The assessment program collects information from inspections and performance indicators (PIs) in order to enable the agency to arrive at objective conclusions about the licensee's safety performance. Based on this assessment information, the NRC determines the appropriate level of agency response, including supplemental inspection and pertinent regulatory actions ranging from management meetings up to and including orders for plant shutdown. The Action Matrix Summary listed below reflects overall plant performance and is updated regularly to reflect inputs from the most recent performance indicators and inspection findings. Security information is not publicly available and the associated performance indicators and inspection findings are not integrated into the Action Matrix Summary.
Notes have been added to plants that are not in the licensee response column of the Action Matrix.
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Note 1: | Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to exceeding the GREEN/WHITE threshold for the Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator. This was based upon 2 unplanned manual scrams in December 2008, and 2 unplanned manual scrams in February 2009. A 95001 supplemental inspection is planned for late May or early June. |
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Note 2: | Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, and 2 are in Degraded Cornerstone Column because of one Yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2004. The significance determination for this final Yellow finding and corresponding Notice of Violation were issued on April 8, 2005. A supplemental inspection completed in December 2005, determined that the Yellow finding would remain open because of inadequate root and contributing causes and ineffective corrective actions. A followup supplemental inspection, completed in September 2006, also determined that the Yellow finding would remain open because of ineffective corrective actions involving root causes and programmatic concerns involving questioning attitude, technical rigor, and operability determinations. An IP 95003 inspection was conducted during the fourth quarter of CY 2007. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not completed the actions associated with the Yellow finding. The adequacy of licensee corrective actions will be reviewed during followup inspections to assess the completion and effectiveness of actions taken in response to a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL).
On March 24, 2009, Region IV issued a followup assessment letter to close the CAL and document that the actions required for Units 1 and 2 to transition out of the Degraded Cornerstone had been met.
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Note 3: | Palo Verde, Unit 3 is in the Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone because of one Yellow finding originating in 4Q2004 remaining open (see above discussion), and one White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2006. The white inspection finding was associated with failures of the Unit 3, Train A, emergency diesel generator on July 25 and September 22, 2006. The underlying performance deficiencies involved a failure to establish appropriate instructions for performing corrective maintenance activities on a relay, and the failure to identify and correct the cause of erratic relay operation prior to installation of the relay into the emergency diesel generator voltage regulator circuit. On June 21, 2007, a CAL was issued to the licensee in response to their shift to Column 4 of the action matrix. An IP 95003 inspection was conducted during the fourth quarter of CY 2007. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not completed the actions associated with the Yellow and White findings. The IP 95003 inspection report was issued on February 1, 2008. On February 15, 2008, a revised CAL was issued that delineated the key performance areas that need to be addressed prior to Palo Verde Unit 3 exiting Column 4 of the action matrix.
On March 24, 2009, Region IV issued a followup assessment letter to close the CAL and document that the actions required for Unit 3 to transition out of the Repetitive Degraded Cornerstone had been met.
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Note 4: | Byron Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Initiating Events Cornerstone originating in 1Q2008. Supplemental inspection was successfully completed in 1Q09. |
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Note 5: | Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, and 2 are in Degraded Cornerstone Column because of one Yellow finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2004. The significance determination for this final Yellow finding and corresponding Notice of Violation were issued on April 8, 2005. A supplemental inspection completed in December 2005, determined that the Yellow finding would remain open because of inadequate root and contributing causes and ineffective corrective actions. A followup supplemental inspection, completed in September 2006, also determined that the Yellow finding would remain open because of ineffective corrective actions involving root causes and programmatic concerns involving questioning attitude, technical rigor, and operability determinations. An IP 95003 inspection was conducted during the fourth quarter of CY 2007. At the time of the inspection, the licensee had not completed the actions associated with the Yellow finding. The adequacy of licensee corrective actions will be reviewed during followup inspections to assess the completion and effectiveness of actions taken in response to a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL).
On March 24, 2009, Region IV issued a followup assessment letter to close the CAL and document that the actions required for Units 1 and 2 to transition out of the Degraded Cornerstone had been met.
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Note 6: | Byron Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Initiating Events Cornerstone originating in 1Q2008. Supplemental inspection was successfully completed in 1Q09. |
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Note 7: | Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 transitioned to the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 1Q2009. The White finding was related to an inaccurate threshold in the emergency action level table. A supplemental inspection for the White finding will be performed. |
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Note 8: | Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 transitioned to the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Emergency Preparedness cornerstone originating in 1Q2009. The White finding was related to an inaccurate threshold in the emergency action level table. A supplemental inspection for the White finding will be performed. |
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Note 9: | Cooper Nuclear Station is in the Regulatory Response Column for a White Performance Indicator in MSPI-EAC in 4Q08. |
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Note 10: | Farley Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to a White PI for Emergency AC Power System and an associated White inspection Finding. Note that the White Finding is not double counted in the Action Matrix. A 95001 inspection was conducted in 3Q/2008. |
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Note 11: | Kewaunee is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone originating in 3Q2008. Finding was originally documented as an Apparent Violation in an inspection report issued on September 23, 2008. Final Determination Letter was issued on October 29, 2008. |
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Note 12: | McGuire Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 3Q2008. |
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Note 13: | McGuire Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 3Q2008. |
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Note 14: | Nine Mile Point (NMP) Unit 2 transitioned to the Regulatory Response Column due to one White performance indicator (PI) in the Mitigating System cornerstone originating in 4Q2008. The White PI was related to exceeding the limit for Cooling Water System unavailability and reliability. A supplemental inspection for the White PI will be performed. |
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Note 15: | Oconee Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Initiating Events Cornerstone originating in 4Q2008. |
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Note 16: | Palisades is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone originating in 4Q2008. Final Determination Letter was issued January 30, 2009. |
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Note 17: | Prairie Island Unit 1 is in the Regulatory Response Column due to one White finding in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone originating in 4Q2008. Final Determination Letter was issued January 27, 2009. |
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Note 18: | San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 is in the Regulatory Response Column based on a White finding associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The finding was issued on December 19, 2008 and involved the failure to establish appropriate instructions for replacement of a safety-related battery output breaker. |
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Note 19: | The supplemental inspection for the white performance indicator was satisfactory completed during 1q2009. The white performance indicator was for Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours which occurred during 4q2008. |
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Note 20: | On December 16, 2008, the EDO approved the deviation memo to continue to provide heightened oversight for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 through calendar year 2009 because some exit criteria in the prior deviation related to ground water monitoring have not been met and the unique factors warranting a deviation from the ROP continue in 2009. This deviation is reduced in scope from prior years because the exit criteria related to the replacement alert and notification system have been met and the ROP is appropriate and sufficient to monitor performance in this regard. |
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Note 21: | On December 16, 2008, the EDO approved the deviation memo to continue to provide heightened oversight for Indian Point Units 2 and 3 through calendar year 2009 because some exit criteria in the prior deviation related to ground water monitoring have not been met and the unique factors warranting a deviation from the ROP continue in 2009. This deviation is reduced in scope from prior years because the exit criteria related to the replacement alert and notification system have been met and the ROP is appropriate and sufficient to monitor performance in this regard. |
