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6	UNITED STATE	S DISTRICT COURT		
7	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE			
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9	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,	Case No.		
10	Plaintiff,			
11		COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION		
12	MATTHEW OLSON and JENNIFER LeROY	AND OTHER EQUITABLE RELIEF		
13	Defendants.			
14	Plaintiff, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "the Commission"), for its Complaint			
15	alleges as follows:			
16	1. The FTC brings this action under Sections 13(b) and 19 of the Federal Trade			
17	Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) and 57b, and under Section 7(a) of the Controlling			
18	the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Ma	arketing Act of 2003 ("CAN-SPAM"), 15 U.S.C.		
19 20	§ 7706(a), to obtain preliminary and permanent in	junctive relief, rescission of contracts, restitution,		
20	redress, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and othe	er equitable relief for defendants' deceptive and unfair		
21	acts or practices in violation of CAN-SPAM, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq.			
22 23	JURISDICTION AND VENUE2.This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 53(b), 57b,7706(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.			
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26	3. Venue in the United States District	t Court for the Western District of Washington is		
27	proper under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1).			
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- 11		FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION		

1	<u>PLAINTIFF</u>	
2	4. Plaintiff FTC is an independent agency of the United States Government created by	
3	statute. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. The Commission is charged with, <i>inter alia</i> , enforcement of Section 5(a)	
4	of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting	
5	commerce. The Commission is also charged with enforcing CAN-SPAM as if a statutory violation of	
6	CAN-SPAM "were an unfair or deceptive act or practice proscribed under Section 18(a)(1)(B) of the	
7	[FTC Act] (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B))." See 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a). The Commission is authorized to	
8	initiate federal district court proceedings, by its own attorneys, to enjoin violations of the FTC Act, and	
9	to secure such equitable relief, including restitution for injured consumers, as may be appropriate in	
10	each case. 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b), 57b.	
11	DEFENDANTS	
12	5. Defendant Matthew Olson at all times material to this Complaint, acting alone or in	
13	concert with others, formulated, directed, controlled or participated in the acts and practices set forth in	
14	this Complaint. Defendant Olson transacts or has transacted business and resides in the Western	
15	District of Washington.	
16	6. Defendant Jennifer LeRoy at all times material to the Complaint, acting alone or in	
17	concert with others, formulated, directed, controlled or participated in the acts and practices set forth in	
18	this Complaint. Defendant LeRoy transacts or has transacted business and resides in the Western	
19	District of Washington.	
20	<u>COMMERCE</u>	
21	7. At all times relevant to this Complaint, defendants have maintained a substantial course	
22	of trade in or affecting commerce, as "commerce" is defined in Section 4 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.	
23	§ 44.	
24	DEFINITIONS	
25	8. "Electronic mail message" (or "email") means a message sent to a unique electronic	
26	mail address. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(6).	
27	9. "Electronic mail address" means a destination, commonly expressed as a string of	
28	characters, consisting of a unique user name or mailbox (commonly referred to as the "local part") and	
	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION	

a reference to an Internet domain (commonly referred to as the "domain part"), whether or not
 displayed, to which an electronic mail message can be sent or delivered. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(5).

10. "Commercial electronic mail message" means any electronic mail message the primary
purpose of which is the commercial advertisement or promotion of a commercial product or service
(including the content of an Internet website operated for commercial purposes). 15 U.S.C. § 7702(2).

11. "Header information" means the source, destination, and routing information attached to
an electronic mail message, including the originating domain name and originating electronic mail
address, and any other information that appears in the line identifying, or purporting to identify, a
person initiating the message. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(8).

10 12. "Initiate," when used with respect to a commercial email message, means to originate or
11 transmit such message or to procure the origination or transmission of such message. 15 U.S.C.
12 § 7702(9).

13 13. "Procure," when used with respect to the initiation of a commercial email message,
means intentionally to pay or provide other consideration to, or induce, another person to initiate such a
message on one's behalf. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(12).

16 14. "Protected Computer" means a computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce
17 or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner that
18 affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(13).

19 15. "Sender" means a person who initiates a commercial email message and whose product,
20 service, or Internet Web site is advertised or promoted by the message. 15 U.S.C. § 7702(16).

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DEFENDANTS' BUSINESS PRACTICES

16. Since at least March 2004, defendants have initiated the transmission of commercial
email messages to protected computers. The primary purpose of these commercial email messages has
been the commercial advertisement or promotion of Internet Web sites. These Web sites market
multiple goods or services, including a device that increases a car's gas milage, and mortgage
opportunities.

17. In numerous instances, defendants have initiated commercial email messages containing
materially false or misleading header information. In many instances, the email contains an originating

email address that was not assigned by the email service provider. In other instances, the email
 message fails to identify accurately the protected computer used to initiate the message because the
 email message was relayed or retransmitted through another protected computer for purposes of
 disguising its origin.

5 18. In numerous instances, in order to induce consumers to open and read their commercial
6 emails, defendants have initiated commercial email messages that contain subject headers that
7 misrepresent the content or subject matter of the message.

8 19. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated commercial email messages that
9 fail to include any notification to recipients of their ability to decline receiving future email messages
10 from the defendants, and the email messages fail to include a reply email address or other mechanism
11 that recipients can use to decline receiving future email messages from the defendants.

12 20. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated commercial email messages that13 fail to include a valid physical postal address of the sender.

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VIOLATIONS OF THE CONTROLLING THE ASSAULT OF NON-SOLICITED PORNOGRAPHIC AND MARKETING ACT OF 2003

21. 16 The Controlling The Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 17 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq., became effective on January 1, 2004, and has since remained in full force and 18 effect. 19 22. Section 5(a)(1) of CAN-SPAM states: 20It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission, to a protected computer, of a commercial electronic mail 21 message . . . that contains, or is accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially 22 misleading. 23 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). 24 25 23. Section 5(a)(6) of CAN-SPAM states: 26 For purposes of [section 5(a)(1)], the term "materially," when used with respect to false or misleading header information, includes the alteration or concealment of 27 header information in a manner that would impair the

ability of an Internet access service processing the

1 2 3 4		message on behalf of a recipient, a person alleging a violation of this section, or a law enforcement agency to identify, locate, or respond to a person who initiated the electronic mail message or to investigate the alleged violation, or the ability of a recipient of the message to respond to a person who initiated the electronic message.	
5	15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(6).		
6			
7	24.	Section (5)(a)(2) of CAN-SPAM states:	
8		It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission to	
9		a protected computer of a commercial electronic mail message if such person has actual knowledge, or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective	
10		circumstances, that a subject heading of the message would be likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably	
11		under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the content or subject matter of the message (consistent	
12		with the criteria used in enforcement of Section 5 of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45)).	
13	15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2).		
14	25		
15	25.	Section 7(e) of CAN-SPAM states that, in any action to enforce compliance through an	
16	injunction with Section 5(a)(2) and other specified sections of CAN-SPAM, the FTC need not allege or		
17	prove the state of mind required by such sections. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(e).		
18	26.	Section 5(a)(3) of CAN-SPAM states:	
19		It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission to a protected computer of a commercial electronic mail message that does not contain	
20		a functioning return electronic mail address or other Internet-based mechanism, clearly and conspicuously displayed that:	
21		(i) a recipient may use to submit, in a manner specified in the message, a reply electronic mail message or other form of	
22	commercial electronic mail messages from that sender at the		
23 24		 electronic mail address where the message was received; and remains capable of receiving such messages or communications for no loss than 20 days after the transmission of the original 	
24		for no less than 30 days after the transmission of the original message.	
26	15 U.S.C. § 7	7704(a)(3).	
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11	COMPLAIN	T - Page 5 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 915 Second Ave., Su. 2896 Seattle, Washington 98174 (206) 220-6350	

1	27. Section 5(a)(5)(A) of CAN-SPAM states:	
2 3	It is unlawful for any person to initiate the transmission of any commercial electronic mail message to a protected computer unless the message provides:	
4	(i) clear and conspicuous identification that the message is an advertisement or	
5	(ii) clear and conspicuous notice of the	
6	opportunity under [section 5(a)(3)] to decline to receive further commercial	
7	electronic mail messages from the sender; and	
8	(iii) a valid physical postal address of the sender.	
9	15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5)(A).	
10	28. Section 7(a) of CAN-SPAM states:	
11	[T]his Act shall be enforced by the [FTC] as if the violation of this Act were an unfair or deceptive act or	
12	practice proscribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the [FTC Act] (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)).	
13	$\operatorname{Act}_{\operatorname{I}}(150.5.6.57a(a)(1)(\mathbf{D})).$	
14	15 U.S.C. § 7706(a).	
15	<u>COUNT ONE</u>	
16	29. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected	
16 17	29. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information	
17	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information	
17 18	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading.	
17 18 19	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C.	
17 18 19 20	 computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). 	
 17 18 19 20 21 	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). COUNT TWO	
 17 18 19 20 21 22 	 computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). <u>COUNT TWO</u> 31. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected 	
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). 31. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected computers, of commercial email messages that contain subject headings that would be likely to mislead	
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). 31. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected computers, of commercial email messages that contain subject headings that would be likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the contents or	
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 	computers, of commercial email messages that contained or are accompanied by, header information that is materially false or materially misleading. 30. The defendants' acts or practices as described in Paragraph 29 violate 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(1). COUNT TWO 31. In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected computers, of commercial email messages that contain subject headings that would be likely to mislead a recipient, acting reasonably under the circumstances, about a material fact regarding the contents or subject matter of the message.	

1	COUNT THREE		
2	33.	In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission, to protected	
3	computers, of commercial email messages that advertise or promote Internet Web sites, products or		
4	services, and do not include:		
5	a. a clear and conspicuous notice of the recipient's opportunity to decline to receive further		
6		commercial electronic mail messages from the defendants at the recipient's email	
7		address; and/or	
8	b.	a functioning return email address or other Internet-based mechanism, clearly and	
9		conspicuously displayed, that a recipient could use to submit a reply email message or	
10	other form of Internet-based communication requesting not to receive future commercial		
11	email messages from the defendants at the electronic mail address where the message		
12		was received, and that remains capable of receiving such messages or communications	
13		for no less than 30 days after the transmission of the original message.	
14	34.	The defendants' acts or practices, as described in paragraph 32 violate 15 U.S.C.	
15	§ 7704(a)(5)(A) and/or § 7704(a)(3).		
16		COUNT FOUR	
17	35.	In numerous instances, the defendants have initiated the transmission of commercial	
18	email messages to protected computers that fail to provide a valid physical postal address of the sender.		
19	36. The defendants acts or practices as described in Paragraph 35 violate 15 U.S.C.		
20	§ 7704(a)(5)(A).		
21	CONSUMER INJURY		
22	37.	Consumers throughout the United States have suffered and continue to suffer substantial	
23	monetary loss as a result of the defendants' unlawful acts or practices. Absent injunctive relief from		
24	this Court, the defendants are likely to continue to injure consumers and harm the public interest.		
25	THIS COURT'S POWER TO GRANT RELIEF		
26	38.	Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), empowers this Court to grant	
27	injunctive and	d such other relief as the Court may deem appropriate to halt and redress violations of the	
28	FTC Act.		
		FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION	

39. Section 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57b, and Section 7(a) of CAN-SPAM, 15
 U.S.C. § 7706(a), empower the Court to grant the FTC such relief as the Court finds necessary to
 redress injury to consumers and other persons resulting from the defendants' violations of CAN SPAM, including rescission or reformation of contracts and the refund of monies. The Court, in the
 exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, may award other ancillary relief including, but not limited to,
 rescission of contracts and restitution, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, to prevent and remedy
 injury caused by defendants' law violations.

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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

9 Wherefore, Plaintiff FTC, pursuant to Sections 13(b) and 19 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)
10 and 57b, Section 7(a) of CAN-SPAM, 15 U.S.C. § 7706(a), and the Court's own equitable powers,
11 requests that the Court:

Award plaintiff such temporary and preliminary injunctive and ancillary relief as may be
 necessary to avert the likelihood of consumer injury during the pendency of this action and to preserve
 the possibility of effective final relief;

2. Permanently enjoin the defendants from violating the FTC Act, as alleged herein;

3. Award such equitable relief as the Court finds necessary to redress injury to consumers
resulting from the defendants' violations of the FTC Act and CAN-SPAM, including, but not limited
to, rescission of contracts and restitution, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains by the defendants;
and

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1	4. Award plaintiff the costs	of bringing this action, as well as such other and additional
2	equitable relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper.	
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4	Dated: November 28, 2005	Respectfully Submitted,
5		WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL General Counsel
6 7		CHARLES A. HARWOOD Regional Director
8		
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