).

While a Licensing Board has held that prepared testimony should be the work and words of the witness, not his counsel, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-63, 14 NRC 1768, 1799 (1981), the Appeal Board has made it clear that what is important is not who originated the words that comprise the prepared testimony but rather whether the witness can truthfully attest that the testimony is complete and accurate to the best of his or her knowledge. Midland, ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 918 (1982).

Where technical issues are being discussed, Licensing Boards are encouraged during rebuttal and surrebuttal to put opposing witnesses on the stand simultaneously so they

may respond immediately on an opposing witness' answer to a question. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981). The admission of surrebuttal testimony is a matter within the discretion of a Licensing Board, particularly when the party sponsoring the testimony reasonably should have anticipated the attack upon its evidence. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 397 n. 101 (1990), citing, Cellular Mobile Systems v. FCC, 782 F.2d 182, 201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Where the credibility of evidence turns on the demeanor of a witness, an appellate board will give the judgment of the trial board, which saw and heard the testimony, particularly great deference. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1218 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). However, demeanor is of little weight where other testimony, documentary evidence, and common sense suggest a contrary result. Three Mile Island, supra, 19 NRC at 1218.

### **3.13.1 Compelling Appearance of Witness**

10 CFR § 2.702 (formerly § 2.720) provides that, pursuant to proper application by a party, a Licensing Board may compel the attendance and testimony of a witness by the issuance of a subpoena. A Licensing Board has no independent obligation to compel the appearance of a witness. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 215 (1986).

A NRC subpoena is enforceable if (1) it is for a proper purpose authorized by Congress; (2) the information is clearly relevant to that purpose and adequately described; and (3) statutory procedures are followed in the subpoena's issuance. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964); Construction Products Research Inc. v. United States, 73 F.3d 464, 469-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 927 (1996). St. Mary's Medical Center, CLI-97-14, 46 NRC 287, 291 (1997). The NRC may begin an investigation "merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurances that it is not." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950). The NRC's subpoena power is essentially analogous to the broad subpoena powers accorded to a grand jury. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57; Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642-43; Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946). St. Mary's Medical Center, CLI-97-14, 46 NRC 287, 291 (1997).

The Rules of Practice preclude a Licensing Board from declining to issue a subpoena on any basis other than that the testimony sought lacks "general relevance." In ruling on a request for a subpoena, the Board is specifically prohibited from attempting "to determine the admissibility of evidence." 10 CFR § 2.702(a) (formerly § 2.720(a)); Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 93 (1977).

#### **3.13.1.1 NRC Staff as Witnesses**

The provisions of 10 CFR § 2.702(a)-(g) (formerly § 2.720(a)-(g)) for compelling attendance and testimony do not apply to NRC Commissioners or Staff. 10 CFR § 2.702(h) (formerly § 2.720(h)). Nevertheless, once a Staff witness has appeared, he may be recalled and compelled to testify further, despite the provisions of 10

CFR § 2.702(h) (formerly § 2.720(h)), if it is established that there is a need for the additional testimony on the subject matter. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 391 (1974).

The Rules of Practice do not permit particular Staff witnesses to be subpoenaed. But a licensing board, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.709 (formerly § 2.720(h)(2)), may upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, require the attendance and testimony of NRC personnel. Where an NRC employee has taken positions at odds with those espoused by witnesses to be presented by the Staff, on matters at issue in a proceeding, exceptional circumstances exist. The Board determined that differing views of such matters are facts differing from those likely to be presented by the Staff witnesses and, on that basis, required the attendance and testimony of named NRC personnel. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), LBP-96-8, 43 NRC 178, 180-81 (1996).

### **3.13.1.2 ACRS Members as Witnesses**

Members of the ACRS are not subject to examination in an adjudicatory proceeding with regard to the contents of an ACRS Report. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 766 n.10 (1977).

The Appeal Board, at intervenors' request, directed that certain consultants to the ACRS appear as witnesses in the proceeding before the Board. Such an appearance was proper under the circumstances of the case, since the ACRS consultants had testified via subpoena at the licensing board level at intervenors' request. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-604, 12 NRC 149, 150-51 (1980).

### **3.13.2 Sequestration of Witnesses**

In Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-379, 5 NRC 565 (1977), the Appeal Board considered a Staff request for discretionary review of a Licensing Board ruling which excluded prospective Staff witnesses from the hearing room while other witnesses testified. The Appeal Board noted that while sequestration orders must be granted as a matter of right in Federal district court cases, NRC adjudicatory proceedings are clearly different in that direct testimony is generally pre-filed in writing. As such, all potential witnesses know in advance the basic positions to be taken by other witnesses. In this situation, the value of sequestration is reduced. Moreover, the highly technical and complex nature of NRC proceedings often demands that counsel have the aid of expert assistance during cross-examination of other parties' witnesses.

In view of these considerations, the Appeal Board held that sequestration is only proper where there is some countervailing purpose which it could serve. The Board found no such purpose in this case, but in fact, found that sequestration here threatened to impede full development of the record. As such, the Licensing Board's order was overturned. The Appeal Board also noted that there may be grounds to distinguish between Staff witnesses and other witnesses with respect to sequestration, with the Staff being less subject to sequestration than other witnesses, depending on the circumstances.

### 3.13.3 Board Witnesses

Where an intervenor would call a witness but for the intervenor's financial inability to do so, the Licensing Board may call the witness as a Board witness and authorize NRC payment of the usual witness fees and expenses. The decision to take such action is a matter of Licensing Board discretion which should be exercised with circumspection. If the Board calls such a witness as its own, it should limit cross-examination to the scope of the direct examination. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-382, 5 NRC 603, 607-08 (1977).

In the interest of a complete record, the Staff may be ordered to submit written testimony from a "knowledgeable witness" on a particular issue in a proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-607, 12 NRC 165, 167 (1980).

A Licensing Board should not call upon independent consultants to supplement an adjudicatory record except in that most extraordinary situation in which it is demonstrated that the Board cannot otherwise reach an informed decision on the issue involved. Part 2 of 10 CFR gives the Staff a dominant role in assessing the radiological health and safety aspects of facilities involved in licensing proceedings. Before an adjudicatory board resorts to outside experts of their own, they should give the NRC Staff every opportunity to explain, correct and supplement its testimony. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140, 1146, 1156 (1981). See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1247 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985). Thus, while Licensing Boards have the authority to call witnesses of their own, the exercise of this discretion must be reasonable and, like other Licensing Board rulings, is subject to appellate review. A Board may take this extraordinary action only after (1) giving the parties to the proceeding every fair opportunity to clarify and supplement their previous testimony, and (2) showing why it cannot reach an informed decision without independent witnesses. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-710, 17 NRC 25, 27-28 (1983).

Applying the criteria of Summer, supra, 14 NRC at 1156, 1163, a Licensing Board determined that it had the authority to call an expert witness to focus on matters the Staff had apparently ignored in a motion for summary disposition of a health effects contention. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-7, 19 NRC 432, 442-43 (1984), reconsid. den. on other grounds, LBP-84-15, 19 NRC 837, 838 (1984).

### 3.13.4 Expert Witnesses

When the qualifications of an expert witness are challenged, the party sponsoring the witness has the burden of demonstrating his expertise. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1405 (1977). The qualifications of the expert should be established by showing either academic training or relevant experience or some combination of the two. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-36, 8 NRC 567, 570 (1978). As to academic training, such training that bears no particular relationship to the matters for which an individual is proposed as an expert witness is

insufficient, standing alone, to qualify the individual as an expert witness on such matters. Diablo Canyon, LBP-78-36, 8 NRC at 571. In addition, the fact that a proposed expert witness was accepted as an expert on the subject matter by another Licensing Board in a separate proceeding does not necessarily mean that a subsequent Board will accept the witness as an expert. Diablo Canyon, LBP-78-36, 8 NRC at 572.

A witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 732 n.67 (1985), citing, Fed. R. Evid. 702. See Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 475 (1982).

The value of testimony by a witness at NRC proceedings is not undermined merely by the fact that the witness is a hired consultant of a licensee. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1211 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

Disqualifying bias cannot automatically be attributed to equipment vendor witnesses, "even if those vendors receive substantial benefits as a result of a decision in their favor." Furthermore, allegations of bias require substantial evidentiary support. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-8, 57 NRC 293, 341 (2003), affirmed by Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-8, 58 NRC 11 (2003).

It is not acceptable for an expert witness to state his ultimate conclusions on a crucial aspect of the issue being tried, and then to profess an inability -- for whatever reason -- to provide the foundation for them to the decision maker and litigants. Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-555, 10 NRC 23, 26 (1979). See General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-89-7, 29 NRC 138, 171-72 (1989), stay denied on other grounds, ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357 (1989), affirmed on other grounds, ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1 (1990). An assertion of "engineering judgment", without any explanation or reasons for the judgment, is insufficient to support the conclusions of an expert engineering witness. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-81, 18 NRC 1410, 1420 (1983), modified on reconsid. sub nom., Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 518, 532 (1984).

A Board should give no weight to the testimony of an asserted expert witness who can supply no scientific basis for his statements (other than his belief) and disparages his own testimony. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 735 (1985).

A witness testifying to the results of an analysis need not have at hand every piece of datum utilized in performing that analysis. In this area, a rule of reason must be applied. It is not unreasonable, however, to insist that, where the outcome on a clearly defined and substantial safety or environmental issue may hinge upon the acceptance or rejection of an expert conclusion resting in turn upon a performed analysis, the witness make available (either in his prepared testimony or on the stand) sufficient

information pertaining to the details of the analysis to permit the correctness of the conclusion to be evaluated. North Anna, *supra*, 10 NRC at 27.

A Licensing Board may refuse to accept an expert witness' prefiled written testimony as evidence in a licensing proceeding in the absence of the expert's personal appearance for cross-examination at the hearing. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1088 n.13 (1983). See generally 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-27, 4 AEC 652, 658-59 (1971).

Merely because expert witnesses for all parties reach similar conclusions on an issue does not mean that the Licensing Board must reach the same conclusion. The significance of various facts is for the Board to determine, based on the record, and cannot be delegated to the expert witnesses of various parties, even if they all agree. The Board must satisfy itself that the conclusions reached have a solid foundation. Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor, Atlanta, Georgia), LBP-97-7, 45 NRC 265, 270 (1997).

When the qualifications of an expert witness are challenged, the party sponsoring the witness has the burden of demonstrating his or her expertise. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1405 (1977); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 250 (2001).

Although the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) are not directly applicable to Commission proceedings, NRC presiding officers often look to the rules for guidance, including FRE 702 that allows a witness to be qualified as an expert “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.” Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 475 (1982) (quoting FRE 702); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 250 (2001).

Agency caselaw indicates that the qualifications of an expert are established by showing either academic training or relevant experience, or some combination of the two. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-78-36, 8 NRC 567, 570 (1978); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 250 (2001).

In the specific circumstances of the instant case, in which the Staff made five separate need-to-know determinations granting a person access to safeguards documents in his asserted capacity as Intervenor's expert, it was too late to challenge the expert's security qualifications and deny access to safeguards documents. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-21, 60 NRC 21, 29 (2004).

For expert qualification in the security context, technical competence ideally requires practical experience, but this is not indispensable in all cases. Too great an insistence on “specific” knowledge in selected aspects of the subject should not be used to disqualify an expert witness who possesses a strong general background and specialized knowledge in the relevant field. Catawba, CLI-04-21, 60 NRC at 30-31.

Licensing boards must assure themselves that a purported security expert has authentic credentials or experience in security. In the security arena, boards ought not tolerate "fishing expeditions" by untutored laypersons. Catawba, CLI-04-21, 60 NRC at 31.

An expert's testimony that challenges a summary disposition motion will not preclude summary disposition where the testimony is based upon "subjective belief or unsupported speculation" rather than the "methods and procedures of science," and where it is not based upon sufficient facts or data to be the product of applying reliable principles and methods to the facts. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-05-4, 61 NRC 71, 98-99 (2005).

#### **3.13.4.1 Fees for Expert Witnesses**

10 C.F.R. § [2.706] incorporates the provisions of FRCP Rule 26(b)(4)(C) pertaining to expert witness fees. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-03-14, 58 NRC 104, 107 (2003).

Commission regulations provide for expert witness fees in connection with depositions (10 CFR § 2.706(a)(8)) (formerly § 2.740(h)) and for subpoenaed witnesses (10 CFR § 2.702(d)) (formerly § 2.720(d)). Although these regulations specify that the fees will be those "paid to witnesses in the district courts of the United States," there had been some uncertainty as to whether the fees referred to were the statutory fees of 28 U.S.C. § 1821 or the expert witness fees of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-18, 5 NRC 671 (1977), the Licensing Board ruled that the fees referred to in the regulations were the statutory fees. The Board suggested that payment of expert witness fees is especially appropriate when the witness was secured because of his experience and when the witness' expert opinions would be explored during the deposition or testimony. The Board relied on 10 CFR § 2.702(f) (formerly § 2.720(f)), which permits conditioning denial of a motion to quash subpoenas on compliance with certain terms and conditions which could include payment of witness fees, and on 10 CFR § 2.705(c) (formerly § 2.740(c)), which provides for orders requiring compliance with terms and conditions, including payment of witness fees, prior to deposition.

#### **3.14 Cross-Examination**

Cross-examination must be limited to the scope of the contentions admitted for litigation and can appropriately be limited to the scope of direct examination. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1096 (1983), citing, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 698, affirmed, CLI-82-11, 15 NRC 1383 (1982); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 867, 869 (1974); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 378 (1985).

In exercising its discretion to limit what appears to be improper cross-examination, a Licensing Board may insist on some offer of proof or other advance indication of what the cross-examiner hopes to elicit from the witness. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1096 (1983), citing, Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978); San Onofre, supra, 15 NRC at 697; Prairie Island, supra, 8 AEC at 869.

The authority of a Board to demand cross-examination plans is encompassed by the Board's power to control the conduct of hearings and to take all necessary and proper measures to prevent argumentative, repetitious, or cumulative cross-examination. 10 CFR §§ 2.319(g), 2.333(c) (formerly §§ 2.718(e), 2.757(c)). Such plans are encouraged by the Commission as a means of making a hearing more efficient and expeditious. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 377 (1985). 10 CFR § 2.711 (formerly § 2.743) clearly gives the presiding officer the discretion to require the submittal of a cross-examination plan from any party seeking to conduct cross-examination. The plan must contain a brief description of the issues on which cross-examination will be conducted, the objectives to be achieved by cross-examination, and the proposed line of questions designed to achieve those objectives. 10 CFR § 2.711(a), (b) and (c) (formerly § 2.743(a), (b)(2)), 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33181 (August 11, 1989). Civil penalty proceedings and proceedings for the modification, suspension, or revocation of a license are exempt from these requirements. 10 CFR § 2.711(d) (formerly § 2.743(b)(3)).

Although the Rules of Practice generally require parties to submit cross-examination plans to the Licensing Board, they do not require parties to provide other parties with advance notice of exhibits they plan to use in cross examinations. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-35, 40 NRC 180 (1994).

Even if cross-examination is wrongly denied, such denial does not constitute prejudicial error per se. The complaining party must demonstrate actual prejudice, i.e., that the ruling had a substantial effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Waterford, supra, 17 NRC at 1096; San Onofre, supra, 15 NRC at 697 n.14; San Onofre, supra, 15 NRC at 1384; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1151 (1984); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 376-77 (1985); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 76 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 495 (1986).

### **3.14.1 Cross-Examination By Intervenors**

The ability to conduct cross-examination in an adjudication is not such a fundamental right that its denial constitutes pre judicial error per se. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-82-11, 15 NRC 1383, 1384 (1982).

An intervenor may cross-examine a witness on those portions of his testimony which relate to matters that have been placed in controversy by any party to the proceeding, as long as the intervenor has a discernible interest in the resolution of the particular matter. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975), affirming, ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857 (1974). In the case of a reopened proceeding, permissible inquiry through cross-examination necessarily extends to every matter within the reach of the testimony submitted by the applicants and accepted by the Board. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977).



It is error to preclude cross-examination on the ground that intervenors have the burden of proving the validity of their contentions through their own witnesses since it is clear that intervenors may build their case "defensively" through cross-examination. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 356 (1978); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-20, 21 NRC 1732, 1745 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986).

Calculations underlying a mathematical estimate which is in controversy are clearly relevant since they may reveal errors in the computation of that estimate. Hartsville, supra, 7 NRC at 355-56. A Licensing Board might be justified in denying a motion to require production of such calculations to aid cross-examination on the estimate as a matter of discretion in regulating the course of the hearing. See, e.g., Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-340, 4 NRC 27, 32-36 (1976). However, an Appeal Board will not affirm a decision to cut off cross-examination on the basis that it was within the proper limits of a Licensing Board's discretion when the record does not indicate that the Licensing Board considered this discretionary basis. Hartsville, supra, 7 NRC at 356.

An intervenor's cross-examination may not be used to expand the number or scope of contested issues. Prairie Island, supra, 8 AEC at 867. To assure that cross-examination does not expand the boundaries of issues, a Licensing Board may:

- (1) require in advance that an intervenor indicate what it will attempt to establish on cross-examination;
- (2) limit cross-examination if the Board determines that it will be of no value for development of a full record on the issues;
- (3) halt cross-examination which makes no contribution to development of a record on the issues; and
- (4) consolidate intervenors for purposes of cross-examination on the same point where it is appropriate to do so in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.316 (formerly § 2.715a).

Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-252, 8 AEC 1175, aff'd, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975).

While an intervenor has a right to cross-examine on any issue in which he has a discernible interest, the Licensing Board has a duty to monitor and restrict such cross-examination to avoid repetition. CLI-75-1 supra, 1 NRC 1. The Board is explicitly authorized to take the necessary and proper measures to prevent argumentative, repetitious or cumulative cross-examination, and the Board may properly limit cross-examination which is merely repetitive. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-367, 5 NRC 92 (1977); Prairie Island, supra, ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 868. Moreover, cross-examination must be strictly limited to the scope of the direct examination. Prairie Island, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 and ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857 at 867. As a general proposition, no party has a right to unfettered or unlimited cross-examination and cross-examination may not be carried to unreasonable lengths. The test is whether the information sought is necessary for a full and true disclosure of the facts. Prairie Island, supra, ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 869 n.16; Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-107,

16 NRC 1667, 1674-1675 (1982), citing, Section 181 of the Atomic Energy Act; Section 7(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. 556(d). This limitation applies equally to cross-examination on issues raised sua sponte by the Licensing Board in an operating license proceeding. Id. at 8 AEC 869.

The scope of cross-examination and the parties that may engage in it in particular circumstances are matters of Licensing Board discretion. Public Service Co. of Indiana Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978).

Unnecessary cross-examination may be limited by a Licensing Board, in its discretion, to expedite the orderly presentation of each party's case. Cross-examination plans (submitted to the Board alone) are encouraged, as are trial briefs and prefiled testimony outlines. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981).

Licensing Boards are authorized to establish reasonable time limits for the examination of witnesses, including cross-examination, under 10 CFR §§ 2.319(d) and 2.333(f) (formerly §§ 2.718(c) and 2.757(c)), Commission's Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452 (1981) and relevant judicial decisions. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-24, 19 NRC 1418, 1428 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 501 (1986). See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 85 F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 708 F.2d 1081, 1170-73 (7th Cir. 1983).

A Licensing Board has the authority to direct that parties to an operating license proceeding conduct their initial cross-examination by means of prehearing examinations in the nature of depositions. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), a Board has the power to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants, as well as to take any other action consistent with the APA. See also 10 CFR § 2.333 (formerly § 2.757). In expediting the hearing process using the case management method contained in Part 2, a Board should ensure that the hearings are fair, and produce a record which leads to high quality decisions and adequately protects the public health and safety and the environment. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-107, 16 NRC 1667, 1677 (1982), citing, Statement of Policy, supra, 13 NRC at 453.

In considering whether to impose controls on cross-examination, questions raised by the applicant concerning the adequacy of the Staffs of the Appeal Board or Commission to review a lengthy record, either on appeal or sua sponte, should not be taken into account. To the extent that cross-examination may contribute to a meaningful record, it should not be limited to accommodate asserted staffing deficiencies within NRC. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-28, 17 NRC 987, 992 (1983).

### **3.14.2 Cross-Examination by Experts**

The rules of practice permit a party to have its cross-examination of others performed by individuals with technical expertise in the subject matter of the cross-examination provided that the proposed interrogator is shown to meet the requirements set forth in 10 CFR § 2.703(a) (formerly § 2.633(a)). An expert interrogator need not meet the

same standard of expertise as an expert witness. The standard for interrogators under 10 CFR § 2.703(a) (formerly § 2.733(a)) is that the individual "is qualified by scientific training or experience to contribute to the development of an adequate decisional record in the proceeding by the conduct of such examination or cross-examination." The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-81-29, 14 NRC 353, 354-55 (1981).

### **3.14.3 Inability to Cross-Examine as Grounds to Reopen**

Where a Licensing Board holds to its hearing schedule despite a claim by an intervenor that he is unable to prepare for the cross-examination of witnesses because of scheduling problems, the proceeding will be reopened to allow the intervenor to cross-examine witnesses. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-249, 8 AEC 980 (1974).

### **3.15 Record of Hearing**

It is not necessary for legal materials, including the Standard Review Plan, Regulatory Guides, documents constituting Staff guidance, and industry code sections applicable to a facility, to be in the evidentiary record. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-55, 18 NRC 415, 418 (1983).

#### **3.15.1 Supplementing Hearing Record by Affidavits**

Gaps in the record may not be filled by affidavit where the issue is technical and complex. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-284, 2 NRC 197, 205-06 (1975).

There is no significance to the content of affidavits which do not disclose the identity of individuals making statements in the affidavit. Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2), ALAB-525, 9 NRC 111, 114 (1979).

#### **3.15.2 Reopening Hearing Record**

If a Licensing Board believes that circumstances warrant reopening the record for receipt of additional evidence, it has discretion to take that course of action. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741 (1977). It may do so, for example, in order to receive additional documents in support of motion for summary disposition where the existing record is insufficient. Id. at 752. For a discussion of reopening, see Section 4.4.

Although the standard for reopening the record in an NRC proceeding has been variously stated, the traditional standard requires that (1) the motion be timely, (2) significant new evidence of a safety question exist, and (3) the new evidence might materially affect the outcome. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 800 n.66 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-41, 18 NRC 104, 108 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 476 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1260 (1984), rev'd in part on other gnnds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985);

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1355 (1984); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282, 285 n.3 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-8, 21 NRC 1111, 1113 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 17 (1986); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 140-141 (2004) (finding that the Board had correctly applied the “materially alter the outcome of the hearing” standard for reopening a hearing record).

The traditional standard for reopening applies in determining whether a record should be reopened on the basis of new information. The standard does not apply where the issue is whether the record should be reopened because of an inadequate record. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282, 285 n.3 (1985).

Reopening a record is an extraordinary action. To prevail, the petitioners must demonstrate that their motions are timely, that the issues they seek to litigate are significant, and that the information they seek to add to the record would change the results. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), LBP-82-34A, 15 NRC 914, 915 (1982); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-750, 18 NRC 1205, 1207 (1983); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1365-66 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986). See also Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-807, 21 NRC 1195, 1216 (1985).

Even though a matter is timely raised and involves significant safety considerations, no reopening of the evidentiary hearing will be required if the affidavits submitted in response to the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine unresolved issue of fact, i.e., if the undisputed facts establish that the apparently significant safety issue does not exist, has been resolved, or for some other reason will have no effect upon the outcome of the licensing proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-41, 18 NRC 104, 109 (1983).

A motion to reopen the evidentiary record because of previously undiscovered conclusions of an NRC Staff inspection group must establish the existence of differing technical bases for the conclusions. The conclusions alone would be insufficient evidence to justify reopening of the record. Three Mile Island, supra, 15 NRC at 916.

Reopening the record is within the Licensing Board's discretion and need not be done absent a showing that the outcome of the proceeding might be affected and that reopening the record would involve issues of major significance. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-46, 15 NRC 1531, 1535 (1982), citing, Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station), 10 NRC 775, 804 (1978); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station), 6 NRC 33, 64, n.35 (1977); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).

After the record is closed in an operating license proceeding, where parties proffering new contentions do not meet legal standards for further hearings, that the contentions

raise serious issues is insufficient justification to reopen the record to consider them as Board issues when the contentions are being dealt with in the course of ongoing NRC investigation and Staff monitoring. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-82-20, 16 NRC 109, 110 (1982). See LBP-82-54, 16 NRC 210; Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-7, 23 NRC 233, 236 (1986), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987).

The Board must be persuaded that a serious safety matter is at stake before it is appropriate for it to require supplementation of the record. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-55, 18 NRC 415, 418 (1983). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-879, 26 NRC 410, 412 n.5, 413 (1987).

In proceedings where the evidentiary record has been closed, the record should not be reopened on TMI related issues relating to either low or full power absent a showing, by the moving party, of significant new evidence not included in the record, that materially affects the decision. Bare allegations or simple submission of new contentions is not sufficient, only significant new evidence requires reopening. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 803 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

The factors to be applied in reopening the record are not necessarily additive. Even if timely, the motion may be denied if it does not raise an issue of major significance. However, a matter may be of such gravity that the motion to reopen should be granted notwithstanding that it might have been presented earlier. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1143 (1983), citing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).

Newspaper allegations of quality assurance deficiencies, unaccompanied by evidence, ordinarily are not sufficient grounds for reopening an evidentiary record. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-3, 19 NRC 282, 286 (1984).

### **3.15.3 Material Not Contained in Hearing Record**

Adjudicatory decisions must be supported by evidence properly in the record. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227, 230 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 499 n.33 (1986). The Licensing Board may not base a decision on factual material which has not been introduced into evidence. However, if extra-record material raises an issue of possible importance to matters such as public health, the material may be examined on review. If this examination creates a serious doubt about the decision reached by the Licensing Board, the record may be reopened for the taking of supplementary evidence. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 351-352 (1978). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135, 150-152 (1990).

Whether or not proffered affidavits would leave the Licensing Board's result unchanged, simple equity precludes reopening the record in aid of intervenors' apparent desire to attack the decision below on fresh grounds. Where the presentation of new matter to supplement the record is untimely, its possible significance to the outcome of the proceeding is of no moment, at least where the issue to which it relates is devoid of grave public health and safety or environmental implications. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-648, 14 NRC 34, 38-39 (1981), citing, Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338 (1978); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-227, 8 AEC 416, 418 (1974); and Hartsville, supra.

### **3.16 Interlocutory Review via Directed Certification**

[See section 5.12.4]

### **3.17 Licensing Board Findings (See also Standards for Reversing Licensing Boards § 5.6)**

The findings of a Licensing Board must be supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence in the record. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-254, 8 AEC 1184 (1975). It is well settled that the possibility that inconsistent or even contrary views could be drawn if the views of an opposing party's experts were accepted does not prevent the Licensing Board's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 866 (1975).

A Licensing Board is free to decide a case on a theory different from that on which it was tried but when it does so, it has a concomitant obligation to bring this fact to the attention of the parties before it and to afford them a fair opportunity to present argument, and where appropriate, evidence. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 55-56 (1978); Niagara Mohawk Power Co. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 354 (1975). Note that as to a Licensing Board's findings, the appellate tribunal has authority to make factual findings on the basis of record evidence which are different from those reached by a Licensing Board and can issue supplementary findings of its own. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 42 (1977). The appellate decision can be based on grounds completely foreign to those relied upon by the Licensing Board so long as the parties had a sufficient opportunity to address those new grounds with argument and/or evidence. *Id.* In any event, decisions may be based on factual material which has not been introduced into evidence. Otherwise, other parties would be deprived of the opportunity to impeach the evidence through cross-examination or to refute it with other evidence. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 351-52 (1978).

A Licensing Board decision which is pending on appeal will be vacated when, subsequent to the issuance of the decision, circumstances have changed so as to significantly alter the evidentiary basis of the decision. Where a party seeks to change its position or materially alter its earlier presentation to the Licensing Board, the hearing record no longer represents the actual situation in the case. Other parties should be given an appropriate opportunity to comment upon or to rebut any new information which is

material to the resolution of issues. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-944, 33 NRC 81, 115-17 (1991).

The Board's initial decision should contain record citations to support the findings. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3, & 4), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 14 n.8 (1975). Despite the fact that a number of older cases have held that a Licensing Board is not required to rule specifically on each finding proposed by the parties (see Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-83, 5 AEC 354, 369 (1972), aff'd sub nom., Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir 1974); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319, 321 (1972)), a Licensing Board must clearly state the basis for its decision and, in particular, state reasons for rejecting certain evidence in reaching the decision. Public Service Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977). While the Seabrook Appeal Board found that the deficiencies in the initial decision were not so serious as to require reversal, especially in view of the fact that the Appeal Board itself would make findings of fact where necessary, the Appeal Board made it clear that a Licensing Board's blatant failure to follow the Appeal Board's direction in this regard is ground for reversal of the Licensing Board's decision.

Notwithstanding its authority to do so, the Appeal Board was normally reluctant to search the record to determine whether it included sufficient information to support conclusions for which the Licensing Board failed to provide adequate justification. A remand, very possibly accompanied by an outright vacation of the result reached below, would be the usual course where the Licensing Board's decision does not adequately support the conclusions reached therein. Seabrook, supra, 6 NRC at 42. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515, 530-31 (1988). Note, however, that in at least one case the Appeal Board did search the record where (1) the Licensing Board's decision preceded the Appeal Board's decision in Seabrook which clearly established this policy and (2) it did not take an extended period of time for the Appeal Board to conduct its own evaluation. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 368 (1978).

The admonition that Licensing Boards must clearly set forth the basis for their decisions applies to a Board's determination with respect to alternatives under NEPA. Thus, although a Licensing Board may utilize its expertise in selecting between alternatives, some explanation is necessary. Otherwise, the requirement of the Administrative Procedure Act that conclusions be founded upon substantial evidence and based on reasoned findings "become[s] lost in the haze of so-called expertise." Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 66 (1977).

When evidence is presented to the Licensing Board in response to appellate instruction that a matter is to be investigated, the Licensing Board is obligated to make findings and issue a ruling on the matter. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 368 (1978).

In Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 492 (1978), the Appeal Board reiterated that the bases for decisions must be set forth in detail, noting that, in carrying out its NEPA responsibilities, an agency "must go beyond mere assertions and indicate its basis for them so that the end product is" an informed and adequately explained judgment.

Licensing Boards have an obligation "to articulate in reasonable detail the basis for [their] determination." A substantial failure of the Licensing Board in this regard can result in the matter being remanded for reconsideration and a full explication of the reasons underlying whatever result that Board might reach upon such reconsideration. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-504, 8 NRC 406, 410-412 (1978).

The fact that a Licensing Board poses questions requiring that evidence be produced at the hearing in response to those questions does not create an inviolate duty on the part of the Board to make findings specifically addressing the subject matter of the questions. Portland General Electric Company (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-78-32, 8 NRC 413, 416 (1978).

A Licensing Board decision which rests significant findings on expert opinion not susceptible of being tested on examination of the witness is a fit candidate for reversal. Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-555, 10 NRC 23, 26 (1979).

Licensing Boards passing on construction permit applications must be satisfied that requirements for an operating license, including those involving management capability, can be met by the applicant at the time such license is sought. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 26-28 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

Where evidence may have been introduced by intervenors in an operating license proceeding, but the construction permit Licensing Board made no explicit findings with regard to those matters, and at the construction permit stage the proceeding was not contested, the operating license Licensing Board will decline to treat the construction permit Licensing Board's general findings as an implicit resolution of matters raised by intervenors. Detroit Edison Company (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-1, 9 NRC 73, 79 n.6 (1979).

In order to avoid unnecessary and costly delays in starting the operation of a plant, a Board may conduct and complete operating license hearings prior to the completion of construction of the plant. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-811, 21 NRC 1622, 1627 (1985), review denied, CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 178 (1985). Thus, a Board must make some predictive findings and, "in effect, approve applicant's present plans for future regulatory compliance." Diablo Canyon, supra, 21 NRC at 1627, citing, Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-653, 16 NRC 55, 79 (1981).

There is no requirement mandated by the Atomic Energy Act nor the Commission's regulations that a Licensing Board may not resolve a contested issue if any form of confirmatory analysis is ongoing as of the close of the record on that issue, where a Licensing Board is able to make the basic findings prerequisite to the issuance of an operating license based on the existing record. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 519 (1983), citing, Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951-52 (1974) and PublicService Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 318 (1978); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon



Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-811, 21 NRC 1622, 1628 (1985), review denied, CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 178 (1985).

Rulings and findings made in the course of a proceeding are not in themselves sufficient reasons to believe that a tribunal is biased for or against a party. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903, 923 (1981).

### **3.17.1 Independent Calculations by Licensing Board**

A Board is free to draw conclusions by applying known engineering principles to and making mathematical calculations from facts in the record whether or not any witness purported to attempt this exercise. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-229, 8 AEC 425, 437, rev. on other gnds., CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809 (1974). However, the Board must adequately explain the basis for its conclusions. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 66 (1977).

### **3.18 Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel**

Although the judicially developed doctrine of res judicata is not fully applicable in administrative proceedings, the considerations of fairness, to parties and conservation of resources embodied in this doctrine are relevant. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 27 (1978), citing, Houston Lighting and Power Company (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-77-13, 5 NRC 1303, 1321 (1977).

Thus, as a general rule, it appears that res judicata principles may be applied, where appropriate, in NRC adjudicatory proceedings. Consistent with those principles, res judicata does not apply when the foundation for a proposed action arises after the prior ruling advanced as the basis for res judicata or when the party seeking to employ the doctrine had the benefit, when he obtained the prior ruling, of a more favorable standard as to burden of proof than is now available to him. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-349, 4 NRC 235 (1976).

The common law rules regarding res judicata do not apply, in a strict sense, to administrative agencies. Res judicata need not be applied by an administrative agency where there are overriding public policy interests which favor re-litigation. United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 420 (1982), citing, International Harvester Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 628 F.2d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1980); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-20, 56 NRC 169, 182 (2002).

The res judicata or other preclusive effect of a previously decided issue is appropriately decided at the time the issue is raised anew. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-5, 47 NRC 113, 114 (1998).

When an agency decision involves substantial policy issues, an agency's need for flexibility outweighs the need for repose provided by the principle of res judicata. Clinch River, supra, 16 NRC at 420, citing, Maxwell v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir.

1969); FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 867, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 883 (1977).

A change in external circumstances is not required for an agency to exercise its basic right to change a policy decision and apply a new policy to parties to which an old policy applied. United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 420 (1982), citing, Maxwell v. N.L.R.B., 414 F.2d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1969).

An Agency must be free to consider changes that occur in the way it perceives the facts, even though the objective circumstances remain unchanged. Clinch River, supra, 16 NRC at 420, citing, Maxwell, supra; FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 867, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 883 (1977).

Principles of collateral estoppel, like those of res judicata, may be applied in administrative adjudicatory proceedings. U.S. v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 421-22 (1966); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-378, 5 NRC 557 (1977); Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210, remanded on other grounds, CLI-74-12, 7 AEC 203 (1974); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 695 (1982); Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-759, 19 NRC 13, 25 n.40 (1984), citing, Farley, supra; Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 620 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 30 n.2 (1994); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 442 (1995); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-20, 56 NRC 169, 181 (2002).

Collateral estoppel precludes re-litigation of issues of law or fact which have been finally adjudicated by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction. Davis-Besse, supra; Farley, supra. As in judicial proceedings, the purpose of the administrative repose doctrine "is to prevent continuing controversy over matters finally determined and to save the parties and boards the burden of relitigating old issues." Safety Light, 41 NRC at 442, citing Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 536 (1986).

The application of collateral estoppel does not hinge on the correctness of the decision or interlocutory ruling of the first tribunal. Moore's Federal Practice, para. 0.405[1] and [4.1] at 629, 634-37 (2d ed. 1974); Davis-Besse, supra; Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 446 (1995); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 165 n.19 (2005).. It is enough that the tribunal had jurisdiction to render the decision, that the prior judgment was rendered on the merits, that the cause of action was the same, and that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to the earlier litigation or in privity with such a party. Davis-Besse, supra; see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 165 (2005) ("Ordinarily, under principles of collateral estoppel, losing parties are not free to relitigate already-decided questions in subsequent cases involving the same parties."). Participants in a proceeding cannot be held bound by the record adduced in another proceeding to which they were not parties. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom

Station, Units 2 and 3), Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Station, Unit 2), Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-640, 13 NRC 487, 543 (1981). In virtually every case in which the doctrine of collateral estoppel was asserted to prevent litigation of a contention, it was held that privity must exist between the intervenor advancing the contention and the intervenor which litigated it in the prior proceeding. General Electric Co. (GETR Vallecitos), LBP-85-4, 21 NRC 399, 404 (1985) and cases cited. But see Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 199-200 (1981). Conversely, that parties to the former action were not joined to the second action does not prevent application of the principle. Dreyfus v. First National Bank of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1171, 1175 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970); Hummel v. Equitable Assurance Society, 151 F.2d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 1945); Davis-Besse, supra, 5 NRC 557. Where circumstances have changed (as to context or law, burden of proof or material facts) from when the issues were formerly litigated or where public interest calls for re-litigation of issues, neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata applies. Farley, supra, 7 AEC 203; Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-20, 5 NRC 680 (1977); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-10, 23 NRC 283, 286 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 537 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-3, 29 NRC 51, 56-57 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-915, 29 NRC 427 (1989); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 445 (1995). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 275 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225 (1990); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 126-127 (1992); Ohio Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; Toledo Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 285 (1992), aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 154 (2004). . Furthermore, under neither principle does a judicial decision become binding on an administrative agency if the legislature granted primary authority to decide the substantive issue in question to the administrative agency. 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 18.12 at pp. 627-28. Cf. US v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 347-52 (1959). Where application of collateral estoppel would not affect the Commission's ability to control its internal proceedings, however, a prior court decision may be binding on the NRC. Davis-Besse, supra.

In appropriate circumstances, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel which are found in the judicial setting are equally present in administrative adjudication. One exception is the existence of broad public policy considerations on special public interest factors which would outweigh the reasons underlying the doctrines. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 574-575 (1979). Whatever other public policy factors may outweigh the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the correctness of the earlier determination of an issue is not among them. Simply stated, issue preclusion does not depend on the correctness of a prior decision. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 446 (1995).

There is no basis under the Atomic Energy Act or NRC rules for excluding safety questions at the operating license stage on the basis of their consideration at the construction permit stage. The only exception is where the same party tries to raise the same question at both the construction permit and operating license stages; principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel then come into play. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 464 (1979); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1044 (1982), citing, Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-12, 7 AEC 203 (1974).

An operating license proceeding should not be utilized to rehash issues already ventilated and resolved at the construction permit stage. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1081 (1982), citing, Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-74-12, 7 AEC 203 (1974); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 536 (1986). A contention already litigated between the same parties at the construction permit stage may not be re-litigated in an operating license proceeding. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-107A, 16 NRC 1791, 1808 (1982), citing, Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-182, 7 AEC 210 (1974); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, 78-82 (1982); Shearon Harris, *supra*, 23 NRC at 536.

A party which has litigated a particular issue during an NRC proceeding is not collaterally estopped from litigating in a subsequent proceeding an issue which, although similar, is different in degree from the earlier litigated issue. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 849 (1987), aff'd, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 22 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987).

A party countering a motion for summary judgment based on res judicata need only recite the facts found in the other proceedings, and need not independently support those "facts." Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2). ALAB-575, 11 NRC 14, 15 n.3 (1980).

When certain issues have been adequately explored and resolved in an early phase of a proceeding, an intervenor may not re-litigate similar issues in a subsequent phase of the proceeding unless there are different circumstances which may have a material bearing on the resolution of the issues in the subsequent proceeding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-942, 32 NRC 395, 402-403 (1990). "To produce absolution from collateral estoppel on the ground of changed factual circumstances, the changes must be of a character and degree such as might place before the court an issue different in some respect from the one decided in the initial case." Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 446 (1995) citing 1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶10.448, at III.-642 (2d ed. 1995). Similarly, "a change or development in the controlling legal principles" or a "change [in] the legal atmosphere" may make issue preclusion inapplicable. Safety Light, 41 NRC at 446; citing Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599-600 (1948).

Collateral estoppel requires presence of at least four elements in order to be given effect: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action, (2) the issue must have been actually litigated, (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and final judgment, and (4) the determination must have been essential to the prior judgment. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 566 (1979); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-34, 18 NRC 36, 38 (1983), citing, Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-81-58, 14 NRC 1167 (1981); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 536-37 (1986), see also Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 445 (1995). In addition, the prior tribunal must have had jurisdiction to render the decision, and the party against whom the doctrine of collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party to the earlier litigation. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 620 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986); Shearon Harris, supra, 23 NRC at 536; Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 161 (1993).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel traditionally applies only when the parties in the case were also parties (or their privies) in the previous case. A limited extension of that doctrine permits "offensive" collateral estoppel, i.e., the claim by a person not a party to previous litigation that an issue had already been fully litigated against the defendant and that the defendant should be held to the previous decision because he has already had his day in court. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Leo M. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979), see also Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 442 (1995). At least one Licensing Board has held that, in operating license proceedings, estoppel may also be applied defensively, to preclude an intervenor who was not a party from raising issues litigated in the construction permit proceeding. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24, 14 NRC 175, 199-201 (1981). This would not appear to be wholly consistent with the Appeal Board's ruling in Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Station, Units 2 and 3), Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Station, Unit 2), Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Hope Creek Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-640, 13 NRC 487. 543 (1981).

The Licensing Board which conducted the San Onofre operating license hearing relied upon similar reasoning. The Board held that, although "identity of the parties" and "full prior adjudication of the issues" are textbook elements of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, they are not prerequisites to foreclosure of issues at the operating stage which were or could have been litigated at the construction permit stage. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-3, 15 NRC 61, 82 (1982). When an issue was known at the construction permit stage and was the subject of intensive scrutiny, anyone who could have (even if no one had) litigated the issue at that time can not later seek to do so at the operating license hearing without a showing of changed circumstances or newly discovered evidence. San Onofre, supra, 15 NRC at 78-82. The Appeal Board subsequently found that the Licensing Board had erred. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 694-696 (1982); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 353-354 (1983). The doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and privity provide the

appropriate bases for determining when concededly different persons or groups should be treated as having their day in court. There is no public policy reason why the Agency's administrative proceedings warrant a looser standard. San Onofre (ALAB-673), supra, 15 NRC at 696. The Appeal Board also disagreed with the Licensing Board's statement that organizations or persons who share a general point of view will adequately represent one another in NRC proceedings. San Onofre (ALAB-673), supra, 15 NRC at 695-696.

The standard for determining whether persons or organizations are so closely related in interest as to adequately represent one another is whether legal accountability between the two groups or virtual representation of one group by the other is shown. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-34, 18 NRC 36, 38 n.3 (1983), citing, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 695-96 (1982) (dictum).

An operating license Board will not apply collateral estoppel to an issue which was considered during an uncontested construction permit hearing. When there are no adverse parties in the construction permit hearing, there can be neither privity of parties nor "actual litigation" of the issue sufficient to support reliance on collateral estoppel. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 622-624 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), citing, Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 694-696 (1982). See also Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-89-15, 29 NRC 493, 506 (1989) (collateral estoppel does not apply to an issue which was reviewed by the NRC Staff, but which was not previously the subject of a contested proceeding).

An intervenor in an operating license proceeding, who was not a party in the construction permit proceeding, is not collaterally estopped from raising and re-litigating issues which were fully investigated in the construction permit proceeding. However, the intervenor has the burden of providing even greater specificity than normally required for its contentions. The intervenor must specify how circumstances have changed since the construction permit proceeding or how the Licensing Board erred in the construction permit proceeding. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 539-40 (1986). Cf. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804, 21 NRC 587, 590-91 (1985). See generally Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 354 n.5 (1983).

Where the legal standards of two statutes are significantly different, the decision of issues under one statute does not give rise to collateral estoppel in litigation of similar issues under a different statute. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-29-27, 10 NRC 563, 571 (1979).

The Commission will give effect to factual findings of Federal courts and sister agencies when those findings are part of a final judgment, even when the party seeking estoppel effect was not a party to the initial litigation. Although the application of collateral estoppel would be denied if a party could have easily joined in the prior litigation, the Commission will apply collateral estoppel even though it is alleged that a party could have joined in, if the prior litigation was a complex antitrust case. Furthermore, FERC determinations

about the applicability of antitrust laws are sufficiently similar to Commission determinations to be entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Even a shift in the burden of persuasion does not exclude the application of collateral estoppel when it is apparent that the FERC opinion did not arrive at its antitrust conclusions because of the burden of persuasion. On the other hand, the decision of a Federal district court on a summary judgment motion is not a final judgment entitled to collateral estoppel effect, particularly when the court did not fully explain the grounds for its opinion and when its decision was issued after the hearing board had already begun studying the record and had formed factual conclusions which were not adequately addressed in the district court's opinion. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-81-58, 14 NRC 1167, 1173-80, 1189-90 (1981). The repose doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, laches and the law of the case are applicable in NRC adjudicatory proceedings generally and all may be applied in antitrust proceedings because 'litigation has the same conclusive power in antitrust as elsewhere.' Ohio Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company; Toledo Edison Company (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 285 (1992), aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Legal determinations made on appeal in a case are controlling precedent, becoming the "law of the case." A prior decision should be followed unless (1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-11, 63 NRC 483, 488-89 (2006).

The repose doctrine of law of the case acts to bar re-litigation of the same issue in subsequent stages of the same proceeding. Perry, 36 NRC at 283, supra, citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983). Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine - which is a rule of repose designed to promote judicial economy and jurisprudential integrity - the decision of an appellate tribunal should ordinarily be followed in all subsequent phases of that case, provided that the particular question in issue was "actually decided or decided by necessary implication." Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 58 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (quoting Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-9, 35 NRC 156, 159-60 & n.5 (1992)). However, where the relevant appellate tribunal did not grant the petition to review the prior decision at issue, and the particular interpretation/issue was not even brought to that tribunal's attention as a basis for review, the law of the case doctrine is not apposite. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC at 58-59.

That the law of the case doctrine does not apply in a particular circumstance does not mean that the prior decision is wholly without precedential value, only that it is limited to its power to persuade. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 59 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006).

The repose doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are somewhat related. As described by the Supreme Court: under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the other hand, the second action is upon a different cause of action and the judgment in the prior suit precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to the outcome of the first action. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5 (1979). Both doctrines

thus bar re-litigation by the same parties of the same substantive issues. Res judicata also bars litigation of an issue that could have been litigated in the prior cause of action. Perry, 36 NRC at 284-85, supra, aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

To establish the defense of laches, which is an equitable doctrine that bars the late filing of a claim if a party would be prejudiced because of its actions during the interim were taken in reliance on the right challenged by the claimant, "the evidence must show both that the delay was unreasonable and that it prejudiced the defendant." Van Bourg v. Nitze, 388 F. 2d 557, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (quoting Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1966)). Perry, 36 NRC at 286, supra, aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995). It is well established that the absence of "subject matter" jurisdiction may be raised at any time in a proceeding without regard to timeliness considerations. Perry, 36 NRC at 387, supra, aff'd on other grounds, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Summary disposition may be denied on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-575, 11 NRC 14 (1980), affirming, LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563 (1979).

### **3.19 Termination of Proceedings**

#### **3.19.1 Procedures for Termination**

10 CFR § 2.203 authorizes a Board to terminate a proceeding, at any time after the issuance of a notice of hearing, on the basis of a settlement agreement, according due weight to the position of the Staff. Robert L. Dickherber and Commonwealth Edison Co. (Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station), LBP-90-28, 32 NRC 85, 86-87 (1990); St. Mary Medical Center-Hobart and St. Mary Medical Center-Gary, LBP-90-46, 32 NRC 463, 465 (1990); Kelli J. Hinds (Order Prohibiting Involvement In Licensed Activities), LBP-94-32, 40 NRC 147 (1994); Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-36, 40 NRC 283, 284 (1994); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination, Decommissioning, License Renewal Denials, and Transfer of Assets), LBP-94-41, 40 NRC 340 (1994). The rationale for providing due weight to the position of the Staff may be grounded on the merited understanding that, in the end, the Staff is responsible for maintaining protection for the health and safety of the public and, in the absence of evidence substantiating challenges to the exercise of that responsibility, the Staff's position should be upheld. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-96-24, 44 NRC 249, 256 (1996). A Licensing Board will review a proposed settlement agreement to determine if approval of the agreement might prejudice the outcome of a related NRC proceeding. New York Power Authority (James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant) and David M. Manning, LBP-92-1, 35 NRC 11, 17-18 (1992).

Termination of adjudicatory proceedings on a construction permit application should be accomplished by a motion filed by applicant's counsel with those tribunals having present jurisdiction over the proceeding. A letter by a lay official to the Commission when the Licensing Board has jurisdiction over the matter is not enough. Toledo Edison Company (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-622, 12 NRC 667, 668-9 (1980).



An operating license proceeding may not be terminated solely on the basis of a Stipulation whereby all the parties have agreed to terminate the proceeding. The parties must formally file a motion to terminate with the Licensing Board. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-14, 29 NRC 487, 488-89 (1989).

Where an amendment to an operating license has been noticed, and a petition for intervention has been filed, but the application for amendment is withdrawn prior to the Licensing Board ruling on the intervention petition and issuing a Notice of Hearing as provided in 10 CFR § 2.105(e)(2), the Commission, not the Licensing Board, has jurisdiction over the withdrawal of the application. See 10 CFR § 2.107(a). Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-93-16, 38 NRC 23 (1993), aff., CLI-93-20, 38 NRC 83 (1993). However, it is the presiding board or officer that has jurisdiction to terminate proceedings under such circumstances. CLI-93-20 at 85.

If a licensing board has not yet issued a Notice of Hearing in a proceeding pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.105(e)(2), the authority to approve a withdrawal of the application resides in the Commission rather than the Board. GPU Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-99-29, 50 NRC 331, 332 (1999); see 10 C.F.R. § 2.107(a); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-93-20, 38 NRC 82 (1993). Cf. 10 C.F.R. § 2.318(a) (formerly § 2.717(a)).

Termination of a proceeding with prejudice is not warranted where there has been no demonstration that there has been substantial prejudice to an opposing party or to the public interest. That an opposing party may “linger in uncertainty” about a future application does not constitute such a demonstration. In addition, termination with prejudice would be inappropriate in the absence of any information that would justify precluding the site from such future use. Northern States Power Company (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-97-17, 46 NRC 227, 231-232 (1997).

Under 10 C.F.R. §2.107(a), when a Notice of Hearing has not been issued, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board has the authority to grant a motion to terminate a proceeding by the Petitioners. Northern States Power Co. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-97-13, 46 NRC 11, 12 (1997). However, the licensing board lacks jurisdiction to terminate a matter pending before the Commission itself. In addition, where rulings on intervenors’ standing were those of the Commission, the licensing board lacks jurisdiction to accord a “with prejudice” termination with respect to such standing rulings. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-99-27, 50 NRC 45, 51 (1999).

### **3.19.2 Post-Termination Authority of Commission**

10 CFR § 2.107(a) expressly empowers Licensing Boards to impose conditions upon the withdrawal of a permit or license application after the issuance of a notice of hearing. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-622, 12 NRC 667, 669 n.2 (1980).

Pursuant to its general supervisory authority and responsibility over safety matters, the Commission may direct the NRC Staff to evaluate safety matters of potential concern which remain after the termination of a proceeding. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63, 67-68 (1992).

### **3.19.3 Dismissal**

Proceeding dismissed where there is continuous failure to provide information requested by the Board and information important to show petitioner's continued participation in the proceeding. Daniel J. McCool (Order Prohibiting Environment in NRC Licensed Activities), LBP-95-11, 41 NRC 475, 476-77 (1995).

Where a contention's only allegation is that a required analysis was omitted, and the applicant subsequently conducts this analysis, the contention must be dismissed as moot. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-05-24, 62 NRC 429, 431-32 (2005).

### **3.20 Uncontested Proceedings (Mandatory Hearings)**

Contested and uncontested designations with regard to mandatory hearings apply issue-by-issue, rather than case-by-case. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 34 (2005).

While there are differences between how a Board should adjudicate a contested hearing and how it should adjudicate an uncontested hearing, the fact that the relevant regulations (10 C.F.R. § 2.104(b)(1)-(2)) instruct Boards to "consider" questions in contested cases but to "determine" questions in uncontested cases was not meant to create any of these differences. "Consider" and "determine" are synonymous in this context. Both terms mean that the Board is to decide the questions involved. North Anna ESP, CLI-05-17, 62 NRC at 38.

When adjudicating an uncontested issue in a mandatory hearing, the Board's job is not to attempt to redo the Staff's work, but rather to conduct a sufficiency review, i.e. to ensure that the Staff performed an adequate review and made findings with reasonable support in logic and fact. De novo Board reviews of uncontested issues are prohibited. Even still, the Board's review should be a "truly independent" review, and the Board retains the authority to ask clarifying questions of witnesses, to order supplementation of the record, to reject the Staff's proposed action, to deny a permit outright, or to set conditions on permit approval. North Anna ESP, CLI-05-17, 62 NRC at 39-42.

Intervenors in mandatory hearings may not participate on uncontested issues, because the scope of intervenor participation is limited to the scope of admitted contentions. North Anna ESP, CLI-05-17, 62 NRC at 49.

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## 4.0 POST HEARING MATTERS

### 4.1 Settlements and Stipulations

The Commission looks with favor upon settlements and is loath to second-guess the parties' (including Staff's) evaluation of their own interest. The Commission, like the Board, looks independently at such settlements to see whether they meet the public interest. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 205 (1997).

10 CFR § 2.338 (formerly § 2.759) expressly provides, and the Commission stresses, that the fair and reasonable settlement of contested initial licensing proceedings is encouraged. This has been reiterated in Commission policy statements: Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18 (July 28, 1998); Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 456 (1981). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3), ALAB-532, 9 NRC 279, 283 (1979); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171, 201 (2002); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49, 129 (2002). ; see also Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-94-10, 39 NRC 126 (1994); Barnett Industrial X-ray, Inc. (Stillwater, Oklahoma), LBP-97-19, 46 NRC 237, 238 (1997).

Apart from its policy of encouraging settlements, the Commission has an equally important policy of supporting prompt decisionmaking. This promptness policy carries extra weight in license renewal proceedings. Further, until a licensing board has addressed the threshold issues of standing and admissibility of contentions, the proceeding is too inchoate to call for aggressive board encouragement of settlement. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 NRC 551, 568-70 (2005).

In short, 10 C.F.R. § 2.338 provides that parties may submit a proposed settlement to the Board (paragraph (a)), authorizes the Board to impose additional requirements as part of a settlement (paragraph (e)), mandates certain form requirements for a settlement agreement (paragraph (g)), and mandates certain content requirements for a settlement agreement (paragraph (h)). Assuming these form and content requirements are met, 10 C.F.R. § 2.338(i) provides the standards for approval of a settlement. Reading paragraphs (e) and (i) together, the Board concluded that it had several options when reviewing a settlement, including: (1) approval of the settlement as is, (2) imposition of additional requirements on the settlement, or (3) rejection of the settlement and issuance of an order requiring adjudication. However, given the Commission's case law, the Board did not prefer the last option. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-18, 63 NRC 830, 836 (2006).

The Presiding Officer may attempt to facilitate negotiations between parties when they are seeking to resolve some or all of the pending issues. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Receipt of Material from Tonawanda, NY), LBP-98-20, 48 NRC 137, 138 (1998). Parties may seek appointment of a settlement judge in accordance with the Commission's guidance in Rockwell Int'l Corp., CLI-90-05, 31 NRC 337 (1990). The Commission encourages the appointment of settlement judges. Since settlement judges are not

involved in a decision-making role and not bound by the ex parte rule, they may avail themselves of a wider array of settlement techniques without compromising the rights of any of the parties. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171, 202 (2002).

When a party requests to withdraw a petition pursuant to a settlement, it is appropriate for a licensing board to review the settlement to determine whether it is in the public interest. 10 C.F.R. § 2.338(i) (formerly § 2.759). See also Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 71 (1994); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomic (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-96-24, 44 NRC 249, 256-57 (1996); John Boschuk, Jr. (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-licensed activities), LBP-98-15, 48 NRC 57, 59 (1998); Lourdes T. Boschuk (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-licensed activities), LBP-98-16, 48 NRC 63, 65 (1998); Magdy Elamir, M.D. (Newark, NJ), LBP-98-25, 48 NRC 226, 227 (1998); 21st Century Technologies, Inc. (Fort Worth, TX), CLI-98-1, 47 NRC 13 (1998). See also Digest section 3.18.1. When the Licensing Board has held extensive hearings and has analyzed the record, it may not need to see the settlement agreement in order to conclude that the withdrawal of the petitioner is in the public interest. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-96-16, 44 NRC 59, 63-65 (1996).

In a proceeding stemming from the denial of a reactor operator license, a Licensing Board considered it appropriate, although no actual notice of hearing was issued, to formally state its approval of a settlement agreement between the parties. While acknowledging the possibility that Board approval may not have been required under 10 C.F.R. § 2.338(i), the Board noted that it had granted the hearing request and that the express terms and conditions of the settlement agreement had contemplated Board approval. David H. Hawes (Reactor Operator License for Vogtle Electric Generating Plant), LBP-06-2, 63 NRC 80, 81 n.1 (2006).

Commission case law holds that the opponents of a settlement may not simply object to settlement in order to block it, but must show some substantial basis for disapproving the settlement or the existence of some material issue that requires resolution. The burden is on the opponent of a settlement to come forward and show that the public interest requires the rejection of the settlement and the adjudication of the issues. This is aptly expressed in 10 C.F.R. 2.338(i), which allows the presiding officer to order the adjudication of the issues if such adjudication is required in the public interest. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-18, 63 NRC 830, 836-37 (2006).

A Licensing Board may refuse to dismiss a proceeding "with prejudice" even though all the participants jointly request that action, unless it is persuaded by legal and factual arguments in support of that request. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. et al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-29, 36 NRC 225 (1992). A settlement agreement must be submitted to the Licensing Board for a determination as to whether it is "fair and reasonable" in accordance with 10 CFR 2.338 (formerly 2.759). A petition may be dismissed with prejudice providing that a Board reviews the settlement agreement and finds, consistent with 10 CFR 2.338 (formerly 2.759), that it is a "fair and reasonable settlement." General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. et al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), LBP-92-30, 36 NRC 227 (1992).

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.203, in contested enforcement proceedings settlements are subject to the approval of a presiding officer, or if none has been assigned, the Chief Administrative Law Judge, according due weight to the position of staff. The settlement need not be immediately approved. If it is in the "public interest," an adjudication of the issues may be ordered. 10 C.F.R. § 2.203; Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics, LBP-96-18, 42 NRC 150, 154 (1995); Barnett Industrial X-ray, Inc. (Stillwater, Oklahoma), LBP-97-19, 46 NRC 237, 238 (1997); Conam Inspection, Inc. (Itasca, IL), LBP 98-31, 48 NRC 369 (1998).

The Commission is willing to presume that its staff acted in the agency's best interest in agreeing to the settlements. Only if the settlement's opponents show some "substantial" public-interest reason to overcome that presumption will the Commission undo the settlement. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 208 (1997).

In the Orem case, although the Commission expressed reservations about aspects of the settlement agreement, the Commission permitted the agreement to take effect since it did not find the agreement to be, on balance, against the public interest. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 427 (1993)(approving settlement after review of supplementary information). Cf. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination, Decommissioning, License Renewal Denials, and Transfer of Assets), LBP-94-41, 40 NRC 340, 341 (1994)(approving settlement after hearing on joint settlement motion).

As true with court proceedings requiring judicial approval of settlements, see, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727 (1986); Jeff D. V. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753, 758 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986), a presiding officer does not have the authority to revise the parties' settlement agreement without their consent. A presiding officer thus must accept or reject the settlement with the provisions proposed by the parties. Eastern Testing & Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-11, 43 NRC 279, 282 n.1 (1996).

When the parties agree to settle an enforcement proceeding, the Licensing Board loses jurisdiction over the settlement agreement once the Board's approval under 10 C.F.R. § 2.203 becomes final agency action. Thereafter, supervisory authority over such an agreement rests with the Commission. Eastern Testing & Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-11, 43 NRC 279, 282 n.1 (1996), citing Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3, & 4), CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514, 417 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-726, 17 NRC 755, 757-58 (1983). The Commission looks with favor upon settlements. 21st Century Technologies, Inc. (Fort Worth, TX), CLI-98-1, 47 NRC 13, 16 (1998).

The NRC is not required under the AEA to adhere without compromise to the remedial plan of an enforcement order. Such a restriction would effectively preclude settlement because, by prohibiting any meaningful compromise as to remedy, it would eliminate the element of exchange which is the groundwork for settlements. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 219-220 (1997).

In examining a settlement of a enforcement proceeding, the Commission divides its public-interest inquiry into four parts: (1) whether, in view of the agency's original order and risks and benefits of further litigation, the settlement result appears unreasonable; (2) whether the terms of the settlement appear incapable of effective implementation and

enforcement; (3) whether the settlement jeopardizes the public health and safety; and (4) whether the settlement approval process deprives interested parties of meaningful participation. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 202-224 (1997). Although these factors were adopted by the Commission in an enforcement context, the Commission derived these factors from an array of federal court settlement approval decisions that dealt with settlements ranging from public school desegregation class actions to antitrust enforcement suits. Given the diversity of these cases and the fact that the Board found these factors to be useful in determining whether there is some substantial public interest reason to reject a settlement in a licensing proceeding, the Board adopted the Sequoyah Fuels factors for the purpose of deciding the public interest issue in a licensing proceeding. Vermont Yankee, LBP-06-18, 63 NRC at 836-37.

The silence of 10 C.F.R. § 2.338(i) as to the process for determining whether a proposed settlement is in the “public interest” indicates that the Commission intended to leave it to the discretion of the Board to determine how to make this determination. Here, the Board considered the nature of the contentions, the identity of the proposed settlers, and the degree of media and public concern in the case, in determining whether to invite public or party comment on the proposed settlement. *Id.* at 838.

Having found that adjudication of contentions was not “required in the public interest” during its review of a proposed settlement agreement, the Board concluded that settlement of those same contentions did not raise serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security concerns warranting sua sponte review under 10 C.F.R. § 2.340(a). *Id.* at 843-44.

In reviewing risks and benefits, the Commission considers (1) the likelihood (or uncertainty) of success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery and the related risk of uncollectibility of a larger trial judgment; and (3) the complexity, length, and expense of continued litigation. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 209 (1997).

Settlement decisions made by the Staff, presumably based on an analysis of litigation risk and optimum use of scarce resources, are commonplace in litigation and have previously received Commission approval, consistent with the Commission’s longstanding policy of encouraging settlements. Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 7 (2006) (citing, e.g., Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 207-11 (1997)). The essence of settlements is compromise and the Commission will not judge them on the basis of whether the Staff (or any party) achieves in a settlement everything it could possibly attain from a fully and successfully litigated proceeding. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 210-211 (1997).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.203, any negotiated settlement between the Staff and any of the parties subject to an enforcement order must be reviewed and approved by the presiding officer. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 71 (1994); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-96-24, 44 NRC 249, 256 (1996), *aff’d*, CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195 (1997).

The issue is not whether the matter before the Board presents the best settlement that could have been obtained. The Board’s obligation instead is merely to determine whether

the agreement is within the reaches of the public interest. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-96-24, 44 NRC 249, 257 (1996), aff'd, CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195 (1997); Special Testing Laboratories, Inc., LBP-99-2, 49 NRC 38, 38 (1999). If the agreement is not in the public interest, the Board may require an adjudication of any issues that require resolution prior to termination of the proceeding. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-96-24, 44 NRC 249, 256 (1996), aff'd, CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195 (1997).

10 CFR § 2.203 sets forth the Board's function in reviewing settlements in enforcement cases. It provides that (1) settlements are subject to the Board's approval; (2) the Board, in considering whether to approve a settlement, should "accord[] due weight to the position of the staff"; and (3) the Board may "order such adjudication of the issues as [it] may deem to be required in the public interest to dispose of the proceeding". Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 205 (1997).

Third parties (including applicants) have no absolute right to veto settlements that the agreeing parties find to their advantage. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 6 (2006).

Administrative agencies and their adjudicators routinely approve stipulations and settlements to which fewer than all the parties in a case subscribe; the Commission has done so in the enforcement context. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 7 (2006) (citing Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 222-23 (1997)). Commission regulations contemplate this possibility, requiring only "the consenting parties" to file the settlement with the Board. Such settlements do not offend the rights of an excluded party, particularly where the party has had notice and opportunity to comment on the approved stipulation. Pa'ina, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC at 7 (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.338(g)).

## **4.2 Proposed Findings**

Each party to a proceeding may file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law with the Licensing Board. Although a number of older cases have held that a Licensing Board is not required to rule specifically on each finding proposed by the parties (see Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-83, 5 AEC 354, 369 (1972), aff'd sub nom., Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319, 321 (1972)), the Appeal Board thereafter indicated that a Licensing Board must clearly state the basis for its decision and, in particular, state reasons for rejecting certain evidence in reaching the decision. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977). 10 CFR § 2.712 (formerly § 2.754) permits the Licensing Board to vary its regularly provided procedures by altering the ordinary regulatory schedule for findings of fact. The NRC Staff is permitted to consider the position of other parties before finalizing its position. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-51A, 16 NRC 180, 181 (1982).

10 CFR § 2.712(c) (formerly 2.754(c)) requires that a party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law be confined to the material issues of fact and law presented on the record. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),



ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981). However, unless a board has previously required the filing of all arguments, a party is not precluded from presenting new arguments in its proposed findings of fact. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-81, 18 NRC 1410, 1420-1421 (1983), reconsid. denied sub nom. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 517 (1984).

Even though a party presents no expert testimony, it may advance proposed findings that include technical analyses, opinions, and conclusions, as long as the facts on which they are based are matters of record. The Licensing Board must do more than act as an "umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it." The Board includes experts who can evaluate the factual material in the record and reach their own judgment as to its significance. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-94-35, 40 NRC 180, 192 (1994); Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), LBP-97-7, 45 NRC 265, 271 n.7 (1997).

Requiring the submission to a Licensing Board of proposed findings of fact or a comparable document is not a mere formality: it gives that Board the benefit of a party's arguments and permits it to resolve them in the first instance, possibly in the party's favor, obviating later appeal. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 906-907 (1982).

Where an intervenor chooses to file proposed findings, the Board is entitled to take that filing as setting forth all of the issues that were contested. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 371 (1983).

A pro se licensee in a civil penalty proceeding will not be held to strict compliance with the format requirements for proposed findings if it can make a convincing showing that it cannot comply with all the technical pleading requirements of 10 CFR § 2.712(c) (formerly § 2.754(c)). Unlike intervenors who voluntarily participate in licensing proceedings, a pro se licensee, who has requested a hearing, must participate in a civil penalty proceeding in order to protect its property interests. A Licensing Board will use its best efforts to understand and rule on the merits of the claims presented. Tulsa Gamma Ray, Inc., LBP-91-40, 34 NRC 297, 303-304 (1991).

When statements in applicant's proposed findings, which are based on applicant statements by witnesses under oath before the presiding officer or as part of its application, indicate a willingness to comply with all or a portion of specific, nationally recognized consensus standards, little purpose would be served in repeating the terms of these commitments as license conditions (or as presiding officer directives). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 410 (2000), citing Commonwealth Edison Co., (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 423-24 (1980).

#### **4.2.1 Intervenor's Right to File Proposed Findings**

An intervenor may file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law only with respect to issues which that party placed in controversy or sought to place in controversy in the proceeding. 10 CFR § 2.712(c) (formerly § 2.754(c)); Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33168, 33182 (Aug. 11, 1989).

If an intervenor files additional filings that are not authorized by the board, they will not be considered in the board's decision. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-98-12, 47 NRC 343, 346 (1998).

#### 4.2.2 Failure to File Proposed Findings

Consistent with 10 CFR § 2.712 (formerly § 2.754(b)), contentions for which findings have not been submitted may be treated as having been abandoned. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-48, 15 NRC 1549, 1568 (1982).

The Appeal Board did not feel bound to review exceptions made by a party who had failed to file proposed findings on the issues with respect to which the exceptions were taken. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-280, 2 NRC 3, 4 n.2 (1975); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 964 (1974).

A Licensing Board in its discretion may refuse to rule on an issue in its initial decision if the party raising the issue has not filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 457 (1981).

A party that fails to submit proposed findings as requested by a Licensing Board, relying instead on the submission of others, assumes the risk that such reliance might be misplaced; it must be prepared to live with the consequence that its further appeal rights will be waived. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 907 (1982).

The filing of proposed findings of fact is optional, unless the presiding officer directs otherwise. The presiding officer is empowered to take a party's failure to file proposed findings, when directed to do so, as a default. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 21 (1983); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26, 20 NRC 53, 61 n.3 (1984). See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1213 n.18 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-47, 20 NRC 1405, 1414 (1984); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-87-13, 25 NRC 449, 452-53 (1987).

Even when a Licensing Board order requesting the submission of proposed findings has been disregarded, the Commission's Rules of Practice do not mandate a sanction. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 23 (1983), citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 332-33 (1973).

The failure to file proposed findings is subject to sanctions only in those instances where a Licensing Board has directed such findings to be filed. That is the extent of the adjudicatory board's enforcement powers under 10 CFR § 2.712 (formerly § 2.754). Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 23 (1983).

Absent a Board order requiring the submission of proposed findings, an intervenor that does not make such a filing is free to pursue on appeal all issues it litigated below. The setting of a schedule for filing proposed findings falls short of an explicit direction to file findings and thus does not form the basis for finding a party in default. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 371 (1983), citing former 10 CFR § 2.754 (now § 2.712); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 21 (1983).

### **4.3 Initial Decisions**

After the hearing has been concluded and proposed findings have been filed by the parties, the Licensing Board will issue its initial decision. This decision can conceivably constitute the ultimate agency decision on the matter addressed in the hearing provided that it is not modified by subsequent Commission review. Under 10 CFR § 2.340(g)(2) (formerly § 2.764), the Licensing Board's decision authorizing issuance of a full power operating license (i.e., for other than fuel loading and 5% power operations) is to be considered automatically stayed until the Commission completes a sua sponte review to determine whether to stay the decision. See Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-647, 14 NRC 27, 29 (1981).

Prior to 1979, an initial decision authorizing issuance of a construction permit (or operating license) was effective when issued, unless stayed. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 170 (1978). At that time decisions were presumptively valid and, unless or until they were stayed or overturned by appropriate authority, were entitled to full recognition. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-423, 6 NRC 115, 117 (1977).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.713 (formerly § 2.760(a)), an initial decision will constitute the final decision of the Commission forty (40) days from its issuance unless a petition for review is filed in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786), or the Commission directs otherwise. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-24, 52 NRC 351, 353 (2000).

With respect to authorization of issuance of construction permits, 10 CFR § 2.340(f) (formerly § 2.764(e)) provides for Commission review, within 60 days of any Licensing Board decision that would otherwise authorize licensing action, of any stay motions timely filed. If none are filed, the Commission will within the same period of time conduct a sua sponte review and decide whether a stay is warranted. In so deciding the Commission applies the procedures set out in 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). With regard to operating licenses, 10 CFR § 2.340(g) (formerly § 2.764(f)) provides for the immediate effectiveness of a Licensing Board's initial decision authorizing the issuance of an operating license for fuel loading and low power testing (up to 5% of rated power). However, a Licensing Board's authorization of the issuance of an operating license at greater than 5% of rated power is not effective until the Commission has determined whether to stay the effectiveness of the decision.

10 C.F.R. 2.340(f) (formerly 2.764(e)) does not apply to manufacturing licenses. A manufacturing license can become effective before it becomes final. The Commission does not undertake an immediate effectiveness review of a Licensing Board decision

authorizing its issuance. Offshore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-82-37, 16 NRC 1691 (1982). A Licensing Board decision on a manufacturing license becomes effective before it becomes final because the issuance of a manufacturing license does not conclude the construction permit process, such a license does not present health and safety issues requiring immediate review. Cf. Immediate Effectiveness Rule, 46 Fed. Reg. 47764, 47765 (Sept. 30, 1981).

A Licensing Board's initial decision must be in writing. Although a Board's initial decision may refer to the transcript of its oral bench rulings, such practice should be avoided in complicated NRC licensing hearings because it is counterproductive to meaningful appellate review. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 727 n.61 (1985).

The findings and initial decision of the Licensing Board must be supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-254, 8 AEC 1184, 1187 (1975). The initial decision must contain record citations to support the findings. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-256, 1 NRC 10, 14 n.18 (1975). Of course, a Licensing Board's decision cannot be based on factual material that has not been introduced and admitted into evidence. Otherwise the parties would be deprived of the opportunity to impeach the evidence through cross-examination or to rebut it with other evidence. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 351-52 (1978).

Licensing Boards have a general duty to insure that initial decisions contain a sufficient exposition of any ruling on a contested issue of law or fact to enable the parties and a reviewing tribunal to readily apprehend the foundation of the ruling. This is not a mere procedural nicety but it is a necessity. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-305, 3 NRC 8, 10-11 (1976); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-104, 6 AEC 179 n.2 (1973).

Clarity of the basis for the initial decision is important. In circumstances where a Licensing Board bases its ruling on an important issue on considerations other than those pressed upon it by the litigants themselves, there is especially good reason why the foundation for that ruling should be articulated in reasonable detail. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-327, 3 NRC 408, 414 (1976). When resort is made to technical language which a layman could not be expected to readily understand, there is an obligation on the part of the opinion writer to make clear the precise significance of what is being said in terms of what is being decided. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-336, 4 NRC 3 (1976).

The requirement that a Licensing Board clearly delineate the basis for its initial decision was emphasized by the Appeal Board in Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977). Therein, the Appeal Board stressed that the Licensing Board must sufficiently inform a party of the disposition of its contentions and must, at a minimum, explain why it rejected reasonable and apparently reliable evidence contrary to the Board's findings.

Thus, a prior Licensing Board ruling in Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-77-7, 5 NRC 452 (1977), to the effect that a Board need

not justify its findings by discounting proffered testimony as unreliable appears to be in error insofar as it is contrary to the Appeal Board's guidance in Seabrook. Although normally the Appeal Board was disinclined to examine the record to determine whether there is support for conclusions which the Licensing Board failed to justify, it evaluated evidence in one case because (1) the Licensing Board's decision preceded the Appeal Board's decision in Seabrook which clearly established this policy, and (2) it did not take much time for the Appeal Board to conduct its own evaluation. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 368 (1978).

In certain circumstances, time may not permit a Licensing Board to prepare and issue its detailed opinion. In this situation, one approach is for the Licensing Board to reach its conclusion and make a ruling based on the evidentiary record and to issue a subsequent detailed decision as time permits. The Appeal Board tacitly approved this approach in Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-460, 7 NRC 204 (1978). This approach has been followed by the Commission in the GESMO proceeding. See Mixed Oxide Fuel, CLI-78-10, 7 NRC 711 (1978).

It is the right and duty of a Licensing Board to include in its decision all determinations of matters on an appraisal of the record before it. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 30 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

Partial initial decisions on certain contentions favorable to an applicant can authorize issuance of certain permits and licenses, such as a low-power testing license (or, in a construction permit proceeding, a limited work authorization), notwithstanding the pendency of other contentions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1137 (1983).

#### **4.3.1 Reconsideration of Initial Decision**

See also Digest section 4.5 infra.

Petitions for reconsideration of a final decision must be filed within 10 days after the date of the decision. 10 CFR § 2.345(a)(1) [former § 2.771(a)] petitions for reconsideration of Commission decisions are subject to the requirements of § 2.341(d) [former § 2.786(e)].

The Commission revised the rules of practice in 2004 with respect to motions for reconsideration by adopting a "compelling circumstances" standard for motions for reconsideration. 10 CFR §§ 2.323(e) and 2.345(b) [former §§ 2.730 and 2.771]. This standard, which is a higher standard than prior case law, is intended to permit reconsideration only where manifest injustice would occur in the absence of reconsideration and the claim could not have been raised earlier. In the Commission's view, reconsideration should be an extraordinary action and should not be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and rationales which were (or should have been) discussed earlier.

A Licensing Board has inherent power to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider an initial decision. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-235, 8 AEC 645, 646 (1974).

A presiding officer in a materials licensing proceeding retains jurisdiction to rule on a timely motion for reconsideration of his or her final initial decision even if one of the parties subsequently files an appeal. Curators of the University of Missouri (Trump-S Project), LBP-91-34, 34 NRC 159, 160-61 (1991), aff'd, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 93 (1995).

An authorized, timely-filed petition for reconsideration before the trial tribunal may work to toll the time period for filing an appeal. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-659, 14 NRC 983, 985 (1981).

A motion for reconsideration should not include new arguments or evidence unless a party demonstrates that its new material relates to a Board concern that could not reasonably have been anticipated. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 517-18 (1984).

Petitioners may be granted permission by the Commission to file a consolidated request for reconsideration if they have not had full opportunity to address the precise theory on which the Commission's first decision rests. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 51 (2000).

A properly supported motion for reconsideration should not include previously presented arguments that have been rejected. Instead the movant must identify errors or deficiencies in the presiding officer's determination indicating the questioned ruling overlooked or misapprehended (1) some legal principle or decision that should have controlling effect; or (2) some critical factual information. Reconsideration may be appropriately sought to have the presiding officer correct what appear to be inharmonious rulings in the same decision. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-31, 52 NRC 340, 342 (2000).

#### **4.4 Reopening Hearings**

Hearings may be reopened, in appropriate situations, either upon motion of any party or sua sponte. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358 (1973). Sua sponte reopening is required when a Board becomes aware, from any source, of a significant unresolved safety issue or of possible major changes in facts material to the resolution of major environmental issues. Commonwealth Edison Co. (LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-153, 6 AEC 821 (1973); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358 (1973). Where factual disclosures reveal a need for further development of an evidentiary record, the record may be reopened for the taking of supplementary evidence. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B and 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 352 (1978). For reopening the record, the new evidence to be presented need not always be so significant that it would alter the Board's findings or conclusions when the taking of new evidence can be accomplished with little or no burden upon the parties. To exclude otherwise competent evidence

because the Board's conclusions may be unchanged would not always satisfy the requirement that a record suitable for review be preserved. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83, 85 (1978). An Appeal Board indicated that it might be sympathetic to a motion to reopen a hearing if documents appended to an appellate brief constituted newly discovered evidence and tended to show that significant testimony in the record was false. Toledo Edison Co. and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3); Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-430, 6 NRC 457 (1977).

Until the full-power license for a nuclear reactor has actually been issued, the possibility of a reopened hearing is not entirely foreclosed; a person may request a hearing concerning that reactor, even though the original time period specified in the Federal Register notice for filing intervention petitions has expired, if the requester can satisfy the late intervention and reopening criteria. Texas Utilities Electric Company (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1, 3-4 (1993).

Until a license has actually been issued, the Commission (as opposed to the Licensing Board) retains jurisdiction to reopen a closed case. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 35-36 (2006) (citing Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-1, 37 NRC 1 (1993); Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-1, 35 NRC 1 (1992)). Until that time, "there remains in existence an operating license 'proceeding'" that can be 'reopened,' and the Commission still has authority to add conditions to a license or to supplement an environmental impact statement if intervenors (or the NRC Staff itself) uncover significant, previously unconsidered, and newly arising safety or environmental impacts. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 24 (2006) (quoting Comanche Peak, CLI-92-1, 35 NRC at 6 n.5). If a motion to reopen a closed proceeding is filed after a license has been issued, the motion should be considered as a petition for enforcement action under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206. Millstone, CLI-06-4, 63 NRC at 36 n.4 (citing Tex. Utils. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 67 (1992)).

Motions to reopen a record are governed by 10 CFR § 2.326 (formerly § 2.734), which requires that a motion to reopen a closed record be timely, that it address a significant safety or environmental issue, and that it demonstrate that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-94-35, 40 NRC 180 (1994); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-9, 59 NRC 120, 124 (2004).. A motion to reopen a closed record is designed to consider additional evidence of a factual or technical nature, and is not the appropriate method for advising a Board of a non-evidentiary matter such as a state court decision. A Board may take official notice of such non-evidentiary matters. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-905, 28 NRC 515, 521 (1988).

New regulatory requirements may establish good cause for reopening a record or admitting new contentions on matters related to the new requirement. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-5, 13 NRC 226, 233 (1981).

A motion to reopen the record based on the recent criminal indictment of a tribal leader does not meet the standard enumerated in § 2.326 where neither the individual indicted nor the tribe would own or operate the facility in question and the intervenor fails to suggest how the alleged theft of tribal money or filing false tax returns - even if true - would have any bearing on facility operations. PFS, CLI-04-9, 59 NRC at 124.

Where a record is reopened for further development of the evidence, all parties are entitled to an opportunity to test the new evidence and participate fully in the resolution of the issues involved. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-335, 3 NRC 830 (1976). Permissible inquiry through cross-examination at a reopened hearing necessarily extends to every matter within the reach of the testimony submitted by the applicants and accepted by the Board. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 94 (1977).

A Licensing Board lacks the power to reopen a proceeding once final agency action has been taken, and it may not effectively "reopen" a proceeding by independently initiating a new adjudicatory proceeding. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-381, 5 NRC 582 (1977).

The Licensing Board also lacks the jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen the record after a petition to review a final order has been filed. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-00-25, 52 NRC 355, 357 (2000), n.3, citing Philadelphia Electric Co., (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-726, 17 NRC 755 (1983); cf. Curators of the University of Missouri (Trump-S Project), CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 93-94 (1995).

An adjudicatory board does not have jurisdiction to reopen a record with respect to an issue when finality has attached to the resolution of that issue. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the board has another discrete issue pending before it. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-513, 8 NRC 694, 695 (1978); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-25, 17 NRC 681, 684 (1983); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-782, 20 NRC 838, 841 n.9 (1984), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-766, 19 NRC 981, 983 (1984); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-792, 20 NRC 1585, 1588 (1984), clarified, ALAB-797, 21 NRC 6 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-821, 22 NRC 750, 752 (1985).

Where finality has attached to some, but not all, issues, new matters may be considered when there is a reasonable nexus between those matters and the issues remaining before the Board. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-782, 20 NRC 838, 841 n.9 (1984), citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 707 (1979); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-792, 20 NRC 1585, 1588 (1984), clarified, ALAB-797, 21 NRC 6 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-821, 22 NRC 750, 752 (1985); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-901, 28 NRC 302, 306-07 (1988). See Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1714 (1985); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-930, 31 NRC 343, 346-47 (1990). The focus is on whether and what issues are still



being reviewed Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-792, 20 NRC 1585, 1589 n.4 (1984), clarified, ALAB-797, 21 NRC 6 (1985); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 708 (1979).

A Board has no jurisdiction to consider a motion to reopen the record in a proceeding where it has issued its final decision and a party has already filed a petition for Commission review of the decision. The motion to reopen the record should be referred to the Commission for consideration. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-823, 22 NRC 773, 775 (1985).

Once an appeal has been filed, jurisdiction over the appealed issues passes to the appellate tribunal and motions to reopen on the appealed issues are properly entertained by the appellate tribunal. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-699, 16 NRC 1324, 1326-27 (1982).

Under former practice, the Appeal Board dismissed for want of jurisdiction a motion to reopen hearings in a proceeding in which the Appeal Board had issued a final decision, followed by the Commission's election not to review that decision. The Commission's decision represented the agency's final action, thus ending the Appeal Board's authority over the case. The Appeal Board referred the matter to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation because, under the circumstances, he had the discretionary authority to grant the relief sought subject to Commission review. Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-530, 9 NRC 261,262 (1979). See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1329-1330 (1983).

The fact that certain issues remain to be litigated does not absolve an intervenor from having to meet the standards for reopening the completed hearing on all other radiological health and safety issues in order to raise a new non-emergency planning contention. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1138 (1983).

#### **4.4.1 Motions to Reopen Hearing**

A motion to reopen the hearing can be filed by any party to the proceeding. A person or organization which was not a party to the proceeding may not file a motion to reopen the record unless it has filed for, and been granted, late intervention in the proceeding under 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)). Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-1, 35 NRC 1, 6 (1992), aff'd sub nom. Dow v. NRC, 976 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 76 (1992). Stringent criteria must be met in order for the record to be reopened. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-94-9, 39 NRC 122, 123 (1994). See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 25 (2006) ("Agencies need not reopen adjudicatory proceedings merely on a plea of new evidence"). Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.326(a) (formerly § 2.734), a motion to reopen a closed record to consider additional evidence will not be granted unless the following criteria are satisfied:

- (1) The motion must be timely, except that an exceptionally grave issue may be considered in the discretion of the presiding officer even if untimely presented.
- (2) The motion must address a significant safety issue.
- (3) The motion must demonstrate that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially.
- (4) The motion must be accompanied by one or more affidavits which set forth factual and/or technical bases for the movant's claim. Affidavits must be given by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts alleged, or by experts in the disciplines appropriate to the issues raised.

Evidence contained in affidavits must meet the admissibility standards set forth in 2.326(b) (formerly § 2.734(c)). Each of the criteria must be separately addressed, with a specific explanation of why it has been met. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-9, 39 NRC 122, 123-24 (1994).

In addition, the motion must be accompanied by one or more affidavits which set forth the factual and/or technical bases for the movant's claims. 10 CFR § 2.326(b) (formerly § 2.734(b)); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-38, 30 NRC 725, 734 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-949, 33 NRC 484 (1991). In addition, the movant is also free to rely on, for example, Staff-applicant correspondence to establish the existence of a newly discovered issue. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358 (1973). A movant may also rely upon documents generated by the applicant or the NRC Staff in connection with the construction and regulatory oversight of the facility. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 17 & n.7 (1985), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 363 (1981).

As is well settled, the proponent of a motion to reopen the record has a heavy burden to bear. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 5 (1986); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338 (1978); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619, 620 (1976); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 180 (1983); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-3, 19 NRC 282, 283 (1984); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 14 (1985); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-42, 22 NRC 795, 798 (1985); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-87-21, 25 NRC 958, 962 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-88-3, 28 NRC 1, 3 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 73 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-936, 32 NRC 75, 82 & n.18 (1990).

Where a motion to reopen relates to a previously uncontested issue, the moving party must satisfy both the standards for admitting late-filed contentions, 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly § 2.714(a)), and the criteria established by case law for reopening the record.

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-82-39, 16 NRC 1712, 1714-15 (1982), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-6, 23 NRC 130, 133 n.1 (1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1325 n.3 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 14 & n.4 (1985); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-42, 22 NRC 795, 798 & n.2 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 17 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-3, 25 NRC 71, 76 and n.6 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-90-1, 31 NRC 19, 21 & n.13, 34 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-936, 32 NRC 75 (1990).

The new material in support of a motion to reopen must be set forth with a degree of particularity in excess of the basis and specificity requirements contained in 10 CFR 2.309(f) (formerly 2.714(b)) for admissible contentions. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986). The supporting information must be more than mere allegations; it must be tantamount to evidence which would materially affect the previous decision. Id.; Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-87-21, 25 NRC 958, 963 (1987). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 74 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991). To satisfy this requirement, it must possess the attributes set forth in 10 CFR 2.337(a) (formerly 2.743(c)) which defines admissible evidence as "relevant, material, and reliable." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366-67 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 5 (1986). Embodied in this requirement is the idea that evidence presented in affidavit form must be given by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts or by experts in the disciplines appropriate to the issues raised. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1367 n.18 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 14, 50 n.58 (1985); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-87-21, 25 NRC 958, 962 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-915, 29 NRC 427, 431-32 (1989).

Even though a matter is timely raised and involves significant safety considerations, no reopening of the evidentiary hearing will be required if the affidavits submitted in response to the motion demonstrate that there is no genuine unresolved issue of fact, i.e., if the undisputed facts establish that the apparently significant safety issue does not exist, has been resolved, or for some other reason will have no effect upon the outcome of the licensing proceeding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-41, 18 NRC 104, 109 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 73

(1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991).

The Commission will not consider a last-second reopening of an adjudication and a restart of Licensing Board proceedings based on a pleading that is defective on its face. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 38 (2006).

Exhibits which are illegible, unintelligible, undated or outdated, or unidentified as to their source have no probative value and do not support a motion to reopen. In order to comply with the requirement for "relevant, material, and reliable" evidence, a movant should cite to specific portions of the exhibits and explain the points or purposes which the exhibits serve. Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 21 n.16, 42-43 (1985); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366-67 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986)

A draft document does not provide particularly useful support for a motion to reopen. A draft is a working document which may reasonably undergo several revisions before it is finalized to reflect the actual intended position of the preparer. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 43 n.47 (1985).

Where a motion to reopen is related to a litigated issue, the effect of the new evidence on the outcome of that issue can be examined before or after a decision. To the extent a motion to reopen is not related to a litigated issue, then the outcome to be judged is not that of a particular issue, but that of the action which may be permitted by the outcome of the licensing proceedings. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-30, 17 NRC 1132, 1142 (1983), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).

#### **4.4.1.1 Time for Filing Motion to Reopen Hearing**

A motion to reopen may be filed and the Licensing Board may entertain it at any time prior to issuance of the full initial decision. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-86, 5 AEC 376 (1972). Where a motion to reopen was mailed before the Licensing Board rendered the final decision but was received by the Board after the decision, the Board denied the motion on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to take any action. The Appeal Board implied that this may be incorrect under former § 2.712(e)(3) (now 10 CFR § 2.305(e)(3)) concerning service by mail, but did not reach the jurisdictional question since the motion was properly denied on the merits. Northern States Power Co. (Tyrone Energy Park, Unit 1), ALAB-464, 7 NRC 372, 374 n.4 (1978).

Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-86, 5 AEC 376 (1972) did not establish an ironclad rule with respect to timing of the motion. In deciding whether to reopen, the Licensing Board will consider both the timing of the motion and the safety significance of the matter which has been raised.

The motion will be denied if it is untimely and the matter raised is insignificant. The motion may be denied, even if timely, if the matter raised is not grave or significant. If the matter is of great significance to public or plant safety, the motion could be granted even if it was not made in a timely manner. As such, the controlling consideration is the seriousness of the issue raised. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973); Vermont Yankee, ALAB-126, 6 AEC 393 (1973); Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124, 6 AEC 365 (1973). See also Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 19 (1986) (most important factor to consider is the safety significance of the issue raised); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-834, 23 NRC 263, 264 (1986). When timeliness is a factor, it is to be judged from the date of discovery of the new issue.

An untimely motion to reopen the record may be granted, but the movant has the increased burden of demonstrating that the motion raises an exceptionally grave issue rather than just a significant issue. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-886, 27 NRC 74, 76, 78 (1988), citing former § 2.734(a)(1)(now 10 CFR § 2.326(a)(1)). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-927, 31 NRC 137, 139 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 446 (1990), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990); Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-02-5, 55 NRC 131, 140 (2002).

A party cannot justify the untimely filing of a reopening motion based upon a particular event before one Licensing Board on the ground that a reopening motion based on the same event was timely filed and pending before a second Licensing Board which was considering related issues. Each Licensing Board only has jurisdiction to resolve those issues which have been specifically delegated to it. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-927, 31 NRC 137, 140 (1990).

A Board will reject as untimely a motion to reopen which is based on information which has been available to a party for one to two years. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-815, 22 NRC 198, 201 (1985); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 445-46 (1990), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990).

A person seeking late intervention in a proceeding in which the record has been closed must also address the reopening standards, but not necessarily in the same petition. However, it is in the petitioner's best interest to address both the late intervention and reopening standards together. See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 162 (1993).

For a reopening motion to be timely presented, the movant must show that the issue sought to be raised could not have been raised earlier. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287

(D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-815, 22 NRC 198, 202 (1985). See Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1764-65 (1982). A party cannot justify its tardiness in filing a motion to reopen by noting that the Board was no longer receiving evidence on the issue when the new information on that issue became available. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-815, 22 NRC 198, 201-02 (1985).

A party's opportunity to gain access to information is a significant factor in a Board's determination of whether a motion based on such information is timely filed. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1723 (1985), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-52, 18 NRC 256, 258 (1983). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1369 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986).

A motion to reopen the record in order to admit a new contention must be filed promptly after the relevant information needed to frame the contention becomes available. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-6, 31 NRC 483, 487 (1990).

A matter may be of such gravity that a motion to reopen may be granted notwithstanding that it might have been presented earlier. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 188 n.17 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1723 (1985); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-45, 22 NRC 819, 822, 826 (1985).

The Vermont Yankee tests for reopening the evidentiary record are only partially applicable where reopening the record is the Board's sua sponte action. The Board has broader responsibilities than do adversary parties, and the timeliness test of Vermont Yankee does not apply to the Board with the same force as it does to parties. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83, 85 (1978).

Where jurisdiction terminated on all but a few issues, a Board may not entertain new issues unrelated to those over which it retains jurisdiction, even where there are supervening developments. The Board has no jurisdiction to consider such matters. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-579, 11 NRC 223, 225-226 (1980).

#### **4.4.1.2 Contents of Motion to Reopen Hearing**

(RESERVED)

#### 4.4.2 Grounds for Reopening Hearing

The standard for admitting a new contention after the record is closed is higher than for an ordinary late-filed contention. New information is not enough to reopen a closed record at the last minute, unless it is significant and plausible enough to require reasonable minds to inquire further and is likely to trigger a different result. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-12, 61 NRC 345, 350 (2005).

Where a motion to reopen an evidentiary hearing is filed after the initial decision, the standard is that the motion must establish that a different result would have been reached had the respective information been considered initially. Where the record has been closed but a motion was filed before the initial decision, the standard is whether the outcome of the proceeding might be affected. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-41, 18 NRC 104, 108 (1983).

In certain instances the record may be reopened, even though the new evidence to be received might not be so significant as to alter the original findings or conclusions, where the new evidence can be received with little or no burden upon the parties. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83, 85 (1978). Reopening has also been ordered where the changed circumstances involved a hotly contested issue. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-74-39, 8 AEC 631 (1974). Moreover, considerations of fairness and of affording a party a proper opportunity to ventilate the issues sometimes dictate that a hearing be reopened. For example, where a Licensing Board maintained its hearing schedule despite an intervenor's assertion that he was unable to attend the hearing and prepare for cross-examination, the Appeal Board held that the hearing must be reopened to allow the intervenor to conduct cross-examination of certain witnesses. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-249, 8 AEC 980 (1974).

In order to reopen a licensing proceeding, an intervenor must show a change in material fact which warrants litigation anew. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), CLI-79-10, 10 NRC 675, 677 (1979).

A decision as to whether to reopen a hearing will be made on the basis of the motion and the filings in opposition thereto, all of which amount to a "mini record." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520 (1973), reconsid. den., ALAB-141, 6 AEC 576. The hearing must be reopened whenever a "significant", unresolved safety question is involved Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520 (1973), reconsid. den., ALAB-141, 6 AEC 576; Vermont Yankee, ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358, 365 n.10 (1973). The same "significance test" applies when an environmental issue is involved. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404 (1975); Commonwealth Edison Co. (LaSalle County Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-153, 6 AEC 821 (1973). See also Digest section 3.13.3.

Matters to be considered in determining whether to reopen an evidentiary record at the request of a party, as set forth in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520 (1973), are whether the

matters sought to be addressed on the reopened record could have been raised earlier, whether such matters require further evidence for their resolution, and what the seriousness or gravity of such matters is. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83 (1978). As a general proposition, a hearing should not be reopened merely because some detail involving plant construction or operation has been changed. Rather, to reopen the record at the request of a party, it must usually be established that a different result would have been reached initially had the material to be introduced on reopening been considered. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338 (1978); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-227, 8 AEC 416, 418 (1974); Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 465 (1982); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1365-66 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986). In fact, an Appeal Board has stated that, after a decision has been rendered, a dissatisfied litigant who seeks to persuade an adjudicatory tribunal to reopen the record "because some new circumstance has arisen, some new trend has been observed or some new fact discovered" has a difficult burden to bear. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-359, 4 NRC 619, 620 (1976). At the same time, new regulatory requirements may establish good cause for reopening a record or admitting new contentions on matters related to the new requirement. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-5, 13 NRC 226, 233 (1981).

Unlike applicable standards with respect to allowing a new, timely filed contention, the Licensing Board can give some consideration to the substance of the information sought to be added to the record on a motion to reopen. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-20, 19 NRC 1285, 1299 n.15 (1984), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523-24 (1973). Because our hearing rules specify that reopening the record requires a showing that the new information will likely trigger a different result, the licensing board properly considered both the party's new information and the opposing party's contrary evidence. (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.734(a)(3) (now § 2.326(a)(3)). PFS, CLI-05-12, 61 NRC at 350.

The proponent of a motion to reopen the record bears a heavy burden. Normally, the motion must be timely and addressed to a significant issue. If an initial decision has been rendered on the issue, it must appear that reopening the record may materially alter the result. Where a motion to reopen the record is untimely without good cause, the movant must demonstrate not only that the issue is significant, but also that the public interest demands that the issue be further explored. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 21 (1978); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1765 n.4 (1982), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973). See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 364-365 (1981); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. and Kansas City Power & Light Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-462, 7 NRC 320, 338 (1978); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1324 (1983); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2),



ALAB-756, 18 NRC 1340, 1344 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-786, 20 NRC 1087, 1089-90 (1984).

The criteria for reopening the record govern each issue for which reopening is sought; the fortuitous circumstance that a proceeding has been or will be reopened on other issues is not significant. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9 (1978); LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1720 (1985).

Whether to reopen a record in order to consider new evidence turns on the appraisal of several factors: (1) Is the motion timely? (2) Does it address significant safety or environmental issues? (3) Might a different result have been reached had the newly proffered material been considered initially? Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-6, 31 NRC 483, 486 n.3 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-10, 32 NRC 218, 221 (1990); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-6, 23 NRC 130, 133 (1986); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-7, 23 NRC 233, 235 (1986), *aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. NRC*, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-18, 24 NRC 501, 505-06 (1986), *citing* former §2.734 (now 10 CFR §2.326); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-87-3, 25 NRC 71, 76 and n.6 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-87-5, 25 NRC 884, 885-86 (1987), *reconsid. denied*, CLI-88-3, 28 NRC 1 (1988); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-87-21, 25 NRC 958, 962 (1987); Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-872, 26 NRC 127, 149-50 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 71 n.17 (1989), *aff'd on other grounds*, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), *remanded on other grounds sub nom. Massachusetts v. NRC*, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), *appeal dismissed as moot*, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-28, 30 NRC 271, 283 n.8, 284, 292 (1989), *aff'd*, ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225, 241-44 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-90-1, 31 NRC 19, 21 & n.10 (1990), *aff'd*, ALAB-936, 32 NRC 75 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-90-12, 31 NRC 427, 443 n.47 (1990), *aff'd in part on other grounds*, ALAB-934, 32 NRC 1 (1990); International Uranium (USA) Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-14, 46 NRC 55, 59 (1997).

A party seeking to reopen must show that the issue it now seeks to raise could not have been raised earlier. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-730, 17 NRC 1057, 1065 (1983).

A motion to reopen an administrative record may rest on evidence that came into existence after the hearing closed. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-598, 11 NRC 876, 879 n.6 (1980).

A Licensing Board has held that the most important factor to consider is whether the newly proffered material would alter the result reached earlier. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 672 (1986).

To justify the granting of a motion to reopen, the moving papers must be strong enough, in light of any opposing filings, to avoid summary disposition. South Carolina

Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-84, 16 NRC 1183, 1186 (1982), citing Vermont Yankee Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 523 (1973).

The fact that the NRC's Office of Investigations is investigating allegations of falsification of records and harassment of QA/QC personnel is insufficient, by itself, to support a motion to reopen. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 5-6 (1986).

Evidence of a continuing effort to improve reactor safety does not necessarily warrant reopening a record. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-598, 11 NRC 876, 887 (1980).

Intervenors failed to raise a significant safety issue when they did not present sufficient evidence to show that an applicant's program and continuing compliance with an NRC Staff-prescribed enhanced surveillance program would not provide the requisite assurance of plant safety. The intervenors' request for harsher measures than the NRC Staff had considered necessary, without presenting any new information that the Staff had failed to consider, is insufficient to raise a significant safety issue. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-90-6, 31 NRC 483, 487-88 (1990).

Differing analyses by experts of factual information already in the record do not normally constitute the type of information for which reopening of the record would be warranted. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-42, 22 NRC 795, 799 (1985), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903, 994-95 (1981).

Repetition of arguments previously presented does not present a basis for reconsideration. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 5 (1980). Nor do generalized assertions to the effect that "more evidence is needed." Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 63 (1981).

Newspaper allegations of quality assurance deficiencies, unaccompanied by evidence, ordinarily are not sufficient grounds for reopening an evidentiary record. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-3, 19 NRC 282, 286 (1984). See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 6 n.2 (1986).

Generalized complaints that an alleged ex parte communication to a board compromised and tainted the board's decisionmaking process are insufficient to support a motion to reopen. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-840, 24 NRC 54, 61 (1986), vacated, CLI-86-18, 24 NRC 501 (1986) (the Appeal Board lacked jurisdiction to rule on the motion to reopen).

In the context of a motion to reopen a closed proceeding, the Commission found that a difference of opinion between an intervenor and the Staff over a scientific question – such as where the Staff accepted a licensee's explanation of emission levels – does not constitute "fraud, deceit, and cover-up" by the Staff. Dominion Nuclear

Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 36-37 (2006).

A movant should provide any available material to support a motion to reopen the record rather than rely on "bare allegations or simple submission of new contentions." Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1324 (1983), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-5, 13 NRC 361, 363 (1981); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-803, 21 NRC 575, 577 (1985); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 14 (1985); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 5 (1986). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-89-1, 29 NRC 89, 93-94 (1989) (a movant's willingness to provide unspecified, additional information at some unknown date in the future is insufficient). Undocumented newspaper articles on subjects with no apparent connection to the facility in question do not provide a legitimate basis on which to reopen a record. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-753, 18 NRC 1321, 1330 (1983); Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-786, 20 NRC 1087, 1089-1090 (1984). The proponent of a motion to reopen a hearing bears the responsibility for establishing that the standards for reopening are met. The movant is not entitled to engage in discovery in order to support a motion to reopen. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-7, 21 NRC 1104, 1106 (1985). An adjudicatory board will review a motion to reopen on the basis of the available information. The board has no duty to search for evidence which will support a party's motion to reopen. Thus, unless the movant has submitted information which raises a serious safety issue, a board may not seek to obtain information relevant to a motion to reopen pursuant to either its sua sponte authority or the Commission's Policy Statement on Investigations, Inspections, and Adjudicatory Proceedings, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,032 (Sept. 13, 1984). Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 6-7 (1986).

A motion to reopen the record based on alleged deficiencies in an applicant's construction quality assurance program must establish either that uncorrected construction errors endanger safe plant operation, or that there has been a breakdown of the quality assurance program sufficient to raise legitimate doubt as to whether the plant can be operated safely. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-756, 18 NRC 1340, 1344-1345 (1983), citing Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 346 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 15 (1985). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225, 243-44 (1990). This standard also applies to an applicant's design quality assurance program. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986).

The untimely listing of "historical examples" of alleged construction QA deficiencies is insufficient to warrant reopening of the record on the issue of management character and competence. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 15 (1985), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo

Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1369-70 (1984), aff'd sub. nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986). Long range forecasts of future electric power demands are especially uncertain as they are affected by trends in usage, increasing rates, demographic changes, industrial growth or decline, and the general state of economy. These factors exist even beyond the uncertainty that inheres to demand forecasts: assumptions on continued use from historical data, range of years considered, the area considered, and extrapolations from usage in residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. The general rule applicable to cases involving differences or changes in demand forecasts is stated in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 352-69 (1975). Accordingly, a possible one-year slip in construction schedule was clearly within the margin of uncertainty, and intervenors had failed to present information of the type or substance likely to have an effect on the need-for-power issue such as to warrant re-litigation. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), CLI-79-5, 9 NRC 607, 609-10 (1979).

Speculation about the future effects of budget cuts or employment freezes does not present a significant safety issue which must be addressed. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-10, 32 NRC 218, 223 (1990).

#### **4.4.3 Reopening Construction Permit Hearings to Address New Generic Issues**

Construction permit hearings should not be reopened upon discovery of a generic safety concern where such generic concern can be properly addressed and considered at the operating license stage. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404 (1975).

#### **4.4.4 Discovery to Obtain Information to Support Reopening of Hearing is Not Permitted**

The burden is on the movant to establish prior to reopening that the standards for reopening are met and "the movant is not entitled to engage in discovery in order to support a motion to reopen." Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-7, 21 NRC 1104, 1106 (1985). See also Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 6 (1986); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-7, 23 NRC 233, 235-36 & n.1 (1986), aff'd sub nom. on other grounds, Ohio v. NRC, 814 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 672-673 n.33 (1986); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-87-21, 25 NRC 958, 963 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-879, 26 NRC 410, 422 (1987).

## 4.5 Motions to Reconsider

See also Digest section 4.3.1 supra.

Motions for reconsideration must be filed within 10 days of the date of issuance of the challenged order or action for which reconsideration is requested. 10 CFR §§ 2.323(e) and 2.345(a)(1) [former §§ 2.730 and 2.771(a)].

The Commission revised the rules of practice in 2004 with respect to motions for reconsideration by adopting a “compelling circumstances” standard for motions for reconsideration. See 69 Fed. Reg. at 2207; 10 CFR §§ 2.323(e) and 2.345(b) [former §§ 2.730 and 2.771]. This standard, which is a higher standard than prior case law, is intended to permit reconsideration only where manifest injustice would occur in the absence of reconsideration and the claim could not have been raised earlier. In the Commission’s view, reconsideration should be an extraordinary action and should not be used as an opportunity to reargue facts and rationales which were (or should have been) discussed earlier.

Licensing Boards have the inherent power to entertain and grant a motion to reconsider an initial decision. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 3), ALAB-281, 2 NRC 6 (1975).

A reconsideration request that is grossly out of time without good cause shown may be rejected. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-14, 51 NRC 301, 311 (2000).

The Commission undertakes motions for reconsideration when a party demonstrates a compelling circumstance. Examples of such a compelling circumstance include the existence of a clear and material error in decision which could not have reasonably been anticipated that renders the decision invalid. This standard is applied strictly; motions for reconsideration are not granted lightly. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-27, 64 NRC 399, 400-001 (2006).

When a Board has reached a determination of a motion in the course of an on-the-record hearing, it need not reconsider that determination in response to an untimely motion but it may, in its discretion, decide to reconsider on a showing that it has made an egregious error. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-6, 15 NRC 281, 283 (1982).

When a petition for review is filed with the Commission at the same time as a motion for reconsideration is filed with the Board, the Commission will delay considering the petition for review until after the Board has ruled. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 3 (2001), citing International Uranium Corp., (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-97-9, 46 NRC 23, 24-25 (1997).

A petitioner lacks standing to seek reconsideration of a decision unless the petitioner was a party to the proceeding when the decision was issued. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-6, 29 NRC 348, 354 (1989).

In certain instances, for example, where a party attempts to appeal an interlocutory ruling, a Licensing Board can properly treat the appeal as a motion to the Licensing Board itself to reconsider its ruling. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-370, 5 NRC 131 (1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1653 (1982).

A motion to reconsider a prior decision will be denied where the motion is not in reality an elaboration upon, or refinement of, arguments previously advanced, but instead is an entirely new thesis and where the proponent does not request that the result reached in the prior decision be changed. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-418, 6 NRC 1, 2 (1977).

“A properly supported reconsideration motion is one that does not rely upon (1) entirely new theses or arguments, except to the extent it attempts to address a presiding officer’s ruling that could not reasonably have been anticipated, or (2) previously presented arguments that have been rejected. Instead, the movant must identify errors or deficiencies in the presiding officer’s determination indicating the questioned ruling overlooked or misapprehended (1) some legal principle or decision that should have controlling effect; or (2) some critical factual information. Reconsideration also may be appropriately sought to have the presiding officer correct what appear to be inharmonious rulings in the same decision.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-38, 54 NRC 490, 493 (2001) (citation omitted), citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-17, 48 NRC 69, 73-74 (1998).

Reconsideration motions afford an opportunity to request correction of a Board error by refining an argument, or by pointing out a factual misapprehension or a controlling decision of law that was overlooked. New arguments are improper. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-2, 55 NRC 5, 7 (2002); see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-21, 52 NRC 261, 264 (2000), citing Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 4 (1997).

When an intervenor attempts, through a reconsideration motion, to broaden the scope of an issue the Board has already decided, the Board does not abuse its discretion by refusing to restart its hearing to reassess the issue in its broader form. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 414 (2005).

A motion for reconsideration should not include new arguments or evidence unless a party demonstrates that its new material relates to a Board concern that could not reasonable have been anticipated. Ralph L. Tetric (Denial of Reactor Operator’s License), LBP-97-6, 45 NRC 130, 131 (1997), citing Texas Utilities Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Elec. Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 517-18 (1984).

Petitioners may be granted permission by the Commission to file a consolidated request for reconsideration if they have not had full opportunity to address the precise theory on which the Commission’s first decision rests. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 51 (2000).

A motion to reconsider may not be used merely to re-argue matters already considered. Motions to reconsider must establish an error in the earlier decision and be based on the elaboration or refinement of arguments made initially, the identification of an overlooked controlling decision or a factual clarification. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-18, 58 NRC 433, 434 (2003); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 153 (2004). However, if the basis for subsequent Commission modification of a Board ruling is not that there was a mistake of law or fact, but that the facts have changed, a party should not be characterized (or penalized) as having waived its argument by not filing a motion for reconsideration; that is not the type of situation where the Commission “reconsiders” its decision. Id. at 154.

A party may not raise, in a petition for reconsideration, a matter which was not contested before the Licensing Board or on appeal. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, 2B), ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459, 462 (1978). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 241-42 (1989). In the same vein, a matter which was raised at the inception of a proceeding but was never pursued before the Licensing Board or on appeal cannot be raised on a motion for reconsideration. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-477, 7 NRC 766, 768 (1978).

Although some decisions hold that motions for reconsideration are generally disfavored when premised on new arguments or evidence rather than errors in the existing record, there also are cases that permit reconsideration based on new facts not available at the time of the decision in question and relevant to the particular issue under consideration which clarify information previously relied on and are potentially sufficient to change the result previously reached. See, e.g., Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-17, 48 NRC 69 (1998); Georgia Power Co. (Vogle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-21, 38 NRC 143 (1993); see also Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-26, 14 NRC 787, 790 (1981). Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), LBP-01-17, 53 NRC 398, 403-04 (2001).

Motions to reconsider an order should be associated with requests for reevaluation in light of elaboration on or refinement of arguments previously advanced; they are not the occasion for advancing an entirely new thesis. Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-81-26, 14 NRC 787, 790 (1981); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-17, 48 NRC 69, 73-74 (1998); see also Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 4 (1977). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., LBP-99-39, 50 NRC 232, 237 (1999).

Additionally, an argument raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider does not serve as a basis for reconsideration of admission of a contention. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-12, 37 NRC 355, 359-360 (1993); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-10, 47 NRC 288, 292 (1998).

Motions for reconsideration are for the purpose of pointing out an error the Board has made. Unless the Board has relied on an unexpected ground, new factual evidence and new arguments are not relevant in such a motion. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche

Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 517-18 (1984). In accordance to 10 CFR § 2.326 (formerly § 2.734), motions for reconsideration will be denied for failure to show that the Presiding Officer has made a material error of law or fact. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-14, 46 NRC 55, 59 (1997), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-7, 23 NRC 233, 235 (1986), Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 6 (1986).

A motion for leave to reargue or rehear a motion will not be granted unless it appears that there is some decision or some principle of law that would have a controlling effect and that has been overlooked or that there has been a misapprehension of the facts. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-94-31, 40 NRC 137, 140 & n.1 (1993). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-17, 48 NRC 69, 73-74 (1998).

Where a party petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a decision of the agency also petitions the agency to reconsider its decision and the Federal court stays its review pending the agency's disposition of the motion to reconsider, the Hobbs Act does not preclude the agency's reconsideration of the case. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259 (1978).

Repetition of arguments previously presented does not present a basis for reconsideration. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 5-6 (1980). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-88-3, 28 NRC 1, 2 (1988).

A Board cannot reconsider a matter after it loses jurisdiction. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-579, 11 NRC 223, 225-226 (1980).

## **4.6 Procedure on Remand**

### **4.6.1 Jurisdiction of the Licensing Board on Remand**

The question as to whether a Licensing Board, on remand, assumes its original plenary authority or, instead, is limited to consideration of only those issues specified in the remand order was, for some time, unresolved. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-389, 5 NRC 727 (1977). Of course, jurisdiction may be regained by a remand order of either the Commission or a court, issued during the course of review of the decision. Issues to be considered by the Board on remand would be shaped by that order. If the remand related to only one or more specific issues, the finality doctrine would foreclose a broadening of scope to embrace other discrete matters. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 708 (1979).

However, a Licensing Board was found to be "manifestly correct" in rejecting a petition requesting intervention in a remanded proceeding where the scope of the remanded proceeding had been limited by the Commission and the petition for intervention dealt with matters outside that scope. This establishes that a Licensing Board has limited jurisdiction in a remanded proceeding and may consider only what has been remanded to it. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-526, 9 NRC 122, 124 n.3 (1979). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick



Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-857, 25 NRC 7, 11, 12 (1987) (the Licensing Board properly rejected an intervenor's proposed license conditions which exceeded the scope of the narrow remanded issue of school bus driver availability).

Although an adjudicatory board to which matters have been remanded would normally have the authority to enter any order appropriate to the outcome of the remand, the Commission may, of course, reserve certain powers to itself, such as, for example, reinstatement of a construction permit suspended pending the remand. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952, 961 (1978).

Where the Commission remands an issue to a Licensing Board it is implicit that the Board is delegated the authority to prescribe warranted remedial action within the bounds of its general powers. However, it may not exceed these powers. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 29 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

#### **4.6.2 Jurisdiction of the Board on Remand**

Jurisdiction over previously determined issues is not necessarily preserved by the pendency of other issues in a proceeding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island, Unit 1), ALAB-766, 19 NRC 981, 983 (1984), citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 708-09 (1979); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-513, 8 NRC 694, 695-96 (1978).

#### **4.6.3 Stays Pending Remand to Licensing Board**

10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) does not expressly deal with the matter of a stay pending remand of a proceeding to the Licensing Board. Prior to the promulgation of Section 2.342 (formerly 2.788), the Commission held that the standards for issuance of a stay pending remand are less stringent than those of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977). In this vein, the Commission ruled that the propriety of issuing a stay pending remand was to be determined on the basis of a traditional balancing of equities and on consideration of possible prejudice to further actions resulting from the remand proceedings.

Where judicial review discloses inadequacies in an agency's environmental impact statement prepared in good faith, a stay of the underlying activity pending remand does not follow automatically. Whether the project need be stayed essentially must be decided on the basis of (1) traditional balancing of equities, and (2) consideration of any likely prejudice to further decisions that might be called for by the remand. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 784-85 (1977). The seriousness of the remanded issue is a third factor which a Board will consider before ruling on a party's motion for a stay pending remand. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-53, 20 NRC 1531, 1543 (1984), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 521 (1977).

#### **4.6.4 Participation of Parties in Remand Proceedings**

Where an issue is remanded to the Licensing Board and a party did not previously participate in consideration of that issue, submitting no contentions, evidence or proposed findings on it and taking no exceptions to the Licensing Board's disposition of it, the Licensing Board is fully justified in excluding that party from participation in the remanded hearing on that issue. Status as a party does not carry with it a license to step in and out of consideration of issues at will. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 268-69 (1978).

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## 5.0 APPEALS

From 1969 to 1991 the Commission used a three-tiered adjudicatory process. As is the case now, controversies were resolved initially by an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board or presiding officer acting as a trial level tribunal. Licensing Board Initial Decisions (final decisions on the merits) and decisions wholly granting or denying intervention were subject to non-discretionary appellate review by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. Appeal Board decisions were subject to review by the Commission as a matter of discretion.

The Appeal Board was abolished in 1991, thereby creating a two-tiered adjudicatory system under which the Commission itself conducts all appellate review. Most Commission review of rulings by Licensing Boards and Presiding Officers, including Initial Decisions, is now discretionary. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (a) - (f) (formerly § 2.786 (a) - (f)). A party must petition for review and the Commission, as a matter of discretion, determines if review is warranted. Appeals of orders wholly denying or granting intervention remain non-discretionary. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a).

The standards for granting interlocutory review have remained essentially the same. Under Appeal Board and Commission case law interlocutory review was permitted in extraordinary circumstances. These case-law standards were codified in 1991 when the Appeal Board was abolished and the two-tiered process was developed. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f) (formerly § 2.786(g)).

Although the Appeal Board was abolished in 1991, Appeal Board precedent, to the extent it is consistent with more recent case law and rule changes, may still be authoritative.

### 5.1 Commission Review

As a general matter, the Commission conducts review in response to a petition for review filed pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.341 (formerly 2.786), in response to an appeal filed pursuant to section 2.311 (formerly 2.714a), or on its own motion (sua sponte).

The Commission has full discretion whether to undertake appellate review of its licensing boards' merits decisions. NRC rules say that the Commission may grant review of initial Board decisions (or partial initial decisions) based on "any consideration" it "deems to be in the public interest." Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 132 (2004) (quoting former 10 C.F.R. § 2.786(b)(4) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)]).

#### 5.1.1 **Commission Review Pursuant to 2.341(b) (formerly 2.786(b))**

In determining whether to grant, as a matter of discretion, a petition for review of a licensing board order, the Commission gives due weight to the existence of a substantial question with respect to the considerations set forth in 10 CFR § 2.341(b) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)). The considerations set out in section 2.341(b) (formerly 2.786(b)(4)) are: (i) a clearly erroneous finding of material fact; (ii) a necessary legal conclusion that is without governing precedent or departs from prior law; (iii) a substantial and important question of law, policy, or discretion; (iv) a prejudicial procedural error; and (v) any other consideration deemed to be in the public interest. Kenneth G. Pierce (Shorewood, Illinois), CLI-95-6, 41 NRC 381, 382 (1995); Advanced

Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-93-8, 37 NRC 181, 184 (1993); Piping Specialists, Inc., et al, (Kansas City, MO), CLI-92-16, 36 NRC 351 (1992); Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D., CLI-99-14, 49 NRC 361, 363 (1999). See also Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 28 (2001); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-5, 57 NRC 279, 282-283 (2003), declining review of LBP-03-04, 57 NRC 69 (2003); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-8, 58 NRC 11, 17 (2003); Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-03-17, 58 NRC 419, 422 (2003); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 35-36 (2004); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-16, 62 NRC 1, 3 (2005); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 410 (2005); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 132 (2004).

The Commission may dismiss its grant of review even though the parties have briefed the issues. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-82-26, 16 NRC 880, 881 (1982), citing Jones v. State Board of Education, 397 U.S. 31 (1970). 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786), describes when the Commission “may” grant a petition for review but does not mandate any circumstances under which the Commission must take review. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-12, 46 NRC 52, 53 (1997).

The Commission agreed to take review of a Board’s merits ruling where it stated that the ruling arguably reflected a mistake of fact or law that may have derived from ambiguities in a prior Commission opinion. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 137 (2004).

### **5.1.2 Sua Sponte Review**

Sua sponte review, although rarely exercised, is taken in extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., Ohio Edison Co., et. al. (Perry & Davis-Besse), CLI-91-15, 34 NRC 269 (1991).

Because the Commission is responsible for all actions and policies of the NRC, the Commission has the inherent authority to act upon or review sua sponte any matter before an NRC tribunal. To impose on the Commission, to the degree imposed on the judiciary, requirements of ripeness and exhaustion would be inappropriate since the Commission, as part of a regulatory agency, has a special responsibility to avoid unnecessary delay or excessive inquiry. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 516 (1977); North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-98-18, 48 NRC 129 (1998). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 228-29 (1990). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-05-14, 61 NRC 359, 362 (2005) (undertaking sua sponte review of an issue that the Commission conceded may well have been moot).

Sua sponte review may be appropriate to ensure that there are no significant safety issues requiring corrective action. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear

Station, Unit 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814, 889 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-84-11, 20 NRC 1 (1984).

In determining whether to take review of a Licensing Board Order approving a settlement agreement, the Commission may ask the staff to provide an explanation for its agreement in the settlement if such reasons are not readily apparent from the settlement agreement or the record of the proceeding. Randall C. Orem, D.O. (Byproduct Material License No. 34-26201-01), CLI-92-15, 36 NRC 251 (1992).

If sua sponte review uncovers problems in a Licensing Board's decision or a record that may require corrective action adverse to a party's interest, the consistent practice is to give the party ample opportunity to address the matter as appropriate. Offshore Power Systems (Manufacturing License for Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-689, 16 NRC 887, 891 n.8, citing Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-655, 14 NRC 799, 803 (1981); Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-611, 12 NRC 301, 309-313 (1980).

Although the absence of an appeal does not preclude appellate review of an issue contested before a Licensing Board, caution is exercised in taking up new matters not previously put in controversy. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 247 (1978). In the course of its review of an initial decision in a construction permit proceeding, the Appeal Board was free to sua sponte raise issues which were neither presented to nor considered by the Licensing Board. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 707 (1979). On review it may be necessary to make factual findings, on the basis of record evidence, which are different from those reached by a Licensing Board. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 42 (1977). On appeal a Licensing Board's regulatory interpretation is not necessarily followed even if no party presses an appeal on the issue. See Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 135 n.10 (1982), citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 247 (1978). A decision reviewing a Board order may be based upon grounds completely foreign to those relied upon by the Licensing Board so long as the parties had a sufficient opportunity to address those new grounds with argument and, where appropriate, evidence. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127 (1982)

### **5.1.3 Effect of Commission's Denial of Petition for Review**

When a discrete issue has been decided by the Board and the Commission declines to review that decision, agency action is final with respect to that issue and Board jurisdiction is terminated. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-782, 20 NRC 838, 841 (1984) (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-766, 19 NRC 981, 983 (1984); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 708-09 (1979); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-513, 8 NRC 694, 695 (1978)).



The Commission's refusal to entertain a discretionary interlocutory review does not indicate its view on the merits. Nor does it preclude a Board from reconsidering the matter as to which Commission review was sought where that matter is still pending before the Board. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 260 (1978). The Commission's denial of review of a particular decision simply indicates that the appealing party "identified no 'clearly erroneous' factual finding or important legal error requiring Commission correction. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 59 n.15 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (citing Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 15910, Rio Rancho, NM 87174), CLI-00-12, 52 NRC 1, 3 (2000) (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 2.786(b)(4), now § 2.341(b)(4))).

When the time within which the Commission might have elected to review a Board decision expires, any residual jurisdiction retained by the Board expires. 10 CFR § 2.318(a) (formerly § 2.717(a)); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project Nos. 3 and 5), ALAB-501, 8 NRC 381, 382 (1978).

#### **5.1.4 Commission Review Pursuant to 2.311 (formerly 2.714a)**

NRC regulations contain a special provision (10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a) allowing an interlocutory appeal from a Licensing Board order on a petition for leave to intervene. Under 10 CFR § 2.311(b) (formerly § 2.714a(b)), a petitioner may appeal such an order but only if the effect thereof is to deny the petition in its entirety -- i.e., to refuse petitioner entry into the case. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-823, 26 NRC 154, 155 (1987), citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 (formerly §2.714a); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-586, 11 NRC 472, 473 (1980); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-683, 16 NRC 160 (1982), citing Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-599, 12 NRC 1, 2 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 18 n.6 (1986); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-535, 9 NRC 377, 384 (1979); Puget Sound Power & Light Co. (Skagit/Hanford Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-712, 17 NRC 81, 82 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-4, 33 NRC 233, 235-36 (1991). Only the petitioner denied leave to intervene can take an appeal of such an order. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 22 n.7 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.311(b) (formerly § 2.714a(b)). A petitioner may appeal only if the Licensing Board has denied the petition in its entirety, i.e., has refused the petitioner entry into the case. A petitioner may not appeal an order admitting petitioner but denying certain contentions. 10 CFR § 2.311(b) (formerly § 2.714(b)); Power Authority of the state of New York (Greene County Nuclear Plant), ALAB-434, 6 NRC 471 (1977); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607 (1976); Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-302, 2 NRC 856 (1975); Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-286, 2 NRC 213 (1975); Portland General Electric Co. (Pebble Springs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-273, 1 NRC 492, 494 (1975); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating station, Unit 2), ALAB-269, 1 NRC 411 (1975); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-206, 7 AEC 841 (1974). Appellate review of a ruling rejecting some but not all of a petitioner's contentions is available only at the end of the case. Northern States Power Co. (Tyronne Energy Park, Unit 1), ALAB-492, 8 NRC 251, 252 (1978). Similarly, where a

proceeding is divided into two segments for convenience purposes and a petitioner is barred from participation in one segment but not the other, that is not such a denial of participation as will allow an interlocutory appeal under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a). Gulf States Utility Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607 (1976).

An order admitting and denying various contentions is not immediately appealable under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a) where it neither wholly denies nor grants a petition for leave to intervene/ request for a hearing. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 252 (1993); Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 468 (2004). For a license applicant to take an appeal under section § 2.311(c)(formerly § 2.714a(c)), the applicant must contend that, after considering all pending contentions, the Board erroneously granted a hearing to the petitioner. Therefore, a license applicant's appeal of a Board order granting a hearing request is premature when filed prior to the Board ruling on all pending contentions. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-11, 59 NRC 203, 207-8 (2004).

An appeal under 10 C.F.R. § 2.311(c) of a licensing board decision granting a petition to intervene and/or request for hearing can only be granted if the request and/or petition should have been wholly denied. Answering this question requires a determination of whether the petitioner has standing and has submitted at least one admissible contention. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-05-15, 61 NRC 365, 371 (2005).

A State participating as an "interested State" under 10 CFR § 2.315 (formerly § 2.715(c)) may appeal an order barring such participation, but it may not seek review of an order which permits the State to participate but excludes an issue which it seeks to raise. Gulf States Utility Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607 (1976).

Unlike a private litigant who must file at least one acceptable contention in order to be admitted as a party to a proceeding, an interested state may participate in a proceeding regardless of whether or not it submits any acceptable contentions. Thus, an interested state may not seek interlocutory review of a Licensing Board rejection of any or all of its contentions because such rejection will not prevent an interested state from participating in the proceeding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-838, 23 NRC 585, 589-90 (1986).

Only the petitioner may appeal from an order denying it leave to intervene. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-345, 4 NRC 212 (1976). The appellant must file a notice of appeal and supporting brief within 10 days after service of the Licensing Board's order. 10 CFR § 2.311(a) (formerly § 2.714a); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 265 (1991). Other parties may file briefs in support of or in opposition to the appeal within 10 days of service of the appeal. The Applicant, the NRC Staff or any other party may appeal an order granting a petition to intervene or request for a hearing in whole or in part, but only on the grounds that the petition or request should have been denied in whole. 10 CFR § 2.311(a) (formerly § 2.714(c)); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-896, 28 NRC 27, 30 (1988).

A Licensing Board's failure, after a reasonable length of time, to rule on a petition to intervene is tantamount to a denial of the petition. Where the failure of the Licensing Board to act is both unjustified and prejudicial, the petitioner may seek interlocutory review of the Licensing Board's delay under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a). Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426 (1977).

The action of a Licensing Board in provisionally ordering a hearing and in preliminarily ruling on petitions for leave to intervene is not appealable under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a) in a situation where the Board cannot rule on contentions and the need for an evidentiary hearing until after the special prehearing conference required under 10 CFR § 2.329 (formerly § 2.751a) and where the petitioners denied intervention may qualify on refiling. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-27, 8 NRC 275, 280 (1978). Similarly, a Licensing Board order which determines that petitioner has met the "interest" requirement for intervention and that mitigating factors outweigh the untimeliness of the petition but does not rule on whether petitioner has met the "contentions" requirement is not a final disposition of the petition seeking leave to intervene. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-595, 11 NRC 860, 864 (1980); Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426 (1977); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating station, Unit 1), ALAB-833, 23 NRC 257, 260-61 (1986); Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-472, 7 NRC 570, 571 (1978).

Where the Presiding Officer has reviewed an extensive record in detail, with the assistance of a technical advisor, the Commission is generally disinclined to upset his findings and conclusions, particularly on matters involving fact-specific issues or where the affidavits or submissions of experts must be weighed. Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 15910, Rio Rancho, New Mexico 87174), CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 45, 46 (2001); Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 2 (2006).

Once the time prescribed in section 2.311 (formerly 2.714a) for perfecting an appeal has expired, the order below becomes final. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-713, 17 NRC 83, 84 n.1 (1983).

#### **5.1.5 Effect of Affirmance as Precedent**

Affirmance of the Licensing Board's decision cannot be read as necessarily signifying approval of everything said by the Licensing Board. The inference cannot be drawn that there is agreement with all the reasoning by which the Licensing Board justified its decision or with the Licensing Board's discussion of matters which do not have a direct bearing on the outcome. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-181, 7 AEC 207, 208 n.4 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), ALAB-795, 21 NRC 1, 2-3 (1985).

Stare decisis effect is not given to Licensing Board conclusions on legal issues not reviewed on appeal. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-713, 17 NRC 83, 85 (1983), citing Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-482, 7 NRC 979, 981 n.4 (1978);

General Electric Co. (Vallecitos Nuclear Center - General Electric Test Reactor, Operating License No. TR-1), ALAB-720, 17 NRC 397, 402 n.7 (1983); Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), ALAB-795, 21 NRC 1, 2 (1985); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-826, 22 NRC 893, 894 n.6 (1985). See Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627, 629 n.5 (1988); Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-98-25, 48 NRC 325, 343 n.3 (1998); Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D., CLI-99-14, 49 NRC 361, 363 (1999).

Unreviewed Board rulings do not constitute binding precedent. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-03-14, 58 NRC 104, 110 (2003).

### **5.1.6 Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions**

Unless published in the official NRC reports, decisions and orders of Appeal Boards are usually not to be given precedential effect in other proceedings. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-592, 11 NRC 744, 745 (1980).

### **5.1.7 Precedential Weight Accorded Previous Appeal Board Decisions**

The Commission abolished the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Panel in 1991, but its decisions still carry precedential weight. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 59 n.2 (1994).

## **5.2 Who Can Appeal**

The right to appeal or petition for review is confined to participants in the proceeding before the Licensing Board. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-433, 6 NRC 469 (1977); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), ALAB-369, 5 NRC 129 (1977); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-311, 3 NRC 85, 88 (1976); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-294, 2 NRC 663, 664 (1975); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-251, 8 AEC 993, 994 (1974); Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-237, 8 AEC 654 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 252 (1986). Thus, with the single exception of a State which is participating under the "interested State" provisions of 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly § 2.715(c)), a nonparty to a proceeding may not petition for review or appeal from a Licensing Board's decision. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-454, 7 NRC 39 (1978).

Although an interested State is not a party to a proceeding in the traditional sense, the "participational opportunity" afforded to an interested State under 10 CFR § 2.315(c) (formerly § 2.715(c)) includes the ability for an interested State to seek review of an initial decision. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383, 392 (1976); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-317, 3 NRC 175, 177-180 (1976).

The selection of parties to a Commission review proceeding is clearly a matter of Commission discretion (10 CFR § 2.341(c) (formerly § 2.786(d)). A major factor in the Commission decision is whether a party has actively sought or opposed Commission review. This factor helps reveal which parties are interested in Commission review and whether their participation would aid that review. Therefore, a party desiring to be heard in a Commission review proceeding should participate in the process by which the Commission determines whether to conduct a review. An interested State which seeks Commission review is subject to all the requirements which must be observed by other parties. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-25, 6 NRC 535 (1977).

In this vein, a person who makes a limited appearance before a Licensing Board is not a party and, therefore, may not appeal from the Board's decision. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-454, 7 NRC 39 (1978).

As to petitions for review by specific parties, the following should be noted:

- (1) A party satisfied with the result reached on an issue is normally precluded from appealing with respect to that issue, but is free to challenge the reasoning used to reach the result in defending that result if another party appeals. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-282, 2 NRC 9, 10 n.1 (1975). The prevailing party is free to urge any ground in defending the result, including grounds rejected by the Licensing Board. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 357 (1975). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-793, 20 NRC 1591, 1597 (1984); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 141 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 789 (1979); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 908 n.8 (1982), citing Black Fox, supra, ALAB-573, 10 NRC at 789.
- (2) A third party entering a special appearance to defend against discovery may appeal. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-311, 3 NRC 85, 87-88 (1976).
- (3) As to orders denying a petition to intervene, only the petitioner who has been excluded from the proceeding by the order may appeal. In such an appeal, other parties may file briefs in support of or opposition to the appeal. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-345, 4 NRC 212 (1976).
- (4) A party to a Licensing Board proceeding has no standing to press the grievances of other parties to the proceeding not represented by him. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-631, 13 NRC 87, 89 (1981), citing Puget Sound Power and Light Co. (Skagit Nuclear Power Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-556, 10 NRC 30 (1979); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 542-543 n.58 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-24, 24 NRC 132, 135 & n.3 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal

Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 203 n.3 (1986).

One seeking to appeal an issue must have participated and taken all timely steps to correct the error. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-583, 11 NRC 447 (1980).

The Commission has long construed its Rules of Practice to allow the Staff to petition for review of initial decisions. Although a party generally may appeal only on a showing of discernible injury, the Staff may appeal on questions of precedential importance. A question of precedential importance is a ruling that would with probability be followed by other Boards facing similar questions. A question of precedential importance can involve a question of remedy. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 23-25 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

### **5.2.1 Participating by filing an Amicus Curiae Brief**

10 CFR § 2.315 (formerly § 2.715) allows a nonparty to file a brief amicus curiae with regard to matters before the Commission. The nonparty must submit a motion seeking leave to file the brief, and acceptance of the brief is a **matter** of discretion. 10 CFR § 2.315(d) (formerly § 2.715(d)).

Our rules contemplate amicus curiae briefs only after the Commission grants a petition for review, and do not provide for amicus briefs supporting or opposing petitions for review. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(d) (formerly § 2.715(d)). Louisiana Energy (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-7, 45 NRC 437, 438-39 (1997).

The opportunity of a nonparty to participate as amicus curiae has been extended to Licensing Board proceedings. A U.S. Senator lacked authorization under his State's laws to represent his State in NRC proceedings. However, in the belief that the Senator could contribute to the resolution of issues before the Licensing Board, an Appeal Board authorized the Senator to file amicus curiae briefs or to present oral arguments on any legal or factual issue raised by the parties to the proceeding or the evidentiary record. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-862, 25 NRC 144, 150 (1987).

Requests for amicus curiae participation do not often arise in the context of Licensing Board hearings because factual questions generally predominate and an amicus customarily does not present witnesses or cross-examine other parties' witnesses. This happenstance, however, "does not perforce preclude the granting of leave in appropriate circumstances to file briefs or memoranda amicus curiae (or to present oral argument) on issues of law or fact that still remain for Licensing Board consideration." Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-862, 25 NRC 144, 150 (1987). Thus, in the context of a proceeding in which a legal issue predominates, permitting a petitioner that lacks standing to file an amicus pleading addressing that issue is entirely appropriate. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 161 n.13 (1996).

A state that does not seek party status or to participate as an "interested state" in the proceedings below is not permitted to file a petition for Commission review of a

licensing board ruling. If the Commission takes review, the Commission may permit a person who is not a party, including a state, to file a brief amicus curiae. 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(d) (formerly § 2.715(d)). Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-96-3, 43 NRC 16,17 (1996).

Third parties may file amicus briefs with respect to any appeal, even though such third parties could not prosecute the appeal themselves. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), ALAB-369, 5 NRC 129 (1977); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-304, 3 NRC 1, 7 (1976). If a matter is taken up by the Commission pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b) (formerly § 2.786(b)), a person who is not a party may, in the discretion of the Commission, be permitted to file a brief amicus curiae. 10 C.F.R. § 2.315(d) (formerly § 2.715(c)). A person desiring to file an amicus brief must file a motion for leave to do so in accordance with the procedures in section 2.715(c). Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-96-3, 43 NRC 16, 17 (1996).

Petitioner is free to monitor the proceedings and file a post-hearing amicus curiae brief at the same time the parties to the proceeding file their post-hearing submissions under 10 C.F.R. § 2.1322(c). North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 223 (1999).

## 5.2.2 Aggrieved Parties Can Appeal

Petitions for review should be filed only where a party is aggrieved by, or dissatisfied with, the action taken below and invokes appellate jurisdiction to change the result. A petition for review is unnecessary and inappropriate when a party seeks to appeal a decision whose ultimate result is in that party's favor. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 202 (1978); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-694, 16 NRC 958, 959-60 (1982), citing Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 202 (1978); Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-478, 7 NRC 772, 773 (1978); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-282, 2 NRC 9, 10 n.1 (1975); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-252, 8 AEC 1175, 1177, aff'd, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-157, 6 AEC 858, 859 (1973); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 393 n.21 (1978); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-644, 13 NRC 903, 914 (1981); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-790, 20 NRC 1450, 1453 (1984); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 141 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 252 (1986).

An appeal from a ruling or a decision is normally allowed if the appellant can establish that, in the final analysis, some discernible injury to it has been sustained as a consequence of the ruling. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-157, 6 AEC 858, 859 (1973); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-252, 8 AEC 1175, aff'd, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975).

There is no right to an administrative appeal on every factual finding. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459, 461 n. 5 (1978). As a general rule, a party may seek appellate redress only on those parts of a decision or ruling which he can show will result in some discernible injury to himself. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-252, 8 AEC 1175, aff'd, CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1 (1975). An intervenor may appeal only those issues which it placed in controversy or sought to place in controversy in the proceeding.

In normal circumstances, an appeal will lie only from unfavorable action taken by the Licensing Board, not from wording of a decision with which a party disagrees but which has no operative effect. Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-482, 7 NRC 979, 980 (1978). For a case in which the Appeal Board held that a party may not file exceptions to a decision if it is not aggrieved by the result, see Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 393 (1978).

The fact that a Board made an erroneous ruling is not sufficient to warrant appellate relief. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1151 (1984), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 756 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-827, 23 NRC 9, 11 (1986) (appeals should focus on significant matters, not every colorable claim of error); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 143 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987). A party seeking appellate relief must demonstrate actual prejudice - that the Board's ruling had a substantial effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1151 (1984), citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1096 (1983). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 278, 280 (1987) (intervenors failed to show any specific harm resulting from erroneous Licensing Board rulings).

### **5.2.3 Parties' Opportunity to be Heard on Appeal**

Requests for emergency relief which require adjudicators to act without giving the parties who will be adversely affected a chance to be heard ought to be reserved for palpably meritorious cases and filed only for the most serious reasons. Emergency relief without affording the adverse parties at least some opportunity to be heard in opposition will be granted only in the most extraordinary circumstances. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 780 n.27 (1977).

### **5.3 How to Petition for Review**

The general rules for petitions for review of a decision of a board or presiding officer are set out in 10 CFR § 2.341(b) (formerly § 2.786(b)). The general rules for an appeal from a Licensing Board decision wholly granting or denying intervention, are set out in 10 CFR 2.311 (formerly 2.714a).



Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)(1)), the Commission will grant a petition for review if the petition raises a “substantial question” whether a finding of material fact is clearly erroneous or in conflict with a finding as to the same fact in a different proceeding.

The NRC page limits on petitions for review and briefs are intended to encourage parties to make their strongest arguments clearly and concisely, and to hold all parties to the same number of pages of argument. The Commission should not be expected to sift unaided through large swaths of earlier briefs filed before the Presiding Officer in order to piece together and discern a party’s particular concerns or the grounds for its claims. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 46 (2001). The intervenor bears responsibility for any misunderstanding of their claims. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 46 (2001).

The Commission’s rule providing for review of decisions of a presiding officer states that a “petition for review . . . must be no longer than twenty five (25) pages.” See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(2) (enlarging 10-page limit formerly in § 2.786(b)(2)). Where a petitioner resorts to the use of voluminous footnotes, references to multipage sections of earlier filings, and supplementation with affidavits that include additional substantive arguments, the Commission views this as an attempt to circumvent the intent of the page-limit rule. See Production and Maintenance Employees Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954 F.2d 1397, 1406 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 406 n.1 (1989). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 393 (2001).

Page limits “are intended to encourage parties to make their strongest arguments clearly and concisely, and to hold to all parties to the same number of pages of argument.” Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 46 (2001). The Commission expects parties to abide by its current page-limit rules, and if they cannot, to file a motion to enlarge the number of pages permitted. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 393 (2001).

#### **5.4 Time for Seeking Review**

As a general rule, only “final” actions are appealable. The test for “finality” for appeal purposes is essentially a practical one. For the most part, a Licensing Board’s action is final when it either disposes of a major segment of a case or terminates a party’s right to participate. Rulings that do neither are interlocutory. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 758 (1975); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-690, 16 NRC 893, 894 (1982), citing Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 758 (1975); Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-606, 12 NRC 156, 160 (1980); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1256 (1982); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-77, 18 NRC 1365, 1394-1395 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-894, 27 NRC 632, 636-37 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-933, 31 NRC 491, 496-98 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-943, 33 NRC 11, 12-13 (1991).

Where a major segment of a case has been remanded to a Licensing Board, there is no final Licensing Board action for appellate purposes until the Licensing Board makes a final determination of all the remanded matters associated with that major segment. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-943, 33 NRC 11, 13 (1991). One may not appeal from an order delaying a ruling, when appeal will lie from the ruling itself. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-585, 11 NRC 469, 470 (1980).

Administrative orders generally are final and appealable if they impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the administrative process. Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222, 225 (9th Cir. 1988).

A Licensing Board's partial initial decision in an operating license proceeding, which resolves a number of safety contentions, but does not authorize the issuance of an operating license or resolve all pending safety issues, is nevertheless appealable since it disposes of a major segment of the case. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-28, 22 NRC 232, 298 n.21 (1985), citing Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), ALAB-632, 13 NRC 91, 93 n.2 (1981).

The requirement of finality applies with equal force to both appeals from rulings on petitions to intervene pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a), and appeals from initial decisions. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-690, 16 NRC 893, 894 (1982).

Licensing board rulings denying waiver requests pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758), which are interlocutory, are not considered final. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-95-7, 41 NRC 383, 384 (1995), questioning Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-920, 30 NRC 121, 125-26 (1989).

In determining whether an agency has issued a final order so as to permit judicial review, courts look to whether the agency's position is definitive and if the agency action is affecting plaintiff's day-to-day activities. General Atomics v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n., 75 F.3d 536, 540 (1996).

Judicial review of administrative agency's jurisdiction should rarely be exercised before final decision from agency; sound judicial policy dictates that there be exhaustion of administrative remedies. Exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that the administrative agency be accorded opportunity to determine initially whether it has jurisdiction. General Atomics v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com'n., 75 F.3d 536, 541 (1996).

In general, an immediately effective Licensing Board initial decision is a "final order," even though subject to appeal within the agency, unless its effectiveness has been administratively stayed pending the outcome of further Commission review. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-349, 4 NRC 235 (1976). In other areas, an order granting discovery against a third party is "final" and appealable as of right. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-311, 3 NRC 85, 87 (1976); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-122, 6 AEC 322 (1973). Similarly, a Licensing Board order on the

issue of whether offsite activity can be engaged in prior to issuance of a limited work authorization (LWA) or a construction permit is appealable. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-331, 3 NRC 771, 774 (1976). When a Licensing Board grants a Part 70 license to transport and store fuel assemblies during the course of an operating license hearing, the decision is not interlocutory and is immediately appealable. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-1, 3 NRC 73, 74 (1976). Partial initial decisions which do not yet authorize construction activities nevertheless may be significant and, therefore, are subject to appellate review. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-301, 2 NRC 853, 854 (1975). Similarly, a Licensing Board's decision authorizing issuance of an LWA and rejecting the applicant's claim that it is entitled to issuance of a construction permit is final for the purposes of appellate review. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 318 (1978).

A protracted withholding of action on a request for relief may be treated as tantamount to a denial of the request and final action. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-417, 5 NRC 1442 (1977). At least in those instances where the delay involves a Licensing Board's failure to act on a petition to intervene, such a "denial" of the petition is appealable. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-376, 5 NRC 426, 428 (1977).

An appeal is taken by the filing of a petition for review within 15 days after service of the initial decision. 10 CFR § 2.341(b)(1). Licensing Boards may not vary or extend the appeal periods provided in the regulations. Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-310, 3 NRC 33 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 3), ALAB-281, 2 NRC 6 (1975). While a motion for a time extension may be filed, mere agreement among the parties is not sufficient to show good cause for an extension. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-154, 6 AEC 827 (1973).

The rules for taking an appeal also apply to appeals from partial initial decisions. Once a partial initial decision is rendered, review must be filed immediately in accordance with the regulations or the review is waived. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-195, 7 AEC 455, 456 n.2 (1974). See also Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-301, 2 NRC 853, 854 (1975).

In the interest of efficiency, all rulings that deal with the subject matter of the hearing from which a partial initial decision ensues should be reviewed by the Commission at the same time. Therefore, the time to ask the Commission's review of any claim that could have affected the outcome of a partial initial decision, including bases that were not admitted or that were dismissed prior to the hearing, is immediately after the partial initial decision is issued. The parties should assert any claims of error that relate to the subject matter of the partial initial decision, whether the specific issue was admitted for the hearing or not, and without regard to whether the issue was originally designated a separate "contention" or a "basis" for a contention. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-24, 52 NRC 351, 353 (2000).

Efficiency does not require the Commission to review orders dismissing contentions or bases (or other preliminary order) unrelated to the subject matter of the hearing on which

the Licensing Board issues its partial hearing. Absent special circumstances, review of preliminary rulings unrelated to the partial initial decision must wait until either the Board considers the issue in a relevant partial initial decision or until the Board completes its proceedings, depending on the nature of the preliminary ruling. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-24, 52 NRC 351, 354 (2000).

Although the time limits established by the Rules of Practice with regard to review of Licensing Board decisions and orders are not jurisdictional, policy is to construe them strictly. Hence untimely appeals are not accepted absent a demonstration of extraordinary and unanticipated circumstances. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-684, 16 NRC 162, 165 n.3 (1982), citing Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-606, 12 NRC 156, 160 (1980); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185, 202 (1988). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-894, 27 NRC 632, 635 (1988). Failure to file an appeal in a timely manner amounts to a waiver of the appeal. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 392-93 (1974). The same rule applies to appeals of partial initial decisions. A party must file its petition for review without waiting for the Licensing Board's disposition of the remainder of the proceeding. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-195, 7 AEC 455, 456 n.2 (1974).

When a petition for review is filed with the Commission at the same time as a motion for reconsideration is filed with the Board, the Commission will delay considering the petition for review until after the Board has ruled. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 3 (2001), citing International Uranium Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-97-9, 46 NRC 23, 24-25 (1997).

The timeliness of a party's brief on appeal from a Licensing Board's denial of the party's motion to reopen the record is determined by the standards applied to appeals from final orders, and not 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a(b)), which is specifically applicable to appeals from board orders "wholly denying a petition for leave to intervene and/or request for a hearing". Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 18 n.6 (1986).

It is accepted appellate practice for the appeal period to be tolled while the trial tribunal has before it an authorized and timely-filed petition for reconsideration of the decision or order in question. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-659, 14 NRC 983 (1981).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a), an appeal concerning an intervention petition must await the ultimate grant or denial of that petition. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-472, 7 NRC 570, 571 (1978). A Licensing Board order which determines that petitioner has met the "interest" requirement for intervention and that mitigating factors outweigh the untimeliness of the petition but does not rule on whether petitioner has met the "contentions" requirement is not a final disposition of the petition seeking leave to intervene. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-472, 7 NRC 570, 571 (1978).

Finality of a decision is usually determined by examining whether it disposes of at least a major segment of the case or terminates a party's right to participate. The general policy is to strictly enforce time limits for appeals following a final decision. However, where the

lateness of filing was not due to a lack of diligence, but, rather, to a misapprehension about the finality of a Board decision, the appeal may be allowed as a matter of discretion. Nuclear Engineering Company, Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-606, 12 NRC 156, 159-160 (1980); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-894, 27 NRC 632, 635-637 (1988).

A petitioner's request that the denial of his intervention petition be overturned, treated as an appeal under 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a), will be denied as untimely where it was filed almost 3 months after the issuance of a Licensing Board's order, especially in the absence of a showing of good cause for the failure to file an appeal on time. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-547, 9 NRC 638, 639 (1979).

#### **5.4.1 Variation in Time Limits on Appeals**

Only the Commission may vary the time for taking appeals; Licensing Boards have no power to do so. See Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 3), ALAB-281, 2 NRC 6 (1975).

Of course, mere agreement of the parties to extend the time for the filing of an appeal is not sufficient to show good cause for such a time extension. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-154, 6 AEC 827 (1973).

### **5.5 Scope of Commission Review**

A petition for review may be granted in the discretion of the Commission, giving due weight to the existence of a substantial question with respect to the considerations listed in 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4)(i) - (v) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)(I)-(V)). These considerations include a finding of material fact is erroneous, or in conflict with precedent; a substantial question of law or policy; or prejudicial procedural error.

When an issue is of obvious significance and is not fact-dependent, and when its present resolution could materially shorten the proceedings and guide the conduct of other pending proceedings, the Commission will generally dispose of the issue rather than remand it. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 517 (1977); Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 2 (2006).

The Commission is not obligated to rule on every discrete point adjudicated below, so long as the Board was able to render a decision on other grounds that effectively dispose of the appeal. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 466 n.25 (1982), citing Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-625, 13 NRC 13, 15 (1981).

Acting as an appellate body, the Commission is free to affirm a Board decision on any ground finding support in the record, whether previously relied on or not. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 166 (2005) (citing Hertz v. Luzenac America, Inc., 370 F.3d 1014, 1017 (10th Cir. 2004); Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). In CLI-05-1, the Commission rejected a timeliness challenge – that an argument made for the first time on appeal had not been not the basis of the Board's decision – when the argument had been

made repeatedly in the course of the proceeding, including by the challenging party. PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 165-66.

Where the Presiding Officer has reviewed an extensive record in detail, with the assistance of a technical advisor, the Commission is generally disinclined to upset his findings and conclusions, particularly on matters involving fact-specific issues or where the affidavits or submissions of experts must be weighed. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 45- 46 (2001).

On appeal evidence may be taken -- particularly in regard to limited matters as to which the record was incomplete. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-467, 7 NRC 459, 461 (1978). However, since the Licensing Board is the initial fact-finder in NRC proceedings, authority to take evidence is exercised only in exceptional circumstances. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-891, 27 NRC 341, 351 (1988).

A Staff appeal on questions of precedential importance may be entertained. A question of precedential importance is a ruling that would with probability be followed by other Boards facing similar questions. A question of precedential importance can involve a question of remedy. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 23-25 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

Opinions that, in the circumstances of the particular case, are essentially advisory in nature are reserved (if given at all) for issues of demonstrable recurring importance. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-743, 18 NRC 387, 390 n.4 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 284-85 (1988).

There is some indication that a matter of recurring importance may be entertained on appeal in a particular case even though it may no longer be determinative in the case. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978).

On a petition for review, petitioner must adequately call the Commission's attention to claimed errors in the Board's approach. Where petitioner has submitted a complex set of pleadings that includes numerous detailed footnotes, attachments, and incorporations by reference. The Commission deems waived any arguments not raised before the Board or not clearly articulated in the petition for review. See Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC at 46; Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-4, 49 NRC 185, 194 (1999); Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 132 n.81(1995). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 383 (2001); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-04-33, 60 NRC 581, 591-92 (2004). But cf. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 181-82 (2005), where for reasons of administrative efficiency, the Commission agreed to consider as part of an appeal an applicant's additional requests for redaction of allegedly privileged commercial information, even though the applicant would ordinarily have raised such supplemental requests initially with the Board. However, the Commission approved redaction of only one piece of information, where the rationale for approval was the same as for other information already redacted by the Board in its ruling; the Commission found no showing of good cause for the applicant's failure to seek Board protection for the other pieces of information in the request.

### 5.5.1 Issues Raised for the First Time on Appeal or in a Petition for Review

Ordinarily an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 348 (1978) (issues not raised in either proposed findings or exceptions to the initial decision). Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 907 (1982); Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 22 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 20 (1986); Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-872, 26 NRC 127, 133 (1987). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-924, 30 NRC 331, 358, 361 n.120 (1989); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 397 n.101 (1990); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-21, 52 NRC 261, 264 (2000). Thus, as a general rule, an appeal may be taken only as to matters or issues raised at the hearing. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43 (1981); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 28 (1978); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-335, 3 NRC 830, 842 n.26 (1976); Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-161, 6 AEC 1003, 1021 (1973); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 343 (1973); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 221 (1997). A contention will not be entertained for the first time on appeal, absent a serious substantive issue, where a party has not pursued the contention before the Licensing Board through proposed findings of fact. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 143 (1982), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981). The disinclination to entertain an issue raised for the first time on appeal is particularly strong where the issue and factual averments underlying it could have been, but were not, timely put before the Licensing Board. Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-648, 14 NRC 34 (1981).

Once an appeal has been filed from a Licensing Board's decision resolving a particular issue, jurisdiction over that issue passes from the Licensing Board. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-859, 25 NRC 23, 27 (1987); See Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 93 (1995). Once a partial initial decision (PID) has been appealed, supervening factual developments relating to major safety issues considered in the PID are properly before the appellate body, not the Licensing Board. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-383, 5 NRC 609 (1977).

An intervenor who seeks to raise a new issue on appeal must satisfy the criteria for reopening the record as well as the requirements concerning the admissibility of late-filed contentions. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 248 n.29 (1986).

An intervenor must raise an issue before the Presiding Officer or the intervenor will be precluded from supplementing the record before the Commission. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 243 (2000); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-29, 64 NRC 417, 421 (2006).

For reasons of administrative efficiency, the Commission agreed in CLI-05-1 to consider as part of an appeal an applicant's additional requests for redaction of allegedly privileged commercial information, even though the applicant would ordinarily have raised such supplemental requests initially with the Board. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 181 (2005). However, the Commission approved redaction of only one piece of information, where the rationale for approval was the same as for other information already redacted by the Board in its ruling; the Commission found no showing of good cause for the applicant's failure to seek Board protection for the other pieces of information in the request. *Id.* at 182.

Jurisdiction to rule on a motion to reopen filed after an appeal has been taken to an initial decision rests with the appellate body rather than the Licensing Board. *See Philadelphia Electric Co.* (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-726, 17 NRC 755, 757 n.3 (1983), *citing Metropolitan Edison Co.* (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-699, 16 NRC 1324, 1327 (1982); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1713 n.5 (1985).

An appeal may only be based on matters and arguments raised below. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-582, 11 NRC 239, 242 (1980); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 20 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 496 n.28 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 235 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 281 (1987). Even though a party may have timely appealed a Licensing Board's ruling on an issue, the appeal may not be based on new arguments offered by the party on appeal and not previously raised before the Licensing Board. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 82-83 (1985). *Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co.* (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-27, 22 NRC 126, 131 n.2 (1985). *See Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency* (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 812 (1986); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 457 (1987), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222, 229-30 (9th Cir. 1988). *See also USEC, Inc.* (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 458 (2006); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 44 (2004).. A party cannot be heard to complain later about a decision that fails to address an issue no one sought to raise. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 47-48 (1984). A party is not permitted to raise on appellate review Licensing Board practices to which it did not object at the hearing stage. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 378 (1985). "In Commission practice the Licensing Board, rather than the Commission itself, traditionally develops the factual record in the first instance." Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-11, 46 NRC 49, 51 (1997), citing Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research



Reactor), CLI-95-10, 42 NRC 1, 2 (1995); accord, Ralph L. Tetrick (Denial of Application for Reactor Operator License), CLI-97-5, 45 NRC 355, 356 (1997).

### **5.5.2 Effect on Appeal of Failure to File Proposed Findings**

A party's failure to file proposed findings on an issue may be "taken into account" if the party later appeals that issue, Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-244, 8 AEC 857, 864 (1974); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-123, 6 AEC 331, 333 (1973), absent a Licensing Board order requiring the submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, an intervenor that does not make such a filing nevertheless is free to pursue on appeal all issues it litigated below. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-709, 17 NRC 17, 19, 20 (1983).

### **5.5.3 Matters Considered on Appeal of Ruling Allowing Late Intervention**

One exception to the rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals is that a party opposing intervention may appeal an order admitting the intervenor. 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a). See also Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20, 23 n.7 (1976). However, since Licensing Boards have broad discretion in allowing late intervention, an order allowing late intervention is limited to determining whether that discretion has been abused. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98, 107 (1976); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20 (1976). The papers filed in the case and the uncontroverted facts set forth therein will be examined to determine if the Licensing Board abused its discretion. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8 (1977).

### **5.5.4 Consolidation of Appeals on Generic Issues**

Where the issues are largely generic, consolidation will result in a more manageable number of litigants, and relevant considerations will likely be raised in the first group of consolidated cases. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-540, 9 NRC 428, 433 (1979), reconsid. denied, ALAB-546, 9 NRC 636 (1979). The Appeal Board consolidated and scheduled for hearing radon cases where intervenors were actively participating, and held the remaining cases in abeyance.

## **5.6 Standards for Reversing Licensing Board on Findings of Fact and Other Matters**

Licensing board rulings are affirmed where the brief on appeal points to no error of law or abuse of discretion that might serve as grounds for reversal of a Board's decision. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-21, 52 NRC 261, 265 (2000); Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 121 (2006) (noting that the Commission affords its Licensing Boards substantial deference on threshold issues, such as standing and the admissibility of contentions).

Licensing Boards are the Commission's primary fact finding tribunals. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 867 (1975).

Pursuant to 2 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4) (formerly 2 C.F.R. § 2.786(b)(4)), the Commission will generally defer to the Board on its fact findings absent a showing that the Board's findings were "clearly erroneous," meaning that, in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the findings were not even plausible. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-16, 62 NRC 1, 3 (2005).

The normal deference that an appellate body owes to the trier of the facts when reviewing a decision on the merits is even more compelling at the preliminary state of review. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 133 (1982), citing Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621, 629 (1977).

In general, the Licensing Board findings may be rejected or modified if, after giving the Licensing Board's decision the probative force it intrinsically commands, the record compels a different result. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 357 (1975); accord, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858 (1975). ; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 834 (1984); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 531 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 537 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 811 (1986); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-881, 26 NRC 465, 473 (1987); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-921, 30 NRC 177, 181-82 (1989); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 13-14 (1990). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-932, 31 NRC 371, 397-98 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 365 n.278 (1991). The same standard applies even if the review is sua sponte. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), ALAB-655, 14 NRC 799, 803 (1981). In fact, where the record would fairly sustain a result deemed "preferable" by the agency to the one selected by the Licensing Board, the agency may substitute its judgment for that of the lower Board. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-367, 5 NRC 92 (1977); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 402-405 (1976). Nevertheless, a finding by a Licensing Board will not be overturned simply because a different result could have been reached. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-254, 8 AEC 1184, 1187-1188 (1975); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319, 322 (1972). Moreover, the "substantial evidence" rule does not apply to the NRC's internal review process and hence does not control evaluation of Licensing Board decisions. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 402-405 (1976); Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77 (1998).

Where Board's decision for the most part rests on its own carefully rendered fact findings, the Commission has repeatedly declined to second-guess plausible Board decisions. See, e.g., Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 45 (2001); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 93 (1998); Kenneth G. Pierce, CLI-95-6, 41 NRC 381, 382 (1995); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 382 (2001); Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 2 (2006); David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 11 (2006) (citing Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495, 501 & n.14 (2006)). But see, Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 423 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004) (Ordinarily the Commission is disinclined to second-guess a Board's finding on a discovery dispute, as the Board is more familiar than the Commission with the nature of the contentions in a particular proceeding. However, the Commission reversed a Board discovery ruling where the Commission had particular knowledge of the history and scope of the requested guidance documents because it had participated in their formulation.).

The Commission tends not to upset the findings of a Presiding Officer on fact-specific technical issues, where the Presiding Officer has reviewed an extensive record in detail, with the assistance of a technical advisor. In particular, the Commission is reluctant to disturb the Presiding Officer's findings and conclusions where the Presiding Officer has weighed the submissions of experts. Occasionally, the Commission may choose to make its own findings of fact. But it does not generally exercise that authority where a Presiding Officer or Licensing Board has issued a plausible decision that rests on carefully rendered findings of fact. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-29, 64 NRC 417, 422-23 (2006).

The Commission is generally not inclined to upset the Board's fact-driven findings and conclusions, particularly where it has weighed the affidavits or submissions of technical experts. Where the Board analyzed the parties' technical submissions carefully, and made intricate and well-supported findings in a 42-page opinion, the Commission saw no basis, on appeal, to redo the Board's work. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 388 (2001), aff'g LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 269-280 (2000). See also Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-28, 62 NRC 721, 723 (2005). Where a Presiding Officer reaches highly fact-specific findings following a review of technical information and consultation with technical experts, the Commission will ordinarily defer to these findings, absent an indication of a clearly erroneous finding. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657, 659 (2004).

The Commission standard of "clear error" for overturning Board factual findings is quite high, particularly with respect to intricate factual findings based on expert witness testimony and credibility determinations. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-8, 58 NRC 11, 26-27 (2003). See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 174 (2005) (The Commission traditionally defers to a Board's disclosure-related factual findings, and will reverse only if the findings are "clearly erroneous" (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 2.786(b)(4)(i) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4)(i)])).

While the Commission has discretion to review all underlying factual issues de novo, it is disinclined to do so where the Board has weighed arguments presented by experts and rendered reasonable, record-based factual findings. The Commission generally steps in only to correct clearly erroneous findings – that is, findings not even plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., (National Enrichment

Facility), CLI-06-15, 63 NRC 687, 697 (2006). See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 411 (2005).

The Commission avoids engaging in de novo factual inquiries when reviewing Board decisions, particularly where the Board proceeding was especially complex and involved numerous experts and voluminous exhibits and where the Board has devoted weeks or months to the controversy. In general, the Commission will defer to the Board's factual findings unless there is strong reason to believe, in the case at hand, that the Board has overlooked or misunderstood important evidence. PFS, CLI-05-19, 62 NRC at 411.

The Board could not be said to have given short shrift to Intervenor's quality assurance concerns where the Board admitted the issue for hearing, allowed discovery, obtained written evidence, heard oral argument, and the Board ultimately devoted some 11 pages of its order to discussing the quality assurance issue on the merits. The Commission would not ordinarily second-guess Board fact findings, particularly those reached with this degree of care. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 391 (2001).

In a materials licensing proceeding concerning uranium mining, the Commission found that the intervenors' hearing rights were not violated where they had the opportunity to challenge the adequacy of the groundwater-related information submitted by the applicant and the Staff, as well as the methodology that would be used during the operational stages of mining to assure protection of groundwater quality. Hydro Resources, Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 6 (2006).

A remand, very possibly accompanied by an outright vacation of the result reached below, would be the usual course where the Licensing Board's decision does not adequately support the conclusions reached therein. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 42 (1977). Thus, a Licensing Board's failure to clearly set forth the basis for its decision is ground for reversal. Although the Licensing Board is the primary fact-finder, the Commission may make factual findings based on its own review of the record and decide the case accordingly. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1087 n.12 (1983).

Licensing Board determinations on the timeliness of filing of motions are unlikely to be reversed on appeal as long as they are based on a rational foundation. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135, 159-160 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-87-12, 26 NRC 383 (1987). A Licensing Board's determination that an intervenor has properly raised and presented an issue for adjudication is entitled to substantial deference and will be overturned only when it lacks a rational foundation. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792, 795 (1986).

A determination of fact in an adjudicatory proceeding which is necessarily grounded wholly in a nonadversary presentation is not entitled to be accorded generic effect, even if the determination relates to a seemingly generic matter rather than to some specific aspect of the facility in question. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Projects No. 3 & 5), ALAB-485, 7 NRC 986, 980 (1978).

Adjudicatory decisions must be supported by evidence properly in the record. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-580, 11 NRC 227, 230 (1980). A Licensing Board finding that is based on testimony later withdrawn from the record will stand, if there is sufficient evidence elsewhere in the record to support the finding. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 84 (1986).

Where a Licensing Board imposed an incorrect remedy, on appeal there may be a search for a proper one. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233, 234-235 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

If conditions on a license are invalid, the matter will be either remanded to the Board or the Commission may prescribe a remedy itself. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 31 (1980), reconsidered, ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

The Appeal Board would not ordinarily conduct a de novo review of the record and make its own independent findings of fact since the Licensing Board is the basic fact-finder under Commission procedures. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant No. 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319 (1972). In this regard, Appeal Boards were reluctant to make essentially basic environmental findings which did not receive Staff consideration in the FES or adequate attention at the Licensing Board hearing. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-260, 1 NRC 51, 55 (1975).

The Commission's review of a Board's settlement decision is de novo, although the Commission gives respectful attention to the Board's views. In its review, the Commission uses the "due weight to...staff" and "public-interest" standards set forth in 10 CFR § 2.203 and New York Shipbuilding Co., 1 AEC 842 (1961). Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 206 (1997).

The Staff's position, while entitled to "due weight," is not itself dispositive of whether an enforcement settlement should be approved. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 207-09 (1997).

The Commission ordinarily defers to the Licensing Board standing determinations, and upheld the Presiding Officer's refusal to grant standing for Petitioner's failure to specify its proximity-based standing claims. Atlas Corp. (Moab, Utah Facility), CLI-97-8, 46 NRC 21, 22 (1997).

A licensing board normally has considerable discretion in making evidentiary rulings, and the Commission's standard for review of these rulings is abuse of discretion. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-21, 60 NRC 21, 27 (2004).

### **5.6.1 Standards for Reversal of Rulings on Intervention**

A Licensing Board has wide latitude to permit the amendment of defective petitions prior to the issuance of its final order on intervention. The Board's decision to allow such amendment will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of gross abuse of

discretion. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 194 (1973).

The Commission's customary practice is to affirm Board rulings on contention admissibility absent an abuse of discretion or error of law. Nuclear Management Company, LLC (Palisades Nuclear Plant), CLI-06-17, 63 NRC 727, 729 (2006).

On specific matters, a Licensing Board's determination as to a petitioner's "personal interest" will be reversed only if it is irrational. Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-109, 6 AEC 243, 244 (1973); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-107, 6 AEC 188, 193 (1973). In the absence of a clear misapplication of the facts or misunderstanding of the law, the Licensing Board's judgment at the pleading stage that a party has standing is entitled to substantial deference. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 47-48 (1994). Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech Research Reactor), CLI-95-12, 42 NRC 111, 116 (1995); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 324 (1999); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 14 (2001).

A Licensing Board's determination that good cause exists for untimely filing will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-354, 4 NRC 383 (1976); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-342, 4 NRC 98 (1976); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20 (1976); Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607 (1976).

A Licensing Board ruling on a discretionary intervention request will be reversed only if the Licensing Board abused its discretion. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-952, 33 NRC 521, 532 (1991).

The Commission generally defers to the presiding officer's determinations regarding standing, absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion. International Uranium Corporation (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI 98-6, 47 NRC 116, 118 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26, 32 (1998); Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-98-20, 48 NRC 183 (1998); Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185, 201 (1988).

The principle that Licensing Board determinations on the sufficiency of allegations of affected interest will not be overturned unless irrational presupposes that the appropriate legal standard for determining the "personal interest" of a petitioner has been invoked. Virginia Electric & Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-522, 9 NRC 54, 57 n.5 (1979).

Licensing Boards have broad discretion in balancing the eight factors which make up the criteria for non timely filings listed in 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)). However, a Licensing Board's decision may be overturned where no reasonable justification can be found for the outcome that is determined. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-806, 21 NRC 1183, 1190 (1985),

citing Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1171 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 20-21 (1986) (abuse of discretion by Licensing Board). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 443 (1987); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 922 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473, 481-82 (1989), remanded, Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311, 333-337 (D.C. Cir. 1991), dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991).

Where a licensing board holds that a contention is inadmissible for failing to meet more than one of the requirements specified in § 2.309(f)(1)(i)-(vi), a petitioner's failure to address each ground for the board's ruling is sufficient justification for the Commission to reject the petitioner's appeal. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631, 638 (2004).

## 5.7 Stays

The Rules of Practice do not provide for an automatic stay of an order upon the filing of an appeal. A specific request must be made. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-714, 17 NRC 86, 97 (1983). The provision for stays in 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) provides only for stays of decisions or actions in the proceeding under review. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55, 58 (1993).

A stay of the effectiveness of a Licensing Board decision pending review of that decision may be sought by the party appealing the decision. 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) confers the right to seek stay relief only upon those who have filed (or intend to file) a timely petition for review of a decision or order sought to be stayed. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-524, 9 NRC 65, 68-69 (1979).

Such a stay is normally sought by written motion, although, in extraordinary circumstances, a stay ex parte may be granted. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-192, 7 AEC 420 (1974). The movant may submit affidavits in support of his motion; opposing parties may file opposing affidavits, and it is appropriate for the appellate tribunal to accept and consider such affidavits in ruling on the motion for a stay. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-356, 4 NRC 525 (1976). The party seeking a stay bears the burden of marshalling the evidence and making the arguments which demonstrate his entitlement to it. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 785 (1977).

General assertions, in conclusionary terms, of alleged harmful effects are insufficient to demonstrate entitlement to a stay. United States Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-721, 17 NRC 539, 544 (1983), citing Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-505, 8 NRC 527, 530 (1978).

In the past it has been held that, as a general rule, motions for stay of a Licensing Board action should be directed to the Licensing Board in the first instance. Under those earlier rulings, the Appeal Board made it clear that, while filing a motion for a stay with the

Licensing Board is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to seeking a stay from the Appeal Board, Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-338, 4 NRC 10 (1976), the failure, without good cause, to first seek a stay from the Licensing Board is a factor which the Appeal Board would properly take into account in deciding whether it should itself grant the requested stay. See Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772 (1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, ALAB-338, 4 NRC 10 (1976). See also Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-25, 4 AEC 633, 634 (1971).

Under 10 CFR § 2.342(f) (formerly § 2.788) a request for stay of a Licensing Board decision, pending the filing of a petition for Commission review, may be filed with either the Licensing Board or the Commission.

Where the Commission issues a stay wholly as a matter of its own discretion, it does not need to address the factors listed in 10 C.F.R. § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 60 (1996).

In ruling on stay requests, the Commission has held that irreparable injury is the most crucial factor. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-17, 52 NRC 79 (2000). See also Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-27, 14 NRC 795, 797 (1981).

The effectiveness of conditions imposed in a construction permit may be stayed without staying the effectiveness of the permit itself. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621 (1977).

An appellate tribunal may entertain and grant a motion for a stay pending remand of a Licensing Board decision. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977).

The provisions of 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) apply only to requests for stays of decisions of the licensing board, not decisions of the Commission itself. A request for a stay of a previous Commission decision and a stay of the issuance of a full-power license pending judicial review is more properly entitled a "Motion for Reconsideration" and/or a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance." Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-11, 37 NRC 251 (1993). The date of service for purposes of computing the time for filing a stay motion under Section 2.342 (formerly 2.788) is the date on which the Docketing and Service Branch of the Office of the Secretary of the Commission serves the order or decision. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, No. 2), ALAB-414, 5 NRC 1425, 1427-1428 (1977).

The Commission may issue a temporary stay to preserve the status quo without waiting for the filing of an answer to a motion for stay. 10 C.F.R. § 2.342(f) (formerly § 2.788(f)). The issuance of a temporary stay is appropriate where petitioners raise serious questions, that, if petitioners are correct, could affect the balance of the stay factors set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.342(e) (formerly § 2.788(e)). Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-3, 47 NRC 7 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-4, 47 NRC 111, 112 (1998).

Where a party files a stay motion with the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.323 (formerly § 2.730) (which contains no standards by which to decide stay motions), the Commission will turn for guidance to the general stay standards in section 2.342 (formerly



2.788). Sequoiah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994). Thus, a full stay pending judicial review of a Commission decision may require the movant to meet the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958), criteria. See Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 272 (1974).

If, absent a stay pending appeal, the status quo will be irreparably altered, grant of a stay may be justified to preserve the Commission's ability to consider, if appropriate, the merits of a case. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-83-6, 17 NRC 333, 334 (1983).

### **5.7.1 Requirements for a Stay Pending Review**

The Commission may stay the effectiveness of an order if it has ruled on difficult legal questions and the equities of the case suggest that the status quo should be maintained during an anticipated judicial review of the order. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-4, 35 NRC 69, 80 (1992), citing, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

#### **5.7.1.1 Stays of Initial Decisions**

Stays of an initial decision will be granted only upon a showing similar to that required for a preliminary injunction in the Federal courts. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-81, 5 AEC 348 (1972). The test to be applied for such a showing is that laid down in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-338, 4 NRC 10 (1976); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-221, 8 AEC 95, 96 (1974); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-199, 7 AEC 478, 480 (1974); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-192, 7 AEC 420, 421 (1974). See also Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-647, 14 NRC 27 (1981); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-643, 13 NRC 898 (1981); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-81-30, 14 NRC 357 (1981); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 691 (1982); South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-84, 16 NRC 1183, 1184-85 (1982); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-40, 18 NRC 93, 96-97 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-17, 20 NRC 801, 803 n.3 (1984); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-21, 20 NRC 1437, 1440 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-789, 20 NRC 1443, 1446 (1984); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1632 n.7 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1599 (1985); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-810, 21 NRC 1616, 1618 (1985); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 178 n.1 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-814, 22 NRC 191, 193, 194

(1985); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.5 (1985); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-4, 23 NRC 113, 121-122 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-835, 23 NRC 267, 270 (1986); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-12, 24 NRC 1, 5 (1986), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. NRC, 799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 435 (1987); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-877, 26 NRC 287, 290 (1987); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357, 361 (1989); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-90-8, 31 NRC 143, 146 (1990), aff'd as modified, ALAB-931, 31 NRC 350, 369 (1990); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 257 & n.59 (1990); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 267 (1990); Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-30, 32 NRC 95, 103-104 (1990); Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-35, 32 NRC 259, 265-66 (1990); Umetco Minerals Corp., LBP-92-20, 36 NRC 112, 115-116 (1992); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55 (1993); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994).

#### **5.7.1.2 Stays of Board Proceedings, Interlocutory Rulings & Staff Action**

The Virginia Petroleum Jobbers rule applies not only to stays of initial decisions of Licensing Boards, but also to stays of Licensing Board proceedings in general, Allied General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separations Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975), and stays pending judicial review, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 272 (1974). In addition, the concept of a stay pending consideration of a petition for directed certification has been recognized. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-307, 3 NRC 17 (1976). The rule applies to stays of limited work authorizations, Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-437, 6 NRC 630 (1977), as well as to requests for emergency stays pending final disposition of a stay motion. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-404, 5 NRC 1185, 1186-89 (1977). The rule also applies to stays of implementation and enforcement of radiation protection standards. Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations (40 CFR 190), CLI-81-4, 13 NRC 298 (1981); Uranium Mill Licensing Requirements (10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 70 and 150), CLI-81-9, 13 NRC 460, 463 (1981). It also applies to postponements of the effectiveness of some license amendments issued by the NRC Staff. In the case of a request for postponement of an amendment, the Commission has stated that a bare claim of an absolute right to a prior hearing on the issuance of a license amendment does not constitute a substantial showing of irreparable injury as required by 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788(e)). Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. and New York State Energy Research & Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), CLI-81-29, 14 NRC 940 (1981). The rule has been applied to a stay of enforcement orders. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-90-8, 31 NRC 143, 146 (1990), aff'd as modified, ALAB-931, 31 NRC 350, 369 (1990).

However, the NRC Staff's issuance of an immediately effective license amendment based on a "no significant hazards consideration" finding is a final determination which is not subject to either a direct appeal or an indirect appeal to the Commission through the request for a stay. In special circumstances, the Commission may, on its own initiative, exercise its inherent discretionary supervisory authority over the Staff's actions in order to review the Staff's "no significant hazards consideration" determination. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-12, 24 NRC 1, 4-5 (1986), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. NRC, 799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1986); 10 C.F.R. § 50.58(b)(6).

Where petitioners do not relate their stay request to any action in the proceeding under review, the request for stay is beyond the scope of 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). Such a request is more properly a petition for immediate enforcement action under 10 CFR § 2.206. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55, 58 (1993).

Interlocutory appeals or petitions to the Commission are not devices for delaying or halting licensing board proceedings. The stringent four-part standard set forth in section 2.342(e) (formerly 2.788(e)) makes it difficult for a party to obtain a stay of any aspect of a licensing board proceeding. Therefore, only in unusual cases should the normal discovery and other processes be delayed pending the outcome of an appeal or petition to the Commission. Cf. 10 CFR § 2.323(g) (formerly § 2.730(g)). Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994).

A party may file a motion for the Commission to stay the effectiveness of an interlocutory Licensing Board ruling, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788), pending the filing of a petition for interlocutory review of that Board order. See Georgia Power Co., et al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 193 (1994).

The provisions of 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) apply only to requests for stays of decisions of the licensing board, not decisions of the Commission itself. A request for a stay of a previous Commission decision and a stay of the issuance of a full-power license pending judicial review is more properly entitled a "Motion for Reconsideration" and/or a "Motion to Hold in Abeyance." Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-11, 37 NRC 251 (1993).

When ruling on stay motions in a license transfer proceeding, the Commission applies the four pronged test set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.1327(d):

- (1) Whether the requestor will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted;
- (2) Whether the requestor has made a strong showing that it is unlikely to prevail on the merits;
- (3) Whether the granting of a stay would harm other participants; and
- (4) Where the public interest lies.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-17, 52 NRC 79 (2000).

The application for a stay will be denied when intervenors do not make a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits or that they will be irreparably harmed pending appeal of the Licensing Board's decision. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-82-11, 15 NRC 1383, 1384 (1982).

Note that 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) does not expressly deal with the matter of a stay pending remand of a proceeding to the Licensing Board. Prior to the promulgation of Section 2.342 (formerly 2.788), the Commission held that the standards for issuance of a stay pending proceedings on remand are less stringent than those of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977). The Commission ruled that the propriety of issuing a stay pending remand was to be determined on the basis of a traditional balance of equities and on consideration of possible prejudice to further actions resulting from the remand proceedings. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-15, 30 NRC 96, 100 (1989). Similarly, in Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772 (1977), the Appeal Board ruled that the criteria for a stay pending remand differ from those required for a stay pending appeal. Thus, it appears that the criteria set forth in 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) may not apply to requests for stays pending remand. Where a litigant who has prevailed on a judicial appeal of an NRC decision seeks a suspension of the effectiveness of the NRC decision pending remand, such a suspension is not controlled by the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria but, instead, is dependent upon a balancing of all relevant equitable considerations. In such circumstances, the negative impact of the court's decision places a heavy burden of proof on those opposing the stay. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 159-60 (1978).

Where petitioners who have filed a request to stay issuance of a low-power license are not parties to the operating license proceeding, and where petitioners' request does not address the eight factors for untimely filing found in 10 CFR § 2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v)), the request cannot properly be considered in that operating license proceeding. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55, 57-58 (1993).

The Commission will hold a stay proceeding in abeyance pending the consummation of a tentative bankruptcy settlement that could make unnecessary an earlier Staff order approving the transfer of operating licenses. As the law favors settlements, the Commission will take this action absent a harm to third parties or the public interest. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-03-10, 58 NRC 127, 129 (2003).

### **5.7.1.3 10 C.F.R. § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) & Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Criteria**

The Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria for granting a stay have been incorporated into the regulations. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 130 (1982). See 10 CFR § 2.342(e) (formerly § 2.788(e)). See Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear

Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 100 (1994) (the Commission will decline a grant of petitioner's request to halt decommissioning activities where petitioner failed to meet the four traditional criteria for injunctive relief); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-5, 47 NRC 119, 120 (1998). Since that section merely codifies long-standing agency practice which parallels that of the courts, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 170 (1978), prior agency case law delineating the application of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria presumably remains applicable.

Under the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test, codified in 10 CFR 2.342(e) (formerly 2.788(e)), four factors are examined:

- (1) has the movant made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail upon the merits of its appeal;
- (2) has the movant shown that, without the requested relief, it will be irreparably injured;
- (3) would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the proceeding;
- (4) where does the public interest lie?

Section 2.342(b)(2) (formerly 2.788(b)(2)) specifies that an application for a stay must contain a concise statement of the grounds for stay, with reference to the factors specified in paragraph (e) of that section. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55, 58 (1993). See also Fansteel, Inc. (Muskogee, Oklahoma Facility), LBP-99-47, 50 NRC 409 (1999).

On a motion for a stay, the burden of persuasion on the four factors of Virginia Petroleum Jobbers is on the movant. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 270 (1978); Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-81-27, 14 NRC 795 (1981).

Stays pending appellate review are governed by 10 C.F.R. § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-11, 55 NRC 260, 262-263 (2002); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 392 (2001).

A decision to deny a petition for review terminates adjudicatory proceedings before the Commission, and renders moot the a motion for a stay pending appeal. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 392 (2001).

The Commission took no action on Intervenor's stay motion during its consideration of the Intervenor's petition for review because it saw no possibility of irreparable injury where the record indicated that the injury asserted by Intervenor could not occur until nearly four months hence and even at that point the additional spent fuel stored at the site would no more than 150 fuel elements in that calendar year. Moreover, Intervenor's claim of injury-offsite radiation exposure in the event of a spent fuel pool accident was speculative. These facts taken together result in a small likelihood of an accident occurring, and does not amount to the kind of

“certain and great” harm necessary for a stay. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 392-93 (2001). See Cuomo v. NRC, 772 F.2d 972, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1985); accord, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 747-48 & n.20 (1985).

Where the four factors set forth in 10 CFR § 2.342(e) (formerly § 2.788(e)) are applicable, no one of these criteria is dispositive. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-9, 55 NRC 227, 232 (2002), see also Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255 (1992). Rather, the strength or weakness of the movant's showing on a particular factor will determine how strong his showing on the other factors must be in order to justify the relief he seeks. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-338, 4 NRC 10 (1976); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-81-30, 14 NRC 357 (1981); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985). Of the four stay factors, “the most crucial is whether irreparable injury will be incurred by the movant absent a stay.” Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-27, 14 NRC 795, 797 (1981). Accord, Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 7 (1994); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 393 (2001). International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-9, 55 NRC 227 (2002), see also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 258 (1990). In any event, there should be more than a mere showing of the possibility of legal error by a Licensing Board to warrant a stay. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-221, 8 AEC 95 (1975); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-158, 6 AEC 999 (1973). The establishment of grounds for appeal is not itself sufficient to justify a stay. Rather, there must be a strong probability that no ground will remain upon which the Licensing Board's action could be based. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621 (1977).

#### **5.7.1.3.1 Irreparable Injury**

The factor which has proved most crucial with regard to stays of Licensing Board decisions is the question of irreparable injury to the movants if the stay is not granted. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-27, 14 NRC 795 (1981); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-437, 6 NRC 630, 632 (1977); Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-716, 17 NRC 341, 342 n.1 (1983); United States Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-721, 17 NRC 539, 543 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-17, 20 NRC 801, 804 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-789, 20 NRC 1443, 1446 (1984); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1633 n.11 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1599 (1985);

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 & n.7 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-835, 23 NRC 267, 270 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 436 (1987); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357, 361 (1989); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 258 (1990); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-5, 47 NRC 119 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 321 n.5 (1998). See, e.g., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-27, 6 NRC 715, 716 (1977); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-507, 8 NRC 551, 556 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-481, 7 NRC 807, 808 (1978). See also Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 662 (1980). It is the established rule that a party is not ordinarily granted a stay of an administration order without an appropriate showing of irreparable injury. Id., quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 773 (1968). Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-814, 22 NRC 191, 196 (1985), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1633-35 (1984). See General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357, 361-62 (1989); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 324 (1998); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-15, 56 NRC 42, 48 (2002); U.S. Dept. of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), CLI-05-27, 62 NRC 715, 718 (2005).

A party is not ordinarily granted a stay absent an appropriate showing of irreparable injury. Where a decision as to which a stay is sought does not allow the issuance of any licensing authorization and does not affect the status quo ante, the movant will not be injured by the decision and there is, quite simply, nothing for the tribunal to stay. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-481, 7 NRC 807, 808 (1978).

Where the Licensing Board's decision is itself the cause of irreparable injury, a stay of proceedings pending review is appropriate. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-8, 55 NRC 222, 225 (2002).

The irreparable injury requirement is not satisfied by some cost merely feared as liable to occur at some indefinite time in the future. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621 (1977). Mere economic loss does not constitute irreparable injury. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-4, 35 NRC 69, 81 (1992), citing Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. NRC, 812 F.2d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 1987). Nor are actual injuries, however substantial in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, sufficient to justify a stay if not irreparable. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621 (1977); see Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 437-38 (1987). Similarly, mere litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoverable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent

Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-11, 55 NRC 260, 263 (2002); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 779 (1977); Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-17, 20 NRC 801, 804 (1984); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-15, 56 NRC 42, 49 (2002).

The mere possibility that a stay would save other parties from incurring significant litigation expenses is insufficient to offset the movant's failure to demonstrate irreparable injury and a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994). Discovery in a license amendment case does not constitute irreparable injury. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-8, 37 NRC 292, 298 (1993). Litigation expense, even substantial and unrecoupable cost, does not constitute irreparable injury. U.S. Dept. of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), CLI-05-27, 62 NRC 715, 718 (2005).

Similarly, the expense of an administrative proceeding is usually not considered irreparable injury. Uranium Mill Licensing Requirements (10 CFR Parts 30, 40, 70, and 150), CLI-81-9, 13 NRC 460, 465 (1981), citing Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).

An intervenor's claim that an applicant's commitment of resources to the operation of a facility pending an appeal will create a Commission bias in favor of continuing a license does not constitute irreparable injury. The Commission has clearly stated that it will not consider the commitment of resources to a completed plant or other economic factors in its decisionmaking on compliance with emergency planning safety regulations. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 258-59 (1990), citing Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Additionally, a party's claim that discovery expenses might deplete assets allotted for decommissioning activities does not constitute irreparable injury. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994). However, the Commission also noted that the commitment of resources and other economic factors are properly considered in the NEPA decisionmaking process. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 258 n.62 (1990). Thus, a party challenging the alternative site selection process may be able to show irreparable injury if a stay is not granted to halt the development of a proposed site during the pendency of its appeal. Any resources which might be expended in the development of the proposed site would have to be considered in any future cost-benefit analysis and, if substantial, could skew the cost-benefit analysis in favor of the proposed site over any alternative sites. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 268-269 (1990).

The fact that an appeal might become moot following denial of a motion for a stay does not per se constitute irreparable injury. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-9, 55 NRC 227, 233 (2002). It must



also be established that the activity that will take place in the absence of a stay will bring about concrete harm. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-810, 21 NRC 1616, 1620 (1985), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1635 (1984). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 411-12 (1989).

Speculation about a nuclear accident does not, as a matter of law, constitute the imminent, irreparable injury required for staying a licensing decision. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 748 n.20 (1985), citing Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-84-5, 19 NRC 953, 964 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-835, 23 NRC 267, 271 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 259-260 (1990).

The risk of harm to the general public or the environment flowing from an accident during low-power testing is insufficient to constitute irreparable injury. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 437 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 410 (1989). Similarly, irreversible changes produced by the irradiation of the reactor during low-power testing do not constitute irreparable injury. Seabrook, CLI-89-8, supra, 29 NRC at 411.

Mere exposure to the risk of full power operation of a facility does not constitute irreparable injury when the risk is so low as to be remote and speculative. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 180 (1985).

The importance of a showing of irreparable injury absent a stay was stressed by the Appeal Board in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-505, 8 NRC 527, 530 (1978), where the Appeal Board indicated that a stay application which does not even attempt to make a showing of irreparable injury is virtually assured of failure.

A party who fails to show irreparable harm must make a strong showing on the other stay factors in order to obtain the grant of a stay. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 260 (1990); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6 (1994).

#### **5.7.1.3.2 Possibility of Success on Merits**

The "level or degree of possibility of success" on the merits necessary to justify a stay will vary according to the tribunal's assessment of the other factors that must be considered in determining if a stay is warranted. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-437, 6 NRC 630, 632 (1977), citing Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-5, 47 NRC 119, 120 (1998). Where there is no showing of irreparable injury absent a stay and the other factors do not favor the movant, an overwhelming

showing of likelihood of success on the merits is required to obtain a stay. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-404, 5 NRC 1185, 1186-1189 (1977); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985) (a virtual certainty of success on the merits). See also Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-415, 5 NRC 1435, 1437 (1977) to substantially the same effect; Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-865, 25 NRC 430, 439 (1987); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357, 362-63 (1989); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 269 (1990); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 7 (1994).

To make a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits, the movant must do more than list the possible grounds for reversal. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621 (1977); Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-27, 14 NRC 795 (1981); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 269-70 (1990). A party's expression of confidence or expectation of success on the merits of its appeal before the Commission or the Boards is too speculative and is also insufficient. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-814, 22 NRC 191, 196 (1985), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-17, 20 NRC 801, 804-805 (1984).

While the Commission will grant a stay where the chance of reversal on appeal is "overwhelming" or "a virtual certainty," the Commission is reluctant to rush to judgment on the merits of an appeal, where there is no irreparable harm. U.S. Dept. of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), CLI-05-27, 62 NRC 715, 719 (2005).

#### **5.7.1.3.3 Harm to Other Parties and Where the Public Interest Lies**

If the movant for a stay fails to meet its burden on the first two 10 CFR § 2.342(e) (formerly § 2.788(e)) factors, it is not necessary to give lengthy consideration to balancing the other two factors. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-810, 21 NRC 1616, 1620 (1985), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-794, 20 NRC 1630, 1635 (1984); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-5, 47 NRC 119, 120 (1998). See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-914, 29 NRC 357, 363 (1989); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 270 (1990); Sequoyah Fuels Corporation and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 8 (1994).

Although an applicant's economic interests are not generally within the proper scope of issues to be litigated in NRC proceedings, a Board may consider such interests in determining whether, under the third stay criterion, the granting of a stay would harm other parties. Thus, a Board may consider the potential economic harm to an applicant caused by a stay of the applicant's operating

license. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1602-03 (1985). See, e.g., Louisiana Power and Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-85-3, 21 NRC 471, 477 (1985); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-404, 5 NRC 1185, 1188 (1977); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 180 (1985).

The imminence of the hearing is also a factor in a determination that the public interest will be served if the parties are allowed to wrap up the matters they have been litigating. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-11, 55 NRC 260, 263 (2002).

In a decontamination enforcement proceeding where a licensee seeks a stay of an immediately effective order, the fourth factor - where the public interest lies - is the most important consideration. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-90-8, 31 NRC 143, 148 (1990), aff'd as modified, ALAB-931, 31 NRC 350, 369 (1990).

### **5.7.2 Stays Pending Remand to Licensing Board**

10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) does not expressly deal with the matter of a stay pending remand of a proceeding to the Licensing Board. Prior to the promulgation of Section 2.342 (formerly 2.788), the Commission held that the standards for issuance of a stay pending remand are less stringent than those of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977). In this vein, the Commission ruled that the propriety of issuing a stay pending remand was to be determined on the basis of a traditional balancing of equities and on consideration of possible prejudice to further actions resulting from the remand proceedings.

Where judicial review discloses inadequacies in an agency's environmental impact statement prepared in good faith, a stay of the underlying activity pending remand does not follow automatically. Whether the project need be stayed essentially must be decided on the basis of (1) traditional balancing of equities, and (2) consideration of any likely prejudice to further decisions that might be called for by the remand. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 784-85 (1977). The seriousness of the remanded issue is a third factor which a Board will consider before ruling on a party's motion for a stay pending remand. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-53, 20 NRC 1531, 1543 (1984), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 521 (1977).

### **5.7.3 Stays Pending Judicial Review**

Requests for stays pending judicial review have been entertained under the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria (see Section 5.7.1, supra) to determine if a stay is appropriate. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 272 (1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, CLI-76-2, 3 NRC 76 (1976).

Section 10(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 705) pertains to an agency's right to stay its own action pending judicial review of that action. It confers no freedom on an agency to postpone taking some action when the impetus for the action comes from a court directive. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 783-84 (1977).

The Appeal Board suspended sua sponte its consideration of an issue in order to await the possibility of Supreme Court review of related issues, following the rendering of a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, where certiorari had not yet been sought or ruled upon for such Supreme Court review. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-548, 9 NRC 640, 642 (1979).

#### **5.7.4 Stays Pending Remand After Judicial Review**

Where a litigant who has prevailed upon a judicial appeal of an NRC decision seeks a suspension of the effectiveness of the NRC decision pending remand, such a suspension is not controlled by the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria but, instead, is dependent upon a balancing of all relevant equitable considerations. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 159-60 (1978). In such circumstances, the negative impact of the court's decision places a heavy burden of proof on those opposing the stay. Id. at 7 NRC 160.

#### **5.7.5 Immediate Effectiveness Review of Operating License Decisions**

Under 10 CFR § 2.340(f)(2) (formerly § 2.764(f)(2)), upon receipt of a Licensing Board's decision authorizing the issuance of a full power operating license, the Commission will determine, sua sponte, whether to stay the effectiveness of the decision. Criteria to be considered by the Commission include, but are not limited to: the gravity of the substantive issue; the likelihood that it has been resolved incorrectly below; and the degree to which correct resolution of the issue would be prejudiced by operation pending review. Until the Commission speaks, the Licensing Board's decision is considered to be automatically stayed. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-647, 14 NRC 27 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-85-13, 22 NRC 1, 2 n.1 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-85-15, 22 NRC 184, 185 n.2 (1985).

The Commission's immediate effectiveness review is usually based upon a full Licensing Board decision on all contested issues. However, the Commission conducted an immediate effectiveness review and authorized the issuance of a full power license for Limerick Unit 2, even though, pursuant to a federal court remand, Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1989), there was an ongoing Licensing Board proceeding to consider environmental issues. The Commission noted that: (1) all contested safety issues had been fully heard and resolved; and (2) the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) does not always require resolution of all contested environmental issues and completion of the entire NEPA review process prior to the issuance of a license. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2), CLI-89-17, 30 NRC 105, 110 (1989), citing 40 CFR 1506.1.

An intervenor's speculative comments are insufficient grounds for a stay of a Licensing Board's authorization of a full power operating license. The intervenor must challenge

the Licensing Board's substantive conclusions concerning contested issues in the proceeding. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-87-1, 25 NRC 1, 4 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Eddleman v. NRC, 825 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1987).

Prior to moving for a stay of issuance of the operating license, a person or persons who are not parties to the license proceeding must petition for and be granted late intervention and reopening. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2) CLI-93-11, 37 NRC 251 (1993).

Where construction of a plant is "substantially completed" any request to stay construction is moot. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2) CLI-93-11, 37 NRC 251, 254 (1993).

The Commission's denial of a stay, pursuant to its immediate effectiveness review, does not preclude a party from petitioning under 10 CFR § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786) for appellate review of the Licensing Board's conclusions. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-87-1, 25 NRC 1, 4 n.3 (1987)(citing 10 CFR § 2.764, now § 2.340), aff'd sub nom. Eddleman v. NRC, 825 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1987).

Before a full power license can be issued for a plant, the Commission must complete its immediate effectiveness review of the pertinent Licensing Board decision pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.340(f)(2) (formerly § 2.764(f)(2)). Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 144 n.26 (1982).

## **5.8 Review as to Specific Matters**

### **5.8.1 Scheduling Orders**

Since a scheduling decision is a matter of Licensing Board discretion, it will generally not be disturbed absent a "truly exceptional situation." Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Unit 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 467 (1980); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-295, 2 NRC 668 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-293, 2 NRC 660 (1975); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244, 250 (1974); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 95 (1986). See also Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-344, 4 NRC 207, 209 (1976) (Appeal Board was reluctant to overturn or otherwise interfere with scheduling orders of Licensing Boards absent due process problems); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-637, 13 NRC 367 (1981) (Appeal Board was loath to interfere with a Licensing Board's denial of a request to delay a proceeding where the Commission has ordered an expedited hearing; in such a case there must be a "compelling demonstration of a denial of due process or the threat of immediate and serious irreparable harm" to invoke discretionary review); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-858, 25 NRC 17, 21 (1987) (petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that a Licensing Board decision to conduct simultaneous hearings deprived it of the right to a fair hearing); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-860, 25 NRC 63, 68

(1987) (intervenors' concerns about infringement of procedural due process were premature); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 277 (1987) (intervenor failed to show specific harm resulting from the Licensing Board's severely abbreviated hearing schedule); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-864, 25 NRC 417, 420-21 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-889, 27 NRC 265, 269 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-4, 29 NRC 243, 244 (1989).

In determining the fairness of a Licensing Board's scheduling decisions, the totality of the relevant circumstances disclosed by the record will be considered. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-864, 25 NRC 417, 421 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-889, 27 NRC 265, 269 (1988).

Where a party alleges that a Licensing Board's expedited hearing schedule violated its right to procedural due process by unreasonably limiting its opportunity to conduct discovery, an Appeal Board will examine: the amount of time allotted for discovery; the number, scope, and complexity of the issues to be tried; whether there exists any practical reason or necessity for the expedited schedule; and whether the party has demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from the expedited hearing schedule. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-864, 25 NRC 417, 421, 425-27 (1987). Although, absent special circumstances, the Appeal Board will generally review Licensing Board scheduling determinations only where confronted with a claim of deprivation of due process, the Appeal Board may, on occasion, review a Licensing Board scheduling matter when that scheduling appears to be based on the Licensing Board's misapprehension of an Appeal Board directive. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-468, 7 NRC 464, 468 (1978).

Matters of scheduling rest peculiarly within the Licensing Board's discretion; the Appeal Board is reluctant to review scheduling orders, particularly when asked to do so on an interlocutory basis. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-541, 9 NRC 436, 438 (1979).

## **5.8.2 Discovery Rulings**

### **5.8.2.1 Rulings on Discovery Against Nonparties**

An order granting discovery against a nonparty is final and appealable by that nonparty as of right. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-122, 6 AEC 322 (1973). An order denying such discovery is wholly interlocutory and immediate review by the party seeking discovery is excluded by 10 CFR § 2.341(f) (formerly § 2.730(f)). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-116, 6 AEC 258 (1973); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-780, 20 NRC 378, 380-81 (1984).

### **5.8.2.2 Rulings Curtailing Discovery**

In appropriate instances, an order curtailing discovery is appealable. To establish reversible error from curtailment of discovery procedures, a party must demonstrate

that the action made it impossible to obtain crucial evidence, and implicit in such a showing is proof that more diligent discovery is impossible. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-303, 2 NRC 858, 869 (1975). Absent such circumstances, however, an order denying discovery, and discovery orders in general are not immediately appealable since they are interlocutory. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-639, 13 NRC 469, 472 (1981); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-370, 5 NRC 131 (1977).

### **5.8.3 Refusal to Compel Joinder of Parties**

A Licensing Board's refusal to compel joinder of certain persons as parties to a proceeding is interlocutory in nature and, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.341 (formerly § 2.730(f)), is not immediately appealable. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-370, 5 NRC 131 (1977).

#### **5.8.3.1 Order Consolidating Parties**

Just as an order denying consolidation is interlocutory, an order consolidating the participation of one party with others may not be appealed prior to the conclusion of the proceeding. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-496, 8 NRC 308, 309-310 (1978); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20, 23 (1976).

### **5.8.4 Order Denying Summary Disposition**

As is the case under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an order denying a motion for summary disposition under 10 CFR § 2.710 (formerly § 2.749) is not immediately appealable. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-641, 13 NRC 550 (1981); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-220, 8 AEC 93 (1974). Similarly, a deferral of action on, or denial of, a motion for summary disposition does not fall within the bounds of the 10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a) exception to the prohibition on interlocutory appeals, and may not be appealed. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Stanislaus Nuclear Project, Unit 1), ALAB-400, 5 NRC 1175 (1977). See also section 3.5.

### **5.8.5 Procedural Irregularities**

Absent extraordinary circumstances, alleged procedural irregularities will not be reviewed unless an appeal has been taken by a party whose rights may have been substantially affected by such irregularities. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-231, 8 AEC 633, 634 (1974). In general, the Commission is very hesitant to disturb procedural case management decisions made by the Board. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 629 (2004).

### **5.8.6 Matters of Recurring Importance**

There is some indication that a matter of recurring procedural importance may be appealed in a particular case even though it may no longer be determinative in that case. However, if it is of insufficient general importance (for instance, whether existing

guidelines concerning cross-examination were properly applied in an individual case), interlocutory review will be refused. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 316 (1978).

### **5.8.7 Advisory Decisions on Trial Rulings**

Advisory decisions on trial rulings which resulted in no discernible injury ordinarily will not be considered on appeal. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-157, 6 AEC 858 (1973).

Where a Board ruling on an issue has no present practical significance, and very likely will have no future practical significance, Commission will hold an appeal from the ruling on that issue in abeyance rather than engaging in the “academic exercise” of reviewing it right away. U.S. Dept. of Energy (High Level Waste Repository), CLI-04-32, 60 NRC 469, 473 (2004).

### **5.8.8 Order on Pre-LWA Activities**

A Licensing Board order on the issue of whether offsite activity can be undertaken prior to the issuance of an LWA or a construction permit is immediately appealable as of right. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-331, 3 NRC 771, 774 (1976).

### **5.8.9 Partial Initial Decisions**

Partial initial decisions which do not yet authorize construction activities still may be significant and, therefore, immediately appealable. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3), ALAB-597, 11 NRC 870, 871 (1980); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-301, 2 NRC 853, 854 (1975).

For the purposes of appeal, partial initial decisions which decide a major segment of a case or terminate a party's right to participate, are final Licensing Board actions on the issues decided. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-25, 17 NRC 681, 684 (1983). See Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), ALAB-632, 13 NRC 91, 93 n.2 (1981).

In the interest of efficiency, all rulings that deal with the subject matter of the hearing from which a partial initial decision ensues should be reviewed by the Commission at the same time. Therefore, the time to ask the Commission's review of any claim that could have affected the outcome of a partial initial decision, including bases that were not admitted or that were dismissed prior to the hearing, is immediately after the partial initial decision is issued. The parties should assert any claims of error that relate to the subject matter of the partial initial decision, whether the specific issue was admitted for the hearing or not, and without regard to whether the issue was originally designated a separate “contention” or a “basis” for a contention. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-24, 52 NRC 351, 353 (2000).



### 5.8.10 Other Licensing Actions

When a Licensing Board, during the course of an operating license hearing, grants a Part 70 license to transport and store fuel assemblies, the decision is not interlocutory and is immediately appealable as of right. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-1, 3 NRC 73, 74 (1976).

When a Licensing Board's ruling removes any possible adjudicatory impediments to the issuance of a Part 70 license, the ruling is immediately appealable. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 45 n.1 (1984), citing Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-765, 19 NRC 645, 648 n.1 (1984). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-854, 24 NRC 783, 787 (1986) (a Licensing Board's dismissal by summary disposition of an intervenor's contention dealing with fuel loading and precriticality testing may be challenged in connection with the intervenor's challenge of the order authorizing issuance of the license).

### 5.8.11 Evidentiary Rulings

While all evidentiary rulings are ultimately subject to appeal at the end of the proceeding, not all such rulings are worthy of appeal. Some procedural and evidentiary errors almost invariably occur in lengthy hearings where the presiding officer must rule quickly. Only serious errors affecting substantial rights and which might have influenced improperly the outcome of the hearing merit the hearing merit exception and briefing on appeal. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-204, 7 AEC 835, 836 (1974).

Evidentiary exclusions must affect a substantial right, and the substance of the evidence must be made known by way of an offer of proof or be otherwise apparent, before the exclusions can be considered errors. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-673, 15 NRC 688, 697-98 n.14 (1982).

For a discussion of the procedure necessary to preserve evidentiary rulings for appeal, see Section 3.11.4.

### 5.8.12 Authorization of Construction Permit

A decision authorizing issuance of a construction permit may be suspended. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-348, 4 NRC 225 (1976). Immediate revocation or suspension of a construction permit, upon review of the issuance thereof, is appropriate if there are deficiencies that:

- (a) pose a hazard during construction;
- (b) need to be corrected before further construction takes place;
- (c) are incorrectable; or
- (d) might result in significant environmental harm if construction is permitted to continue.

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-268, 1 NRC 383, 401 (1975).

Whether a public utility commission's consent is required before construction contracts can be entered into and carried out is a question of State law. If the State authorities want to suspend construction pending the results of the public utility commission's review, it is their prerogative. But the construction permit will not be suspended on the "strength of nothing more than potentiality of action adverse to the facility being taken by another agency" (citation omitted). Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-443, 6 NRC 741, 748 (1977).

### **5.8.13 Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants**

To be eligible to petition for review of a Director's Decision on the certification of a gaseous diffusion plant, an interested party must have either submitted written comments in response to a prior Federal Register notice or provided oral comments at an NRC meeting held on the application or compliance plan. 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c). U.S. Enrichment Corp., CLI-96-12, 44 NRC 231, 233-34, 236 (1996).

Individuals who wish to petition for review of an initial Director's decision must explain how their "interest may be affected." 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c). For guidance, petitioners may look to the Commission's adjudicatory decisions on standing. U.S. Enrichment Corp., 44 NRC 231, 234-36 (1996).

## **5.9 Perfecting Appeals**

Normally, review is not taken of specific rulings (e.g., rulings with respect to contentions) in the absence of a properly perfected appeal by the injured party. Washington Public Power Supply System (Nuclear Projects 1 & 4), ALAB-265, 1 NRC 374 n.1 (1975); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-242, 8 AEC 847, 848-849 (1974).

While the Commission does not require the same precision in the filings of laymen that is demanded of lawyers, any party wishing to challenge some particular Licensing Board action must at least identify the order in question, indicate that he is seeking review of it, and give some reason why he thinks it is erroneous. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-469, 7 NRC 470, 471 (1978).

### **5.9.1 General Requirements for Petition for Review of an Initial Decision**

The general requirements for petitions for review from an initial decision are set out in 10 CFR § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786). Section 2.341(b) (formerly 2.786(b)) provides that such a petition is to be filed within fifteen days after service of the initial decision.

## **5.10 Briefs on Appeal**

### **5.10.1 Importance of Brief**

The filing of a brief in support of a section 2.311 (formerly 2.714a) appeal is mandatory. The Commission upon taking review, pursuant to § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786), may order the filing of appropriate briefs. See 10 C.F.R. 2.341(c) (formerly 2.786(d)).

Failure to file a brief has resulted in dismissal of the entire appeal, even when the appellant was acting pro se. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-140, 6 AEC 575 (1973); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 485 n.2 (1986); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-91-5, 33 NRC 238, 240-41 (1991); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63, 66-67 (1992); see also Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-270, 1 NRC 473 (1975). Commission appellate practice has long stressed the importance of a brief. A mere recitation of an appellant's prior positions in a proceeding or a statement of his or her general disagreement with a decision's result is no substitute for a brief that identifies and explains the errors of the Licensing Board in the order below. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-10, 37 NRC 192, 198 (1993).

Intervenors have a responsibility to structure their participation so that it is meaningful and alerts the agency to the intervenors' position and contentions. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 50, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978). Even parties who participate in NRC licensing proceedings pro se have an obligation to familiarize themselves with proper briefing format and with the Commission's Rules of Practice. Salem, 14 NRC at 50 n.7. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 266 (1991); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63, 66 (1992).

When an intervenor is represented by counsel, there should be no need, and there is no requirement, to piece together or to restructure vague references in the intervenor's brief in order to make intervenor's arguments for it. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1255 (1982), citing Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 51 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3rd Cir. 1982). Therefore, those aspects of an appeal not addressed by the supporting brief may be disregarded. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1255 (1982), citing Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Unit 1 & 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952 (1982); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-270, 1 NRC 473 (1975); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-207, 7 AEC 957 (1974).

#### **5.10.2 Time for Submittal of Brief**

10 CFR § 2.311(a) (formerly § 2.714a(a)) requires the filing of a notice of appeal and a supporting brief within 10 days after service of a Licensing Board order wholly denying a petition for leave to intervene. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 265 (1991).

If the Commission grants review pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786) and seeks additional briefs from the parties, it will issue an order setting the schedule for the filing of any further briefs. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(c) (formerly § 2.786(d)).

The Commission may consider an untimely appeal if the appellant can show good cause for failure to file on time. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-14, 34 NRC 261, 265-66 (1991).

The time limits imposed for filing briefs refer to the date upon which the appeal was actually filed and not to when the appeal was originally due to be filed prior to a time extension. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 125 (1977).

It is not necessary for a party to bring to the adjudicator's attention the fact that its adversary has not met prescribed time limits. Nor as a general rule will any useful purpose be served by filing a motion seeking to have an appeal dismissed because the appellant's brief was a few days late; the mailing of a brief on a Sunday or Monday which was due for filing the prior Friday does not constitute substantial noncompliance which would warrant dismissal, absent unique circumstances. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 125 (1977).

In the event of some late arising unforeseen development, a party may tender a document belatedly. As a rule, such a filing must be accompanied by a motion for leave to file out-of-time which satisfactorily explains not only the reasons for the lateness, but also why a motion for a time extension could not have been seasonably submitted, irrespective of the extent of the lateness. Apparently, however, the written explanation for the tardiness may be waived if, at a later date, the Board and parties are provided with an explanation which the Board finds to be satisfactory. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 125-26 (1977).

If service of appellant's brief is made by mail, and the responsive brief is to be filed within a certain period after service of the appellant's brief, add five days to the time period for filing. 10 C.F.R. § 2.306 (formerly § 2.710).

#### **5.10.2.1 Time Extensions for Brief**

Motions to extend the time for briefing are not favored. In any event, such motions should be filed in such a manner as to reach the Commission at least one day before the period sought to be extended expires. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-117, 6 AEC 261 (1973); Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Station), ALAB-74, 5 AEC 308 (1972). An extension of briefing time which results in the rescheduling of an already calendared oral argument will not be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), ALAB-144, 6 AEC 628 (1973).

If unable to meet the deadline for filing a brief in support of its appeal of a Licensing Board's decision, a party is duty-bound to seek an extension of time sufficiently in advance of the deadline to enable a seasonable response to the application. Virginia Electric and Power Company (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-568, 10 NRC 554, 555 (1979).

In the event of some late arising unforeseen development, a party may tender a document belatedly. As a rule, such a filing must be accompanied by a motion for

leave to file out-of-time which satisfactorily explains not only the reasons for the lateness, but also why a motion for a time extension could not have been seasonably submitted, irrespective of the extent of the lateness. Apparently, however, the written explanation for the tardiness may be waived if, at a later date, the Board and parties are provided with an explanation which the Board finds to be satisfactory. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 125-26 (1977).

#### **5.10.2.2 Supplementary or Reply Briefs**

A supplementary brief will not be accepted unless requested or accompanied by a motion for leave to file which sets forth reasons for the out-of-time filing. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-115, 6 AEC 257 (1973).

Material tendered by a party without leave to do so, after an appeal has been submitted for decision, constitutes improper supplemental argument. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312, 321-22 (1981).

10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a) does not authorize an appellant to file a brief in reply to parties' briefs in opposition to the appeal. Rather, leave to file a reply brief must be obtained. See Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Ill. Low-Level Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-473, 7 NRC 737, 745 n.9 (1978).

A permitted reply to an answer should only reply to opposing briefs and not raise new matters. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-582, 11 NRC 239, 243 n.9 (1980). The Commission disapproves of parties presenting their main arguments in reply briefs rather than initial briefs because it deprives the other parties of an opportunity to directly respond to those arguments. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-05-14, 61 NRC 359, 361-62 n. 7 (2005).

#### **5.10.3 Contents of Brief**

Any brief which in form or content is not in substantial compliance with appropriate briefing format may be stricken either on motion of a party or on the Commission's own motion. For example, an appendix to a reply brief containing a lengthy legal argument will be stricken when the appendix is simply an attempt to exceed the page limitations. Toledo Edison Co. and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-430, 6 NRC 457 (1977).

An issue which is not addressed in an appellate brief is considered to be waived, even though the issue may have been raised before the Licensing Board. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-01-21, 54 NRC 247, 253 (2001); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-828, 23 NRC 13, 20 n.18 (1986).

The brief must contain sufficient information and argument to allow the appellate tribunal to make an intelligent disposition of the issue raised on appeal. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397 (1976); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon

Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 204 (1986); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-921, 30 NRC 177, 181 (1989). See General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 9 (1990). A brief which does not contain such information is tantamount to an abandonment of the issue. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-270, 1 NRC 473 (1975); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 381 n.88 (1985); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-802, 21 NRC 490, 496 n.30 (1985); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 66 n.16 (1985); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 533-34 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 537 (1986); Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 805 (1986); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), ALAB-868, 25 NRC 912, 924 n.42 (1987); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 9 (1990). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-793, 20 NRC 1591, 1619 (1984).

At a minimum, briefs must identify the particular error addressed and the precise portions of the record relied upon in support of the assertion of error. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-739, 18 NRC 335, 338 n.4 (1983); Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-696, 16 NRC 1245, 1255 (1982) and Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49-50 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 533 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 537 (1986). This is particularly true where the Licensing Board rendered its rulings from the bench and did not issue a detailed written opinion. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 702-03 n.27 (1985).

A brief must clearly identify the errors of fact or law that are the subject of the appeal and specify the precise portion of the record relied on in support of the assertion of error. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43 (1981); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 66 n.16 (1985); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-825, 22 NRC 785, 793 (1985); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 542-543 n.58 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 204 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 809 (1986); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 464 (1987), remanded on other grounds. Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC

1, 9 (1990); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-616, 12 NRC 419, 424 (1980).

Claims of error that are without substance or are inadequately briefed will not be considered on appeal. Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-669, 15 NRC 453, 481 (1982); Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49-50 (1981). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-863, 25 NRC 273, 280 (1987); Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-872, 26 NRC 127, 132 (1987); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 499 (1991). Issues which are inadequately briefed are deemed to be waived. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 10, 12 (1990). Bald allegations made on appeal of supposedly erroneous Licensing Board evidentiary rulings are properly dismissed for inadequate briefing. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-799, 21 NRC 360, 378 (1985).

The appellant bears the responsibility of clearly identifying the asserted errors in the decision on appeal and ensuring that its brief contains sufficient information and cogent argument to alert the other parties and the Commission to the precise nature of and support for the appellant's claims. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

An appeal may be dismissed when an inadequate brief makes its arguments impossible to resolve. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 956 (1982), citing Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 787 (1979); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 413 (1976). See Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 204 (1986).

A brief that merely indicates reliance on previously filed proposed findings, without meaningful argument addressing the Licensing Board's disposition of issues, is of little value in appellate review. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343, 348 n.7 (1983), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 50 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Township of Lower Alloways Creek v. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., 687 F.2d 732 (3d Cir. 1982); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 71 (1985), Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 533 (1986); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 69 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 547 n.74 (1986). See Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-872, 26 NRC 127, 131 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 322 (1991).

Lay representatives generally are not held to the same standard for appellate briefs that is expected of lawyers. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 956 (1982), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 50 n.7 (1981); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-926, 31 NRC 1, 10 (1990). See Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-921, 30 NRC 177, 181 (1989). Nonetheless, litigants appearing pro se or through lay representatives are in no way relieved by that status of any obligation to familiarize themselves with the Commission's rules. To the contrary, all individuals and organizations electing to become parties to NRC licensing proceedings can fairly be expected both to obtain access to a copy of the rules and refer to it as the occasion arises. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 956 (1982), citing Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-563, 10 NRC 449, 450 n.1 (1979). See Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-3, 35 NRC 63, 66 (1992). All parties appearing in NRC proceedings, whether represented by counsel or a lay representative, have an affirmative obligation to avoid any false coloring of the facts. Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 531 n.6 (1986).

A party's brief must (1) specify the precise portion of the record relied upon in support of the assertion of error, and (2) relate to matters raised in the party's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Arguments raised for the first time on appeal, absent a serious, substantive issue are not ordinarily entertained on appeal. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 955-56, 956 n.6 (1982), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43, 49 (1981); Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B, & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 348 (1978); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 906-907 (1982).

All factual assertions in the brief must be supported by references to specific portions of the record. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), ALAB-159, 6 AEC 1001 (1973); Carolina Power & Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843, 24 NRC 200, 211 (1986). All references to the record should appear in the appellate brief itself; it is inappropriate to incorporate into the brief by reference a document purporting to furnish the requisite citations. Kansas Gas & Electric Company (Wolf Creek Generating Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-424, 6 NRC 122, 127 (1977).

Documents appended to an appellate brief will be stricken where they constitute an unauthorized attempt to supplement the record. However, if the documents were newly discovered evidence and tended to show that significant testimony in the record was false, there may be a sufficient basis to grant a motion to reopen the hearing. Toledo Edison Co. and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-430, 6 NRC 451 (1977); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 720 n.51 (1985), citing Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-648, 14 NRC 34, 36 (1981).



Personal attacks on opposing counsel are not to be made in appellate briefs, Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-204, 7 AEC 835, 837-838 (1974), and briefs which carry out personal attacks in an abrasive manner upon Licensing Board members will be stricken. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-121, 6 AEC 319 (1973).

Established page limitations may not be exceeded without leave and may not be circumvented by use of "appendices" to the brief, Toledo Edison Co. and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-430, 6 NRC 457 (1977).

A request for enlargement of the page limitation on a showing of good cause should be filed at least seven days before the date on which the brief is due. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-827, 23 NRC 9, 11 n.3 (1986).

#### **5.10.3.1 Opposing Briefs**

Briefs in opposition to the appeal should concentrate on the appellant's brief. See Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-340, 4 NRC 27, 52 n.39 (1976).

#### **5.10.3.2 Amicus Curiae Briefs**

Amicus curiae briefs are limited to the matters already at issue in the proceeding. "[A]n amicus curiae necessarily takes the proceeding as it finds it. An amicus curiae can neither inject new issues into a proceeding nor alter the content of the record developed by the parties." Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-862, 25 NRC 144, 150 (1987) (footnote omitted); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-4, 45 NRC 95, 96 (1997).

Our rules contemplate amicus curiae briefs only after the Commission grants a petition for review, and do not provide for amicus briefs supporting or opposing petitions for review. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-7, 45 NRC 437, 438-39 (1997).

### **5.11 Oral Argument**

The Commission, in its discretion, may allow oral argument upon the request of a party made in a notice of appeal or brief, or upon its own initiative. 10 CFR § 2.343 (formerly § 2.763). The Commission will deny a request for oral argument where it determines that, based on the written record, it understands the positions of the participants and has sufficient information upon which to base its decision. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 68-69 (1992).

The Commission requires that a party seeking oral argument must explain how oral argument would assist it in reaching a decision. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-2, 37 NRC 55, 59 n.4 (1993); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 68-69 (1992); In re Joseph J. Macktal, CLI-89-12, 30 NRC 19, 23 n.1 (1989).

A late intervention petitioner may request oral argument on its petition. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 69 n.4 (1992).

All parties are expected to be present or represented at oral argument unless specifically excused by the Board. Such attendance is one of the responsibilities of all parties when they participate in Commission adjudicatory proceedings. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-666, 15 NRC 277, 279 (1982).

#### **5.11.1 Failure to Appear for Oral Argument**

If for sufficient reason a party cannot attend an oral argument, it should request that the appeal be submitted on briefs. Any such request, however, must be adequately supported. A bare declaration of inadequate financial resources is clearly deficient. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-666, 15 NRC 277, 279 (1982).

Failure to advise of an intent not to appear at oral argument already calendared is discourteous and unprofessional and may result in dismissal. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-337, 4 NRC 7 (1976).

#### **5.11.2 Grounds for Postponement of Oral Argument**

Postponement of an already calendared oral argument for conflict reasons will be granted only upon a motion setting out:

- (1) the date the conflict developed;
- (2) the efforts made to resolve it;
- (3) the availability of alternate counsel;
- (4) public and private interest considerations;
- (5) the positions of the other parties;
- (6) the proposed alternate date.

Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-165, 6 AEC 1145 (1973).

A party's inadequate resources to attend oral argument, properly substantiated, may justify dispensing with oral argument. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-666, 15 NRC 277, 279 (1982).

#### **5.11.3 Oral Argument by Nonparties**

Under 10 CFR § 2.315(d) (formerly § 2.715(d)), a person who is not a party to a proceeding may be permitted to present oral argument to the Commission. A motion to participate in the oral argument must be filed and non-party participation is at the discretion of the Commission.

## 5.12 Interlocutory Review

### 5.12.1 Interlocutory Review Disfavored

With the exception of an appeal by a petitioner from a total denial of its petition to intervene or an appeal by another party on the question whether the petition should have been wholly denied (10 CFR § 2.311 (formerly § 2.714a)), there is no right to appeal any interlocutory ruling by a Licensing Board. 10 CFR § 2.323(f) (formerly § 2.730(f)); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277, 280 (1987). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-3, 33 NRC 76, 80 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-4, 33 NRC 233, 235-36 (1991). As the Commission's procedural rules grant no right of appeal from interlocutory orders, an "Appeal" from such an order will be treated as a petition for discretionary interlocutory review under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f). Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 4 (2006).

Interlocutory appellate review of Licensing Board orders is disfavored and will be undertaken as a discretionary matter only in the most compelling circumstances. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-742, 18 NRC 380, 383 n.7 (1983), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-271, 1 NRC 478, 483-86 (1975); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 59 (1994); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307 (1998); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-00-11, 51 NRC 297 (2000).

A Licensing Board's action is final for appellate purposes where it either disposes of at least a major segment of the case or terminates a party's right to participate. Rulings which do neither are interlocutory. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-731, 17 NRC 1073, 1074-75 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-787, 20 NRC 1097, 1100 (1984); Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 4 n.10 (2006) (citing Seabrook, ALAB-731, 17 NRC at 1074)).

Thus, for example, a Licensing Board's rulings limiting contentions or discovery or requiring consolidation are interlocutory and generally are not immediately appealable, though such rulings may be reviewed later by deferring appeals on them until the end of the case. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-339, 4 NRC 20 (1976). See also Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-637, 13 NRC 367 (1981); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-768, 19 NRC 988, 992 (1984); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-906, 28 NRC 615, 618 (1988) (a Licensing Board denied a motion to add new bases to a previously admitted contention). Similarly, interlocutory appeals from Licensing Board rulings made during the course of a proceeding, such as the denial of a motion to dismiss the proceeding, are forbidden. Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-433, 6 NRC 469 (1977); Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 70 (2004).

The Commission avoids piecemeal interference in ongoing licensing board proceedings and typically denies petitions to review interlocutory board orders summarily, without engaging in extensive merits discussion. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-7, 55 NRC 205, 213 (2002); Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 465-66 (2004).

Commission practice generally disfavors interlocutory review, but recognizes an exception in 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f)(2) (formerly § 2.786(g)) where the disputed ruling threatens the aggrieved party with serious, immediate and irreparable harm where it will have a “pervasive or unusual” effect on the proceedings below. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-8, 55 NRC 222, 224 (2002); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-2, 51 NRC 77 (2000); Sacramento Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-94-2, 39 NRC 91, 93 (1994); Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-06-24, 64 NRC 111, 119 (2006).

The question whether to hold an NRC enforcement proceeding in abeyance pending a related criminal prosecution is generally suitable for interlocutory review because, unlike most interlocutory questions, the abeyance issue cannot await the end of the proceeding (it becomes moot). David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 11 (2006) (citing, e.g., Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495, 500 (2006); Oncology Servs. Corp., CLI-93-13, 37 NRC 419, 420-21 (1993)).

Although Commission practice generally disfavors interlocutory review, the Commission has the power to modify procedural rules on a case-by-case basis and, in the interest of efficiency, can modify rules about interlocutory appeal. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-16, 58 NRC 360, 360-361 (2003).

Absent a demonstration of irreparable harm or other compelling circumstances, the fact that legal error may have occurred does not of itself justify interlocutory appellate review in the teeth of the longstanding Commission policy generally disfavoring such review. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-734, 18 NRC 11, 15 (1983); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2) CLI-94-15, 40 NRC 319 (1994). See 10 CFR § 2.323(f) (formerly § 2.730(f)).

“The threat of future widespread harm to the general population of NRC Licensees is not a factor in interlocutory review, although it might encourage the Commission to review the final decision.” Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), CLI-01-25, 54 NRC 368, 373 (2001). See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786).

The Commission disapproves of the practice of simultaneously seeking reconsideration of a Presiding Officer’s decision and filing an appeal of the same ruling because that approach would require both trial and appellate tribunals to rule on the same issues at the same time. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), CLI-97-9, 46 NRC 23, 24 (1997), citing Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear

Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-630, 13 NRC 84, 85 (1981). See also Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314 (1998).

Lack of participation below will increase the movant's already heavy burden of demonstrating that such review is necessary. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-737, 18 NRC 168, 175-76 (1983).

In a licensing proceeding, it is the order granting or denying a license that is ordinarily a final order. NRC orders that are given "immediate effect" constitute an exception to the general rule. City of Benton v. NRC, 136 F.3d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

Incorrect interlocutory rulings may be reviewed, if necessary, on appeals from partial initial decisions or other final appealable orders. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001), citing Private Fuel Storage, CLI-00-2, 51 NRC at 80.

While the Commission does not ordinarily review interlocutory orders denying extensions of time, it may do so in specific cases as an exercise of its general supervisory jurisdiction over agency adjudications. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-3, 49 NRC 25, 26 (1999). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-21, 60 NRC 21, 27 (2004)(interlocutory challenge regarding expert witness qualifications in a security context); Exelon Generation Co., LLC. (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 466 (2004)..

Licensing board rulings denying waiver requests pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758), which are interlocutory, are not considered final for the purposes of appeal. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-95-7, 41 NRC 383, 384 (1995).

### **5.12.2 Criteria for Interlocutory Review**

Although interlocutory review is disfavored and generally is not allowed as of right under NRC rules of practice, the criteria in section 2.341(f) (formerly §2.786(g)(1)&(2)) reflect the limited circumstances in which interlocutory review may be appropriate in a proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23 (2000); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307, 310 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-22, 48 NRC 215, 216-17 (1998); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-94-2, 39 NRC 91, 93 (1994). Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-9, 35 NRC 156, 158 (1992), clarified Oncology Services Corp., CLI-93-13, 37 NRC 419, 420-21 (1993).

The Commission may also grant interlocutory review as an exercise of its inherent supervisory authority over ongoing adjudicatory proceedings. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 70 (2004).

Current practice under section 2.341(f) (formerly §2.786(g)) is rooted in the practice developed by the former Appeal Board in recognizing certain exceptions to the proscription against interlocutory review. See Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-9, 35 NRC 156, 158 (1992); Procedures for Direct Commission Review of Decisions of Presiding Officers, 56 Fed.Reg. 29403 (June 27,

1991). For decisions of the Appeal Board on interlocutory review, see South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140 (1981); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-635, 13 NRC 309, 310 (1981); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-593, 11 NRC 761 (1980); United States Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-688, 16 NRC 471, 474, 475 (1982), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-588, 11 NRC 533, 536 (1980); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-737, 18 NRC 168, 171 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-858, 25 NRC 17, 20-21 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129, 134 (1987); Advanced Medical Systems, ALAB-929, 31 NRC 271, 278-79 (1990).

Discretionary interlocutory review will be granted if the Licensing Board's action either (1) threatens the party adversely affected with immediate and serious irreparable harm that could not be remedied by a later appeal or (2) affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner. 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(f) (formerly § 2.786(1) & (2)). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-3, 33 NRC 76, 80 (1991); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-4, 33 NRC 233, 236 (1991); Georgia Power Company (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) CLI-94-15, 40 NRC 319 (1994); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-94-2, 39 NRC 91, 93 (1994); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-7, 49 NRC 230, 231 (1999); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-8, 49 NRC 311, 312 (1999); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-18, 49 NRC 411, 431 (1999); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-2, 51 NRC 77 (2000); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001). For Appeal Board decisions on this point see Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-635, 13 NRC 309, 310 (1981); Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-588, 11 NRC 533, 536 (1980); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190, 1192 (1977); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1110, 1113-14 (1982); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-706, 16 NRC 1754, 1756 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-762, 19 NRC 565, 568 (1984); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1582 (1984); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-805, 21 NRC 596, 599 n.12 (1985); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-838, 23 NRC 585, 592 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-839, 24 NRC 45, 49-50 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129, 134 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-864, 25 NRC 417, 420 (1987); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-870, 26 NRC 71, 73 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-888, 27 NRC 257, 261 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-889, 27 NRC 265, 269 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-896, 28 NRC 27, 31 (1988); Public

Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-916, 29 NRC 434, 437 (1989); Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), ALAB-931, 31 NRC 350, 360-62 (1990); Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 70 (2004).

The Commission additionally has discretion under 2.341(f)(1) to grant interlocutory review where the Board has either referred a ruling, or certified a question, which raises significant and novel legal or policy issues. Absent a referral or certification by the Board, however, the Commission will generally not consider taking interlocutory appeals under this standard, even if the Commission itself views the issue is significant or novel. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 466-68 (2004).

Though the Commission's procedural rules at 10 CFR 2.311(c) allow an applicant to file an interlocutory appeal of board orders admitting contentions, the appeal must challenge the admissibility of all admitted contentions. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510, 508-509 (2006).

Where the applicant did not show that the intervenor's request for a hearing should have been denied in its entirety, remaining points of error would have to meet the Commission's standard for interlocutory review; that is, appellant must show that it will suffer serious immediate and irreparable harm or that the adverse ruling will have a pervasive and unusual effect on the hearing below. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 18 (2001).

The Commission encourages licensing boards and presiding officers to refer rulings to the Commission which present novel questions which could benefit from early resolution. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 29 (2000) (citing Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 23 (1988)).

Satisfaction of one of the criteria in 10 CFR § 2.341(b)(4) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)) is not mandatory in order to obtain interlocutory review. When reviewing interlocutory matters on the merits, the Commission may consider the criteria set forth in 10 CFR § 2.341(b)(4) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)). However, it is the standards listed in 10 CFR § 2.341(f) (formerly § 2.786(g)) that control the Commission's determination of whether to undertake such review. Oncology Services Corp., CLI-93-13, 37 NRC 419 (1993); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 NRC 307, 310 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 320 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001).

Discovery rulings rarely meet the test for discretionary interlocutory review. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-780, 20 NRC 378, 381 (1984). See Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-870, 26 NRC 71, 74 (1987); Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-318, 3 NRC 186 (1976). This is true even of orders rejecting objections to discovery on grounds of privilege. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-634, 13 NRC 96 (1981); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 769 (1975). In this vein, the Appeal Board refused to review a discovery ruling

referred to it by a Licensing Board where the Board below did not explain why it believed Appeal Board involvement was necessary, where the losing party had not indicated that it was unduly burdened by the ruling, and where the ruling was not novel. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-438, 6 NRC 638 (1977). The aggrieved party must make a strong showing that the impact of the discovery order upon that party or upon the public interest is indeed "unusual." Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-634, 13 NRC 96 (1981).

Similarly, rulings on the admissibility of evidence rarely meet the standards for interlocutory review. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-314, 3 NRC 98 (1976); Power Authority of the State of New York (Green County Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-439, 6 NRC 640 (1977); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-504, 8 NRC 406, 410 (1978); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-630, 13 NRC 84 (1981). In fact, the Appeal Board was generally disinclined to direct certification on rulings involving "garden-variety" evidentiary matters. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-353, 4 NRC 381 (1976). In Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-393, 5 NRC 767, 768 (1977), the Appeal Board reiterated that it would not allow consideration of interlocutory evidentiary rulings, stating that, "it is simply not our role to monitor these matters on a day-to-day basis; were we to do so, 'we would have little time for anything else.'" (citation omitted). Interlocutory review is rarely appropriate where the question for which certification has been sought involves the scheduling of hearings or the timing and admissibility of evidence. United States Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corp., Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-688, 16 NRC 471, 475 (1982), citing Toledo Edison Co. and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-314, 3 NRC 98, 99-100 (1976).

The Commission has granted interlocutory review in situations where the question or order must be reviewed "now or not at all". Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 321 (1998). The Commission does not ordinarily review Board orders denying extensions of time. However, the Commission may review such interlocutory orders pursuant to its general supervisory jurisdiction over agency adjudications. Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-98-19, 48 NRC 132, 134 (1998).

When considering whether to exercise "pendent" discretionary review over otherwise nonappealable issues, the Commission will favor review where the otherwise unappealable issues are "inextricably intertwined" with appealable issues, such that consideration of all issues is necessary to ensure meaningful review. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, site decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 19 (2001). When the Commission considers whether to exercise "pendent" discretionary review over otherwise nonappealable issues, factor weighing against review include a lack of an adequate record; the possibility that the issue could be altered or mooted by further proceedings below; and whether complex issues considered under pendent review would predominate over relatively insignificant, but final and appealable, issues. Id. at 19-20.

Interlocutory review of a Licensing Board's ruling denying summary disposition of a part of a contention, claimed to be an unwarranted expansion of the scope of issues



resulting in the necessity to try these issues and cause unnecessary expense and delay meets neither standard for interlocutory review. That case is no different than that involved any time a litigant must go to hearing. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-641, 13 NRC 550 (1981); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-737, 18 NRC 168, 176 n.12 (1983).

Even though the criteria for discretionary interlocutory review have not been satisfied, the Commission may still accept a Licensing Board's referral of an interlocutory ruling where the ruling involves a question of law, has generic implications, and has not been addressed previously on appeal. Oncology Services Corporation, CLI-93-13, 37 NRC 419 (1993); see Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), ALAB-929, 31 NRC 271, 279 (1990). However, interlocutory review will not be granted unless the Licensing Board below had a reasonable opportunity to consider the question as to which review is sought. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-297, 2 NRC 727, 729 (1975). See also Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-330, 3 NRC 613, 618-619, rev'd in part sub nom. USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-76-13, 4 NRC 67 (1976).

Neither the presiding officer's inappropriate admission of an area of concern, nor the use of an inappropriate legal standard, meets the standard for interlocutory review in a Subpart L proceeding. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, site decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 18-19 (2001), citing Pennsylvania Power and Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-641, 13 NRC 550 (1981).

When interlocutory review is granted of one Licensing Board order, it may also be conducted of a second Licensing Board order which is based on the first order. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), ALAB-931, 31 NRC 350, 362 (1990).

#### **5.12.2.1 Irreparable Harm**

To meet the criterion in section § 2.341(f)(2)(i) (formerly § 2.786(g)), petitioners must demonstrate that the ruling if left in place will result in irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, cannot be alleviated by Commission review at the end of the proceeding. The following cases illustrate the extraordinary circumstances that must be present to warrant review pursuant to the first criterion:

Immediate review may be appropriate in exceptional circumstances, when the potential difficulty of later unscrambling and remedying the effects of an improper disclosure of privileged material would likely result in an irreparable impact. Georgia Power Co., et. al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-95-15, 42 NRC 181, 184 (1995) (Commission reviewed Board order to release notes claimed to be attorney-client work product); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-839, 24 NRC 45, 50, 51 (1986) (A Licensing Board's denial of an intervenor's motion to correct the official transcript of a prehearing conference was granted where there were doubts that the transcript could be corrected at the end of the hearing. Without a complete and accurate transcript, the intervenor would suffer serious and irreparable injury because its ability to challenge the Licensing Board's rulings through an appeal would be compromised).

For purposes of interlocutory review, irreparable harm does not qualify as immediate merely because it is likely to occur before completion of the hearing. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314 (1998).

While it may not always be dispositive, one factor favoring review is that the question or order for which review is sought is one which "must be reviewed now or not at all." Georgia Power Co., et. al. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-94-5, 39 NRC 190, 193 (1994) (interlocutory Commission review warranted where Board ordered immediate release of an NRC Investigatory Report); see Oncology Services Corp., CLI--93-13, 37 NRC 419,420-21 (1993) (interlocutory Commission review warranted where Board imposed 120-day stay of a license-suspension proceeding); see also Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-327, 3 NRC 408, 413 (1976), cited in Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-639, 13 NRC 469, 473 (1981).

The question whether to hold an NRC enforcement proceeding in abeyance pending a related criminal prosecution is generally suitable for interlocutory review because, unlike most interlocutory questions, the abeyance issue cannot await the end of the proceeding (it becomes moot). David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 11 (2006) (citing, e.g., Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495, 500 (2006); Oncology Servs. Corp., CLI-93-13, 37 NRC 419, 420-21 (1993)).

There is no irreparable harm arising from a party's continued involvement in a proceeding until the Licensing Board can resolve factual questions pertinent to the Commission's jurisdiction. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 62 (1994). Nor is there obvious irreparable harm from continuation of the proceeding. The mere commitment of resources to a hearing that may later turn out to have been unnecessary does not justify interlocutory review of a Licensing Board scheduling order. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-9, 40 NRC 1, 6-7 (1994); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-858, 25 NRC 17, 21-22 (1987). A mere increase in the burden of litigation does not constitute serious and irreparable harm. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), CLI-01-25, 54 NRC 368, 374 (2001). In the absence of a potential for truly exceptional delay or expense, the risk that a Licensing Board's interlocutory ruling may eventually be found to have been erroneous, and that because of the error further proceedings may have to be held, is one which must be assumed by that board and the parties to the proceeding. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-768, 19 NRC 988, 992 (1984), citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-116, 6 AEC 258, 259 (1973); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-805, 21 NRC 596, 600 (1985); Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 466 (2004)..

Mere generalized representations by counsel or unsubstantiated assertions regarding "immediate and serious irreparable impact" are insufficient to meet the stringent threshold for interlocutory review. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 61 (1994); Clinton ESP , CLI-04-31, 60 NRC at 467.

A license applicant's request for Commission review of the Staff's settlement of NEPA claims with an intervenor failed to satisfy the criteria for interlocutory review, because settling NEPA claims and eliminating the need for the hearing on those issues did not constitute "immediate and serious irreparable" harm to the applicant, and settling some but not all contentions is a routine feature of NRC litigation and does not affect the proceeding in a "pervasive or unusual manner." Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 4 (2006).

#### **5.12.2.2 Pervasive and Unusual Effect on the Proceeding**

An interlocutory review is appropriate when the ruling "affects the basic structure of the proceeding by mandating duplicative or unnecessary litigating steps." Private Fuel Storage (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Facility), CLI-98-7, 47 307, 310 (1998).

Review of interlocutory rulings pursuant to the criterion in section 2.341(f)(2)(ii) (formerly § 2.786); *i.e.*, the Board ruling affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner, is granted only in extraordinary circumstances. The following cases illustrate this point:

Although a definitive ruling by the Licensing Board that the Commission actually has jurisdiction might rise to the level of a pervasive or unusual effect upon the nature of the proceeding, a preliminary ruling that mere factual development is necessary does not rise to that level. The fact that an appealed ruling touches on a jurisdictional issue does not, in and of itself, mandate interlocutory review. Similarly, the mere issuance of a ruling that is important or novel does not, without more, change the basic structure of a proceeding, and thereby justify interlocutory review. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 63 (1994); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-00-11, 51 NRC 297, 299 (2000).

A Licensing Board decision refusing to dismiss a party from a proceeding does not, without more, constitute a compelling circumstance justifying interlocutory review. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 59 (1994).

The mere expansion of issues rarely, if ever, has been found to affect the basic structure of a proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner so as to warrant an interlocutory review. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-94-2, 39 NRC 91, 93 (1994); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-888, 27 NRC 257, 262-63 (1988). See Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-9, 35 NRC 156, 159 (1992).

A Board order to the Staff to disclose safeguards information to a party would result in immediate harm if the party lacks sufficient basis to view the information, and so interlocutory review of the order is proper. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 71 (2004).

The fact that an interlocutory ruling may be wrong does not per se justify interlocutory appellate review, unless it can be demonstrated that the error

fundamentally alters the proceeding. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-741, 18 NRC 371, 378 n. 11 (1983), citing Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1113-14 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-734, 18 NRC 11, 14 n.4 (1983); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 61 (1994); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001); Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 467 (2004).

“A mere legal error is not enough to warrant interlocutory review because interlocutory errors are correctable on appeal from final Board decisions.” Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), CLI-01-25, 54 NRC 368, 373 (2001), citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314 (1998). A legal error, standing alone, does not alter the basic structure of an ongoing proceeding. Such errors can be raised on appeal after the final licensing board decision. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC Licensed Activities), CLI-95-3, 41 NRC 245, 246 (1995).

Similarly, a mere conflict between Licensing Boards on a particular question does not mean that interlocutory review as to that question will automatically be granted. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-371, 5 NRC 409 (1977); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-271, 1 NRC 478, 484-485 (1975). Unless it is shown that the error fundamentally alters the very shape of the ongoing adjudication, appellate review must await the issuance of a "final" Licensing Board decision. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1112-13 (1982). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-888, 27 NRC 257, 263 (1988).

Interlocutory review is not favored on the question as to whether a contention should have been admitted into the proceeding. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 5 (2001); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-2, 51 NRC 77, 79-80 (2000); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-94-2, 39 NRC 91, 94 (1994), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129, 135 (1987). See also Project Management Corp. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-326, 3 NRC 406, reconsid. den., ALAB-330, 3 NRC 613, rev'd in part sub nom., USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-76-13, 4 NRC 67 (1976); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-838, 23 NRC 585, 592 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129, 135 (1987); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-706, 16 NRC 1754, 1756 (1982), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 464 (1982). Ordinarily appeals of such interlocutory decisions by the Board must wait until the case ends. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 467 (2004). A Board's rejection of an interested State's sole contention is not appropriate for directed certification when the issues presented by the State are also raised by the

contentions of intervenors in the proceeding Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-838, 23 NRC 585, 592-593 (1986).

The admission by a Licensing Board of more late-filed than timely contentions does not, in and of itself, affect the basic structure of a licensing proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner warranting interlocutory review. If the untimely filings have been admitted by the Board in accordance with 10 CFR § 2.309 (formerly § 2.714), it cannot be said that the Board's rulings have affected the case in a pervasive or unusual manner. Rather, the Board will have acted in furtherance of the Commission's own rules. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-706, 16 NRC 1754, 1757 (1982). The basic structure of an ongoing proceeding is not changed by the simple admission of a contention which is based on a Licensing Board ruling that (1) is important or novel or (2) may conflict with case law, policy, or Commission regulations. See Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1583 (1984); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1112-13 (1982).

Despite the reluctance to grant review of Board orders admitting contentions, in exceptional circumstances limited review has been undertaken. In Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986), the Commission reviewed, and reversed a Board order admitting a late filed contention; the Appeal Board had declined review of the same ruling, stating that the Board's admission of a contention did not meet the stringent standards for interlocutory review. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-817, 22 NRC 470, 474 (1985). In Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460 (1982), the Appeal Board accepted referral of several rulings associated with the Licensing Board's conditional admission of several contentions. The Appeal Board limited its review to two questions which it determined to have "generic implications": (1) whether the Rules of Practice sanctioned the admission of contentions that fall short of meeting Section 2.309(f) (formerly 2.714(b)) specificity requirements; and (2) if not, how should a Licensing Board approach late-filed contentions that could not have been earlier submitted with the requisite specificity Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 464-65 (1982).

Adverse evidentiary rulings may turn out to have little, if any evidentiary effect on a Licensing Board's ultimate substantive decision. Therefore, determinations regarding what evidence should be admitted rarely, if ever, have a pervasive or unusual effect on the structure of a proceeding so as to warrant interlocutory intercession. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1583 (1984).

The Commission itself may exercise its discretion to review a licensing board's interlocutory order if the Commission wants to address a novel or important issue. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-00-11, 51 NRC 297, 299 (2000).

with an intervenor failed to satisfy the criteria for interlocutory review, because settling NEPA claims and eliminating the need for the hearing on those issues did not constitute "immediate and serious irreparable" harm to the applicant, and settling

some but not all contentions is a routine feature of NRC litigation and does not affect the proceeding in a “pervasive or unusual manner.” Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 4 (2006).

### 5.12.3 Responses Opposing Interlocutory Review

Opposition to a petition seeking interlocutory review should include some discussion of petitioner’s claim of Licensing Board error. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-741, 18 NRC 371, 374 n.3 (1983), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-734, 18 NRC 11, 14 n.4 (1983).

Failure of a party to address the standards for interlocutory review in responding to a motion seeking such review may be construed as a waiver of any argument regarding the propriety of such review. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1582 n.7 (1984); see Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-734, 18 NRC 11, 14 n.4 (1983).

### 5.12.4 Certification of Questions for Interlocutory Review and Referred Rulings

Although generally precluding interlocutory appeals, 10 CFR §§ 2.319(l) and 2.323(f) (formerly §§ 2.718(l) & 2.730(f)) allow the presiding officer to refer a ruling to the Commission. See Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, site decontamination and decommissioning funding), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994); Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-11, 59 NRC 203, 209 (2004). The Commission need not, however, accept the referral. See Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-741, 18 NRC 371, 375 n.6 (1983); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-817, 22 NRC 470, 475 (1985). The Commission does assign considerable weight to the board’s view of whether the ruling merits immediate review because licensing boards are granted a great deal of discretion in managing the proceedings of cases before them. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), CLI-01-25, 54 NRC 368, 374 (2001).

Notwithstanding the general proscription against interlocutory review, the Commission has encouraged Boards and presiding officers to certify novel legal or policy questions early in the proceeding. Statement of Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, CLI-98-12, 48 NRC 18, 23 (1998); Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-05-14, 61 NRC 359, 364 n. 18 (2005); see 10 CFR §§ 2.323(f) and 2.319(l) (formerly §§ 2.730(f) and 2.718(i)). In commenting on the Commission’s earlier Statement of Policy on Conduct of Licensing Proceedings, CLI-81-8, 13 NRC 452, 456 (1981), the Appeal Board opined that the policy statement did not call for a marked relaxation of the standard that the discretionary review of interlocutory Licensing Board rulings authorized should be undertaken only in the most compelling circumstances; rather, the policy statement simply exhorts the Licensing Boards to put before the appellate tribunal legal or policy questions that, in their judgment, are “significant” and require prompt appellate resolution. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-741, 18 NRC 371, 375 (1983); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1583 (1984).

Generally, the Commission has accepted “novel issues that would benefit from early review” where the board, rather than a party, has found such review necessary and helpful. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), CLI-01-25, 54 NRC 368, 375 (2001), citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23 (2000). See also Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for the Clinton ESP Site), CLI-04-31, 60 NRC 461, 467 (2004).

The Commission has the authority to consider a matter even if the party seeking interlocutory review has not satisfied the criteria for such review. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 320 n.3 (1998).

A Licensing Board's decision to admit a contention which will require the Staff to perform further statutory required review does not result in unusual delay or expense which justifies referral of the Board's decision for interlocutory review. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-3, 21 NRC 244, 257-258 n.19 (1985), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 464 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041 (1983).

The fact that an evidentiary ruling involves a matter that may be novel or important does not alter the strict standards for directed certification. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-791, 20 NRC 1579, 1583 (1984).

Authority to certify questions to the Commission should be exercised sparingly. Absent a compelling reason, certification will be declined. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-421, 6 NRC 25, 27 (1977); Consolidated Edison Co. and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Units 2 & 3), LBP-82-23, 15 NRC 647, 650 (1982).

Despite the general prohibition against interlocutory review, the regulations provide that a party may ask a Licensing Board to certify a question to the Commission without ruling on it. 10 CFR § 2.319(l) (formerly § 2.718(l)). The regulations also allow a party to request that a Licensing Board refer a ruling on a motion to the Commission under 10 CFR § 2.323(f) (this provision was added to former § 2.730(f)).

The Boards' certification authority was not intended to be applied to a mixed question of law and fact in which the factual element was predominant. Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-405, 5 NRC 1190, 1192 (1977).

It is the Commission's customary practice to accept Board certifications or referrals. Similarly, the NRC's rules of practice permit interlocutory Commission review of referred Board rulings if the referral raises significant and novel legal or policy issues, and resolution of the issues would materially advance the orderly disposition of the proceeding. However, routine rulings on the admissibility of contentions are not usually occasions for the Commission to exercise its authority to step into ongoing Licensing Board proceedings and undertake interlocutory review. This is especially true when a Board hearing on related matters is about to take place. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-21, 62 NRC 538, 539-40 (2005).

A party seeking certification under Section 2.319(l) (formerly 2.718(i)) must, at a minimum, establish that a referral under 10 CFR § 2.323(f) (formerly § 2.730(f)) would have been proper -- i.e., that a failure to resolve the problem will cause the public interest to suffer or will result in unusual delay and expense. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-361, 4 NRC 625 (1976); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 759 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-271, 1 NRC 478, 483 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1652-53 (1982). However, the added delay and expense occasioned by the admission of a contention -- even if erroneous -- does not alone distinguish the case so as to warrant interlocutory review. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1114 (1982). The fact that applicants will be unable to recoup the time and financial expense needed to litigate late-filed contentions is a factor that is present when any contention is admitted and thus does not provide the type of unusual delay that warrants interlocutory Appeal Board review. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-706, 16 NRC 1754, 1758 n.7 (1982), citing, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-675, 15 NRC 1105, 1114 (1982).

The case law standards governing review of interlocutory orders have been codified in 10 CFR § 2.341(f) (formerly § 2.786(g)) which provides that the Commission may conduct discretionary interlocutory review of a certified question, 10 CFR § 2.319(l) (formerly § 2.718(l)), or a referred ruling, 10 CFR 2.323(f) (formerly § 2.730(f)), if the petitioner shows that the certified question or referred ruling either (1) threatens the party adversely affected by it with immediate and serious irreparable impact which, as a practical matter, could not be alleviated through a petition for review of the presiding officer's final decision; or (2) affects the basic structure of the proceeding in a pervasive or unusual manner. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), CLI-92-9, 35 NRC 156, 158 (1992); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-94-11, 40 NRC 55, 59 (1994). See section 5.12.1, "Criteria for Interlocutory Review".

#### **5.12.4.1 Effect of Subsequent Developments on Motion to Certify**

Developments occurring subsequent to the filing of a request for interlocutory review may strip the question brought of an essential ingredient and, therefore, constitute grounds for denial of the motion. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-419, 6 NRC 3, 6 (1977). See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-93-18, 38 NRC 62 (1993).

When reviewing a motion for directed certification, an Appeal Board would not consider events which occurred subsequent to the issuance of the challenged Licensing Board ruling. A party which seeks to rely upon such events must first seek appropriate relief from the Licensing Board. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-889, 27 NRC 265, 271 (1988).



#### **5.12.4.2 Effect of Directed Certification on Uncertified Issues**

The pendency of interlocutory review does not automatically result in a stay of hearings on independent questions not intimately connected with the issue certified. See Public Service Company of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-374, 5 NRC 417 (1977).

#### **5.12.4.3 Certification of Questions Relating to Restricted Data or National Security Information**

A Licensing Board may certify to the Commission for its consideration and determination any questions relating to access to Restricted Data or National Security Information arising in an adjudicatory context. While the Commission may consider matters that arguably touch on the merits in resolving such questions, an actual merits decision comes only after development of the record. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646, 649-50 (2004).

### **5.13 Disqualification of a Commissioner**

Determinations on the disqualification of a Commissioner reside exclusively in that Commissioner, and are not reviewable by the Commission. Consolidated Edison Co. and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point Units 2 & 3), CLI-81-1, 13 NRC 1 (1981), clarified, CLI-81-23, 14 NRC 610 (1981); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-6, 11 NRC 411 (1980).

When a party requests the disqualification of more than one Commissioner, each Commissioner must decide whether to recuse himself from the proceeding, but the Commissioners may issue a joint opinion in response to the motion for disqualification. Joseph J. Macktal, CLI-89-18, 30 NRC 167, 169-70 (1989), denying reconsideration of CLI-89-14, 30 NRC 85 (1989).

It is Commission practice that the Commissioners who are subject to a recusal motion will decide that motion themselves, and may do so by issuing a joint decision. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 56-57 (1996).

A prohibited communication is not a concern if it does not reach the ultimate decision maker. Where a prohibited communication is not incorporated into advice to the Commission, never reaches the Commission, and has no impact on the Commission's decision, it provides no grounds for the recusal of Commissioners. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 57 (1996).

Commission guidance does not constitute factual prejudgment where the guidance is based on regulatory interpretations, policy judgments, and tentative observations about dose estimates that are derived from the public record. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 58 (1996).

Where there are no facts from which the Commission can reasonably conclude that a prohibited communication was made with any corrupt motive or was other than a simple mistake, and where a Report of the Office of the Inspector General confirms that an innocent mistake was made and that the Staff was not guilty of any actual wrongdoing,

and where the mistake did not ultimately affect the proceeding, the Commission will not dismiss the Staff from the proceeding as a sanction for having made the prohibited communication. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 59 (1996).

In the absence of bias, an adjudicator who participated on appeal in a construction permit proceeding need not disqualify himself from participating as an adjudicator in the operating license proceeding for the same facility. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-11, 11 NRC 511, 512 (1980).

The expression of tentative conclusions upon the start of a proceeding does not disqualify the Commission from again considering the issue on a fuller record. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, IL, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 4 (1980).

#### **5.14 Reconsideration by the Commission (Also see Section 4.5)**

The Commission's ability to reconsider is inherent in the ability to decide in the first instance. The Commission has 60 days in which to reconsider an otherwise final decision, which is at the discretion of the Commission. Florida Power & Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), CLI-80-41, 12 NRC 650, 652 (1980).

“Reconsideration petitions must establish an error in a Commission decision, based upon an elaboration or refinement of an argument already made, an overlooked controlling decision or principle of law, or a factual clarification.” Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-02-1, 55 NRC 1, 2 (2002). The Commission does not lightly revisit our own already-issued and well-considered decisions and does so only if the party seeking reconsideration brings decisive new information to our attention or demonstrates a fundamental Commission misunderstanding of a key point. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., CLI-04-35, 60 NRC 619, 622 (2004); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 153 (2004). However, if the basis for subsequent Commission modification of a Board ruling is not that there was a mistake of law or fact, but that the facts have changed, a party should not be characterized (or penalized) as having waived its argument by not filing a motion for reconsideration; that is not the type of situation where the Commission “reconsiders” its decision. Id. at 154.

Petitions for reconsideration of Commission decisions denying review will not be entertained. 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(d) (formerly § 2.786(e)). A petition for reconsideration after review may be filed. 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(d) (formerly § 2.786(e)). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 410 (2005).

A movant seeking reconsideration of a final decision must do so on the basis of an elaboration upon, or refinement of, arguments previously advanced, generally on the basis of information not previously available. See Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-26, 14 NRC 787, 790 (1981); Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-418, 6 NRC 1, 2 (1977). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-35, 36 NRC 355, 357 (1992). A reconsideration request is not an occasion for advancing an entirely new thesis or for simply reiterating arguments previously proffered and rejected. See Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3),

CLI-02-1, 55 NRC 1, 2 (2002); Central Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-26, 14 NRC 787, 790 (1981); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-88-03, 28 NRC 1, 3-4 (1988); Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-35, 36 NRC 355, 357 (1992); and State of Alaska Dept. of Transportation and Public Facilities, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652, 655-56 (2004).

Petitioners may be granted permission by the Commission to file a consolidated request for reconsideration if they have not had full opportunity to address the precise theory on which the Commission's first decision rests. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 51 (2000).

The Commission has granted reconsideration to clarify the meaning or intent of certain language in its earlier decision. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 390-91 (1995); Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004); and Alaska Dept. of Transp., CLI-04-38, 60 NRC at 653.

Reconsideration is at the discretion of the Commission. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-17, 42 NRC 229, 234 n.6 (1995); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), CLI-80-41, 12 NRC 650, 652 (1980)).

NRC rules contemplate petitions for reconsideration of a Commission decision on the merits, not petitions for reconsideration of a Commission decision to decline review of an issue. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(d) (formerly § 2.786(e)). Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 5 (1997).

10 CFR § 2.345 (formerly § 2.771) provides that a party may file a petition for reconsideration of a final decision within 10 days after the date of that decision. See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-19, 62 NRC 403, 409 (2005).

A motion to reconsider a prior decision will be denied where the arguments presented are not in reality an elaboration upon, or refinement of, arguments previously advanced, but instead, is an entirely new thesis. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-418, 6 NRC 1, 2 (1977); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-2, 45 NRC 3, 4 (1997).

Motions to reconsider an order must be grounded upon a concrete showing, through appropriate affidavits rather than counsel's rhetoric, of potential harm to the inspection and investigation functions relevant to a case. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-735, 18 NRC 19, 25-26 (1983).

A showing of factual discrepancies contained in dicta in a Commission decision is not sufficient to support a motion for reconsideration when those discrepancies do not undercut the core rulings of the decision. Alaska Dept. of Transp., CLI-04-38, 60 NRC at 654-55.

A majority vote of the Commission is necessary for reconsideration of a prior Commission decision. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Project Management Corporation, Tennessee Valley

Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-8, 15 NRC 1095, 1096 (1982).

Where a party petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of a decision of the agency also petitions the agency to reconsider its decision, and the Federal court stays its review pending the agency's disposition of the motion to reconsider; the Hobbs Act does not preclude the agency's reconsideration of the case. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259 (1978).

Although the Commission must set aside wrongly issued licenses when the post-licensing hearing uncovers fatal defects, the Commission need not set aside licenses when it uncovers defects which are promptly curable. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-15, 52 NRC 65 (2000).

### **5.15 Jurisdiction of NRC to Consider Matters While Judicial Review is Pending**

The NRC has jurisdiction to deal with supervening developments in a case which is pending before a court, at least where those developments do not bear directly on any question that will be considered by the court. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-349, 4 NRC 235 (1976).

There has been no definitive ruling as to whether the NRC has jurisdiction to consider matters which do bear directly on questions pending before a court. The former Appeal Board considered it inappropriate to do so, at least where the court had not specifically requested it, based on considerations of comity between the court and the agency. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-350, 4 NRC 365 (1976); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-85-14, 22 NRC 177, 179 (1985), citing 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c).

The NRC must act promptly and constructively in effectuating the decisions of the courts. Upon issuance of the mandate, the court's decision becomes fully effective on the Commission, and it must proceed to implement it. Consumers Power Company (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 783-784 (1977). Neither the filing nor the granting of a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court operates as a stay, either with respect to the execution of the judgment below or of the mandate below by the lower courts. Id. at 781.

The NRC may rely upon a district court decision striking down a state statute even if that district court ruling has been appealed, at least so long as the district court's decision appears reasonable. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 37 (2004).

When the U.S. Court of Appeals has stayed its mandate pending final resolution of a petition for rehearing en banc on the validity of an NRC regulation, the regulation remains in effect, and the Board is bound by those rules until that mandate is issued. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-53, 16 NRC 196, 205 (1982).

Where a party petitioning the Court of Appeals for review of the decision of the agency also petitions the agency to reconsider its decision and the Federal court stays its review pending the agency's disposition of the motion to reconsider, the Hobbs Act does not

preclude the agency's reconsideration of the case. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 259 (1978).

The pendency of a criminal investigation by the Department of Justice does not necessarily preclude other types of inquiry into the same matter by the NRC. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 188 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

The pendency of a Grand Jury proceeding does not legally bar parallel administrative action. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 191 n.27 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

#### **5.16 Procedure on Remand (Also see Section 4.6)**

#### **5.17 Mootness and Vacatur**

The Commission is not subject to the jurisdictional limitations placed upon Federal courts by the "case or controversy" provision in Article III of the Constitution. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-714, 17 NRC 86, 93 (1983), citing Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 54 (1978), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Generally, a case will be moot when the issues are no longer "live," or the parties lack a cognizable interest in the outcome. The mootness doctrine applies to all stages of review, not merely to the time when a petition is filed. Consequently, when effective relief cannot be granted because of subsequent events, an appeal is dismissed as moot. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-10, 37 NRC 192, 200 (1993). A case may not be moot when the dispute is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). The exception applies only to cases in which the challenged action was in its duration too short to be litigated, and there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-10, 37 NRC 192, 205 (1993).

In an enforcement proceeding concerning a licensee's challenge to a suspension order, a Licensing Board found there was no remaining live controversy and dismissed the proceeding as moot where the Staff 1) unconditionally withdrew the suspension order and 2) gave assurance that the issuance of another suspension order concerning violations of the same license conditions was not fairly "capable of repetition" (quoting the established exception to the mootness doctrine). Safety Light Corp., LBP-05-6, 61 NRC 185, 187 (2005) (referencing Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth. (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-605, 12 NRC 153, 154 (1980)).

The Commission is not bound by judicial practice and need not follow judicial standards of vacatur. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-96-2, 43 NRC 13, 14-15 (1995).

Therefore, there is no insuperable barrier to the Commission's rendition of an advisory opinion on issues which have been indisputably mooted by events occurring subsequent to a Licensing Board's decision. However, this course will not be embarked upon in the absence of the most compelling cause. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak

Steam Electric Station, Unit 2), ALAB-714, 17 NRC 86, 93 (1983); Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 54 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 284 (1988); Commission practice is to address novel legal or policy issues and to provide appropriate guidance, and the Commission will review licensing board decisions even in moot cases when necessary to clarify important issues for the future. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-05-14, 61 NRC 359, 362 (2005) (reviewing a licensing board decision sua sponte).

Advanced Medical Systems, CLI-93-8, 37 NRC 181, 185 (1993)(a case is moot when there is no reasonable expectation that the matter will recur and interim relief or intervening events have eradicated the effects of the allegedly unlawful action). The NRC is not strictly bound by the mootness doctrine, however, its adjudicatory tribunals have generally adhered to the mootness principle. Innovative Weaponry, Inc., LBP-95-8, 41 NRC 409, 410 (1995)(the Board determined the issue of whether there was an adequate basis for the Staff's denial to be moot because the license was transferred).

As opposed to unreviewed licensing board orders, vacatur of prior Commission decisions in a terminated license transfer proceeding is not warranted because the precedential value of a final determination on a generic legal issue litigated in a particular proceeding should not hinge upon the presence or absence of wholly extraneous subsequent developments in that proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-18, 60 NRC 1, 3 (2004).

While unreviewed Board decisions do not create binding precedent, when the unreviewed rulings "involve complex questions and vigorously disputed interpretations of agency provisions," the Commission may choose as a policy matter to vacate them and thereby eliminate any future confusion and dispute over their meaning or effect. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-5, 47 NRC 113, 114 (1998); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-99-24, 50 NRC 219, 222 (1999).

The Commission's customary practice is to vacate board decisions that have not been reviewed at the time the case becomes moot. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-98-24, 48 NRC 267 (1998).

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## 6.0 GENERAL MATTERS

### 6.1 Amendments to Existing Licenses and/or Construction Permits

General requirements and guidance for the amendment of an existing license or construction permit for production and utilization facilities are set out in 10 CFR §§ 50.90, 50.91.

In passing upon an application for an amendment to an operating license or construction permit, "the Commission will be guided by the considerations which govern the issuance of initial licenses or construction permits to the extent applicable and appropriate." 10 CFR § 50.91. These considerations are broadly identified in 10 CFR § 50.40. In essence, Section 50.40 requires that the Commission be persuaded, inter alia, that the application will comply with all applicable regulations, that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered, and that any applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 51 (governing environmental protection) have been satisfied. Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 44 (1978).

For two years following the Three Mile Island accident, the Commission authorized the operation of a nuclear facility by issuing, first, a low-power license, and then, a full-power operating license. However, believing that it was unnecessary to issue two separate licenses, the Commission in recent years has "amended" an existing low-power license by dropping the low-power limitation and authorizing full-power operation. Such a "license amendment" in a previously uncontested licensing proceeding is not intended to create any new hearing rights under § 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which requires an appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing on an amendment to an operating license. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-19, 20 NRC 1055, 10581059 (1984).

A Board must evaluate an application for a license amendment according to its terms. The Board may not speculate about future events which might possibly affect the application. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-21, 23 NRC 849, 855, 859 (1986).

The Board expressed skepticism that the amendment proposed by Licensee "is a 'material alteration' in the sense intended by the regulations so as to require a construction permit." See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 281-82 (2000), citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.92(a); see also Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 391-92 (2001). Alterations of the type that require a construction permit are those that involve substantial changes that, in effect, transform the facility into something it previously was not or that introduce significant new issues relating to the nature and function of the facility. See Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-77-69, 6 NRC 1179, 1183 (1977). To trigger the need for a construction permit, the change must "essentially [render] major portions of the original safety analysis for the facility inapplicable to the modified facility. See id.; Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 391-92 (2001).

### **6.1.1 Staff Review of Proposed Amendments**

A Board adjudicating issues regarding a proposed license amendment does not thereby gain authority over the Staff's nonadjudicatory review of the proposed amendment. Therefore, a Board lacked jurisdiction to order the Staff to allow a hearing petitioner's representatives to attend a scheduled closed meeting between the Staff and the amendment applicant regarding the applicant's security submittal. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-6, 59 NRC 62, 74 (2004).

### **6.1.2 Amendments to Research Reactor Licenses**

(RESERVED)

### **6.1.3 Matters to be Considered in License Amendment Proceedings**

License amendments can be made immediately effective solely at the discretion of NRC Staff, following a determination by Staff that there are no significant hazards considerations involved. Immediate effectiveness findings by the Staff are not subject to review by licensing boards. Gulf States Utilities Company, et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31 (1994), *aff'd*, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994).

#### **6.1.3.1 Specific Matters Considered in License Amendment Proceedings**

While the balancing of costs and benefits of a project is usually done in the context of an environmental impact statement prepared because the project will have significant environmental impacts, at least one court has implied that a cost-benefit analysis may be necessary for certain federal actions which, of themselves, do not have a significant environmental impact. Specifically, the court opined that an operating license amendment derating reactor power significantly could upset the original cost-benefit balance and, therefore, require that the cost-benefit balance for the facility be reevaluated. Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

Neither the Staff nor the Licensing Board need concern itself with the matter of the ultimate disposal of spent fuel; i.e., with the possibility that the pool will become an indefinite or permanent repository for its contents, in the evaluation of a proposed expansion of the capacity of a spent fuel pool. Northern States Power Company (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 51 (1978).

A license amendment that does not involve, or result in, environmental impacts other than those previously considered and evaluated in prior initial decisions for the facility in question does not require the preparation and issuance of either an environmental impact statement or an environmental impact appraisal and negative declaration pursuant to 10 CFR § 51.5(b) and (c). Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-78-40, 8 NRC 717, 744-45 (1978), *aff'd*, ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287 (1979).

An operating license amendment that does not modify any systems, structures, or components (SSCs) but which extends the license term to recapture time lost during

construction represents a significant amendment, and not merely a ministerial administrative change, notwithstanding prior review during the operating license proceeding of such SSCs. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-94-35, 40 NRC 180, 188 (1994).

There is no statutory or regulatory requirement that an applicant demonstrate any benefit from a license amendment. Tennessee Valley Authority (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), LBP-02--14, 56 NRC 15, 35 (2002).

One necessary component of NRC review of a license amendment application is review of the proposed amendment's compatibility with the licensee's existing design and licensing basis. If the NRC finds that there would be unacceptable incompatibilities, it may condition its approval of the amendment upon the licensee making necessary adjustments to the existing design and licensing basis to resolve these incompatibilities. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 565 (2004).

#### **6.1.4 Hearing Requirements for License/Permit Amendments**

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, does not specifically require a mandatory hearing on the question as to whether an amendment to an existing license or permit should issue. At the same time, the Act and the regulations (10 CFR § 2.105(a)(3)) require that, where a proposed amendment involves "significant hazards considerations," the opportunity for a hearing on the amendment be provided prior to issuance of the amendment and that any hearing requested be held prior to issuance of the amendment. An opportunity for a hearing will also be provided on any other amendment as to which the Commission, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation or the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards determines that an opportunity for public hearing should be afforded. 10 CFR § 2.105(a)(6),(7).

Section 189a hearing rights are triggered despite Commission assertion that it did not "amend" the license when the Commission abruptly changed its policy so as to retroactively enlarge extant licensee's authority, and licensee's original license did not authorize licensee to implement major-component dismantling of type undertaken in project. Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284, 294 (1st Cir. 1995). The statute's phrase "modification of rules and regulations" encompasses substantive interpretative policy changes, and the Commission cannot effect such modifications without complying with the statute's notice and hearing provisions. 59 F.3d at 292.

In evaluating whether an NRC authorization represents a license amendment within the meaning of section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, courts repeatedly have considered whether the NRC approval granted the licensee any greater operating authority or otherwise altered the original terms of a license. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315, 326 (1996).

Where an NRC approval does not permit the licensee to operate in any greater capacity than originally prescribed and all relevant regulations and license terms remain applicable, the authorization does not amend the license. Cleveland Electric

Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-96-13, 44 NRC 315, 327(1996).

A technical specification is a license condition. A license request to change that condition constitutes a request to amend the license and therefore creates adjudicatory hearing rights under Atomic Energy Act § 189a, 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a). See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-93-21, 38 NRC 87, 91 n.6, 93 (1993); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-96-23, 44 NRC 143, 150 n.6 (1996).

Construction permit amendment/extension cases, unlike construction permit proceedings, are not subject to the mandatory hearing requirement. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1188 (1984).

An application for an exemption concerning the security plan under 10 C.F.R. § 73.5 does not constitute a license amendment. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-00-5, 51 NRC 90, 96 (2000).

A prior hearing is not required under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for Commission approval of a license amendment in situations where the NRC Staff makes a "no significant hazards consideration" finding. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616, 622-623 (1981); Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-4, 23 NRC 113, 123 (1986). See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-12, 24 NRC 1, 11 (1986), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. San Luis Obispo Mothers For Peace v. NRC, 799 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1986).

The legislative history of Section 12 of Pub. L. 97-415 (1982), the "Sholly Amendment," modifying Section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, supports the determination that Congress intended that hearings on license amendments be held, if properly requested, even after irreversible actions have been taken upon a finding of no significant hazards consideration. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-23, 19 NRC 1412, 1414-15 (1984). Thus a timely filed contention will not be considered moot, even if the contested action has been completed. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-19, 19 NRC 1076, 1084 (1984).

"The Court has recognized that even where an agency's enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration'.... '[A] contrary holding would require the agency continually to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a single rulemaking proceeding.'" Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 228 (1991) (quoting Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 467 (1983)).

An opportunity for a hearing pursuant to Section 189a of the AEA is not triggered by a rulemaking that is generic in nature, and involves no specific licensing decision. The rulemaking may specifically benefit a particular plant, but it does not trigger hearing

rights if the rulemaking does not grant a specific plant a right to operate in a greater capacity than it had previously been allowed to operate. Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1515 (6th Cir. 1995).

The "Sholly" provisions have been extended to amendments to Part 52 combined construction permits and operating licenses issued pursuant to 10 CFR Part 52. A post-construction amendment to a combined license may be made immediately effective, prior to the completion of any required hearing, if the Commission determines that there are no significant hazards considerations. 10 CFR § 52.97(b)(2)(ii)1, 57 Fed. Reg. 60975, 60978 (Dec. 23, 1992).

Upholding the Commission's rule changes to Part 52, the court held that the Commission may rely on prior hearings and findings from the pre-construction and construction stage and significantly limit the scope of a 189a hearing when considering whether to authorize operation of a plant. Nuclear Information Resource Service v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

The Staff may issue an amendment to a materials license without providing prior notice of an opportunity for a hearing. Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-18, 31 NRC 559, 574 (1990), aff'd on other grounds, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71 (1995).

A Licensing Board granted a petition for a hearing in a license amendment application case where the petitioner established the threshold standing requirements. Energy Fuels Nuclear, Inc., LBP-94-33, 40 NRC 151, 156-57 (1994).

A Board may terminate a hearing on an application for an amendment to an operating license when the only intervenor withdraws from the hearing, and there are no longer any matters in controversy. Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-39, 20 NRC 1031, 1032 (1984).

A hearing on an application for a facility license amendment may be dismissed when the parties have all agreed to a stipulation for the withdrawal of all the intervenors' admitted contentions and the Board has not raised any sua sponte issues. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3), LBP-88-4, 27 NRC 236, 238-39 (1988).

A hearing can be requested on the application for a license amendment to reflect a change in ownership of a facility. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 80 (1977).

A license amendment initiated by staff order may become immediately effective under § 2.202 without a prior hearing if the public health, safety or interest requires. Furthermore, there is no inherent contradiction between a finding that there is "no significant hazard" in a given case and a finding in the same case that latent conditions may potentially cause harm in the future thus justifying immediate effectiveness of an amendment permitting corrections. Nuclear Fuel Services Inc. and New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (Western New York Nuclear Service Center), CLI-81-29, 14 NRC 940, 942 (1981).

For there to be any statutory right to a hearing on the granting of an exemption, such a grant must be part of a proceeding for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending



of any license or construction permit under the Atomic Energy Act. United States Department of Energy, Project Management Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 421 (1982).

#### **6.1.4.1 Notice of Hearing on License/Permit Amendments**

(RESERVED)

#### **6.1.4.2 Intervention on License/Permit Amendments**

The requirements for intervention in license amendment proceedings are the same as the requirements for intervention in initial permit or license proceedings (see generally Section 2.9). The right to intervene is not limited to those persons who oppose the proposed amendment itself, but extends to those who raise related claims involving matters arising directly from the proposed amendment. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-245, 8 AEC 873, 875 (1974).

Persons who would have standing to intervene in new construction permit hearings, which would be required if good cause could not be shown for the extension, have standing to intervene in construction extension proceedings to show that no good cause existed for extension and, consequently, new construction permit hearings would be required to complete construction. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), LBP-80-22, 12 NRC 191, 195 (1980).

The fact a member of a citizens' group lived twenty miles from a site was not sufficient to grant the group standing to intervene in a proceeding for an amendment to a materials license held by the site. U.S. Dep't of Army (Army Research Laboratory), LBP-00-21, 52 NRC 107 (2000).

#### **6.1.4.3 Summary Disposition Procedures on License/Permit Amendments**

Summary disposition procedures may be used in proceedings held upon requests for hearings on proposed amendments. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-191, 7 AEC 417 (1974). In a construction permit amendment proceeding, summary disposition may be granted based on pleadings alone, or pleadings accompanied by affidavits or other documentary information, where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that warrants a hearing and the moving party is entitled to a decision in its favor as a matter of law. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), ALAB-771, 19 NRC 1183, 1189 (1984), citing 10 CFR § 2.710(d) (formerly § 2.749(d)). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 565 (2004).

#### **6.1.4.4 Matters Considered in Hearings on License Amendments**

In considering an amendment to transfer part ownership of a facility, a Licensing Board held that questions concerning the legality of transferring some ownership interest in advance of the Commission action on the amendment was outside its jurisdiction and should be pursued under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B (dealing with enforcement) instead. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power

Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 386 (1978). The same Licensing Board also ruled that issues to be considered in such a transfer of ownership proceeding do not include questions of the financial qualifications of the original applicant or the technical qualification of any of the applicants. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 392 (1978).

With regard to environmental considerations in a proceeding on an application for license amendment, a Licensing Board should not embark broadly upon a fresh assessment of the environmental issues which have already been thoroughly considered and which were decided in the initial decision. Rather, the Board's role in the environmental sphere will be limited to assuring itself that the ultimate NEPA conclusions reached in the initial decision are not significantly affected by such new developments. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 415 (1975).

License amendments can be made immediately effective solely at the discretion of NRC staff under the so-called 'Sholly Amendment,' in advance of the holding and completion of any required hearing, following a determination by staff that there are no significant hazards considerations involved. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-7, 53 NRC 113, 117 (2001); see AEA § 189, 42 U.S.C. 2239.

The staff is authorized to make a no significant hazards consideration finding if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

- (1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
- (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
- (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-7, 53 NRC 113, 116 (2001).

Immediate effectiveness findings are not subject to review by licensing boards. Gulf States Utilities Co., et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31, 1994, aff'd, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994). Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 393 (1978), citing Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 41-5 (1975). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 844 (1987)(citing 10 CFR § 50.58(b)(6)), aff'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13 (1987), reconsid. denied on other grounds, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 457 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988); Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-89-15, 29 NRC 493, 499-500 (1989). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-90-6, 31 NRC 85, 90-91 (1990). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-7, 53 NRC 113, 116 (2001). Nor can a Licensing Board review the immediate effectiveness of a license amendment issued on the basis of a "no significant hazards consideration" after the Staff has

completed all the steps required for the issuance of the amendment. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-98-24, 48 NRC 219, 222 (1998). However, the Board has authority to review such an amendment if the Staff fails to perform the environmental review required by 10 CFR § 51.25 prior to the issuance of the amendment. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-19, 28 NRC 145, 153-56 (1988).

What may raise significant hazards consideration at one time may, at a later date, no longer present significant hazards consideration due to technological advances and further study. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-7, 53 NRC 113, 118 (2001).

The Commission also has the inherent authority to exercise its discretionary supervisory authority to stay staff's actions or rescind a license amendment. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-7, 53 NRC 113, 119 (2001).

A license amendment that does not involve, or result in, environmental impacts other than those previously considered and evaluated in prior initial decisions for the facility in question does not require the preparation and issuance of either an environmental impact statement or environmental impact appraisal and negative declaration pursuant to 10 CFR § 51.5(b) and (c). Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-78-40, 8 NRC 717, 744-45 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-534, 9 NRC 287 (1979). For example, the need for power is not a cognizable issue in a license amendment proceeding where it has been addressed in previous construction permit and operating license proceedings. Trojan, supra, ALAB-534, 9 NRC at 289, cited in Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), LBP-81-14, 13 NRC 677, 698 n.49 (1981).

Where health and safety issues were evaluated during the operating license proceeding, a Licensing Board will not admit a contention which provides no new information or other basis for reevaluating the previous findings as a result of the proposed amendment. Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 466 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988).

#### **6.1.5 Primary Jurisdiction to Consider License Amendment in Special Hearing**

Although the usual procedure for amending an existing license involves a licensee's applying for the proposed amendment pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.90, this is not the sole and exclusive means for obtaining an amendment. For example, where the Commission orders a special hearing on particular issues, the licensee may seek at hearing, and presiding officer has jurisdiction to issue, an amendment to the license as long as the modification sought bears directly on the questions addressed in the hearing. In such a situation, the licensee need not follow the usual procedure for filing an application for an amendment under 10 CFR 50.90. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-357, 4 NRC 542 (1976), aff'd, CLI-77-2, 5 NRC 13 (1977). Moreover, the presiding officer's authority to modify license conditions in such an instance is not limited by the inadequacies of the materials

submitted by the parties; the presiding officer may take such action as the public interest warrants. Id.

### **6.1.6 Facility Changes Without License Amendments**

10 CFR § 50.59(a)(1) provides that changes may be made to a production or utilization facility without prior NRC approval where such changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question, as defined in Section 50.59(a)(2), or a change in technical specifications. The determination as to whether a proposed change requires prior NRC approval under Section 50.59 apparently rests with the licensee in the first instance. Yankee Atomic Electric Company (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 101 (1994).

Where a hearing on a proposed license amendment was pending and the licensee embarked on "preparatory work" related to the proposed amendment without prior authorization, the presiding Licensing Board denied an intervenor's request for a cease and desist order with regard to such work on the grounds that there was no showing that such work posed any immediate danger to the public health and safety or violated NEPA and that such work was done entirely at the licensee's risk. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), LBP-77-69, 6 NRC 1179, 1184 (1977). Subsequently, the Appeal Board indicated that the intervenor's complaint in this regard might more appropriately have been directed, in the first instance, to the Staff under 10 CFR § 2.206, rather than to the Licensing Board. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-451, 6 NRC 889, 891 n.3 (1977).

A low-level waste facility can accept special nuclear material (SNM) for disposal only under an NRC license that it holds, not under a state license under which the facility has accepted reactor materials and components removed from a nuclear power plant site. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 100-01 (1994).

Commitments which are part of the licensing basis for a facility must be complied with, even though they do not take the form of formal license conditions. Changes to commitments of this sort require the filing of a license amendment, which is subject to challenge via the hearing process. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-8, 58 NRC 11, 21 (2003).

### **6.2 Amendments to Construction Permit Applications**

Three years after the Licensing Board sanctioned a limited work authorization (LWA) and before the applicant had proceeded with any construction activity, applicant indicated it wanted to amend its construction permit application to focus only on site suitability issues. The Appeal Board "vacate[d] without prejudice" the decisions of the Licensing Board sanctioning the LWA, and remanded the case for proceedings deemed appropriate by the Licensing Board upon formal receipt of an early site approval application. Delmarva Power & Light Co. (Summit Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-516, 9 NRC 5 (1979).

### 6.3 Antitrust Considerations

Section 105(c)(6) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 indicates that nothing in the Act was intended to relieve any person from complying with the federal antitrust laws. This section does not authorize the NRC to institute antitrust proceedings against licensees, but does permit the Commission to impose conditions in a license as needed to ensure that activities under the license will not contribute to the creation or maintenance of an anticompetitive situation. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), LBP-77-7, 5 NRC 452 (1977). Note that reactors licensed as research and development facilities under Section 104b of the Atomic Energy Act prior to the 1970 antitrust amendments are excluded from antitrust review. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1; Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-428, 6 NRC 221, 225 (1977); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-323, 3 NRC 331 (1976).

The standard to be employed by the NRC is whether there is a "reasonable probability" that a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws and the policies underlying those laws would be created or maintained by the unconditioned licensing of the facility. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-24, 5 NRC 804 (1977). The Commission's statutory obligation, pursuant to Section 105c, is not limited to investigation of the effects of construction and operation of the facility to be licensed, but rather includes an evaluation of the relationship of the specific nuclear facility to the applicant's total system or power pool. Id. This threshold determination as to whether a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws could arise from issuance of the proposed license does not involve balancing public interest factors such as public benefits from the activity in question, public convenience and necessity, or the desirability of competition. Only after the Commission determines that an anticompetitive situation exists or is likely to develop under a proposed license are such other factors considered. In exceptional cases, the NRC may issue the license, despite the possibility of an anticompetitive situation, if it determines that, on balance, issuance of the license would be in the public interest. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-385, 5 NRC 621, 632-633 (1977).

Under Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a hearing on whether authorizing construction of a nuclear power facility "would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws" is called for if the Attorney General so recommends or an interested party requests one and files a timely petition to intervene. When an antitrust hearing is convened, a permit to construct the project may not be awarded without the parties' consent until the proceedings are completed. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-420, 6 NRC 8, 10 (1977).

One of the policies reflected in Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act is that a government-developed monopoly -- like nuclear power electricity generation -- should not be used to contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. Section 105c is a mechanism to allow smaller utilities, municipals and cooperatives access to the licensing process to pursue their interests in the event that larger utility applicants might use a government license to create or maintain an anticompetitive market position. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

When the Attorney General recommends an antitrust hearing on a license for a commercial nuclear facility, the NRC is required to conduct one. This is the clear

implication of Section 105c(5) of the Atomic Energy Act. Where such a hearing is held, the Attorney General or his designee may participate as a party in connection with the subject matter of his advice. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-5, 7 NRC 397, 398 (1978); Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-560, 10 NRC 265, 272 (1979). However, where the Licensing Board's jurisdiction over an antitrust proceeding does not rest upon Section 105c(5), the Justice Department must comply with the standards for intervention, including the standards governing untimely intervention petitions. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) and Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. and Toledo Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 253-54 (1991), aff'd in part on other grounds and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992).

In dealing with antitrust issues, the NRC's role is something more than that of a neutral forum for economic disputes between private parties. If an antitrust hearing is convened, it should encompass all significant antitrust implications of the license, not merely the complaints of private intervenors. If no one performs this function, the NRC Staff should assure that a complete picture is presented to Licensing Boards. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 949 (1978).

The antitrust review undertaken by the Commission in licensing the construction of a nuclear power plant is, by statute, to determine "whether the activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws...." Section 105c(5) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2135c(5). This means that the licensed activities must play some active role in creating or maintaining the anticompetitive situation. Put another way, the nuclear power plant must be an actor, an influence, on the anticompetitive scene. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), ALAB-665, 15 NRC 22, 32 (1982).

Where a license is found to create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, the Commission may impose corrective conditions on the license rather than withhold it. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-13, 7 NRC 583, 597 (1978).

In making a determination under AEA section 105c about the antitrust implications of a licensing action, the Commission must act to ensure that two results do not obtain: Activities under the license must not (1) "maintain" a "situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws" or (2) "create" such a situation. In making its ultimate determination about whether an applicant's activities under the license will result in a "situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws," the term "maintain" permits the Commission to look at the applicant's past and present competitive performance in the relevant market, whereas the word "create" envisions that the Commission's assessment will be a forward-looking, predictive analysis concerning the competitive environment in which the facility will operate. See Alabama Power Co. v. NRC, 692 F.2d 1362, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983). Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 288 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Only the NRC is empowered to make the initial determination under Section 105(c) whether activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent

with the antitrust laws, and if so what license conditions should be required as a remedy. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 574 (1979).

In specifying which federal antitrust laws are implicated in an NRC antitrust review, AEA section 105 references all the major provisions governing antitrust regulation, including the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts. It is a basic tenet that "the antitrust laws seek to prevent conduct which weakens or destroys competition". See Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3) et al., ALAB-560, 10 NRC 265, 279 & n.34 (1979)(principal purpose of Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts is preservation of and encouragement of competition.) Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 290 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In order to conduct a Section 105c proceeding, it is not necessary to establish a violation of the antitrust laws. Any violation of the antitrust laws also meets the less rigorous standard of Section 105c which is inconsistent with the antitrust laws. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 570 (1979). The Commission has a broader authority that encompasses those instances in which there is a "reasonable probability" that those laws "or the policies clearly underlying those laws" will be infringed. Alabama Power Co., 692 F. 2d 1362,1367-68 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 290 n. 54 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

A threshold showing of lower cost nuclear power is not required as an indispensable prerequisite of retaining antitrust conditions. City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

NRC statutory responsibilities under Section 105(c) cannot be impaired or limited by a State agency. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 577 (1979).

The legislative history and language of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 clearly establish that the act was not intended to divest NRC of its antitrust jurisdiction. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-27, 10 NRC 563, 577 (1979).

Once the U.S. Attorney General has withdrawn from a proceeding and permission has been granted to the remaining intervenors to withdraw, the Board no longer has jurisdiction to entertain an antitrust proceeding under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-82-21, 15 NRC 639, 640-641 (1982).

### **6.3.A Application of Antitrust Laws; Market Power**

One of the cardinal precepts of antitrust regulation is that a commercial entity that is dominant in the relevant market (even if its dominance is lawfully gained) is accountable for the manner in which it exercises the degree of market power that dominance affords. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973). See also A. Neal, The Antitrust Laws of the United States, at 126 (2d ed.

1970). Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 32 NRC 269, 290 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

"Market power" is generally defined as the "power of a firm to affect the price which will prevail on the market in which the firm trades.[cites omitted] If a firm possesses market power such that it has a substantial power to exclude competitors by reducing price, then it is considered to have "monopoly power." If an entity with market dominance utilizes its market power with the purpose of destroying competitors or to otherwise foreclose competition or gain a competitive advantage, then its conduct will violate the antitrust laws, specifically section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992); Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973). Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 291 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

AEA § 105c directs that the focus of the Commission's consideration during an antitrust review must be whether, considering a variety of factors, a nuclear utility has market dominance and, if so, given its past (and predicted) competitive behavior, whether it can and will use that market power in its activities relating to the operation of its licensed facility to affect adversely the competitive situation in the relevant market. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 298-99 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Under general antitrust principles, what is required relative to a particular competitive situation is an analysis of the existence and use of market power among competing firms to determine whether anticompetitive conditions exist. This assessment, in turn, is based upon a number of different factors that have been recognized as providing some indicia of a firm's competitive potency in the relevant market, including firm size, market concentration, barriers to entry, pricing policy, profitability, and past competitive conduct. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 291 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Nothing in AEA § 105c, or in the pertinent antitrust laws and cases supports the proposition that traditional antitrust market power analysis is inapplicable in the first instance when the assessment of the competitive impact of a particular asset (i.e., a nuclear facility) is involved. Consistent with the antitrust laws referenced in AEA § 105c, what ultimately is at issue under that provision is not a competitor's comparative cost of doing business, but rather its possession and use of market power. And if a commercial entity's market dominance gives it the power to affect competition, how it uses that power -- not merely its cost of doing business -- remains the locus for any antitrust analysis under section 105c. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 292 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

### **6.3.B Application of Antitrust Laws; Remedial Authority**

During an antitrust review under AEA section 105c, if it can be demonstrated that market power has or would be misused, then with cause to believe that the applicant's "activities under the license would create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws" the Commission can intervene to take remedial measures. On the other hand, if the Commission reaches a judgment that an otherwise dominant utility has not



and will not abuse its market power, i.e., that its "activities under the license" will not "create or maintain a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws," then the Commission need not intercede. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 295 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

In reaching a judgment under AEA section 105c about a utility's "activities under the license," the Commission is permitted to undertake a "broad inquiry" into an applicant's conduct. See Alabama Power Co., 692 F. 2d 1362,1368 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983). Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 295 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

### **6.3.1 Consideration of Antitrust Matters After the Construction Permit Stage**

The NRC antitrust responsibility does not extend over the full life of a licensed facility but is limited to two procedural stages -- the construction permit stage and the operating license stage. This limitation on NRC jurisdiction extends to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation as well as to the rest of the NRC. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1; Turkey Point Plant, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-428, 6 NRC 221, 226-227 (1977). For reactors which have undergone antitrust review in connection with a construction permit application pursuant to Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act, Section 105c(2) governs the question of antitrust review at the operating license stage. Antitrust issues may only be pursued at this stage if a finding is made that the licensee's activities have significantly changed subsequent to the construction permit review. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-13, 5 NRC 1303, 1310 (1977). Where a construction permit antitrust proceeding is under way, the antitrust provisions of the Atomic Energy Act effectively preclude the Commission from instituting a second antitrust hearing in conjunction with an operating license application for the plant. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-661, 14 NRC 1117, 1122 (1-981). Where, subsequent to issuance of a construction permit and to termination of the jurisdiction of the Licensing Board which considered the application, new contractual arrangements give rise to antitrust contentions, such contentions cannot be resolved by the original Licensing Board. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-381, 5 NRC 582 (1977). The Commission's regulations indicate that the new antitrust concerns should be raised at the operating license stage. The Commission Staff could also initiate show cause proceedings requiring the licensee to demonstrate why antitrust conditions should not be imposed in an amendment to the construction permit. Id. Where the petitioner who raises the antitrust contentions is a co-licensee, 10 CFR § 50.90 permits the petitioner to seek an amendment to the construction permit which would impose antitrust considerations. Id.

The NRC may facilitate operating license stage antitrust review by waiving the requirements of 10 CFR § 50.30(d) and § 50.34(b) (which require operating license applications to be accompanied by the filing of an FSAR). This permits operating license antitrust review at a much earlier stage prior to completion of the FSAR. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-13, 5 NRC 1303, 1319 (1977).

Atomic Energy Act §105 and its implementing regulations contemplate that mandatory antitrust review be conducted early in the construction permit process. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

Antitrust review might be conducted out-of-time if significant doubts were cast on the adequacy of the initial antitrust review. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 945 (1978).

Despite the fact that further antitrust review following issuance of a construction permit will usually await the operating license stage of review, a construction permit amendment may give rise to an additional antitrust review prior to the operating license stage. An application for a construction permit amendment that would add new co-owners to a plant is within the scope of the phrase in Section 105c(1) of the Atomic Energy Act requiring antitrust review of "any license application." As such, it triggers an opportunity for intervention based on the antitrust aspects of adding new coowners. To hold otherwise would subvert Congressional intent by insulating applicants coming in by way of amendment from antitrust investigation. Moreover, because a joint venture might raise antitrust problems that would not exist if the joint applicants were considered individually, the Licensing Board has jurisdiction to consider intervention petitions and antitrust issues filed in connection with a new application for joint ownership. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-13, 7 NRC 583, 588 (1978).

A narrower, second antitrust review is to occur at the operating license stage, if and only if, "The Commission determines such review is advisable on the ground that significant changes in the licensee's activities or proposed activities have occurred subsequent to the previous review by the Attorney General and the Commission..." in connection with the construction permit for the facility. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-28, 11 NRC 817, 823 (1980).

The ultimate issue in the operating license stage antitrust review is the same as for the construction permit review: would the contemplated license create a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws or the policies underlying those laws. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-28, 11 NRC 817, 824 (1980).

To trigger antitrust review at the operating license stage, the significant changes specified by Section 105c of the Atomic Energy Act must (1) have occurred since the previous antitrust review of the licensee; (2) be reasonably attributable to the licensee; and (3) have antitrust implications that would warrant Commission remedy. This requires an examination of (a) whether an antitrust review would be likely to conclude that the situation as changed has negative antitrust implications and (b) whether the Commission has available remedies. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-28, 11 NRC 817, 824-25 (1980).

In determining whether significant changes have occurred which require referral of the matter to the Attorney General, the Commission must find: (1) that there is a factual basis for the determination; and (2) that the alleged changes are reasonably apparent. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-28, 11 NRC 817, 824-25 (1980).

Although the NRC regulations do not specify a period during which requests for a significant change determination will be timely, the relevant question in determining timeliness is whether the request has followed sufficiently promptly the operating license application. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-80-28, 11 NRC 817, 829 (1980).

### **6.3.1.1 Limitations on Antitrust Review after Issuance of Operating License**

Congress did not invest the NRC with ongoing antitrust responsibility during the period subsequent to issuance of an operating license and the NRC's authority in this area terminates at that point. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-13, 5 NRC 1303, 1317 (1977). Congress did not envision for the NRC a broad, ongoing antitrust enforcement role but, rather, established specific procedures (and incentives) intended to tie antitrust review to the two-step licensing process. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 945 (1978). However, a Licensing Board has determined that, pursuant to its general authority to amend a facility license at the request of the licensee, Atomic Energy Act 189a and 10 CFR § 50.90, it had jurisdiction to consider the licensees' request to suspend the antitrust conditions in their operating licenses. Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., LBP-91-38, 34 NRC 229, 239-44 (1991), aff'd in part and appeal denied, CLI-92-11, 36 NRC 47 (1992), subsequent history, LBP-92-32, 36 NRC 269, 295 (1992), aff'd, City of Cleveland v. NRC, 68 F.3d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Under license renewal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, an antitrust review is not required for applications for renewal of nuclear plant commercial licenses or research and development nuclear plant licenses. The NRC acted permissibly in limiting its antitrust review duties to situations in which it issued new operating licenses. American Public Power Assoc. v. NRC, 990 F.2d 1310, 1312-13 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The Commission has concluded, upon a close analysis of the AEC, that its antitrust reviews of post-operating license transfer applications cannot be squared with the terms or intent of the Act and that the Commission therefore lacks authority to conduct them. But even if the Commission possesses some general residual authority to continue to undertake such antitrust reviews, it is certainly true that the Act nowhere requires them, and the Commission thinks it sensible from a legal and policy perspective to no longer conduct them. Kansas Gas and Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441, 460 (1999). In the Wolf Creek Case, the Commission concluded that the competitive and regulatory landscape has dramatically changed since 1970 in favor of those electric utilities who are the intended beneficiaries of the section 105 antitrust reviews, especially in connection with acquisitions of nuclear power facilities and access to transmission services. The Commission concludes that the duplication of other antitrust reviews makes no sense and only impedes nationwide efforts to streamline the federal government. The Commission subsequently codified its Wolf Creek decision by rulemaking, Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification, 65 Fed. Reg. 44649 (July 19, 2000); see also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-03-2, 57 NRC 19, 34-35 (2003), vacated as moot sub nom. Northern Calif. Power Agency v. NRC, 2004 WL 2983601 (D.C. Cir., Dec. 28, 2004).

NRC Antitrust review of post-operating license transfers is unnecessary from both a legal and policy perspective. GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000) (responding to fear that corporations “may be stretched too thin in their ability to operate a multitude of nuclear reactors”).

The fact that a particular license transfer may have antitrust implications does not remove it from the NEPA categorical exclusion. In any event, because the Atomic Energy Act does not require, and arguably, does not even allow, the Commission to conduct antitrust evaluations of license transfer application, any “failure” of the Commission to conduct such an evaluation cannot constitute a federal action warranting a NEPA review. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266 (2000) at 30, n.55, quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167-68 (2000).

The AEA does not require, and arguably does not allow, the Commission to conduct antitrust evaluations of license transfer applications. As a result, failure by the NRC to conduct an antitrust evaluation of a license transfer application does not constitute a Federal action warranting a NEPA review. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168 (2000). See also Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1) CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, “Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification,” 65 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000).

The Commission no longer conducts antitrust reviews in license transfer proceedings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 318 (2000), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168, 174 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000).

### **6.3.2 Intervention in Antitrust Proceedings**

The Commission's regulations make clear that an antitrust intervention petition: (1) must first describe a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws; (2) would be deficient if it consists of a description of a situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, however well pleaded, accompanied by a mere paraphrase of the statutory language alleging that the situation described therein would be created or maintained by the activities under the license; and (3) must identify the specific relief sought and whether, how and the extent to which the request fails to be satisfied by the license conditions proposed by the Attorney General. The most critical requirement of an antitrust intervention petition is an explanation of how the activities under the license would create or maintain an anticompetitive situation. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-665, 15 NRC 22, 29 (1982), citing Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-279, 1 NRC 559, 574-75 (1975).

Although Section 105 of the Atomic Energy Act encourages petitioners to voice their antitrust claims early in the licensing process, reasonable late requests for antitrust review are not precluded so long as they are made concurrent with licensing. Licensing Boards must have discretion to consider individual claims in a way which does justice to all of the policies which underlie Section 105c and the strength of particular claims justifying late intervention. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

The criteria of 10 CFR § 2.309 for late petitions are as appropriate for evaluation of late antitrust petitions as in health, safety and environmental licensing, but the Section 2.309 (formerly 2.714) criteria should be more stringently applied to late antitrust petitions, particularly in assessing the good cause factor. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

Late requests for antitrust review hearings may be entertained in the period between the filing of an application for a construction permit -- the time when the advice of the Attorney General is sought -- and its issuance. However, as the time for issuance of the construction permit draws closer, Licensing Boards should scrutinize more closely and carefully the petitioner's claims of good cause. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 946 (1978).

Where an antitrust petition is so late that relief will divert from the licensee needed and difficult-to-replace power, the Licensing Board may shape any relief granted to meet this problem. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), CLI-78-12, 7 NRC 939, 948 (1978).

Where a late petition for intervention is involved, the factors set forth within 10 CFR § 2.309(c) (formerly § 2.714(a)(1)) must be balanced and applied before petitions may be granted; the test becomes increasingly vigorous as time passes. Of particular significance is the availability of other remedies for the late petitioner where remedies are available before the Federal Energy Regulating Commission and petitioner has not shown that the remedy is insufficient. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-81-28, 14 NRC 333, 336, 338 (1981).

### **6.3.3 Discovery in Antitrust Proceedings**

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine will operate to immunize those legitimately petitioning the government, or exercising other First Amendment rights, from liability under the antitrust laws, even where the challenged activities were conducted for purposes condemned by the antitrust laws. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 174 (1979).

Material on applicant's activities designed to influence legislation and requested through discovery is relevant and may reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, and therefore is not immune from discovery. The Noerr-Pennington cases, on which applicant had based its argument, go to the substantive protection of the First Amendment and do not immunize litigants from discovery. Appropriate discovery into applicant's legislative activities must be permitted, and the information sought to be discovered may well be directly admissible as evidence. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 175 (1979).

### **6.3.3.1 Discovery Cutoff Dates for Antitrust Proceedings**

The imposition of the cutoff date for discovery is for the purpose of making a preliminary ruling about relevancy for discovery. The cutoff date is only a date after which, in the dimension of time, relevancy may be assumed for discovery purposes. Requests for information from before the cutoff date must show that the information requested is relevant in time to the situation to be created or maintained by a licensed activity. If the information sought is relevant, and not otherwise barred, it may be discovered, no matter how old, upon a reasonable showing. This is entirely consistent with 10 CFR § 2.705(b) (formerly § 2.740(b)) and Rule 26(b) which are in turn consistent with the Manual for Complex Litigation, Part 1, § 4.30. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 169-70 (1979).

In antitrust proceedings, the relevant period for discovery must be determined by the circumstances of the alleged situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws, not the planning of the nuclear facility. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 168 (1979).

The standard for allowing discovery requests predating a set cutoff date is that there be a reasonable possibility of relevancy; it is not necessary to show relevancy plus good cause. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Plant, Unit No. 2), LBP-79-4, 9 NRC 164, 172 (1979).

## **6.4 Attorney Conduct**

### **6.4.1 Practice Before Commission**

10 CFR § 2.314 (formerly § 2.713) contains general provisions with respect to representation by counsel in an adjudicatory proceeding, standards of conduct and suspension of attorneys.

Counsel appearing before all NRC adjudicatory tribunals "have a manifest and iron-clad obligation of candor." This obligation includes the duty to call to the tribunal's attention facts of record which cast a different light upon the substance of arguments being advanced by counsel. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-505, 8 NRC 527, 532 (1978).

A lawyer citing legal authority to an adjudicatory board in support of a position, with knowledge of other applicable authority adverse to that position, has a clear professional obligation to inform the board of the existence of such adverse authority. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1174 n.21 (1983), citing Rule 3.3(a)(3) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983).

Canon 7 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which exhorts lawyers to represent their clients "zealously within the bounds of the law," and its Associated Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules provide the standards by which attorneys should abide in the preparation of testimony for NRC proceedings. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 916, 918 (1982).

In judging the propriety of a lawyer's participation in the preparation of testimony of a witness, the key factor is not who originated the words that comprise the testimony, but whether the witness can truthfully attest that the statement is complete and accurate to the best of his or her knowledge. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 918 (1982).

Counsel have an obligation to keep adjudicatory boards informed of the material facts which are relevant to issues pending before them. University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-84-22, 19 NRC 1383, 1401 (1984), citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), 16 NRC 897, 910 (1982); Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-677, 15 NRC 1387 (1982); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 172 n.64 (1978).

A party's obligation to disclose material information extends to, and is often the responsibility of, counsel, especially in litigation involving highly complex technology where many decisions regarding materiality of information can only be made jointly by a party and its counsel. University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-84-22, 19 NRC 1383, 1405 (1984).

Counsel's obligations to disclose all relevant and material factual information to the Licensing Board under the Atomic Energy Act are not substantially different from those laid out by the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In discharging his obligations, counsel may verify the accuracy of factual information with his client or verify the accuracy of the factual information himself. University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-84-22, 19 NRC 1383, 1406-07 (1984).

The Commission's Rules of Practice require parties and their representatives to conduct themselves with honor, dignity, and decorum as they should before a court of law. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 916 (1982), citing 10 CFR 2.314(a) (formerly 2.713(a)). See Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-4, 47 NRC 17 (1998). A letter from an intervenor's counsel to an applicant's counsel which is reasonably perceived as a threat to seek criminal sanctions against the applicant's employees or to seek disciplinary action by the Bar against the applicant's attorneys in order to compel the applicant to negotiate the cancellation of its facility does not meet this standard. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 668-670 (1986).

Counsel's derogatory description of the NRC Staff constitutes intemperate even disrespectful, rhetoric and is wholly inappropriate in legal pleadings. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-17, 42 NRC 229, 232-33 (1995).

The Commission generally follows the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility in judging lawyer conduct in NRC proceedings. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 916 (1982), citing Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-204, 7 AEC 835, 838 (1974).

Gamesmanship and "sporting conduct" between or among lawyers and parties is not condoned in Nuclear Regulatory Commission proceedings. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 919 (1982).

Attorneys practicing before Licensing and Appeal Boards are to conduct themselves in a dignified and professional manner and are not to engage in name calling with respect to opposing counsel. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), ALAB-204, 7 AEC 835 (1974). In this vein, Licensing Boards have a duty to regulate the course of hearings and the conduct of participants in the interest of insuring a fair, impartial, expeditious and orderly adjudicatory process, 10 CFR § 2.319(g) (formerly § 2.718(e)); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-417, 5 NRC 1442, 1445-46 (1977), and the Commission has the authority to disqualify an attorney or an entire law firm for unprofessional conduct, whatever its form. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976).

The Code of Professional Responsibility considerably restricts the comments that counsel representing a party in an administrative hearing may make to the public. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-592, 11 NRC 744, 750 (1980).

Parties should not impugn one another's integrity without first submitting supporting evidence. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-5A, 15 NRC 216 (1982).

#### **6.4.2 Disciplinary Matters re Attorneys**

The Commission has the authority to disqualify an attorney or an entire law firm for unprofessional conduct, whatever its form. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976). 10 CFR § 2.314(c) (formerly § 2.713(c)) lists various acts or omissions by an attorney which would justify his suspension from further participation in a proceeding. That Section also sets forth the procedure to be followed by the presiding officer in issuing an order barring the attorney from participation.

A Licensing Board may, if necessary for the orderly conduct of a proceeding, reprimand, censure or suspend from participation in the particular proceeding pending before it any party or representative of a party who shall be guilty of disorderly, disruptive, or contemptuous conduct. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-87, 16 NRC 1195, 1201 (1982).

Where a party's representative (or counsel) engages in repeated disregard of the Commission's practices and procedures, disciplinary action may include summary rejection (without referral to the Commission or Licensing Boards) of future pleadings under such representative's signature that do not conform with all procedural requirements. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 38-39 (2006).

An intervenor's generalized allegations of prejudice resulting from the submission of an alleged ex parte communication by applicant's counsel to a Board are insufficient to support a motion to disqualify counsel. The intervenor must demonstrate how specific Board rulings have been prejudiced by the submission of the ex parte communication. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-18, 24 NRC 501, 504-05 (1986).



Petitions which raise questions about the ethics and reputation of another member of the Bar should only be filed after careful research and deliberation. Moreover, although ill feeling understandably results from any petition for disciplinary action, retaliation in kind should not be the routine response. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-82-36, 16 NRC 1512, 1514 n.1 (1982).

A party's lack of resources does not excuse its baseless and undocumented charges against the integrity and professional responsibility of counsel for an opposing party. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-45, 22 NRC 819, 828 (1985).

The Commission has no interest in general matters of attorney discipline and chooses to focus instead on the means necessary to keep its judicatory proceedings orderly and to avoid unnecessary delays. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-82-36, 16 NRC 1512, 1514 n.1 (1982), citing 45 Fed. Reg. 3594 (1980).

While the Commission has inherent supervisory power over all agency personnel and proceedings, it is not necessarily appropriate to bring any and all matters to the Commission in the first instance. Under 10 CFR § 2.314 (formerly § 2.713), where a complaint relates directly to a specified attorney's actions in a proceeding before a Licensing Board, that complaint should be brought to the Board in the first instance if correction is necessary for the integrity of the proceedings. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-82-36, 16 NRC 1512, 1514 n.1 (1982).

#### **6.4.2.1 Jurisdiction of Special Board re Attorney Discipline**

The Special Board appointed to consider the disqualification issue has the ultimate responsibility as to that decision. The Licensing Board before which the disqualification question was initially raised should determine only whether the allegations of misconduct state a case for disqualification and should refer the case to the Special Board if they do. After the Special Board's decision, the Licensing Board merely carries out the ministerial duty of entering an order in accordance with the Special Board's decision. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976).

#### **6.4.2.2 Procedures in Special Disqualification Hearings re Attorney Conduct**

The attorney or law firm accused of misconduct is entitled to a full hearing on the matter. The Commission's discovery rules are applicable to the proceeding and all parties have the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses. The burden of proof is on the party moving for disqualification and the Special Board's decision must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976).

In general, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to disqualification proceedings. An earlier judicial decision would be entitled to collateral estoppel effect unless giving it effect would intrude upon the Commission's ability to ensure the orderly and

proper prosecution of its internal proceedings. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-378, 5 NRC 557 (1977). As to costs incurred from an attorney discipline proceeding, there is no basis on which NRC can reimburse a private attorney for out-of-pocket expenses in connection with the termination, and settlement of a special proceeding brought to investigate misconduct charges against a private attorney and NRC Staff attorneys. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-79-3, 9 NRC 107, 109 (1979).

#### **6.4.2.3 Conflict of Interest**

Disqualification of an attorney or law firm is appropriate where the attorney formerly represented a party whose interests were adverse to his present client in a related matter. The aggrieved former client need not show that specific confidences were breached but only that there is a substantial relationship between the issues in the pending action and those in the prior representation. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-332, 3 NRC 785 (1976).

A perceived bias in an attorney's view of a proceeding is distinguishable from a situation where there is an attorney conflict of interest of a type recognized in law to compromise counsel's ability to represent his client, e.g., that he had previously represented another party in the proceeding, or had a financial interest in common with another party, or the like. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-82-36, 16 NRC 1512, 1515 (1982).

An attorney for a party in an NRC proceeding should discontinue his or her representation of the client when it becomes apparent that the attorney will be called to testify as a necessary witness in the proceeding. However, an attorney will not be disqualified when it is shown that the client would suffer substantial hardship because of the distinctive value of the attorney. A party may waive the possible disqualification of its attorney if the opposing parties are not thereby prejudiced. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1717-20 (1985), citing DR 5-101(B)(4), DR 5-102(A) and (B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Model Rule 3.7(a)(3) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.

### **6.5 Communications Between Staff/Applicant/Other Parties/Adjudicatory Bodies**

During the course of an ongoing adjudication, Commission regulations restrict communications between the Commission adjudicatory employees and certain employees within the NRC who are participating in the proceeding or any person outside the NRC, with respect to information relevant to the merits of an adjudicatory proceeding. Commission adjudicatory employees include the Commissioners, their immediate staff, and other employees advising the Commission on adjudicatory matters, the Licensing Board and their immediate staffs. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.347, 2.348 (formerly §§ 2.780, 2.781). Employees "participating in a proceeding" include those engaged in the performance of any investigative or litigating function in the proceeding or in a factually related proceeding. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.348(a) (formerly § 2.781(a)). Communications between Commission adjudicatory employees and other NRC employees are subject to the "separation of functions" restrictions in 10 C.F.R. § 2.348 (formerly § 2.781).

Communications between Commission adjudicatory employees and any person outside the NRC are subject to the ex parte restrictions in 10 C.F.R. § 2.347 (formerly § 2.780).

Although the separation of functions and ex parte contact restrictions are subject to different regulations, caselaw discussing prohibited communications in the context of one situation may be equally applicable to the other. Thus, depending on the issue, it may be helpful or necessary to review caselaw arising in both areas.

### 6.5.1 Ex Parte Communications Rule

10 CFR § 2.347 (formerly § 2.780) sets forth the applicable rules with respect to ex parte (off-the-record) communications involving NRC personnel who exercise quasi-judicial functions with respect to the issuance, denial, amendment, transfer, renewal, modification, suspension or revocation of a license or permit. In general, the regulation prohibits ex parte communications with Commissioners, members of their immediate staffs, NRC officials and employees who advise the Commissioners in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, and Licensing Board members and their immediate staffs. The ex parte rule proscribes litigants' discussing, off-the record, matters in litigation with members of the adjudicatory board. The rule does not apply to undisputed issues in contested proceedings and uncontested mandatory proceedings. 10 C.F.R. § 2.347(f)(5).

It does not apply to discussions between and among the parties, between the NRC Staff and the applicant or between the Staff, applicant, other litigants and third parties (including state officials and Federal agencies) not involved in the proceeding. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 269 (1978). The NRC Staff does not advise the Commission or the Boards. The Staff is a separate and distinct entity that participates as a party in a proceeding and may confer with the other parties. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 883 n.161 (1984).

The ex parte rule relates only to discussions of any substantive matter at issue in a proceeding on the record. It does not apply to discussions of procedural matters, such as extensions of time for filing of affidavits. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-8, 15 NRC 299, 336 (1982). See, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-5, 17 NRC 331, 332 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.347(a) (formerly § 2.780(a)).

Nothing in the Commission's ex parte rule pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.347 (formerly § 2.780) precludes conversations among parties, none of whom is a decisionmaker in the licensing proceeding. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 144 (1982). See also Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-717, 17 NRC 346, 378 (1983).

Generic discussions of general health and safety problems and responsibilities of the Commission not arising from or directly related to matters in adjudication are not ex parte. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-3, 17 NRC 72, 74 (1983), citing 10 CFR 2.347 (formerly 2.780(d)).

Regarding a prohibition on ex parte contacts, the ex parte rule is not properly invoked where in an enforcement matter the licensee is complying with Staff's order and has not sought a hearing, nor is a petition for an enforcement action sufficient to invoke the provisions of 10 CFR § 2.347 (formerly § 2.780). Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-83-4, 17 NRC 75, 76 (1983).

The Staff's communication of the results of its reviews, through public filings served on all parties and the adjudicatory boards, does not constitute an ex parte communication. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 197 n.39 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

In determining whether an ex parte communication has so tainted the decisionmaking process as to require vacating a Board's decision, the Commission has evaluated the following factors: the gravity of the ex parte communication; whether the contacts could have influenced the agency's decision; whether the party making the contacts benefited from the Board's final decision; whether the contents of the communication were known to the other parties to the proceeding; and whether vacating the Board's decision would serve a useful purpose. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-86-18, 24 NRC 501, 506 (1986), citing Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 685 F.2d 547, 564-565 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

#### **6.5.2 "Separation of Functions" Rules**

Communications between NRC employees advising the Commission on adjudicatory matters and NRC employees participating in adjudicatory proceedings on behalf of the staff are subject to the restrictions in 10 C.F.R. § 2.348(a) (formerly § 2.781(a)). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-5, 43 NRC 53, 56-57 (1996). A separation of functions violation is "not a concern if it does not reach the ultimate decision maker." CLI-96-5, 43 NRC at 57 (quoting Press Broadcasting Co., Inc v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).

The Commission retains the power, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.206(c), to consult with the NRC Staff on a formal or informal basis regarding the institution of enforcement proceedings. See Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station), CLI-91-11, 34 NRC 3, 6 (1991).

Separation of functions does not apply to uncontested proceedings or to an undisputed issue in contested initial license proceedings. 10 C.F.R. § 2.348(d)(3).

#### **6.5.3 Telephone Conference Calls**

A conference call between an adjudicatory board and some but not all of the parties should be avoided except in the case of the most dire necessity. Such calls must be avoided even where no substantive matters are to be discussed and the rule precluding ex parte communications is, therefore, not technically violated. Puerto Rico Water Resources Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-313, 3 NRC 94 (1976).

In general, where substantive matters are to be considered in a prehearing conference call, all parties must be on the line unless that representation has been waived. Promptly after any prehearing conference carried on via telephone during which rulings governing the conduct of future proceedings have been made, Licensing Boards must draft and enter written orders confirming those rulings. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-334, 3 NRC 809 (1976). See 10 CFR 2.329(d) (formerly § 2.752(c)).

Where a party informs an adjudicatory board that it is not interested in a matter to be discussed in a conference call between the board and the other litigants, that party cannot later complain that it was not consulted or included in the conference call. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 269 n.63 (1978).

#### **6.5.4 Staff-Applicant Communications**

##### **6.5.4.1 Staff Review of Application**

A prospective applicant may confer informally with the Staff prior to filing its application. 10 CFR §§ 2.101(a)(1), 2.102(a).

The Staff may continue to confer privately with the applicant even after a hearing has been noticed. While a Licensing Board has supervisory authority over Staff actions that are part of the hearing process, it has no jurisdiction to supervise the Staff's review process and, as such, cannot order the Staff and applicant to hold their private discussions in the vicinity of the site or to provide transcripts of such discussions. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Montague Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-75-19, 1 NRC 436 (1975). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-5, 37 NRC 168, 170 (1993).

With certain exceptions, all meetings conducted by the NRC technical Staff as part of its review of a particular domestic license or permit application, including applications for amendments to a license or permit, are to be open to attendance by all parties or petitioners for leave to intervene in the case. See Enhancing Public Participation in NRC Meetings: Policy Statement, 67 Fed. Reg. 36920 (May 28, 2002). The policy has its origins in a statement of staff policy originally published as Domestic License Applications, Open Meetings and Statement of NRC Staff Policy, 43 Fed. Reg. 28058 (June 28, 1978).

In the absence of a demonstration that meetings were deliberately being scheduled with a view to limiting the ability of intervenors' representatives to attend, the imposition of hard and fast rules on scheduling and meeting location would needlessly impair the Staff's ability to obtain information. The Staff should regard the intervenors' opportunity to attend as one of the factors to be taken into account in making its decisions on the location of such meetings. Fairness demands that all parties be informed of the scheduling of such meetings at the same time. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2); Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-82-41, 16 NRC 1721, 1722-23 (1982).

#### **6.5.4.2 Staff-Applicant Correspondence**

All Staff-applicant correspondence is required to be served on all parties to a proceeding and such service must be continued through the entire judicial review process, at least with respect to those parties participating in the review and those issues which are the subject of the review. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), ALAB-184, 7 AEC 229, 237 n.9 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-179, 7 AEC 159, 183 (1974). Note that this requirement of service on all parties of documents exchanged between applicant and Staff in the review process does not arise from 10 CFR § 2.302(b) (formerly § 2.701(b)) which separately requires that all documents offered for filing in adjudications be served on all parties. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2112 (1982). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 152-53 (1993).

#### **6.5.5 Notice of Relevant Significant Developments**

##### **6.5.5.1 Duty to Inform Adjudicatory Board of Significant Developments**

The NRC Staff has an obligation to lay all relevant materials before the Board to enable it to adequately dispose of the issues before it. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-77-2, 5 NRC 13 (1977); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1091 n.18 (1983), citing Indian Point, *supra*, 5 NRC at 15. See generally Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-677, 15 NRC 1387 (1982); Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671, 680 (1975). Moreover, the Staff is obligated to make every effort promptly to report newly discovered important information or significant developments related to a proceeding to the presiding Licensing Board and the parties. The Staff's obligation to report applies to Part 2, Subpart L proceedings in which the Staff has "a continuing duty to keep the hearing file up to date", 10 CFR § 2.1203(c) (formerly § 2.1231(c)). Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-34, 32 NRC 253, 254-55 (1990).

This duty to report arises immediately upon the Staff's discovery of the information, and the Staff is not to delay in reporting until it has completed its own evaluation of the matter. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480, 491 n.11 (1976). This same obligation extends to all parties, each of whom has an affirmative duty to keep Boards advised of significant changes and developments relevant to the proceeding. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 408 (1975); Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 625-626 (1973); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1357 (1984); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-14, 23 NRC 553, 560 (1986); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 623-625 (1986). See Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-34, 32 NRC 253, 255-57 (1990). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-5, 37 NRC 168, 170 (1993).

Parties in Commission proceedings have an absolute obligation to alert adjudicatory bodies in a timely fashion of material changes in evidence regarding: (1) new information that is relevant and material to the matter being adjudicated; (2) modifications and rescissions of important evidentiary submissions; and (3) outdated or incorrect information on which the Board may rely. Similarly, internal Staff procedures must ensure that Staff counsel be fully apprised of new developments. Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-677, 15 NRC 1387, 1388, 1394 (1982), citing Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397, 406 n.26 (1976); Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 411 (1975); and Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 625 (1973); Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-752, 18 NRC 1318, 1320 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-765, 19 NRC 645, 656 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 884 n.163 (1984).

However, the Commission has discussed the conflict between the Staff's duty to disclose information to the boards and other parties, and the need to protect such information. The Commission noted that, pursuant to its Policy Statement on Investigations, Inspections, and Adjudicatory Proceedings, 49 Fed. Reg. 36,032 (Sept. 13, 1984), the NRC Staff or the Office of Investigations could provide to a board, or a board could request, for ex parte in camera presentation, information concerning an inspection or investigation when the information is material and relevant to any issue in controversy in the proceeding. The Commission held that the Appeal Board did not have the authority to request information from the Office of Investigations for use in reviewing a motion to reopen where the motion to reopen concerned previously uncontested issues and not "issues in controversy in a proceeding." Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), CLI-86-1, 23 NRC 1, 7 (1986). See Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-829, 23 NRC 55, 58 & n.1 (1986).

All parties, including the Staff, are obliged to bring any significant new information to the boards' attention. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 197 n.39 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985), citing Tennessee Valley Authority (Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), ALAB-677, 15 NRC 1387, 1394 (1982); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-750, 18 NRC 1205, 1210 n.11 (1983). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-93-3, 37 NRC 135, 152-53 n.46 (1993).

Parties and counsel must adhere to the highest standards in disclosing all relevant factual information to the Licensing Board. Material facts must be affirmatively disclosed. If counsel have any doubt whether they have a duty to disclose certain facts, they must disclose. An externality such as a threatened lawsuit does not relieve a party of its duty to disclose relevant information and its other duties to the Board. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-63, 14 NRC 1768, 1778, 1795 (1981); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-750, 18 NRC 1205, 1210 n.11 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-786, 20 NRC 1087, 1092 n.8 (1984); Commonwealth

Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-11, 21 NRC 609, 624 n.9 (1985), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, CLI-86-8, 23 NRC 241 (1986).

If a licensee or applicant has a reasonable doubt concerning the materiality of information in relation to its Board notification obligation or duties under Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2236a, the information should be disclosed for the Board to decide its true worth. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1358 (1984), citing Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 625 n.15 (1973) and Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-691, 16 NRC 897, 914 (1982), review declined, CLI-83-2, 17 NRC 69 (1983); Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-6, 21 NRC 447, 461 (1985); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-14, 23 NRC 553, 560 (1986).

Before submitting information to the Board pursuant to its notification obligations, a licensee or applicant is entitled to a reasonable period of time for internal review of the documents under consideration. However, an obvious exception exists for information that could have an immediate effect on matters currently being pursued at hearing, or that disclose possible serious safety or environmental problems requiring immediate attention. An applicant or licensee is obliged to report the latter to the NRC Staff without delay in accordance with numerous regulatory requirements. See, e.g., 10 CFR § 50.72. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-774, 19 NRC 1350, 1359 n.8 (1984).

The routine submittal of informational copies of technical materials to a Board is not sufficient to fulfill a party's obligation to notify the Board of material changes in significant matters relevant to the proceeding. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-53, 20 NRC 1531, 1539 n.23 (1984). If a Board notification is to serve its intended purpose, it must contain an exposition adequate to allow a ready appreciation of (1) the precise nature of the addressed issue and (2) the extent to which the issue might have a bearing upon the particular facility before the Board. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1114 n.59 (1983), citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-551, 9 NRC 704, 710 (1979); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-786, 20 NRC 1087, 1092 n.8 (1984).

The untimely provision of significant information is an important measure of a licensee's character, particularly if it is found to constitute a material false statement. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-738, 18 NRC 177, 198 (1983), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

An applicant's failure to notify a board of significant information may reflect a deficiency in character or competence if such failure is a deliberate breach of a clearly defined duty, a pattern of conduct to that effect, or an indication of bad faith. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-15, 23 NRC 595, 625-626 (1986).



## 6.6 Decommissioning

Prior to 1996, hearings in decommissioning proceedings were held relatively early in the process and the issues litigated related to whether the agency should approve the licensee's decommissioning plan. The hearings were held pursuant to the formal hearing requirements in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G. This is no longer the case. The only predictable staff action during decommissioning that will trigger the opportunity for a hearing will be on whether to approve the licensee's termination plan, which will be submitted at the end of the project, not at the beginning. It is contemplated that a termination plan will be much simpler than the decommissioning plan because it will not include a dismantlement plan and may be as simple as a final site survey plan. Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Reactors, 61 Fed. Reg. 39,278, 39,280 (July 19, 1996).

An opportunity for a hearing may be available earlier in the process for any activities requiring an amendment to the license, or if the staff takes enforcement action against a licensee during the decommissioning process.

There is no question that the NRC has subject matter jurisdiction over the decommissioning of licensed facilities and the public's protection against dangers to health, life or property from the operation of licensed nuclear facilities. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 365 (1994). The NRC, like other federal administrative agencies, is a statutory creature with powers controlled by legislative grants of authority. *Id.* at 361.

Outside the realm of the Commission's jurisdiction are decisions concerning a ratepayer-funded Decommissioning Trust Fund. GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210-11 (2000) (holding that the disposition of any money remaining in the Trust Fund after completion of decommissioning is beyond scope of proceeding).

Section 50.82(e) of 10 C.F.R. expressly requires that decommissioning be performed in accordance with the regulations, including the ALARA rule in 10 C.F.R. § 20.1101. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 250-51 (1996).

After decommissioning, the fact that a very small portion of a site may not be releasable does not preclude the release of the overwhelming remainder of the site. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 252 (1996).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403, a site may be suitable for restricted decommissioning even though it includes a long- as well as short-lived radioactive contaminants. Sequoyah Fuels Corporation (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning) LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386, 396-97 (1999).

### 6.6.1 Decommissioning Plan

To obtain a hearing on the adequacy of the decommissioning plan, petitioners must show some specific, tangible link between the alleged errors in the plan and the health

and safety impacts they invoke. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 258 (1996).

#### **6.6.1.1 Decommissioning Funding**

The Commission's regulations regarding decommissioning funding are intended to minimize administrative effort and provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available to carry out decommissioning in a manner that protects public health and safety. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 143 (2001), (citing Final Rule: General Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24,030 (June 27, 1988)). "The generic formulas set out in 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) fulfill the dual purpose of the rule. Consolidated Edison, Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 144 (2001).

A litigable contention asserting that a reactor decommissioning plan does not comply with the funding requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(b)(4) & (c), must show not only that one or more of a plan's cost estimate provisions are in error, "but that there is not reasonable assurance that the amount will be paid." Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Atomic Nuclear Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 9 (1996). A petitioner must establish that some reasonable ground exists for concluding that the licensee will not have sufficient funds to cover decommissioning costs for the facility. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-2, 43 NRC 61, (1996).

The Commission does not have statutory authority to determine the recipient of excess decommissioning funds. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 305 (2000).

Decommissioning trusts are reserved for decommissioning as defined in 10 C.F.R. § 50.2. Thus, offsite remediation is not an accepted expense. However, some licensees use the decommissioning trust to accumulate funds for both "decommissioning" as NRC defines it and decommissioning in the broader sense that includes interim spent fuel management, nonradioactive structure demolition, and site remediation to greenfield status. The Commission has accepted this approach as long as the NRC-defined "decommissioning" funds are clearly earmarked. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 307-308 (2000).

NRC regulations regarding decommissioning funding do not require the inclusion of costs related to nonradioactive structures or materials beyond those necessary to terminate an NRC license. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 145 (2001).

In addition, once the funds are in the decommissioning trust, withdrawals are limited by 10 C.F.R. § 50.82, so that "non-decommissioning" funds (as defined by the NRC) could be spent after the NRC-defined "decommissioning" work had been finished or committed. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick

Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 308 n.52 (2000).

NRC regulations do not require a license transfer application to provide an estimate of the actual decommissioning and site cleanup costs. Instead the Commission's decommissioning funding regulation under 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) generically establishes the amount of decommissioning funds that must be set aside. A petitioner cannot challenge the regulation in a license transfer adjudication. The NRC's decommissioning funding rule reflects a deliberate decision not to require site-specific estimates in setting decommissioning funding levels. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 308 (2000), citing Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-14 52 NRC 37, 59 (2000).

The use of site-specific estimates were expressly rejected by the Commission in its decommissioning rulemaking, although the Commission did recognize that site-specific cost estimates may be prepared for rate regulators. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 144 (2001), citing Final Rule: Financial Assurances Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,465, 50,468-69 (Sept. 22, 1998); Final Rule: General Design Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24,030 (June 27, 1988).

The argument that decommissioning technology is still in an experimental stage is considered a collateral attack on 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) establishing the amount that must be set aside, and is thus invalid. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 309 (2000), quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167 n.9 (2000) and citing Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 59 (2000).

An applicant's claimed inability to pay for decommissioning as desired by the intervenor does not mean the intervenor's alleged injuries are not redressable, so as to defeat the intervenor's standing to contest the applicant's proposed decommissioning plan. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 14-15 (2001).

A contention challenging the reasonableness of a decommissioning plan's cost estimate is not litigable if reasonable assurance of decommissioning costs is not in serious doubt and if the only available relief would be a formalistic redraft of the plan with a new estimate. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 257 (1996).

Decisions concerning a ratepayer-funded Decommissioning Trust Fund are outside the Commission's jurisdiction. GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210-11 (2000).

The standard for determining that the funds for decommissioning the plant will be forthcoming is whether there is "reasonable assurance" of adequate funding, not whether that assurance is "ironclad." Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 261-62 (1996).

Criterion 9 of 10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A, requires submission of a plan for decommissioning, including cost estimates, prior to issuance of the materials license. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 238-39 (2000).

Section 3113 of the USEC Privatization Act (42 USC 2297) requires the Department of Energy to accept depleted uranium hexafluoride for deconversion and disposal at the request of an NRC-licensed uranium enrichment facility operator, but it gives DOE exclusive authority to determine the amount of reimbursement required for disposition of that depleted uranium waste. Neither an intervener nor an applicant/licensee has the authority to challenge or direct DOE's estimates of the fees it will charge to a uranium facility that requests DOE to disposition its depleted uranium wastes. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), LBP-06-15, 63 NRC 591, 629 (2006).

## 6.7 Early Site Review Procedures

Part 2 of the Commission's regulations has been amended to provide for adjudicatory early site reviews. See 10 CFR §§ 2.101(a-1), 2.600-2.606. The early site review procedures, which differ from those set forth in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 52 and Appendix Q to 10 CFR Part 52 (formerly in 10 CFR Part 50), allow for the early issuance of a partial initial decision on site suitability matters.

Early site review regulations provide for a detailed review of site suitability matters by the Staff, an adjudicatory hearing directed toward the site suitability issues proposed by the applicant, and the issuance by a Licensing Board of an early partial decision on site suitability issues. A partial decision on site suitability is not a sufficient basis for the issuance of a construction permit or for a limited work authorization. Neither of these steps can be taken without further action, which includes the full review required by Section 102(2) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), and by 10 CFR Part 51, which implements NEPA. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-79-23, 10 NRC 220, 223 (1979).

The early partial decision on site suitability does not authorize the applicant to do anything; it does provide applicant with information of value to applicant in its decision to either abandon the site or proceed with plans for the design, construction, and operation of a specific nuclear power plant at that site. Implementation of any such plans is dependent upon further review by the Staff and approval by a Licensing Board. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Fulton Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-23, 10 NRC 220, 223 (1979).

The Commission, in its discretion, will determine whether formal or informal hearing procedures will be used to conduct a Part 52 post-construction hearing on a combined

construction permit and operating license. 10 CFR § 52.103(d), 57 Fed. Reg. 60975, 60978 (Dec. 23, 1992). See Nuclear Information Resource Service v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

### **6.7.1 Scope of Early Site Review**

The early site review is not a "major Federal action significantly affecting the human environment" such as would require a full NEPA review of the entire proposed project. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Carroll County Site), ALAB-601, 12 NRC 18, 25 (1980).

The scope of the early site review is properly limited to the issues specified in the notice of hearing subject to the limits of NEPA, Section 102(2)(c), 42 U.S.C § 4332(2)(c). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Carroll County Site), ALAB-601, 12 NRC 18, 26 (1980).

## **6.8 Endangered Species Act**

### **6.8.1 Required Findings re Endangered Species Act**

Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, Federal agencies, in consultation with the Department of Interior, are to take such action as necessary to insure that actions authorized by them do not "jeopardize the continued existence of such endangered species." Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 360 (1978). The Federal agency is to obtain input from the Department of Interior and then make its decision. A Licensing Board may not approve relevant action until Interior has been consulted. Approval by the Board which is conditioned on later approval by the Department of Interior does not fulfill the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. "To give advance approval to whatever Interior might decide is to abdicate the Commission's duty under the Act to make its own fully informed decision." ALAB-463, 7 NRC at 363-364.

A Licensing Board's finding with regard to the Endangered Species Act aspects of a construction permit application should not be restricted to a consideration of the particular points raised by contentions. Once informed that an endangered species lives in the vicinity of the proposed plant, the Licensing Board is obligated to examine all possible adverse effects upon the species which might result from construction or operation of the plant and to make findings with respect to them. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 361 (1978). In this vein, releases from the plant which will not produce significant adverse effects on endangered species clearly "will not jeopardize their continued existence." The Act does not require a finding that there will not be any adverse effects. "Insignificant effects are not proscribed by the Statute." ALAB-463, 7 NRC at 360. Likewise, if there are no significant adverse effects on an endangered species, there will be no "harm" to the species under Section 9 of the Act. ALAB-463, at 366-367, n.114.

### **6.8.2 Degree of Proof Needed re Endangered Species Act**

The finding that the proposed action will not jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered species must be established by a preponderance of the evidence rather

than by clear and convincing proof. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-463, 7 NRC 341, 360 (1978).

## **6.9 Financial Qualifications**

Section 182(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 does not impose any financial qualifications requirement on license applicants; it merely authorizes the Commission to impose such financial requirements as it may deem appropriate. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 8, 9 (1978); see also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 149 (2004). The relevant implementing regulation is 10 CFR 50.33(f) which is amplified by Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix C of 10 C.F.R. Part 50 is not designed to apply to a 10 C.F.R. Part 72 proceeding in toto, although there may be some parallels in appropriate circumstances. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-6, 51 NRC 101, 114 (2000).

The "reasonable assurance" requirement in the regulation was adopted to assure that financial conditions did not compromise the applicant's clear self-interest in safety. It contemplates actual inquiry into the applicant's financial qualifications. It is not enough that the applicant is a regulated public utility. "Reasonable assurance" means that the applicant must have a reasonable financing plan in light of relevant circumstances. However, given the history of the present rule and the relatively modest implementing requirements in Appendix C, it does not mean a demonstration of near certainty that an applicant will never be pressed for funds during the course of construction. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1,18 (1978). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-895, 28 NRC 7, 18 & n.39 (1988), citing Coalition for the Environment v. NRC, 795 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

Financial assurance findings (whether under Part 50 or Part 72) are, by their nature, predictive and "speculation of some sort is unavoidable." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-11, 58 NRC 47, 71 (2003).

Financial assurance must be viewed on a case-by-case basis. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 138 (2004).

Non-utility applicants for operating licenses are required by the NRC's financial qualifications rule to demonstrate adequate financial qualifications before operating a facility. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 129 (2001). A board is not authorized to grant exemptions from this rule or to acquiesce in arguments that would result in the rule's circumvention. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-95-10, 41 NRC 460, 473 (1995).

Safety considerations are the heart of the financial qualifications rule. The Board reasoned in this regard that insufficient funding can cause licensees to cut corners on operating or maintenance expenses. Moreover, the Commission has recognized that a license in financially straitened circumstances would be under more pressure to commit safety violations or take safety "shortcuts" than one in good financial shape. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-95-10, 41 NRC 460, 473 (1995); GPU

Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000).

The Commission found in a proceeding for an ISFSI license (where the adequacy of model service agreements for ensuring sufficient financing was at issue) that the applicant need not establish the creditworthiness of each and every potential customer prior to operations. It is enough that the applicant's customers will have the ability and contractual obligation to pay. The applicant cannot be expected to prove that all of its customers invariably will fulfill their financial commitments; there is always a risk in business that some customer may ignore its obligations and force its creditor into court. "The Commission will accept financial assurances based on plausible assumptions and forecasts, even though the possibility is not insignificant that things will turn out less favorably than expected." Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 137-38 (2004) (quoting N. Atl. Energy Serv. Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 222 (1999)).

The fundamental question in reviewing an intervenor's challenge to an ISFSI applicant's financing plan is whether it departs from governing regulations, the Commission's controlling order on financial qualifications (CLI-00-13), and sound financial sense. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-10, 61 NRC 131, 139 (2004).

Following judicial review of an earlier rule (see New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 727 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1984), on September 12, 1984, the Commission issued amendments to 10 CFR § 50.33(f) which:

- 1) reinstated financial qualifications review for electric utilities which apply for facility construction permits; and
- 2) eliminated financial qualifications review for electric utilities which apply for operating licenses, if the utility is a regulated public utility or is authorized to set its own rates.

See 49 Fed. Reg. 35747 (September 12, 1984), as corrected, 49 Fed. Reg. 36631 (Sept. 19, 1984); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-784, 20 NRC 845, 847 (1984); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-813, 22 NRC 59, 84 & n.126 (1985).

Commission regulations recognize that underfunding can affect plant safety. Under 10 CFR § 50.33(f)(2), applicants -- with the exception of electric utilities -- seeking to operate a facility must demonstrate that they possess or have reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds necessary to cover estimated operation costs for the period of the license. Behind the financial qualifications rule is a safety rationale. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43, 48 (1994).

In its statement of considerations accompanying the 1984 promulgation of the revised financial qualification review requirements, the Commission discussed the special circumstances which might justify a waiver, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335(b) (formerly § 2.758(b)), of the exemption from financial qualifications review for an electric utility operating license applicant. 49 Fed. Reg. 35747, 35751 (Sept. 12, 1984). Among the possible special circumstances for which a waiver may be appropriate are: (1) a showing that the local public utility commission will not allow the electric utility to recover the costs

of operating the facility through its rates; and (2) a showing of a nexus between the safe operation of a facility and the electric utility's financial condition. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-895, 28 NRC 7, 17, 21-22 (1988). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-10, 29 NRC 297, 302-03 (1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, ALAB-920, 30 NRC 121, 133-35 (1989). The 1984 financial qualifications rulemaking proceeding did not limit the special circumstances that could serve as grounds for waiver under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 596 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989).

Section 50.33(f), the Commission's financial qualification exemption applies only to regulated electric utilities. Gulf States Utilities Co., et al. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31 (1994), aff'd, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994).

If a licensee has a service agreement with an "electrical utility" as defined in 10 CFR § 50.33(f), in which the utility offers reasonable assurances as to the payment of the licensee's costs, then this satisfies the financial qualifications of 10 CFR § 50.33(f) for the licensing of utilization and production facilities and the financial qualifications of 10 CFR § 72 for the licensing of ISFSIs. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 50-52 (2000).

In the licensing of a proposed ISFSI facility, the use of passthrough provisions (labeling certain expenditures as costs that the applicant will pass directly to its customers) offers reasonable assurance that the construction, operating, and maintenance costs will be covered by incoming revenue. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-05-21, 62 NRC 248, 301 (2003).

Reasonable financial assurance requires an applicant to only provide estimates of construction costs, not pre-construction costs, such as design drawings of the facility. PFS, LBP-05-21, 62 NRC at 301.

The special circumstances which may justify a waiver under 10 CFR 2.335 (formerly 2.758) are present only if the petition properly pleads one or more facts, not common to a large class of applicants or facilities, that were not considered either explicitly or by necessary implication in the proceeding leading to the rule sought to be waived. The special circumstances must be such as to undercut the rationale for the rule sought to be waived. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 596-97 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-10, 29 NRC 297, 300, 301 (1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, ALAB-920, 30 NRC 121, 133 (1989). An anti-CWIP (construction work in progress) law which prohibits a public utility from recovering plant construction costs through rate increases until the plant is in commercial operation is not a special circumstance which justifies a waiver of the exemption from financial qualifications review for public utility operating license applicants. The potential delay in recovering such costs was considered by the Commission during rulemaking and was found not to undercut the rationale of the rule that ratemakers would authorize sufficient rates to assure adequate funding for safe full power operation of the plant. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-20, 30 NRC 231, 240-41 (1989).



A waiver petition under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758) should not be certified unless the petition indicates that a waiver is necessary to address, on the merits, a significant safety problem related to the rule sought to be waived. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 597 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-920, 30 NRC 121, 133-35 (1989).

In order to obtain a waiver, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758(b)), of the financial qualifications review exemption in a low-power operating license proceeding, a petitioner must establish that the electric utility has insufficient funds to cover the costs of safe low-power operation of its facility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-895, 28 NRC 7, 18-19 (1988).

Unusual and compelling circumstances are needed to warrant a waiver of the financial qualifications rule. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-37, 18 NRC 52, 57 (1983). Implicit in the "compelling circumstances" standard is the need to show the existence of at least a "significant" safety issue. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234, 239 (1989).

A waiver of the 10 CFR Part 72 financial qualifications standards is not an infringement on an intervenor's right to litigate material issues bearing on a licensing decision. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-6, 51 NRC 101, 117 (2000).

Matters involving decommissioning funding are considered under the Commission's decommissioning rule, issued on June 27, 1988, and not as a part of the financial qualifications review under 10 CFR § 50.33(f). The decommissioning rule requires an applicant to provide reasonable assurance that, at the time of termination of operations, it will have available adequate funds for the decommissioning of its facility in a safe and timely manner. 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24,037 (June 27, 1988). The Commission applied the decommissioning rule to the unusual circumstances in the Seabrook operating license proceeding, and directed the applicant to provide, before low-power operation could be authorized, reasonable assurance that adequate funding for decommissioning will be available in the event that low-power operation has occurred and a full-power license is not granted. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-7, 28 NRC 271, 272-73 (1988). In a subsequent decision, the Commission held that the decommissioning rule is directed to the safe and timely decommissioning of a reactor after a lengthy period of full-power operation, and thus is not directly applicable to the hypothetical situation addressed in CLI-88-7 -- the denial of a full-power operating license following low power operation. However, due to the unusual circumstances in the Seabrook operating license proceeding, the Commission in CLI-88-7 did apply the safety concern underlying the decommissioning rule requiring the availability of adequate funds for safe and timely decommissioning. The Commission did not require the applicants to provide a final decommissioning plan containing precise and detailed information. Given the hypothetical situation, the applicants were required to provide only reasonable estimates of decommissioning costs and a reasonable assurance of availability of funding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 584-86 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989), second motion for reconsid. denied, CLI-89-7, 29 NRC 395 (1989).

Decommissioning funding costs exclude the cost of removal and disposal of spent fuel (10 CFR § 50.75(c)n.1), but do not clearly exclude costs of interim onsite storage of spent fuel. The cost of casks to store spent fuel in an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation do not appear to be excluded. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 218 (1993).

Outside of the reactor context, it is sufficient for a license applicant to identify adequate mechanisms to demonstrate reasonable financial assurance, such as license conditions and other commitments. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23 (2000) (citing Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294 (1997)); See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 150 (2004) (stating that in cases where the applicant does not have cash in hand, the Commission has allowed the use of license conditions to ensure that the licensee does not start operations without assurance of future revenues). In CLI-04-27, the Commission noted that it had earlier approved the use of service contracts to show financial assurance in an ISFSI licensing proceeding; it further determined that, under certain circumstances, an applicant's use of "passthrough" contracts could provide the necessary assurances as well as "fixed-price" contracts. See PFS, CLI-04-27, 61 NRC at 157-58. In a license-transfer proceeding, our financial qualifications rule is satisfied if the applicant provides a cost and revenue projection for the first five years of operation that predicts sufficient revenue to cover operating costs. GPU Nuclear, Inc., (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 206-08 (2000), cited in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 176 (2000).

The financial requirements for an independent spent fuel storage installation under 10 CFR Part 72 require nonspecific financial assurances, which are not the same as the more exacting financial requirements for a reactor license under 10 CFR Part 50. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 30-31 (2000).

The NRC's regulations [at 10 CFR 72.22(e)] require the license applicant to provide "reasonable assurance" that it can cover the "estimated costs" of operating and decommissioning the facility. This regulation requires that costs be estimated. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 155 (2004). However, it does not impose a requirement that cost estimates be written into license conditions. Id. at 156.

A showing of reasonable assurance of estimating construction and operating costs for an ISFSI does not require that the applicant make the same showing of financial capability required under part 50. Rather, reasonable financial assurance for an ISFSI applicant is provided through reasonable cost estimates based on plausible assumptions and forecasts. Assumptions seriously at odds with governing realities will not be acceptable. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-05-21, 62 NRC 248, 298-99 (2003).

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f)(2), applicants for a license transfer "shall submit estimates for total annual operating costs for each of the first five years of operation of the facility." The Commission has interpreted this rule as requiring "data for the first five 12-month periods after the proposed transfer. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear

Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001). If the submissions are deemed insufficient, this alone is not grounds for rejecting the application. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001); citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 95-96 (1995), reconsid. denied, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 395 (1995). If the missing data concerning financial qualifications can easily be submitted for consideration at the adjudicatory hearing, the Presiding Officer need not reject the application. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001).

The requirement that a party provide reasonable financial assurance does not require an ironclad guarantee of future business success. The mere casting of a doubt on some aspect of proposed funding plans is not in itself sufficient to defeat a finding of reasonable assurance. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 31 (2000) (citing Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 297 (1997); North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 222 (1999)).

The adequacy of a corporate parent's supplemental commitment is not material to NRC license transfer proceedings. The NRC does not need to examine site-specific conditions in calculating the costs of decommissioning. Our decommissioning funding regulation, 10 CFR § 50.75(c), generically establishes the amount of decommissioning funds that must be set aside. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 165-166 (2000).

Sections 30.35(a) and 70.25(a) of the Commission's regulations generally require a materials license applicant to submit a decommissioning funding plan if the amount of unsealed byproduct material or unsealed special nuclear material to be licensed exceeds certain levels. However, section 30.35(c)(2) and 70.25(c)(2) provide specific exceptions to the requirements of sections 30.35(a) and 70.25(a) for any holder of a license issued on or before July 27, 1990. Such a licensee has a choice of either (1) filing a decommissioning plan on or before July 27, 1990, or (2) filing a Certification of Financial Assurance on or before that date and then filing a decommissioning funding plan in its next license renewal application. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 165 (1995).

A financial assurance plan should not be left for later resolution or a second round of hearings close to the time of operation. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-8, 51 NRC 227, 240 (2000).

In a proceeding concerning the adequacy of financial assurance for an ISFSI license, the Commission stated in dicta that in ruling on the acceptability of any given license condition, it (the Commission) does not intend to forestall the Board's ability to determine the acceptability of an alternative method of meeting NRC financial assurance requirements. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-27, 61 NRC 145, 153 n.28 (2004).

## 6.10 Generic Issues

A generic issue may be defined as one which is applicable to the industry as a whole or to all reactors or facilities or to all reactors or facilities of a certain type. Current regulations do not deal specifically with generic issues or the manner in which they are to be addressed.

### 6.10.1 Consideration of Generic Issues in Licensing Proceedings

As a general rule, a true generic issue should not be considered in individual licensing proceedings but should be handled in rulemaking. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-128, 6 AEC 399, 400, 401 (1973); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-99, 6 AEC 53, 55-56 (1973). The Commission had indicated at least that generic safety questions should be resolved in rulemaking proceedings whenever possible. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 814-815, clarified, CLI-74-43, 8 AEC 826 (1974). An appellate court has indicated that generic proceedings "are a more efficient forum in which to develop issues without needless repetition and potential for delay." Natural Resources Defense Council v. NRC, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), on remand, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 462 U.S. 87 (1983). To the same effect, see Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-380, 5 NRC 572 (1977). Nevertheless, it appears that generic issues may properly be considered in individual adjudicatory proceedings in certain circumstances.

For example, an Appeal Board has held that Licensing Boards should not accept, in individual licensing cases, any contentions which are or are about to become the subject of general rulemaking but apparently may accept so-called "generic issues" which are not (or are not about to become) the subjects of rulemaking. Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-8, 23 NRC 182, 185-86 (1986). Moreover, if an issue is already the subject of regulations, the publication of new proposed rules does not necessarily suspend the effectiveness of the existing rules. Contentions under these circumstances need not be dismissed unless the Commission has specifically directed that they be dismissed during pendency of the rulemaking procedure.

Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-1A, 15 NRC 43, 45 (1982); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-8, 23 NRC 182, 186 (1986). The basic criterion is safety and whether there is a substantial safety reason for litigating the generic issue as the rulemaking progresses. In some cases, such litigation probably should be allowed if it appears that the facility in question may be licensed to operate before the rulemaking can be completed. In such a case, litigation may be necessary as a predicate for required safety findings. In other cases, however, it may become apparent that the rulemaking will be completed well before the facility can be licensed to operate. In that kind of case there would normally be no safety justification for litigating the generic issues, and strong resource management reasons not to litigate. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-107A, 16 NRC 1791, 1809 (1982).

In an operating license proceeding, where a hearing is to be held to consider other issues, Licensing Boards are enjoined, in the absence of issues raised by a party, to determine whether the Staff's resolution of various generic safety issues applicable to the reactor in question is "at least plausible and...if proven to be of substance...adequate to justify operation." Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 311 (1979). See Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-5, 23 NRC 89, 90 (1986).

A Licensing Board must refrain from scrutinizing the substance of particular explanations in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) justifying operation of a plant prior to the resolution of an unresolved generic safety issue. The Board should only look to see whether the generic issue has been taken into account in a manner that is at least plausible and that, if proven to be of substance, would be adequate to justify operation. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-82-100, 16 NRC 1550, 1559 (1982), citing Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245 (1978).

As a matter of policy, most evidentiary hearings in NRC proceedings are conducted in the general vicinity of the site of the facility involved. In generic matters, however, when the hearing encompasses distinct, geographically separated facilities and no relationship exists between the highly technical questions to be heard and the particular features of those facilities or their sites, the governing consideration in determining the place of hearing should be the convenience of the participants in the hearing. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-566, 10 NRC 527, 530-31 (1979).

A Licensing Board does not have to apply the same degree of scrutiny to uncontested generic unresolved safety issues as is applied to issues subject to the adversarial process. A Licensing Board is required to examine the Staff's presentation in the SER on such uncontested issues to determine whether a basis is provided to permit operation of the facility pending resolution of those issues. A Licensing Board need not make formal findings of fact on these matters as if they were contested issues, but it is required to determine that the relevant generic unresolved safety issues do not raise a "serious safety, environmental, or common defense and security matter" such as to require exercise of the Board's authority under 10 CFR § 2.340 (formerly § 2.760a) to raise and decide such issues *sua sponte*. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 465 (1983), citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1110-13 (1983).

## **6.10.2 Effect of Unresolved Generic Issues**

### **6.10.2.1 Effect of Unresolved Generic Issues in Construction Permit Proceedings**

The existence of an unresolved generic safety question does not necessarily require withholding of construction permits since the Commission has available to it the provisions of 10 CFR § 50.109 for backfitting and the procedures of 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart B for imposing new requirements or conditions. Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404 (1975).

While unresolved generic issues might not preclude issuance of a construction permit, those generic issues applicable to the facility in question must be considered and information must be presented on whether (1) the problem has already been resolved for the reactor under study, (2) there is a reasonable basis for concluding that a satisfactory solution will be obtained before the reactor is put into operation, or (3) the problem will have no safety implications until after several years of reactor operation, and if there is no resolution by then, alternate means will be available to assure that continued operation, if permitted, will not pose an undue risk. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760, 775 (1977). See also Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-8219, 15 NRC 601, 614 (1982).

#### **6.10.2.2 Effect of Unresolved Generic Issues in Operating License Proceedings**

An unresolved safety issue cannot be disregarded in individual licensing proceedings merely because the issue also has generic applicability; rather, for an applicant to succeed, there must be some explanation why construction or operation can proceed although an overall solution has not been found.

Where issuance of an operating license is involved, the justification for allowing operation may be more difficult to come by than would be the case where a construction permit is involved. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 248 (1978).

Explanations of why an operating license should be issued despite the existence of unresolved generic safety issues should appear in the Safety Evaluation Report. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-491, 8 NRC 245, 249 (1978).

Where generic unresolved safety issues are involved in an operating license proceeding, for an application to succeed there must be some explanation why the operation can proceed even though an overall solution has not been found. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 472 (1983), aff'd, ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1135 n.187 (1984). A plant will be allowed to operate pending resolution of the unresolved issues when there is reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 472 (1983), aff'd, ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1135 n.187 (1984).

### **6.11 Power Reactor License Renewal Proceeding**

The NRC will conduct a formal hearing, if requested, on an application to renew a nuclear power reactor operating license. 10 CFR § 54.27, 56 Fed. Reg. 64943, 64960-61 (Dec. 13, 1991). However, a formal "on-the-record" hearing in accordance with the APA is not required for reactor license renewal proceedings under section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act. See Baltimore Gas and Electric Co., (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-98-25, 48 NRC 325, 342 (1998). The hearing will be limited to consideration of issues concerning (1) age-related degradation unique to license renewal and (2) compliance with National Environmental Policy Act requirements. 10 CFR § 54.29(a),(b). The Commission may, at its discretion, admit an issue for resolution in the

formal renewal hearing if the intervenor can demonstrate that the issue raises a concern relating to adequate protection which would occur only during the renewal period. 10 CFR § 54.29(c), 2.335 (formerly 2.758(b)(2)).

The “proximity presumption” used in reactor construction and operating license proceedings should also apply to reactor license renewal proceedings. For construction permit and operating license proceedings, the NRC recognizes a presumption that persons who live, work or otherwise have contact within the area around the reactor have standing to intervene if they live within close proximity of the facility (e.g. 50 miles). Reactor license extension cases should be treated similarly because they allow operation of a reactor over an additional period of time during which the reactor can be subject to some of the same equipment failure and personnel error as during operations over the original period of the license. Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, & 3), LBP-98-33, 48 NRC 381, 385 n.1 (1998).

The Commission’s license renewal environmental regulations are based on NUREG-1437, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants” (May 1996). License renewal regulations only require the agency to prepare a supplement to the GEIS for each license renewal action. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152-53 (2001).

For issues listed in Subpart A, Appendix B of 10 CFR Part 51 as Category 1 issues, the Commission resolved the issues generically for all plants and those issues are not subject to further evaluation in any license renewal proceeding. See 61 Fed. Reg. 28, 467 (1996). Consequently, the Commission’s license renewal regulations also limit the information that the Applicant need include in its environmental report, see 10 CFR 51.71(d), and the matters the agency need consider in draft and final supplemental environmental impact statements to the GEIS. See Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 11 (2001); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 154 (2001).

Even when a GEIS has resolved a Category 1 issue generically, the applicant must still provide additional analysis in its Environmental Report if new significant information may bear on the applicability of the Category 1 finding at the particular plant. The Commission has identified three methods by which petitioners can petition the NRC to address significant new information that has arisen since the GEIS on Category 1 issues was finalized: (1) petitioners may seek a waiver to a rule if they possess information that may show that a generic rule would not serve its purpose at the specific plant; (2) petitioners may petition the NRC to initiate a new rulemaking process; or (3) petitioners may use the SEIS notice and comment process to request that the NRC forgo use of the suspect generic finding and suspend license renewal proceedings, pending a new rulemaking or update of the GEIS. However, the Commission treats all spent fuel accidents as generic, whatever their cause. There is to be no litigation of spent fuel accidents. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 294-95 (2006).

10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A, Appendix B, Category 2 issues are site specific and must be addressed by the applicant in its environmental report and by the NRC in its draft and final supplemental environmental impact statements for the facility. Florida Power & Light Co.

(Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 153 (2001); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-01-17), 54 NRC 3, 11 (2001).

The scope of the draft and final supplemental environmental impact statement is limited to the matters that 10 CFR 51.33(c) requires the applicant to provide in its environmental report. These requirements do not include severe accident risks, but only "severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA)." 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L). The Commission, therefore, has left consideration of SAMAs as the only Category 2 issue with respect to severe accidents. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 160-161 (2001).

Probabilistic risk assessments are not required for the renewal of an operating license. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 159-160 (2001).

The purpose of a SAMA review is to ensure that any plant changes that have a potential for significantly improving severe accident safety performance are identified and addressed. SAMAs are rooted in a cost-benefit assessment. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-17, 56 NRC 1, 5 (2002), rev'g in part & aff'g in part LBP-02-04, 55 NRC 49 (2002); clarified, CLI-02-28, 56 NRC 373 (2002). Any number of possible SAMAs may be theoretically conceivable, but many will prove far too costly compared to the reduction in risk that they might provide. CLI-02-17, 56 NRC at 12.

The impacts associated with spent fuel and high-level waste disposal, low-level waste disposal, mixed waste storage, and onsite spent fuel storage are all Category 1 issues that are not subject to further evaluation in a license renewal proceeding. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 161 (2001).

The Commission has endorsed the distinction drawn by a Licensing Board between the need to propose a SAMA and the more substantive question of risk associated with severe accidents. It has also stated unequivocally that SAMAs apply to reactor accidents, not to spent fuel accidents. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 291, 293 (2006).

Offsite radiological impacts are classified as a Category 1 issue in 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix B and, therefore, are excluded from consideration in this renewal proceeding. See Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 162 (2001).

Although 10 CFR 51, Subpart A, Appendix B Category 2 issues may be considered during the license renewal process, all the Category 2 groundwater conflict issues deal with the issue of withdrawal of groundwater by the Applicant when there are competing groundwater uses. See Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 164 (2001).

Issues involving the current licensing basis for the facility are not within the scope of review of license renewal. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating



Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 165 (2001); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 8-9 (2001); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 276 (2006). Contentions related to terrorism, lack of a valid National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, and emergency planning are not aging-related issues and, therefore, are outside the scope of license renewal hearings. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631, 638-40 (2004).

For the Commission to grant an exemption or waiver of 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1), and thereby permit adjudication of emergency-planning issues in a license renewal proceeding, under its regulations (10 CFR 2.335(b)) and case law it must first conclude that: (i) the rule's strict application would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted; (ii) the movant has alleged special circumstances that were not considered (either explicitly or by implication) in the rulemaking proceeding leading to the rule sought to be waived, (iii) those circumstances are unique to the facility rather than common to a large class of facilities, and (iv) a waiver of the regulation is necessary to reach a significant safety problem. Further, all four factors must be met in order for a waiver request to be granted. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-05-24, 62 NRC 551, 559-60 (2005).

With respect to technical issues, the renewal regulations, 10 CFR Part 54, are footed on the principle that, with the exception of the detrimental affects of aging and a few other issues related to safety only during the period of extended operations, the agency's existing regulatory processes are sufficient to ensure that the licensing bases of operating plants provide an acceptable level of safety to protect the public health and safety. 60 Fed. Reg. 22,464; Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 7-8 (2001); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152 (2001).

A petitioner in a license renewal proceeding must explain how an issue falls within the framework of license renewal, which "focuses on 'the potential impacts of an additional 20 years of nuclear power plant operation,' not on everyday operational issues." Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-06-4, 63 NRC 32, 37 (2006) (quoting Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631, 637-38 (2004); Fla. Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 7 (2001)).

The scope of a safety review for license renewal is limited to (1) managing the effects of aging of certain systems, structures, and components; (2) review of time-limited aging evaluations; and (3) any matters for which the Commission itself has waived the application of these rules. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152 (2001). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 276, 277 (2006).

The scope of Commission review determines the scope of admissible contentions in a renewal hearing absent a Commission finding under 10 CFR 2.335 (formerly 2.758). 60 Fed. Reg. 22,461, 22,482 n.2; Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152 (2001).

Under 10 C.F.R. §§ 54.21(a) and (c), and 54.4, the scope of a proceeding on an operating license renewal is limited to a review of the plant structures and components that will require an aging management review for the period of extended operation and the plant's systems, structures, and components that are subject to an evaluation of time-limited aging analyses. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3 & 4), CLI-00-23, 52 NRC 327, 329 (2000). Amergen Energy Company, LLC (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-06-22, 64 NRC 229, 235 (2006).

The Commission determined that it would be unnecessary and wasteful to require a full reassessment of issues that were thoroughly reviewed when the facility was first licensed and which are routinely monitored and assessed by agency oversight and mandated licensee programs. License renewal review focuses on "those potential detrimental effects of aging that are not routinely addressed by ongoing regulatory oversight programs." Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 7 (2001); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 275-76 (2006).

The aging of materials is important during the period of extended operation, since certain components may have been designed upon an assumed service life of forty years. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 7 (2001). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 276 (2006). Part 54 requires license renewal applicants to demonstrate how they will manage the effects of aging during period of extended operation. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 8 (2001). Applicants must demonstrate how their programs will manage the effects of aging in a detailed manner with respect to specific components and structures, rather than at a more generalized system level. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 275 (2006). Before the NRC will grant a license renewal application, the applicant must reassess safety reviews or analyses made during the original license period that were based upon a presumed service life not exceeding the original license term. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 8 (2001). The reassessment must "(1) show that the earlier analysis will remain valid for the extended operation period; (2) modify and extend the analysis to apply to a longer term such as 60 years; or (3) otherwise demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed in the renewal term." Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), CLI-01-17, 54 NRC 3, 8 (2001)(citations omitted).

Review of environmental issues in a licensing renewal proceeding is limited in accordance with 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.71(d) and 51.95(c). Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3 & 4), CLI-00-23, 52 NRC 327, 329 (2000).

Apart from its policy of encouraging settlements, the Commission has an equally important policy of supporting prompt decisionmaking. This promptness policy carries extra weight in license renewal proceedings. Further, until a licensing board has addressed the threshold issues of standing and admissibility of contentions, the proceeding is too inchoate to call for aggressive board encouragement of settlement. Millstone, CLI-05-24, 62 NRC at 568-70.

## **6.12 Masters in NRC Proceedings**

For a discussion of the role of a "master" in NRC proceedings, see Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 759 (1975) and Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-290, 2 NRC 401 (1975). In ALAB-300, the Appeal Board ruled that parties to an NRC proceeding may voluntarily agree among themselves to have a master of their own choosing make certain discovery rulings by which they will abide. In effect, the master's rulings were like stipulations among the parties. The question as to whether the Licensing and Appeal Boards retained jurisdiction to review the master's discovery rulings was not raised in this case. Consequently, the Appeal Board did not reach a decision as to that issue. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-300, 2 NRC 752, 768 (1975).

10 CFR Part 2 provides for the use of special assistants to Licensing Boards. Specifically, special assistants may be appointed to take evidence and prepare a record. With the consent of all parties, the special assistant may take evidence, and prepare a report that becomes a part of the record, subject to appeal to the Licensing Board. 10 CFR § 2.322 (formerly § 2.722).

It is within the discretion of the Special Master to hold information confidential if to do so would increase the likelihood of a fair and impartial hearing. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-50, 14 NRC 888, 894 (1981).

A Special Master's conclusions are considered as informed advice to the Licensing Board; however, the Board must independently arrive at its own factual conclusions. Where judgment is material to a particular conclusion, the Board must rely on its own collegial consensus. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 289 (1982). Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.322(a)(3), the regulations under which a Special Master may be appointed in NRC proceedings specify that Special Masters' reports are advisory only. The Board alone is authorized by statute, regulation and the notice of hearing to render the initial decision in proceedings. The decision must be rendered upon the Board's own understanding of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence of the record. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 288 (1982).

Where the Special Master's conclusions are materially affected by a witness' demeanor, the Licensing Board must give especially careful consideration to whether or not other more objective witness credibility standards are consistent with the Special Master's conclusions. However, the Licensing Board may afford weight to the Special Master's reported direct observations of a witness' demeanor. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-56, 16 NRC 281, 289 (1982)

## **6.13 [Reserved]**

## **6.14 Materials Licenses**

Notwithstanding the absence of a hearing on an application for a materials license, the Commission's regulations require the Staff to make a number of findings concerning the applicant and its ability to protect the public health and safety before the issuance of a materials license. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 48 (1984). See 10 CFR §§ 70.23, 70.31. Cf. South Carolina

Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895-96 (1981) (analogous to the regulatory scheme for the issuance of operating licenses under 10 CFR § 50.57), aff'd sub nom. Fairfield United Action v. NRC, 679 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

The production, processing and sale of uranium and uranium ore are controlled by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. Homestake Mining Co. v. Mid-Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787, 791 (10th Cir. 1960). Natural uranium and ores bearing it in sufficient concentration constitute "source material" and, when enriched for fabrication into nuclear fuel, become "special nuclear material" within the meaning of the Act. (42 U.S.C. § 2014(z) and (aa), 2071, 2091.) Both are expressly subject to Commission regulation (42 U.S.C. § 2073, 2093). 10 CFR Parts 40 and 70 specifically provide for the domestic licensing of source and special nuclear material respectively.

In the special case of uranium enrichment facilities, section 193 of the AEA "prescribes a one-step process, including a single adjudicatory hearing, that considers both construction and operation." Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-7, 55 NRC 205, 215-216 (2002); see 10 C.F.R. §§ 70.23a, 70.31(e).

The AEA is silent concerning any particular hearing or review requirements for the construction and operation of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facilities. Thus, the Commission is free to establish a process to consider construction and operation of MOX facilities. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-7, 55 NRC 205, 214-215 (2002). The key regulations governing a plutonium processing and fuel fabrication facility, 10 C.F.R. §§ 70.23(a)(7), 70.23(a)(8), and 70.23(b), contemplate two approvals, construction and operation. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-7, 55 NRC 205, 216 (2002). In the construction authorization phase, the NRC is examining issues related only to construction and the review is aimed at the findings required by 10 C.F.R. § 70.23(b) for construction approval. Duke Cogema Stone & Webster (Savannah River Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility), CLI-02-7, 55 NRC 205, 217 (2002).

A Part 40 license applicant need not provide as part of the application process the names of the individuals who will fill positions within its organization in order to demonstrate the technical qualifications of the applicant's personnel. A commitment to hire qualified personnel prior to operations suffices. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-00-12, 52 NRC 1, 4 (2000).

In this regard, the NRC has granted a general license to acquire title to nuclear fuel without first obtaining a specific license. A general license is a license under the Atomic Energy Act that is granted by rule and may be used by anyone who meets the term of the rule, "without the filing of applications with the Commission or the issuance of licensing documents to particular persons." 10 CFR § 70.18. NRC rules establish many general licenses, including a general license for NRC licenses to transport licensed nuclear material in NRC-approved containers. 10 CFR § 71.12. State of New Jersey, CLI-93-25, 38 NRC 289, 293-94 (1993).

"The fundamental purpose of the financial qualifications provision of...section [182a of the AEA] is the protection of public health and safety and the common defense and security."

33 Fed. Reg. 9704 (July 4, 1968). Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294, 303 (1997). The shorter, more flexible language of Part 70, as compared to Part 50, allows a less rigid, more individualized approach to determine whether an applicant has demonstrated that it is financially qualified to construct and operate an NRC-licensed facility. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294, 298 (1997).

Thus, persons may obtain title and own uranium fuel and are free to contract to receive title to such fuel without an NRC license or specific NRC regulatory control. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-507, 8 NRC 551, 554-55 (1978). It is only when a person seeks to reduce its contractual ownership to actual possession that regulatory requirements on possession and use must be met and a specific materials license must be obtained. Sterling, supra, ALAB-507, 8 NRC at 555.

There would be no point to the NRC's general licensing scheme if a licensee's mere use of a general license triggered individual licensing proceedings. State of New Jersey, CLI-93-25, 38 NRC 289, 294 (1993).

#### **6.14.1 Written Presentations in Materials Proceedings**

After the Hearing File is made available, Intervenor may file a written presentation and may also present in writing, under oath or affirmation, arguments, evidence and documentary data further explaining their concerns. They must describe any defect or omissions in the application; however, the applicant or licensee seeking the license from the NRC, has the burden of proof with respect to the controversies placed into issue by the Intervenor. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (Pennsylvania Nuclear Services Operations, Parks Township, PA), LBP-95-1, 41 NRC 1, 3 (1995).

Section 2.1208 (formerly 2.1233) of Subpart L provides for written presentations. It does not by its terms restrict the Intervenor's written presentation to stating concerns falling within the area of concerns raised in the initial request. However, the overall scheme of Subpart L clearly anticipates that specific concerns set out in the written presentation must fall within the scope of the areas of concerns advanced by a petitioner in the request for hearing and accepted as issues in the hearing by the presiding officer. Babcock and Wilcox Co. (Pennsylvania Nuclear Services Operations, Parks Township, PA), LBP-95-1, 41 NRC 1, 5 (1995).

Section 2.1208 (formerly 2.1233(a)) accords the Presiding Officer the discretion both to determine the sequence in which the parties present their arguments, documentary data, informational materials, and other supporting written evidence, and to offer individual parties the opportunity to provide further data, material and evidence in response to the Presiding Officer's questions. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 117 (1995). Section 7(c) and the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to informal hearings conducted pursuant to Subpart L.

The Commission's regulations and practice do not preclude an applicant from submitting post-application affidavits into the record of a materials licensing proceeding. Such affidavits fall within the types of documents that the Presiding Officer has the discretion to allow into the record pursuant to section 2.1208 (formerly 2.1233(d)). The Commission practice of permitting the licensee to file such supplemental supporting evidence in a Subpart G proceeding applies equally well to a

Subpart L proceeding. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 114 (1995). Affidavits submitted during a hearing are explanatory material offered to aid in the understanding of the underlying applications; they do not constitute amendments to the applications. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 114, n. 48 (1995).

The Presiding Officer in a Subpart L proceeding has broad discretion to determine the point at which the intervenors have been accorded sufficient opportunity to respond to all issues of importance raised by the licensee. If the Presiding Officer needs information to compile an adequate record, he may obtain it by posing questions pursuant to section 2.1208. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 116-17 (1995). The Commission's intent in promulgating Subpart L was to decrease the cost and delay for the parties and the Commission and to empower presiding officers to manage and control the parties' written submissions. CLI-95-1, 41 NRC at 117, n. 54.

#### **6.14.2 Stays of Material Licensing Proceedings**

A motion for a stay in a materials licensing proceeding must comply with the requirements of 10 CFR § 2.1213 (formerly § 2.1263) which incorporate the four stay criteria of 10 CFR 2.342 (formerly 2.788); the movant has the burden of persuasion on the criteria. Umetco Minerals Corp., LBP-92-20, 36 NRC 112, 115-116 (1992). See § 5.7.1.

Although a hearing petition regarding a materials license amendment request generally can be filed as soon as an amendment application is submitted to the agency, a request for a stay the amendment proceeding is not appropriate until the Staff has taken action to grant the amendment request and to make the approved licensing action effective. See 10 CFR § 2.1213 (formerly § 2.1263); Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-35, 36 NRC 355, 359 (1992), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461, 468 (1991).

A license may be granted containing a condition, such as a requirement for subsequent testing, before material may be imported under the license. The condition does not create a fresh opportunity for filing a request for a stay. Timeliness depends on when the amendment was issued, and not on the fulfillment of subsequent conditions. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Receipt of Material from Tonawanda, NY), LBP-98-19, 48 NRC 83, 84-85 (1998).

In accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.1213 (formerly § 2.1263), consideration of stay applications are governed by 10 C.F.R. § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). Those criteria are derived from the decision in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

The Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria for granting a stay have been incorporated into the regulations at 10 CFR § 2.342(e) (formerly § 2.788(e)). Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 130 (1982); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 100 (1994) (the Commission will decline a grant of petitioner's request to halt decommissioning activities where petitioner failed to meet the four traditional criteria for

injunctive relief); Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-98-5, 47 NRC 119, 120 (1998). Since that section merely codifies longstanding agency practice which parallels that of the courts, Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 170 (1978), prior agency case law delineating the application of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers criteria presumably remains applicable.

Under the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test, four factors are examined:

- (1) has the movant made a strong showing that it is likely to prevail upon the merits of its appeal;
- (2) has the movant shown that, without the requested relief, it will be irreparably injured;
- (3) would the issuance of a stay substantially harm other parties interested in the proceeding;
- (4) where does the public interest lie?

While no one criterion is dispositive. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-9, 55 NRC 227, 232 (2002), see Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985); Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255 (1992). The Commission has stated that the most important of these criterion is whether there is irreparable harm. International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-9, 55 NRC 227, 232 (2002), see also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 258 (1990).

A presiding officer's determination to permit a hearing petition concerning a licensing action to be supplemented does not automatically extend the time for filing a stay request regarding that action. A litigant that wishes to extend the time for making a filing must do so by making an explicit request. See 10 CFR § 2.307 (formerly § 2.711). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 262 (1992). [See also section 2.9.3.8.1.]

The standard for obtaining a stay, which is set forth in 10 CFR § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788) and is incorporated into the Subpart L Rules of Practice section by § 2.1213 (formerly § 2.1263), specifies that the movants must demonstrate (1) a strong showing that they are likely to prevail on the merits; (2) that unless a stay is granted they will be irreparably injured; (3) that the granting of the stay will not harm other parties; and (4) where the public interest lies. Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 262-253 (1992).

In addressing the stay criteria in a Subpart L proceeding, a litigant must come forth with more than general or conclusory assertions in order to demonstrate its entitlement to relief. Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 263 (1992), citing United States Department of Energy (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-721, 17 NRC 539, 544 (1983).

#### **6.14.3 Scope of Materials Proceedings/Authority of Presiding Officer**

A nonadjudicatory request for relief under 10 CFR § 2.206 generally is not a matter within the province of a presiding officer. Babcock and Wilcox (Apollo, Pennsylvania Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-35, 36 NRC. 355, 359, n. 11 (1992).

There is no reason to believe that the granting of a Special Nuclear Material (SNM) license should be deferred until after the applicant shows its compliance with local laws. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-38, 18 NRC 61, 65 (1983).

The presiding officer may certify questions to the Commission pursuant to the authority of 10 C.F.R. § 2.319 (formerly 2.1209(d)). Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma Site), LBP-03-7, 57 NRC 287, 291 (2003), certified questions accepted, CLI-03-6, 57 NRC 547 (2003).

#### **6.14.4 Amendments to Material Licenses**

An amendment to a Part 70 application gives rise to the same rights and duties as the original application. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 48 (1984). The Commission does not require that proposed safety procedures to protect health and minimize danger to life or property be included in a materials license amendment application if they have already been submitted to the Commission in previous applications associated with the same NRC license. Sections 70.21(a)(3) and 30.32(a) of the Commission's regulations expressly permit an applicant to incorporate by reference any information contained in previous applications, statements or reports filed with the Commission. Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 99 (1995).

A separate environmental impact statement is not required for a Special Nuclear Material (SNM) license to receive fuel at a new facility. When an environmental impact statement has been done for an operating license application, including the delivery of fuel, there is no need for each component to be analyzed separately on the assumption that a plant may never be licensed to operate. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-38, 18 NRC 61, 65 (1983). Although the Commission's regulations do not require the licensee to submit emergency procedures as part of an amendment application, the Commission is free to consider a licensee's general emergency procedures when resolving risk issues. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 398 (1995).

#### **6.14.5 Materials License - Renewal**

Pursuant to the former 10 CFR § 40.42(e), a source material license may remain automatically in effect beyond its expiration date to allow a licensee to continue decommissioning and security activities authorized under the license. Section 40.42(e) has been superseded by a new automatic license extension provision, 10 CFR § 40.42(c) which became effective August 1994. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, site), CLI-95-2, 41 NRC 179, 183, n.10, 187 (1995).

The automatic license extension provision under 10 CFR § 40.42(c) may extend a license regardless of the nature of the source material remaining on site. The "necessary" provision (which appears in both the former section 40.42(e) and the new section 40.42(c)) simply means that the limited regulatory license extension comes into play only when decommissioning cannot be completed prior to the license's expiration date. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, site), CLI-95-2, 41 NRC 179, 187-88 (1995).



The automatic license extension provision grants the licensee no sweeping powers, but permits only limited activities related to decommissioning and to control of entry to restricted areas. Such activities also must have been approved under the licensee's license. To implement an activity not previously authorized by its license, and thus not previously subject to challenge, the licensee must first obtain a license amendment. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, site), CLI-95-2, 41 NRC 179, 191 (1995).

Licensees need only submit the final radiological survey showing that the site or area is suitable for release in accordance with NRC regulations after decommissioning has been completed. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, Oklahoma site), CLI-95-2, 41 NRC 179, 189 (1995).

#### **6.14.6 Termination of Material License**

A materials licensee may not unilaterally terminate its license where continuing health and safety concerns remain. A license to receive, process, and transport radioactive waste to authorized land burial sites imposes a continuing obligation on the licensee to monitor and maintain the burial sites. The requirement of State ownership of land burial sites is intended to provide for the ultimate, long term maintenance of the sites, not to shift the licensee's continuing responsibility for the waste material to the States. U.S. Ecology, Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), LBP-87-5, 25 NRC 98, 110-11 (1987), vacated, ALAB-866, 25 NRC 897 (1987).

#### **6.15 Motions in NRC Proceedings**

Provisions with regard to motions in general in NRC proceedings are set forth in 10 CFR § 2.323 (formerly § 2.730). Motion practice before the Commission involves only a motion and an answer; movants who do not seek leave to file a reply are expressly denied the right to do so. 10 CFR § 2.323 (formerly § 2.730(c)). Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-469, 7 NRC 470, 471 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-18, 14 NRC 71 (1981).

A moving party has no right of reply to answers in NRC proceedings except as permitted by the presiding officer. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-72, 16 NRC 968, 971 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 2.323 (formerly § 2.730); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461, 469 (1991). Further, parties who do not seek leave to file a reply are expressly denied the opportunity to do so. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. LBP-94-39, 40 NRC 314 (1994).

Commission Rules of Practice make no provision for motions for orders of dismissal for failing to state a legal claim. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do in Rule 12(b)(6), and Licensing Boards occasionally look to federal cases interpreting that rule for guidance. In the consideration of such dismissal motions, which are not generally viewed favorably by the courts, all factual allegations of the complaint are to be considered true and to be read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-17, 39 NRC 359, 365 (1994).

Although the Rules of Practice do not explicitly provide for the filing of either objections to contentions or motions to dismiss them, each presiding board must fashion a fair procedure for dealing with such objections to petitions as are filed. The cardinal rule of

fairness is that each side must be heard. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521, 524 (1979).

Prior to entertaining any suggestions that a contention not be admitted, the proponent of the contention must be given some chance to be heard in response, because they cannot be required to have anticipated in the contentions themselves the possible arguments their opponents might raise as grounds for dismissing them. Contentions and challenges to contentions in NRC licensing proceedings are analogous to complaints and motions to dismiss in Federal court. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-565, 10 NRC 521, 525 (1979).

A motion for “clarification” filed nearly 3 weeks after the Staff order at issue had been revised (and 9 weeks after the initial Staff order was issued) was found to be inexcusably late, as Commission rules (10 C.F.R. § 2.323(a)) require motions to be filed no more than 10 days after “the occurrence or circumstance from which the motion arises” and petitioners showed no good cause for their delayed filing. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Power Station, Unit 1; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-06-2, 63 NRC 9, 18 n.36 (2006).

### **6.15.1 Form of Motion**

The requirements with regard to the form and content of motions are set forth in 10 CFR § 2.323(b) (formerly § 2.730(b)).

The Appeal Board expects the caption of every filing in which immediate affirmative relief is requested to reference that fact explicitly by adverting to the relief sought and including the word "motion." The movant will not be heard to assert that it has been prejudiced by the Board's failure to take timely action on the motion in the absence of such a reference. Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-457, 7 NRC 70, 71 (1978).

#### **6.15.1.1 Consultation Requirement (2.323(b))**

In dicta, one Board has stated that compliance with the 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b) requirement that a movant make a “sincere effort to contact other parties in the proceeding and to resolve the issues raised in the motion” can only be determined from the objective reasonableness of the movant’s efforts, as shown by all the facts and circumstances, not by his or her subjective intent. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 129 (2006).

Although it determined that a ruling on compliance with the 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b) “attempt at resolution” requirement was not necessary to its decision, a Board noted that where a movant had 10 months to prepare a summary disposition motion, a consultation call to the opposing party on the last day the motion could be filed (in effect asking only if the intervenor wanted to agree to drop its contention) indicated a lack of a sincere effort to resolve the issues as required by § 2.323(b). Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 129-131 (2006).

Although it determined that a ruling on compliance with the 10 C.F.R. § 2.323(b) “attempt at resolution” requirement was not necessary to its decision, a Board noted that even if a party moving for summary disposition believes that consultation with an opposing party about such a motion might prove futile, the regulation requires some reasonable effort. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-5, 63 NRC 116, 130-31 (2006).

## **6.15.2 Responses to Motions**

### **6.15.2.1 Time for Filing Responses to Motions**

Unless specific time limits for responses to motions are expressly set out in specific regulations or are established by the presiding adjudicatory board, the time within which responses to motions must be filed is set forth in 10 CFR § 2.323 (formerly § 2.730).

If a document requiring a response within a certain time after service is served incompletely (e.g., only part of the document is mailed), 10 CFR § 2.305 (formerly § 2.712) would indicate that the time for response does not begin to run since implicit in that rule is that documents mailed are complete, otherwise service is not effective. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-235, 8 AEC 645, 649 n.7 (1974) (dictum).

### **6.15.3 Licensing Board Actions on Motions**

Although an intervenor may have failed, without good cause, to timely respond to an applicant's motion to terminate the proceeding, a Board may grant the intervenor an opportunity to respond to the applicant's supplement to the motion to terminate. Public Service Co. of Indiana and Wabash Valley Power Ass'n (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-16, 23 NRC 789, 790 (1986).

If a Licensing Board decides to defer indefinitely a ruling on a motion of some importance, "considerations of simple fairness require that all parties be told of that fact." Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-417, 5 NRC 1442, 1444 (1977).

When an applicant for an operating license files a motion for authority to conduct low-power testing in a proceeding where the evidentiary record is closed but the Licensing Board has not yet issued an initial decision finally disposing of all contested issues, the Board is obligated to issue a decision on all outstanding issues (i.e., contentions previously litigated) relevant to low-power testing before authorizing such testing. See 10 CFR § 50.57(c). Such a motion, however, does not automatically present an opportunity to file new contentions specifically aimed at low-power testing or any other phase of the operating license application. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 801 n.72 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-34, 24 NRC 549, 553 (1986), aff'd, ALAB-854, 24 NRC 783 (1986).

## 6.16 NEPA Considerations

NEPA expanded the Commission's regulatory jurisdiction beyond that conferred by the Atomic Energy Act or the Energy Reorganization Act. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-247, 8 AEC 936 (1974). NEPA requires the Commission to consider environmental factors in granting, denying or conditioning a construction permit. It does not give the Commission the power to order an applicant to construct a plant at an alternate site or to order a different utility to construct a facility. Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission is not empowered to implement alternatives does not absolve it from its duty to consider them. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977).

By its terms, NEPA imposes procedural rather than substantive constraints upon an agency's decisionmaking process: The statute requires only that an agency undertake an appropriate assessment of the environmental impacts of its action without mandating that the agency reach any particular result concerning that action. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-93-4, 37 NRC 72, 93 (1993); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-96-25, 44 NRC 331, 341-42 (1996); Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 44 (2001); Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 447 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004).

NEPA imposes a procedural requirement on an agency's decisionmaking process by mandating that an agency consider the environmental impacts of a proposed action and inform the public that it has taken those impacts into account in making its decision. In other words, an agency must take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of a proposed action before taking that action. Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., LBP-05-8, 61 NRC 202, 207 (2005) (citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) and quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983)).

NEPA's requirement that federal agencies prepare an EIS serves an action-forcing function in two ways. First, it ensures that the agency will have available and will consider detailed environmental impact information. Second, it guarantees that the relevant environmental information will be available to the wider audience that may play a role in the decision-making and in the implementation of the decision reached. Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 277 (2006).

NEPA requirements apply to license amendment proceedings as well as to construction permit and operating license proceedings. In license amendment proceedings, however, a Licensing Board should not embark broadly upon a fresh assessment of the environmental issues which have already been thoroughly considered and which were decided in the initial decision. Rather, the Board's role in the environmental sphere will be limited to assuring itself that the ultimate NEPA conclusions reached in the initial decision are not significantly affected by such new developments. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 393 (1978), citing Georgia Power Co. (Alvin W. Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-291, 2 NRC 404, 415 (1975).

NEPA does not mandate that environmental issues considered in-the construction permit proceedings be considered again in the operating license hearing, absent new information. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1459 (1982). With regard to license amendments, it has been held that the grant of a license amendment to increase the storage capacity of a spent fuel pool is not a major Commission action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, and therefore, no EIS is required. Public Service Electric & Gas Company (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-80-27, 12 NRC 435, 456 (1980); Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 264-268 (1979).

Under NEPA, when several proposals for actions that will have a cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386 (1999). Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386 (1999). 6 at 57, citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976). The term "synergistic" refers to the joint action of different parts - or sites - which, acting together, enhance the effects of one or more individual sites. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), LBP-99-46, 50 NRC 386 (1999).

After examining an agency action to determine its impact on the environment, the Council on Environmental Quality's regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500 et seq, suggest several basic options if it determines that a project will have potential adverse environmental consequences. Disapproval of a project may be warranted where the adverse impacts are too severe. However, an agency may decide that aspects of the project may be modified in order to reduce the adverse impacts to an acceptable level. An agency could then proceed to license the project, after a determination that the overall benefits of the project exceed environmental and other costs, and that there are no obviously superior alternatives of which the agency is aware. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171, 191 (2002).

"[T]he Commission is under a dual obligation: to pursue the objectives of the Atomic Energy Act and those of the National Environmental Policy Act. 'The two statutes and the regulations promulgated under each must be viewed in pari materia.'" Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-506, 8 NRC 533, 539 (1978). (emphasis in original) In fulfilling its obligations under NEPA, the NRC may impose upon applicants and licensees conditions designed to minimize the adverse environmental effects of licensed activities. Such conditions may be imposed even on other Federal agencies, such as TVA, which seek NRC licenses, despite the language of Section 271 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. § 2018) which states, in part, that nothing in the act shall be construed to affect the authority of any Federal, State or local agency with respect to the generation, sale, or transmission of electric power through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the Commission. Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-506, 8 NRC 533, 541-544 (1978). Unless it was explicitly made exclusive, the authority of other Federal, state or local agencies or government corporations to consider the environmental consequences of a proposed project does not preempt the NRC's authority to condition its permits and licenses pursuant to NEPA. For example, TVA's jurisdiction over environmental matters is not exclusive where TVA seeks a license from a Federal agency, such as NRC, which also

has full NEPA responsibilities. Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-14, 5 NRC 494 (1977).

Pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the Department of Energy (DOE) has primary responsibility for evaluating the environmental impacts related to the development and operation of geologic repositories for high-level radioactive waste. In any proceeding for the issuance of a license for such a repository, the NRC will review and, to the extent practicable, adopt the environmental impact statement (EIS) submitted by DOE with its license application. The NRC will not adopt the EIS if: 1) the action which the NRC proposes to take is different from the action described in the DOE license application, and the difference may significantly affect the quality of the human environment; or 2) significant and substantial new information or new considerations render the EIS inadequate. 10 CFR § 51.109(c). To the extent that the NRC adopts the EIS prepared by DOE, it has fulfilled all of its NEPA responsibilities. 10 CFR § 51.109(d); 54 Fed. Reg. 27864, 27871 (July 3, 1989).

NEPA directs all Federal agencies to comply with its requirements "to the fullest extent possible." (42 U.S.C. § 4332.) The leading authorities teach that an agency is excused from those NEPA duties only "when a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists." Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-506, 8 NRC 533, 545 (1978).

NEPA cannot logically impose requirements more stringent than those contained in the safety provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 696 n.10 (1985), citing Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-518, 9 NRC 14, 39 (1979).

While the authority of other Federal or local agencies to consider the environmental effects of a project does not preempt the NRC's authority with regard to NEPA, the NRC, in conducting its NEPA analysis, may give considerable weight to action taken by another competent and responsible government authority in enforcing an environmental statute. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-28, 8 NRC 281, 282 (1978).

NRC regulations pertaining to environmental assessments do not require consultation with other agencies. They only require a "list of agencies and persons consulted, and identification of sources used." 10 CFR § 51.30(a)(2). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 245 (1993).

The NRC cannot delegate to a local group the responsibility under NEPA to prepare an environmental assessment (EA). The EA must be prepared by the NRC, not a local agency, although in preparing an EA the Staff may take into account site uses proposed by a local agency. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), LBP-96-21, 44 NRC 134, 136 (1996).

It is the Staff, not the applicant, that has the legal duty to perform a NEPA analysis and to issue appropriate NEPA documents (such as an EA), and the burden of any settlement with an intervenor on NEPA issues falls on the Staff. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, CLI-06-18, 64 NRC 1, 5 (2006) (citing Wetlands Action Network v. Army Corps of Eng'rs,

222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000); USEC Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 474 & n.144 (2006)).

In contrast to safety questions, the environmental review at the operating license stage need not duplicate the construction permit review, 10 CFR § 51.21. To raise an issue in an operating license hearing concerning environmental matters which were considered at the construction permit stage, there needs to be a showing either that the issue had not previously been adequately considered or that significant new information has developed after the construction permit review. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-10, 9 NRC 439, 465 (1979).

Consideration by the NRC in its environmental review is not required for the parts of the water supply system which will be used only by a local government agency, however, cumulative impacts from the jointly utilized parts of the system will be considered. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1473, 1475 (1982).

Insofar as environmental matters are concerned, under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) there is no legal basis for refusing an operating license merely because some environmental uncertainties may exist. Where environmental effects are remote and speculative, agencies are not precluded from proceeding with a project even though all uncertainties are not removed. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1992 (1982), citing State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part sub nom. Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1982); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835, 837-838 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

NEPA provides no guarantee that federally approved projects will have no adverse environmental impacts. Nor does NEPA require agencies to select the most environmentally advantageous or benign option available. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-29, 64 NRC 417, 429 (2006).

Environmental uncertainties raised by intervenors in NRC proceedings do not result in a per se denial of the license, but rather are subject to a rule of reason. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, & 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1992 (1982). If intervenors fail to show a deficiency in the staff's Cultural Resources Management Plan, then NEPA claims are without merit. Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-99-9, 49 NRC 136, 144 (1999).

The Commission's regulations categorically exclude from NEPA review all amendments for the use of radioactive materials for research and development. The purpose of an environmental report is to inform the Staff's preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) and, where appropriate, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Where the Staff is categorically excused from preparing an EA or EIS, a licensee need not submit an environmental report. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 396 (1995).

The fact that a particular license transfer may have antitrust implications does not remove it from the NEPA categorical exclusion. In any event, because the Atomic Energy Act does not require, and arguably, does not even allow, the Commission to conduct antitrust evaluations of license transfer application, any "failure" of the Commission to conduct such an evaluation cannot constitute a federal action warranting a NEPA review. Power

Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, n.55 (2000), quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167-68 (2000); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168 (2000). See also Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1) CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000).

The Commission may reject a petitioner's request for an EIS on the ground that the scope of the proceeding does not include the new owners' operation of the plant - but includes only the transfer of their operating licenses. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 309 (2000).

Termination of an operating license application gives rise to a need, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 51.21, for an EA to consider the impacts of the termination. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), LBP-96-21, 44 NRC 134, 136 (1996).

Because a construction permit termination would appear to have impacts that encompass operating license termination impacts, one EA would appear to suffice for both actions. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), LBP-96-21, 44 NRC 134, 136 (1996).

#### **6.16.1 Environmental Impact Statements (EIS)**

The activities for which environmental statements need be prepared and the procedures for preparation are covered generally in 10 CFR Part 51. For a discussion of the scope of an NRC/NEPA review when the project addressed by that review is also covered by a broader overall programmatic EIS prepared by another Federal agency, see USERDA (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-76-13, 4 NRC 67 (1976).

Neither the Atomic Energy Act, NEPA, nor the Commission's regulations require that there be a hearing on an environmental impact statement. Public hearings are held on an EIS only if the Commission finds such hearings are required in the public interest. 10 CFR § 2.104. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-25, 14 NRC 616, 625 (1981), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 298 (2006).

It is premature to entertain a contention calling for issuance of an Environmental Impact Statement where the Staff has not yet issued an Environmental Assessment determining that no EIS is required. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-9, 37 NRC 433 (1993).

Under the plain terms of NEPA, the environmental assessment of a particular proposed Federal action coming within the statutory reach may be confined to that action together with, inter alia, its unavoidable consequences. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 48 (1978).



The environmental review mandated by NEPA is subject to a rule of reason and as such need not include all theoretically possible environmental effects arising out of an action, but may be limited to effects which are shown to have some likelihood of occurring. This conclusion draws direct support from the judicial interpretation of the statutory command imposing the obligation to make reasonable forecasts of the future. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 48, 49 (1978); Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 447 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004). In other words, the Staff is excused from conducting a NEPA analysis of "remote and speculative" impacts or "worst case" scenarios. Nuclear Fuel Servs., Inc., LBP-05-8, 61 NRC 202, 208 (2005) (quoting Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 348-49 (2002)). See also Prairie Island, ALAB-455, 7 NRC at 48, 49.

An agency can fulfill its NEPA responsibilities in the preparation of an EIS if it:

- 1) reasonably defines the purpose of the proposed Federal action. The agency should consider Congressional intent and views as expressed by statute as well as the needs and goals of the applicants seeking agency approval;
- 2) eliminates those alternatives that would not achieve the purpose as defined by the agency; and
- 3) discusses in reasonable detail the reasonable alternatives which would achieve the purpose of the proposed action.

Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 195198 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Underlying scientific data and inferences drawn from NEPA through the exercise of expert scientific evaluation may be adopted by the NRC from the NEPA review done by another Federal agency. The NRC must exercise independent judgment with respect to conclusions about environmental impacts based on interpretation of such basic facts. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-43A, 15 NRC 1423, 1467-1468 (1982), citing FTC v. Texaco, 555 F.2d 862, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 868 n.65 (1984). However, to the extent possible, the NRC will adopt the environmental impact statement prepared by the Department of Energy to evaluate the environmental impact related to the development and operation of a geologic repository for high-level radioactive waste. 10 CFR § 51.109, 54 Fed. Reg. 27864, 27870-71 (July 3, 1989).

NEPA requires that a Federal agency make a "good faith" effort to predict reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts and that the agency apply a "rule of reason" after taking a "hard look" at potential environmental impacts. But an agency need not have complete information on all issues before proceeding. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-26, 8 NRC 102, 141 (1978).

NEPA requires only that the NRC consider "reasonably foreseeable" indirect effects of a proposed licensing action. A Licensing Board's reluctance to assume or speculate about far-reaching and large-scale changes required to find significant long-term adverse impacts was not unreasonable. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P., (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-06-15, 63 NRC 687, 698 (2006).

In order to advance an claim under NEPA, the intervenor must allege with adequate support that the NRC staff has failed to take a “hard look” at one or more significant environmental questions, that is, that the Staff has unduly ignored or minimized pertinent environmental effects of the proposed action. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-03-17, 58 NRC 419, 431 (2003).

The “rule of reason” means that, in an EIS, there is no need to consider impractical alternatives or alternatives that could only be implemented after significant changes in governmental policy or legislation. Also, it is sufficient to consider an appropriate range of alternatives, rather than every available alternative. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-30, 58 NRC 454, 463 and 479 (2003).

An adequate final environmental impact statement for a nuclear facility necessarily includes the lesser impacts attendant to low power testing of the facility and removes the need for a separate EIS focusing on questions such as the costs and benefits of low power testing. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 795 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

An EIS should include a statement on the alternatives to the proposed action, including the no-action alternative. Louisiana Energy Services (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-04-03, 59 NRC 10, 22 (2004).

Section 102(2)(E) of NEPA requires agencies to “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to the recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.” But the NRC regulations explicitly excuse an applicant from this analysis at the ESP stage of the proceeding. Rather, this analysis should be conducted at the CP or COL application stage. Exelon Generation Co., Inc. (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-06-28, 64 NRC 460, 486 (2006).

There may, of course, be mistakes in an EIS, but it is the Intervenor’s burden to show their materiality and significance. If the EIS “comes to grips with all important considerations,” nothing more need be done. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), CLI-05-29, 62 NRC 801, 811 (2005).

When Staff is preparing an EIS, it may rely on an Environmental Report prepared by the applicant, but Staff is ultimately responsible for all information used in the EIS and so must independently evaluate any information it uses for this purpose. Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 155 (2005).

#### **6.16.1.1 Need to Prepare an EIS**

Federal agencies are required to prepare an environmental impact statement for every major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. NEPA 102(2)(C); 42 U.S.C 4332(2)(C). An agency's decision not to exercise its statutory authority does not constitute a major Federal action. Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d 327, 334 (D.C. Cir. 1991), citing

Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-2, 33 NRC 61, 70 (1991), reconsid. denied, CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461 (1991).

The purpose of an applicant's environmental report is to inform the Staff's preparation of an Environmental Assessment (EA) and, where appropriate, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Where the Staff is categorically excused from preparing an EA or EIS, an applicant need not submit an environmental report. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 396 (1995).

An agency's refusal to prepare an environmental impact statement is not by itself a final agency action which requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916, 918-919 (D.C. Cir. 1992), citing Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1991). An agency is not required to prepare an environmental impact statement where it is only contemplating a particular course of action, but has not actually taken any final action. Public Citizen, supra, 970 F.2d at 920.

License transfers fall within a categorical exclusion for which EISs are not required, and the fact that a particular license transfer may have implications does not remove it from the categorical exclusion. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167-168 (2000). See also 10 CFR § 51.22(c)(21).

It is possible that for a petitioner to raise an admissible contention with respect to a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI), the petitioner need not show that there will be a significant environmental impact. Instead, the petitioner must allege facts which, if proven, show that the proposed federal action may significantly impact the environment. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground Site), LBP-06-27, 64 NRC 438, 458 (2006).

The granting of conditional approval of a power authority's plan for barge shipments of irradiated fuel does not constitute a "major federal action" by an agency and, thus, NEPA does not require that agency to perform an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement. New Jersey v. Long Island Power Authority, 30 F.3d 403, 415 (3d Cir. 1994).

Where a nonfederal party voluntarily informs a federal agency of its intended activities to ensure compliance with law and regulation, and to facilitate the agency's monitoring of activities for safety purposes, the agency's review of the plan does not constitute a "major federal action" requiring an environmental impact statement pursuant to NEPA. New Jersey v. Long Island Power Authority, 30 F.3d 403, 416 (3d Cir. 1994).

An agency cannot skirt NEPA or other statutory commands by essentially exempting a licensee from regulatory compliance, and then simply labelling its decision "mere oversight" rather than a major federal action. To do so is manifestly arbitrary and capricious. Citizens Awareness Network v. NRC, 59 F.3d 284, 293 (1st Cir. 1995).

Although the determination as to whether to prepare an environmental impact statement falls initially upon the Staff, that determination may be made an issue in

an adjudicatory proceeding. Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 120 (1979).

In the final analysis, the significance of the impact of the project -- in large part an evidentiary matter -- will determine whether a statement must be issued. Consumers Power Co. (Palisades Nuclear Plant), LBP-79-20, 10 NRC 108, 120 (1979).

In the case of licensing nuclear power plants, adverse impacts include the impacts of the nuclear fuel cycle. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1076 (1982), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 539 (1978).

In determining whether a license amendment is a major action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, it is relevant to determine if prior activities "in actuality have given rise to environmental harm such as Petitioners fear." International Uranium (USA) Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-02-19, 56 NRC 113, 117 (2002).

The test of whether benefits of a proposed action outweigh its costs is distinct from the primary question of whether an environmental impact statement is needed because the action is a major Federal action significantly affecting the environment. Virginia Electric Power Co. (Surry Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-4, 11 NRC 405 (1980).

The Commission has consistently taken the position that individual fuel exports are not "major Federal actions." Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to Philippines), CLI-80-15, 11 NRC 672 (1980).

The fact that risks of other actions or no action are greater than those of the proposed action does not show that risks of the proposed action are not significant so as to require an EIS. Where conflict in the scientific community makes determination of significance of environmental impact problematical, the preferable course is to prepare an environmental impact statement. Virginia Electric Power Co. (Surry Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80,4, 11 NRC 405 (1980).

For an analysis of when an environmental assessment rather than an EIS is appropriate, see Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-80-7, 11 NRC 245, 249-50 (1980).

The NRC Staff is not required to prepare a complete environmental impact statement if, after performing an initial environmental assessment, it determines that the proposed action will have no significant environmental impact. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-790, 20 NRC 1450, 1452 n.5 (1984); Curators of University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 124 (1995).

In a situation where an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is neither required nor categorically excluded, a contention seeking an EIS, filed prior to the Staff's issuance of an Environmental Assessment (EA), is premature. After Staff issuance of an EA, a late-filed contention may be submitted (assuming the EA does not call

for an EIS). Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 36 (1993).

To read the agency's hearing notice that found a categorical exclusion applicable to an application as thus preventing challenges authorized by 10 C.F.R. § 51.22 to the use of such categorical exclusions would be tantamount to ruling that the agency need not comply with its own regulations. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 109 n.38 (2006) (citing, e.g., Fort Stewart Schools v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 654 (1990)).

A Board admitted a contention based on the argument that NEPA analysis requires an explanation of the applicability of a categorical exclusion where a petitioner has alleged special circumstances necessitating an environmental review; the Staff and applicant had not negated the contention because they did not explain the applicability of that categorical exclusion in the specified circumstances, or provide a basis to conclude that the alleged circumstances were actually considered as part of the adoption of the categorical exclusion. Pa'ina Hawaii, LLC, LBP-06-4, 63 NRC 99, 108-112 & 108 n.36 (2006) (citing Alaska Center for the Environment v. U.S. Forest Service, 189 F.3d 851, 859 (9th Cir. 1999); Jones v. Gordon, 792 F.2d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1986); Steamboaters v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 759 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985); Wilderness Watch & Public Employees for Envi. Responsibility v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004)).

An operating license amendment to recapture the construction period and allow for operation for 40 full years is not an action which requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement or an environmental report. A construction period recapture amendment only requires the Staff to prepare an environmental assessment. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-90-6, 31 NRC 85, 97 (1990).

A separate environmental impact statement is not required for a Special Nuclear Material (SNM) license. When an environmental impact statement has been done for an operating license application, including the delivery of fuel, there is no need for each component to be analyzed separately on the assumption that a plant may never be licensed to operate. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-38, 18 NRC 61, 65 (1983).

The NRC's obligation under NEPA does not end following initial approval of an action. Even beyond that stage, NEPA requires that the agency take a "hard look" at the environmental effects of the proposal. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 447-48 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004) (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989)). Similar to the determination to prepare an EIS in the first place, agency decisions regarding whether to supplement an FEIS are also governed by the rule of reason. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC at 448 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373-74).

Not every change requires a supplemental EIS; only those changes that cause effects that are significantly different from those already studied. The new circumstance must reveal a seriously different picture of the environmental impact of the proposed project. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 52 (2001); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657, 659 (2004); Hydro Res., Inc.,

LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 448 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004).

A supplemental EIS is needed where new information “raises new concerns of sufficient gravity such that another, formal in-depth look at the environmental consequences of the proposed action is necessary.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 28 (2006) (quoting Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418 (7th Cir. 1984); Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989)).

The question whether some new information or circumstance is significant (and would consequently require supplementation of an FEIS) ordinarily raises a factual dispute. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 448 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004) (citing Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1989); Friends of the Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 1997)).

A supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or an Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) does not have to be prepared prior to the granting of authorization for issuance of a low-power license. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 634 (1983).

The issuance of a possession-only license need not be preceded by the submission of any particular environmental information or accompanied by any NEPA review related to decommissioning. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-91-1, 33 NRC 1, 6-7 (1991).

When the environmental effects of full-term, full-power operation have already been evaluated in an EIS, a licensing action for limited operation under a 10 CFR § 50.57(c) license that would result in lesser impacts need not be accompanied by an additional impact statement or an impact appraisal. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-5, 13 NRC 226 (1981), and ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 795 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983). The Commission authorized the issuance of a low power operating license for Limerick Unit 2, even though, pursuant to a federal court order, Limerick Ecology Action v. NRC, 869 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1989), there was an ongoing Licensing Board proceeding to consider certain severe accident mitigation design alternatives. Since the existing EIS was valid except for the failure to consider the design alternatives, and low power operation presents a much lower risk of a severe accident than does full power operation, the Commission found that the existing EIS was sufficient to support the issuance of a low power license. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-10, 30 NRC 1, 5-6 (1989), reconsid. denied and stay denied, CLI-89-15, 30 NRC 96, 101-102 (1989).

It is well-established NEPA law that separate environmental statements are not required for intermediate, implementing steps such as the issuance of a low-power license where an EIS has been prepared for the entire proposed action and there have been no significant changed circumstances. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-9, 19 NRC 1323, 1326 (1984), on certification from ALAB-769, 19 NRC 995 (1984). See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Andrus, 619 F.2d 1368, 1377 (1980).

The principle stated in the Shoreham and Diablo Canyon cases, supra, is applicable even where an applicant may begin low power operation and it is uncertain whether the applicant will ever receive a full-power license. In Shoreham, the fact that recent court decisions in effect supported the refusal by the State and local governments to participate in the development of emergency plans was determined not to be a significant change of circumstances which would require the preparation of a supplemental environmental impact statement to assess the costs and benefits of low-power operation. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station), CLI-85-12, 21 NRC 1587, 1589 (1985). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-875, 26 NRC 251, 258-59 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 418-19 (1989).

The NRC Staff is not required to prepare an environmental impact statement to evaluate the "resumed operation" of a facility or other alternatives to a licensee's decision not to operate its facility. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-90-8, 32 NRC 201, 207-208 (1990), reconsid. denied, CLI-91-2, 33 NRC 61 (1991), reconsid. denied, CLI-91-8, 33 NRC 461, 470 (1991); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-17, 33 NRC 379, 390 (1991); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-91-30, 34 NRC 23, 26, 27 (1991); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 135 (1992). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-9135, 34 NRC 163, 169 (1991).

A contention attempting to raise an issue of the lack of long-term spent fuel storage is barred as a matter of law from operating license and operating license amendment proceedings. 10 CFR §§ 51.23(1), 51.53(a). Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 29-30 (1993).

Environmental review of the storage of spent fuel in reactor facility storage pools for at least 30 years beyond the expiration of reactor operating licenses is not required based upon the Commission's generic determination that such storage will not result in significant environmental impacts. Dairyland Power Coop. (LaCrosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-88-15, 27 NRC 576, 580 (1988), citing 10 CFR § 51.23.

An environmental impact statement need not be prepared with respect to the expansion of the capacity of a spent fuel pool if the environmental impact appraisal prepared for the project had an adequate basis for concluding that the expansion of a spent fuel pool would not cause any significant environmental impact. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-78, 16 NRC 1107 (1982).

When a licensee seeks to withdraw an application to expand its existing low-level waste burial site, the granting of the request to withdraw does not amount to a major Federal action requiring a NEPA review. This is true even though, absent an expansion, the site will not have the capacity to accept additional low-level waste. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), ALAB-606, 12 NRC 156, 161-163 (1980).

It must at least be determined that there is significant new information before the need for a supplemental environmental statement can arise. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 49 (1983), citing Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble, 621 F.2d 1017, 1023-36 (9th Cir. 1981); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-29, 64 NRC 417, 419 (2006).

A supplemental EIS may be necessary if new information raises a previously unknown environmental concern, but not necessarily when it amounts to mere additional evidence supporting one side or the other of a disputed environmental effect. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 28 (2006).

A supplemental environmental statement need not necessarily be prepared and circulated even if there is new information. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 49-50 (1983), citing California v. Watt, 683 F.2d 1253, 1268 (9th Cir. 1982). See 40 CFR § 1502.9(c); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-22, 50 NRC 3, 14 (1999); Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 448 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-29, 64 NRC 417, 419 (2006).

The proponent of the need for an evidentiary hearing bears the burden of establishing that need, but the staff bears the ultimate burden to demonstrate its compliance with NEPA in its determination that an EIS is not necessary on a proposed license amendment. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 249 (2001).

Once an intervenor crosses the admissibility threshold relative to its environmental contention, the ultimate burden in a subpart K proceeding then rests with the proponent of the NEPA document -- the staff (and the applicant to the degree it becomes a proponent of the staff's EIS-related action) -- to establish the validity of that determination on the question whether there is an EIS preparation trigger. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 249 (2001).

However, it is not unreasonable to ask an intervenor to come forward with support for a request to supplement a FEIS. This burden is akin to a petitioner's initial obligation to come forward with a sufficient basis for a contention and imposition of such burden does not improperly shift the "burden of proof" on factual evidence to the intervenor. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657, 659-60 (2004).

The standard for issuing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 51.92: There must be either substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns, or significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-7, 43 NRC 235, 269 (1996); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-22, 50 NRC 3, 14 (1999). The fact that a supplement to a FEIS would have been distributed to additional members of the public if such a supplement had in fact been prepared, is not a persuasive argument that the supplement should have been prepared in the first instance. Decisions on whether to supplement an FEIS are made pursuant to 10 CFR 51.92. HRI, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC at 661.



For NEPA purposes, the “major federal action” triggering the EIS is issuing the license, not adjudicating the license. Until a license issues, the Commission must entertain motions to reopen the adjudicatory record, albeit under the strict standards of the Commission’s reopening regulations. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 24 (2006) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.326; Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-12, 61 NRC 345, 350 & n.19 (2005)).

In LBP-04-23, the Presiding Officer stated in dicta that the supplementation requirement of NEPA and the agency’s environmental regulations is not abrogated by the Commission’s practice rule authorizing the Staff to issue a license before the adjudication is commenced or completed. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-04-23, 60 NRC 441, 450 n.45 (2004), review declined, CLI-04-39, 60 NRC 657 (2004) (referencing 10 C.F.R. § 2.1205(m) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.103(a)]).

The Supreme Court has found that a cumulative Environmental Impact Statement must be prepared only when “several proposals for actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are pending concurrently before an agency.” Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-14, 55 NRC 278, 294 (2002), citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). The Court further stated agencies need not consider “possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions.” The Commission reads post-Kleppe rulings to indicate that to bring NEPA into play a possible future action must at least constitute a “proposal” pending before the agency (i.e. ripeness), and must be in some way interrelated with the action that the agency is actively considering. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-14, 55 NRC 278, 295 (2002).

#### **6.16.1.2 Scope of EIS**

The scope of the environmental statement or appraisal must be at least as broad as the scope of the action being taken. Duke Power Co. (Oconee/ McGuire), LBP-80-28, 12 NRC 459, 473 (1980).

An agency may authorize an individual, sufficiently distinct portion of an agency plan without awaiting the completion of a comprehensive environmental impact statement on the plan so long as the environmental treatment under NEPA of the individual portion is adequate and approval of the individual portion does not commit the agency to approval of other portions of the plan. Kerr-McGee Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-82-2, 15 NRC 232, 265 (1982), aff’d sub nom. City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983); Peshlakai v. Duncan, 476 F. Supp. 1247, 1260 (D.D.C. 1979); Conservation Law Foundation v. GSA, 427 F. Supp. 1369, 1374 (D.R.I. 1977).

In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978), the U.S. Supreme Court embraced the doctrine that environmental impact statements need not discuss the environmental effects of alternatives which are “deemed only remote and speculative possibilities.” The same has been held with respect to remote and speculative environmental impacts

of the proposed project itself. Public Service Electric & Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43 (1981); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-629, 13 NRC 75 (1981); Public Service Electric & Gas Company (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-518, 9 NRC 14, 38 (1979); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-705, 16 NRC 1733, 1744 (1982), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551 (1978), quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 696-97 & n.12 (1985); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77 (1998). See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-877, 26 NRC 287, 293-94 (1987). Moot or farfetched alternatives need not be considered under NEPA. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, & 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1992 (1982), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 837-838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 961 (1974).

NEPA does not require certainty or precision, but, rather, an estimate of anticipated (not unduly speculative) impacts. An assessment of the estimated impacts at one or more representative or reference sites can be sufficient. In this type of analysis, the impacts for a range of potential facilities or locations having one or more common site or design features can be bounded. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-20, 62 NRC 523, 536 (2005).

The scope of a NEPA environmental review in connection with a facility license amendment is limited to a consideration of the extent to which the action under the amendment will lead to environmental impacts beyond those previously evaluated. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-81-14, 13 NRC 677, 684-685 (1981), citing Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312 (1981).

An environmental review of the decommissioning of a nuclear facility supplements the operating license environmental review, and is only required to examine any new information or significant environmental change associated with the decommissioning of the facility or the storage of spent fuel. 10 CFR § 51.53(b). Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-92-23, 36 NRC 120, 134 (1992).

When major Federal actions are involved, if related activities taken abroad have a significant effect within the U.S., those effects are within NEPA's ambit. However, remote and speculative possibilities need not be considered under NEPA. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-562, 10 NRC 437, 446 (1979).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board found that an intervenor's assertions regarding sabotage risk did not provide a litigable basis for a NEPA contention. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-19, 52 NRC 85, 97 (2000).

The challenges of terrorism (destructive acts of malice or insanity by enemies of the U.S.) are not appropriately addressed in an EIS, as it is speculative and too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1, 6-7 (2003), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413 (2002).

The challenges of terrorism (destructive acts of malice or insanity by enemies of the U.S.) are not appropriately addressed in an EIS, as it is speculative and too far removed from the natural or expected consequences of agency action. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-03-1, 57 NRC 1, 6-7 (2003), LBP-02-23, 56 NRC 413 (2002).

NEPA does not impose a legal duty to consider intentional malevolent acts. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 360 (2002), reviewing certified questions, LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49 (2002). Nor is the NEPA process an appropriate forum for addressing the challenges of terrorism for four interlocking reasons: (1) the likelihood and nature of a postulated terrorist attack are speculative and are not proximately caused by an NRC licensing decision; (2) the risk of terrorist attack cannot be meaningfully determined by NRC staff; (3) NEPA does not require a “worst case” analysis and such an analysis would not enhance an agency’s decisionmaking process as the appropriate test is what is “reasonably foreseeable” from the consequence of the licensed action and not a terrorist attack; and (4) a terrorism review is incompatible with the public character of the NEPA process. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 360 (2002), reviewing certified questions, LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49 (2002); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 353 (2002), aff’g LBP-01-37, 54 NRC 476 (2001). As a practical matter, an anti-terrorism review is particularly ineffectual during a reactor licensing renewal as it burdens Staff resources that are better utilized for addressing more immediate anti-terrorism issues while not alleviating intervenor concerns that are also focused on the near term. Duke Energy Corp. (McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-26, 56 NRC 358, 361 (2002), reviewing certified questions, LBP-02-4, 55 NRC 49 (2002). Moreover, excluding safeguards data pertaining to anti-terrorism from the NEPA process is “not simply a policy choice” but is mandated by section 147 of the AEA. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 355 (2002), aff’g LBP-01-37, 54 NRC 476 (2001). In this regard, confidentiality in this area can be equated with the NEPA definition of a “essential consideration of national policy” and protects against “risks to health and safety” and avoids “undesirable and unintended consequences.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 355 (2002), aff’g LBP-01-37, 54 NRC 476 (2001). Finally, it should be noted that the Commission has not stated that an ER should never consider anti-terrorism issues as they have been addressed in considerable detail in generic studies—only that they should not be required as part of the NEPA process. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 354 (2002), aff’g LBP-01-37, 54 NRC 476 (2001).

In a case where petitioners challenged an export license to export weapons-grade plutonium oxide to France and argued that the applicant Department of Energy's associated Environmental Impact Statement failed to address post-September 11 terrorism threats, the Commission stated that NRC case law does not require a NEPA-based review of terrorism; however, DOE has discretion to review terrorism in the NEPA context. No hearing was warranted for additional NEPA review on terrorism, as DOE had taken the requisite "hard look" in its EIS and "NEPA does not override [the Commission's] concern for making sure that sensitive security-related information ends up in as few hands as practicable." U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 371-72 (2004) (quoting Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-25, 56 NRC 340, 347 (2002)).

NEPA does not require the NRC to investigate or enforce tribal leadership's promises to spend lease payments collected from an applicant prudently, legally, or in a manner otherwise to the satisfaction of the entire tribe, even where such promises are cited in the FEIS. There would be no end to the NRC's environmental review if the agency had to follow and scrutinize ongoing contract payments and the actions of tribal leaders. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-9, 59 NRC 120, 125 (2004).

#### **6.16.2 Role of EIS**

A NEPA analysis of the Government's proposed licensing of private activities is necessarily more narrow than a NEPA analysis of proposed activities which the Government will conduct itself. The former analysis should consider issues which could preclude issuance of the license or which could be affected by license conditions. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). It should focus on the proposal submitted by the private party rather than on broader concepts. It must consider other alternatives, however, even if the agency itself is not empowered to order that those alternatives be undertaken. Were there no distinction in NEPA standards between those for approval of private actions and those for Federal actions, NEPA would, in effect, become directly applicable to private parties. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977).

The impact statement does not simply "accompany" an agency recommendation for action in the sense of having some independent significance in isolation from the deliberative process. Rather, the impact statement is an integral part of the Commission's decision. It forms as much a vital part of the NRC's decisional record as anything else, such that for reactor licensing, for example, the agency's decision would be fundamentally flawed without it. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-31, 12 NRC 264, 275 (1980). The principal goals of an EIS are twofold: to compel agencies to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed project, and to permit the public a role in the agency's decision making process. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 87 (1998).

Where an applicant has submitted a specific proposal, the statutory language of NEPA's Section 102(2)(C) only requires that an environmental impact statement be prepared in conjunction with that specific proposal, providing the Staff with a "specific action of the known dimensions" to evaluate. A single approval of a plan does not commit the agency to subsequent approvals; should contemplated actions later reach

the stage of actual proposals, the environmental effects of the existing project can be considered when preparing the comprehensive statement on the cumulative impact of the proposals. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), LBP-79-15, 9 NRC 653, 658-660 (1979).

### **6.16.3 Circumstances Requiring Redrafting of Final Environmental Statement (FES)**

In certain instances, an FES may be so defective as to require redrafting, recirculation for comment and reissuance in final form. Possible defects which could render an FES inadequate are numerous and are set out in a long series of NEPA cases in the Federal Courts. See, e.g., Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Wash. 1972) (FES inadequate when it suffers from a serious lack of detail and relies on conclusions and assumptions without reference to supporting objective data); Essex City Preservation Ass'n. v. Campbell, 536 F.2d 956, 961 (1st Cir. 1976) (new FES required when there is significant new information or a significant change in circumstances upon which original FES was based); NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (existence of unexamined but viable alternative could render FES inadequate). A new FES may be necessary when the current situation departs markedly from the positions espoused or information reflected in the FES. Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-3, 21 NRC 244, 256 (1985).

In an adjudicatory hearing, to the extent that any environmental findings by the Presiding Officer (or the Commission) differ from those in the FEIS, the FEIS is deemed modified by the decision. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 53 (2001).

Even though an FES may be inadequate in certain respects, ultimate NEPA judgments with respect to any facility are to be made on the basis of the entire record before the adjudicatory tribunal. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163 (1975). Previous regulations explicitly recognized that evidence presented at a hearing may cause a Licensing Board to arrive at conclusions different from those in an FES, in which event the FES is simply deemed amended pro tanto. Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), LBP-82-100, 16 NRC 1550, 1571 n.20 (1982). Since findings and conclusions of the licensing tribunal are deemed to amend the FES where different therefrom, amendment and recirculation of the FES is not always necessary, particularly where the hearing will provide the public ventilation that recirculation of an amended FES would otherwise provide. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163 (1975). Defects in an FES can be cured by the receipt of additional evidence subsequent to issuance of the FES. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 47 (1983). See Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998, 1000-02 (2d Cir. 1974); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-660, 14 NRC 987, 1013-14 (1981); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163, 195-97 (1975).

Such modification of the FES by Staff testimony or the Licensing Board's decision does not normally require recirculation of the FES. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-264, 1 NRC 347, 372 (1975), unless the

modifications are truly substantial. Allied-General Nuclear Services (Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant Separation Facility), ALAB-296, 2 NRC 671 (1975); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-31, 20 NRC 446, 553 (1984); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-3, 21 NRC 244, 252, 256 (1985).

Two Courts of Appeals have approved the Commission's rule that the FES is deemed modified by subsequent adjudicatory tribunal decisions. Citizens for Safe Power v. NRC, 524 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998, 1001-02 (2nd Cir. 1974); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 29 n.43 (1978). See also New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 94 (1st Cir. 1978); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 705-07 (1985), citing 10 CFR § 51.102 (1985).

If the changes contained in an errata document for an FES do not reveal an obvious need for a modification of plant design or a change in the outcome of the cost-benefit analysis, the document need not be circulated or issued as a supplemental FES. Nor is it necessary to issue a supplemental FES when timely comments on the DES have not been adequately considered. The Licensing Board may merely effect the required amendment of the FES through its initial decision. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-21, 5 NRC 684 (1977); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 47 (1983).

The NRC Staff is not required to respond to comments identified in an intervenor's dismissed contention concerning the adequacy of the final environmental statement (FES), where the Staff has prepared and circulated for public comment a supplemental final environmental statement (SFES) which addresses and evaluates the matters raised by the comments on the FES. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-89-35, 30 NRC 677, 698 (1989), vacated and reversed on other grounds, ALAB-944, 33 NRC 81 (1991).

Similarly, there is no need for a supplemental impact statement and its circulation for public comment where the changes in the proposed action which would be evaluated in such a supplement mitigate the environmental impacts, although circulation of a supplement may well be appropriate or necessary where the change has significant aggravating environmental impacts. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 28-29 (1978).

NEPA does not require the staff of a Federal agency conducting a NEPA review to consider the record, as developed in collateral State proceedings, concerning the environmental effects of the proposed Federal action. Failure to review the State records prior to issuing an FES, therefore, is not grounds for requiring preparation and circulation of a supplemental FES. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-21, 5 NRC 684 (1977).

A proposed shift in ownership of a plant with no modification to the physical structure of the facility does not by itself cast doubt on the benefit to be derived from the plant such as to require redrafting and recirculating the EIS. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc.

(Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-459, 7 NRC 179, 184 (1978).

The Staff's environmental evaluation is not deficient merely because it contains only a limited discussion of facility decommissioning alternatives. There is little value in considering at the operating license stage what method of decommissioning will be most desirable many years in the future in light of the knowledge which will have been accumulated by that time. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-179, 7 AEC 159, 178 n.32 (1974).

For a more recent case discussing recirculation of an FES, see Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 786 (1979).

Incorporation by reference. While an agency may not reflexively rubber-stamp an analysis performed by others, actually redoing incorporated calculations would be a duplication of resources not required by law. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-28, 62 NRC 721, 730 (2005).

#### **6.16.3.1 Effect of Failure to Comment on Draft Environmental Statement (DES)**

Where an intervenor received and took advantage of an opportunity to review and comment on a DES and where his comments did not involve the Staff's alternate site analysis and did not bring sufficient attention to that analysis to stimulate the Commission's consideration of it, the intervenor will not be permitted to raise and litigate, at a late stage in the hearings, the issue as to whether the Staff's alternate site analysis was adequate, although he may attack the conclusions reached in the FES. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-366, 5 NRC 39, 66-67 (1977), aff'd as modified, CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977).

Since the public is afforded early opportunity to participate in the NEPA review process, imposition of a greater burden for justification for changes initiated by untimely comments is appropriate. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 539 (1977).

Comments on a DES which fail to meet the standards of CEQ Guidelines (40 CFR § 1500.9(e)) on responsibilities of commenting entities to assist the Staff need not be reviewed by the Staff. Thus, where comments which suggest that the Staff consider collateral State proceedings on the environmental effects of a proposed reactor do not specify the parts of the collateral proceedings which should be considered and the parts of the DES which should be revised, the Staff need not review the collateral proceedings. Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-21, 5 NRC 684 (1977).

#### **6.16.3.2 Stays Pending Remand for Inadequate EIS**

Where judicial review disclosed inadequacies in an agency's environmental impact statement prepared in good faith, a stay of the underlying activity pending remand does not follow automatically. Whether the project need be stayed essentially must be decided on the basis of (1) a traditional balancing of the equities, and (2) a consideration of any likely prejudice to further decisions that might be called for by

the remand. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-395, 5 NRC 772, 784-785 (1977).

#### 6.16.4 Alternatives

NEPA requires an agency to consider alternatives to its own proposed action which may significantly affect the quality of the human environment. An agency should not consider alternatives to the applicant's stated goals. Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Perhaps the most important environmentally related task the Staff has under NEPA is to determine whether an application should be turned down because there is some other site at which the plant ought to be located. No other environmental question is both so significant in terms of the ultimate outcome and so dependent upon facts particular to the application under scrutiny. Consequently, the Appeal Board expects the Staff to take unusual care in performing its analysis and in disclosing the results of its work to the public. Florida Power & Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-435, 6 NRC 541, 543, 544 (1977).

"In the context of the environmental impact statement drafting process, when a reasonable alternative has been identified it must be objectively considered by the evaluating agency so as not to fall victim to 'the sort of tendentious decisionmaking that NEPA seeks to avoid.'" Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-34, 54 NRC 293, 302 (2001), citing I-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 253 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975).

A hard look for a superior alternative is a condition precedent to a licensing determination that an applicant's proposal is acceptable under NEPA. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 513 (1978). When NEPA requires an EIS, the Commission is obliged to take a harder look at alternatives than if the proposed action were inconsequential. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-660, 14 NRC 987, 1005-1006 (1981), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263 (1979). In fact the NEPA mandate that alternatives to the proposed licensing action be explored and evaluated does not come into play where the proposed action will neither (1) entail more than negligible environmental impacts, nor (2) involve the commitment of available resources respecting which there are unresolved conflicts. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 265-266 (1979).

NEPA was not intended merely to give the appearance of weighing alternatives that are in fact foreclosed. Pending completion of sufficient comparison between an applicant's proposed site and others, in situations where substantial work has already taken place, the Commission can preserve the opportunity for a real choice among alternatives only by suspending outstanding construction permits. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952, 958-959 (1978).

Despite the importance of alternate site considerations, where all parties have proceeded since the inception of the proceeding on the basis that there was no need to



examine alternate sites beyond those referred to in the FES, a party cannot insist at the "eleventh hour" that still other sites be considered in the absence of a compelling showing that the newly suggested sites possess attributes which establish them to have greater potential as alternatives than the sites already selected as alternatives. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-495, 8 NRC 304, 306 (1978).

A party seeking consideration at an advanced stage of a proceeding of a site other than the alternate sites already explored in the proceeding must at least provide information regarding the salient characteristics of the newly suggested sites and the reasons why these characteristics show that the new sites might prove better than those already under investigation. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-499, 8 NRC 319, 321 (1978).

The fact that a possible alternative is beyond the Commission's power to implement does not absolve the Commission of any duty to consider it, but that duty is subject to a "rule of reason". Factors to be considered include distance from site to load center, institutional and legal obstacles and the like. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 486 (1978).

Under NEPA, there is no need for Boards to consider economically better alternatives, which are not shown to also be environmentally preferable. No study of alternatives is needed under NEPA unless the action significantly affects the environment (§ 102(2)(c)) or involves an unresolved conflict in the use of resources (§ 102(2)(e)). Where an action will have little environmental effect, an alternative could not be materially advantageous. Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-584, 11 NRC 451, 456-458 (1980); Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-34, 22 NRC 481, 491 (1985).

Pursuant to NEPA 102(2)(E), the Staff must analyze possible alternatives, even if it believes that such alternatives need not be considered because the proposed action does not significantly affect the environment. A Board is to make the determination, on the basis of all the evidence presented during the hearing, whether other alternatives must be considered. "Some factual basis (usually in the form of the Staff's environmental analysis) is necessary to determine whether a proposal 'involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources' - the statutory standard of Section 102(2)(E)." Virginia Electric & Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-34, 22 NRC 481, 491 (1985), quoting Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312, 332 (1981). See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-26, 28 NRC 440, 449-50 (1988), reconsidered, LBP-89-6, 29 NRC 127, 134-35 (1989), rev'd on other grounds, ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29 (1989), vacated in part on other grounds and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990).

Where a licensing board is required by regulation to consider reasonable alternatives pursuant to NEPA, the fact that the hearing notice does not refer to this consideration of reasonable alternatives does not excuse the Board from conducting this required analysis. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 46 (2005).

NEPA does not require the NRC to choose the environmentally preferred site. NEPA is primarily procedural, requiring the NRC to take a hard look at environmental consequences and alternatives. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), CLI-80-23, 11 NRC 731, 736 (1980).

The application of the Commission's "obviously superior" standard for alternative sites (see 6.15.4.1 infra) does not affect the Staff's obligation to take the hard look. The NRC's "obviously superior" standard is a reasonable exercise of discretion to insist on a high degree of assurance that the extreme action of denying an application is appropriate in view of inherent uncertainties in benefit-cost analysis. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), CLI-80-23, 11 NRC 731, 735 (1980).

Whether or not the parties to a particular licensing proceeding may agree that none of the alternatives (at Seabrook, alternative sites) to the proposal under consideration is preferable, based on a NEPA cost-benefit balance, it remains the Commission's obligation to satisfy itself, that is so. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-557, 10 NRC 153, 155 (1979).

The scope of a NEPA environmental review in connection with a facility license amendment is limited to a consideration of the extent to which the action under the amendment will lead to environmental impacts beyond those previously evaluated. The consideration of alternatives in such a case does not include alternatives to the continued operation of the plant, even though the amendment might be necessary to continued reactor operation. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 & 4), LBP-81-14, 13 NRC 677, 684-85 (1981), citing Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312 (1981).

Issues concerning alternative energy sources in general may no longer be considered in operating license proceedings. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 527 (1982). In general, the NRC's environmental evaluation in an operating license proceeding will not consider need for power, alternative energy sources, or alternative sites. 10 CFR §§ 51.95, 51.106.

The FEIS must include a statement on the alternatives to the proposed action. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). Generally this includes a discussion of the agency alternative of "no action" (see 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d)), which is most easily viewed as maintaining the status quo. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 97 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 54 (2001).

With regard to the proposed alternatives in an EIS, there need not be much discussion for the "no action" alternative. It is most simply viewed as maintaining the status quo. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 54 (2001).

Agencies need only discuss those alternatives that are reasonable and will bring about the ends of the proposed action. When the purpose of the action is to accomplish one thing, it makes no sense to consider alternative ways by which another thing might be achieved. When reviewing a discrete license application filed by a private applicant, a federal agency may appropriately accord substantial weight to the preferences of the

applicant and/or sponsor in the siting and design of the project. The agency thus may take into account the economic goals of the project's sponsor. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 55 (2001); Nuclear Management Co., LLC (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant), LBP-05-31, 62 NRC 735, 753 (2005). See also USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 467-68 (2006); Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 156-57 (2005).

While an agency must not craft a set of alternatives so narrowly as to render it a foregone conclusion that the proposed action will be deemed superior, agencies may still limit the alternatives they consider to those that are reasonable. Where the agency action in question is a decision on a license or permit application submitted by a private party, the agency may consider the applicant's purposes and goals when determining which alternatives are reasonable. Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 158 n. 77 (2005).

"Demand-side management" or energy efficiency, is not a reasonable alternative that would advance the goals of the applicant, which has a limited purpose, selling electricity. Neither the NRC nor the applicant have the mission (or power) to implement a general societal interest in energy efficiency. Exelon Generation Co., LLC (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), CLI-05-29, 62 NRC 801, 806 (2005).

A licensing board's consideration of reasonable alternatives is substantially different when it is adjudicating an application for a license for an actual facility, such as a uranium enrichment facility, than when it is adjudicating an early site permit application. For the early site permit application, consideration of reasonable alternatives looks at only alternative sites; for the license application, the analysis of reasonable alternatives would be substantially broader. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 48 (2005).

#### **6.16.4.1 Obviously Superior Standard for Site Selection**

The standard for approving a site is acceptability, not optimality. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977). Due to the more extensive environmental studies made of the proposed site in comparison to alternate sites, more of the environmental costs of the selected site are usually discovered. Upon more extensive analysis of alternate sites, additional cost will probably be discovered. Moreover, a Licensing Board can do no more than accept or reject the application for the proposed site; it cannot ensure that the applicant will apply for a construction permit at the alternate site. For these reasons, a Licensing Board should not reject a proposed site unless an alternate site is "obviously superior" to the proposed site. CLI-77-8, 5 NRC at 526. Standards of acceptability, instead of optimality, apply to approval of plant designs as well. CLI-77-8, 5 NRC at 526. In view of all of this, an applicant's selection of a site may be rejected on the grounds that a preferable alternative exists only if the alternative is "obviously superior." Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-435, 6 NRC 541 (1977). For a further discussion of the "obviously superior" standard with regard to alternatives, see Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 67, 78 (1977).

The Commission's obviously superior standard for alternate sites has been upheld by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The Court held that, given the necessary imprecision of the cost-benefit analysis and the fact that the proposed site will have been subjected to closer scrutiny than any alternative, NEPA does not require that the single best site for environmental purposes be chosen. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 95 (1st Cir. 1978).

A Licensing Board determination that none of the potential alternative sites surpasses a proposed site in terms of providing new generation for areas most in need of new capacity cannot of itself serve to justify a generic rejection of all those alternative sites on institutional, legal, or economic grounds. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 491 (1978).

To establish that no suggested alternative sites are "obviously superior" to the proposed site, there must be either (1) an adequate evidentiary showing that the alternative sites should be generically rejected or (2) sufficient evidence for informed comparisons between the proposed site and individual alternatives. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 498 (1978).

It is not enough for rejection of all alternative sites to show that a proposed site is a rational selection from the standpoint solely of system reliability and stability. For the comparison to rest on this limited factor, it would also have to be shown that the alternative sites suffer so badly on this factor that no need existed to compare the sites from other standpoints. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 497 (1978).

For application of the "obviously superior" standard, see Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 393-399 (1978), particularly at 8 NRC 397 where the Appeal Board equates "obviously" to "clearly and substantially."

#### **6.16.4.2 Standards for Conducting Cost-Benefit Analysis Related to Alternatives**

If, under NEPA, the Commission finds that environmentally preferable alternatives exist, then it must undertake a cost-benefit balancing to determine whether such alternatives should be implemented. Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), ALAB-660, 14 NRC 987, 1004 (1981), citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155 (1978).

Neither the NRC Staff nor a Licensing Board is limited to reviewing only those alternate sites unilaterally selected by the applicant. To do so would permit decisions to be based upon "sham" alternatives elected to be identified by an applicant and would often result in consideration of something less than the full range of reasonable alternatives that NEPA contemplates. The adequacy of the alternate site analysis performed by the Staff remains a proper subject of inquiry by the Licensing Board, notwithstanding the fact that none of the alternatives selected by the applicant proves to be "obviously superior" to the proposed site. Tennessee Valley Authority (Phipps Bend Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-60, 6 NRC 647, 659 (1977). Nevertheless, the NEPA evaluation of alternatives is subject to a "rule

of reason" and application of that rule "may well justify exclusion or but limited treatment" of a suggested alternative. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 100 (1977), citing CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 540 (1977).

In Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503 (1977), the Commission set forth standards for determining whether, in connection with conducting a second cost-benefit analysis to consider alternate sites, the Licensing Board should account for nontransferable investments made at the previously approved site. Where the earlier environmental analysis of the proposed site had been soundly made, the projected costs of construction at the alternate site should take into account nontransferable investments in the proposed site. Where the earlier analysis lacked integrity, prior expenditures in the proposed site should be disregarded. CLI-77-8, 5 NRC at 533-536.

Population is one -- but only one -- factor to be considered in evaluating alternative sites. All other things being equal, it is better to place a plant farther from population concentrations. The population factor alone, however, usually cannot justify dismissing alternative sites which meet the Commission's regulations. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 510 (1978).

In alternative site considerations, the presence of an existing reactor at a particular site where the proposed reactor might be built is significant, but not dispositive. Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 394-395 (1978).

In assessing the environmental harm associated with land clearance necessary to build a nuclear facility, one must look at what is being removed -- not just how many acres are involved. Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 395 (1978).

In considering the economic costs of building a facility at an alternative site, the costs of replacement power which might be required by reason of the substitution at a late date of an alternate site for the proposed site may be considered. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 394 (1978). However, where no alternative site is "obviously superior" from an environmental standpoint, there is no need to consider this "delay cost" factor. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 533-536 (1977); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 398 (1978) Indeed, unless an alternative site is shown to be environmentally superior, comparisons of economic costs are irrelevant. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. (Sterling Power Project, Nuclear Unit 1), ALAB-502, 8 NRC 383, 395 n.25 (1978).

#### **6.16.5 Need for Facility**

NEPA does not foreclose reliance, in resolution of "need-of-power" issues, on the judgment of local regulatory bodies that are charged with the responsibility to analyze future electrical demand growth, at least where the forecasts are not facially defective, are explained on a detailed record, and a principal participant in the local proceeding

has been made available for examination in the NRC proceeding. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-490, 8 NRC 234, 241 (1978).

The general rule applicable to cases involving differences or changes in demand forecasts is not whether the utility will need additional generating capacity but when. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-80-30, 12 NRC 683, 691 (1980).

The standard for judging the "need-for-power" is whether a forecast of demand is reasonable and additional or replacement generating capacity is needed to meet that demand. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1-4), ALAB-490, 8 NRC 234, 237 (1978).

For purposes of NEPA, need-for-power and alternative energy source issues are not to be considered in operating license proceedings for nuclear power plants. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 527-528 (1982); Carolina Power & Light Co. & North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-837, 23 NRC 525, 544-546 (1986).

In general, the NRC's environmental evaluation in an operating license proceeding will not consider need for power, alternative energy sources, or alternative sites. 10 CFR §§ 51.95, 51.106.

NEPA does not require NRC staff, when preparing and EIS for an offsite Independent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), to consider whether or not the nation as a whole "needs" the facility. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-4, 59 NRC 31, 40 (2004).

#### **6.16.6 Cost-Benefit Analysis Under NEPA**

The NEPA cost-benefit analysis considers the costs and benefits to society as a whole. Rather than isolate the costs or benefits to a particular group, overall benefits are weighed against overall costs. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 391 (1978); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77 (1998).

A cost-benefit analysis should include the consideration and balancing of qualitative as well as quantitative impacts. Those factors which cannot reasonably be quantified should be considered in qualitative terms. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-84-42, 20 NRC 1296, 1329-1330 (1984), citing Statement of Considerations for 10 CFR Part 51, 49 Fed. Reg. 9363 (March 12, 1984); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77 (1998).

NEPA requires a weighing of the environmental costs of a project against its benefits to society at large; however, while economic benefits are properly considered in an EIS, NEPA does not transform the financial costs and benefits into environmental costs and benefits. Thus, the Commission rejected an intervenor's request to reopen a proceeding and supplement an EIS where it found that the resulting difference in the NEPA analysis would be primarily financial (i.e., an increase in the licensee's expenses, reducing the project's economic benefits). Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-06-3, 63 NRC 19, 30 (2006).

Where a licensing board is required by regulation (e.g. by 10 C.F.R. § 51.105(a)(3)) to weigh costs versus benefits pursuant to NEPA, the fact that the hearing notice does not refer to this weighing of costs and benefits does not excuse the Board from conducting this required analysis. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 46 (2005).

In weighing the costs and benefits of a facility, adjudicatory boards must consider the time and resources that have already been invested if the facility has been partially completed. Money and time already spent are irrelevant only where the NEPA comparison is between completing the proposed facility on the one hand and abandoning that facility on the other. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-392, 5 NRC 759 (1977). In comparing the costs of completion of a facility at the proposed site to the costs of building the facility at an alternate site, the Commission may consider the fact that costs have already been incurred at the proposed site. New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 95-96 (1st Cir. 1978).

Unless a proposed nuclear unit has environmental disadvantages when compared to alternatives, differences in financial cost are of little concern. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-26, 8 NRC 102, 161 (1978); Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-82-117A, 16 NRC 1964, 1993 (1982), citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-458, 7 NRC 155, 162 (1978). Only after an environmentally superior alternative has been identified do economic considerations become relevant. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 527 (1982). The Commission is not in the business of regulating the market strategies of licensees. Under NEPA, determination of economic benefits and costs that are tangential to environmental consequences are within a wide area of agency discretion. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-05-28, 62 NRC 721, 726 (2005).

A reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative, substantial reduction in benefits should trigger the need, under NEPA, to reevaluate the cost-benefit balance of a proposed action before further irreversible environmental costs are incurred. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-57, 18 NRC 445, 630-31 (1983).

The NRC considers need-for-power and alternative energy sources (e.g., a coal plant) as part of its NEPA cost benefit analysis at the construction permit stage for a nuclear power reactor. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-27A, 17 NRC 971, 972 (1983). See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2), 1 NRC 347, 352-72 (1975); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 522 (1977). In the operating license environmental analysis, however, need-for-power and alternative energy sources are not considered and contentions which directly implicate need-for-power projections and comparisons to coal are barred by the regulations; correlatively, such comparative cost savings may not be counted as a benefit in the Staff's NEPA cost-benefit analysis. Carolina Power and Light Co. and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-27A, 17 NRC 971, 974 (1983).

Even if the cost-benefit balance for a plant is favorable, measures may be ordered to minimize particular impacts. Such measures may be ordered without awaiting the ultimate outcome of the cost-benefit balance. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-11, 17 NRC 413, 419 (1983).

While the balancing of costs and benefits of a project is usually done in the context of an environmental impact statement prepared because the project will have significant environmental impacts, at least one court has implied that a cost-benefit analysis may be necessary for certain Federal actions which, of themselves, do not have a significant environmental impact. Specifically, the court opined that an operating license amendment derating reactor power significantly could upset the original cost-benefit balance and, therefore, require that the cost-benefit balance for the facility be reevaluated. Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

In assessing how economic benefits are portrayed, a key consideration of several courts has been whether the economic assumptions of the FEIS were so distorted as to impair fair consideration of the project's adverse environmental effects. Louisiana Energy Services, (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 89 (1998).

Sunk costs are as a matter of law not appropriately considered in an operating license cost-benefit balance. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 586-87 (1982), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-77-8, 5 NRC 503, 534 (1977); Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-95, 16 NRC 1401, 1404-1405 (1982).

An adequate final environmental impact statement for a nuclear facility necessarily includes the lesser impacts attendant to low power testing of the facility and removes the need for a separate focusing on questions such as the costs and benefits of low power testing. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 795 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

When licensing boards, pursuant to NEPA, are considering the environmental impacts of licensing a facility, they must weigh the costs of constructing and operating the facility versus the benefits of doing so. Yet, where the proceeding concerns merely an early site permit application, the board should not attempt to weigh costs and benefits. That weighing process must be postponed until the review of an actual license application to build a facility at the site in question, because until then there would not be enough specific information about the project to permit a proper and meaningful cost-benefit analysis. Dominion Nuclear North Anna, LLC (Early Site Permit for North Anna ESP Site), CLI-05-17, 62 NRC 5, 46-47 (2005).

Under NRC regulations (10 C.F.R. § 52.18), an EIS for an early site permit application does not need to assess the benefits of the project. Exelon Generation Company (Early Site Permit for Clinton ESP Site), LBP-05-19, 62 NRC 134, 167 (2005).

Analysis of the costs of alternative power generation technologies and the costs of constructing and operating the proposed nuclear facility were deemed unnecessary by the Board where it had not been shown that a reasonable alternative to the proposed



nuclear facility would be environmentally preferable. Clinton ESP, LBP-05-19, 62 NRC at 176-79.

There is a difference between an “environmental impact” and a purely economic benefit discussed in an EIS. NEPA’s cost-benefit analysis requires the agency to weigh economic benefits against environmental impacts. This does not, however, transform those economic benefits into environmental impacts. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-22, 60 NRC 125, 147-48 (2004).

Congress’s alleged preference for on site storage of high level radioactive waste as express in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, is neither an economic nor an environmental, cost or benefit of the proposed licensing action that must be considered as part of NEPA’s cost benefit analysis. Congressional preferences are not necessarily the most environmentally benign nor the most economically beneficial. PFS, CLI-04-22, 60 NRC at 152.

#### **6.16.6.1 Consideration of Specific Costs Under NEPA**

When water quality decisions have been made by the EPA pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and these decisions are raised in NRC licensing proceedings, the NRC is bound to take EPA’s considered decisions at face value and simply to factor them into the NEPA cost-benefit analysis. Carolina Power & Light Co. (H.B. Robinson Unit 2), ALAB-569, 10 NRC 557, 561-62 (1979).

The environmental and economic costs of decommissioning necessarily comprise a portion of the cost-benefit analysis which the Commission must make. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 313 (1979).

Alternative methods of decommissioning do not have to be discussed. All that need be shown is that the estimated costs do not tip the balance against the plant and that there is reasonable assurance that an applicant can pay for them. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-79-6, 9 NRC 291, 314 (1979).

##### **6.16.6.1.1 Cost of Withdrawing Farmland from Production**

(Also see Section 3.7.3.5.1)

##### **6.16.6.1.2 Socioeconomic Costs as Affected by Increased Employment and Taxes from Proposed Facility**

Increased employment and tax revenue cannot be included on the benefit side in striking the ultimate NEPA cost-benefit balance for a particular plant. But the presence of such factors can certainly be taken into account in weighing the potential extent of the socioeconomic impact which the plant might have upon local communities. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC 477, 509 n.58 (1978).

### 6.16.7 Consideration of Class 9/"Remote and Speculative" Accidents in an Environmental Impact Statement

The ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria as set forth in 10 CFR § 50.46 and Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 assume that ECCS will operate during an accident. On the other hand, Class 9 accidents postulate the failure of the ECCS. Thus, on its face, consideration of Class 9 accidents would appear to be a challenge to the Commission's regulations. However, the Commission has squarely held that the regulations do not preclude the use of inconsistent assumptions about ECCS failure for other purposes. Thus, the prohibition of challenges to the regulations in adjudicatory proceedings does not preclude the consideration of Class 9 accidents and a failure of ECCS related thereto in environmental impact statements and proceedings thereon. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 221 (1978).

Because the law does not require consistency in treatment of two parties in different circumstances, the Staff does not violate principles of fairness in considering Class 9 accidents in environmental impact statements for floating but not land based plants. The Staff need only provide a reasonable explanation why the differences justify a departure from past agency practice. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 222 (1978).

In proceedings instituted prior to June, 1980, serious (Class 9) accidents need be considered only upon a showing of "special circumstances." Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-82-58, 16 NRC 512, 529 (1982); 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 13, 1980). The subsequent Commission requirement that NEPA analysis include consideration of Class 9 accidents (45 Fed. Reg. 40101) cannot be equated with a health and safety requirement. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82106, 16 NRC 1649, 1664 (1982). The fact that a nuclear power plant is located near an earthquake fault and in an area of known seismic activity does not constitute a special circumstance. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 826-828 (1984), aff'd in part, LBP-82-70, 16 NRC 756 (1982) (full power license for Unit 1). See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 795-796 (1983).

Absent new and significant safety information, Licensing Boards may not act on proposals concerning Class 9 accidents in operating reactors. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-21, 23 NRC 849, 870 (1986), citing 50 Fed. Reg. 32144, 32144-45 (Aug. 8, 1985). Licensing Boards may not admit contentions which seek safety measures to mitigate or control the consequences of Class 9 accidents in operating reactors. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 846-47 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 30-31 (1987), reconsider. denied, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-26, 28 NRC 440, 443-45, 446 (1988), reconsidered, LBP-89-6, 29 NRC 127, 132-35 (1989), rev'd, ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29, 45-47 (1989), vacated in part and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7,

32 NRC 129 (1990). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units & 2), LBP-89-3, 29 NRC 51, 54 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-915, 29 NRC 427 (1989). However, pursuant to their NEPA responsibilities, Licensing Boards may consider the risks of such accidents. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 25 NRC 838, 854-55 (1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 31 n.28 (1987), reconsid. denied, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277, 285 (1987). See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-89-6, 29 NRC 127, 132-35 (1989)(citing Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988) and the NRC's Severe Accident Policy Statement, 50 Fed. Reg. 32138 (Aug. 8, 1985)), rev'd, ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29 (1989), vacated in part and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990).

In Diablo Canyon and Vermont Yankee the licensees applied for license amendments which would permit the expansion of each facility's spent fuel pool storage capacity. The intervenors submitted contentions, based on hypothetical accident scenarios, and requested the preparation of environmental impact statements. The Appeal Board rejected the contentions after determining that the hypothetical accident scenarios were based on remote and speculative events, and thus were Class 9 or beyond design-basis accidents which could not provide a proper basis for admission of the contentions. The Appeal Board has made it clear that: (1) NEPA does not require the preparation of an environmental impact statement on the basis of an assertion of a hypothetical accident that is a Class 9 or beyond design-basis accident, citing San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986); and (2) the NEPA Policy Statement, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101 (June 13, 1980), which describes the circumstances under which the Commission will consider, as a matter of discretion, the environmental impacts of beyond design-basis accidents, does not apply to license amendment proceedings. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277, 283-85 (1987); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-877, 26 NRC 287, 293-94 (1987); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-880, 26 NRC 449, 458-460 (1987), aff'g, LBP-87-24, 26 NRC 159 (1987), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. NRC, 862 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-88-26, 28 NRC 440, 443-45, 446 (1988), reconsidered, LBP-89-6, 29 NRC 127, 132-35 (1989), rev'd, ALAB-919, 30 NRC 29, 47-51 (1989), vacated in part and remanded, CLI-90-4, 31 NRC 333 (1990), request for clarification, ALAB-938, 32 NRC 154 (1990), clarified, CLI-90-7, 32 NRC 129 (1990). See also Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-IOA, 27 NRC 452, 458-59 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988).

NRC staff can make a determination without a full PRA analysis about whether a postulated accident sequence is 'remote and speculative' (so as not to require an analysis of its impact in an EIS) based on existing materials available to it, probabilistic and otherwise, supplemented by additional information it might obtain from the applicant in an environmental report or through requests for additional information (RAI's). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 252 (2001).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board interprets the Commission's intent to be firmly directed to deciding what is "remote and speculative" by examining the probabilities inherent in a proposed accident scenario. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-19, 52 NRC 85, 97 (2000).

#### **6.16.8 Power of NRC Under NEPA**

The Licensing Board is not obliged under NEPA to consider all issues which are currently the subject of litigation in other forums and which may some day have an impact on the amount of effluent available. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-82-45, 15 NRC 1527, 1528, 1530 (1982).

The Commission is not required by NEPA to hold formal hearings on site preparation activities because NEPA did not alter the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 421 (1982), citing Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214, 1220 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 39 Fed. Reg. 14506, 14507 (Apr. 24, 1979). "While NEPA clearly mandates that an agency fully consider environmental issues, it does not itself provide for a hearing on those issues." Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1995), citing Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that the Commission prepare an environmental impact statement only for major actions significantly affecting the environment. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 424 (1982).

A Federal agency may consider separately under NEPA the different segments of a proposed Federal action under certain circumstances. Where approval of the segment under consideration will not result in any irreversible or irretrievable commitments to remaining segments of the proposed action, the agency may address the activities of that segment separately. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 424 (1982).

An agency will consider the following factors to determine if it should confine its environmental analysis under NEPA to the portion of the plan for which approval is being sought: (1) whether the proposed portion has substantial independent utility; (2) whether approval of the proposed portion either forecloses the agency from later withholding approval of subsequent portions of the overall plan or forecloses alternatives to subsequent portions of the plan; and (3) if the proposed portion is part of a larger plan, whether that plan has become sufficiently definite such that there is high probability that the entire plan will be carried out in the near future. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-43, 22 NRC 805, 810 (1985), citing Swain v. Brinegar, 542 F.2d 364, 369 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc). Applying these criteria, the Board determined that it was not required to assess the environmental impacts of possible future construction and operation of transmission lines pursuant to an overall grid system long-range plan when considering a presently proposed part of the transmission system (operation of the Braidwood nuclear facility). Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-43, 22 NRC 805, 810-12 (1985).

The NRC Staff may, if it desires, perform a more complete review than the minimum legally required. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-72, 16 NRC 968, 972 (1982).

In some limited cases, NRC Staff review of a Licensee's preliminary environmental document may satisfy the requirement for an Environmental Assessment. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Power Station), CLI-95-13, 42 NRC 125 (1995).

Compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act does not preclude the need to comply with NEPA with regard to impacts on historic and cultural aspects of the environment. Therefore, noise impacts on proposed historic districts must be evaluated and, if necessary, mitigation measures undertaken. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-11, 17 NRC 413, 435 (1983). See also Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-05-26, 62 NRC 442, 472 (2005) (To comply with NEPA in this regard, "an agency must reasonably (1) consider the historic and cultural resources in the affected area; (2) assess the impact of the proposed action, and reasonable alternatives to that action, on cultural resources; (3) disseminate the relevant facts and assessments for public comment; and (4) respond to legitimate concerns.").

#### **6.16.8.1 Powers in General**

Commensurate with the Commission's obligation to comply with NEPA in licensing nuclear facilities is an implicit power to impose permit and license conditions indicated by the NEPA analysis.

The Commission may prescribe such regulations, orders and conditions as it deems necessary under any activity authorized pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and NEPA requires the Commission to exercise comparable regulatory authority in the environmental area. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach, Unit 2), ALAB-82, 5 AEC 350, 352 (1972).

Where necessary to assure that NEPA is complied with and its policies protected, Licensing Boards can and must ignore stipulations among the parties to that effect. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3), CLI-75-14, 2 NRC 835 (1975). Beyond this, Licensing Boards have independent responsibilities to enforce NEPA and may raise environmental issues sua sponte. Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1A, 2A, 1B & 2B), ALAB-380, 5 NRC 572 (1977).

In addressing the question as to the degree to which NEPA allows the NRC to preempt State and local regulation with respect to nuclear facilities, the Appeal Board held that the Federal doctrine of preemption invalidates local zoning decisions that substantially obstruct or delay the effectuation of an NRC license condition imposed by the Commission pursuant to NEPA. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), ALAB-399, 5 NRC 1156, 1169-70 (1977). However, the Appeal Board also indicated that, where a question is presented as to whether State or local regulations relating to alteration of a nuclear power plant are preempted under NEPA, the NRC should refrain from ruling on that question until regulatory action has been taken by the State or local agency involved. ALAB-399 at 1170. To the same effect in this regard is Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point

Station, Unit 2), ALAB-453, 7 NRC 31, 35 (1978), wherein the Appeal Board reiterated that Federal tribunals should refrain from ruling on questions of Federal preemption of State law where a State statute has not yet been definitively interpreted by the State courts or where an actual conflict between Federal and State authority has not ripened.

A State or political subdivision thereof may not substantially obstruct or delay conditions imposed upon a plant's operating license by the NRC pursuant to its NEPA responsibilities, as such actions would be preempted by Federal law. However, a State may refuse to authorize construction of a nuclear power plant on environmental or other grounds and may prevent or halt operation of an already built plant for some valid reason under State law. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), ALAB-453, 7 NRC 31, 34-35 (1978).

When another agency has yet to resolve a major issue pertaining to a particular nuclear facility, NRC may allow construction to continue at that facility only if NRC's NEPA analysis encompasses all likely outcomes of the other agency's review. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-14, 7 NRC 952, 957 (1978).

A Licensing Board may rule on the adequacy of the FES once it is introduced into evidence and may modify it if necessary. A Licensing Board's authority to issue directions to the NRC Staff regarding the performance of its independent responsibilities to prepare a draft environmental statement is limited. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-80-18, 11 NRC 906, 909 (1980).

Neither NEPA nor the Atomic Energy Act applies to activities occurring in foreign countries and subject to their sovereign control. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-562, 10 NRC 437, 445-46 (1979).

#### **6.16.8.2 Transmission Line Routing**

Consistent with its interpretation of the Commission's NEPA authority (see Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach, Unit 2), ALAB-82, 5 AEC 350 (1972)), the Appeal Board has held that the NRC has the authority under NEPA to impose conditions (i.e., require particular routes) on transmission lines, at least to the extent that the lines are directly attributable to the proposed nuclear facility. Detroit Edison Co. (Greenwood Energy Center, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-247, 8 AEC 936, 939 (1974). In addition, the Commission has legal authority to review the offsite environmental impacts of transmission lines and to order changes in transmission routes selected by an applicant. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 83 (1977).

#### **6.16.8.3 Pre-LWA Activities/Offsite Activities**

NEPA and the Commission's implementing regulations proscribe environmentally significant construction activities associated with a nuclear plant, including activities beyond the site boundary, without prior Commission approval. A "site," in the context of the Commission's NEPA responsibilities, includes land where the proposed plant is to be located and its necessary accouterments, including

transmission lines and access ways. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977). See Section 6.20 on activities prior to issuance of a Limited Work Authorization (LWA) or construction permit.

#### **6.16.8.4 Relationship to EPA with Regard to Cooling Systems**

The NRC may accept and use without independent inquiry EPA's determination of the magnitude of the marine environmental impacts from a cooling system in striking an overall cost benefit balance for the facility. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 23-24 (1978). For a discussion of the statutory framework governing the relationship between NRC and EPA in this area, see CLI-78-1, 7 NRC at 23-26. That relationship may be described thusly: EPA determines what cooling system a nuclear power facility may use and NRC factors the impacts resulting from use of that system into the NEPA cost-benefit analysis. CLI-78-1, 7 NRC at 26.

The NRC's acceptance and use, without independent inquiry, of EPA's determination as to the aquatic impacts of the Seabrook Station was upheld in New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 98 (1st Cir. 1978), aff'g Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, (1978).

The Commission may rely on final decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency prior to completion of judicial review of such decisions. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-17, 8 NRC 179, 180 (1978).

Although an adverse environmental impact on water quality resulting from a cooling system discharge is an important input in the NEPA cost-benefit balance, a Licensing Board cannot require alteration of a facility's cooling system if that system has been approved by EPA. Carolina Power & Light Co. (H. B. Robinson, Unit 2), LBP-78-22, 7 NRC 1052, 1063-64 (1978).

NRC need not re-litigate issue of environmental impacts caused by a particular cooling system when it is bound to accept that cooling system authorized by EPA. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-72, 16 NRC 968, 970 (1982), citing Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-78-1, 7 NRC 1, 24 (1978).

#### **6.16.8.5 NRC Power Under NEPA re the Federal Water Pollution Control Act**

Section 511(c)(2) of the FWPCA does not change a licensing agency's obligation to weigh degradation of water quality in its NEPA cost-benefit balance, but the substantive regulation of water pollution is in EPA's hands. Tennessee Valley Authority (Yellow Creek Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-515, 8 NRC 702, 712-13 (1978).

Section 511(c)(2) of the FWPCA requires that the Commission and the Appeal Board accept EPA's determinations on effluent limitations. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit 3), ALAB-532, 9 NRC 279, 282 (1979).

Section 511(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act does not preclude NRC from considering noise impacts of the cooling water system on the surrounding environment. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-11, 17 NRC 413, 419 (1983).

When water quality decisions have been made by the EPA pursuant to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and these decisions are raised in NRC licensing proceedings, the NRC is bound to take EPA's considered decisions at face value and simply to factor them into the NEPA cost-benefit analysis. Carolina Power & Light Co. (H.B. Robinson, Unit 2), ALAB-569, 10 NRC 557, 561-62 (1979).

#### **6.16.8.6 Environmental Justice**

The NRC integrates environmental justice considerations into its NEPA review process. See Policy Statement on the Treatment of Environmental Justice Matters in NRC Regulatory and Licensing Actions, 69 Fed. Reg. 52040 (Aug. 24, 2004). The policy statement reflects principles established by the Commission in adjudications. See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-20, 56 NRC 147, 153 (2002), rev'g LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171 (2002); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 100-10 (1998). See also Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-09, 59 NRC 120 (2004); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 64 (2001).

The purpose of Executive Order 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995) is to "underscore certain provision[s] of existing law that can help ensure that all communities and persons across the nation live in a safe and healthful environment." It does not create any new legal rights or remedies. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 102 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26, 35-36 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-20, 56 NRC 147, 153 (2002), rev'g LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171 (2002); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-9, 59 NRC 120, 123 (2004).

An agency inquiry into a license applicant's supposed discriminatory motives or acts would be far removed from NEPA's core interest in protecting the physical environment. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 102 (1998)

"Disparate impact" analysis is the principal tool for advancing environmental justice under NEPA. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171, 190 (2002). The NRC's goal is to identify and adequately weigh or mitigate effects on low-income and minority communities that become apparent only by considering factors peculiar to those communities. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-98-3, 47 NRC 77, 100 (1998); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C., (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26, 36 (1998). The Commission has focused on



addressing any disproportionately high and adverse effects in these communities. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC 31, 64 (2001).

The NRC will not focus investigations on which subgroups within a minority community may obtain special benefits as compared to others. Claims of financial or political corruption do not belong in the NRC hearing process under the rubric of environmental justice or NEPA. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-02-20, 56 NRC 147, 156-57 (2002), rev'g LBP-02-8, 55 NRC 171 (2002).

Petitioners may not file for a hearing using Executive Order 12898, "Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations" (1994) when the case concerns itself with an amendment for a site that has already been licensed. International Uranium Corp. (White Mesa Uranium Mill), LBP-97-12, 46 NRC 1, 8 (1997). Executive Order 12898, which directed agencies to take into account environmental justice issues in exercising their statutory duties, created no new substantive right. This EO is relevant only to the Commission's actions under NEPA and not under any other statutory duty, therefore, the Commission only takes into account "disproportionate adverse effects" of a project that peculiarly affect an environmental justice community and have some nexus to factors properly within the scope of NEPA. System Energy Resources, Inc. (Early Site Permit for Grand Gulf ESP Site), CLI-05-4, 61 NRC 10, 13 (2005).

Editing NEPA documents is not a function of the Commission's hearing process. Busy Licensing Boards do not sit to parse and fine-tune EISs. Grand Gulf, CLI-05-4, 61 NRC at 19.

#### **6.16.8.7 Relationship of NRC Environmental Reviews to State Law**

When the monitoring of contaminants in effluents is regulated through a state permit, the DEIS must address this monitoring, but compliance with State requirements is, in the first instance, a matter for the State. Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), LBP-05-13, 61 NRC 385, 419 (2005).

#### **6.16.9 Spent Fuel Pool Proceedings**

A spent fuel capacity expansion proceeding is subject to the hybrid hearing process outlined in 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart K, to the degree that any party wishes to invoke those procedures.

A Licensing Board is not required to consider in a spent fuel pool expansion case the environmental effects of all other spent fuel pool capacity expansions. Because pending or past licensing actions affecting the capacity of other spent fuel pools could neither enlarge the magnitude nor alter the nature of the environmental effects directly attributable to the expansion in question, there is no occasion to take into account any such pending or past actions in determining the expansion application at bar. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 267-68 (1979).

The attempt, in a licensing proceeding for an individual pool capacity expansion, to challenge the absence of an acceptable generic long-term resolution of the waste management question was precluded in Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island

Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41 (1978), remanded sub nom. Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979), restating the Commission's policy that for the purposes of licensing actions, the availability of offsite spent fuel repositories in the relatively near term should be presumed. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 267-68 (1979); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 853-54 (1987) (Licensing Board rejected a contention which sought to examine the possibilities or effects of long-term or open ended storage), aff'd in part and rev'd in Part, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13 (1987), reconsid. denied, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987).

The Licensing Board need not consider alternatives to pool capacity expansion in a proposed expansion proceeding, where the environmental effects of the proposed action are negligible. The NEPA mandate that alternatives to the proposed licensing action be explored and evaluated does not come into play where the proposed action will neither (1) entail more than negligible environmental impacts nor (2) involve the commitment of available resources respecting which there are unresolved conflicts. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 265-66 (1979); Public Service Electric and Gas Co. (Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-650, 14 NRC 43 (1981). See Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-LOA, 27 NRC 452, 459 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988).

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board found that an intervenor's assertions regarding sabotage risk to an expanded spent fuel pool did not provide a litigable basis for a NEPA contention. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-19, 52 NRC 85, 97 (2000).

In a license amendment proceeding to expand a spent fuel pool, the environmental review for such amendment need not consider the effects of continued plant operation where the environmental status quo will remain unchanged. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 NRC 312, 326 (1981), citing, Committee for Auto Responsibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980).

After analyzing the regulatory history, it was confirmed that 10 CFR § 50.68(b)(2), (4), (7) contemplate the use of enrichment, burnup and soluble boron as criticality control measures. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 260 (2000).

There is no requirement under 10 CFR 50.68(b)(4) that K-effective must be kept at or below .95 under all conditions, including the scenario involving a fresh fuel assembly misplacement concurrent with the loss of soluble boron. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 269 (2000).

In a spent fuel pool proceeding, compliance with 10 CFR § 50.55a affords compliance with Appendix B of Part 50. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-00-12, 51 NRC 247, 272 (2000).

### **6.16.10 Certificate of Compliance/Gaseous Diffusion Plant**

No environmental assessment or environmental impact statement is required for the issuance, amendment, modification, or renewal of a certificate of compliance for gaseous diffusion enrichment facilities, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 51.22(c)(19). Although NRC regulations do not require a general review of the environmental impacts associated with the issuance of certificates of compliance, an environmental assessment of the impacts of compliance plan approval is required. U.S. Enrichment Corp., CLI-96-12, 44 NRC 231, 238-39 (1996).

### **6.16.11 Waste Confidence Rule (NEPA)**

The waste confidence rule's restriction on considering "environmental impacts" at 10 CFR § 51.23(b) does not expressly address how the NRC evaluates a project's potential economic benefits. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-04-22, 60 NRC 125, 148 (2004). The waste confidence provisions were designed to limit the scope of the environmental inquiry to exclude looking at long term effects as if there were no prospect for permanent disposal of waster. They were not designed to prevent the NRC from considering the very benefits for which a facility license is sought. Id.

## **6.17 NRC Staff**

### **6.17.1 Staff Role in Licensing Proceedings**

The NRC Staff generally has the final word in all safety matters, not placed into controversy by parties, at the operating license stage. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 143 (1982), citing South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-663, 14 NRC 1140, 1156 n.31 (1981).

The NRC Staff has a continuing responsibility to assure that all regulatory requirements are met by an applicant and continue to be met throughout the operating life of a nuclear power plant. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-680, 16 NRC 127, 143, 143 n.23 (1982).

The NRC Staff has the primary responsibility for reviewing all safety and environmental issues prior to the award of any operating license. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-91, 16 NRC 1364, 1369 (1982).

An operating license may not be issued until the NRC makes the findings specified in 10 CFR § 50.57. It is the Staff's duty to ensure the existence of an adequate basis for each of that section's determinations. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-678, 15 NRC 1400, 1420 n.36 (1982), citing South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895-896 (1981).

The fact that an application for an operating license is uncontested does not mean that an operating license automatically issues. An operating license may not issue unless and until the NRC Staff makes the findings specified in 10 CFR 50.57, including the ultimate finding that such issuance will not be inimical to the health and safety of the

public. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 553 n.8 (1983), citing South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-642, 13 NRC 881, 895-96 (1981). The same procedure applies under 10 CFR § 70.23, 70.31 in the case of an application for a materials license. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 48 (1984).

In a contested operating license proceeding, a Licensing Board may authorize the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to issue a license for fuel loading and precriticality testing in order to avoid delaying these activities pending a decision on the issuance of a full power license. If the Board determines that any of the admitted contentions is relevant to fuel loading and precriticality testing, the Board must resolve the contention and make the related findings pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.57(a) for the issuance of a license. The Director is still responsible for making the other § 50.57(a) findings. If there are no relevant contentions, the Board may authorize the Director to make all the § 50.57(a) findings. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-31, 24 NRC 451, 453-54 (1986), citing 10 CFR § 50.57(c). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-34, 24 NRC 549, 553, 555-56 (1986), aff'd, ALAB-854, 24 NRC 783, 790 (1986) (a Licensing Board is required to make findings concerning the adequacy of onsite emergency preparedness, pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.47(d), only as to matters which are in controversy); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-892, 27 NRC 485, 490-93 (1988) (to authorize low-power operation pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.57(c), a board need only resolve those matters in controversy involving low-power, as opposed to full power, operation); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-88-20, 28 NRC 161, 166-67 (1988), aff'd, ALAB-904, 28 NRC 509, 511 (1988).

One of a number of Licensing Boards in the Shoreham operating license proceeding, having dismissed the government intervenors from the proceeding, found that the applicant's motion for 25% power operation was unopposed. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.57(c), the Board authorized the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to make the required findings under 10 CFR § 50.57(a) and to issue a 25% power license. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-8830, 28 NRC 644, 648-49 (1988). The Appeal Board found that the Licensing Board's decision did not give due regard to the rights of the government intervenors. Although the government intervenors had been dismissed by the Shoreham OL-3 Licensing Board, they still retained full party status before the Shoreham OL-5 Licensing Board. The Appeal Board believed that 10 CFR § 50.57(c) gave the government intervenors the opportunity to be heard on the 25% power request to the extent that any of its contentions which might be admitted by the Shoreham OL-5 Board were relevant. The Appeal Board certified the case to the Commission. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-908, 28 NRC 626, 633-35 (1988). The Commission directed certification of the appeals to the Commission for decision and agreed with the Licensing Board, dismissed the intervenors and ordered the staff to review any unresolved contentions, make the necessary § 50.57 findings, and wait for a Commission vote to authorize operation above 5% power. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-89-2, 29 NRC 211 (1989).

The NRC Staff may not deny an application without giving the reasons for the denial, and indicating how the application failed to comply with statutory and regulatory

requirements. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), LBP-85-3, 21 NRC 244, 250 (1985), citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943), Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-770, 19 NRC 1163, 1168-69 (1984), 5 U.S.C. 555(e), 10 CFR § 2.103(b).

In general, the Staff does not occupy a favored position at hearing. It is, in fact, just another party to the proceeding. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-138, 6 AEC 520, 532 (1973). The Staff's views are in no way binding upon the Board and they cannot be accepted without being subjected to the same scrutiny as those of other parties. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-304, 3 NRC 1, 6 (1976); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-268, 1 NRC 383, 399 (1975); Ohio Edison Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1) et al., CLI-92-6, 35 NRC 86, 88-89 (1992). In the same vein, the Staff must abide by the Commission's regulations just as an applicant or intervenor must do. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-194, 7 AEC 431, 435 (1974); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-801, 21 NRC 479, 484 (1985). On the other hand, in certain situations, as where the Staff prepares a study at the express direction of the Commission, the Staff is an arm of the Commission and the primary instrumentality through which the NRC carries out its regulatory responsibilities and its submissions are entitled to greater consideration. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-76-17, 4 NRC 451 (1976).

In a construction permit proceeding, the NRC Staff has a duty to produce the necessary evidence of the adequacy of the review of unresolved generic safety issues. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 806 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983).

After an order authorizing the issuance of a construction permit has become final agency action, and prior to the commencement of any adjudicatory proceeding on any operating license application, the exclusive regulatory power with regard to the facility lies with the Staff. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-381, 5 NRC 582 (1977). Under such circumstances an adjudicatory board has no authority with regard to the facility or the Staff's regulation of it. In the same vein, after a full-term, full power operating license has issued and the order authorizing it has become final agency action, no further jurisdiction over the license lies with any adjudicatory board. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-451, 6 NRC 889, 891 n.3 (1977); Duquesne Light Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-408, 5 NRC 1383, 1386 (1977); Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), LBP-78-11, 7 NRC 381, 386, aff'd, ALAB-470, 7 NRC 473 (1978).

Prior to issuing an operating license, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation must find that Commission regulations, including those implementing NEPA, have been satisfied and that the activities authorized by the license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. and Allegheny Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-693, 16 NRC 952, 956 n.7 (1982), citing 10 CFR § 50.40(d); 10 CFR § 50.57; Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 44 (1978), remanded on other grounds sub nom., Minnesota v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Licensing Boards lack the power to direct the Staff in the performance of its independent responsibilities and, under the Commission's regulatory scheme, Boards cannot direct the Staff to suspend review of an application, preparation of an environmental impact statement or work, studies or analyses being conducted or planned as part of the Staff's evaluation of an application. New England Power Co. (NEP, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271, 278-79 (1978). Cf. U.S. Army (Jefferson Proving Ground), LBP-05-9, 61 NRC 218, 222 (2005) (In a materials license proceeding, where the Staff delayed its technical review of a decommissioning-related proposal pending a licensee's submission of relevant information requested by the Staff, a presiding officer found that he was foreclosed from either calling upon the Staff to justify its approach or directing the Licensee to furnish a full explanation regarding its default in furnishing to the Staff the information sought from it).

The Staff produces, among other documents, the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and the Draft and Final Environmental Statements (DES and FES). The studies and analyses which result in these reports are made independently by the Staff, and Licensing Boards have no role or authority in their preparation. The Board does not have any supervisory authority over that part of the application review process that has been entrusted to the Staff. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-83-36, 18 NRC 45, 48-49 (1983), citing New England Power Co. (NEP Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-9, 7 NRC 271 (1978). See Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 206-07 (1978); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-785, 20 NRC 848, 865 n.52 (1984); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 56 (1985), citing Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514, 516-17 (1980).

Although the establishment of a local public document room is an independent Staff function, the presiding officer in an informal proceeding has directed the Staff to establish such a room in order to comply with the requirements of proposed regulations which had been made applicable to the proceeding. However, the presiding officer acknowledged that he lacked the authority to specify the details of the room's operation. Alfred J. Morabito (Senior Operator's License), LBP-88-5, 27 NRC 241, 243-44 & n.1 (1988).

Although the Licensing Boards and the NRC Staff have independent responsibilities, they are "partners" in implementation of the Commission's policy that decisionmaking should be "both sound and timely," and thus they must coordinate their operations in order to achieve this goal. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 203 (1978).

In an operating license proceeding (with the exception of certain NEPA issues), the applicant's license application is in issue, not the adequacy of the Staff's review of the application. An intervenor thus is free to challenge directly an unresolved generic safety issue by filing a proper contention but it may not proceed on the basis of allegations that the Staff has somehow failed in its performance. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 807 (1983), review denied, CLI-83 32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-812, 22 NRC 5, 55-56 (1985). See Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-921, 30 NRC 177, 186 (1989); Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-91-31, 34 NRC 29, 108-

109 (1991), clarified, LBP-91-34, 34 NRC 159 (1991). Furthermore, although the Commission expects its Staff to thoroughly consider all its licensing decisions, the issue for decision in adjudications is not whether the Staff performed its duty well, but instead whether the license application raises health and safety concerns. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 396 (1995).

The adequacy of the manner in which the Staff conducts its review of a technical or safety matter is outside the scope of Commission proceedings. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-11, 58 NRC 47, 66 (2003).

The general rule that the applicant carries the burden of proof in licensing proceedings does not apply with regard to alternate site considerations. For alternate sites, the burden of proof is on the Staff and the applicant's evidence in this regard cannot substitute for an inadequate analysis by the Staff. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), ALAB-479, 7 NRC 774, 794 (1978). The Staff plays a key role in assessing an applicant's qualifications. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 34 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

The Staff is assumed to be fair and capable of judging a matter on its merits. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 4 (1980). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-4, 29 NRC 62, 73 (1989), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-918, 29 NRC 473 (1989), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Massachusetts v. NRC, 924 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed as moot, ALAB-946, 33 NRC 245 (1991).

When conducting its review of the issues, the Staff should acknowledge differences of opinion among Staff members and give full consideration to views which differ from the official Staff position. Such discussion can often contribute to a more effective treatment and resolution of the issues. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-803, 21 NRC 575, 580-582 n.6 (1985).

An early appraisal of an applicant's capability does not foreclose the Staff from later altering its conclusions. Such an early appraisal would aid the public and the Commission in seeing whether a hearing is warranted. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-577, 11 NRC 18, 33-34 (1980), reconsidered, ALAB-581, 11 NRC 233 (1980), modified, CLI-80-12, 11 NRC 514 (1980).

#### **6.17.1.1 Staff Demands on Applicant or Licensee**

While the Commission, through the Regulatory Staff, has a continuing duty and responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to assure that applicants and licensees comply with the applicable requirements, Duke Power Co. (William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-143, 6 AEC 623, 627 (1973), the Staff may not require an applicant to do more than the regulations require without a hearing. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Power Station), ALAB-191, 7 AEC 431, 445, 447 n.32 (1974). The Staff can require a general licensee to comply with public health and safety conditions which are more stringent

than the Commission's regulatory requirements applicable to general licensees. Wrangler Laboratories, ALAB-951, 33 NRC 505, 516-18 (1991). Because the law does not require consistency in treatment of two parties in different circumstances, the Staff does not violate principles of fairness in considering Class 9 accidents in environmental impact statements for floating but not land based plants. The Staff need only provide a reasonable explanation why the differences justify a departure from past agency practice. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 222 (1978).

The scope of the NRC regulatory authority does not extend to all questions of fire safety at licensed facilities; instead, the scope of agency regulatory authority with respect to fire protection is limited to the hazards associated with nuclear materials. Thus, while the agency's radiological protection responsibility requires it to consider questions of fire safety, this does not convert the agency into the direct enforcer of local codes, Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations, or national standards on fire, occupational, and building safety that it has not incorporated into its regulatory scheme. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 388 (2000), citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 393 (1995); Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 159 (1995).

Only statutes, regulations, orders, and license conditions can impose requirements on applicants and licenses. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 390 (2000), citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC at 41, 98.

#### **6.17.1.2 Staff Witnesses**

Except in extraordinary circumstances, a Licensing Board may not compel the Staff to furnish a particular named individual to testify - *i.e.*, the Staff may select its own witnesses. 10 CFR § 2.709(a) (formerly § 2.720(h)(2)(i)). However, once a certain individual has appeared as a Staff witness, he may be recalled and compelled to testify further. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 391 (1974). A Board may require Staff witnesses to update their previous testimony on a relevant issue in light of new analyses and information which have been developed on the same subject. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-786, 20 NRC 1087, 1094-1095 n.13 (1984).

The Commission's rules provide that the Executive Director for Operations generally determines which Staff witnesses shall present testimony. An adjudicatory board may nevertheless order other NRC personnel to appear upon a showing of exceptional circumstances, such as a case in which a particular named NRC employee has direct personal knowledge of a material fact not known to the witnesses made available by the Executive Director for Operations. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-715, 17 NRC 102, 104-05 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.709(a) (formerly § 2.720(h)(2)(i)); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-802, 21 NRC 490, 500-501 (1985) (mere disagreement among NRC Staff members is not an exceptional circumstance); Carolina Power & Light Co. et al. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-856, 24 NRC 802, 811 (1986). See Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decontamination), LBP-92-3A, 35 NRC 110, 111-112 (1992). See



generally Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-613, 12 NRC 317, 323 (1980).

### 6.17.1.3 Post Hearing Resolution of Outstanding Matters by the Staff

As a general proposition, issues should be dealt with in the hearings and not left over for later, and possibly more informal, resolution. The post hearing approach should be employed sparingly and only in clear cases, for example, where minor procedural deficiencies are involved. Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1103 (1983), citing Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit No. 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951 n.8, 952 (1974); accord, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-298, 2 NRC 730, 736-37 (1975); Washington Public Power Supply System (Hanford No. 2 Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-113, 6 AEC 251, 252 (1973); Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-2, 19 NRC 36, 210 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, ALAB-793, 20 NRC 1591, 1627 (1984); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 494 (1986).

On the other hand, with respect to emergency planning, the Licensing Board may accept predictive findings and post hearing verification of the formulation and implementation of emergency plans. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-2, 19 NRC 36, 212, 251-52, citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1103-04 (1983); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1600, 1601 (1985); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 494-95 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-32, 30 NRC 375, 569, 594 (1989), rev'd in part on other grounds and remanded, ALAB-937, 32 NRC 135 (1990), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, ALAB-941, 32 NRC 337 (1990), and aff'd, ALAB-947, 33 NRC 299, 318, 346, 347, 348-349, 361-362 (1991).

Completion of the minor details of emergency plans are a proper subject for post hearing resolution by the NRC Staff. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26, 20 NRC 53, 61-62 (1984), citing Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076 (1983).

A Licensing Board may refer minor matters which in no way pertain to the basic findings necessary for issuance of a license to the Staff for post hearing resolution. Such referral should be used sparingly, however. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951-52 (1974); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1159 (1984). Since delegation of open matters to the Staff is a practice frowned upon by the Commission and the Appeal Board, a Licensing Board properly decided to delay issuing a construction permit until it had reviewed a loan guarantee from Rural Electrification Administration rather than delegating that responsibility to the Staff for post hearing resolution. Public Service Co. of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 318 (1978).

Post-hearing resolution of licensing issues must not be employed to obviate the basic findings prerequisite to a license, including a reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public. Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 4 (2006) (citing Consol. Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951-52 (1974)).

A Licensing Board has delegated to the Staff responsibility for reviewing and approving changes to a licensee's plan for the design and operation of an on-site waste burial project. The Board believed that such a delegation was appropriate where the Board had developed a full and complete hearing record, resolved every litigated issue, and reviewed the project plan which the licensee had developed, at the Board's request, to summarize and consolidate its testimony during the hearing concerning the project. Toledo Edison Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-11, 25 NRC 287, 298 (1987).

The mere pendency of confirmatory Staff analyses regarding litigated issues does not automatically foreclose Board resolution of those issues. The question is whether the Board has adequate information, prior to the completion of the Staff analyses, on which to base its decision. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1171 (1984).

In a materials licensing proceeding, the Commission rejected an intervenor's argument that because the licensee might not adhere to the methodology in its license, the intervenor should therefore have rights to an adjudicatory hearing on future determinations made in connection with particular license conditions. This argument would transmogrify license proceedings into open-ended enforcement actions; licensing boards would be required to keep license proceedings open for the entire life of the license so intervenors would have a continuing, unrestricted opportunity to raise charges of noncompliance. If the intervenors subsequently have cause to believe that the licensee is not following the relevant procedures, they can petition the Staff for enforcement action. Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 5-6 (2006).

In order to conduct an expeditious hearing, without having to wait for the completion of confirmatory tests by a licensee and analysis of the test results by the Staff, a Licensing Board may decide to conduct a hearing on all matters ripe for adjudication and to grant an intervenor an opportunity to request an additional hearing limited to matters, within the scope of the admitted contentions, which arise subsequent to the closing of the record. The intervenor must be given timely access to all pertinent information developed by the licensee and the Staff after the close of the hearing with respect to the confirmatory tests. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-14, 23 NRC 553, 560-61 (1986), citing Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-73-35, 6 AEC 861, 865 (1973), aff'd, ALAB-226, 8 AEC 381, 400 (1974). Although the intervenor will not be required to meet the usual standards for reopening a record, the intervenor must indicate in the motion to reopen that the new test data and analyses are so significant as to change the result of the prior hearing. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-17, 23 NRC 792, 797 (1986).

The Licensing Board must determine that the analyses remaining to be performed will merely confirm earlier Staff findings regarding the adequacy of the plant. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-32, 22 NRC 434, 436 & n.2, 440 (1985), citing Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station, Unit 2), CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947, 951 (1974), which cites, Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), CLI-73-4, 6 AEC 6 (1973) (the mechanism of post-hearing findings is not to be used to provide a reasonable assurance that a facility can be operated without endangering the health and safety of the public); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-729, 17 NRC 814 (1983) (post hearing procedures may be used for confirmatory tests); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-811, 21 NRC 1622 (1985) (once a method of evaluation had been used to confirm that one of two virtually identical units had met the standard of a reasonable assurance of safety, it was acceptable to exclude from hearings the use of the same evaluation method to confirm the adequacy of the second unit). Staff analyses which are more than merely confirmatory because a further evaluation is necessary to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements in light of negative findings of the Licensing Board regarding certain equipment and that relate to contested issues should be retained with the Board's jurisdiction until a satisfactory evaluation is produced. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-841, 24 NRC 64, 79-80 (1986).

Post-hearing issue resolution involving confirmatory analysis by the Staff is acceptable with respect to soil cement testing when the Staff action involves verification only. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-8, 57 NRC 293, 328-329 (2003).

At the same time, it is entirely appropriate for the Staff to resolve matters not at issue in an operating license or amendment proceeding. In such proceedings, once a Licensing Board has resolved any contested issues and any issues which it raises sua sponte, the decision as to all other matters which need be considered prior to issuance of an operating license is the responsibility of the Staff alone. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976); Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-181, 7 AEC 207, 209 n.7 (1974); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-854, 24 NRC 783, 790-91 (1986). The Licensing Board is neither required nor expected to pass upon all items which the Staff must consider before the operating license is issued. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-319, 3 NRC 188, 190 (1976).

#### **6.17.2 Status of Staff Regulatory Guides**

(See Section 6.21.3)

#### **6.17.3 Status of Staff Position and Working Papers**

Staff position papers have no legal significance for any regulatory purpose and are entitled to less weight than an adopted regulatory guide. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-268, 1 NRC 383 (1975); Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1),

ALAB-224, 8 AEC 244 (1974). Similarly, an NRC Staff working paper or draft report neither adopted nor sanctioned by the Commission itself has no legal significance for any NRC regulatory purpose. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-355, 4 NRC 397 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2), ALAB-209, 7 AEC 971, 973 (1974). But see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-87-17, 25 NRC 838, 857-60 (1987) (the Licensing Board admitted contentions that questioned the sufficiency of an applicant's responses to an NRC Staff guidance document which provided guidelines for Staff review of spent fuel pool modification applications), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, ALAB-869, 26 NRC 13, 34 (1987), reconsid. denied, ALAB-876, 26 NRC 277 (1987).

Nonconformance with regulatory guides or Staff positions does not mean that General Design Criteria are not met; applicants are free to select other methods to comply with the G.D.C. The G.D.C. are intended to provide engineering goals rather than precise tests by which reactor safety can be gauged. Petition for Emergency & Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406 (1978).

#### **6.17.4 Status of Standard Review Plan**

Where the applicant used criteria "required" by the Staff's Standard Review Plan (NUREG-75/087, § 2.2.3) in determining the probability of occurrence of a postulated accident, it is not legitimate for the Staff to base its position on a denigration of the process which the Staff itself had promulgated. Public Service Electric & Gas (Hope Creek Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-518, 9 NRC 14, 29 (1979).

#### **6.17.5 Conduct of NRC Employees**

(RESERVED)

### **6.18 Orders of Licensing Boards and Presiding Officers**

#### **6.18.1 Compliance with Board Orders**

Compliance with orders of an NRC adjudicatory board is mandatory unless such compliance is excused for good cause. Thus, a party may not disregard a board's direction to file a memorandum without seeking leave of the board after setting forth good cause for requesting such relief. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-488, 8 NRC 187, 190-91 (1978). Similarly, a party seeking to be excused from participation in a prehearing conference ordered by the board should present its justification in a request presented before the date of the conference. ALAB-488, 8 NRC at 191. A Licensing Board may deny an intervention petition as a sanction for the petitioner's failure to comply with a Board order to appear at a prehearing conference. Arizona Public Service Co. (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), LBP-91-13, 33 NRC 259, 262-63 (1991).

A Licensing Board is not expected to sit idly by when parties refuse to comply with its orders. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), a Licensing Board has the power and the duty to maintain order, to take appropriate action to avoid delay and to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants. Furthermore, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.320 (formerly § 2.707), the refusal of a party to comply with a Board order relating to its appearance at a proceeding constitutes a default for which

a Licensing Board may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1928 (1982).

A party may not simply refuse to comply with a direct Board order, even if it believes the Board decision to have been based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law. A Licensing Board is to be accorded the same respect as a court of law. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1930 & n.5 (1982). See 10 CFR § 2.314(a) (formerly § 2.713(a)).

When parties, for whatever reason, fail to respond or otherwise comply with Board requests, the Board has the authority to take appropriate action in accordance with its power and duty to maintain order, to avoid delay, and to regulate the course of the hearing and the conduct of the participants. Washington Public Power Supply System (Washington Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-00-18, 52 NRC 9, 13 (2000) (citing Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-5, 51 NRC 64, 67 (2000) and Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923, 1928 (1982)).

When an issue is admitted into a proceeding in an order of the Board, it becomes part of the law of that case. Parties may use the prior history of a case to interpret ambiguities in a Board order, but no party may challenge the precedential authority of a Board's decision other than in a timely motion for reconsideration. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-18, 17 NRC 501, 504 (1983).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.314 (formerly § 2.707), Licensing Boards have broad discretion to sanction willful, prejudicial, and bad-faith behavior. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-1, 53 NRC 1, 7 (2001), citing Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-902, 28 NRC 423 (1988), review denied, CLI-88-11, 28 NRC 603 (1988).

#### **6.19 Precedent and Adherence to Past Agency Practice**

Legal determinations made on appeal in a case are controlling precedent, becoming the "law of the case." A prior decision should be followed unless (1) the decision is clearly erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-06-11, 63 NRC 483, 488-89 (2006).

Application of the "law of the case" doctrine is a matter of discretion. When an administrative tribunal finds that its declared law is wrong and would work an injustice, it may apply a different rule of law in the interests of settling the case before it correctly. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-493, 8 NRC 253, 260 (1978).

That the law of the case doctrine does not apply in a particular circumstance does not mean that the prior decision is wholly without precedential value, only that it is limited to its power to persuade. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 59 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006).

An Appeal Board does not give stare decisis effect to affirmation of Licensing Board conclusions on legal issues not brought to it by way of an appeal. Duke Power Co. (Cherokee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2 & 3), ALAB-482, 7 NRC 979, 981 n.4 (1978).

A Licensing Board is required to give stare decisis effect only to an issue of law which was heard and decided in a prior proceeding. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-924, 30 NRC 331, 358-59 & n.112 (1989), citing EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986), and 1B Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.402[2], at 30.

A determination of fact in an adjudicatory proceeding which is necessarily grounded wholly in a non-adversary presentation is not entitled to be accorded generic effect, even if the determination relates to a seemingly generic matter rather than to some specific aspect of the facility in question. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Projects Nos. 3 & 5), ALAB-485, 7 NRC 986, 988 (1978).

Because the law does not require consistency in treatment of two parties in different circumstances, the Staff does not violate principles of fairness in considering Class 9 accidents in environmental impact statements for floating but not land-based plants. The Staff need only provide a reasonable explanation why the differences justify a departure from past agency practice. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 222 (1978).

## **6.20 Pre-Construction Permit Activities**

**The Commission adopted in 2007 significant changes to 10 CFR 50.10 and related regulations governing the definition of construction and the limited work authorization (LWA) process. See 72 FR 57416 (Oct. 9, 2007). As part of this rulemaking, the special definition of construction in former § 50.10(c) applicable to nuclear power reactors has been removed. The former § 50.10(b) definition of construction has been slightly modified, redesignated as paragraph (a), and as reconstituted now applies to all production and utilization facilities. An LWA is now required only for certain foundation work, including the driving of piles, placement of engineered backfill, and the construction of structural foundations. The environmental impacts review necessary for issuance of an LWA may be limited, at the applicant's request, to the environmental impacts associated with the activities to be conducted under the LWA. Much of the earlier NRC case law on LWA apply in the context of the prohibition on construction as defined in § 50.10(c), and will not be directly applicable to LWAs under the revised LWA rule.**

NEPA and the Commission's implementing regulations proscribe environmentally significant construction activities associated with a nuclear plant, including activities beyond the site boundary, without prior Commission approval. A "site" in this context includes land where the proposed plant is to be located and its necessary accouterments, including transmission lines and access ways. 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c), which broadly prohibits any substantial action which would adversely affect the environment of the site prior to Commission approval, can clearly be interpreted to bar, for example, road and railway construction leading to the site, at least where substantial clearing and grading is involved. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977). The Commission may authorize certain site-related work prior to issuance of a construction permit pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c) and (e).

The limited work authorization procedure under 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(e)(1) and (2) and the 10 C.F.R. § 50.12(b) exemption procedure are independent avenues for applicants to begin site preparation in advance of receiving a construction permit. United States Dep't of Energy, et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 423 (1982).

A request for an exemption from any Commission regulation in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, including the general prohibition on commencement of construction in 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c), may be granted under 10 C.F.R. § 50.12(a). United States Dept of Energy, et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 418 (1982).

The Commission may apply 10 C.F.R. § 50.12 to a first of a kind project. There is no indication in 10 C.F.R. § 50.12 that exemptions for conduct of site preparation activities are to be confined to typical, commercial light water nuclear power reactors. Commission practice has been to consider each exemption request on a case-by-case basis under the applicable criteria in the regulations. There is no indication in the regulations or past practice that an exemption can be granted only if an LWA-1 can also be granted or only if justified to meet electrical energy needs. United States Dep't of Energy, et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 419 (1982).

In determining whether to grant an exemption pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.12 to allow pre-permit activities the Commission considers the totality of the circumstances and evaluates the exigency of the circumstances in that overall determination. Exigent circumstances have been found where: (1) further delay would deny the public currently needed benefits that would have been provided by timely completion of the facility but were delayed due to external factors, and would also result in additional otherwise avoidable costs; and (2) no alternative relief has been granted (in part) or is imminent. The Commission will weigh the exigent circumstances offered to justify an exemption against the adverse environmental impacts associated with the proposed activities. Where the environmental impacts of the proposed activities are insignificant, but the potential adverse consequences of delay may be severe and an exemption will mitigate the effects of that delay, the case is strong for granting an exemption that will preserve the option of realizing those benefits in spite of uncertainties in the need for prompt action. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-83-1, 17 NRC 1, 4-6 (1983), citing Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1, 2, 3 & 4), CLI-74-22, 7 AEC 938 (1974); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-76-20, NRC 476 (1976); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project Nos. 3 & 5), CLI-77-11, 5 NRC 719 (1977).

Use of the exemption authority under 10 C.F.R. § 50.12 has been made available by the Commission only in the presence of exceptional circumstances. A finding of exceptional circumstances is a discretionary administrative finding which governs the availability of an exemption. A reasoned exercise of such discretion should take into account the equities of each situation. These equities include the stage of the facility's life, any financial or economic hardships, any internal inconsistencies in the regulation, the applicants good-faith effort to comply with the regulation from which the exemption is sought, the public interest in adherence to the Commission's regulations, and the safety significance of the issues involved. These equities do not, however, apply to the requisite findings on public health and safety and common defense and security. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-84-8, 19 NRC 1154, 1156 n.3 (1984);

Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-45, 20 NRC 1343, 1376-1377 (1984). The costs of unusually heavy and protracted litigation may be considered in evaluating financial or economic hardships as an equity in assessing the propriety of an exemption. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-45, 20 NRC 1343, 1378-1379 (1984).

The public interest criterion for granting an exemption from 10 C.F.R. § 50.10 under 10 C.F.R. § 50.12(b) is a stringent one: exemptions of this sort are to be granted sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances. United States Dep't of Energy, et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), CLI-82-23, 16 NRC 412, 426 (1982), citing Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Power Projects Nos. 3 & 5), CLI-77-11, 5 NRC 719 (1977).

### 6.20.1 Pre-LWA Activity

**Under 10 C.F.R. § 50.10, as revised by the Commission (72 Fed. Reg. 57,416 (Oct. 9, 2007)), the NRC no longer asserts jurisdiction over the pre-LWA activities which NRC defined as "construction" under former 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(c), and any entity may perform those pre-construction activities without NRC approval. Accordingly, the *de minimis* standard, see, e.g., Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPS Nuclear Projects 3 and 5), CLI-77-11, 5 NRC 719 (1977), is no longer relevant to proceedings involving the construction of a new utilization and production facility.**

### 6.20.2 Limited Work Authorization

In those situations where the Commission does approve offsite (through an LWA or CP) or pre-permit (through an LWA) activities, conditions may be imposed to minimize adverse impacts. Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wold Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-77-1, 5 NRC 1 (1977).

A limited work authorization allows preliminary construction work to be undertaken at the applicant's risk, pending completion of later hearings covering radiological health and safety issues. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-688, 16 NRC 471, 473 n.1 (1982) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(e)(1)); Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-573, 10 NRC 775, 778 (1979).

Applicants are not required to have every permit in hand before a Limited Work Authorization can be granted. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-26, 8 NRC 102, 123, 129 (1978).

The Board may conduct a separate hearing and issue a partial decision on issues pursuant to NEPA, general site suitability issues specified by 10 C.F.R. § 50.10(e), and certain other possible issues for a limited work authorization. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), LBP-83-8, 17 NRC 158, 161 (1983), vacated as moot, ALAB-755, 18 NRC 1337 (1983).

Although the LWA and construction permit aspects of the case are simply separate phases of the same proceeding, Licensing Boards have the authority to regulate the course of the proceeding and limit an intervenor's participation to issues in which it is



interested. United States Dep't of Energy et al. (Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant), ALAB-761, 19 NRC 487, 492 (1984) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718)).

#### **6.20.2.1 LWA Status Pending Remand Proceedings**

It has been held that, where a partial initial decision on a construction permit is remanded to the Licensing Board for further consideration, an outstanding LWA may remain in effect pending resolution of the CP issues provided that little consequential environmental damage will occur in the interim. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-335, 3 NRC 830 (1976). On appeal of this decision, however, the Court of Appeals stayed the effectiveness of the LWA pending alternate site consideration by the Licensing Board on the grounds that it is anomalous to allow construction to take place at one site while the Board is holding further hearings on other sites. Hodder v. NRC, 589 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1978).

### **6.21 Regulations**

The proper test of the validity of a regulation is whether its normal and fair interpretation will deny persons their statutory rights. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC 1041, 1047 (1983), citing American Trucking Association v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

#### **6.21.1 Compliance with Regulations**

All participants in NRC adjudicatory proceedings, whether lawyers or laymen, have an obligation to familiarize themselves with the NRC Rules of Practice. The fact that a party may be a newcomer to NRC proceedings will not excuse that party's noncompliance with the rules. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-816, 22 NRC 461, 467 n.24 (1985), citing Duke Power Co. (Perkins Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), ALAB-615, 12 NRC 350, 352 (1980); Houston Lighting & Power Co. (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-609, 12 NRC 172, 173 n.1 (1980).

Applicants and licensees must, of course, comply with the Commission's regulations, but the Staff may not compel an applicant or licensee to do more than the regulations require without a hearing. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-194, 7 AEC 431, 445, 447 n.32 (1974).

The power to grant exemptions from the regulations has not been delegated to Licensing Boards and such Boards, therefore, lack the authority to grant exemptions. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), LBP-77-35, 5 NRC 1290, 1291 (1977).

#### **6.21.2 Commission Policy Statements**

A Commission policy statement is binding upon the Commission's adjudicatory boards. Mississippi Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725, 1732 n.9 (1982), citing Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41, 51 (1978), remanded on

other grounds sub nom. Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 695 (1985), citing Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 82-83 (1974).

### 6.21.3 Regulatory Guides and Other Guidance Documents

Staff regulatory guides are not regulations and do not have the force of regulations. When challenged by an applicant or licensee, they are to be regarded merely as the views of one party, although they are entitled to considerable *prima facie* weight. See Section 6.16.2 and cases cited therein. Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-725, 17 NRC 562, 568 and n.10 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 129899 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983); Umetco Minerals Corp. LBP-93-7, 37 NRC 267 (1993); Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America v. AEC, 633 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1976); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-229, 8 AEC 425, 439, rev'd on other grounds, CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-217, 8 AEC 61, 68 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-216, 8 AEC 13, 28 n.76 (1974); Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2), ALAB-188, 7 AEC 323, 333 n.42, rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-74-23, 7 AEC 947 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-179, 7 AEC 159, 174 n.27 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 737 (1985). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-875, 26 NRC 251, 260-61 (1987); Florida Power and Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), LBP-88-10A, 27 NRC 452, 463-64 (1988), aff'd on other grounds, ALAB-893, 27 NRC 627 (1988); Sacramento Municipal Utility District (Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-93-23, 38 NRC 200, 214 (1993). Nevertheless, regulatory guides are entitled to considerable *prima facie* weight. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 811 (1974), clarified as to other matters, CLI-74-43, 8 AEC 826 (1974).

Guidance documents, such as NUREGS or the Standard Review Plan, do not have the force of legally binding regulations. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-22, 54 NRC 255, 264 (2001). Where the NRC has developed guidance documents assisting in compliance with applicable regulations, they are entitled to special weight. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-01-22, 54 NRC 255, 264 (2001). See also Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-05-15, 61 NRC 365, 375 n. 26 (2005) (discussing the contents of a Standard Review Plan). Guidance documents such as NUREGs do not purport to establish enforceable requirements, so nonconformance with such guides does not equate to noncompliance. While an NRC guidance document sets forth one way in which compliance might be obtained, other approaches to such compliance might prove just as acceptable. FMRI, Inc. [formerly Fansteel, Inc.], LBP-04-8, 59 NRC 266, 270 (2004).

A regulatory guide, however, only presents the Staff's view of how to comply with the regulatory requirements. Such a guide is advisory, not obligatory and, as the guide itself states at the bottom of the first page: "Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, and compliance with them is not required." Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-96-7, 43 NRC 142 (1996).

Staff documents (NUREG's) are intended as guidance, compliance with which is not required. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-4, 57 NRC 69, 92 (2003), review declined, CLI-03-5, 57 NRC 279 (2003). See also Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-04-29, 60 NRC 417, 424 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-37, 60 NRC 646 (2004) ("Guidance documents are, by nature, only advisory. They need not apply in all situations and do not themselves impose legal requirements on licensees.").

In the absence of other evidence, adherence to regulatory guidance may be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1299 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983); see Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406-407 (1978); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983). Generally speaking, however, such guidance is treated simply as evidence of legitimate means for complying with regulatory requirements, and the Staff is required to demonstrate the validity of its guidance if it is called into question during the course of litigation. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1299 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983); see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 811 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 737 (1985).

Interpretation from NRC guidance documents and history "may not conflict with the plain meaning of the wording used in [a] regulation," which in the end "of course must prevail." See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 288-90 (1988), review declined, CLI-88-11, 28 NRC 603 (1988); Graystar, Inc., LBP-01-7, 53 NRC 168, 187 (2001).

Nonconformance with regulatory guides or Staff positions does not mean that the General Design Criteria (G.D.C.) are not met; applicants are free to select other methods to comply with the G.D.C. The G.D.C. are intended to provide engineering goals rather than precise tests by which reactor safety can be gauged. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406 (1978).

A licensee is free either to rely on NUREGs and Regulatory Guides or to take alternative approaches to meet its legal requirements (as long as those approaches have the approval of the Commission or NRC Staff). Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 398 (1995). Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1299 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983).

While it is clear that regulatory guides are not regulations, are not entitled to be treated as such, need not be followed by applicants, and do not purport to represent the only satisfactory method of meeting a specific regulatory requirement, they do provide guidance as to acceptable modes of conforming to specific regulatory requirements. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-444, 6 NRC 760 (1977); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1161, 1169 (1984). See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-91-39, 34 NRC 273, 280-81 (1991). Indeed, the Commission itself has indicated that conformance with regulatory guides is likely to result in compliance with specific regulatory requirements, though nonconformance with such guides does not mean noncompliance with the regulations. Petition for Emergency & Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406-07 (1978). See also Wrangler Laboratories et al., LBP-89-39, 30 NRC 746, 756-57, 759 (1989), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, ALAB-951, 33 NRC 505 (1991).

When determining issues of public health and safety, the Commission has discretion to use the best technical guidance available, including any pertinent NUREGs and Regulatory Guides, as long as they are germane to the issues then pending before the Commission. However, the Commission's decision to look to such documents for technical guidance in no way contradicts the Commission's ruling that NUREGs and Regulatory Guides are advisory by nature and do not themselves impose legal requirements on either the Commission or its licensees. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 397 (1995).

The fact that the emergency planning regulations had not yet gone into effect when the applicant filed its applications did not preclude the Commission from seeking technical guidance from a NUREG that provided the scientific foundation for those regulations. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 397-98 (1995).

Licensees can be required to show they have taken steps to provide equivalent or better measures than called for in regulatory guides if they do not, in fact, comply with the specific requirements set forth in the guides. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of N.Y. (Indian Point, Unit 3), LBP-82-105, 16 NRC 1629, 1631 (1982).

The criteria described in NUREG-0654 regarding emergency plans, referenced in NRC regulations, were intended to serve solely as regulatory guidance, not regulatory requirements. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1298-99 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983). See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 710 (1985); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-86-11, 23 NRC 294, 367-68 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 487 (1986); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-845, 24 NRC 220, 238 (1986); Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532, 544-45 (1986); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 290-91 (1988).

In absence of other evidence, adherence to NUREG-0654 may be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR § 50.47(b). However, such adherence is not required, because regulatory guides are not intended to serve as substitutes for regulations. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1298-99 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983).

Methods and solutions different from those set out in the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-83-22, 17 NRC 608, 616 (1983), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-698, 16 NRC 1290, 1299 (1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-83-22, 18 NRC 299 (1983); Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-788, 20 NRC 1102, 1161 (1984).

#### **6.21.4 Challenges to Regulations**

In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), 4 AEC 243, 244 (1969), the Commission recognized the general principle that regulations are not subject to amendment in individual adjudicatory proceedings. Under that ruling, now supplanted by 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758), challenges to the regulations would be permitted only where application of the rule or regulation would not serve the purposes for which the rule or regulation was adopted. Cf. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 59-60 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (A Presiding Officer lacks authority to adopt a "policy" that invalidates a Commission regulation; intervenors may not use a licensing proceeding in essence to rewrite Commission regulations) (citing Balt. Gas & Elec., 4 AEC at 244)).

The Commission directed Licensing Boards to certify the question of the validity of any challenge to it prior to rendering any initial decision. Thus, the Commission adheres to the fundamental principle of administrative law that its rules are not subject to collateral attack in adjudicatory proceedings. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-119A, 16 NRC 2069, 2073 (1982).

No challenge of any kind is permitted, in an adjudicatory proceeding, as to a regulation that is the subject of ongoing rulemaking. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-78, 5 AEC 319 (1972); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), ALAB-57, 4 AEC 946 (1972). In such a situation, the appropriate forum for deciding a challenge is the rulemaking proceeding itself. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-352, 4 NRC 371 (1976).

The assertion of a claim in an adjudicatory proceeding that a regulation is invalid is barred as a matter of law as an attack upon a regulation of the Commission. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1402 (1977); Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-456, 7 NRC 63, 65 (1978); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-25, 24 NRC 141, 144 (1986); American Nuclear Corp. (Revision of Orders to Modify Source Materials Licenses), CLI-86-23, 24 NRC 704, 709-710 (1986); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-90-4, 31 NRC 54, 71 (1990), aff'd, ALAB-950, 33 NRC 492, 502-503 (1991). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-875, 26 NRC 251, 256 (1987); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-89-8, 29 NRC 399, 416-17 (1989). Consequently, under current regulations, there can be no challenge of any kind by discovery, proof, argument, or other means except in accord with 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79, 88-89 (1974); Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-262, 1 NRC 163, 204 (1975); Mississippi Power and Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-92, 16 NRC 1376, 1385, aff'd, ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725 (1982); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 804 n.82 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. (Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3), ALAB-732, 17 NRC 1076, 1104 n.44 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-24, 24 NRC 132, 136, 138 (1986).

Under 10 CFR 2.335 (formerly 2.758), the regulation must be challenged by way of a petition requesting a waiver or exception to the regulation on the sole ground of "special circumstances" (i.e., because of special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding, application of the regulation would not serve the purposes for which the regulation was adopted. 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758(b)); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-86-25, 24 NRC 141, 145 (1986); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-895, 28 NRC 7, 16 (1988); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 595 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989). Curators of the University of Missouri, LBP-90-23, 32 NRC 7, 9 (1990). Special circumstances are present only if the petition properly pleads one or more facts, not common to a large class of applicants or facilities, that were not considered either explicitly or by necessary implication in the proceeding leading to the rule sought to be waived. Also, the special circumstances must be such as to undercut the rationale for the rule sought to be waived. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 596-97 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989). The petition must be accompanied by an affidavit. Other parties to the proceeding may respond to the petition. If the petition and responses, considered together, do not make a prima facie showing that application of the regulation would not serve the purpose intended, the Licensing Board may not go any further. If a prima facie showing is made, then the issue is to be directly certified to the Commission. 10 CFR § 2.335(d) (formerly § 2.758(d)) for determination. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-728, 17 NRC 777, 804 n.82 (1983), review denied, CLI-83-32, 18 NRC 1309 (1983); Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-84-35, 20 NRC 887, 890 (1984); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-33, 22 NRC 442, 445 (1985); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-875, 26 NRC 251, 256 (1987). A waiver petition should not be certified unless the petition indicates that a waiver is necessary to address, on the merits, a significant safety problem related to the rule sought to be waived. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-88-10, 28 NRC 573, 597 (1988), reconsid. denied, CLI-89-3, 29 NRC 234 (1989). In the alternative, any party who asserts that a regulation is invalid may always petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart H (§§2.800-2.807).

The provisions of 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758) do not entitle a petitioner for a waiver or exception to a regulation to file replies to the responses of other parties to the petition. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-87-12, 25 NRC 324, 326 (1987).

An attack on a Commission regulation is prohibited unless the petitioner can make a prima facie showing of special circumstances such that applying the regulation would not serve the purpose for which it was adopted. The prima facie showing must be made by affidavit. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-52A, 18 NRC 265, 270 (1983), citing 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-87-12, 25 NRC 324, 326 (1987).

Petitioners also cannot challenge a mere increase in radiological dose that overall remains well within regulatory limits as this amounts to an impermissible collateral attack on the regulation. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-14, 58 NRC 207, 218 (2003).

To make a prima facie showing under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758) for waiving a regulation, a stronger showing than lack of reasonable assurance has to be made. Evidence would have to be presented demonstrating that the facility under review is so different from other projects that the rule would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted. Houston Lighting & Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 & 2), LBP-83-49, 18 NRC 239, 240 (1983).

To satisfy the "special circumstances" test under 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.1239), the situation must present "unusual facts" that were not contemplated when the regulation was promulgated. CFC Logistics, Inc., LBP-04-24, 60 NRC 475, 494 (2004).

Another Licensing Board has applied a "legally sufficient" standard for the prima facie showing. According to the Board, the question is whether the petition with its accompanying affidavits as weighed against the responses of the parties presents legally sufficient evidence to justify the waiver or exception from the regulation. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-87-12, 25 NRC 324, 328 (1987). See also Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-895, 28 NRC 7, 22 (1988).

A request for an exception, based upon claims of costly delays resulting from compliance with a regulation, rather than claims that application of the regulation would not serve the purposes for which the regulation was adopted, is properly filed pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.12 rather than 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758). Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-33, 22 NRC 442, 444-45 (1985).

A request for an exception is properly filed pursuant to 10 CFR § 50.12, and not 10 CFR § 2.335 (formerly § 2.758), when the exception: (1) is not directly related to a contention being litigated in the proceeding; and (2) does not involve safety, environmental, or common defense and security issues serious enough for the Board to raise on its own initiative. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-85-33, 22 NRC 442, 445-46 (1985).

The ECCS Final Acceptance Criteria as set forth in 10 CFR § 50.45 and Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 assume that ECCS will operate during an accident. On the other hand, Class 9 accidents postulate the failure of ECCS. Thus, on its face, consideration of Class 9 accidents would appear to be a challenge to the Commission's regulations. However, the Commission has squarely held that the regulations do not preclude the use of inconsistent assumptions about ECCS failure for other purposes. Thus, the prohibition of challenges to the regulations in adjudicatory proceedings does not preclude the consideration of Class 9 accidents and a failure of ECCS related thereto in environmental impact statements and proceedings thereon. Offshore Power Systems (Floating Nuclear Power Plants), ALAB-489, 8 NRC 194, 221 (1978).

#### **6.21.5 Agency's Interpretation of its Own Regulations**

In the absence of any specific definition in a rule, one looks first to the meaning of the language of the provision in question. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-25, 54 NRC 177, 184 (2001). Where a regulatory term lacks a statutory or regulatory definition, it should be construed in accord with its "ordinary or natural" meaning", which may be informed by regulatory and industry usage and practice. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 66 n.24 (2006), aff'd, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (citing Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).

The wording of a regulation generally takes precedence over any contradictory suggestion in its administrative history. Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-687, 16 NRC 460, 469 (1982); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-89-38, 30 NRC 725, 745 (1989), aff'd, ALAB-949, 33 NRC 484, 489-90 (1991); Wrangler Laboratories, LBP-89-39, 30 NRC 746, 756 (1989), rev'd and remanded, ALAB-951, 33 NRC 505, 513-16 (1991).

Where NRC interprets its own regulations and where those regulations have long been construed in a given way, the doctrine of stare decisis will govern absent compelling reasons for a different interpretation; the regulations may be modified, if appropriate, through rulemaking procedures. New England Power Co. (NEP Units 1 & 2), Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2) ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733, 741-42 (1977).

Agency practice, of course, is one indicator of how an agency interprets its regulations. See Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 129 (1996); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 13 (2001); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-99-10, 49 NRC 318, 324 (1999); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (Gore, OK, Site Decommissioning), CLI-01-2, 53 NRC 2, 14 (2001).

In interpreting a statute or regulation, the usual inference is that different language is intended to mean different things. This inference might be negated, however, by a showing that the purpose or history behind the language demonstrates that no difference was intended. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54 (1994), aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).



If the plain language analysis does not resolve ambiguities, it may be appropriate to inquire into guidance documents, provided they do not conflict with the plain meaning of the words used in the regulation. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-25, 54 NRC 177, 184 (2001).

Language in a Statement of Consideration for a regulation, having been endorsed by the Commission in its own Statement of Consideration, is entitled to “special weight” under relevant case law. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-900, 28 NRC 275, 290-91 (1988), review declined, CLI-88-11, 28 NRC 603 (1988); Graystar Inc., LBP-01-7, 53 NRC 168, 187 (2001).

Interpretation of a regulation begins with the language and structure of the provision itself. See Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294, 299 (1997). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 361 (2001).

It is a canon of construction that, where possible, a regulation should be construed in a manner that avoids internal inconsistencies. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 57 (2006), aff’d, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (citing, e.g., United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 547 (1938); Water Quality Ass’n Employees’ Benefit Corp. v. United States, 795 F.2d 1303, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986); Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 274 F.2d 641, 646-47 (8th Cir. 1960)).

Under the canon of construction known as the rule of the last antecedent, “qualifying words, phrases and clauses must be applied to the words or phrases immediately preceding them and are not to be construed as extending to and including others more remote.” Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 56 n.11 (2006), aff’d, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (citing Demko v. United States, 216 F.3d 1049, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atl. Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1989))).

Where regulatory words at issue “are followed by a clause which is applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural construction of the language demands that the clause be read as applicable to all.” Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 58 (2006), aff’d, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (quoting Porto Rico Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253 U.S. 345, 348 (1920)).

Boards have declined to interpret regulatory text in a way that would essentially negate the stated purpose of the regulation or impute to the Commission an intent to create a “schizophrenic” rule. Hydro Res., Inc., LBP-06-1, 63 NRC 41, 68-69 (2006), aff’d, CLI-06-14, 63 NRC 510 (2006) (citing Exxon Nuclear Co. (Nuclear Fuel Recovery and Recycling Center), ALAB-447, 6 NRC 873, 878 (1977); New York State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419-20 (1973); Treadway v. Gateway Chevrolet Oldsmobile Inc., 362 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2004)).

It is a well established rule of construction that technical terms of art should be interpreted by reference to the trade or industry to which they apply. A layman’s reading of a regulation, uninformed by context, is not decisive. Pa’ina Hawaii, LLC., CLI-06-13, 63 NRC 508, 518-19 (2006).

### 6.21.6 General Design Criteria

The general design criteria (GDC) set out in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix A, are “cast in broad, general terms and constitute the minimum requirements for the principal design criteria of water-cooled nuclear power plants. There are a variety of methods for demonstrating compliance with GDC.” Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 360-61 (2001) citing Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406 (1978).

General Design Criteria include little implementing detail. The general design criteria are “only a regulatory beginning and not the end product.” Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 360 (2001), quoting Nader v. NRC, 513 F.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

There are no regulatory requirements that would require a summary of a licensee’s conformance to the draft GDC in the UFSAR. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), DD-05-2, 62 NRC 389, 395 (2005).

The NRC does not require licensees to compile a complete list of a plant’s current conformance to the draft GDC. The design and licensing bases for any plant reside in many documents. These documents are either submitted to the NRC as part of the formal docket or are available at the plant for review by NRC inspectors. A compilation of a plant’s compliance with the GDC or draft GDC is therefore not necessary for the staff to perform license reviews or license inspections. Vermont Yankee, DD-05-2, 62 NRC at 396-97.

GDC 62 instructs NRC licensees in general terms to prevent criticality “by physical systems or processes.” GDC 62 contains no restrictive provisions against reliance on “administrative” measures (i.e. human intervention). In the context of regulations pertaining to nuclear power facilities, a “physical process” is a method of doing something, producing something, or accomplishing a specific result using the forces and operations of physics. Similarly, a “physical system” is an organized or established procedure or method based on the forces and operations of physics. Neither term excludes human intervention to set physical forces in motion or to monitor them. GDC 62 is not incompatible with “administrative” implementation of physical properties. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 361 (2001).

GDC 62’s use of the term “physical” simply reinforces an obvious point: effective criticality prevention requires protective physical measures. The regulatory term excludes, at the most, marginal (and implausible) criticality prevention schemes lacking any physical component, such as, perhaps, mere observation without accompanying physical mechanisms. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 364 (2001).

General design criteria do not purport to prescribe “precise tests or methodologies.” See Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 406 (1978). Intervenors nonetheless would have us construe GDC 62 to distinguish between “one-time” and “ongoing” administrative controls and to allow only “one-time” controls. Nothing in the text of GDC 62 suggests that, when promulgating the rule, the

Commission envisioned anything like Intervenor's complex approach, and we decline to adopt it today. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 364 (2001).

10 C.F.R. 50.68 expressly provides for the use of enrichment, burnup, and soluble boron as criticality control measures. Both the regulation and its history demonstrate that the Commission endorses the use of physical controls with significant procedural aspects for criticality control. The Commission was mindful of GDC 62 when it approved the use of administrative controls in 10 C.F.R. 50.68. The Statement of Considerations refers specifically to GDC 62 as reinforcing the prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling "through physical systems, processes, and safe geometrical configuration." See Criticality Accident Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 63825, 63826 (Dec. 3, 1997). Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 366 (2001).

As the latest expression of the rulemakers' intent, the more recent regulation prevails if there is a perceived conflict with an earlier regulation. See 2B Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.02 (1992). The specific provisions of 10 C.F.R. § 50.62 provide strong evidence for our current reading of the more general strictures of GDC 62. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 367 (2001).

In 1982, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act ("NWPA") was enacted by Congress, recognizing that accumulation of spent nuclear fuel is a national problem and that federal efforts to devise a permanent solution to problems of civilian radioactive waste disposal have not been adequate. See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(2)-(3). The NWPA established federal responsibility and a definite federal policy for the disposal of spent fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(2). Further, the act declared as one of its purposes the addition of new spent nuclear fuel storage capacity at civilian reactor sites. See 42 U.S.C. § 10151(b)(1). The NWPA directed nuclear power plant operators to exercise their "primary responsibility" for interim storage of spent fuel "by maximizing, to the extent practical, the effective use of existing storage facilities at the site of each civilian nuclear power reactor, and by adding new onsite storage capacity in a timely matter where practical." See 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(1). Under the NWPA, the Commission was to promulgate rules for an expedited hearing process on applications "to expand the spent nuclear fuel storage capacity at the site of civilian nuclear power reactor[s] through the use of high-density fuel storage racks." See 42 U.S.C. § 10154. The Licensing Board's understanding of GDC 62 is compatible with the NWPA, while Intervenor's viewpoint cannot be reconciled with Congressional policy on nuclear waste storage. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 367-68 (2001).

The phrase "physical systems or processes" in GDC 62 comprehends the administrative and procedural measures necessary to implement or maintain such physical systems or processes. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-10, 53 NRC 353, 369 (2001).

#### **6.21.7 Reporting Requirements**

By using the words "initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications," the regulation definitionally limits the reporting requirement

to a single 1-hour report per technical specification shutdown. Michel A. Phillipon (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator's License), LBP-99-44, 50 NRC 347, 368 (1999) interpreting 10 C.F.R. § 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A).

Although subsequent events involving the plant's technical specifications may occur during the shutdown process, those later events do not "initiate" the shutdown and 10 C.F.R. § 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) does not require a 1-hour report to NRC for them. Michel A. Phillipon (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator's License), LBP-99-44, 50 NRC 347, 369 (1999).

## 6.22 Rulemaking

Rulemaking procedures are covered, in general, in 10 CFR § 2.800-2.807, which govern the issuance, amendment and repeal of regulations and public participation therein. It is well established that an agency's decision to use rulemaking or adjudication in dealing with a problem is a matter of discretion. Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, CLI-81-11, 13 NRC 778, 800 (1981), citing NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 668 (1976); Oncology Services Corp., LBP-94-2, 39 NRC 11 (1994).

The Administrative Procedure Act provides agencies with considerable flexibility to choose between rulemaking and adjudicatory procedures when making law. All Power Reactor Licensees and Research Reactor Licensees who Transport Spent Nuclear Fuel, CLI-05-06, 61 NRC 37, 40 (2005). The Commission has authority to determine whether a particular issue shall be decided through rulemaking, through adjudicatory consideration, or by both means. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-118, 16 NRC 2034, 2038 (1982), citing F.P.C. v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 42-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1955). In the exercise of that authority, the Commission may preclude or limit the adjudicatory consideration of an issue during the pendency of a rulemaking. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-118, 16 NRC 2034, 2038 (1982).

When a matter is involved in rulemaking, the Commission may elect to require an issue which is part of that rulemaking to be heard as part of that rulemaking. Where it does not impose such a requirement, an issue is not barred from being considered in adjudication being conducted at that time. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-63, 16 NRC 571, 584-585 (1982); LBP-82-118, 16 NRC 2034, 2037 (1982).

A contention that seeks to litigate a matter that is the subject of an agency rulemaking is not admissible. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-01, 51 NRC 1, 5 (2000); See Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-98-7, 47 NRC 142, 179, reconsideration granted in part and denied in part on other grounds, LBP-98-10, 47 NRC 288, aff'd on other grounds, CLI-98-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998).

It is, of course, a well-recognized proposition that the choice to use rulemaking rather than adjudication is a matter within the agency's discretion. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974); Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-01, 51 NRC 1, 5 (2000).

### 6.22.1 Rulemaking Distinguished from General Policy Statements

While notice and comment procedures are required for rulemaking, such procedures are not required for issuance of a policy statement by the Commission since policy statements are not rules. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-76-14, 4 NRC 163 (1976).

### 6.22.2 Generic Issues and Rulemaking

The Commission has indicated that, as a rule, generic safety questions should be resolved in rulemaking rather than adjudicatory proceedings. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-74-40, 8 AEC 809, 814-15, clarified, CLI-74-43, 8 AEC 826 (1974). In this vein, it has been held that the Commission's use of rulemaking to set ECCS standards is not a violation of due process. Union of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 499 F.2d 1069, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

It is within the agency's authority to settle factual issues of a generic nature by means of rulemaking. Minnesota v. NRC, 602 F.2d 412, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1979) and Ecology Action v. AEC, 492 F.2d 998, 1002 (2d Cir. 1974), cited in Fire Protection for Operating Nuclear Power Plants, CLI-81-11, 13 NRC 778, 802 (1981). An agency's previous use of a case-by-case problem resolution method does not act as a bar to a later effort to resolve generic issues by rulemaking. Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205-06 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965). The fact that standards addressing generic concerns adopted pursuant to such a rulemaking proceeding affect only a few, or one, licensee(s) does not make the use of rulemaking improper. Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cited in Fire Protection, CLI-81-11, 13 NRC 778 (1981). Waiver of a Commission rule is not appropriate for a generic issue. The proper approach when a problem affects nuclear reactors generally is to petition the Commission to promulgate an amendment to its rules under 10 CFR § 2.802. If the issue is sufficiently urgent, petitioner may request suspension of the licensing proceeding while the rulemaking is pending. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-57, 14 NRC 1037, 1038-39 (1981).

### 6.23 Research Reactors

10 CFR § 50.22 constitutes the Commission's determination that if more than 50% of the use of a reactor is for commercial purposes, that reactor must be licensed under 103 of the Atomic Energy Act rather than 104. Section 104 licenses are granted for research and education, while Section 103 licenses are issued for industrial or commercial purposes. The Regents of the University of California (UCLA Research Reactor), LBP-83-24, 17 NRC 666, 670 (1983).

In amending the Atomic Energy Act, Congress intended to "grandfather" research and development nuclear plant licenses and to exempt such licenses from seeking new licenses under the Act's section governing commercial licenses. American Public Power Ass'n v. NRC, 990 F.2d 1309, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The Atomic Energy Act does not require antitrust review for applications for renewal of research and development nuclear plant licenses. American Public Power Ass'n v. NRC, 990 F.2d 1309, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

#### **6.24 Disclosure of Information to the Public**

10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790) deals generally with NRC practice and procedure in making NRC records available to the public. The requirements governing the availability of some official records, governed by 10 C.F.R. § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790), were amended. 68 Fed. Reg. 18,836 (April 17, 2003). 10 CFR Part 9 specifically establishes procedures for implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (10 CFR § 9.3 to 9.16) and Privacy Act (10 CFR § 9.50, 9.51).

Under 10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790), hearing boards are delegated the authority and obligation to determine whether proposals of confidentiality filed pursuant to Section 2.390(b)(1) (formerly 2.790(b)(1)) should be granted pursuant to the standards set forth in subsections (b)(2) through (c) of that Section. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-62, 14 NRC 1747, 1755-56 (1981). Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.319 (formerly § 2.718), Boards may issue a wide variety of procedural orders that are neither expressly authorized nor prohibited by the rules. They may permit intervenors to contend that allegedly proprietary submissions should be released to the public. They may also authorize discovery or an evidentiary hearing that is not relevant to the contentions but is relevant to an important pending procedural issue, such as the trustworthiness of a party to receive allegedly proprietary material. However, discovery and hearings not related to contentions are of limited availability. They may be granted, on motion, if it can be shown that the procedure sought would serve a sufficiently important purpose to justify the associated delay and cost. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-2, 15 NRC 48 (1982).

Section 10(b) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. 10(b), generally requires an agency to make available for public inspection and copying all materials which were made available to or prepared for or by an advisory committee. The materials must be made available to the public before or on the date of the advisory committee meeting for which they were prepared. A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for disclosure of the materials is required only for those materials which an agency reasonably withholds pursuant to a FOIA exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Food Chemical News v. HHS, 980 F.2d 1468, 1471-72 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Under Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 60 L.Ed.2d 208, 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979), neither the Privacy Act nor the Freedom of Information Act gives a private individual the right to prevent disclosure of names of individuals where the Licensing Board elects to disclose. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-50, 14 NRC 888, 891 (1981).

In Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-33, 15 NRC 887, 891-892 (1982), the Board ruled that the names and addresses of temporary employees who have worked on a tube-sleeving project are relevant to intervenor's quest for information about quality assurance in a tube-sleeving demonstration project. Since applicants have not given any specific reason to fear that intervenors will harass these individuals, their names should be disclosed so that intervenors may seek their voluntary cooperation in providing information to them.

In the Seabrook offsite emergency planning proceeding, the Licensing Board extended a protective order to withhold from public disclosure the identity of individuals and organizations who had agreed to supply services and facilities which would be needed to implement the applicant's offsite emergency plan. The Board noted the emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding the Seabrook facility, and, in particular, the possibility that opponents of the licensing of Seabrook would invade the applicant's commercial interests and the suppliers' right to privacy through harassment and intimidation of witnesses in an attempt to improperly influence the licensing process. Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-88-8, 27 NRC 293, 295 (1988).

#### **6.24.1 Freedom of Information Act Disclosure**

Under FOIA, a Commission decision to withhold a document from the public must be by majority vote. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma (Black Fox Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-35, 12 NRC 409, 412 (1980).

While FOIA does not establish new government privileges against discovery, the Commission has elected to incorporate the exemptions of the FOIA into its own discovery rules. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 121 (1980).

Section 2.390 (formerly 2.790) of the Rules of Practice is the NRC's promulgation in obedience to the Freedom of Information Act. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 121 (1980).

Section 2.709 of the Rules of Practice provides that a presiding officer may order production of any record exempt under Section 2.390 (formerly 2.790) if its "disclosure is necessary to a proper decision and the document is not reasonably obtainable from another source." This balancing test weighs the need for a proper decision against the interest in privacy. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-50, 14 NRC 888, 892 (1981).

The presiding officer in an informal hearing lacks the authority to review the Staff's procedures or determinations involving FOIA requests for NRC documents. However, the presiding officer may compel the production of certain of the requested documents if they are determined to be necessary for the development of an adequate record in the proceeding. Alfred J. Morabito (Senior Operator's License), LBP-87-28, 26 NRC 297, 299 (1987).

Although 10 CFR § 2.744 by its terms refers only to the production of NRC documents, it also sets the framework for providing protection for NRC Staff testimony where disclosure would have the potential to threaten the public health and safety. Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-83-40, 18 NRC 93, 99 (1983). Nondisclosure of commercial or financial information pursuant to FOIA Exemption 4, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4), may be appropriate if an agency can demonstrate that public disclosure of the information would harm an identifiable agency interest in efficient program operations or in the effective execution of its statutory responsibilities. The mere assertion that disclosure of confidential information provided to the NRC by a private organization will create friction in the relationship between the NRC and the private organization does not satisfy this standard. Critical Mass Energy

Project v. NRC, 931 F.2d 939, 943-945 (D.C. Cir. 1991), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Also, commercial or financial information may be withheld if disclosure of the information likely would impair the agency's ability to obtain necessary information in the future. To meet this standard, an agency may show that nondisclosure is required to maintain the qualitative value of the information. Critical Mass, 931 F.2d at 945-947, citing National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 942 F.2d 799 (D.C. Cir. 1991). On rehearing, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the National Parks test for determining the confidentiality of commercial or financial information under FOIA Exemption 4. Such information is confidential if disclosure of the information is likely to 1) impair the government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future, or 2) cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained. National Parks, 498 F.2d at 770. However, the court restricted the National Parks test to information which a person is compelled to provide the government. Information which is voluntarily provided to the government is confidential under Exemption 4 if it is of a kind that customarily would not be released to the public by the provider. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 876-877, 879-880 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).

The Commission, in adopting the standards of Exemption 5, and the "necessary to a proper decision" as its document privilege standard has adopted traditional work product/executive privilege exemptions from disclosure. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 123 (1980).

The Government is no less entitled to normal privilege than is any other party in civil litigation. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 127 (1980).

Any documents in final form memorializing the Director's decision not to issue a notice of violation imposing civil penalties does not fall within Exemption 5. Consumers Power Company (Palisades Nuclear Power Facility), ALJ-80-1, 12 NRC 117, 129 (1980).

A person who has submitted an FOIA request to an agency must exhaust all administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit seeking production of the documents. An agency has 10 working days to respond to the request. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A). If the agency has not responded within this 10-day period, then the requester has constructively exhausted the administrative remedies and may file a lawsuit. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C). However, if the agency responds after the 10-day period, but before the requester has filed suit, then the requester must exhaust all the administrative remedies. Oglesby v. United States Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 63-65 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

An agency must conduct a good faith search for the requested records, using methods which reasonably can be expected to produce the information requested. Oglesby v. United States Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

#### **6.24.2 Privacy Act Disclosure**

(RESERVED)



### 6.24.3 Disclosure of Proprietary Information

10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790), which deals generally with public inspection of NRC official records, provides exemptions from public inspection in appropriate circumstances. Specifically, Section 2.390(a) (formerly 2.790(a)) establishes that the NRC need not disclose information, including correspondence to and from the NRC regarding issuance, denial, and amendment of a license or permit, where such information involves trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person as privileged or confidential.

Under 10 CFR § 2.390(b) (formerly § 2.790(b)), any person may seek to have a document withheld, in whole or in part, from public disclosure on the grounds that it contains trade secrets or is otherwise proprietary. To do so, he must file an application for withholding accompanied by an affidavit identifying the parts to be withheld and containing a statement of the reasons for withholding. As a basis for withholding, the affidavit must specifically address the factors listed in Section 2.390(b)(4) (formerly 2.790(b)(4)). If the NRC determines that the information is proprietary based on the application, it must then determine whether the right of the public to be fully apprised of the information outweighs the demonstrated concern for protection of the information.

A party is not required to submit an application and affidavit, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(1) (formerly 2.790(b)(1)), for withholding a security plan from public disclosure, since 10 CFR § 2.390(d) (formerly 2.790(d)) deems security plans to be commercial or financial information exempt from public disclosure. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-92-15A, 36 NRC 5, 1112 (1992).

For an affidavit to be exempt from the Board's general authority to rule on proposals concerning the withholding of information from the public, that affidavit must meet the regulatory requirement that it have "appropriate markings." When the plain language of the regulation requires "appropriate markings," an alleged tradition by which Staff has accepted the proprietary nature of affidavits when only a portion of the affidavits is proprietary is not relevant to the correct interpretation of the regulation. In addition, legal argument may not appropriately be withheld from the public merely because it is inserted in an affidavit, a portion of which may contain some proprietary information. Affidavits supporting the proprietary nature of other documents can be withheld from the public only if they have "appropriate markings." An entire affidavit may not be withheld because a portion is proprietary. The Board may review an initial Staff determination concerning the proprietary nature of a document to determine whether the review has addressed the regulatory criteria for withholding.

A party may not withhold legal arguments from the public by inserting those arguments into an affidavit that contains some proprietary information. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-5A, 15 NRC 216 (1982).

If the Commission believes that an order contains proprietary information which may be harmful to the party/parties if released to the public, the Commission may withhold the order from public release. After the party/parties have an opportunity to review the order and advise the Commission of any confidential information, the Commission will release the order with the appropriate redactions. Power Authority of the State of New

York, Entergy Nuclear Fitzpatrick LLC, Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 3 LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-01-16, 54 NRC 1, 1-2 (2001).

After reviewing a dispute over redaction of allegedly privileged commercial information, the Commission ordered an applicant to provide the Board with redacted versions consistent with the rulings in the Commission's order, finding the Board to be better positioned to make an initial review of the proposed redactions given the factual nature of the redaction issues, the Board's greater familiarity with the record, and the Board's authorship of the initial redaction orders. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 183 (2005).

The Commission's requirements regarding the availability of official documents, governed by 10 C.F.R. § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790), were modified by an amendment, in part providing that those who submit documents supposedly containing proprietary or other confidential information to mark the portions of the document containing such information. 68 Fed. Reg. 18,836 (April 17, 2003).

#### **6.24.3.1 Protecting Information Where Disclosure is Sought in an Adjudicatory Proceeding**

To justify the withholding of information in an adjudicatory proceeding where full disclosure of such information is sought, the person seeking to withhold the information must demonstrate that:

- (1) the information is of a type customarily held in confidence by its originator;
- (2) the information has, in fact, been held in confidence;
- (3) the information is not found in public sources;
- (4) there is a rational basis for holding the information in confidence.

Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB-327, 3 NRC 408 (1976).

The Government enjoys a privilege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons furnishing information about violations of law to officers charged with enforcing the law. Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957), cited in Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-639, 13 NRC 469, 473 (1981). This applies not only in criminal but also civil cases, In re United States, 565 F.2d 19, 21 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Bell v. Socialist Workers Party, 436 U.S. 962 (1978), and in Commission proceedings as well, Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-16, 4 AEC 435, aff'd by the Commission, 4 AEC 440 (1970); § 2.390(a)(7) (formerly § 2.790(a)(7)); and is embodied in FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). The privilege is not absolute; where an informer's identity is (1) relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or (2) essential to a fair determination of a cause (Rovario, supra); it must yield. However, the Appeal Board reversed a Licensing Board's order to the Staff to reveal the names of confidential informants (subject to a protective order) to intervenors as an abuse of discretion, where the Appeal Board found that the burden to obtain the names of such informants is not met by intervenor's speculation that identification might be of some assistance to them. To require disclosure in such a case would contravene NRC policy in that it might jeopardize the likelihood of receiving similar

future reports. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-639, 13 NRC 469 (1981).

For a detailed listing of the factors to be considered by a Licensing Board in determining whether certain documents should be classed as proprietary and withheld from disclosure in an adjudicatory proceeding, see Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-137, 6 AEC 491, Appendix at 518 (1973) and Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-42, 15 NRC 1307 (1982). If a Licensing Board or an intervenor with a pertinent contention wishes to review data claimed by an applicant to be proprietary, it has a right to do so, albeit under a protective order if necessary. 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(6) (formerly § 2.790(b)(6)); Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-435, 6 NRC 541, 544 n.12 (1977); Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 292 (2000).

Because 10 C.F.R. § 2.790 [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.390] embodies the standards of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the agency looks for guidance to the plentiful federal case law on that exemption, although that case law does not bind the Commission. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 163, 172 (2005). Under Exemption 4, the current generally accepted legal definition of “confidential” is information whose disclosure is likely to (1) impair the government’s future ability to obtain necessary information; or (2) impair other government interests such as compliance, program efficiency and effectiveness, and the fulfillment of an agency’s statutory mandate; or (3) cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was obtained. *Id.* at 163-64 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 180 F.3d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc denied, No. 98-5251 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 1999); Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993), approving on this ground but rev’g and vacating on other grounds, 830 F.2d 278, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 7-10 (1st Cir. 1983). The federal courts (and now the Commission) have interpreted the third prong to require a showing of (a) the existence of competition and (b) the likelihood of substantial competitive injury. PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 164, 171 (citing CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 977 (1988); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1976)). While federal court decisions are divided on the question as to what constitutes “competitive injury,” the Commission has adopted the broader of two interpretations, finding that interpretation to be closer to the heart of Exemption 4 and § 2.790 [now § 2.390]; this position concludes that such injury can flow from either competitors or noncompetitors (such as customers and suppliers). PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 164 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp., 180 F.3d at 306; Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n, 547 F.2d at 687; Cont’l Oil Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 519 F.2d 31, 35 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)).

Applicants seeking redaction of supposedly confidential or privileged commercial or financial information must address the criteria of 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(b)(4) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.390(b)(4)] with specificity, and if the Commission determines that any of the information is in fact “confidential commercial or financial information,” then it

must determine “whether the right of the public to be fully apprised as to the bases for an effects of the proposed action outweighs the demonstrated concern for protection of a competitive position.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 163 (2005) (citing former 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(b)).

NRC decisions have consistently expressed support for settlements, and disclosure of proprietary information from a settlement [not of the immediate matter before the agency, but of a third-party settlement relevant to an applicant’s costs] would discourage parties from settling their financial disputes in the future; this would in turn hinder the fulfillment of the agency’s statutory mandate to protect the public health and safety. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 168 (2005) (citing Sequoyah Fuels Corp and Gen. Atomic (Gore, Oklahoma Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 205 (1997); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983); Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Nat’l Insts. of Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 53 (D.D.C. 2002); Nadler v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 899 F. Supp. 158, 162, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), *aff’d*, 92 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996)). The importance of honoring settling parties’ expectations of confidentiality is particularly strong where both parties to the settlement oppose disclosure of its terms on grounds of potential financial harm. PFS, CLI-05-1, 61 NRC at 168.

Even where certain submitted information might otherwise have qualified for confidential treatment in connection with a licensing proceeding, an applicant’s own actions and practice (publishing that or similar information on its website or in newsletters) may render redaction inappropriate under the five-factor test of 10 C.F.R. § 2.790(b)(4) [now 10 C.F.R. § 2.390 (b)(4)]. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 176-77 (2005) (certain ISFSI-related cost estimates).

In making determinations about document redaction, the NRC, like the federal courts, need not “engage in a sophisticated economic analysis of the substantial competitive harm...that might result from disclosure” of allegedly confidential or privileged commercial information. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-1, 61 NRC 160, 177 n.101 (2005) (quoting GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Portions of a hearing may have to be closed to the public when issues involving proprietary information are being addressed. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 292 (2000).

Where a party to a hearing objects to the disclosure of information on the basis that it is proprietary in nature and makes out a prima facie case to that effect, it is proper for an adjudicatory board to issue a protective order and conduct further proceedings in camera. If, upon consideration, the Board determined that the material was not proprietary, it would order the material released for the public record. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-807, 21 NRC 1195, 1214-15 (1985). See also Commonwealth Edison Co. (Zion Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-196, 7 AEC 457, 469 (1974).

Following issuance of a protective order enabling an intervenor to obtain useful information, a Board can defer ruling on objections concerning the public's right to know until after the merits of the case are considered. If an intervenor has difficulties due to failure to participate in in camera sessions, these cannot affect the Board's ruling on the merits. Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-81-55, 14 NRC 1017 (1981).

When relevant parties, by reason of a protective order, have access to information claimed to be proprietary and considerable effort would be involved in parsing the various parties' pleadings to identify and then resolve the question of what information has protected status, the resolution of disputes over the nature of the protected information is best left until after the conclusion of a merits resolution relative to the issues of the litigation. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-6, 51 NRC 101, 135 (2000).

Where a demonstration has been made that the rights of association of a member of an intervenor group in the area have been threatened through threats of compulsory legal process to defend contentions, the employment situation in the area is dependent on the nuclear industry, and there is no detriment to applicant's interests by not having the identity of individual members of petitioner organization publicly disclosed, the Licensing Board will issue a protective order to prevent the public disclosure of the names of members of the organizational petitioner. Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 1), LBP-83-16, 17 NRC 479, 485-486 (1983).

#### **6.24.3.2 Security Plan Information Under 10 CFR § 2.390(d) (formerly § 2.790(d))**

Plant security plans are "deemed to be commercial or financial information" pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.390(d) (formerly § 2.790(d)). Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-80, 16 NRC 1121, 1124 (1982). Since 10 CFR § 2.390(d) (formerly § 2.790(d)) deems security plans to be commercial or financial information exempt from public disclosure, a party is not required to submit an application and affidavit, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.390(b)(1) (formerly § 2.790(b)(1)), for withholding a security plan from public disclosure. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-92-15A, 36 NRC 5, 11-12 (1992).

A security plan, whether in the possession of the NRC Staff or a private party, is to be protected from public disclosure. Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-92-15A, 36 NRC 5, 11 (1992).

In making physical security plan information available to intervenors, Licensing Boards are to follow certain guidelines. Security plans are sensitive and are subject to discovery in Commission adjudicatory proceedings only under certain conditions: (1) the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the plan or a portion of it is relevant to its contentions; (2) the release of the plan must (in most circumstances) be subject to a protective order; and (3) no witness may review the plan (or any portion of it) without it first being demonstrated that he possesses the technical competence to evaluate it. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-24, 11 NRC 775, 777 (1980).

Intervenors in Commission proceedings may raise contentions relating to the adequacy of the applicant's proposed physical security arrangements. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-80, 16 NRC 1121, 1124 (1982).

Commission regulations, 10 CFR § 2.390 (formerly § 2.790), contemplate that sensitive information may be turned over to intervenors in NRC proceedings under appropriate protective orders. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-80, 16 NRC 1121, 1124 (1982); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), LBP-92-15A, 36 NRC 5, 11 (1992), citing Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398, 1403, 1404 (1977).

Release of a security plan to qualified intervenors must be under a protective order and the individuals who review the security plan itself should execute an affidavit of nondisclosure. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-24, 11 NRC 775, 778 (1980)..

Protective orders may not constitutionally preclude public dissemination of information which is obtained outside the hearing process. A person subject to a protective order, however, is prohibited from using protected information gained through the hearing process to corroborate the accuracy or inaccuracy of outside information. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-24, 11 NRC 775, 778 (1980). The Licensing Board is in the best position to determine the most appropriate circumstances in which safeguards information may be viewed. Duke Energy Corp. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-05-2, 61 NRC 1, 7 (2005).

## **6.25 Enforcement Proceedings**

### **6.25.1 NRC Enforcement Authority**

Previous judicial interpretation makes it clear that the Commission's procedures for initiating formal enforcement powers under section 161b, 161i(3), and 186a of the Atomic Energy Act are wide ranging, perhaps uniquely so. Oncology Services Corp., LBP-94-2, 39 NRC 11 (1994), citing Siegel v. AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

As is evident from the Commission's enforcement policy statement, regulatory requirements -- including license conditions -- have varying degrees of public health and safety significance. Consequently, as part of the enforcement process, the relative importance of each purported violation is evaluated, which includes taking a measure of its technical and regulatory significance, as well as considering whether the violation is repetitive or willful. Although, in contrast to civil penalty actions, there generally is no specification of a "severity level" for the violations identified in an enforcement order imposing a license termination, suspension, or modification, this evaluative process nonetheless is utilized to determine the type and severity of the corrective action taken in the enforcement order. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 33-34 (1994).

Under Atomic Energy Act provisions such as subsections (b) and (i) of section 161, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b), (i), the agency's authority to protect the public health and safety is

uniquely wide-ranging. That, however, is not the same as saying that it is unlimited. In exercising that authority, including its prerogative to bring enforcement actions, the agency is subject to some restraints. See, e.g., Hurley Medical Center (Flint, MI), ALJ-87-2, 25 NRC 219, 236-37 & n.5 (1987) (NRC Staff cannot apply a comparative-performance standard in civil penalty proceedings absent fair notice to licensees about the parameters of that standard). One of those constraints is the requirement of constitutional due process. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 29-30 (1994).

The scope of the NRC regulatory authority does not extend to all questions of fire safety at licensed facilities; instead, the scope of agency regulatory authority with respect to fire protection is limited to the hazards associated with nuclear materials. Thus, while the agency's radiological protection responsibility requires it to consider questions of fire safety, this does not convert the agency into the direct enforcer of local codes, Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations, or national standards on fire, occupational, and building safety that it has not incorporated into its regulatory scheme. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 388 (2000), citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 393 (1995); Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 159 (1995).

Only statutes, regulations, orders, and license conditions can impose requirements on applicants and licenses. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 390 (2000), citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC at 41, 98.

The Commission is empowered to impose sanctions for violations of its license and regulations and to take remedial action to protect public health and safety. Within the limits of the agency's statutory authority, the choice of sanction is quintessentially a matter of the Commission's sound discretion. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc., CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 312-313 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

A violation of a regulation does not of itself require that a license be suspended. Both the Atomic Energy Act and NRC regulations support the conclusion that the choice of remedy for regulatory violations is within the sound judgment of the Commission and not foreordained. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2236, 2280, 2282; 10 CFR § 50.100. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 405 (1978).

Where the Staff in an enforcement settlement does not insist on strict compliance with a particular Commission regulation, it is neither waiving the regulation at issue nor amending it, but is instead merely exercising discretion to allow an alternative means of meeting the regulation's goals. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 221 (1997).

### **6.25.2 Enforcement Procedures**

On August 15, 1991, the Commission completed final rulemaking which revised the Commission's procedures for initiating formal enforcement action. 56 Fed. Reg. 40664 (Aug. 15, 1991). Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.204(a), the Commission will issue a demand for information to a licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the

Commission in order to determine whether to initiate an enforcement action. A licensee must respond to the demand for information; a person other than a licensee may respond to the demand or explain the reasons why the demand should not have been issued. 10 CFR § 2.204(b). Since the demand for information only requires the submission of information, and does not by its own terms modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or take other enforcement action, there is no right to a hearing. If the Commission decides to initiate enforcement action, it will serve on the licensee or other person subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, an order specifying the alleged violations and informing the licensee or other person of the right to demand a hearing on the order. 10 CFR § 2.202(a). The Commission has deleted the term "order to show cause" from Section 2.202.

While a show cause order with immediate suspension of a license or permit may be issued without prior written notice where the public health, interest or safety is involved, the Commission cannot permanently revoke a license without prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing guaranteed by 10 CFR § 2.202. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-3, 7 AEC 7 (1974).

The designated staff officials, subject to requirements that they give licensees written notice of specific violations in deciding whether penalties are warranted, may prefer charges, may demand the payment of penalties, and may agree to compromise penalty cases without formal litigation. Additionally, such officials may consult with their Staff privately about the course to be taken. Radiation Technology, Inc., ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 537 (1979).

Once a notice of opportunity for hearing has been published and a request for a hearing has been submitted, the decision as to whether a hearing is to be held no longer rests with the Staff but instead is transferred to the Commission or an adjudicatory tribunal designated to preside in the proceeding. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-80-26, 12 NRC 367, 371 (1980).

In Geo-Tech Associates (Geo-Tech Laboratories), CLI-92-14, 36 NRC 221 (1992), the Commission directed the presiding Officer to consider the hearing request under the criteria for late filing in 10 CFR 2.309(c) (formerly 2.714(a)(1)) in the absence of regulations governing late-filed and deficient hearing requests on enforcement orders.

An agency may dispense with an evidentiary hearing in an enforcement proceeding in resolving a controversy if no dispute remains as to a material issue of fact. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 299-300 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

Where a Board attaches license conditions in an enforcement proceeding, such action does not convert the enforcement proceeding into a license amendment proceeding. Once the Commission establishes a formal adjudicatory hearing in an enforcement case, it need not grant separate hearings on any license conditions that are imposed as a direct consequence of that enforcement hearing. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-9, 21 NRC 1118, 1148 (1985).



The procedures for modifying, suspending or revoking a license are set forth in Subpart B to 10 CFR Part 2. See All Chemical Isotope Enrichment, Inc., LBP-90-26, 32 NRC 30, 36-38 (1990), citing Atomic Energy Act 186(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2236(a).

There is no statutory requirement under Section 189a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 for the Commission to offer a hearing on an order lifting a license suspension. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a). It is within the discretionary powers of the Commission to offer a formal hearing prior to lifting a license suspension. The Commission's decision depends upon the specific circumstances of the case and a decision to grant a hearing in a particular instance (such as the restart of Three Mile Island, Unit 1) does not establish a general agency requirement for hearings on the lifting of license suspensions. The Commission has generally denied such requests for hearings. Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-10, 21 NRC 1569, 1575 n.7 (1985). See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-5, 19 NRC 953 (1984), aff'd, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'q en banc, 789 F.2d 26 (1986); Massachusetts v. NRC, 878 F.2d 1516, 1522 (1st Cir. 1989).

#### **6.25.2.1 Due Process**

The Commission's decision that cause existed to start a proceeding by issuing an immediately effective show cause order does not disqualify the Commission from later considering the merits of the matter. No prejudgment is involved, and no due process issue is created. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois LowLevel Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 4-5 (1980).

A party responding to an agency enforcement complaint has been accorded due process so long as the charges against it are understandable and it is afforded a full and fair opportunity to meet those charges. See Citizens State Bank v. FDIC, 751 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1984). Put somewhat differently, "[p]leadings in administrative proceedings are not judged by standards applied to an indictment at common law,' but are treated more like civil pleadings where the concern is with notice . . . ." Id. (quoting Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 598 F.2d 250, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 30 (1994).

The ability of the responsible staff official to proceed against a licensee by issuing an order imposing civil penalties is not a denial of due process because the licensee was not able to cross-examine the official to determine that he had not been improperly influenced by his staff. The demands of due process do not require a hearing at the initial stage or at any particular point or at more than one point in an administrative proceeding so long as the requisite hearing is held before the final order becomes effective. Radiation Technology, Inc., ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 536-538 (1979).

#### **6.25.2.2 Intervention**

One cannot seek to intervene in an enforcement proceeding to have NRC impose a stricter penalty than the NRC seeks. Issues in enforcement proceedings are only those set out in the order. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 442 (1980). State of

Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 404 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). Injury alleged as a result of failure to grant more extensive relief is not cognizable in a proceeding on a Confirmatory Order and thus does not constitute grounds for appeal. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-04-23, 60 NRC 154, 158 (2004). One who seeks the imposition of stricter requirements should file a petition pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.206. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (UF6 Production Facility), CLI-86-19, 24 NRC 508, 513-514 (1986), citing Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1982). State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 407 n.35 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

For an enforcement order, the threshold question – related to both standing and admissibility of contentions – is whether the hearing request is within the scope of the proceeding as outlined in the order. State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 405 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

For an enforcement order, the Commission has the authority to define the scope of the hearing, and this authority includes limiting the hearing to the question whether the order should be sustained. State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 405 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

One may only intervene in an enforcement action upon a showing of injury from the contemplated action set out in the show cause order. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54 (1994); aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994). One who seeks a stricter penalty than the NRC proposes has no standing to intervene because it is not injured by the lesser penalty. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 442 (1980). State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 404 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

The requirements for standing in an enforcement proceeding are no stricter than those in the usual licensing proceeding. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-80-26, 12 NRC 367, 374 (1980); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, Oklahoma Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54 (1994).

The agency has broad discretion in establishing and applying rules for public participation in enforcement proceedings. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 440-41 (1980). Intervention by interested persons who support an enforcement action does not diminish the agency's discretion in initiating enforcement proceedings because the Commission need not hold a hearing on whether another path should have been taken. The Commission may lawfully limit a hearing to consideration of the remedy or sanction proposed in the order. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 70 (1994).

The Commission has authority to define the scope of public participation in its proceedings beyond that which is required by statute. Consistent with this authority the Commission permits participation by those who can show that they have a cognizable interest that may be adversely affected if the proceeding has one outcome rather than another, including those who favor an enforcement action. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 69 (1994).

For an enforcement order the threshold question, intertwined with both standing and contention admissibility issues, is whether the hearing request is within the scope of the proceeding outlined in the enforcement order itself, i.e., whether the Confirmatory Order should be sustained. The Commission has the authority to define the scope of the hearing, including narrowly limiting the proceeding. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-04-23, 60 NRC 154, 157-58 (2004).

The Commission has broad discretion to allow intervention where it is not a matter of right. Such intervention will not be granted where conditions have already been imposed on a licensee, and no useful purpose will be served by that intervention. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 442-43 (1980).

Contentions in enforcement proceeding can be properly rejected under the doctrine of Belotti v. NRC [725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983), aff'g Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-82-16, 16 NRC 44 (1982)], when they in reality seek additional measures as a substitute for those imposed by the Staff. State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 405 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). The rationale underlying Belotti is that, when a licensee agrees to make positive changes or does not contest an order requiring remedial changes, it should not be at risk of being subjected to a wide-ranging hearing and further investigation. Id.

To decide whether an enforcement order should be upheld, the pertinent time contrast is between the petitioner's position with and without the order in question - not between the disputed order and a hypothetical substitute order, regardless of whether that substitute order would be, in the petitioner's estimation, an improvement. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 406 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

The critical inquiry in a proceeding on a confirmatory order is whether the order improves the licensee's health and safety conditions. If it does, no hearing is appropriate. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 408 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). A petitioner is not adversely affected by a Confirmatory Order that improves the safety situation over what it was in the absence of the order. Id. at 406. However, the notice of opportunity for hearing provides the public a "safety valve" because an order conceivably may remove a restriction upon a licensee or otherwise have the effect of worsening the safety situation. Such an order remains open to challenge. Id. at 406 n.28.

For a proceeding on a confirmatory order (where the licensee has already agreed to an enforcement order by the time the notice of hearing is published, as distinct from an enforcement proceeding still contestable by the licensees at the time of publication of the notice of hearing), a challenge to the facts themselves by a nonlicensee is not cognizable. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 408 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). (However, in the aforementioned situation where the licensees could still contest the Staff's factual findings or sanctions, a petitioner who supports the order could have standing. Id. at 408 n.38.)

In terms of enforcement, the NRC's role, as outlined in [10 C.F.R.] section 30.7, is to procure corrective action for the Licensee's program, and by example, other licensees' programs, not to provide redress for the whistleblower. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 406-07 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004) [referencing 10 C.F.R. § 30.7(c)]. Even where a petitioner appears to have been a victim of retaliatory misbehavior, and understandably focuses on his personal grievances, the NRC charter does not include providing a personal remedy. Id. at 407.

In evaluating whether to pursue enforcement relief, and in considering various enforcement remedies, the NRC Staff acts like a prosecutor. The NRC's adjudicatory process is not an appropriate forum for petitioners to second-guess enforcement decisions on resource allocation, policy priorities, or the likelihood of success at hearings. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 407 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004).

The NRC Staff has considerable latitude in choosing enforcement weapons, and a petitioner's (or the Board's) disapproval of the remedy the Staff selected does not justify reopening an enforcement proceeding. See State of Alaska Dep't of Transp. and Pub. Facilities, CLI-04-26, 60 NRC 399, 409 (2004), reconsid. denied, CLI-04-38, 60 NRC 652 (2004). The precise enforcement sanction to impose is within the Staff's sound discretion, and whether the Staff carries out its responsibility in crafting the terms of enforcement directives to the degree a petitioner believes is warranted is not a matter within the ambit of a Licensing Board. Id. at 411.

### **6.25.3 Petitions for Enforcement Action Under 10 CFR 2.206**

Although 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 may be technically available for a petitioner that wishes to assert operational problems, it is not the exclusive forum. Where operational issues are relevant to a recapture proceeding, they may also be raised in that proceeding. Moreover, the hearing rights available through a section 2.206 petition are scarcely equivalent to, and not an adequate substitute for, hearing rights available in a licensing proceeding. See Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 3), ALAB-747, 18 NRC 1167, 1175-77 (1983). The decision of the Staff to take or not take enforcement action pursuant to section 2.206 is purely discretionary -- it is not subject to review by the Commission (except on its own motion) or by courts, even for abuse of discretion. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(c)(1) and (2); Heckler v. Cheney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). The Commission has agreed that petitions utilizing 10 CFR 2.206 to address matters under 10 C.F.R. Part 52 are reviewable -- unlike actions taken under section 2.206 in other contexts. Such reviewability in that context was one of the primary

ingredients in the judicial approval of Part 52. Nuclear Information Resource Service v. NRC, 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The Court there noted that "the use to which a § 2.206 petition is put -- not its form -- governs its reviewability." 969 F.2d at 1178. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-93-1, 37 NRC 5, 18 (1993).

Under 10 CFR § 2.206, members of the public may request the NRC Staff to issue an enforcement order. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-83-16, 17 NRC 1006, 1009 (1983); Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-94-3, 39 NRC 95, 101 (1994). Under 10 CFR § 2.206, any person at any time may request the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, or Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, as appropriate, to issue an order under 10 CFR § 2.202 et seq. for suspension, revocation or modification of an operating license or a construction permit.

However, the Commission's long standing policy discourages the use of section 2.206 procedures as an avenue for deciding matters that are already under consideration in a pending adjudication. Georgia Power Co., et al. (Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-95-5, 41 NRC 321, 322 (1995). The staff's final determination of common issues should take into account the Licensing Board's findings.

Although petitions for enforcement action are filed with the NRC Staff, the Commission retains the power to rule directly on enforcement petitions. 10 CFR § 2.206(c). The Commission will elect to exercise this power only when the issues raised in the petition are of sufficient public importance. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Rowe Nuclear Power Station), CLI-91-11, 34 NRC 3, 6 (1991); Earthline Technologies, LBP-03-6, 57 NRC 251, 245 (2003).

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, upon receipt of a request to initiate an enforcement proceeding, is required to make an inquiry appropriate to the facts asserted. Provided he does not abuse his discretion, he is free to rely on a variety of sources of information, including Staff analyses of generic issues, documents issued by other agencies and the comments of the licensee on the factual allegations. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 432, 433 (1978).

In reaching a determination on a petition for enforcement action, the Director need not accord presumptive validity to every assertion of fact, irrespective of the degree of substantiation. Nor is the Director required to convene an adjudicatory proceeding to determine whether an adjudicatory proceeding is warranted. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 432 (1978).

The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., particularly Section 554, and the Commission's regulations deal specifically with on-the-record adjudication; thus, the Staff's participation in a construction permit proceeding does not render it incapable of impartial regulatory action in a subsequent show cause or suspension proceeding where no adjudication has begun. Moreover, in terms of policy, any view which questions the Staff's capabilities in such a situation is contradicted by the structure of nuclear regulation established by the Atomic Energy Act and the

experience implementing that statute. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 431, 432 (1978).

New matters which cannot be raised before a Board because of a lack of jurisdiction may be raised in a petition under 10 CFR § 2.206. Florida Power & Light Co. (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-579, 11 NRC 223, 226 (1980); Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1), ALAB-750, 18 NRC 1205, 1217 n.39 (1983); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-782, 20 NRC 838, 840 (1984). Where petitioner's case has no discernible relationship to any other pending proceeding involving the same facility, the procedure set out in 10 CFR § 2.206 must be regarded as the exclusive remedy. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 570 (1980).

After the Commission has awarded an operating license, the appropriate means by which to challenge the issuance of the license or to seek the suspension of the license is to file a petition, 10 CFR § 2.206, requesting that the Commission initiate enforcement action pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202. Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-92-12, 36 NRC 62, 67, 77-78 (1992).

In every case, a petitioner that for some reason cannot gain admittance to a construction permit or operating license hearing, but wishes to raise health, safety, or environmental concerns before the NRC, may file a request with the staff under 10 CFR § 2.206 asking the staff to institute a proceeding to address those concerns. The staff must analyze the technical, legal, and factual basis for the relief requested and respond either by undertaking some regulatory activity, or if it believes no proceeding or other action is necessary, by advising the requestor in writing of reasons explaining that determination. Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-707, 16 NRC 1760, 1767, 1768 (1982). See Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project Nos. 1& 2), CLI-82-29, 16 NRC 1221, 1228-1229 (1982). See also Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363, 1369-1370 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Washington Public Power Supply System (WPPSS Nuclear Project No. 2), ALAB-722, 17 NRC 546, 552-53 (1983).

Under 10 CFR § 2.206, one may petition the NRC for stricter enforcement actions than the agency contemplates. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 442-43 (1980).

The mechanism for requesting an enforcement order is a petition filed pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.206. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-83-16, 17 NRC 1006, 1009 (1983). Note that such a petition may not be used to seek relitigation of an issue that has already been decided or to avoid an existing forum in which the issue is being or is about to be litigated. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173, 177 (1975); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-81-6, 13 NRC 443, 446 (1981); General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2) and (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-85-4, 21 NRC 561, 563 (1985); Georgia Power Co., et al. (Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-93-15, 38 NRC 1, 2-3 (1993), clarified CLI-95-5, 41 NRC 321 (1995). This

general rule is not intended to bar petitioners from seeking immediate enforcement action from the NRC Staff in circumstances in which the presiding officer in a proceeding is not empowered to grant such relief. Georgia Power Co., et al. (Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-93-15, 38 NRC 1, 2 (1993).

Nonparties to a proceeding are also prohibited from using 10 CFR § 2.206 as a means to reopen issues which were previously adjudicated. General Public Utilities Nuclear Corp. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2) and (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-85-4, 21 NRC 561, 564 (1985). See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429 (1979), aff'd, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

The Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation properly has discretion to differentiate between those petitions which indicate that substantial issues have been raised warranting institution of a proceeding and those which serve merely to demonstrate that in hindsight, even the most thorough and reasonable of forecasts will prove to fall short of absolute prescience. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 433 (1978), aff'd, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

Under 10 CFR § 2.202, the NRC Staff is empowered to issue an order when it believes that modification or suspension of a license, or other such enforcement action, is warranted. Under 10 CFR § 2.206, members of the public may request the NRC Staff to issue such an order. Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Unit 2) and Power Authority of the State of New York (Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-83-18, 17 NRC 1006, 1009 (1983).

A Director does not abuse his or her discretion by refusing to take enforcement action based on mere speculation that financial pressures might in some unspecified way undermine the safety of a facility's operation. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-83-21, 18 NRC 157, 160 (1983).

The Director may, in his discretion, consolidate the essentially indistinguishable requests of petitioners if those petitioners are unable to demonstrate prejudice as a result of the consolidation. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 433 (1978), aff'd, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

If the Intervenor disagree with conclusions reached at a meeting between Staff and licensee regarding whether the licensee had complied with the Commission's licensing conditions, the Intervenor may seek further agency action by filing a petition with the Commission pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.206. The Staff response to such a petition would be subject to the ultimate oversight of the Commission. Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-17, 42 NRC 229 (1995).

In a materials licensing proceeding, the Commission rejected an intervenor's argument that because the licensee might not adhere to the methodology in its license, the intervenor should therefore have rights to an adjudicatory hearing on future determinations made in connection with particular license conditions. This argument

would transmogrify license proceedings into open-ended enforcement actions; licensing boards would be required to keep license proceedings open for the entire life of the license so intervenors would have a continuing, unrestricted opportunity to raise charges of noncompliance. If the intervenors subsequently have cause to believe that the licensee is not following the relevant procedures, they can petition the Staff for enforcement action. Hydro Res., Inc. (P.O. Box 777, Crownpoint, New Mexico 87313), CLI-06-1, 63 NRC 1, 5-6 (2006).

Requests for emergency injunctions are akin to petitions for enforcement actions. Earthline Technologies, LBP-03-6, 57 NRC 251, 245 (2003).

### **6.25.3.1 Commission Review of Director's Decisions Under 10 CFR 2.206**

The Commission retains plenary authority to review Director's decisions. 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(c)(1). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 126 (1996).

10 CFR § 2.206 provides that the Commission may, on its own motion, review the decision of the Director not to issue a show cause order to determine if the Director has abused his discretion. 10 CFR § 2.206(c)(1). No other petition or request for Commission review will be entertained. 10 CFR § 2.206(c)(2). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 127 (1996).

While there is no specific provision for Commission review of a decision to issue a show cause order, the regulation does acknowledge that the review power set forth in Section 2.206 does not limit the Commission's supervisory power over delegated Staff actions. 10 CFR § 2.206(c)(1). Thus, it is clear that the Commission may conduct any review of a decision with regard to requests for show cause orders that it deems necessary. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323 (1994).

The Commission has indicated that its review of Director's decisions under section 2.206 would be directed toward whether the Director abused his authority and, in particular, would include a consideration of the following:

- (1) does the statement of reasons for issuing the order permit a rational understanding of the basis for the decision;
- (2) did the Director correctly comprehend the applicable law, regulations and policy;
- (3) were all necessary factors included and irrelevant factors excluded;
- (4) were appropriate inquiries made as to the facts asserted;
- (5) is the decision basically untenable on the basis of the facts known to the Director.

Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point, Units 1, 2 & 3), CLI-75-8, 2 NRC 173 (1975). See also Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-79-6, 9 NRC 673, 676 n.1 (1979).

Under the Indian Point standards, the Director's decision will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unwarranted or an abuse of discretion. Licenses Authorized to Possess or Transport Strategic Quantities of Special Nuclear Material, CLI-77-3, 5 NRC 16



(1977). Although the Indian Point review is essentially a deferral to the Staff's judgment on facts relating to a potential enforcement action, it is not an abdication of the Commission's responsibilities since the Commission will decide any policy matters involved. CLI-77-3, 5 NRC at 20 n.6.

If the Commission takes no action to reverse or modify a Director's decision within twenty-five (25) days of issuance of the decision, it becomes final agency action 10 C.F.R. § 2.206(c)(1). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-6, 43 NRC 123, 128 (1996).

The question of whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Director's denial of a § 2.206 petition has not been directly addressed by the Supreme Court. See Lorion v. NRC, 470 U.S. 729 (1985). However, some federal appeals courts have determined that the Director's denial is unreviewable. Safe Energy Coalition v. NRC, 866 F.2d 1473, 1476, 1477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Arnow v. NRC, 868 F.2d 223, 230, 231 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 61 (1989); Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group v. NRC, 852 F.2d 9, 14-18 (1st Cir. 1988). The courts relied upon: (1) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), which precludes judicial review when agency action is committed to agency discretion by law, and (2) the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 701(a)(2) in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), decided the same day as Lorion v. NRC, 470 U.S. 729 (1985), wherein the Court held that an agency's refusal to undertake enforcement action upon request is presumptively unreviewable by the courts. That presumption may be rebutted where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers. Upon review of the Atomic Energy Act, NRC regulations, and NRC case law, the courts did not find any provisions which would rebut the presumption of unreviewability. Also note Ohio v. NRC, 868 F.2d 810, 818-19 (6th Cir. 1989), in which the court avoided the jurisdictional issue, and instead dismissed the petition for review on its merits.

Licensing Boards lack jurisdiction to entertain motions seeking review only of actions of the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation; the Commission itself is the forum for such review. See 10 CFR § 2.206(c). Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2), ALAB-466, 7 NRC 457 (1978).

Safety questions not properly raised in an adjudication may nonetheless be suitable for NRC consideration under its public petitioning process, 10 C.F.R. § 2.206. See Power Authority of the State of New York (James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 311 (2000); International Uranium (USA) Corp. (Receipt of Material from Tonawanda, New York), CLI-98-23, 48 NRC 259, 265-266 (1998). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 383 n.4 (2001).

#### **6.25.4 Grounds for Enforcement Orders**

An intentional act that a person knows causes a violation of a licensee procedure is considered "deliberate misconduct" actionable under section 30.10(a)(1). As a consequence, an assertion that a person who created a document containing false information did not intend to mislead the agency (or did not actually mislead the agency) appears irrelevant. Instead, the focus is on whether the person's action was a knowing violation of a licensee procedure that could have resulted in a regulatory

violation by the submission to the agency of materially incomplete or inaccurate information. See 56 Fed. Reg. 40,664, 40,670 (1991) (stating that "[f]or situations that do not actually result in a violation by a licensee, anyone with the requisite knowledge who engages in deliberate misconduct as defined in the rule has the requisite intent to act in a manner that falls within the NRC's area of regulatory concern. The fact that the action may have been intercepted or corrected prior to the occurrence of an actual violation has no bearing on whether, from a health and safety standpoint, that person should be involved in nuclear activities."). Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 224 (1996).

The institution of a proceeding to modify, suspend, or revoke a license need not be predicated upon alleged license violations, but rather may be based upon any "facts deemed to be sufficient grounds for the proposed action." 10 CFR § 2.202. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 570-71 (1980).

The Commission need not withhold enforcement action until it is ready to proceed with like action against all others committing similar violations. The Commission may act against one firm practicing an industry-wide violation. A rigid uniformity of sanctions is not required, and a sanction is not rendered invalid simply because it is more severe than that issued in other cases. Enforcement actions inherently involve the exercise of informed judgment on a case-by-case basis, and the ordering of enforcement priorities is left to the agency's sound discretion. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

The Staff is not precluded, as a matter of law, from relying on allegations as the basis for an enforcement order if there is a "sufficient nexus" between the allegations and the regulated activities that formed the focus of the Staff's order. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 331 (1994), citing Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 31 (1994).

In assessing whether the bases assigned support an order in terms of both the type and duration of the enforcement action, a relevant factor may be the public health and safety significance, including the medical appropriateness, of the specified bases. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 329 (1994).

A person may not be convicted of a conspiracy to conceal facts from the NRC unless he had a duty to reveal those facts or that he entered into an agreement to conceal facts from the NRC. Kenneth G. Pierce, LBP-95-4, 41 NRC 203, 218, n.50 (1995).

The standard to be applied in determining whether to issue an order is whether substantial health or safety issues have been raised. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 433 (1978); Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 334 (1994). See also Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-95-7, 41 NRC 323 (1995).

Allegations about financial difficulties at an operating facility are not by themselves a sufficient basis for action to restrict operations. On the other hand, allegations that

defects in safety practices have in fact occurred or are imminent would form a possible basis for enforcement action, whether or not the root cause of the fault was financial. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), CLI-83-21, 18 NRC 157, 159-60 (1983).

When there is no claim of a lack of understanding regarding the nature of the charges in an NRC Staff enforcement order, the fact that the validity of the Staff's assertions have not been litigated is no reason to preclude the Staff from utilizing those charges as a basis for the order. The adjudicatory proceeding instituted pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202 affords those who are adversely affected by the order with an opportunity to contest each of the charges that make up the Staff's enforcement determination, an opportunity intended to protect their due process rights. The "unlitigated" nature of the Staff's allegations in an enforcement order thus is not a constitutional due process deficiency that bars Staff reliance on those allegations as a component of the enforcement order. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 30 (1994).

The involvement of a licensee's management in a violation has no bearing on whether the violation may have occurred; if a licensee's employee was acting on the licensee's behalf and committed acts that violated the terms of the license or the Commission's regulations, the licensee is accountable for the violations, and appropriate enforcement action may be taken. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table); see also Atlantic Research Corp., CLI-80-7, 11 NRC 413 (1980).

A license or construction permit may be modified, suspended or revoked for

- (1) any material false statement in an application or other statement of fact required of the applicant;
  - (2) conditions revealed by the application, statement of fact, inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license in the first instance;
  - (3) failure to construct or operate a facility in accordance with the terms of the construction permit or operating license; or
  - (4) violation of, or failure to observe, any terms and provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the regulations, a permit, a license, or an order of the Commission.
- See, e.g., 10 CFR § 50.100.

Where information is presented which demonstrates an undue risk to public health and safety, the NRC will take prompt remedial action including shutdown of operating facilities. Such actions may be taken with immediate effect notwithstanding the Administrative Procedure Act requirements of notice and opportunity to achieve compliance. Petition for Emergency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-6, 7 NRC 400, 404, 405 (1978).

Refusal by a licensee and contractor to permit a lawful staff investigation deemed necessary to assure public health and safety is serious enough to warrant the drastic remedy of permit suspension pending submission to investigation, since the refusal interferes with the Commission's duty to assure public health and safety. Union

Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Unit 1 & 2), LBP-78-31, 8 NRC 366, 378 (1978), aff'd ALAB-527, 9 NRC 126 (1979).

If a safety problem is revealed at any time during low-power operation of a facility or as a result of the merits review of a party's appeal of the decision to authorize low-power operation, the low-power license can be suspended. Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-789, 20 NRC 1443, 1447 (1984). See also Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-81-30, 14 NRC 950 (1981).

The Commission is authorized to consider a licensee's character and integrity in deciding whether to continue or revoke a license. Piping Specialists, Inc., et al (Kansas City, MO), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, 153 (1992), citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1207 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985).

The enforcement policy provides that suspensions ordinarily are not ordered where the failure to comply with requirements was "not willful and adequate corrective action has been taken." Piping Specialists, Inc., et al (Kansas City, MO), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156 (1992).

#### **6.25.5 Immediately Effective Orders**

The validity of an immediately effective order is judged on the basis of information available to the Director at the time it was issued at the start of the proceeding. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 5 (1980). See Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-90-17, 31 NRC 540, 542-43 n.5, 556-57 (1990), aff'd, CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

Issuance of an order requiring interim action is not the determination of the merits of a controversy. Nuclear Engineering Co., Inc. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-80-1, 11 NRC 1, 6 (1980).

Although a licensee usually should be afforded a prior opportunity to be heard before the Commission suspends a license or takes other enforcement action, extraordinary circumstances may warrant summary action prior to hearing. The Commission's regulations regarding summary enforcement action are consistent with section 9(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 558(c) and due process principles. Due process does not require that emergency action be taken only where there is no possibility of error; due process requires only that an opportunity for hearing be granted at a meaningful time and in a manner appropriate for the case. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 299-300 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table). The Commission is empowered to make a shutdown order immediately effective where such action is required by the public health, safety, or public interest. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-9, 21 NRC 1118, 1123-24 n.2 (1985). See 10 CFR § 2.202(a)(5), implementing Administrative Procedure Act § 9(b), 5 U.S.C. 558(c).

The Commission is obligated under the law to lift the effectiveness of an immediately effective shutdown order once the concerns which brought about the order have been adequately resolved. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-9, 21 NRC 1118, 1124 (1985). See, e.g., Pan American Airways v. C.A.B., 684 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Northwest Airlines v. C.A.B., 539 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. C.A.B., 458 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975). This holds true even where Licensing and Appeal Boards' deliberations and decisions as to resumption of operations are pending, provided the issues before the Board do not implicate the public health and safety. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-85-9, 21 NRC 1118, 1149 (1985).

The Director may issue an immediately effective order without prior written notice if (1) the public health, safety or interest so requires, or (2) the licensee's violations are willful. In civil proceedings, action taken by a licensee in the belief that it was legal does not preclude a finding of willfulness. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-79-6, 9 NRC 673, 677-78 (1979).

Latent conditions which may cause harm in the future are a sufficient basis for issuing an immediately effective show cause order where the consequences might not be subject to correction in the future. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-79-6, 9 NRC 673, 677 (1979), citing Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-74-3, 7 AEC 7, 10-12 (1974).

Purported violations of agency regulations support an immediately effective order even where no adverse public health consequences are threatened. Nuclear Engineering Co. (Sheffield, Illinois Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site), CLI-79-6, 9 NRC 673, 677-78 (1979).

An immediately effective suspension order was found justified where the alleged violations involved significant license conditions and procedures that were intended to ensure safe handling and maintenance of devices containing a radioactive source that could deliver a substantial or even lethal radiation dose. The staff could reasonably conclude that license suspension was required to remove the possible threat of adverse safety consequences to patients and workers from maintenance and service on teletherapy units by untrained licensee employees. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 314 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

In deciding whether an immediately effective order is necessary to protect public health and safety, the staff is required to make a prudent, prospective judgment at the time that the order is issued about the potential consequences of the apparent regulatory violations. A reasonable threat of harm requiring prompt remedial action, not the occurrence of the threatened harm itself, is all that is required to justify immediate action. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

Where the contested issues focused on the adequacy of the evidence in the Staff's knowledge when it initiated the license suspension, the licensing board did not err in limiting its consideration to the evidence amassed by the Staff before the order was

issued. Nor is the staff barred from relying on additional evidence gathered after an immediately effective order is issued to defend the continued effectiveness of that order; however, the staff may not issue the order based merely on the hope that it will thereafter find the necessary quantum of evidence to sustain the order's immediate effectiveness. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

#### **6.25.5.1 Review of Immediate Effectiveness of Enforcement Order**

On May 12, 1992, the Commission issued a final rule concerning challenges to the immediate effectiveness of orders. 57 Fed. Reg. 20194 (May 12, 1992) (See Digest § 6.25.10). Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(i), the subject of an immediately effective order may, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the order. The NRC Staff must respond within five days after receiving the motion. The Commission declined to specify a time limit for the presiding officer's review of the motion and, instead, strongly emphasized that a presiding officer should decide the motion as expeditiously as possible. 57 Fed. Reg. at 20197. The presiding officer will apply an adequate evidence test to evaluate the set aside motion. Adequate evidence exists "when facts and circumstances within the NRC Staff's knowledge, of which it has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the charges specified in the order are true and that the order is necessary to protect the public health, safety, or interest." 57 Fed. Reg. at 20196. The adequate evidence test does not apply to the determination of the merits of the immediately effective order. The presiding officer should rule on the merits of the immediately effective order as expeditiously as possible, although the presiding officer may delay the hearing for good cause. 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(ii). When an immediate effectiveness determination is challenged, the Staff must satisfy a two-part test: it must demonstrate that adequate evidence – i.e. reliable, probative and substantial (but not preponderant) evidence – supports a conclusion that (1) the licensee violated a Commission requirement (10 C.F.R. § 2.202(a)(1)), and (2) the violation was "willful," or the violation poses a risk to "the public health, safety, or interest" that requires immediate action (*id.* § 2.202(a)(5)). Safety Light Corp., LBP-05-2, 61 NRC 53, 61 (2005).

When the character and veracity of the source for a Staff allegation are in doubt, a presiding officer will be unable to credit the source's information as sufficiently reliable to provide "adequate evidence" for that allegation absent sufficient independent corroborating information. Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 219-21 (1996).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(i) a person to whom the Commission has issued an immediately effective enforcement order may move to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the order on the ground that "the order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error." St. Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc. and Joseph L. Fisher, M.D., LBP-92-34, 36 NRC 317 (1992); see also United Evaluation Services, Inc. (Beachwood, New Jersey), LBP-02-13, 55 NRC 351, 354 (2002).

The movant challenging a Staff determination to make an enforcement order immediately effective bears the burden of going forward to demonstrate that the order, and the Staff's determination that it is necessary to make the order immediately effective, are not supported by "adequate evidence" within the meaning 10 C.F.R. § 2.202(c)(2)(i), but the Staff has the ultimate burden of persuasion on whether this standard has been met. See 55 Fed. Reg. 27,645, 27646 (1990). See also St Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc., LBP-92-34, 36 NRC 317, 321-22 (1992). Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 215-16 (1996); Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D., LBP-97-15, 46 NRC 60, 61 (1997).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.202(c)(2)(i), to support an immediate effectiveness determination for an enforcement order, besides showing that the bases for the order are supported by "adequate evidence," the Staff must show there is a need for immediate effectiveness that is supported by "adequate evidence." That need can be established by showing either that the alleged violations or the conduct supporting the violations is willful or that the public health, safety, or interest requires immediate effectiveness. Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 227 (1996).

Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(i), a set-aside motion must state with particularity the reasons why the enforcement order is not based upon adequate evidence and the motion must be accompanied by affidavits or other evidence relied upon by the movant. St. Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc., LBP-92-34, 36 NRC 317, 321-22 (1992); United Evaluation Services, Inc. (Beachwood, New Jersey), LBP-02-13, 55 NRC 351, 354 (2002).

In order to set aside the immediate effectiveness of an enforcement order, a party served with an enforcement order must file a timely written answer, under oath, that admits or denies each Staff allegation or charge in the enforcement order and sets forth the facts and legal arguments on which the party relies in claiming that the order should not have been issued. Failure to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 2.202(b) may result in dismissal of the proceeding. St. Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc. and Joseph L. Fisher, M.D., LBP-93-14, 38 NRC 18 (1993).

A Licensing Board will uphold the immediate effectiveness of the order if it finds that there is adequate evidence to support immediate effectiveness. The adequate evidence test is met when the "facts and circumstances within the NRC Staff's knowledge, of which it has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the charges specified in the order are true and that the order is necessary to protect the public health, safety, or interest." 57 Fed. Reg. 20194, 20196 (May 12, 1992). St. Joseph Radiology Associates, Inc. and Joseph L. Fisher, M.D., LBP-93-14, 38 NRC 18 (1993). United Evaluation Services, Inc. (Beachwood, New Jersey), LBP-02-13, 55 NRC 351, 354 (2002). The Commission likened the adequate evidence standard to probable cause, which is described as "less than must be shown in trial, but . . . more than uncorroborated suspicion or accusation." United Evaluation Services, Inc. (Beachwood, New Jersey), LBP-02-13, 55 NRC 351, 354 (2002), citing, Horne Brothers, Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

In determining whether the Director abused his discretion in issuing an immediately effective order, a Licensing Board will evaluate the reasonableness of the Director's

decision in light of the facts available to the Director at the time he issued his decision. Advanced Medical Systems (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-90-17, 31 NRC 540, 556-57 (1990), aff'd, CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

The standard by which the immediate effectiveness of an order is judged may differ from the standard ultimately applied after a full adjudication on the merits of an enforcement order. The review of an order's immediate effectiveness permits such orders to be based on preliminary investigation or other emerging information that is reasonably reliable and that indicates the need for immediate action under the criteria in 10 CFR § 2.202. In accordance with the Commission's rulemaking on the procedures for review of the immediate effectiveness of enforcement orders, the basic test is "adequate evidence," a test similar to the one used for probable cause for an arrest, warrant, or preliminary hearing. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table); Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D., LBP-97-15, 46 NRC 60, 63 (1997).

The "adequate evidence" test is intended to strike a balance between the interest of the Commission in protecting the public health, safety, or interest and an affected party's interest in protection against arbitrary enforcement action. The test is intended only as a preliminary procedural safeguard against the ordering of immediately effective action based on clear error, unreliable evidence, or unfounded allegations. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

In considering whether there is probable cause for an arrest, courts have held that information supplied by an identified ordinary citizen witness may be presumed reliable. See, e.g., McKinney v. George, 556 F. Supp. 645, 648 (N.D. Ill. 1983)(citing cases), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1984). In determining whether there is "adequate evidence" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. §2.202(c)(2)(i) to support the immediate effectiveness of an enforcement order, applying this presumption to a witness who is corroborating a family member's allegations may be inappropriate because that relationship creates a possible bias that also brings the corroborating witness' reliability into substantial question. Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 221 (1996).

Absent a showing that provides some reasonable cause to believe that, because of bias or mistake, an agency inspector cannot be considered a credible observer, inspector's direct personal observations should be credited in considering whether allegations based on those observations are supported by "adequate evidence" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. § 2.202(c)(2)(i). This is based on the accepted presumption that a government officer can be expected faithfully to execute his or her official duties. Eastern Testing and Inspection, Inc., LBP-96-9, 43 NRC 211, 225 (1996) (citing United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).

Claims of a movant under 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(i) may properly suggest the existence of factual disputes, but they may not be sufficient to demonstrate lack of



probable cause for a Staff immediately effective order. Aharon Ben-Haim, Ph.D., LBP-97-15, 46 NRC 60, 64 (1997).

The Commission's supervisory role over licensing and enforcement proceedings permits it, on its own initiative, to lift the immediate effectiveness of a license suspension order issued by the Staff. Safety Light Corp., CLI-05-7, 61 NRC 69, 69-70 (2005).

#### **6.25.6 Issues in Enforcement Proceedings**

The agency alone has power to develop enforcement policy and allocate resources in a way that it believes is best calculated to reach statutory ends. NRC can develop policy that has licensees consent to, rather than contest, enforcement proceedings. A Director may set forth and limit the questions to be considered in an enforcement proceeding. Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 441 (1980).

In an enforcement proceeding, once the licensee has voluntarily complied with the Staff's enforcement order requiring cleanup and decontamination of the licensee's byproduct materials facility, the controverted issue upon which a proceeding may be based -- whether the order was justified -- has become moot. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), LBP-92-36, 36 NRC 366, 368 (1992), review denied, CLI-93-8, 37 NRC 181 (1993).

To justify further inquiry into a claim of discriminatory enforcement, the licensee must show both that other similarly situated licensees were treated differently and that no rational reason existed for the different treatment. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

The Commission may limit the issues in enforcement proceedings to whether the facts as stated in the order are true and whether the remedy selected is supported by those facts. Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-82-16, 16 NRC 44, 45 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Bellotti v. NRC, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir 1983); Public Service Co. of Indiana (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-80-10, 11 NRC 438, 441-442 (1980); Sequoyah Fuels Corp. (UF6 Production Facility), CLI-86-19, 24 NRC 508, 512 n.2 (1986).

When violation of ambiguous plant procedures is alleged by NRC staff in an enforcement proceeding, it is appropriate to receive evidence from plant operators to determine how those procedures were interpreted by them. It is also appropriate to interpret the procedures in light of company actions in cases of alleged violations of the same procedures, as reflected in official records. It is not appropriate to sustain an enforcement action in which the operator did not act willfully because he reasonably believed he had complied with plant procedures. Kenneth G. Pierce, LBP-95-4, 41 NRC 203, 212 (1995).

When a person is charged with improperly stating under oath that he had failed to remember facts about a meeting or conversation, it is important to examine precisely what that person was doing at the time and how strong others' memories are before

concluding that he had lied. Kenneth G. Pierce, LBP-95-4, 41 NRC 203, 221-24 (1995).

Licensing Boards have no jurisdiction to enforce license conditions unless they are the subject of an enforcement action initiated pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202. Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend Station, Unit 1), LBP-94-3, 39 NRC 31 (1994); aff'd, CLI-94-10, 40 NRC 43 (1994).

A decision under section 2.206 on a request for a show cause order is no more than the decision of an NRC staff Director and thus does not constitute an adjudicatory order under section 189b of the Atomic Energy Act and cannot serve as the basis of a valid contention in an enforcement proceeding. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-93-9, 37 NRC 433 (1993).

No further consideration need be given to the potential willful nature of license violations where an order's immediate effectiveness was not sustained on the basis of willfulness and where the licensee suffers no other collateral effects of the order. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

In Geo-Tech Associates (Geo-Tech Laboratories), CLI-92-14, 36 NRC 221 (1992), the Commission provided guidance on any hearing held on the issue of an order revoking materials license for failure to pay the annual license fee required by 10 CFR Part 171. A hearing request on enforcement sanctions for failure to pay license fees will be limited in scope to the issue of whether the Licensee's fee was properly assessed, (*i.e.*, was Licensee placed in the proper category; was Licensee charged the proper fee for that category; was Licensee granted a partial or total exemption from the fee by the NRC staff?) and challenges to the fee schedule or its underlying methodology are not properly challenged in this type of proceeding, since they were established by rulemaking which an adjudicatory proceeding cannot amend.

#### **6.25.7 Burden of Proof**

The Atomic Energy Act intends the party seeking to build or operate a nuclear reactor to bear the burden of proof in any Commission proceeding bearing on its application to do so, including a show cause proceeding on a construction permit. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear 1), ALAB-619, 12 NRC 558, 571 (1980).

The burden of proof in a show cause proceeding with respect to a construction permit is on the permit holder. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-283, 2 NRC 11 (1975). As to safety matters this is so until the award of a full-term operating license. Dairyland Power Coop. (La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor), LBP-81-7, 13 NRC 257, 264-65 (1981). However, the burden of going forward with evidence "sufficient to require reasonable minds to inquire further" is on the person who sought the show cause order. Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-315, 3 NRC 101, 110-11 (1976).

The Commission has never adopted the "clear and convincing" evidence standard as the evidentiary yardstick in reaching the ultimate merits of an enforcement proceeding,

nor is it required to do so under the Atomic Energy Act or the Administrative Procedure Act. NRC administrative proceedings have generally relied upon the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in reaching the ultimate conclusions after a hearing to resolve the proceeding. Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995) (Table).

#### **6.25.8 Licensing Board Review of Proposed Sanctions**

In making a determination about whether a license suspension or modification order should be sustained, a presiding officer must undertake an evaluative process that may involve assessing, among other things, whether the bases assigned in the order support it both in terms of the type and duration of the enforcement action. As the Commission noted, "the choice of sanction is quintessentially a matter of the agency's sound discretion." Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. (One Factory Row, Geneva, Ohio 44041), CLI-94-6, 39 NRC 285, 312 (1994), aff'd, Advanced Medical Systems, Inc. v. NRC, 61 F.3d 903 (6th Cir. 1995)(Table) (footnote omitted). In this regard, a presiding officer's review of an NRC Staff enforcement action would be limited to whether the Staff's choice of sanction constituted an abuse of discretion. And, just as with the NRC Staff's initial determination about imposition of the enforcement order, a relevant factor may be the public health and safety significance of the bases specified in the order. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 34 n.5 (1994).

A Licensing Board may terminate an enforcement proceeding when the licensee withdraws its challenge to the revocation of its license. The Board should not vacate for mootness any prior decisions in the proceeding when no appeals of those prior decisions are extant. Wrangler Laboratories, LBP-91-37, 34 NRC 196, 197 (1991).

One or more of the bases put forth by the NRC Staff as support for an enforcement order may be subject to dismissal if it is established they lack a sufficient nexus to the regulated activities that are the focus of the Staff's enforcement action. Indiana Regional Cancer Center, LBP-94-21, 40 NRC 22, 31 (1994).

A Staff action to relax or rescind the conditions in an enforcement order that is the subject of an ongoing adjudication would be subject to review by the presiding officer with input from all parties to the proceeding. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site Decontamination and Decommissioning Funding), LBP-94-5, 39 NRC 54 (1994); aff'd, CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64 (1994).

Review of a show cause order is limited to whether the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation abused his discretion. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (Bailey Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429, 433 (1978).

It is not likely that, after a lengthy evidentiary hearing, a Board would agree with the Director of NMSS in every detail. Nor is that necessary in order to sustain the Director's decision. Atlantic Research Corp. (Alexandria, Virginia), ALAB-594, 11 NRC 841, 848-49 (1980)(the adjudicatory hearing in a civil penalty proceeding is essentially a trial de novo, subject only to the principle that the Board may not assess a greater penalty than the Staff). See Piping Specialists, Inc., (Kansas City, MO), LBP-92-25, 36 NRC 156, review declined, CLI-92-16, 39 NRC 351 (1992).

### 6.25.9 Stay of Enforcement Proceedings

Claiming a constitutional deprivation arising from a delayed adjudication generally requires some showing of prejudice. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 330 (1994), citing Oncology Services Corp., CLI-93-17, 38 NRC 44, 50-51 (1993).

Commission regulations require that hearings regarding immediately effective enforcement orders be held expeditiously. David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 12 (2006) (citing 10 C.F.R. § 2.202(c)(1)).

The pendency of a related criminal investigation can provide an appropriate basis for postponing litigation on a Staff enforcement order. Dr. James E. Bauer (Order Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities), LBP-94-40, 40 NRC 323, 330-31 (1994).

The NRC's mere assertion that it wishes to protect a pending criminal prosecution does not, without more, justify holding the NRC's parallel administrative enforcement proceeding in abeyance. The staff, as the party supporting abeyance, must make at least some showing of potential detrimental effect on the criminal case. Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495 (2006).

The Commission, as a matter of policy memorialized in a formal Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Justice, defers to the Department of Justice when it seeks a delay in NRC enforcement proceedings pending the conclusion of DOJ's own criminal investigations or proceedings. The Commission does not lightly second-guess DOJ's views on whether, or how, premature discussions might affect its criminal prosecution. Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC at 504.

The presiding officer may delay an enforcement proceeding for good cause. 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(ii). In determining whether good cause exists, the presiding officer must consider both the public interest as well as the interests of the person subject to the immediately effective order. The factors to be considered in balancing the competing interests include (1) length of delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) risk of erroneous deprivation, (4) assertion of one's right to prompt resolution of the controversy, (5) prejudice to the licensee, including harm to the licensee's interests and harm to the licensee's ability to mount an adequate defense. Oncology Service Corp., CLI-93-17, 38 NRC 44, 50-51 (1993); followed by Licensing Board in 3rd request for stay by NRC staff in Oncology proceeding, LBP-93-20, 38 NRC 130 (1993); Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495, 500 (2006).

The determination of whether the length of delay in an enforcement proceeding is excessive depends on the facts of the particular case and the nature of the proceeding. The risk of erroneous deprivation is reduced if the licensee is given an opportunity to request that the presiding officer set aside the immediate effectiveness of the suspension order by challenging whether the suspension order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is based on adequate evidence. Oncology Service Corp., CLI-93-17, 38 NRC 44, 57 (1993); followed by Licensing Board in 3rd request for stay by NRC staff in Oncology proceeding, LBP-93-20, 38 NRC 130 (1993).

Staff's showing of possible interference with an investigation being conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations and a strong interest in protecting the integrity of the investigation in conjunction with a demonstration that the risk of erroneous deprivation has been reduced weighs heavily in the Staff's favor. However, a licensee's vigorous opposition to a stay and its insistence on a prompt adjudicatory hearing are entitled to strong weight, irrespective of whether the licensee failed to challenge the basis for the immediate effectiveness of the Staff's suspension order. Oncology Service Corp., CLI-93-17, 38 NRC 44, 58 (1993). Nevertheless, without a particularized showing of harm to the licensee's interests, licensee's vigorous opposition to a stay does not tip the scale in favor of the licensee when balancing the competing interests. CLI-93-17 at 59-60. The Commission's decision was followed by the Licensing Board in ruling on a third NRC staff request for a stay in the Oncology proceeding, LBP-93-20, 38 NRC 130 (1993).

Although it is not unusual for an adjudicatory proceeding and an investigation on the same general subject matter to proceed simultaneously, the Commission has been willing to stay parallel proceeding if a party shows substantial prejudice, e.g., where discovery in an adjudicatory proceeding would compromise an investigation. Georgia Power Co. (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-95-9, 41 NRC 404, 405 (1995).

The target of an enforcement action has a strong argument regarding harm from delay in enforcement proceedings where there is direct causal nexus between the enforcement order and the target's firing. David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 12 (2006).

The Commission has found insufficient basis for holding an enforcement proceeding in abeyance where the Department of Justice affidavit in support of such an abeyance (i.e., justifying why continuation of the enforcement proceeding could jeopardize a parallel criminal proceeding) includes only generalities rather than specific supporting facts, which are essential in justifying such a request. David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 12-14 (2006) (citing Andrew Siemaszko, CLI-06-12, 63 NRC 495, 503 (2006)).

While the Commission is generally inclined to accommodate the Department of Justice's requests for abeyance of NRC enforcement proceedings pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the agencies, the MOU does not entail an ironclad guarantee of such accommodation. The MOU reflects a clear understanding that DOJ must provide factual justification for delays in NRC adjudication (and related impositions on the enforcement target), via appropriate affidavits or testimony. David Geisen, CLI-06-19, 64 NRC 9, 13 (2006).

#### **6.25.10 Civil Penalty Proceedings**

Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act directs the Commission to afford an opportunity for a hearing to a licensee to whom a notice has been given of an alleged violation. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., ALJ-78-3, 8 NRC 649, 653 (1978).

The Commission established detailed procedures and considerations to be undertaken in the assessment of civil penalties by: (1) notice of proposed rulemaking (36 Fed. Reg. 19122, Aug. 26, 1971), and (2) amendment of the Rules of Practice to include the

factors which will determine the assessment of civil penalties. (35 Fed. Reg. 16894, Dec. 17, 1970). These two actions fulfill the legal requirements for standards utilized in civil penalty proceedings. Radiation Technology, Inc., ALJ-78-4, 8 NRC 655, 663 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533 (1979). See also Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Company, ALJ-78-3, 8 NRC 649, 653 (1978).

Under Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2282(b), and 10 CFR § 2.205 of the Commission's regulations, a person subject to imposition of a civil penalty must first be given written notice of: (1) the specific statutory, regulatory or license violations; (2) the date, facts, and nature of the act or omission with which the person is charged; and (3) the proposed penalty. The person subject to the fine must then be given an opportunity to show in writing why the penalty should not be imposed. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1), CLI-82-31, 16 NRC 1236, 1238 (1982).

Although recognizing the Staff's broad discretion in determining the amount of a civil penalty, results reached in other cases may nonetheless be relevant in determining whether the Staff may have abused its discretion in this case. A nexus to the current proceeding would have to be shown, and differing circumstances might well explain seemingly disparate penalties in various cases. Radiation Oncology Center at Marlton (Marlton, NJ), LBP-95-25, 42 NRC 237, 239 (1995).

When a hearing is requested to challenge the imposition of civil penalties, the officer presiding at the hearing, not the staff, decides on the basis of the record whether the charges are sustained and whether civil penalties are warranted. Radiation Technology, Inc., ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 536 (1979).

Civil penalties are not invalidated by the absence of a formally promulgated schedule of fees when the penalties imposed are within statutory limits and in accord with general criteria published by the Commission. Radiation Technology, ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 541 (1979).

One factor which a Licensing Board may consider in determining the amount of a civil penalty is the promptness and extent to which a licensee takes corrective action. Certified Testing Laboratories, Inc., LBP-92-2, 35 NRC 20, 44 (1992).

The five-year statute of limitations on civil penalty actions imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 commences when the claim first accrues. This requirement is satisfied by the issuance of a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty within five years of the date of the underlying violation. 3M Company v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457-63 (D.C. Cir.1994); See also Johnson v. SEC, 87 F. 3d 484 (D.C. Cir. 1996). With respect to continuing violations, absent fraud or concealment of the violation, the claim first accrues when the course of conduct constituting the violation ceases. See Newell Recycling Co. v. U.S. EPA, 231 F. 3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 2000). In some circumstances, equitable considerations permit tolling the five-year period. For example, if the fraudulent conduct of the defendant caused the injured party to remain ignorant of the violation, without any fault or lack of due diligence, the limitations period does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1874); Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F. 2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Furthermore, when a licensee is required to report a violation, the limitation does not run until the licensee reports the violation. See Public Interest Research Group v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,

913 F. 2d 64, 75 (3rd Cir. 1990); United States v. ALCOA, 824 F. Supp. 640, 645 (D.W.Tex. 1993).

A civil penalty may be imposed on a licensee even though there is no evidence of (1) malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance by the licensee, or (2) a failure by the licensee to take prompt corrective action. In such circumstances, a civil penalty may be considered proper if it might have the effect of deterring future violations of regulatory requirements or license conditions by the licensee, other licensees, or their employees. It does not matter that the imposition of the civil penalty may be viewed as punitive. Atlantic Research Corp., CLI-80-7, 11 NRC 413 (1980), vacating ALAB-542, 9 NRC 611 (1979).

An adjudicatory hearing in a civil penalty proceeding is essentially a trial de novo. The penalty assessed by the staff constitutes the upper bound of the penalty which may be imposed after the hearing but the Board may substitute its own judgment for that of the Director. Atlantic Research Corporation, ALAB-594, 11 NRC 841, 849 (1980).

The grounds for the Staff's finding of a whistleblower violation form the upper jurisdictional boundary for the grounds available to a licensing board in determining whether a violation has occurred. These bounds are established in the enforcement order. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-04-24, 60 NRC 160, 202-203 (2004).

Civil penalty adjudications are de novo proceedings. The licensing board may substitute its own judgment for that of the director, and is entirely free to mitigate or remit the assessed penalty. The Commission's Enforcement Policy does not give exclusive discretion to the staff in determining the amount of a civil penalty. TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 217-218.

Where the Staff is detailed and complete in explaining its method of calculating the amount of civil penalty and the Licensee has not controverted the Staff's reasoning the amount of the civil penalty will stand. Cameo Diagnostic Centre, Inc., LBP-94-34, 40 NRC 169, 175-76 (1994).

Civil penalties may be imposed for the violation of regulations or license conditions without a finding of fault on the part of the licensee, so long as it is believed such action will positively affect the conduct of the licensee, or serve as an example to others. It matters not that the imposition of the civil penalty might be viewed as punitive. A licensee is responsible for all violations committed by its employees, whether it knew or could have known of them. There is no need to show scienter. One is not exempted from regulation by operating through an employee. Atlantic Research Corp., CLI-80-7, 11 NRC 413 (1980); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., ALJ-78-3, 8 NRC 649, 651-52 (1978).

For treatment of the administrative record of an NRC civil penalty action in a collection action in federal district court, see NRC v. Radiation Technology, 519 F. Supp. 1266 (D.N.J. 1981).

### 6.25.11 Settlement of Enforcement Proceedings

In enforcement proceedings, settlements between the Staff and the licensee, once a matter has been noticed for hearing, are subject to review by the presiding officer. 10 CFR § 2.203. Thus, once an enforcement order has been set for hearing at a licensee's request, the NRC Staff no longer has untrammelled discretion to offer or accept a compromise or settlement. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site), CLI-94-12, 40 NRC 64, 71 (1994).

Where the Staff in an enforcement settlement does not insist on strict compliance with a particular Commission regulation, it is neither waiving the regulation at issue nor amending it, but is instead merely exercising discretion to allow an alternative means of meeting the regulation's goals. Sequoyah Fuels Corp. and General Atomics (Gore, OK, Site), CLI-97-13, 46 NRC 195, 221 (1997).

### 6.25.12 Inspections and Investigations

The Commission has both the duty and the authority to make such investigations and inspections as it deems necessary to protect the public health and safety. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-31, 8 NRC 366, 374 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-527, 9 NRC 126 (1979).

Because the atomic energy industry is a pervasively regulated industry, lawful inspections of licensee's activities are within the warrantless search exception for a "closely regulated industry" delineated by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978). A licensee's submission to all applicable NRC regulations constitutes advance consent to lawful inspections; a search warrant is not required for such inspections. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-31, 8 NRC 366, 377 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-527, 9 NRC 126 (1979); Radiation Technology, Inc., ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 540 (1979); U.S. v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 1266, 1288 (D.N.J. 1981).

Proposed investigation of the discharge by a licensee's contractor of a worker who reported alleged construction problems to the NRC was within the NRC's statutory and regulatory authority to assure public health and safety. The Commission should not defer such an inquiry into the discharge of a worker under a proper exercise of its authority to investigate safety related matters merely because such investigation may touch on matters that are the subject of a grievance proceeding between the licensee and the worker. Union Electric Co. (Callaway Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-78-31, 8 NRC 366, 376-78 (1978), aff'd, ALAB-527, 9 NRC 126 (1979).

An agency investigation must be conducted for a legitimate purpose. However, section 161c of the AEA, 42 USC § 2201(c), does not require that the precise nature and extent of the investigation be articulated in a specific provision of the AEA or the Energy Reorganization Act. Rather, the AEA § 161c makes clear that an NRC investigation is proper if it "assist[s] [the NRC] in exercising any authority provided in this, . . . or any regulations or orders issued thereunder." U.S. v. Construction Products Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 471 (2nd Cir. 1996).

Inspections of licensed activities during company-scheduled working hours are reasonable per se. Commission inspections may not be limited to "office hours." In re



Radiation Technology, Inc., ALAB-567, 10 NRC 533, 540 (1979); U.S. v. Radiation Technology, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 1266, 1288 (D.N.J. 1981).

The NRC staff is authorized by the Commission to issue subpoenas pursuant to Section 161c of the Atomic Energy Act where necessary or appropriate for the conduct of inspections or investigations. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), CLI-87-8, 26 NRC 6, 9 (1987). The NRC staff may issue a subpoena to a person who is not an NRC licensee under section 161c of the AEA, where the recipient of the subpoena has information that would help determine whether a properly issued NRC regulation was violated by the former employee of a licensee. Rene Chun, CLI-04-34, 60 NRC 607 (2004).

The Department of Justice guidelines for issuing subpoenas to members of the media do not vest any rights in members of the media. Thus, the fact that a subpoena does not satisfy the DOJ guidelines does not mean that a federal court would refuse to enforce the subpoena. Further, while members of the media enjoy some protection from subpoena under the First Amendment "reporter's privilege," the First Amendment interest protected by this "qualified privilege" is narrowed and easier to overcome when confidential sources are not involved. Specifically, where non-confidential sources are involved and information is sought from a non-party press entity, the privilege can be overcome if the party issuing the subpoena can show that the materials at issue are of likely relevance to a significant issue in the case, and are not reasonably obtainable from other available sources. (citing Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1999). Id.

### **6.25.13 False Statements**

The Commission depends on licensees and applicants for accurate information to assist the Commission in carrying out its regulatory responsibilities and expects nothing less than full candor from licensees and applicants. Randall C. Orem, D.O., CLI-93-14, 37 NRC 423, 427 (1993); Hamlin Testing Laboratories, Inc., 2 AEC 423, 428 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.1966). A seminal case on false statements in the context of NRC regulation is Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-76-22, 4 NRC 480 (1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir.1978).

The penalties that flow from making a false statement to a presiding officer and the NRC staff, including the possibility of criminal violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and agency enforcement actions, can be sufficient to ensure compliance without the additional step of incorporating into a decision a list of commitments that an applicant has clearly acknowledged it accepts and will fulfill. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 410 (2000), citing Florida Power and Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4), ALAB-898, 28 NRC 36, 41 n.20 (1988) (holding that there was no need to incorporate applicant commitment in order given potential Staff enforcement).

### **6.25.14 Independence of Inspector General**

Congress enacted the Inspector General Act of 1978 in order "to more effectively combat fraud, abuse, waste and mismanagement in the programs and operations of ... departments and agencies." NRC v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 25 F.3d 229,

233 (4th Cir. 1994), citing S. Rep. No. 1071, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USSCAN 2676. One of the most important goals of the Inspector General Act was to make Inspectors General independent enough that their investigations and audits would be wholly unbiased. The bulk of the Inspector General Act's provisions are accordingly devoted to establishing the independence of the Inspectors General from the agencies that they oversee. Thus, shielded with independence from agency interference, the Inspector General in each agency is entrusted with the responsibility of auditing and investigating the agency, a function which may be exercised in the judgment of the Inspector General as each deems it "necessary or desirable." 5 U.S.C. App. 3 § 6(a)(2). NRC v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 25 F.3d at 234.

To allow the agency and the union, which represents the agency's employees, to bargain over restrictions that would apply in the course of the Inspector General's investigatory interviews in the agency would impinge on the statutory independence of the Inspector General, particularly when it is recognized that investigations within the agency are conducted solely by the Office of the Inspector General. NRC v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 25 F.3d 229, 234 (4th Cir. 1994).

### **6.25.15 Whistleblower Protection**

Licensing board findings of fact are reviewed by the Commission under the "clearly erroneous" standard, and such deference is particularly great where a board bases its findings of fact in significant part on the credibility of witnesses. Whistleblowing discrimination cases are, by their nature, peculiarly fact-intensive and dependant on witness credibility. Fact-based appeals in a whistleblower case face an uphill climb before the Commission. Tennessee Valley Authority (Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3), CLI-04-24, 60 NRC 160, 189 (2004).

The touchstone for evidentiary standards in nuclear whistleblowing cases is the special evidentiary framework under section 211 of the Equal Rights Act, not McDonnell Douglass Corp v. Green, or Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 190-91. Section 211 of the Equal Rights Act establishes a two part evidentiary approach for nuclear whistleblower cases: (1) employees must show that the whistleblowing activity was a "contributing factor" in an unfavorable personnel action, and (2) if that showing is made, the employer must demonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that it would have taken the same personnel activity anyway, regardless of the whistleblowing activity. Id. at 191.

The evidentiary framework of Section 211 of the Equal Rights Act does not provide for a special exception for nuclear whistleblower cases litigated on a "pretext" theory. TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 191.

The evidentiary standard set forth in Section 211 of the Equal Rights Act favors employees by imposing a "clear and convincing evidence" standard on employers to prove that its chosen personnel activity would have been taken notwithstanding the alleged whistleblowing activity. TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 192-93.

Employees must demonstrate under Section 211 of the Equal Rights Act that the whistleblowing activity was a "contributing factor" in an unfavorable personnel action. This requires that the evidence presented must allow a reasonable person to infer that

protected activities influenced the unfavorable personnel action to some degree. It does not require an employee to demonstrate that the whistleblowing activity was a “significant,” “motivating,” “substantial,” or “predominant” factor in a personnel action. TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 197.

The mere involvement, without more, in the resolution of a safety or regulatory compliance issue raised by another person does not constitute a “protected activity” defined in 10 CFR § 50.7(a). However, an employee’s involvement in the resolution of such an issue does not deprive an employee of the protections that section 50.7 offers for otherwise protected activities. TVA, CLI-04-24, 60 NRC at 209.

## **6.26 Stay of Agency Licensing Action - Informal Hearings**

The pendency of a hearing request, or an ongoing proceeding, does not preclude the staff (acting under its general authority delegated by the Commission) from granting a requested licensing action effective immediately. Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 225, 261 (1992). Section 2.1213 (formerly 10 CFR 2.1263) provides that if a requested licensing action is approved and is made effective immediately by the Staff, then any participant in an ongoing informal adjudication concerning that action can request that the presiding officer stay the effectiveness of the licensing action. Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 225, 261 (1992).

Applications for stay of staff’s licensing action are governed by the stay criteria in § 2.342 (formerly § 2.788). The participants should use affidavits to support any factual presentations that may be subject to dispute. See 10 CFR § 2.342(a)(3) (formerly § 2.788(a)(3)). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 262-63 (1992).

Because no one of the four stay criteria, of itself, is dispositive, the strength or weakness of a movant’s showing on a particular factor will determine how strong its showing must be on the other factors. See Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-820, 22 NRC 743, 746 n.8 (1985). However, the second stay factor -- irreparable injury -- is so central that failing to demonstrate irreparable injury requires that the movant make a particularly strong showing relative to the other factors. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-90-3, 31 NRC 219, 260 (1990). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 263 (1992). Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., LBP-04-2, 59 NRC 77, 80 (2004).

The irreparable injury factor will weigh in the movant’s favor only if the movant establishes that the claimed injury would be “both certain and great.” Mere speculation that a nuclear accident could potentially occur does not meet this standard. NFS, LBP-04-2, 59 NRC at 81.

A movant’s reliance upon a listing of areas of concern in its hearing petition, along with the otherwise unexplained assertion that it expects to prevail on those issues, is inadequate to meet its burden under the first stay criteria to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. See Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), ALAB-928, 31 NRC 263, 270 (1990). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 264 (1992).

Failure to show irreparable injury means that the movant's stay application will fail unless the movant can show to a "virtual certainty" that it will ultimately prevail on the merits. NFS, LBP-04-2, 59 NRC at 80.

Further, a movant's failure to make an adequate showing relative to the first two stay criteria makes an extensive analysis of the third and fourth factors unnecessary. See Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-810, 21 NRC 1616, 1620 (1985). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 266 (1992). NFS, LBP-04-2, 59 NRC at 83.

As applicant's showing regarding extensive additional financial expenditures it must make if a stay is granted is a relevant consideration under the third stay criterion -- harm to other parties. See Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-808, 21 NRC 1595, 1602-03 (1985). Babcock & Wilcox (Apollo, PA, Fuel Fabrication Facility), LBP-92-31, 36 NRC 255, 267 (1992).

Stays of any final decisions or actions of the Commission, a presiding officer or the NRC staff in issuing a license are permissible, but the regulations do not provide for "injunctions" to stay actions that are not yet final. Earthline Technologies, LBP-03-6, 57 NRC 251, 245 (2003).

## **6.27 [Reserved]**

## **6.28 Technical Specifications**

10 CFR § 50.36 specifies, inter alia, that each operating license will include technical specifications to be derived from the analysis and evaluation included in the safety analysis report, and amendments thereto, and may also include such additional technical specifications as the Commission finds appropriate. The regulation sets forth with particularity the types of items to be included in technical specifications. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 351 (2001). Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 272 (1979). The policy of the Commission "is to reserve technical specifications for the most significant safety requirements", as outlined in 10 C.F.R. § 50.36. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-02-1, 55 NRC 1, 3 (2002).

There is neither a statutory nor a regulatory requirement that every operational detail set forth in an application's safety analysis report (or equivalent) be subject to a technical specification to be included in the license as an absolute condition of operation which is legally binding upon the licensee unless and until changed with specific Commission approval. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 360 (2001). Technical specifications are reserved for those matters where the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety. Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979); Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-831, 23 NRC 62, 65-66 & n.8 (1986) (fire protection program need not be included in technical specification).

Originally, 10 C.F.R. § 50.36 contained no well defined criteria specifically describing the required contents of the technical specifications. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 351 (2001). After 10 C.F.R. 50.36 was issued, the amount of items listed in the technical specifications greatly increased. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 352 (2001). The NRC revised section 50.36 so that it identifies criteria to be used in deciding what should be included in the technical specifications. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 352 (2001). If a requirement meets one of the criteria, it must be retained in the technical specifications. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 352 (2001). If it does not meet any of the criteria, it may be transferred to licensee-controlled documents. The agency policy is to limit technical specifications to focus licensee and plant operator attention on the most significant technical concerns. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 352 (2001). NRC “generic letters” issued to licensees identify particular items deemed amenable to removal from the technical specifications. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 & 3), CLI-01-24, 54 NRC 349, 352 (2001).

Relative to technical specification conditions for power reactor licenses, the Appeal Board has observed: “technical specifications are to be reserved for those matters as to which the imposition of rigid conditions or limitations upon reactor operation is deemed necessary to obviate the possibility of an abnormal situation or event giving rise to an immediate threat to the public health and safety.” Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-00-35, 52 NRC 364, 409 (2000), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 273 (1979). While this suggests that the threshold for imposing a technical license condition is not insignificant, in other contexts, in particular financial matters, Commission rulings indicate that the threshold may be somewhat lower. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 32 (adopting as ISFSI license conditions PFS financial qualification commitments made during the licensing process); Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294, 308-09 (1997) (adopting as enrichment facility license conditions financial qualification commitments made in licensing proceedings).

Technical specifications for a nuclear facility are part of the operating license for the facility and are legally binding. Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-772, 19 NRC 1193, 1257 (1984), rev'd in part on other grounds, CLI-85-2, 21 NRC 282 (1985), citing Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant), ALAB-531, 9 NRC 263, 272-73 (1979).

## 6.29 Termination of Facility Licenses

Termination of facility licenses is covered generally in 10 CFR § 50.82.

In a proceeding concerning the adequacy of an License Termination Plan (LTP), the scope of admissible contentions in the proceeding is coextensive with the scope of the LTP itself, which is governed by the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-99-14, 49 NRC 238, 239 (1999).

The Commission considers the license termination plan (LTP) significant enough to require the LTP to be treated as a license amendment, complete with a hearing

opportunity. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185 (1988).

A site characterization in a license termination plan (LTP) must contain a description of the essential character or quality of the plant site. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-21, 54 NRC 33, 59 (2001). The Commission declines to develop a “bright line” test for when a site characterization or site remediation plan is final or complete enough to support approval of a license termination plan. A site characterization is not incomplete solely because additional site characterization may be obtained at a later time, but site characterization involves more than methodologies or plans for characterization. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-05-15, 61 NRC 365, 377 (2005).

It appears that the adequacy of site characterization and site remediation plans depends to a large extent on site-specific ... (cont.) conditions. At a minimum, the site characterization and remediation plans must provide sufficient information to allow the NRC to determine the extent and range of expected radioactive contamination, to determine whether estimates for remaining decommissioning costs are reasonable, to determine the likely schedule for remaining activities, and to support the final survey site to verify compliance with Part 20 release limits—the ultimate goal of the decommissioning process. Yankee, CLI-05-15, 61 NRC at 377 (discussing the content requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(9)(ii)(A),(C) for license termination plans). The purpose of site characterization is to define relevant features of the soil, water, and buildings in order to assess risks and develop adequate plans to complete decommissioning. The license termination plan (LTP) must deal with issues already identified and those reasonably anticipated. The key question at the LTP stage is whether the site characterization is sufficiently detailed to allow the evaluation of the adequacy of each element prescribed by 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(9) and for making the findings required for approval of the LTP (see 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(10)). Id. at 381.

A showing of a violation of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(9)-- which contains the words, “[t]he [license termination plan] must include” - could constitute a significant indication of a possible of 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(10); if a site characterization as required under section 50.82(a)(9)(ii)(A) is shown to be inadequate, then areas not covered by the site characterization might be omitted or given inadequate attention in cleanup efforts and in the final status survey, which could in turn be an indication that the LTP has not “demonstrate[d]” that the remainder of the decommissioning activities [1] will be performed in accordance with the regulations in this chapter, [2] will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public and [3] will not have a significant effect on the quality of the environment,” under section 50.82(a)(10). Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Haddam Neck Plant), LBP-01-21, 54 NRC 33, 66-67 (2001).

Spent fuel management is outside the scope of a license termination proceeding, which is confined to a review of the matters specified in 10 C.F.R. § 50.82(a)(9) and (10). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185 (1988).

## **6.30 Procedures in Other Types of Hearings**

### **6.30.1 Military or Foreign Affairs Functions**

Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (4), and the Commission's Rules of Practice, 10 CFR § 2.301 (§ 2.700a), procedures other than those for formal evidentiary hearings may be fashioned when an adjudication involves the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions. Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (Erwin, Tennessee), CLI-80-27, 11 NRC 799, 802 (1980).

### **6.30.2 Export Licensing**

Individual fuel exports are not major Federal actions. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-15, 11 NRC 672 (1980). (Also see Section 3.4.6)

Commission regulations provide in 10 CFR § 110.82(c)(2) that hearing requests on applications to export nuclear fuel are to be filed within 15 days after the application is placed in the Commission's Public Document Room. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 327 (1994).

United States nonproliferation policy, as set forth in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) requires the NRC to act in a timely manner on export license applications to countries that meet U.S. non-proliferation requirements. Because Congress viewed timely action on export license applications as fundamental to achieving the nonproliferation goals underlying the NNPA, the Commission is reluctant to grant late hearing requests on export license applications. Because timely action on export licenses supports U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals under the NNPA, it is particularly important that petitioners in this context demonstrate that the pertinent factors weigh in favor of granting an untimely petition. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 328 (1994).

Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), the Commission is required to hold a hearing only if it concludes that public participation will be in the public interest and assist it in making the statutory determinations required by the Atomic Energy Act. Nothing in the statutory language suggests that the Commission must hold a hearing if a member of the public requesting a hearing has standing – or as AEA § 189 puts it, “an interest which may be affected.” U.S. Dep’t of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 366-67 (2004). In its export licensing orders, the Commission has typically addressed the standing of requesters but has not explicitly found that if a person has standing the Commission must hold a hearing. See *id.* at 367.

In a case where petitioners requested a hearing challenging an export license to export weapons-grade plutonium oxide to France, the Commission stated that (under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and 10 C.F.R. § 110.84(a)), the petitioners’ requested export license hearing for the purpose of delving into the specifics of the physical security measures of a recipient foreign country to determine the adequacy of those measures and of the existing standards clearly would not be appropriate, both because of legal restrictions on dissemination of such information and because further

dissemination of such information could endanger security. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 368-69 (2004).

In a case where petitioners requested a hearing challenging an export license to export weapons-grade plutonium oxide to France, and petitioners argued standing in part because of proximity to cross-country shipments of the plutonium, the Commission stated (via dicta in a footnote) that the NRC's jurisdiction to license DOE exports of special nuclear material under AEA § 54d does not extend to any aspects of DOE's domestic transportation of such material. Therefore, it was unclear that denial of DOE's proposed export license would redress or avoid the harm that Petitioners asserted for standing purposes – i.e., DOE's transportation of the plutonium oxide near petitioners' residences. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 366 n.13 (2004).

The transfer of nuclear material to an intermediate consignee performing only shipping services does not in any respect constitute an "export" to a foreign sovereign under the Commission's regulations (see 10 C.F.R. § 110.2) or under international law. U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 370 (2004).

Under 10 CFR § 110.84(c), untimely hearing requests may be denied unless good cause for failure to file on time is established. In reviewing untimely requests, the Commission will also consider: 1) the availability of other means by which the petitioner's interest, if any, will be protected or represented by other participants in a hearing; and 2) the extent to which the issues will be broadened or action on the application delayed. The potential for delay of action on an export license application is an important factor in the Commission's analysis of a late-filed petition on such applications, in light of the NNPA's directive for timely decisions on export license applications. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 328 (1994).

The first and principal test for late intervention is whether a petitioner has demonstrated "good cause" for filing late. In addressing the good-cause factor, a petitioner must explain not only why it failed to file within the time required, but also why it did not file as soon thereafter as possible. Lacking a demonstration of "good cause" for lateness, a petitioner is bound to make a compelling showing that the remaining factors nevertheless weigh in favor of granting the late intervention and hearing request. The fact that no one will represent a petitioner's perspective if its hearing request is denied is in itself sufficient for the Commission to excuse the untimeliness of the request. Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Nuclear Fuel Export License for Czech Republic - Temelin Nuclear Power Plants), CLI-94-7, 39 NRC 322, 329 (1994). Also, in the absence of evidence that a hearing would generate significant new information or analyses, a public hearing would be inconsistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act. CLI-94-7 at 334.

#### **6.30.2.1 Jurisdiction of Commission re Export Licensing**

The Commission is neither required nor precluded by the Atomic Energy Act or NEPA from considering impacts of exports on the global commons. Provided that NRC review does not include visiting sites within the recipient nation to gather information or otherwise intrude upon the sovereignty of a foreign nation, consideration of impacts upon the global commons is legally permissible.



Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 637-644 (1980). The Commission's legislative mandate neither compels nor precludes examination of health, safety and environmental effects occurring abroad that could affect U.S. interests. The decision whether to examine these effects is a question of policy to be decided as a matter of agency discretion. CLI-80-14, 11 NRC at 654.

As a matter of policy, the Commission has determined not to conduct such reviews in export licensing decisions primarily because no matter how thorough the NRC review, the Commission still would not be in a position to determine that the reactor could be operated safely. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 648 (1980).

The Commission lacks legal authority under AEA, NEPA and NNPA to consider health, safety and environmental impacts upon citizens of recipient nations because of the traditional rule of domestic U.S. law that Federal statutes apply only to conduct within, or having effect within, the territory of the U.S. unless the contrary is clearly indicated in the statute. Id., 11 NRC at 637. See also General Electric Co. (Exports to Taiwan), CLI-81-2, 13 NRC 67, 71 (1981).

The alleged undemocratic character of the Government of the Philippines does not relate to health, safety, environmental and non-proliferation responsibilities of the Commission and are beyond the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 656 (1980).

The NRC views actions as being inimical to the common defense and security where there is an unacceptable likelihood of grave or exceptionally grave damage to the United States. Thus, the NRC's principal concern once fissile nuclear materials have left the United States is the possibility of theft. U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 375 (2004).

#### **6.30.2.2 Export License Criteria**

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, provides that the Commission may not issue a license authorizing the export of a reactor, unless it finds, based on a reasonable judgment of the assurances provided, that the criteria set forth in §§ 127 and 128 of the AEA are met. The Commission must also determine that the export would not be inimical to the common defense and security or health and safety of the public and would be pursuant to an Agreement for Cooperation. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 652 (1980).

In order to grant an export license to a nuclear-weapons state, the Commission must determine that the nonproliferation criteria set forth in section 127 of the Atomic Energy Act have been met, and also, pursuant to section 57c(2) of the AEA, that a proposed export will not be "inimical to the common defense and security" of the United States. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 372, 373 (2004).

The Commission may not issue a license for component exports unless it determines that the three specific criteria in 109(b) of AEA are met and also determines that the export won't be inimical to common defense. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (Exports to the Philippines), CLI-80-14, 11 NRC 631, 654 (1980).

The legislative history of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act indicates that, in the absence of "unusual circumstances," the Commission "need not look beyond the non-proliferation safeguards [in section 127 for nuclear-weapons states] in determining whether the common defense and security standard is met." U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 374 (2004) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).

The NRC may properly rely on the conclusions of the Executive Branch regarding the common defense and security requirements of section 126 of the AEA (regarding export licensing procedures). Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-00-16, 52 NRC 68, 77 (2000). See also U.S. Dep't of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 374 (2004) (NRC can rely on Executive Branch's noninimicality determinations because they involve "strategic judgments" and foreign policy and national security expertise (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Transnuclear, CLI-00-16, 52 NRC at 77).).

### **6.30.2.3 HEU Export License-Atomic Energy Act**

Diplomatic notes containing a foreign government's assurance that it will use LEU targets when such targets become available, provided that their use does not result in a large percentage increase in the total cost of operating the pertinent reactor, constitute assurance sufficient to satisfy AEA section 134a(2), 42 USC 2160d. That provision requires that the proposed recipient of HEU provide assurance that, whenever an alternative nuclear reactor target can be used in that reactor, it will use that alternative in lieu of HEU. Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-20, 49 NRC 469, 473 (1999).

The requirement under AEA section 134a(3) of an active program for the development of an LEU target that can be used in the particular reactor to which the HEU exports are being made is satisfied where the Commission finds that the principals have executed a confidentially agreement to enable the principals to forward technical information that would enable a feasibility study to be completed, and have provided information pursuant to that agreement. Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of Enriched Uranium), CLI-99-20, 49 NRC 469, 473 (1999).

### **6.30.3 High-Level Waste Licensing**

There is no legal requirement for a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding concerning the Commission's statutory concurrence in the Department of Energy's General Guidelines for Recommendation of Sites for Nuclear Waste Repositories, pursuant to Section 112(a) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. NRC Concurrence in High-Level Waste Repository Safety Guidelines Under Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, CLI-83-26, 18 NRC 1139, 1140 (1983).

The procedures for the conduct of the adjudicatory proceeding on the application for a license to receive and possess high-level radioactive waste at a geologic repository operations area are specified in Subpart J of 10 C.F.R. Part 2 (10 C.F.R. §§ 2.1000 - 2.1027). These procedures take precedence over the rules of general applicability in 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart C, although 10 C.F.R. § 2.1000 specifies many of the rules of general applicability which will continue to apply to high-level waste licensing proceedings.

Subpart J provides procedures for the development and operation of the Licensing Support Network (LSN), an electronic information management system, that will make documentary material relevant to the proceeding electronically available to the participants. See Digest ¶2.11.7, *Discovery in High-Level Waste Licensing Proceedings*. Because many of the features of the system contemplated under the original 1988 rule no longer provide optimal approaches to electronic information management, the Commission adopted a revised approach to the LSN in a rulemaking published at 63 Fed. Reg. 71729 (Dec. 30, 1998).

#### **6.30.4 Low-Level Waste Disposal**

Faced with a looming shortage of disposal sites for low-level radioactive waste in 31 States, Congress enacted the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, which, among other things, imposes upon States, either alone or in "regional compacts" with other States, the obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders, and contains three provisions setting forth "incentives" to States to comply with that obligation. The three incentives are: (1) the monetary incentives; (2) the access incentives; and (3) the "take title" provision.

Because the Act's take title provision offers the States a "choice" between two unconstitutionally coercive alternatives--either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to Congress' instructions--the provision lies outside Congress' enumerated powers and is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment. On the one hand, either forcing the transfer of waste from generators to the States or requiring the States to become liable for the generators' damages would "commandeer" States into the service of federal regulatory purposes. On the other hand, requiring the States to regulate pursuant to Congress' direction would present a simple unconstitutional command to implement legislation enacted by Congress. Thus, the States' "choice" is no choice at all. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 176-77 (1992).

The take title provision is severable from the rest of the Act, since severance will not prevent the operation of the rest of the Act or defeat its purpose of encouraging the States to attain local or regional self-sufficiency in low-level radioactive waste disposal. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 186-87 (1992).

#### **6.30.5 [Reserved]**

#### **6.30.6 Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants**

Individuals who wish to petition for review of an initial Director's decision must explain how their "interest may be affected." 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c). For guidance, petitioners may look to the Commission's adjudicatory decisions on standing. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky), CLI-01-23, 54 NRC 267, 272 (2001); U.S. Enrichment

Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky, and Piketon, Ohio), CLI-96-12, 44 NRC 231, 234, 236 (1996).

An analysis of potential accidents and consequences is required by 10 C.F.R. § 76.85 and should include plant operating history that is relevant to the potential impacts of accidents. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky, and Piketon, Ohio), CLI-96-12, 44 NRC 231, 245-46 (1996).

By rejecting a petition for review pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c), the Commission allows a Director's decision to become final. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, KY), CLI-98-2, 47 NRC 57 (1998).

To be eligible to petition for review of a Director's decision on the certification of a gaseous diffusion plant, an interested party must have either submitted written comments in response to a prior Federal Register notice, or provided oral comments at an NRC meeting held on the application or compliance plan. 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c). U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky, and Piketon, Ohio), CLI-96-10, 44 NRC 114, 117 (1996); U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky, and Piketon, Ohio), CLI-96-12, 44 NRC 231, 233-34 (1996).

10 CFR Part 76 contemplates a Commission decision on petitions for review of certification decisions within a relatively short (60-day) time period. See 10 C.F.R. § 76.62(c). Extending the Part 76 petition deadline in the absence of a strong reason is not compatible with the contemplated review period. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky, and Piketon, Ohio), CLI-96-10, 44 NRC 114, 118 (1996).

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 76.45(d), "any person whose interest may be effected," may file a petition requesting the Director of the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) review NRC Staff determinations made on an application for amendment to a certification of a GDP. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky), CLI-01-23, 54 NRC 267, 271-72 (2001). Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 76.54(e), "any person whose interest may be affected and who filed a petition for review or filed a response to a petition for review under § 76.54(d), may file a petition requesting the Commission's review of a Director's decision. U.S. Enrichment Corp. (Paducah, Kentucky), CLI-01-23, 54 NRC 267, 271-72 (2001).

### **6.30.7 Senior Operator License Proceedings**

The NRC Staff's policy states that an applicant must score "at least" an 80% on the written exam to pass. The Commission declines to accept a Presiding Officer procedure of rounding up lower scores and declares the practice "impermissible." Ralph L. Tetrick (Denial of Application for Reactor Operator License), CLI-97-10, 46 NRC 26, 32 (1997).

"A presiding officer properly can look to NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors" (Interim Rev. 8, Jan. 1997), as an important source in assessing whether the Staff has strayed too far afield of the stated twin goals of 'equitable and consistent' examination administration." Michel A. Phillippon (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License), LBP-99-44, 50 NRC 347, 358 (1999), quoting Frank J. Calabrese, Jr. (Denial of Senior Reactor Operator License), LBP-97-16, 46 NRC 66, 86 (1997).

### 6.30.8 Subpart K Proceedings

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)(1)), the Commission will grant a petition for review if the petition raises a “substantial question” whether a finding of material fact is clearly erroneous or in conflict with a finding as to the same fact in a different proceeding. The general reviewability standards set out in 10 C.F.R. § 2.341 (formerly § 2.786) apply to subpart K by virtue of 10 C.F.R. § 2.1103 (formerly § 2.1117), which makes the general Subpart C rules applicable “except where inconsistent” with Subpart K. Subpart K has no reviewability rules of its own. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 27, n. 6 (2001).

### 6.31 License Transfer Proceedings

The Atomic Energy Act and NRC’s own rules unquestionably confer to NRC the legal power to approve the indirect transfer of control over NRC operating licenses. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129 (2000). See 42 U.S.C. § 2234; 10 CFR § 50.80(a).

On its face, section 184 not only broadly prohibits all manner of transfers, assignments, and disposals of NRC licenses, but also all manner of actions that have the effect of, in any way, directly or indirectly, transferring actual or potential control over a license without the agency’s knowledge and express written consent. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 451 (1995).

If the statutory proscription against the transfer of control of NRC licenses could be avoided by the expedience of a corporate restructuring, complex or otherwise, then section 184 would be a toothless tiger. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 454 (1995).

As long as section 184 and any other regulation or license condition is not violated, a material licensee may transfer its assets without notifying and obtaining the agency’s permission. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 456 (1995). When the transfer of control of NRC licenses is involved, section 184 requires the agency’s express written consent, not just that the agency be notified. Id.

The language of the Atomic Energy Act itself demonstrates that Congress placed no importance on the corporate form in enacting section 184. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 456 (1995).

The inclusion of a “corporation” in the definition of a “person” in section 11s of the Atomic Energy Act and the use of the latter term in the inalienability of licenses provision in section 184 indicates that Congress intended a corporation to be treated in the same manner as all other entities. Corporate law principles, which are applicable only to the corporate form of organization, are entitled to no consideration under section 184 and do not thwart NRC regulatory jurisdiction over a corporation for violating that provision. It long has been established that the fiction of corporate separateness of state-chartered

corporations will not be permitted to frustrate the policies of a federal statute. Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 457 (1995).

The statutory frustration principle permits the NRC to disregard the corporate form and impose liability on the parent corporation shareholder for the obligations of its subsidiary. And, this is true whether or not its intent was to avoid the statutory prohibition of section 184 for “intention is not controlling when the fiction of corporate entity defeats a legislative purpose.” Safety Light Corp. (Bloomsburg Site Decommissioning and License Renewal Denials), LBP-95-9, 41 NRC 412, 458 (1995), quoting Kavanaugh v. Ford Motor Co., 353 F.2d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1965).

A hearing on the transfer of a license need not be a pre-effectiveness or prior hearing. Atomic Energy Act § 189a(1); 42 U.S.C. § 2239. The NRC has strictly construed 189a(1). Although this section mentions numerous actions for which hearings shall be granted if requested by an interested person, the discussion of pre-effectiveness hearings mentions only four of these actions for which a prior hearing is required. A transfer of control is not one of these four actions. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-92-4, 35 NRC 69, 76-77 (1992).

Section 189a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act requires the Commission to offer an opportunity for a hearing for certain kinds of proceedings, including those involving the “transfer of control” over licensed facilities. In order to trigger hearing rights under the “transfer of control” provision of § 189a.(1)(A), there must actually be a license transfer. Where a corporate merger did not propose to change either operating or possession authority, there was no direct license transfer. Similarly, where the same parent company would indirectly control the licensee – both before and after the proposed merger – there was no indirect license transfer. Therefore, the proceeding did not involve a “transfer of control,” and no hearing rights attached. Amergen Energy Co., LLC (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CLI-05-25, 62 NRC 572, 573-74 (2005).

The Commission’s rules for the license transfer at 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart M, set out two possible avenues to address issues that may arise from license transfer applications: written comments or an oral hearing. Duquesne Light Co., Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Co., and Pennsylvania Power Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-23, 50 NRC 21, 22 (1999).

When a license is transferred, the new licensee is subject to both the terms of the license and the applicable sections of Part 40. Moab Mill Reclamation Trust (Atlas Mill Site), CLI-00-7, 51 NRC 216, 224 (2000).

### **6.31.1 Subpart M Procedures**

Subpart M to 10 CFR Part 2 is intended to apply in all license transfer proceedings unless the Commission directed otherwise in a case specific order. Moab Mill Reclamation Trust (Atlas Mill Site), CLI-00-7, 51 NRC 216, 221-22 (2000).

Motions for a Subpart G proceeding are expressly prohibited in Subpart M proceedings, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.1322(d). Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 290 (2000), citing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 162 (2000). Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 335 (2002). Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 130 (2001). However, 10 CFR § 2.335 provides for waiver of the rules under “special Circumstances” that demonstrate that the “application if a rule or regulation would not serve the purposes for which it was adopted.” Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 130 (2001). Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 290 (2000). Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 335 (2002).

The interpretation of Subpart M as dealing only with financial matters is overly restrictive and does not meet the requisite “special circumstances” for a waiver of the rules. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 290 (2000).

Subpart M calls for “specificity” in pleadings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), n.23, citing, Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 131-32 (2000). However, where critical information has been submitted to the NRC under a claim of confidentiality and was not available to the petitioners when framing their issues, the Commission has deemed it appropriate to defer ruling on the admissibility of an issue until the petitioner has had an opportunity to review this information and submit a properly documented issue. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000).

Specific pleadings are required in license transfer hearings. Neither “notice pleading,” nor “the filing of a vague, unparticularized issue,” nor the submission of “general assertions or conclusions,” suffices to trigger a license transfer hearing. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, & 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 132 (2000), (citing GPU Nuclear Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000); Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 47 (2000)).

These standards do not allow “mere notice pleading”; the Commission will not accept “the filing of a vague, unparticularized” issue, unsupported by alleged fact or expert opinion and documentary support. General assertions or conclusions will not suffice. However the threshold admissibility requirements should not be turned into a fortress to deny intervention. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 295 (2000). An individual license transfer adjudication is not an appropriate forum for a legislative-like inquiry into issues affecting the entire nuclear industry. Id. at 296.

In the NRC's Subpart M rulemaking, which established the agency's current license transfer hearing process, the Commission expressed a willingness to review labor-type issues to a limited extent. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 315 (2000), citing Final Rule, "Streamlined Hearing Process for NRC Approval of License Transfers," 63 Fed. Reg. 66,721, 66.723 (Dec. 3, 1998). See also Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 34 (2006) (Although the Commission is disinclined to "step into the middle of a labor dispute," there may be cases where employment-related contentions which are "closely tied to specific health-and-safety concerns or to potential violations of NRC rules[] can be admitted for a hearing." (quoting Fitzpatrick, CLI-00-22, 52 NRC at 314, 315)). However, general assertions, unsupported by specific facts or expert opinion, that personnel reductions may adversely affect health and safety do not meet the Commission's contention-pleading standards (whose "hallmark" is "specificity") and are inadmissible. Calvert Cliffs, CLI-06-21, 64 NRC at 34 (citing Fitzpatrick, CLI-00-22, 52 NRC at 315, and quoting Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 132 (2000)). Overall, the Commission generally does not involve itself in the personnel decisions of licensees. "[T]he Commission is interested in whether the plant poses a risk to the public health and safety, and so long as personnel decisions do not impose that risk, NRC regulations and policy do not preclude a licensee from reducing or replacing portions of its staff." Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 315 (2000), quoting Oyster Creek, CLI-00-6, 51 NRC at 214, and citing Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 170 n.1600 (2000).

The Commission's license transfer hearings under Subpart M are designed solely to adjudicate genuine health-and-safety disputes arising out of license transfers. The grant of hearings merely on the broad assertion that contentious labor relations forum, contrary to the Commission's statutory mission and at a significant cost in resources and effort. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 316 (2000).

#### **6.31.2 Standing in License Transfer Proceedings (Also see 2.10.4.1.4 Standing to Intervene in License Transfer Proceedings)**

In a license transfer case in which petitioners plausibly claim that deficiencies may result in a general safety risk affecting their persons or property, the petitioners have standing to seek a hearing on the merits of their arguments. Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 47 (2000).

The standing of petitioners in a license transfer case, involving simply a change in corporate structure, is not affected by the same petitioners having been granted standing to intervene in a separate case which involved an addition to the physical



facility. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 132 (2000) citing Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Park Steam Electronic Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 163 (1993).

Local government entities, such as school districts or townships, have standing to intervene in a license transfer case when the township is the locus of the power plant because it is in a position analogous to that of an individual living or working within a few miles of the plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 294-95 (2000).

The Commission has granted standing in license transfer proceedings to petitioners who raised similar assertions and who were authorized to represent members living or active quite close to the site. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 293-94 (2000), citing Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 163-64 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000); Northern States Power Co., (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 137, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-19, 52 NRC 135 (2000).

The Commission denied a state public utilities commission standing to represent the interests of electric consumers in a proceeding before the Commission when the state commission provided no facts or legal arguments suggesting that it represented citizens on nuclear safety issues. The Commission stated, “the ‘zone of interests’ test for standing in an NRC proceeding does not encompass economic harm that is not directly related to environmental or radiological harm.” Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 336 (2002).

Employees who work inside a nuclear power plant should ordinarily be accorded standing as long as the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the license transfer. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 294 (2000).

As part of a petitioner’s required demonstration of standing for intervention in a license transfer proceeding, the petitioner must show it “has suffered [or will suffer] a distinct and palpable harm that constitutes injury-in-fact within the zone of interests arguably protected by the governing statute [and that this] injury can fairly be traced to the challenged action (the approval of the license transfer). FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Power Station, Unit 1; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-06-2, 63 NRC 9, 13-14 (2006) (quoting Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-96-1, 43 NRC 1, 6 (1996)).

A union failed to demonstrate standing in an indirect license transfer proceeding where it described no causal nexus between the asserted potential injury to its members’ “employment and financial well-being” and the indirect transfer of licenses for 6 of the 7 facilities at issue, whose employees it did not even claim to represent. Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 34-35 (2006).

A union failed to demonstrate standing in an indirect license transfer proceeding where it provided no factual support, only speculation, for its alleged link between the proposed merger and personnel decisions affecting its members, and where the personnel actions of which it complained commenced at least a year before the parent corporations filed their transfer applications. Fla. Power & Light Co., FPL Energy Seabrook, LLC, FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation; Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant; Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Plants, Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2; Seabrook Station; Duane Arnold Energy Center), CLI-06-21, 64 NRC 30, 35 (2006).

In a reactor license transfer proceeding, the threatened injury (i.e., the grant of the license transfer application) is fairly traceable to the challenged action because the alleged increase in risk associated with AmerGen taking over a majority interest in Unit 2 could not occur without Commission approval of the application. Similarly, this threatened injury can be redressed by a favorable decision because the Commission's denial of the application would prevent the indirect transfer of interest. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Station, Unit 3), CLI-99-28, 50 NRC 257, 263 (1999). Cf. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 215 (1999).

"It is hard to conceive of an entity more entitled to claim standing in a license transfer case than a co-licensee whose costs may rise...as a result of an ill-funded license transfer. This kind of situation justifies standing based on the 'real-world consequences that conceivably could harm Petitioners and entitle them to a hearing.'" Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 341 (1999), quoting North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 215 quoting Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-98-21, 48 NRC 185, 205 (1998); North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) and Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Station, Unit 3), CLI-99-27, 50 NRC 257, 262-63 (1999).

The standing of petitioners in a license transfer case, involving simply a change in corporate structure, is not affected by the same petitioners having standing to intervene in a separate case which involved an addition to the physical facility. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129 (2000) (citing Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electronic Station, Unit 2), CLI-93-4, 37 NRC 156, 163 (1993)).

In a license transfer proceeding, the Commission found a petitioner's "highly general comment" that it and its members "compete with [the entities involved in the transfer] for generation ... services" to be too vague and general to show a real potential for injury sufficient for standing. Petitioners failed to explain how their distribution, generation, and transmission rights would be adversely affected in connection with certain antitrust license conditions that they claimed would allegedly be rendered

unenforceable by the license transfer. FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co. (Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis-Besse Power Station, Unit 1; Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1), CLI-06-2, 63 NRC 9, 16 (2006) (citing GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 203 (2000); Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 337 (2002)).

### 6.31.3 Scope of License Transfer Proceedings

NRC's role in evaluation of transferee's financial qualifications is to decide whether the plan as proposed, including the [power sale agreement], will meet our financial qualifications regulations." Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), CLI-02-16, 55 NRC 317, 340 (2002). "If an application lacks detail, a Petitioner may meet its pleading burden by providing 'plausible and adequately supported' claims that the data are either inaccurate or insufficient." Consolidated Edison Co. of New York and Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 134 (2001); citing GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 213-214 (2000).

Claims that a proposed license transfer is not in the public interest are too broad and vague to be considered in an NRC adjudication. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 149 (2001). The NRC's goal is to protect the public health and safety, not to make general judgments concerning public interest. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 149 (2001). Such determinations regarding public policy are best left to agencies charged with that mission, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and state public service commissions. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 149 (2001).

A license transfer proceeding is not a forum for a full review of all aspects of current plant operation. GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 213-214 (2000), cited in Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 133 (2000). Substantive questions related to plant operation, such as the necessity for future remediation, are outside the scope of a license transfer proceeding. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 145 (2001).

The question in indirect transfer cases is whether the proposed shift in ultimate corporate control will affect a licensee's existing financial and technical qualifications. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 18,381 (2000). The transfer applicants need provide only information bearing on the inquiry at hand, and not more extensive information that may be required in other contexts. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 133 (2000). "A license transfer proceeding is not a forum for a full review of all aspects of current plant operation." GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6,

51 NRC 193, 202-03 (2000), cited in Northeast Nuclear Energy Co., et. al. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-00-18, 52 NRC 129, 133 (2000).

A petitioner in an individual adjudication cannot challenge generic decisions made by the Commission in rulemakings. Thus, general attacks on the agency's competence and regulations are not admissible issues in license transfer proceedings. Molycorp, Inc. (Washington, Pennsylvania, Temporary Storage of Decommissioning Wastes), LBP-00-24, 52 NRC 139 (2000). See also North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 217 (1999).

The enforcement or revision of power purchase contracts entered into by private parties, subject to NRC regulatory authority, is not within the jurisdiction of the NRC, and is outside the scope of a license transfer proceeding. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 139 (2001).

A license transfer hearing is not the proper forum in which to conduct a full-scale health-and-safety review of a plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 311 (2000), quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 169 (2000), and citing GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 213, 214 (2000). A petitioner may file a petition for Staff enforcement pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 if it is concerned about current safety issues, citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 169 n.14 (2000).

The NRC's responsibility in license transfer cases "is to protect the health and safety of the nuclear workforce and general population by ensuring the safe use of nuclear power. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 140 (2001). Issues that are not in conflict with Commission jurisdiction and are properly contested under a individual state's law, such as contractual matters, are issues for the state to handle, and should not be a part of an NRC license transfer proceeding. Consolidated Edison, Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 140 (2001).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 50.54(m), for key positions necessary to operate a plant safely, the Commission has regulations requiring specific staffing levels and qualifications. Other than those specific positions, the licensee has a responsibility to ensure that it has adequate staff to meet the Commission's regulatory requirements. If a licensee's staff reductions or other cost-cutting decisions result in its being out of compliance with NRC regulations, then the agency can and will take the necessary enforcement action to ensure the public health and safety. However, so long as personnel decisions do not impose a risk to the public health and safety, NRC regulations and policy do not preclude a licensee from reducing or replacing portions of its staff. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 313 (2000), citing GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 209, 214 (2000). An intervenor's speculation about the likelihood of staff reductions is insufficient to trigger a hearing on this issue. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 313 (2000).

New licensees must meet all requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 and Appendix E to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 concerning emergency planning and preparedness. For the issue to be admissible at a license transfer hearing, the petitioner must allege with supporting facts that the new licensee is likely to violate the NRC's emergency planning rules. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 317 (2000).

A plant's proximity to various cities, towns, entertainment centers, and military facilities is not relevant to the question whether to approve the license transfer to that plant. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 317 (2000).

The Commission denied a petitioner's request to arrange for an independent analysis of plants' conditions based on "historical problems" in the NRC's Region I since such a inquiry would go considerably beyond the scope of the license transfer proceeding. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 318 (2000), citing, Vermont Yankee, CLI-00-20, 52 NRC at 171 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000); see Final Rule, Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings - Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,168, 33,171 (Aug. 11, 1989).

A petitioner's contentions regarding the overall performance of NRC's Region I office in overseeing a plant for which a license transfer was being considered were deemed to be far outside the scope of a license transfer proceeding. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 171 (2000).

In a license transfer proceeding, the Commission held that where both petitioners have independently met the requirements for participation, the Presiding Officer may provisionally permit petitioners to adopt each other's issues early in the proceeding. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 132 (2001). If the primary sponsor of a contention withdraws from the proceeding, the remaining petitioner must demonstrate that it can independently litigate the issue. If the petitioner can not make such a showing, the issue is subject to dismissal prior to hearing. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 132 (2001). The Commission cautioned that it did not "give carte blanche approval of this practice of incorporation by reference, particularly in cases where it would have the effect of circumventing NRC-prescribed page limits or specificity requirements. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 132-33 (2001). Incorporation should also be denied to parties who merely establish standing and then attempts to incorporate issues of other petitioners. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 133 (2001). Incorporation by reference would also be improper in cases where a petitioner has not independently established compliance with requirements for admission in its own pleadings by submitting at least one admissible contention. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC,

and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 133 (2001).

### **6.31.3.1 Consideration of Financial Qualifications**

Outside of the reactor context, it is sufficient for a license applicant to identify adequate mechanisms to demonstrate reasonable financial assurance, such as license conditions and other commitments. Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-13, 52 NRC 23, 30 (2000) (citing Louisiana Energy Services (Claiborne Enrichment Center), CLI-97-15, 46 NRC 294 (1997)). In a license transfer proceeding, our financial qualifications rule is satisfied if the applicant provides a cost and revenue projection for the first five years of operation that predicts sufficient revenue to cover operating costs. GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 206-08 (2000), cited in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 176 (2000).

In a case of a license transfer where the new owner and the new operator of the nuclear power plant facility is not an electric utility, as defined in applicable regulations, the transferee must demonstrate its financial qualifications to own and/or operate the plant. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 129 (2001), citing 10 C.F.R. § 50.33.

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f)(2), applicants for a license transfer “shall submit estimates for total annual operating costs for each of the first five years of operation of the facility.” The Commission has interpreted this rule as requiring “data for the first five 12-months periods after the proposed transfer. . . .” Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001). If the submissions are deemed sufficient, this alone is not grounds for rejecting the application. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001); citing Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC 71, 95-96 (1995), reconsideration denied, CLI-95-8, 41 NRC 386, 395 (1995). If the missing data concerning financial qualifications can easily be submitted for consideration at the adjudicatory hearing, the Presiding Officer need not reject the application. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 131 (2001).

Where a petitioner raises a genuine issue about the accuracy or plausibility of an applicant’s cost and revenue projections, the petitioner is entitled to a hearing. North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 220-21 (1999), cited in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 176 (2000). The adequacy of a corporate parent’s supplemental commitment is not material to our license transfer decision, absent a demonstrated shortfall in the revenue predictions required by 10 CFR § 50.33(f). GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 205 (2000), cited in Vermont

Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 177 (2000).

Consideration of supplemental funding is not warranted where the applicant has not relied on supplemental funding as a basis for its financial qualifications.

Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 139 (2001).

In a license transfer proceeding, our financial qualifications rule is satisfied if the applicant provides a cost and revenue projection for the first five years of operation that predicts sufficient revenue to cover operating costs. GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 206-08, cited in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151 (2000). In determining the applicable financial requirements to be met by applicants in license transfer proceedings, the NRC does not need to examine site-specific conditions in calculating the cost of decommissioning. Our decommissioning funding regulation, 10 CFR § 50.75(c), generically establishes the amount of decommissioning funds that must be set aside. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 165-166 (2000).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(f)(2), the sufficiency *vel non* of the transferee's supplemental funding does not constitute grounds for a hearing; and the parent company guarantee is supplemental information and not material to the financial qualifications determination. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 299-300 (2000), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 175 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 205 (2000).

Petitioner can challenge the transferee's cost and revenue projections if the challenge is based on sufficient facts, expert opinion, or documentary support. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), citing Oyster Creek, CLI-00-6, 5 NRC at 207-08.

The Commission does not require "absolute certainty" in financial forecasts. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), citing North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 20, 221-22 (1999). Challenges by interveners to financial qualifications "ultimately will prevail only if [they] can demonstrate relevant certainties significantly greater than those that usually cloud business outlooks." Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300 (2000), quoting North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 20, 222 (1999).

A petitioner's argument that the applicant must meet financial requirements in addition to those imposed by our regulations constitutes a demand for additional rules, but does not provide an adequate basis for a hearing. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit

3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 301 (2000), n. 24, citing Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 178 (2000).

### 6.31.3.2 Antitrust Considerations

The AEA does not require, and arguably does not allow, the Commission to conduct antitrust evaluations of license transfer applications. As a result, failure by the NRC to conduct an antitrust evaluation of a license transfer application does not constitute a Federal action warranting a NEPA review. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168 (2000). See also Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1) CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification, 65 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000). The fact that a particular license transfer may have antitrust implications does not remove it from the NEPA categorical exclusion. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266 (2000), quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167-68 (2000).

The Commission no longer conducts antitrust reviews in license transfer proceedings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 318 (2000), citing Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 168, 174 (2000); GPU Nuclear, Inc. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000); Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-19, 49 NRC 441 (1999); Final Rule, Antitrust Review Authority: Clarification, 56 Fed. Reg. 44,649 (July 19, 2000).

NRC antitrust review of post-operating license transfers is unnecessary from both a legal and policy perspective. GPU Nuclear, Inc., et. al. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-00-6, 51 NRC 193, 210 (2000). (responding to petitioner's concern that corporations may be "stretched too thin in their ability to operate a multitude of nuclear reactors").

### 6.31.3.3 Need for EIS Preparation

License transfers fall within a categorical exclusion for which EISs are not required, and the fact that a particular license transfer may have antitrust implications does not remove it from the categorical exclusion. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., et. al. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167-168 (2000). See also 10 CFR § 51.22(c)(21).

The Commission may reject a petitioner's request for an EIS on the ground that the scope of the proceeding does not include the new owner's operation of the plant - but includes only the transfer of their operating licenses. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 309 (2000).



#### 6.31.3.4 Concurrent Proceedings

Simultaneous litigation in multiple proceedings does not impose a “tremendous burden” upon parties in reactor license transfer proceedings sufficient to suspend the NRC proceedings, as such parties are frequently participants in proceedings concurrently conducted by other state and federal agencies. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 343 (1999). See also Kerr-McGee Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility), CLI-82-2, 15 NRC 232, 269 (1982), aff'd, City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1983); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 & 3), ALAB-171, 7 AEC 37, 39 (1974).

The occurrence of concurrent proceedings before a state regulatory agency is not a sufficient ground for suspension of a reactor license transfer proceeding, when the state agency is reviewing a license transfer under a different statutory authority than the NRC (and its conclusion would therefore not be dispositive of issues before the NRC) and when an insufficient explanation of financial burden reduction on the parties has not been fully explained. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et. al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 344 (1999).

#### 6.31.3.5 Decommissioning

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 50.33(k)(1), a license transfer application must contain information pertaining to the adequacy of its funding for decommissioning of the facility. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 142 (2001). A reactor licensee must provide assurances that it has adequate resources to fund decommissioning by one of the methods described in 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(e). Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 142 (2001). The Commission has held that showing compliance with 10 C.F.R. § 50.75 demonstrates sufficient assurance of decommissioning funding. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 142 (2001); see also North Atlantic Energy Service Corp. (Seabrook Station, Unit 1), CLI-99-6, 49 NRC 201, 217 (1999).

The Commission’s regulations regarding decommissioning funding are intended to minimize administrative effort and provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available to carry out decommissioning in a manner that protects public health and safety. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 143 (2001); citing Final Rule: General Design Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24,030 (June 27, 1988). The generic formulas set out in 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) fulfill the dual purpose of the rule. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 144 (2001).

“Price-Anderson indemnification agreements continue in effect even after plants have ceased permanent operation and are engaged in decommissioning. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant;

Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 300-01 (2000), citing 10 C.F.R. § 140.92 and quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 175 (2000).

The Commission has accepted the question of whether the applicants' financial assurance arrangement is lawful under 10 C.F.R. § 50.75 as a genuine dispute of law and fact that is admissible at a hearing. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 302 (2000). Other issues which have been recognized as appropriate in a hearing on a license transfer are whether NRC approval of the transfers will deprive the Commission of authority to require the applicant to conduct remediation under decommissioning, and whether, under those circumstances, the applicant would no longer have access to the decommissioning trust for the remediation it would need to complete. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 307 (2000).

A petitioner's challenge to an applicant's use of the very decommissioning cost estimate methodology sanctioned by the Commission's rules amount to an impermissible collateral attack on 10 C.F.R. § 50.75. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 303 (2000); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 165-66 (2000).

The Commission does not have statutory authority to determine the recipient of excess decommissioning funds. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 305 (2000).

In addition, once the funds are in the decommissioning trust, withdrawals are limited by 10 C.F.R. § 50.82, so that "non-decommissioning" funds (as defined by the NRC) could be spent after the NRC-defined "decommissioning" work had been finished or committed. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 308 n.52 (2000).

The use of site-specific estimates were expressly rejected by the Commission in its decommissioning rulemaking, although the Commission did recognize that site-specific cost estimates may be prepared for rate regulators. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 144 (2001); citing Final Rule: Financial Assurances Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Power Reactors, 63 Fed. Reg. 50,465, 50,469-69 (Sept. 22, 1998); Final Rule: General Design Requirements for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24,018, 24,030 (June 27, 1988).

NRC regulations do not require a license transfer application to provide an estimate of the actual decommissioning and site cleanup costs. Instead the Commission's decommissioning funding regulation under 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) generically establishes the amount of decommissioning funds that must be set aside. A petitioner cannot challenge the regulation in a license transfer adjudication. The

NRC's decommissioning funding rule reflects a deliberate decision not to require site-specific estimates in setting decommissioning funding levels. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 308 (2000), citing Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 59 (2000).

The argument that decommissioning technology is still in an experimental stage is considered a collateral attack on 10 C.F.R. § 50.75(c) establishing the amount that must be set aside, and is thus invalid. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 309 (2000), quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-20, 52 NRC 151, 167 n.9 (2000) and citing Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant; Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Prairie Island Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, reconsid. denied, CLI-00-14, 52 NRC 37, 59 (2000).

NRC regulations regarding decommissioning funding do not require the inclusion of costs related to nonradioactive structures or materials beyond those necessary to terminate an NRC license. Consolidated Edison Co., Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 1 and 2), CLI-01-19, 54 NRC 109, 145 (2001).

#### **6.31.4 Motions for Stay/Suspension of Proceedings**

When ruling on stay motion in a license transfer proceeding, the Commission applies the four pronged test set forth in 10 CFR § 2.1327(d):

- (1) Whether the requestor will be irreparably injured unless a stay is granted.
- (2) Whether the requestor has made a strong showing that it is unlikely to prevail on the merits.
- (3) Whether the granting of a stay would harm other participants; and
- (4) Where the public interest lies.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-00-17, 52 NRC 79 (2000).

A temporary suspension of a license transfer proceeding where several parties have not yet exercised their right of first refusal to buy out a co-owner's share of a reactor does not contravene the Commission's stated policy of expedition in Subpart M proceedings, because it would not be sensible to require the expenditure of both public and co-owner funds in a proceeding, part or all of which may well be rendered moot in the immediate future. See Final Rule, Streamlined Hearing Process for NRC approval of License Transfers, 63 Fed. Reg. 66,721, 66,722 (Dec. 3, 1998) (Subpart M "procedures are designed to provide for public participation... while at the same time providing an efficient process that recognizes the time-sensitivity normally present in transfer cases.") Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., et.al. (Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 343 (1999).

The pendency of parallel proceedings before other forums is not an adequate ground to stay a license transfer adjudication. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 289 (2000), citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. (Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), CLI-99-30, 50 NRC 333, 343-44 (1999). But the parties should inform the Commission promptly of any court or administrative decision that might in any way relate to, or render moot, all or part of the proceeding. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 289 (2000).

When a number of arguments apply to the plants for which a request for a joint license transfer hearing was made, and the Commission's resources would be better spent by addressing these arguments only once, the Commission may grant the motion to consolidate the license transfer proceedings. Power Authority of the State of New York, et. al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Indian Point, Unit 3), CLI-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 288 (2000).

### **6.32 Television and Still Camera Coverage of NRC Proceedings**

Under current agency practice, any individual or organization may videotape a Commission-conducted open meeting so long as their activities do not disrupt the proceeding. See U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "A Guide to Open Meetings," NUREG/BR-0128, Rev. 2 (4th ed.); see also Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-14, 44 NRC 3, 5 (1996).

Videotaping of a Board proceeding must be done in a manner that does not present an unacceptable distraction to the participants or otherwise disrupt the proceeding. The Board may terminate videotaping at any time it determines a videotape-related activity is disruptive (i.e. interferes with the good order of the proceeding). Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-14, 44 NRC 3, 6 (1996).

Anyone videotaping a proceeding held in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Hearing Room must abide by the following conditions:

1. Cameras must remain stationary in the designated camera area of the Licensing Board Panel Room.
2. No additional lighting is permitted.
3. No additional microphones will be permitted outside of the designated camera area. A connection is available in the designated camera area that provides a direct feed from the hearing room audio system.

Yankee Atomic Electric Co. (Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-96-14, 44 NRC 3, 6 (1996).

As provided in the 1978 Commission policy statement, 43 Fed. Reg. 4294 (1978), when a Licensing Board is using other facilities, such as a state or federal courtroom, the Board generally will follow the camera policy governing that facility, even if it is stricter than the agency's camera policy. However, in order to prevent disruption of the proceeding and maintain an appropriate judicial atmosphere, the Board reserves the right to impose restrictions beyond those generally used at the facility. Yankee Atomic Electric Co., LBP-96-14, 44 NRC 3, 6 n.2 (1996).

### **6.33 National Historic Preservation Act Requirements**

The National Historic Preservation Act contains no prohibition against a “phased review” of a property. Section 470(f) of that statute provides only that a federal agency shall, “prior to the issuance of any license. . . Take into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.” Nor does federal case law suggest any such prohibitions. The regulations implementing section 470(f) are ambiguous on the matter. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 323 n.15 (1998); Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-22, 50 NRC 3, 12 (1999).

Absent a clear Congressional statement, adjudicatory tribunals should not infer that Congress intended to alter equity practices such as the standards for reviewing stay requests. The National Historic Preservation Act contains no such clear congressional statement. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-98-8, 47 NRC 314, 323 (1998).

Unlike NEPA, consideration of alternatives under the National Historic Preservation Act comes into play only if the project will have an adverse effect on historic properties, and only after that determination is made. USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-9, 63 NRC 433, 448-49 (2006)

### **6.34 Cultural Resources Plan**

When intervenors fail to show deficiency in the staff’s Cultural Resources Management Plan, their NEPA claims are without merit. Hydro Resources, Inc., LBP-99-9, 49 NRC 136, 143-144 (1999).

### **6.35 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act Requirements**

Under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), consultation and concurrence of the affected tribe take place prior to the intentional removal from or excavation of Native American cultural items from federal or tribal lands. Where no intentional removal or excavation of cultural items is planned, the applicable regulatory provisions is 43 C.F.R. § 10.4, which applies to inadvertent discoveries of human remains, funeral objects, sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony. The regulations generally do not require prior consultation or concurrence with the affected tribe for unintentional activities. Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-99-22, 50 NRC 3, 14-15 (1999).

### **6.36 Hybrid Procedures under Subpart K (Also see Section 6.16.9)**

The procedures in Subpart K apply to contested proceedings on applications filed after January 7, 1983, for a license or license amendment under Part 50 of this chapter, to expand the spent fuel storage capacity at the site of a civilian nuclear power plant, through the use of high density fuel storage racks, fuel rod compaction, the transshipment of spent nuclear fuel to another civilian nuclear power reactor within the same utility system, the construction of additional spent nuclear fuel pool capacity or dry storage capacity or by other means. See 10 CFR § 2.1103.

The subpart K process empowers a licensing board to resolve fact questions, when it can do so accurately, at the abbreviated hearing stage. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 383 (2001).

Subpart K establishes a two-part test to determine whether a full evidentiary hearing is warranted: (1) there must be a genuine and substantial dispute of fact “which can only be resolved with sufficient accuracy” by a further adjudicatory hearing; and (2) the Commission’s decision “is likely to depend in whole or in part on the resolution of that dispute.” See 10 C.F.R. § 2.1115(b). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 383 (2001).

Subpart K derives from the NWSA, where Congress called on the Commission to “encourage and expedite” onsite spent fuel storage. See 42 U.S.C. § 10151(a)(2). To help accomplish this goal, the NWSA required the Commission, “at the request of any party,” to employ an abbreviated hearing process -- i.e., discovery, written submissions, and oral argument. See 42 U.S.C. § 10154. The NWSA authorized the Commission to convene additional “adjudicatory” hearings “only” where critical fact questions could not otherwise be answered “with sufficient accuracy.” See 42 U.S.C. § 10154(b)(1)(A). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 384 (2001).

In promulgating section 2.1115(b) of Subpart K, the Commission used the same test described in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 [“NWSA”] at 42 U.S.C. § 10154(b)(1). The statutory criteria are quite strict and are designed to ensure that the hearing is focused exclusively on real issues. They are similar to the standards under the Commission’s existing rule for determining whether summary disposition is warranted. They go further, however, in requiring a finding that adjudication is necessary to resolution of the dispute and placing the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine and substantial dispute of material fact on the party requesting adjudication. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 383-84 (2001), quoting, Final Rule, Hybrid Hearing Procedures for Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear Power Reactors, 50 Fed. Reg. 41,662, 41,667 (Oct. 15, 1985).

Subpart K proceedings are intended to be decided “on the papers” with no live evidentiary hearing unless issues such as witness credibility require it. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Power Plant Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-03-11, 58 NRC 47, 57-58 (2003).

It seems unlikely to us that Congress intended the Commission to enact Subpart K simply to replicate the NRC’s existing summary disposition practice. Congress “cannot be presumed to do a futile thing.” Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Accord, Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Hence, Subpart K extends beyond the NRC’s pre-existing summary disposition practice. Unlike summary disposition, which requires an additional evidentiary hearing whenever a licensing board finds, based on the papers filed, that there remains a genuine issue of material fact, Subpart K’s procedure authorizes the board to resolve disputed facts based on the evidentiary record made in the abbreviated hearing, without convening a full evidentiary hearing, if the board can do so with “sufficient accuracy.” Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 384-85 (2001).

Subpart K directs the Board to “[dispose] of any issues of law or fact not designated for resolution in an adjudicatory hearing.” See 10 C.F.R. § 2.1115(a)(2) (emphasis added). “Issues” are, by definition, points of debate or dispute. To “dispose” of issues, a board must resolve them. To move from Subpart K’s abbreviated hearing stage to an additional evidentiary hearing, a licensing board must make a specific determination that issues “can only be resolved with sufficient accuracy” at such a hearing. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.1115(b)(1) (emphasis added). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370 (2001).

The Statement of Considerations for Subpart K reinforces the rule’s text:

“The appropriate evidentiary weight to be given an expert’s technical judgment will depend, for the most part, on the expert’s testimony and professional qualifications. In some circumstances, it may be possible to make such a determination without the need for an adjudicatory hearing. The presiding officer must decide, based on the sworn testimony and sworn written submissions, whether the differing technical judgment gives rise to a genuine and substantial dispute of fact that must be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing.” See 50 Fed. Reg. at 41,667 (1985). Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 385 (2001).

The NWPA and our rule implementing it (Subpart K) contemplate merits rulings by licensing boards based on the parties’ written submissions and oral arguments, except where a board expressly finds that “accuracy” demands a full-scale evidentiary hearing. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 385 (2001). Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.1115(b), a two-part test is used to determine whether a full evidentiary hearing is warranted on a contention in a 10 C.F.R., Part 2, Subpart K proceeding: (1) There must be a genuine and substantial dispute of fact which can only be resolved with sufficient accuracy by the introduction of evidence in an adjudicatory hearing; and (2) the decision of the Commission is likely to depend in whole or in part on the resolution of that dispute. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 26 (2001). The criteria of 10 C.F.R. § 2.1115(b), for determining whether a full evidentiary hearing is warranted are strict and are designed to ensure that the hearing is focused exclusively on real issues. They are similar to the standards for determining whether summary disposition is warranted. They go further in requiring a finding that adjudication is necessary to resolution of the dispute and in placing the burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine and substantial dispute of material fact on the party requesting adjudication. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 26 (2001) n.5.

Licensing boards are fully capable of making fair and reasonable merits decisions on technical issues after receiving written submissions and hearing oral arguments. The Commission is a technically oriented administrative agency, an orientation that is reflected in the makeup of its licensing boards. Most licensing boards have two, and all have at least one, technically trained member. In Subpart K cases, licensing boards are expected to assess the appropriate evidentiary weight to be given competing experts’ technical judgments, as reflected in their reports and affidavits. The inquiry is similar to that performed by presiding officers in materials licensing cases, where fact disputes normally are decided “on the papers,” with no live evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Hydro Resources, Inc., CLI-01-4, 53 NRC at 45; Curators of the University of Missouri, CLI-95-1, 41 NRC at 118-20. The NRC’s administrative judges, in other words, and the Commission itself, are

accustomed to resolving technical disputes without resort to in-person testimony. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 385-86 (2001).

There may be issues, such as those involving witness credibility, that cannot be resolved absent face-to-face observation and assessment of the witness. Or there may be issues involving expert or other testimony where key questions require follow-up and dialogue to be answered “with sufficient accuracy.” In these kinds of cases, Subpart K contemplates further evidentiary hearings. Many issues, however, particularly those involving competing technical or expert presentations, frequently are amenable to resolution by a licensing board based on its evaluation of the thoroughness, sophistication, accuracy, and persuasiveness of the parties’ submissions. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 386 (2001).

The Commission generally will defer to licensing boards’ judgment on when they will benefit from hearing live testimony and from direct questioning of experts or other witnesses. If a decision can be made judiciously on the basis of written submissions and oral argument, r boards are expected to follow the mandate of the NWPA and Subpart K to streamline spent fuel pool expansion proceedings by making the merits decision expeditiously, without additional evidentiary hearings. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10151(a)(2), 10154. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 386 (2001).

The Commission is generally not inclined to upset the Board’s fact-driven findings and conclusions, particularly where it has weighed the affidavits or submissions of technical experts. Where the Board analyzed the parties’ technical submissions carefully, and made intricate and well-supported findings in a 42-page opinion. The Commission, on appeal, saw no basis to redo the Board’s work. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 388 (2001).

The Commission saw no basis for upsetting the Board’s probability estimate or its decision against a further evidentiary hearing. Even if a further evidentiary hearing were convened, Intervenor apparently intends merely to reiterate its critique of the probabilistic risk assessment of others (the NRC Staff and the Licensee), but not to offer a fresh analysis of its own. Under these circumstances, scheduling a further hearing would serve only to delay the proceedings and increase the costs for all parties, in direct contravention of the NWPA. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370, 389 (2001).

In a 10 C.F.R. Part 2, Subpart K proceeding, general allegations are insufficient to trigger an evidentiary hearing. Factual allegations must be supported by experts or documents to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. The applicant cannot be required to prove that uncertain future events could never happen. Although the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the license applicant, the proponent of a contention has the initial burden of coming forward with factual issues, not merely conclusory statements and vague allegations. Northeast Nuclear Energy Co. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-01-3, 53 NRC 22, 27 (2001).

Under 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4)(1) (formerly § 2.786(b)(4)(1)), the Commission will grant a petition for review if the petition raises a “substantial question” whether a finding of



material fact is clearly erroneous or in conflict with a finding as to the same fact in a different proceeding.

Once an intervenor crosses the admissibility threshold relative to its environmental contention, the ultimate burden in a subpart K proceeding then rests with the proponent of the NEPA document-the staff (and the applicant to the degree it becomes a proponent of the staff's EIS-related action) - to establish the validity of that determination on the question whether there is an EIS preparation trigger. Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-01-9, 53 NRC 239, 249 (2001).

### **6.37 Agreement State Issues**

In reviewing a petition under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 to revoke, suspend or modify an agreement state license, the NRC will respond only to common defense and security issues, not public health and safety issues. For agreement state licenses, public health and safety issues are the domain of the agreement state, while the NRC retains authority only to regulate issues relating to the common defense and security. Radiac Research Corp. (License No. NYDOL 1944-1879), DD-04-4, 60 NRC 387, 389, 396 (2004). 389, 396.

### **6.38 Generic Security Issues**

The NRC will not analyze the petitioner's concern that the fears of local residents would make the facilities attractive terrorist targets. While psychological fear exists, the NRC can only evaluate the technical merits of the common defense and security issues that may contribute to the concerned citizens' fears and openly and accurately communicate those findings. Radiac Research Corp., DD-04-4, 60 NRC at 392 (reviewing a petition under 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 to revoke, suspend or modify an agreement state license).

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Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-82-16, 16 NRC 44 (1982), *aff'd*, *Bellotti v. NRC*, 725 F.2d 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

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Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-01-11, 53 NRC 370 (2001), petition for review denied, *Orange County v. NRC*, 47 Fed. Appx. 1, 2002 WL 31098379 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-86-7, 23 NRC 233, *aff'd*, *Ohio Citizens for Responsible Energy v. NRC*, 803 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1986).

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Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant), ALAB-636, 13 N.R.C. 312, appeal dismissed, Christa Maria v. NRC, No. 81-1920 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 27, 1981) (unreported).

Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2), CLI-03-18, 58 NRC 433 (2003), aff'd, Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. NRC, 2004 WL 2309754 (2d Cir. Oct. 14, 2004), amended and superseded, Nuclear Reg. Rep. P 20,644, 114 Fed. Appx. 36 (2nd Cir. Nov 16, 2004) (again affirming the NRC).

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Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), ALAB-705, 16 NRC 1733 (1982), dismissed, Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, No. 83-1503 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27, 1983) (unreported).

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Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. (Bailly Generating Station, Nuclear-1), CLI-78-7, 7 NRC 429 (1978), aff'd, Porter County Chapter v. NRC, 606 F.2d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

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Texas Util. Elec. Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-4, 23 NRC 113 (1986), aff'd, Citizens Ass'n for Sound Energy v. NRC, 821 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

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Trustees of Columbia Univ., [no ALAB number], 4 AEC 680 (1971), aff'd, Morningside Renewal Council v. AEC, 482 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 951 (1974).

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NEPA = National Environmental Policy Act

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