Recollections of Captain Daniel V. Gallery, USN, commander of USS Guadalcanal Task Group concerning the capture of German submarine U-505 on 4 June 1944.
Adapted from: Daniel V. Gallery interview, recorded 26 May 1945, that is in box 11 of World War II Interviews, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center
Related Resource: Capture
of U-505 on 4 June 1944
When war broke out, that is on Pearl Harbor Day, I was attached
to the American Embassy in London as an observer. I had been slated
to command one of the Naval Air Bases that we were at that time
building in England.
A few days after Pearl Harbor I was ordered to Iceland to take
command of Fleet Air Base, Reykjavik [Iceland], up there. I was
there from December, 1941, until May, 1943. During this time we
built the fleet air base. There were very primitive living conditions
there when I first arrived but within six months we had a very
comfortable base built with excellent facilities for operating
airplanes, for living and for recreation. We worked in very close
cooperation with the British there, actually, although not theoretically,
under the operational control of the air officer commanding the
Royal Air Force [RAF], Iceland.
We had one squadron of PBY [twin-engine patrol bomber seaplane,
known as "Catalina"] amphibians which operated as far
as 600 miles south of Reykjavik. We would meet convoys....approximately
off Cape Farewell in Iceland and would carry them under our escort
until they were within range of the RAF planes from England. During
the period of which I speak our planes delivered more attacks
on [German] submarines than any other squadron in the U.S. Navy.
We had, during that period, six official A and B assessments and,
as I remember it, around 70 attacks.
I left Iceland in June 1943 and came to the United States and
put the [escort aircraft carrier] USS Guadalcanal [CVE-60]
in commission at Astoria, Oregon. I was there for several months
before her commissioning and the actual commissioning was in September
of 1943. We went from Astoria to Puget Sound, then down to San
Diego for preliminary shakedown [sea tests of the ship and crew],
and in actual fact that shakedown amounted to one week, and then
we took a squadron [of aircraft] aboard and came around to the
east coast via the Panama Canal, arriving in Norfolk [Virginia]
in December of 1943.
We left on our first ASW [anti-submarine warfare] cruise in January
1944 and operated in the vicinity of the Azores on January 19.
We got our first two U-boat [German submarine, or unterseeboot]
kills when we surprised a refueling operation and depth charged
and sank a big refueler [a German submarine equipped with extra
fuel tanks and responsible for resupplying attack U-boats to permit
them to remain on patrol longer] and a small [attack] U-boat alongside
of it [U-544 was sunk on 16 Jan.; apparently the second
submarine survived the action]. On our second cruise which began
late in March, we got two more kills. We sank the U-515
and picked up 40-some prisoners, including the captain, and sank
the U-68 the next day, getting one survivor and one dead
man and a great deal of wreckage.
On this cruise we broke the ice on night operations for CVEs [escort
aircraft carriers]. So far as I know, we were the first CVE to
operate continuously at night as a matter of routine. On this
cruise there was one period during which we had planes in the
air continuously for 48 hours and it was during that period that
we got both of our kills.
Planned capture of U-boat
It was also during this cruise that we got the idea of trying
to capture a U-boat. When we sank the [U-]515 we
had been hunting her continuously for about 18 hours, making intermittent
sound contacts, sightings by the planes at night and contacts
by destroyers....and contacts on sonar buoys, in other words,
we'd been right on top of the U-515 for about 18 hours
and had delivered several depth charge attacks, both from the
air and surface vessels, which had damaged him until he got to
the point where he had to come up and he suddenly popped up right
in the middle of a group of three of our destroyers which were
only three to four hundred yards away from him, and he was surrounded
by them.
We had three or four planes in the air at the time over this spot.
As soon as he popped up everyone opened up on him in accordance
with the usual accepted doctrine and hammered him to pieces, set
fire to him and blew him up and he sank within a few minutes of
the time that he had come up. He attempted to man his guns but
the gunfire from our ships was so heavy that it drove the crew
overboard.
In analyzing this attack afterwards it occurred to us that if
we had anticipated what was going to happen and had been ready
for it with organized boarding parties, we might possibly have
gotten aboard the U-515 in time to save her. So we determined
that on the next cruise we would anticipate such an event and
be ready for it.
The next cruise started in May and at the departure conference
attended by the representatives of Cinclant [Commander in Chief,
US Atlantic Fleet], ComAirLant [Commander, Atlantic Air Forces],
ComFairNorfolk [Commander, Fleet Air, Norfolk, Virginia], DesDivLant
[Destroyer Division, Atlantic}, we discussed plans for boarding
and capture and we agreed that if we encountered a submerged submarine
and forced him to surface we would then assume that he had surfaced
for only one reason, which was to try to save his hide, save the
crew. And that as soon as he surfaced we would cease fire with
any weapons that could inflict fatal damage on the submarine,
that we would use only anti-personnel weapons from that point
on, attempting to drive the crew overboard as rapidly as possible,
meantime having our boarding parties already to go.
Each ship in the task force was ordered to organize and instruct
boarding parties and to have all preparations ready for taking
a sub in tow on short notice. On 17th of May, approximately ten
days after we had sailed, in my intention for the night signal
I told the group that we expected to be on a hot trail the next
day and reminded them that our objective was to capture rather
than sink and said for all ships to have their boarding parties
ready and be ready to tow. That was May 17th.
The actual capture occurred on June 4th. We didn't get the one
that I had in mind on May 17th. We went on and operated off of
Cape Verde Islands for approximately two weeks, operating continuously
day and night and finally we were running short of fuel and had
to head for Casablanca. But on the way to Casablanca we decided
to run searches for a U-boat reported by Cominch [Commander-in-Chief,
United States Fleet] to be home bound off the west coast of Africa.
Vectored planes over [USS] Chatelain
We hunted for this fellow about four or five days and nights,
had numerous indications that a submarine was nearby, such as
disappearing radar contacts, noisy sonar-buoys, TAG bearings but
we never did sight this fellow and we were finally about to give
up the hunt. As a matter of fact for all practical purposes we
had given it up and were on our way to Casablanca but were keeping
fighter planes in the air to serve as escort and also on the outside
chance we might still find the fellow, when on June 4th, Sunday
morning, at about 11:10, 150 miles west of Cape Blanco in French
West Africa, the Chatelain reported that she had a possible
sound contact.
Within a half minute she reported contact evaluated as U-boat
and in accordance with the doctrine of our task group, without
further orders from me, she and the two destroyers nearest to
her started the attack while the Guadalcanal and my other
two escorts turned away from the contact. The Chatelain,
having the sound contact, was the attacking ship and the [USS]
Pillsbury [DE-133] and [USS] Jenks [DE-665] were
assisting ships. ComCortDivFour, Commander Hall, was in the Pillsbury
and as ComCortDivFour was in tactical command at the scene of
the attack.
The Pillsbury was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Cassleman.
The Chatelain was commanded by Lieutenant Commander Dudley
S. Knox and the [USS] Jenks was commanded by Lieutenant
Commander Julius F. Way.
As soon as the Chatelain's report came into the combat
information center on the Guadalcanal we vectored [diverted]
our fighting planes over to the Chatelain. All ships and
aircraft guarded [listened to] the same radio frequency so the
fighters that heard the report were already on the way. The fighters
sighted the sub running fully submerged.
The Chatelain's first attack with hedgehogs ["v"-shaped
mortars on a ship's deck which fired depth charges to each side
of the ship] apparently was ineffective and at this point the
sub sighted the task force, fired one acoustic [sound-guided]
torpedo and reversed course. This temporarily shook off the Chatelain
but our fighters saw the sub reverse course, and being on the
same radio frequency with the Chatelain, told her what
was happening, coached her to reverse course too and then coached
her on to a collision course with the sub.
She very soon picked up the sub again with her sound gear and
following the indications of the sound gear and of the fighter
planes in the air, she made a depth charge attack firing a full
pattern [with hedgehog depth charges to each side and other depth
charges rolled off the stern for maximum area coverage] which
rolled the sub on her beams end under the water. The fighter planes
immediately reported, "Chatelain, you struck oil [the
explosive depth charges exploded near the sub and caused one of
its oil lines to rupture, creating an oil slick on the surface],
sub is surfacing," Then in a few seconds the sub broke surface
and found herself practically in the center of a group consisting
of the Chatelain, Pillsbury, and Jenks.
These ships and the two aircraft immediately opened fire on the
submarine with anti-personnel ammunition. The planes fired 50
caliber guns, the destroyers fired 20 mm. and 40 mm. guns and
some three-inch shells of high explosives [designed to explode
on impact] rather than armor piercing [designed to penetrate the
target and then explode].
The Nazis [German sailors] scrambled overboard as fast as they
could. They attempted to man the guns but there was just too much
stuff flying and they went overboard pretty fast. As soon as it
was apparent that most of them had gone overboard, Commander Hall,
the Division Commander issued the order, "Cease firing,"
"Away boarding parties."
The Jenks, Pillsbury and Chatelain all put
boats in the water and Commander Hall then ordered the Jenks
and the Chatelain to pick up survivors while the [boarding
party of the] Pillsbury would board the sub.
Put their lives "on the line."
The sub was left running at about 10 knots with her rudder jammed
hard right and in just about full surface trim. The Pillsbury's
boat had to chase the sub and cut inside the circle to catch her,
which she did, and the boarding party, consisting of eight enlisted
men and Lieutenant (j.g. [junior grade]) Albert Leroy David, leaped
from the boat to the circling sub and took possession of it.
On deck there was one dead man. They didn't know what was down
below. They had every reason to believe, from the way the sub
was still running, that there were still Nazis left below engaged
in scuttling, setting booby traps or perhaps getting rid of confidential
gear. At any rate David and two enlisted men, one named Knispel,
the other Wdowiak, plunged down the conning tower hatch carrying
hand grenades and machine guns ready to fight it out with anyone
they found below. They very definitely put their lives on the
line when they went down the hatch. However, they found no one
below.
They did find that water was pouring into the U-boat through a
bilge strainer about 8 inches in diameter which had the cover
knocked off, and that all the vents were open and the boat was
rapidly flooding. When they found there was no one else below
they called the other boarders below and went to work closing
vents. They found the cover to this bilge strainer, slapped it
back in place, screwed up the butterfly nuts on it and checked
the flooding, just in the nick of time.
In the meantime another boarding party from the Guadalcanal
arrived under the command of Commander Earl Trosino, Chief Engineer
of the Guadalcanal, and took charge of the salvage operations.
At this time the sub was so low in the water that to prevent the
swells from washing down the conning tower hatch they had to close
the hatch on the people who were working below. Those people down
below wouldn't have had any chance whatsoever to escape in case
the sub had gotten away from us.
The Pillsbury meanwhile was attempting to come alongside
and take the sub in tow. She sent a message to the sub to stop
the engines so she could get alongside. However, when they pulled
the switches and stopped the engines, the stern of the sub sank
so far in the water that it looked like she was going to up end
and sink so they had to throw the switches to full speed ahead
again to get the lift of the stern planes [external short "wings"
designed to make vertical axis of the submarine hull go above
or below 90 degrees] to keep the stern up, and the sub circled
some more.
The Pillsbury then tried to come alongside while she was
still circling, actually did get alongside and get a line aboard
but, of course, with the sub circling she couldn't hold her position
very well and the two ships swung together, and the bow flippers
[planes] of the submarine ripped a long underwater gash in the
side of the Pillsbury and flooded two main compartments.
So the Pillsbury had to back. clear.
Looked like cowboy at rodeo
Incidentally, while the Pillsbury was chasing the sub,
from the bridge of the Guadalcanal it looked for all the
world like a cowboy trying to rope a wild horse in a rodeo. And
when she finally got her first line aboard, I broadcasted on the
TBS ["talk between ships" radio], "Ride `em cowboy."
Well, the Pillsbury finally had to back clear and sent
a message saying that the sub had to be towed to remain afloat
but she didn't think a destroyer could do it. So I sent back and
told the destroyers to stand clear that I'd take her in tow myself.
So we maneuvered the Guadalcanal into position. I had them
stop the engines on the sub and pulled up as quickly as we could,
shoved our stern up against her nose, got a tow line aboard and
got her going again. Meantime the Pillsbury reported two
compartments flooded to the waterline and they didn't know whether
they could check the flooding or not. So we sent assistance to
the Pillsbury.
About this time, or a little later, one of the destroyers, I think
the Chatelain, reported that she had another possible sound
contact and the [USS] Flaherty [DE-135] reported a disappearing
radar pip. So I decided that was a good place to get away from
and we started off with our tow to head for the nearest friendly
port, which was Dakar.
As we got underway the sub sheared way out to the right indicating
that she had her rudder jammed full right. Well, we didn't feel
inclined to stop at that time, so we continued the tow with the
sub riding about 20 degrees on our starboard quarter [to the right
rear of the towing ship]. Meantime, we had to land our planes,
of which we had three or four in the air. So we turned into the
wind and landed aircraft with the sub in tow as if it were an
every day matter.
I had reported the capture immediately to Cinclant and reported
my intention of proceeding to Dakar. Along about 4 o'clock in
the afternoon I got word to proceed to Casablanca instead of Dakar
[for] security reasons so we changed course to head for Casablanca.
I had meantime reported that I probably just barely had enough
fuel left to reach Casablanca.
We left the Pillsbury lying dead in the water with one
destroyer standing by her and attempting to get her engines back
in commission. At midnight the tow line [to the submarine] broke
as the first tow line we put out was only about an inch and a
quarter wire. The tow line broke and so we spent the rest of the
night circling the sub and getting our big tow line ready. We
came alongside the sub again shortly after dawn and passed a big
tow line. Meanwhile I had instructed the boarding parties to try
to get the rudder amidships [i.e., turned so as to be in alinement
with the long axis of the submarine so it would go straight when
towed]. They signaled to me from the sub that the rudder was amidships,
so we then recovered our boarding parties and got underway again.
However, it soon became apparent that the rudder wes still not
amidships. The sub rode the same way, about 20 degrees on our
starboard quarter.
Suspected booby trap
I found then that the boarding parties had moved an electric indicator,
or had caused this indicator to move from the hard right to the
amidships position but that they had no way of checking where
the rudder actually was because the watertight door to the after
torpedo room was closed and had that they thought was a booby
trap on it. We had also discovered from interrogation of prisoners
that the prisoners thought the after torpedo room was flooded.
However, it appeared we had to get the rudder amidships if we
were going to have any success with the tow.
So, I had been just looking for a good excuse to get over to the
sub myself anyway and when the boarding parties reported this
booby trap I figured I was as well qualified as anyone in the
task group to open booby traps because I had an ordnance PG [Post
Graduate] course and quite a lot of experience with ordnance.
So we stopped and I went over with a selected party and we went
aft to inspect the booby trap.
The booby trap consisted of the door to a fuse box or rather the
cover to an electric fuse box which was lying across the main
dog [short metal rod or bar fashioned to form a clamp or clip
and used for holding watertight doors in place] of the watertight
door in such a manner that you couldn't move the dog to open the
door without closing the fuse box cover. This arrangement had
possibilities as a booby trap but careful inspection of it showed
no unusual or suspicious electric connections. We were unable
to find any trigger mechanisms or anything else that would indicate
a booby trap and in addition I was firmly of the opinion that
the Nazis had left in too much of a hurry to set any booby traps.
So we decided to assume that it was not a booby trap, close tho
fuse box cover and nothing happened. So we then proceeded to open
the watertight door very carefully so that if the after torpedo
room was flooded we would be able to jam the thing closed in case
water started squirting out around the edges. However, the after
torpedo room was dry so we went aft and found the hand steering
gear, rigged the clutches to engage it and moved the rudder amidships
by hand, meantime determining that the pressure hull was intact
and that there was no flooding in the after torpedo room. However,
the boat at this time was riding with her stern well down and
we found considerably later, in fact after we got in, that this
was due to the fact that one of the after ballast tanks had been
ruptured by the depth charges.
We then fastened everything down and returned to the Guadalcanal
and resumed the tow. In the meantime the Pillsbury had
gotten herself pumped out, got a patch over the hole and was able
to rejoin. At this time we got another message from Cinclant telling
us that instead of going to Casablanca they wanted us for security
reasons to go to Bermuda if the condition of the sub warranted
it and telling us that we would be met by an oiler [a Navy fuel
supply ship] and a [seagoing] tug.
So we reversed course and headed for Bermuda. I was not too sure
that we could make Bermuda or that the sub would remain afloat
that long. However, I figured it would take us approximately three
days to get to Casablanca and that if we were going to lose her
at all, we'd lose her within three days, therefore, I might just
as well try for Bermuda as Casablanca because if I could make
Casablanca and keep her afloat three days, the chances were that
we could keep her afloat longer.
In the meantime the Naval Operating Base, Casablanca, Moroccan
Sea Frontier, was sending out the [USS] Humbolt [AVP-21]
with Commander Rucker aboard, who is a qualified submarine commander.
I figured that ho would soon be there to give me advice snd help.
The next day, or rather on June 7th, we rendezvoused with the
fleet tug [USS] Abnaki [ATF-96] and transferred our tow.
Put salvage party aboard
When we lost headway and transferred the tow the sub sank so far
in the water that it looked like she was going all the way down.
So we rushed our salvage parties back aboard, had the Abnaki
heave her into short stay, tow as fast as she could and started
lightening the sub. We removed all the loose gear that we could.
We had electric submersible pumps which we sent over from the
Guadalcanal and we rigged electric lines to the Abnaki
and got these pumps running and pulled out probably some 33 or
40 tons of bilge water from the main control room. It was a very
close thing that day as to whether she was going to go down or
not.
As a matter of fact while the issue was still in doubt, the Guadalcanal
got ready to act as a pontoon and hold the sub up. We rigged a
heavy wire from the forward starboard edge of our starboard corner
of our flight deck, let it hang in a bite [bight] underwater and
brought the other end in through our Lawse [hawse, or anchor cable]
pipe and over to our anchor windlass. We then cruised along very
slowly with our bow about 40 feet from the stern of the sub or
where we figured the stern was under water. With this bite of
wire hanging in the water so that if the sub started going down
too far the idea was we would forge ahead, slip this bite of wire
under the stern and heave around with our anchor windlass and
try to hold the stern up until we got her lightened enough to
save her.
After about an hour of standing by to do this, it became apparent
that it would not be necessary. We got the electric pumps going
and got her up to manageable trim. When the salvage parties left
that day they had traced out the electric wiring circuits in the
sub and set the switches to charge the batteries. They disconnected
the diesel engines from the electric motors so that when the Abnaki
towed at about nine knots the propellers turned over the electric
motors which acted as generators and charged her batteries.
The next day we were able to run some of the electric machinery
on the boat, the pumps, the air compressors, to blow the tanks,
pump the bilges and pull her up to full surface trim. We had to
do all this without benefit of the expert advice I was hoping
to get from Casablanca because we couldn't wait that long. The
situation finally got desperate and we had to do this ourselves.
The Humbolt arrived several hours after we had done this.
The next day Commander Rucker inspected the sub, approved all
our salvage measures and assured us that she was in seaworthy
condition for the tow home.
During all this time, that is the three days that the Guadalcanal
had her in tow herself, we conducted flight operations day and
night because we were in [German] submarine lanes. Other subs
were supposed to be nearby and there was a full moon. So I thought
it was necessary to keep our own air patrols up. At times we landed
planes with only 15 knots of wind across the deck and got away
with it.
After the Abnaki took over the tow we escorted her, well,
first we refueled the task group from the [oiler USS] Kennebec
[AO-36] and then we took all the confidential documents, secret
codes, coding machines and a tremendous stack of dispatches, dumped
them in ten mail bags and sent them over to the Jenks.
We then sent the Jenks on ahead to Bermuda at full speed
and this material was picked up in Bermuda by Naval Air Transport
and flown to Washington.
Meantime, we proceeded in company with the Abnaki, which
did the towing, and escorted her to Bermuda. On June 19th we turned
the U-505 over to the Commandant Naval Operating Base,
Bermuda. Only one man in the submarine crew was killed. We buried
him at sea while the capture was going on. The others were all
rescued. I believe a total of 59 of them. The submarine skipper
was pretty badly wounded and remained in the sick bay of the Guadalcanal
throughout the trip back.
Interviewer:
Captain Gallery, was there any special significance to the insignia
on the conning tower of the U-505?
Captain Gallery:
Yes, that insignia is the insignia of the Dutch Shell Oil Company
and it's on there because the Vice President of Dutch Shell Oil
was the sponsor of this U-boat.
On the way back to Bermuda we had it very thoroughly impressed
on us by messages from Cominch and Cinclant that this whole business
was to be kept in an absolute top secret category and we took
steps to impress that on everyone in the task group. It's interesting
to note that obviously this actually was done.
When the German sub surrendered after V-E Day [Victory in Europe
Day, 8 May 1945, the date of the surrender of Nazi Germany to
the Allies] one of the submarines came up Delaware Bay and surrendered
off the mouth of Delaware Bay to the USS Pillsbury, which
was in on this capture I've been describing. It's also very interesting
to note that the officer who was sent over by the Pillsbury
to accept this surrender and take charge of the sub was Lieutenant
David who led the boarding parties when my task group captured
the U-505. It's also interesting that the skipper of this
submarine that surrendered after V-E Day had at one time been
the Exec [executive officer - or second-in-command] of the U-505.
When David found this out, he asked him what had become of the
U-505 and the Germans answered, "She was lost with
all hands about a year ago." So at the time of the surrender
of Germany, the Germans still did not know that we had captured
the U-505.
I want to mention the names of some individuals who did outstanding
work in conjunction with this capture. They are: Commander Hall
who was ComCortDiv 4 [Commander Escort Division Four]; Lieutenant
Commander Knox who commanded the Chatelain which delivered
the attack which brought the U-boat up; Lieutenant Commander Casselman
who was skipper of the Pillsbury that furnished the first
boarding party and which attempted to get alongside the sub; Lieutenant
Hodgson who commanded the aircraft squadron attached to the Guadalcanal
and whose pilots rendered invaluable assistance to
the Pillsbury in coaching her on for her attack; Lieutenant
David, who led the first boarding party aboard and all members
of his boarding party; the two who accompanied David down the
hatch. The first ones to enter the sub were two enlisted men named
Knispel and Wdowiak.
Another officer who rendered outstanding service was Commander
Trosino of the Guadalcanal. He was in charge of all salvage
operations and in my opinion is the officer who was principally
responsible for getting the sub back to port. He spent many hours
crawling around in the bilges, under the engines, into inaccessible
places that he couldn't possibly have escaped from had the sub
got away from us, tracing out the pipe lines, closing valves with
his own hands, and doing whatever was necessary to keep that submarine
afloat. He definitely risked his life time and time again over
a period of several days.
Those are the outstanding individuals, however, I wish to say
that the success of this operation was due primarily to the splendid
teamwork of the whole group. Ever since the task force had first
been formed I had tried to impress on all hands that we would
work together as a team, destroyers, carriers, and aircraft, all
one team and no individual prima donas. Any kills we got we would
consider as kills by the whole force whether they were made by
one airplane at the end of a search leg and a hundred miles away
from the task group or whether they were made by three or four
destroyers on a sub that came up right in the middle of the task
group.
Captain stressed teamwork
All hands were well indoctrinated with this idea and they
carried it out. When an attack started each one knew what he was
supposed to do and those destroyers, for instance, who had the
minor role of simply protecting the carrier while she retired
from the immediate contact did their jobs willingly and efficiently
and left the job with a lot of glory in it, making the kill, to
the other people.
The same thing was true of aircraft. They were willing and anxious
to coach destroyers when that was the proper thing to do rather
than to rush in and try to make a kill themselves and perhaps
spoil the job for the group. So in my opinion it was teamwork
of the whole task group that did this job.
I also want to mention that all the ships in the task group were
less than one year old and approximately 80 per cent of the crews
in all ships were serving on their first seagoing ship. Most of
these people had never seen salt water until several months before
this kill, or this capture. None of them, with one or two exceptions
in the boarding parties, none of them had ever been on a submarine
before and all they knew about U-boats is what they learned from
studying intelligence bulletins.
While these boarding parties were aboard the sub there was constant
danger that she would founder and take all hands with her. And
every valve, switch and push button in the U-boat was a possible
booby trap. There were 13 demolition charges in the U-boat which
were later found and removed. I believe the first day we were
able to find and pull the wires off only five or six of them.
However, in spite of their inexperience and great danger to their
lives, all hands in the boarding parties did their stuff like
veteran submarine sailors. I consider it a great honor and a privilege
to have commanded them and I'm very proud of their work indeed.
Of course, after we got this submarine in tow all of my crew were
the cockiest bunch of sailors you've ever seen in your life and
on June 6th a little incident happened that will indicate just
how cocky they were. June 6th, of course, was D-Day in France
when the invasion of Normandy began. That morning when communiques
from France were posted on the bulletin board, one of my brave
young lads read over all the historic communiques coming from
headquarters about the invasion and then shoved his hat on back
of his head and said, "Boy, oh boy, look what Eisenhower
had to do to top us."
During the long tow back to Bermuda we kept ourselves amused by
looking through the history books in regard to captures at sea
and, as far as we could determine, this case was the first time
that the U.S. Navy had boarded and captured a foreign enemy man-of-war
in battle on the high seas since 1815.
When you say foreign, you eliminate the Civil War from discussion
and, as far as I can find out, when you say on the high seas,
you eliminate the Spanish War [of 1898]. There were a number of
captures, of course, during the Spanish War but I believe they
were all either ships that surrendered in a harbor, I think there
was a case in Manila where some gunboat came in without knowing
that war had broken out, or there were numerous ships raised from
the bottom after they had been sunk at Manila, and I believe a
number of ships that were beached off Santiago were later salvaged.
But as far as we could find out this was the first one on the
high seas. There was a capture, I believe, about 1823 of a Portuguese
man-of-war by an American man-of-war but Portugal and the United
States were never at war. I don't know the details of that capture.
As a matter of fact this one in 1815, which occurred out in the
East Indies, actually happened after peace between the United
States and England had been signed. I believe the U.S. ship was
the [USS] Peacock and I don't remember the name of the
British ship. *
During this World War there was one German U-boat which surrendered
to the British off Iceland in 1941. She was bombed by aircraft
and disabled several hundred miles south of Reykjavik in very
stormy weather. She surfaced and actually surrendered to the aircraft.
RAF Iceland then maintained a continuous air patrol over her while
she headed back toward Iceland and a British trawler was sent
out to meet her. When the trawler arrived it was too rough to
put a boarding party aboard so they passed the tow line to the
Nazis and made it quite plain to them that unless they kept their
ship afloat they were going to go down with her. So the Nazis
cooperated, took the tow line aboard and remained with their ship
until she was beached off the south coast of Iceland. She was
later salvaged by the British and is now known as the HMS Graph.
With that exception, no German submarine had been captured in
either the First or Second World War. So far as I can determine
the U-505 is the only German submarine ever boarded and
captured.
A number of times during the tow home my officers and men came
to me and wanted to go over on the sub and start her engines and
bring her into Bermuda under her own power. I'm sure now, from
some of the remarkable feats they accomplished, that they would
have been able to do that too but I wouldn't let them do it because
my main objective was to get that sub into port and I knew we'd
get it in by towing it. I also knew that we had lost many of our
own subs in the past through people in their own crews opening
the wrong valve by mistake and I was afraid that if I pushed my
luck any further with this one somebody would be almost sure to
open the wrong valve. I must say now that I confess I probably
underestimated my lads.
[* Note: The incident mentioned was probably the capture
of the Algerian flagship Mashuda, armed with 46 guns, on
17 June 1815. During the engagement, Mashuda fought USS
Constellation, USS Ontario, USS Guerriere
and USS Epervier. The Algerian frigate surrendered after
her commander and twenty crew members were killed, and many others
wounded. The engagement began on the high seas but the Mashuda
ran into shoal water. Source: Dudley W. Knox, History
of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1948):
137.]