

September 5, 2001

EA-01-070

Mr. M. Reddemann  
Site Vice President  
Kewaunee and Point Beach Nuclear Plants  
Nuclear Management Company, LLC  
6610 Nuclear Road  
Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: KEWAUNEE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT  
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-305/01-11

Dear Mr. Reddemann:

On August 9, 2001, the NRC completed an inspection at your Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results which were discussed on August 9, 2001, with Mr. K. Hoops and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). One of these issues was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating this issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you deny this Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Kewaunee facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRC/ADAMS/index.html> (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

Original signed by  
Roger D. Lanksbury

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief  
Branch 5  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-305  
License No. DPR-43

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-305/01-11

cc w/encl: K. Hoops, Manager, Kewaunee Plant  
D. Graham, Director, Bureau of Field Operations  
Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission  
State Liaison Officer

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Sincerely,

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief  
Branch 5  
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 50-305  
License No. DPR-43

Enclosure: Inspection Report 50-305/01-11

cc w/encl: K. Hoops, Manager, Kewaunee Plant  
D. Graham, Director, Bureau of Field Operations  
Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission  
State Liaison Officer

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No: 50-305  
License No: DPR-43

Report No: 50-305/01-11

Licensee: Nuclear Management Company, LLC

Facility: Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant

Location: N 490 Highway 42  
Kewaunee, WI 54216

Dates: July 1 through August 9, 2001

Inspectors: Z. Dunham, Acting Senior Resident Inspector  
P. Krohn, Point Beach Senior Resident Inspector  
K. Walton, Reactor Engineer  
R. Langstaff, Senior Reactor Engineer  
D. Pelton, Senior Operations Engineer  
J. Ellegood, Reactor Engineer

Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief  
Branch 5  
Division of Reactor Projects

## Summary of Findings

IR 05000305-01-11, on 07/01-08/09/2001, Nuclear Management Company, LLC, Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant. Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Other.

The inspection was conducted over a 5½-week period by resident inspectors, regional reactor inspectors, and a regional senior operations engineer. The inspection identified two Green findings, one of which was a Non-Cited Violation. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by "No Color" or by the severity level of the applicable violation. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at <http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/index.html>.

### A. Inspector-Identified Findings

#### Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

- Green. The inspectors identified that two of eight crews examined during the licensee's calendar year 2001 licensed operator requalification operating test had failed.

The finding was of very low safety significance because both crews that had failed received remedial training prior to being returned to shift and the results of the licensee's operator licensing requalification operating test given in calendar year 2000 indicated that only one crew, out of a total of eight crews tested, had failed. (Section 1R11)

- Green. A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to provide a 3-hour rated fire barrier to separate redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment.

This finding was of very low safety significance because the licensee tested a replica of the fire barrier and demonstrated that the fire barrier provided protection for at least 60 minutes, which was sufficient for the hazards in the area. (Section 4OA5.1)

### B. Licensee-Identified Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

## Report Details

### Summary of Plant Status

The plant was operated at approximately 96 percent power during this period.

#### 1. REACTOR SAFETY

**Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, and Emergency Preparedness**

##### 1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator on July 12, 2001. The inspectors reviewed the system lineup checklist, normal operating procedure, abnormal and emergency operating procedures, and system drawings to verify the correct system lineup. Valve positions and electrical power availability were examined to verify that valve and electrical breaker positions were consistent with, and in accordance with the licensee's procedures and design documentation. The material condition of the equipment was also inspected.

###### b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

##### 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

###### .1 Fire Zone Inspections

###### a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors walked down the following areas on the dates listed to assess the overall readiness of fire protection equipment and barriers:

- Control Room Post Accident Recirculation Fan Floor Room (Zone AX-35), July 13, 2001
- Battery Rooms 'A' and 'B' (Zones TU-97 and TU-98), July 24, 2001
- Relay Room (Zone AX-30), July 24, 2001

Emphasis was placed on the control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, the material condition of fire protection equipment, and the material condition and operational status of fire barriers used to mitigate fire damage or propagation. Additionally, fire hoses, sprinklers, portable fire extinguishers, and fire detection devices were inspected to verify that they were installed at their designated locations, were in satisfactory physical

condition, and were unobstructed. Passive features such as fire doors, fire dampers, and fire zone penetration seals were also inspected to verify that they were in satisfactory condition and capable of providing an adequate fire barrier.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (71111.11)

.1 Written Examination and Operating Test Results

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the pass/fail results of individual operating tests and simulator operating tests (required to be given per 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2)) administered by the licensee during calendar year 2001.

b. Findings

Licensee evaluators had determined that the performance of two crews on the simulator operating test was unsatisfactory. The failure of two crews out of a total of eight crews tested during the annual simulator operating test was determined to be of "Green" safety significance.

The inspectors determined that the licensed operator performance (as demonstrated by a 25 percent crew failure rate on the simulator operating test) was more than minor, in that, it had a credible impact on safety. Specifically, operator performance errors could negatively impact the initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones of Reactor Safety. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 Significance Determination Process analysis, in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP)," and classified the finding as "Green" and of very low safety significance. Factors and assumptions which primarily contributed to this classification included:

- Both crews that had failed received remedial training prior to being returned to shift; and
- The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's operator licensing requalification operating test given in calendar year 2000 and determined that only one crew, out of a total of eight crews tested, had failed.

The licensee documented the 2001 crew failures and corrective actions taken in Kewaunee Assessment Process Work Order 01-009963-000.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's implementation of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, for the systems listed below. The inspectors reviewed recent maintenance rule evaluations to assess: (1) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65; (2) characterization of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) failures; (3) SSC safety significance classification; (4) 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSCs; and (5) performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1). The inspectors also interviewed licensee staff and evaluated the licensee's monitoring and trending of performance data.

Specific systems evaluated were:

- Auxiliary Feedwater System (System 05B)
- Trains 'A' and 'B' Emergency Diesel Generators (System 10 and System 42)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and assessment of plant risk, scheduling, and configuration control during the planned and emergent work activities listed below. In particular, the licensee's planning and management of maintenance was evaluated to verify that on-line risk was acceptable and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Additionally, the inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration against the actual plant conditions and any in-progress evolutions or external events to verify that the assessment was accurate, complete, and appropriate. Licensee actions to address increased on-line risk during these periods were also inspected to verify that actions were in accordance with approved administrative procedures.

- Maintenance work activities scheduled during week of July 16, 2001
- Maintenance work activities scheduled during week of July 30, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.



1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

On July 27, 2001, the inspectors reviewed design basis information and technical specification requirements to verify the technical adequacy of the operability evaluation listed below and to verify that system operability was properly justified and the system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred.

The inspectors reviewed the following operability evaluation:

- Traveling Water Screen B2 Shear Pin Failures

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWAs) (71111.16)

.1 OWA 01-10

a. Inspection Scope

On July 26, 2001, the inspectors reviewed OWA 01-10 which documented compensatory actions to take in response to a failed control room air conditioning damper (ACC-4), which was required to reposition upon detection of smoke in the control room. Power had been temporarily removed from Damper ACC-4 as part of the installation of a design change request. The inspectors reviewed OWA 01-10 to verify that there was no impact on the operators to properly respond to plant transients and accidents and to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the post-maintenance testing activities associated with the maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that the test was adequate for the scope of the maintenance work which had been performed and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness consistent with the

design and licensing basis documents. The inspectors attended pre-job briefings to verify that the impact of the testing had been properly characterized; observed or reviewed the test to verify that the test was performed as written and all testing prerequisites were satisfied; and reviewed the test acceptance criteria. Following

the completion of the test, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the affected equipment to verify that the test equipment was removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

- Repair of 'A' Safeguards Battery Charger, August 6, 2001
- Internal Containment Spray Pump 'A' Discharge Isolation Valve (ICS-5A) Motor-Operated Valve Testing, July 11, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment to verify that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety function and that the surveillance tests satisfied the requirements contained in technical specifications and the licensee's procedures, and that the equipment was capable of meeting its design function. During the surveillance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test to verify that it was adequate to demonstrate operational readiness consistent with the design and licensing basis documents, and that the testing acceptance criteria were clear. Portions of the test were observed to verify that the test was performed as written, that all testing prerequisites were satisfied, and that the test data were complete, appropriately verified, and met the requirements of the testing procedure. Following the completion of the test where applicable, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the affected equipment to verify that the test equipment was removed and that the equipment was returned to a condition in which it could perform its safety function.

The inspectors observed and reviewed the performance of the following surveillance testing on risk-significant equipment:

- Diesel Generator 'A' Availability Test, July 10, 2001
- Reactor Protection Logic Train 'B' Monthly Test, July 23, 2001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23)

a. Inspection Scope

On July 11, 2001, the inspectors reviewed and observed installation of Temporary Change Request (TCR) 01-07, "Connect Recorder to Motor 1-155," which installed an ammeter and strip chart recording device into safety-related 480-volt alternating current panel MCC-1-62D. The TCR was installed as part of a troubleshooting effort to measure the current for traveling water screen 1B2 Motor #1-155 which had broken at least three shear pins. The inspectors observed the installation of the stripchart and ammeter and inspected the internals of the traveling water screen motor breaker cubicle to verify no other safety-related equipment in MCC-1-62D was affected by the modification. The inspectors also verified that the test gear associated with the TCR was properly secured to eliminate adjacent safety-related equipment seismic concerns. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the design basis for the traveling water screens to verify that sufficient service water supply capacity existed, even if all traveling water screen shear pins were to break.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

**4. OTHER ACTIVITIES**

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

a. Inspection Scope

On July 20, 2001, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's Performance Indicator data collection process and historical data through the second quarter of 2001 to verify the accuracy of collected and submitted data. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed corrective action records, monthly operating reports, and control room logs to independently verify the data that the licensee had collected. The following Performance Indicator was evaluated:

- Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

- .1 (Closed) Escalated Enforcement Item (EEI) 50-305/01-02-01: Non-rated fire barrier. As of February 16, 2001, electrical cable pull box (PB) 2105 located in the auxiliary feedwater pump 1B room, part of fire area TU-95B, and safeguards alley was not rated as a fire barrier. Pull Box 2105 served to separate redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown equipment within the same fire area. This finding was preliminarily determined to be Yellow in Inspection Report 50-305/01-02. Subsequent to the inspection report, the licensee provided additional information in Supplement 2, dated

April 30, 2001, to Licensee Event Report 01-02. The information provided included results of a fire test which had been performed on a replica of the fire barrier. The test results demonstrated that the fire barrier provided protection for at least 60 minutes, which was sufficient for the hazards in the area. Based on review of the additional information, the NRC determined that the finding was Green (i.e., an issue having very low safety significance). The NRC's determination was documented in a letter from J. Grobe to M. Reddemann, Nuclear Management Company, LLC., dated June 6, 2001. Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, of 10 CFR Part 50 required, in part, that redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions which are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment have a separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Contrary to the above, cables for redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown equipment in fire area TU-95B did not have separation by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Because of the very low safety significance of the item and because the licensee included this item in their corrective action program (Kewaunee Assessment Process Work Order 01-001965), this issue is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) (NCV 50-305/01-11-01, Non-rated Fire Barrier), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

#### 40A6 Meetings, Including Exit

##### End-of-Cycle Assessment Public Meeting

On July 10, 2001, the NRC held a public meeting with the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant at the Carlton Town Hall, in Carlton, Wisconsin. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant's performance for the period from April 2, 2000 to April 1, 2001. Slides which were presented at the meeting are attached to this report.

##### Exit Meeting

On August 9, 2001, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. K. Hoops and other members of the Nuclear Management Company staff. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

##### Interim Exit Meeting Summary

Senior Official at Exit:	Parks Walker, Training Manager
Date:	July 20, 2001
Proprietary	No
Subject:	Results of Licensed Operator Requalification Testing for Calendar Years 2000/2001 and Applicability of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, "Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination process (SDP)"

Change to Inspection Findings: No

Attachments: As Stated

## KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

### Nuclear Management Company, LLC

S. Baker, Manager, Radiation Protection  
R. Farrell, Manager, Planning and Scheduling  
J. Fletcher, Security Manager  
W. Godes, Operations Training Manager  
G. Harrington, Licensing Leader  
K. Hoops, Plant Manager, Kewaunee Plant  
M. Kwitek, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance  
J. Owens, Initial Operator License Training Supervisor  
K. Peveler, Manager, Nuclear Oversight  
R. Pulec, Manager, Site Assessment  
R. Mende, Engineering Director  
J. Owens, Supervisor, Nuclear Training  
M. Reddemann, Site Vice President  
R. Repshas, Manager, Site Services  
J. Schweitzer, Manager, Engineering and Technical Support  
J. Stoeger, Superintendent, Operations  
T. Taylor, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations  
P. Walker, Training Manager  
T. Webb, Nuclear Licensing Director

### Nuclear Regulatory Commission - RIII

R. Lanksbury, Branch Chief, DRP, Branch 5

## ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

### Opened

50-305/01-11-01                      NCV    Non-rated Fire Barrier (Section 40A5)

### Closed

50-305/01-11-01                      NCV    Non-rated Fire Barrier (Section 40A5)

50-305/01-02-01                      EEI    Non-rated Fire Barrier (Section 40A5)

## LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DRP	Division of Reactor Projects, Region III
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
NCV	Non-Cited Violation
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
OWA	Operator Workaround
SDP	Significance Determination Process
SSCs	Systems, Structures, and Components
TCR	Temporary Change Request

## LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

### 1RO4 Equipment Alignment

N-DAM-10-CLA	Diesel Generator A Prestartup Checklist	Revision G
USAR, Section 8	Electrical Systems	Revision 16
OPERM 213-9	Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Startup Air Compressor A&B and Fish Screen Air	Revision B
OPERM 220	Flow Diagram Fuel Oil Systems	Revision AF

### 1RO5 Fire Protection

FPP 08-07	Control of Ignition Sources	Revision D
FPP 08-08	Control of Transient Combustibles	Revision A
FPP 08-09	Barrier Control	Revision C
FPP 08-10	Fire Drills	Revision A
FPP 08-12	Fire Prevention Tour	Revision B
N-FP-08-CL	Fire Protection System Checklist	Revision AL
	Appendix R Design Description	December 14, 2000
	Kewaunee Fire Protection Program Plan	Revision 4

### 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

OPS-TP Appendix H, Form H-1	Upgrade/Remedial/Accelerated Training Assignment	Crew "C"
OPS-TP Appendix H, Form H-1	Upgrade/Remedial/Accelerated Training Assignment	Crew "Staff 1"

### 1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation

NAD 08.20	Maintenance Rule Implementation	Revision B
GNP 08.20.01	Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria	Revision B
GNP 08.20.2	Maintenance Rule Data Evaluation	Revision B



GNP 08.20.4	Maintenance Rule MRFF and MPFF Evaluations	Revision A
GNP 08.20.05	Maintenance Rule (a)(1)/(a)(2) Evaluations	Revision A
KAP WO 01-010319	Resident NRC Inspector Questions Operability of AFW-1B	
KAP WO 01-010310	AFW Pump B Suction Relief Lifting	
KAP WO 01-001784	TDAFW Pump Turbine Bearing Oil Level	
KAP WO 01-008868	Turbine Driven AFW Pump Oil Level	
KAP WO 01-010183	Auxiliary Feedwater System Placed in Category (a)(1) for Maintenance Rule	
KAP WO 01-006705	Turbine Outboard Bearing Oil Level Below Minimum Level Recommended by Vendor	
KAP WO 01-007071	Resident Inspector Raised Question on KAP 01-6708	
KAP WO 01-006902	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Governor Sightglass Oil Level is "Out of Sight High"	
KAP WO 01-006708	Auxiliary Feedwater Oil Level Questioned	
KAP WO 00-001941	MU-320B Lifts and Does Not Reseat Properly	
KAP WO 00-002412	Retaining Ring on Oil filter Housing for 1A AFW Pump Found Cracked	
KAP WO 00-004161	Potentially Incorrect NRC Performance Indicator Data May Have Been Reported for 1997 TD	
KAP WO 00-002948	AFWP Suction Strainers	
KAP WO 00-000303	Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Speed not Adjusted to Test Range	
KAP WO 00-000378	Tappet Assembly on Turbine Driven AFW Pump Appears to be Out of Place	
KAP WO 00-001302	Diesel Generator 1A	

KAP WO 00-001387	Diesel Generator 1A Failed to Start	
KAP WO 00-004188	Potential MRFF - Diesel Generator 1A Failure to Start	
SP 42-047A	Diesel Generator A Operational Test Data	May 10, 2000
SP 10-111-1	Inspection of Diesel Generator A (Electrical)	May 3, 2000
SP 10-111-3	Inspection of Diesel Generator A (Component Retest)	May 7, 2000
	Performance Monitoring Report	May 2001
	KNPP Maintenance Rule Program Plan	Revision 2

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Evaluation

NAD 08.2	Work Request/Work Order	Revision D
GNP 08.21.01	Risk Assessment for Plant Configurations	Revision A
NAD 08.21	Configuration Risk Management	Revision A
GNP 08.02.01	Work Request/Work Order Processing	Revision F
Individual Plant Examination, Section 5	Core Damage Frequency Quantification	

1R15 Operability Evaluations

KAP WO 01-011643	Traveling Water Screen 1B2 Shear Pin Failures	
USAR, Section 9.6.2	Service Water System	Revision 16
USAR, Section 10.2.2	Circulating Water System	Revision 16

1R16 Operator Workarounds

OWA 01-10	ACC-4 Control Room A/C Normal Recirculation Damper Will not Reposition on Smoke in the Control Room	
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E-FP-08	Emergency Operating Procedure - Fire	Revision AF
N-FP-08	Fire Protection System	Revision J
N-FP-08-CL	Fire Protection System Lineup	Revision AL

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

KAP WO 01-011436	Charger-Battery Charger BRA-108 125 VDC	
	Letter From C&D Technologies Inc. to Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant	July 31, 2001
CMP 38-07A/B	DC Supply and Distribution (EDC) QA-1 Spare Battery BRA/B-108 Installation	Original Revision
PMP 38-02	DC Supply and Distribution (EDC) QA-1 Battery Charger Adjustments Safeguard	Revision K
XK-02789-9	Schematic Diagram Three Phase Model ARR C&D Technologies, Inc. Vendor Manual	November, 1981
USAR, Section 8.0	Electrical Systems	Revision 16
KAP WO 01-007045	Actuator ICS-5A/MV32066 Containment Spray Pump A Discharge Isolation	
GMP 236-03	Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Testing Using the Universal Diagnostic System (UDS)	Revision B
GMP 236-02	MOV Diagnostic Test Analysis and Acceptability Determination	Revision B
GMP 238	MOV Thrust and Torque Evaluations	Revision E
GMP 238-A1	MOV Data Tables	Revision A
Technical Specification 3.6	Containment System	Amendment No. 155
USAR 6.4	Containment Vessel Internal Spray System	Revision 16
OPERM-217	Flow Diagram - Internal Containment Spray System	Revision AK

1R22 Surveillance Testing

SP 42-312A	Diesel Generator A Availability Test	Revision N
SP 42-312B	Diesel Generator B Availability Test	Revision M
PMP 42-3	Train 'A' Auto Sequencing Test with Diesel A in Pullout	Revision N
NEP 15.31	Diesel Generator Start-Up Air System Leakage Test	Original Revision
PMP 01-08	Diesel Generator Startup Air Compressor Relief and Check Valve Testing and Inspection	Revision G
OPERM 213-9	Flow Diagram - Diesel Generator Startup Air Compressor A&B and Fish Screen Air	Revision B
SP 47-062B	Reactor Protection Logic Train B Monthly Test	Revision N
USAR, Section 7	Instrumentation and Control	Revision 16

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

TCR 01-07	Connect Recorder to Motor 1-155	July 11, 2001
KAP WO 01-004075	Broken Shear Pin, 1B2 Traveling Water Screen	
KAP WO 01-004124	Traveling Water Screen 1B2 Problems	
USAR, Section 9.6.2	Service Water System	Revision 16
USAR, Section 10.2.2	Design Features - Circulating Water System	Revision 16

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

NEI 99-02	Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline	Revision 0
	Reactor Operator and Shift Manager Logs	July 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001
GNP 03.18.01	NRC Performance Indicators Reporting Instructions	Revision B

40A5 Other

KAP WO 01-00196	During the NRC Fire Protection Inspection, the Qualification of Electrical Pull Box (PB) 2105 was Questioned Regarding its Ability to Meeting Appendix R Requirements	February 14, 2001
NRC-01-053	Reportable Occurrence 2001-02-02	April 30, 2001
	Final Significance Determination for a Finding at Kewaunee - NRC Inspection Report 50-305/01-02(DRS)	June 6, 2001