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NRC NEWS
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| Office of Public Affairs |
Telephone: 301/415-8200 |
| Washington, DC 20555-001 |
E-mail: opa@nrc.gov |
No. 96-125 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Friday, September 20, 1996)
NRC ISSUES SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT ON MILLSTONE
A special Nuclear Regulatory Commission team inspection of engineering and
licensing activities at the Millstone 2 and 3 nuclear power plants in Connecticut found
multiple deficiencies and apparent violations.
The team identified apparent violations in the licensee's failure to control design
changes, properly maintain the plants' Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and
maintain a corrective action program that measured up to NRC requirements.
NRC management decided to conduct the special inspection after the Millstone units
were placed on the agency's "Watch List" of problem plants in January.
Team inspections on March 11-29 and May 13-22 focused on Northeast Utilities'
methods for identifying, evaluating and resolving technical issues related to Millstone 3's
auxiliary feedwater, service water and emergency power systems. Selected technical issues
were reviewed at Millstone 2.
Deficiencies and weaknesses included:
--Licensing/design-bases documentation: A number of operating, surveillance and
maintenance practices or procedures were inconsistent with descriptions in the Millstone 3
UFSAR. As a result, in one instance the licensee failed to conduct required surveillance and
maintenance tests for equipment needed in case of a station blackout.
--Application of design requirements to procedures, practices and drawings: A
post-accident instrumentation system to monitor containment conditions was not designed
as stated in the UFSAR.
--Problem identification and corrective action: Failure to identify degraded or
nonconforming equipment conditions that, in some instances, had existed for several years.
For example, the failure to test certain valves at Millstone 2 went undetected for three
years. Weaknesses also were found in the plant's management response to concerns
identified in quality assurance audits and third party assessments.
--Engineering: Several instances were found where design discrepancies were
corrected by the engineering department through temporary fixes rather than restoring the
systems to their original design. At Millstone 2 for example, a procedure was changed to
have reactor operators install temporary jumper cables in the control room to meet the
single failure requirement for containment hydrogen monitors following an accident.
--Materials classification: Lack of licensee oversight resulted in incorrect
classifications of material, equipment and parts provided by vendors.
A predecisional enforcement conference will be scheduled at a later date to discuss the
deficiencies and apparent violations of NRC requirements and provide management an
opportunity to respond.
The executive summary of the inspection report is available upon request from the
NRC's Office of Public Affairs. The summary has been posted on the Internet at this
address: http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/reports.
The full report will be placed shortly in the local Public Document Room for Millstone
at Three Rivers Community Technical College, Thames Valley Campus, 574 New London
Turnpike, Norwich CT.; and in the NRC Public Document Room at 2120 L Street, NW,
Washington, DC.
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