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The Road to Pearl Harbor: The United States and East Asia, 1915-1941
—Curriculum Unit Overview—
Introduction
Although most Americans were shocked by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the outbreak of war between the two countries came as no surprise to most observers of international affairs. Indeed, the war could be seen as the culmination of tensions between the two countries that can be traced back to 1915, when Japan issued its so-called "Twenty-One Demands" on China. These demands, presented as an ultimatum to the Chinese government, would have amounted to giving Japan a privileged status in certain parts of the country. This was in direct conflict with the stated policy of the United States toward China—the famous "Open Door," in which all countries were to respect Chinese sovereignty and enjoy equal access to Chinese trade.
Exacerbating the situation were the economic problems of Japan in the late 1920s, made worse by the Great Depression which swept the industrialized world in the early 1930s. As an island country with few natural resources, Japan was dependent on international trade, which was disrupted by the economic crisis. Moreover, Japan was overpopulated, but other countries—most importantly the United States—closed the door to Japanese emigrants. Increasingly Japan's military leaders became convinced that only through domination of China could they solve their country's problems. Japan's excess population could be settled in the largely undeveloped Chinese province of Manchuria, while Japanese industry could be revitalized through control of China's import market.
Therefore the 1930s saw a steadily increasing campaign of Japanese aggression in China, beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and culminating in the outbreak of full-scale war between the two powers in 1937. Each instance of aggression resulted in denunciations from the United States, but the administrations of the time—that of Herbert Hoover until 1933, and of Franklin D. Roosevelt thereafter-understood that there was no will on the part of the American public to fight a war in East Asia. Therefore U.S. policy by the late 1930s consisted of nothing more than a refusal to recognize Japanese conquests, limited economic sanctions against Japan, and equally limited military and economic assistance for China.
Nevertheless, the Japanese bitterly resented even these halfway measures, and when their war against China bogged down in 1939 they blamed outside interference for the stubborn refusal of the Chinese to submit to their terms. They sought a way to prevent foreign aid from reaching China, and to replace the foreign resources that they could no longer acquire due to American economic sanctions.
In Germany's lightning victories of April - June 1940 Tokyo believed it had found the answer to both problems. In Southeast Asia and the South Pacific lay a number of territories controlled by France, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, which none of those countries appeared capable of defending. If they were to fall into Japanese hands Tokyo's strategic dilemma, it seemed, could be solved. After concluding an alliance with Germany in July 1940, Japan pressured the French government into allowing Japanese troops to occupy the northern part of French Indochina. In the following year Japanese forces occupied the entire country.
The U.S. government met this latest series of aggressive moves with a steadily escalating campaign of economic sanctions, so that by late summer of 1941 Japan was no longer able to purchase any materials from the United States. This was a tremendous blow for many reasons, but particularly because Japan was almost completely dependent upon U.S. imports for its supply of oil. Without oil, of course, Tokyo would have to abandon its war against China—a humiliation that no Japanese leader would accept.
The result was a frenzy of diplomatic maneuvering between Japan and the United States throughout the second half of 1941. However, Tokyo knew that time was running out; if the United States failed to drop its trade sanctions Japan would run out of oil within months. Therefore Japan's leaders made a fateful decision-if no settlement could be reached with Washington by the end of November there would be war. Moreover, the Japanese naval command concluded that this war must begin with the most devastating attack possible against the United States—an air strike, using carrier-based planes, against the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The result, of course, would be a four-year conflict that, in the end, would prove disastrous for Japan.
In this four-lesson curriculum unit, students begin by exploring through contemporary documents the rise of animosity between the United States and Japan beginning in World War I and continuing over the next two decades . They consider next through primary source documents and an interactive timeline the overall principles which underlay both Japanese and American foreign policy in the mid- to late-1930. Students turn then to examine through primary documents and maps why Japan embarked on its policy of aggression against China, also considering the U.S. response to this new policy, and how it contributed to war between the United States and Japan. Finally they are asked to put themselves in the shoes of U.S. and Japanese diplomats in the final months of 1941, desperately trying to reach a settlement that will avoid war. Through the use of primary documents and an interactive map and timeline, they will consider whether there was any reasonable chance of preventing the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific.
Guiding Questions
- What accounts for the growing hostility that had developed between the United States and Japan by the early 1930s?
- In its approach to the Sino-Japanese conflict of the 1930s, did the United States place itself on a path to war?
- Was the "southern advance" a reasonable attempt to address to Japan's international dilemma, or was it a reckless step toward war?
- Was war between the United States and Japan inevitable after September 1941?
Learning Objectives
At the end of this lesson students will be able to:
- Explain how Japan's ambitions in China conflicted with the American concept of the "Open Door."
- Discuss the means by which the United States and Japan sought peaceful means of resolving their differences.
- Articulate why U.S. trade and immigration policies angered the Japanese.
- Explain the importance of the Manchurian Incident of 1931, and the American response to it, for the deterioration in U.S.-Japanese relations.
- Explain why Japan went to war against China during the 1930s.
- Articulate the reasons why the United States believed that its interests were at stake in East Asia.
- Discuss how the United States responded to developments in the Sino-Japanese War.
- Assess the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia in the 1930s.
- Define what Japanese leaders meant by the "southern advance," and explain why they opted to pursue it.
- Articulate the U.S. response to the "southern advance," and assess whether it was a reasonable one.
- Explain why Tokyo decided in September 1941 to prepare for war against the United States.
- List and explain the issues that divided the United States and Japan in the fall of 1941.
- Articulate the reasons why Japan chose to go to war against the United States.
- Assess the overall effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy during this period.
Preparing to Teach this Lesson
- Review the lesson plans in the unit. Locate and bookmark suggested materials and links from EDSITEment reviewed websites used in this lesson. Download and print out selected documents and duplicate copies as necessary for student viewing. Alternatively, excerpted versions of these documents are available as part of the downloadable PDF files.
- Download the Text Documents for the lessons, available as PDF files. These PDF files are listed under "Additional Student/Teacher Resources" on the left-hand sidebar. These files contain excerpted versions of the documents used in each lesson, as well as questions for students to answer. Print out and make an appropriate number of copies of the handouts you plan to use in class.
- Finally, familiarize yourself with the interactive timeline "America on the Sidelines: The United States and World Affairs, 1931-1941" that accompanies this lesson. This timeline will, through text and maps, guide students through the major events in Asia in late 1941, and will ask students for each event to identify (choosing from among a menu of options) how the United States responded to it.
Unit Lessons
Each lesson in this unit is designed to stand alone; taken together they offer a glimpse into why and how war broke out between the United States and Japan. If there is not sufficient time to use all of the lessons in the unit, the fourth should take priority, followed by the third, then the first, and finally the second.
Related EDSITEment Lesson Plans
Selected EDSITEment Website
- The Avalon Project at Yale University
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon
- First World War.com
http://www.firstworldwar.com/
- History Matters
http://historymatters.gmu.edu
- Teaching American History
http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org
- Digital History
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/
- WWII Resources
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/index.html
- Words of Peace,
Words of War
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/index.html
- Japan-Manchukuo
Protocol, September 15, 1932
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/pre-war/320915a.html
- Peace and War:
United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/index.html
- Memorandum
Handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi),
September 22, 1931
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/002.html
- The Secretary
of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Forbes), January 7, 1932
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/005.html
- The Secretary
of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson), February 12,
1932
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/008.html
- The Ambassador
in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State (Stimson), August 13,
1932
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/010.html
- Statement
by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, July 16, 1937
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/086.html
- Address delivered
by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Chicago, October 5, 1937
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/093.html
- Secretary
of State Cordell Hull to Ambassador Joseph Grew, December 13,
1937
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/098.html
- Ambassador
Joseph Grew to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, December 14, 1937
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/099.html
- Ambassador
Joseph C. Grew to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, September 12,
1940
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/182.html
- Memorandum
by Secretary of State Hull Regarding a Conversation with Ambassador
Nomura of Japan, March 8, 194
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/199.html
- Draft Proposal
Handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary of State Hull, May 12,
1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/209.html
- Draft Proposal
Handed by Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Nomura, June 21,
1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/213.html
- Draft Proposal
Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of
State, November 20, 1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/254.html
- Document Handed
by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura),
November 26, 1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/257.html
- Memorandum
Regarding a Conversation, Between the Secretary of State, the
Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), and Mr. Kurusu, December 7, 1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/265.html
- Address Delivered
by President Roosevelt to the Congress, December 8, 1941
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/paw/267.html
- The Japanese Monographs
http://ibiblio.org/pha/monos/
- Visualizing
Cultures
http://ocw.mit.edu/OcwWeb/Foreign-Languages-and-Literatures/
21F-027JVisualizing-CulturesSpring2003/Units/index.htm
- Internet Public Library
http://www.ipl.org
- Internet Medieval Sourcebook
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/sbook.html
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