W TO: M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Inspections and Assessments SUBJECT: Timing of Independent Team Meetings and Communications for Shuttle-Mir and International Space Station (ISS) Missions The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an inquiry on U.S. participation in the Phase I Russian Mir Space Station Program. NASA used independent external reviews to identify and analyze issues for the first Shuttle-Mir rendezvous. The Agency continues to use this approach for subsequent Shuttle-Mir missions during the Phase 1 Program. We believe NASA can better ensure safety and mission success if these independent review teams schedule key meetings and communications in a more timely manner. Specifically, we are recommending that NASA task the independent review teams to raise and/or resolve critical recommendations and issues prior to the Phase 1 Joint Mission Readiness Review (JMRR) [Note 1], but no later than the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) [Note 2]. This recommendation applies both to the remaining Shuttle-Mir mission currently scheduled and all ISS missions for which NASA requests independent reviews. We received NASA's response to our draft report on November 7, 1997 (See Appendix A). In addition, we received separate responses from the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (Code Q) and the Stafford Task Force. These responses are provided in Appendix B, for information purposes only. Based on these comments, we have made changes to the report, as appropriate. A. Background In May 1994, the Acting Deputy Administrator established a special Task Force to assess Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions under the charter of the NASA Advisory Council (NAC). Lieutenant General Thomas P. Stafford (Retired) was appointed chair of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions (Stafford Task Force). The charter provided that the Stafford Task Force submit reports to the NAC (See Appendix C for NAC Stafford Task Force charters). During 1994 and 1995, the Stafford Task Force issued five separate reports in preparation of the STS-71 and STS-74 rendezvous and docking missions to the Russian space station Mir. In addition, beginning with STS-71, the Task Force issued separate letters to the Administrator assessing the flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir missions. In March 1995, NASA revised the terms of the Task Force to include briefings and interviews with individuals and parties from Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (the Space Station Liaison Office, the Russian Space Agency Headquarters, Mission Control Center - Moscow, Baikonur launch facility, Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center, and other facilities as appropriate) [Note 3]. A charter between the Stafford Task Force and Academician Vladimir Utkin's Advisory Expert Council (AEC) [Note 4] was signed on September 11, 1995 (Appendix D). This charter authorizes the two groups to jointly assess issues concerning the technical issues, risk mitigation plans, and lessons learned from Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and docking missions. Subsequently, the Stafford Task Force issued reports to the NASA Administrator directly and/or through the NAC, and the AEC issued reports to the Russian Space Agency. In June 1996, the Stafford Task Force and the AEC issued their first report providing joint independent assessments of Shuttle-Mir missions. The Task Force's letters of flight readiness for STS-84 and STS-86 (dated May 7, 1997, and September 23, 1997, respectively) include joint Stafford Task Force/AEC activities and assessments. In November 1996, NASA chartered the Stafford Task Force to conduct reviews and assessments and issue recommendations to the NAC regarding the ISS operational readiness (See Appendix C). B. Shuttle-Mir Safety Assurance Process (A Three-Fold Approach) On July 10, 1997, the Chairman of the House Committee on Science sent a letter to NASA regarding certification of Mir to meet or exceed U.S. safety standards. In response, the Agency forwarded a document entitled, Shuttle-Mir Safety Assurance Summary (Summary) (Appendix E) [Note 5]. In essence, NASA employs a three-fold approach that includes assessments from: (1) the Phase 1 Program Office, (2) the NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and (3) independent assessments (the Stafford Task Force). The Summary outlines NASA's Safety Assurance Process, Shuttle-Mir Safety Assurance Methods, Phase 1 Program Office Flight Readiness Review and Certification, and the FRR [Note 6]. As part of the safety assurance process, the Phase 1 Program Office conducts JMRR's for each Shuttle-Mir mission prior to the FRR. The JMRR certifies that all U.S. and Russian activities required to conduct a safe Shuttle-Mir mission have been completed. As a result of these JMRR activities, a Certificate of Flight Readiness is jointly signed by U.S. and Russian managers and officials (Appendix F). According to the Summary, all assessment activities for every Space Shuttle mission culminate with the FRR. During the FRR, all activities and elements necessary to conduct a mission from prelaunch through mission completion are reviewed and addressed prior to the Shuttle launch. C. Parallel Role of the Task Force Assessment In the Safety Process The Stafford Task Force communicates with the Phase 1 Program Office, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and others involved in the Shuttle-Mir Program during its assessments and determinations of flight readiness [Note 7]. However, the Task Force does not make formal presentations in the JMRR's or FRR's (See Appendix G for a listing of JMRR topics and presenters). It also is not a member of the formal System Safety Review Panel or the Shuttle Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance Commit-To-Flight Panel; the Phase 1 Program; Headquarters Safety and Mission Assurance; or Certificate of Flight Readiness processes as currently established for Shuttle-Mir Phase 1 (Appendix H). Instead, final reports, letters, and other determinations from the Stafford Task Force are used by the Administrator and others as independent checks for mission assurance. D. Timeliness of Independent Assessments [Note 8] Useful insights and critical issues developed in the Stafford Task Force reports should be reported prior to 1 week before launch, preferably prior to the Phase 1 JMRR, but not later than the FRR. This would allow the Task Force's insights, questions, and recommendations to be appropriately addressed and resolved by U.S. and Russian officials. (See Appendix I for a summary of the Shuttle-Mir Missions and Review/Assessment Timing of Major Activities). The Task Force or its subgroups should schedule fact finding and other meetings early enough in the process so that its reports and assessments can be generally communicated to NASA prior to the Phase 1 JMRR [Note 9]. If the Task Force does not conduct its Russian meetings in advance of the FRR process, its ability to provide useful information to NASA is circumscribed [Note 10]. In addition, Stafford Task Force/AEC joint reports should be issued separately if waiting for the joint release will delay the issuing of letters/assessments of flight readiness beyond the JMRR/FRR time frames. Requiring timely transmittal of information in no way diminishes the independence of the Task Force. It still selects its members, determines the issues it will consider, and freely accesses Agency information and personnel. In fact, timely reporting will enhance the effectiveness of the Task Force's mission as set forth in the Stafford Task Force/AEC charter (Appendix D): In addition to their joint efforts, the independent work of the Advisory Expert Council and the Task Force will continue through Phase 1 with the participation in and the review of all aspects of the activity of their respective programs. Each will continue to produce independent separate reports containing necessary recommendations prior to each mission and, should the need arise, for emergent issues. (Emphasis added.) E. Recommendation: NASA should task the independent review teams to raise and/or resolve critical recommendations and issues prior to the JMRR, but no later than the FRR. This includes recommendations and issues raised by the Stafford Task Force, joint Stafford Task Force/AEC, and other Shuttle/Station independent groups. F. Summary of NASA Management's Response NASA's response states that our recommendation is based on a misunderstanding of the role the Task Force plays in the NASA management system. NASA describes the role of the Task Force as independent and not part of the FRR process. It contends that including the Task Force in the FRR process would harm the Task Force's ability to provide independent assessments. Further, timely resolution of issues identified by the Task Force are implemented through good communications as issues occur. Finally, NASA does not consider Phase 1 JMRR an end to the flight readiness review process. It is a culmination of months of extensive reviews, but continued work and preparation occurs during the last 2 weeks leading up to launch [Note 11]. G. Evaluation of Management Response We are not recommending that independent review teams be subordinate to NASA program review teams, but that they timely schedule their activities so their insights can enhance the NASA review teams processes. This requires that Task Force and joint Stafford Task Force/AEC issues, for the most part, be communicated and resolved between NASA and the Russian Space Agency before Certificates of Flight Readiness are signed during the JMRR process. Our recommendation in no way inhibits continued review by the Task Force of the results of the Flight Readiness Review and issues that arise after the review. Naturally, we encourage safety and oversight processes from prelaunch through mission completion. Instead, our recommendation allows the Task Force the time it needs to: (1) assemble or informally contact the experts it requires to evaluate issues, (2) schedule communications with relevant Russian or other personnel, and (3) evaluate these communications with additional expert consultation if applicable. We will continue to review the process and evaluate the application of the recommended change. H. Conclusion NASA characterizes the independent assessments of the Stafford Task Force and other independent groups as vital for the safety and flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir missions and ISS Phase II and Phase III operational readiness. The timeliness of the assessments is therefore essential so that mission-critical issues (both U.S. and Russian) can be resolved before the JMRR's and FRR's. /original signed by/ David M. Cushing 10 Enclosures cc: Distribution National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Officials-In-Charge A/Administrator AD/Acting Deputy Administrator AT/Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical) G/General Council J/Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities L/Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight P/Associate Administrator for Public Affairs U/Associate Administrator for Life & Microgravity Sciences & Applications Z/Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans NASA Advisory Council Officials Chairman, NASA Advisory Committee Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel Chairman, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station Chairman, Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and ISS Operational Readiness Task Force Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of each of the following Congressional Committees and Subcommittees: Senate Committee on Appropriations Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space Senate Committee on Government Affairs House Committee on Appropriations House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice House Committee on Science House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics NOTES: 1. The Phase 1 Joint Mission Readiness Review also is referred to as the Joint Flight Readiness Review, the Phase 1 Flight Readiness Review, or the Shuttle/Mir Joint CoFR Process. 2. Obviously, if critical issues impacting safety and mission assurance arise after the JMRR and FRR, these issues should be immediately reported to the Phase 1 Program Office, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the Administrator, and other relevant officials. 3. Appendix C, March 30, 1995, Terms of Reference for the Stafford Task Force, Page 1. 4. Russian Space Agency General Director Koptev appointed Academician Utkin to chair the AEC. The AEC provides independent assessments of the joint Russian-U.S. missions and serves as the Stafford Task Force's counterpart in Russia. 5. The Summary does not represent the Stafford Task Force's separate, independent, parallel role in the Review Process (i.e., Appendix E, Figure 1 and the text regarding timing of Task Force recommendations, page 2) (See Agency comments, Appendix A). 6. During his September 25, 1997, press briefing, Administrator Goldin reiterated NASA's safety review process. The Administrator explained the process is comprised of three components: (1) a comprehensive all systems analysis headed by Phase 1 Program Manger Frank Culbertson, (2) an internal review led by Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance Fred Gregory, and (3) an independent review by the Stafford Task Force led by General Stafford. 7. For example, during its fact finding meetings, the Stafford Task Force receives presentations on Mir systems and other related areas. Members of the Task Force may also request additional information on an as needed basis. 8. In response to increased Congressional oversight and in support of the STS-86 launch on September 18, 1997, Administrator Goldin initiated another independent group headed by A. Thomas Young to review the OIG letter dated August 29, 1997, sent to the House Committee on Science, and NASA's response to that letter. In addition, Young's group focused on communications with the Phase 1 Program Office and the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and adequacy of NASA's safety assessment process vis-…-vis the STS-86 launch. Young's final report was delivered to the Administrator on September 24, 1997, 1 day before the launch. This independent review was initiated 7 days before the September 25, 1997, launch. We do not know whether this group will be tasked with further inquiries. If the group will play a continued role in mission assurance, then our recommendations also apply to this group's activities. 9. The Task Force has utilized advance teams to meet with the Russians. For example, in the preparation of the Fifth Report of the Task Force on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions, General Stafford formed a team of Task Force members led by Colonel James C. Adamson (Retired) to conduct extensive discussions with NASA and Russian officials. The presentation of their findings to the Task Force occurred about 2 months before the publication of the final report and almost 3 months prior to the JMRR. 10. The timing of the Task Force's meetings with Russia for Shuttle-Mir STS-86 contrasts to its actions for the Shuttle-Mir mission STS-84 (See Appendix J). Earlier contacts with the Russians regarding the Shuttle STS-86 mission seemed warranted. September 12, 1997, was the earliest meeting between the Task Force members and their Russian counterparts even though there were serious unresolved safety issues (e.g., determining the causes of the February 1997 fire and Progress collision in June 1997). There were also increased problems compared to earlier Shuttle-Mir flights (e.g., ethylene glycol leaks, computer anomalies). More timely, candid, and technical discussions between the Task Force and the Russians may have enhanced NASA's review process and diminished the uncertainty and tension surrounding the decision to launch the STS-86, where the Administrator received the Task Force's information the day before the scheduled launch. 11. In his response, General Stafford characterizes the role of the Task Force, among other responsibilities, to provide the Administrator with an independent assessment of operational readiness just prior to each Shuttle-Mir mission (Emphasis added, see Appendix B).