1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE : 3 4 CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF : 5 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, : 6 Petitioner : 7 : No. 06-637 v. TOM F., ON BEHALF OF 8 : 9 GILBERT F., A MINOR CHILD. 10 - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 11 Washington, D.C. 12 Monday, October 1, 2007 13 14 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 15 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 16 at 10:55 a.m. 17 APPEARANCES: 18 LEONARD J. KOERNER, ESQ., New York, N.Y.; on behalf of 19 Petitioner. PAUL G. GARDEPHE, ESQ., New York, N.Y.; on behalf of 20 21 Respondent. GREGORY G. GARRE, ESQ., Deputy Solicitor General, 22 23 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 24 behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, 25 supporting Respondents.

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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:55 a.m.)
3	We'll hear argument next in Case 06-637,
4	Board of Education of the City School District of the
5	City of New York versus Tom F.
6	Mr. Koerner.
7	ORAL ARGUMENT OF LEONARD KOERNER
8	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
9	MR. KOERNER: Mr. Chief Justice, and members
10	of the Court:
11	In 1985 when this Court decided the Burlington
12	decision, it based it based it based on the broad
13	remedial clause set forth in 20 U.S.C. 1415, which
14	allowed an impartial hearing officer, a State review
15	officer, or the court itself, to grant relief where
16	appropriate.
17	In so doing, it noted that there was no
18	other substantive section which touched and concerned
19	the issue before the Court, and that is whether an
20	individual can voluntarily remove a child and seek
21	tuition reimbursement before the conclusion of the
22	administrative and court remedies.
23	It made a point of noting that it felt it
24	was gleaning the congressional intent; and, had Congress
25	known that the administrative and court process would be

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protracted, it would have provided a process which would allow the child to be removed.

3 Similarly, in the sequel, the Carter case, 4 the Court made the other -- the same conclusion. It 5 noted that, although the primary responsibilities to 6 educate the child in a public school, least restrictive 7 environment, there would be occasions when you would 8 place that child outside, having been in the school 9 system.

10 1412, which was the eligibility section 11 during this period, was very truncated. It did not 12 provide a lot of conversation concerning the 13 relationship of public and private schools within the 14 It provided that you had to provide the child who IDEA. 15 demanded it a FAPE, a free appropriate education. Ιf you couldn't do that, the public school had to then pay 16 17 for the tuition. It was silent though on the 18 relationship between the private schools where the child 19 voluntary removes.

In 1997 the IDEA was codified, and for the first time the specific section was inserted dealing with the relationship of children and private schools. Indeed, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(10) -- just the beginning, just that paragraph, says "children placed in private schools" and the structure was detailed. Subdivision

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(A) dealt with the relationship of the private schools with the public system generally and noted that, in that particular case, while the children would be entitled to some small amount of Federal funding, they would not be entitled in private school to a free appropriate public education.

7 They also noted that if a parent was 8 dissatisfied with the service plan, they'd have to seek 9 relief administratively. They would not be entitled to 10 an impartial due process or a court review. It was a 11 recognition that children who are placed in private 12 school were entitled to much lesser services than 13 children placed in public school.

14 Subdivision (B) dealt with the situation when children were not placed in public school but the 15 16 local district consented that they could not provide a 17 free appropriate public education. As a consequence, in 18 those cases and in only those cases, since the public 19 would then be supervising and directing the private 20 school, they would be responsible for the tuition. 21 Sub (C) is the issue now before this Court. Sub (C) is entitled Children Placed in Private School, 22 23 Payment and Where the Local Education Agency Did Not Consent. And that particular section is broken down 24 25 again into three parts. The first part says, if a child

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is offered FAPE, that is, a child is given a program
 which is adequate, you cannot get reimbursement if you
 remove your child during any time but in this case
 during the pendency of the administrative and the court
 process.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, do you 7 agree that if we conclude the language is ambiguous, we 8 should defer to the Secretary's interpretation in the 9 comments accompanying the regulations?

10 MR. KOERNER: The answer is no because the 11 Secretary's interpretation on the note in common and the 12 letter submitted to the educational consultant is 13 inconsistent with its own Federal regulation. Its 14 Federal regulation, titled Children Placed in Private 15 Schools When FAPE Is at Issue, also requires that you 16 previously receive --

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: It just mirrors the
 18 statutory language --

19MR. KOERNER: That's exactly -- it does.20CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, then --

21 MR. KOERNER: But the note --

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Assuming we would 23 think the statutory language is ambiguous, we are likely 24 to think the same language in the regulation is 25 ambiguous.

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1	MR. KOERNER: Well, Chief Justice, if it is	
2	ambiguous and we ought to at least discuss the nature of	
3	the ambiguity, then that ambiguity under the spending	
4	clause should redound to the benefit of the local	
5	education district as well, for if it does not set forth	
б		
7	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, which which	
8	prevails, Chevron deference or spending clause	
9	presumption?	
10	MR. KOERNER: Well, the Chevron deference	
11	requires notes and comments which are persuasive and	
12	analyzed. There is absolutely no analysis in the note	
13	and comment in this case. All it says conclusively is	
14	that the decisions of this Court in Burlington and	
15	Carter create an independent obligation separate and	
16	distinct from the statute. It doesn't explain why the	
17	specific language of the statute should not be	
18	incorporated in a Burlington court. And indeed	
19	JUSTICE ALITO: If Gilbert F. had attended	
20	the public school for 11 days, would this case come out	
21	differently, in your view?	
22	MR. KOERNER: I'm sorry.	
23	JUSTICE ALITO: If the student here had	
24	attended the public school for let's say 11 days before	
25	being transferred to the public to the private	

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1 school, would your -- would your argument still fly? 2 MR. KOERNER: No. If the -- if the child 3 attends a public school and receives special education 4 and related services --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: You've added something to the question, though, didn't you? 6 7 MR. KOERNER: No, I don't think so. 8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, it's attending public school and receiving --9 10 MR. KOERNER: I -- I thought, I'm sorry --11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, that was my 12 assumption. Let's say he attends public school in a 13 special education class for 11 days. His parents think 14 the public -- the placement that's proposed, the IEP 15 that's proposed by the school is inadequate, and they 16 turn out to be correct, and they want to send their 17 child to the private school, but they understand this 18 argument based on the statutory language, so they say 19 all right, we are going to put him in the public school 20 special education class for 11 days, but we've already 21 got the placement in the private school all lined up at 22 the end of the 11 days. He goes one day, we give 23 notice; we take him out and we put him in the private 24 school; then they are entitled to reimbursement under 25 your argument.

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1	MR. KOERNER: That that would satisfy the
2	statutory definition, but when it went before the
3	impartial officer, or the State review officer, there
4	would be a very compelling argument that there was a
5	lack of cooperation, because it's not just that you're
б	in the system, but that you articulate the problems that
7	you have with the public placement
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, it depends on
9	the particular circumstances. I mean, if the parent is
10	able to show look, the school district is being very
11	unreasonable here; it's quite clear he needs more
12	services than they were going to offer, well then that
13	wouldn't have
14	MR. KOERNER. Yes.
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: run afoul of any
16	of the other provisions.
17	MR. KOERNER: My only comment, Chief
18	Justice, was that yes, that would satisfy the statutory
19	section as long as the notice was given in (iii), but
20	we would then have an argument in the individual case
21	that the parent was not cooperating. So for the purpose
22	of this case, where they come into the system even for a
23	minimum period and give the appropriate notice under
24	(iii), yes, that would it would be satisfied.
25	JUSTICE ALITO: Well, why would Congress

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1	ever have wanted to adopt a scheme like that? What
2	possible purpose is served by simply requiring the
3	student to be in a placement that is by definition not
4	providing a not providing FAPE for this very short
5	period of time? It makes no sense whatsoever.
6	MR. KOERNER: The reason Congress wanted to
7	provide it is the reason that this Court discussed in
8	Burlington. The upset of this Court in Burlington was
9	that it was an extremely protracted process. The child
10	there was subject to a very long impartial hearing and
11	State review and court review
12	JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that enabled the
13	parent to remove the child immediately and risk that
14	MR. KOERNER: That's correct.
15	JUSTICE GINSBURG: the public education
16	would be found inadequate.
17	MR. KOERNER: But the reason
18	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But all that section does
19	is to repeat the Burlington scenario. It says, it
20	codifies what the Court held. The Court didn't say
21	anything in Burlington about the situation where the
22	child was never in public education.
23	MR. KOERNER: That's correct, but it's a
24	statute of limitations. It says that you must receive
25	special education and related services. There is no

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there is no exception to the condition. If you look at the particular statute when they refer to "may," they are only talking about the relief that a court or an impartial hearing officer or State review officer can grant. They are not talking about the predicate, you must be in the system.

7 Now you asked, Justice Alito, why do they 8 have to be in the system, and the reason is Congress 9 thought that if you're in the system and you have a 10 vested interest in the system, that because of all the 11 processes that are there, including mediation, including 12 a modified IEP, that it would increase the numbers of 13 people in terms of cooperation who want to participate 14 in the system. And that's --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I thought it wasn't that. 16 I thought it was simply Congress figured that there are 17 probably a lot of people in New York City, in Manhattan 18 in particular, who are going to send their kids to 19 private school, no matter what, and they can get special 20 services in private school, but what the heck, if we can 21 get \$30,000 from the city to pay for it, that's fine. 22 In other words, this was meant to be an

23 option for people who wanted to go to the public schools 24 but couldn't go to the public schools because they 25 couldn't get the private services there, but it was

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1	never meant to be an option for people who had no desire
2	to go to public schools at all anyway, and
3	MR. KOERNER: I think
4	JUSTICE SCALIA: and without this
5	condition, somebody I think the plaintiff here was
б	never in a public school, was he?
7	MR. KOERNER: That's correct. He never had
8	any contact with the public school at all except to
9	request a free appropriate public education. And I
10	think there
11	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are there not children
12	I think there was a brief on behalf of the Autism
13	Society that said many school systems simply do not have
14	the facilities to attend to the needs of these children?
15	MR. KOERNER: Yes, but you don't know that
16	until you've actually been subjected to the process
17	itself. Indeed in Schaffer, you, this Court said that
18	you had to presume that the officials in the department
19	of education of a local school district are going to do
20	their job. Their job is to try to find an appropriate
21	IEP. If it turns out that it's insufficient, of course
22	you can then litigate.
23	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are there not cases where
24	school districts have said from day one, look, we don't

25 have facilities to handle this type of disability?

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1	MR. KOERNER: But if we don't if the	
2	public schools district does not have the facility,	
3	then it will consent to a private placement to deal with	
4	the particular problem it cannot deal with. We are only	
5	talking about cases where the school system believes it	
6	can deal with an individual problem and at the very	
7	least if the person's child comes into the system, they	
8	will have the opportunity to work with the parent and	
9	try to work out a situation. In as this Court is	
10	well aware, the primary obligation is to find a public	
11	education for this child, and if from day one you assume	
12	that the individual education plan is defective, not	
13	only is it inconsistent with Schaffer, it's inconsistent	
14	with the whole statutory scheme which is set up to try	
15	to work cooperatively. Indeed	
16	JUSTICE GINSBURG: But isn't it true that	
17	the parent will never be reimbursed? Let's take the	
18	parent that Justice Scalia has hypothesized, will never	
19	get one penny of that tuition unless that parent carries	
20	the burden the parent would have the burden of	
21	showing that there was no appropriate public education?	
22	MR. KOERNER: The parent in this case can	
23	never get reimbursed because they don't meet the	
24	predicate which is that their child had to previously	
25	JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's not the question I	

13

1 asked.

2	MR. KOERNER: Oh I'm sorry.
3	JUSTICE GINSBURG: I said that the parent
4	let's assume that the parent never sends the child to
5	public school, nonetheless seeks reimbursement. In
6	order to get reimbursement that parent would have to
7	show, would have bear the burden of showing that there
8	is no appropriate public education available; is that
9	not true?
10	MR. KOERNER: Yes. You mean assuming the
11	statute does not apply?
12	JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, but that is but the
13	parent would not have to show that the parent would have
14	used that available public remedy
15	MR. KOERNER: That's correct.
16	JUSTICE SCALIA: if it were there?
17	MR. KOERNER: And Congress could have
18	concluded that the parent you're referring to who placed
19	that child immediately in a private school, and who may
20	not have an interest in obtaining a public school
21	education for that child, may not be as cooperative and
22	as collaborative as someone who has a child in the
23	system, to work out an individual education plan because
24	of some of these
25	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Maybe then the conclusion woul

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1 be that that parent hasn't met the heavy burden of 2 showing that there is no appropriate public education. 3 MR. KOERNER: But the problem is, if you go 4 to an impartial hearing officer as in this case, and you 5 have a child that's been in a private school for a number of years and is doing very well, and the private 6 7 school special ed teacher comes in and highlights all the successes of the kid, and then the New York City 8 Department of Education comes in with its profit plan 9 10 which is based on speculation, because the child has 11 never been in the system, is it so unreasonable for 12 Congress to conclude as a matter of statutory, explicit 13 language that the child should go into the system so 14 that at least, with respect to your burden, there's at 15 least a participatory program where they try to help the 16 child get an individual education. 17 If Congress's purpose really JUSTICE ALITO: 18 was what you -- what you suggest and what I think 19 Justice Scalia's question suggests, that there was a 20 desire to make parents who really had no interest in the 21 public school system give the public schools a chance, 22 why is it that, even as you read the statute, there's no 23 requirement that the child remain in the public school system for any significant period of time? It's just 24

25 pro forma.

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1	MR. KOERNER: Indeed, Justice Alito.
2	Congress in this case got it completely right because
3	not only did they put in the explicit language, they
4	also put in a time period because they understood that
5	this Court had ruled in a number of cases that its upset
6	was with the protracted period that a family has to have
7	a child in the system. But by having a notice provision
8	and by thereby ensuring a parent that by giving notice
9	and specifically articulating the reason why the plan is
10	deficient and giving the school district an opportunity
11	to cure the problem, everybody would understand 10 days
12	later that they can leave. So the very problem that you
13	highlighted in Burlington and Carter is no longer a
14	problem under the explicit legislation.
15	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think they may
16	they may well have to stay longer than 10 days to either
17	realize that the program is inadequate or to feel
18	comfortable that they'll be able to establish that on
19	the record. It's pretty hard to say something's not
20	working after only on 10 days.
21	MR. KOERNER: Chief Judge, you're absolutely
22	right. And that is why I say that would be based on an
23	individual determination. All the statute says is come
24	into the system. What happens after that, if you give
25	your notice as was raised in a hypothetical, that would

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1 go to whether or not there was the duty to cooperate 2 which was fulfilled, which also is a requirement under 3 this particular section for reimbursement.

4 It's not just that you are in a program in 5 private school that is providing appropriate service and 6 then you have an IEP that may not provide the free 7 appropriate public education, but you also have to show 8 you cooperated with the program because the whole 9 primary purpose of the program is to provide a public 10 education.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course, to be fair, this 12 provision doesn't just apply to the rich person who 13 wants New York City to pay \$30,000 of his tuition to a 14 private school. It also applies to somebody who is 15 already in public school, and the program offered by the 16 -- by the city is patently inadequate. You are 17 compelling the parent nonetheless to put the kid in a 18 program that anybody would see will -- will not meet the 19 needs.

20 MR. KOERNER: That is correct, but your --21 first of all, Congress could weigh the balance between 22 that particular problem and the need to give the school 23 district an opportunity to try to provide a program, but 24 it does run contrary to this Court's discussion in 25 Schaffer which presumes that the school district is

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going try to accommodate the child, try to provide the
 needs of the child.

In effect, I think all of these questions 3 4 are based on the assumption that the plan is going to be 5 automatically deficient. I don't believe there's any foundation this Court has indicated there's no 6 7 foundation. That's why it said in Schaffer that the parent has the ultimate burden of persuasion because it 8 presumed that the plan -- if you accept that principle, 9 10 which has already been articulated and you accept the 11 fact that specialists on the Board of Education have --12 are going to try to adjust to this kid's needs, then 13 having the kid in the system even for a short while is 14 something that Congress could determine. And indeed 15 that's what the language says.

16 Now, we recognize that there is an absurd 17 argument, but it was difficult for us to understand how 18 it would be absurd to require this when indeed it has 19 solved the problems of Burlington and Carter because it 20 makes sure that if a parent doesn't want to stay for a 21 protracted period, it doesn't have to stay and then they 22 can litigate later. As Judge Alito noted, it can be as 23 little as 10 days.

I mean some of the arguments -- some of the arguments I should at least mention that the other side

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1 has made: The chief -- in the Second Circuit, the 2 argument was that there was an ambiguity because the 3 word "only" wasn't used. So if I may use the example 4 that an individual may be eligible for welfare 5 recipients -- welfare benefits if that individual previously received food stamps, the argument would be, 6 7 well, that's a little ambiguous because you didn't say "only received food stamps." Of course, the condition 8 doesn't have to have "only" and it probably undermines a 9 10 lot of statutes that Congress has passed. The language 11 is very, very clear.

12 The second argument that is made both by the 13 Solicitor General and the Respondent is that there's 14 been an implied repeal of this Court's decisions in 15 Burlington and Carter. But an implied repeal is when 16 you have two statutes that are specific and the latest 17 specific statute is inconsistent with the earlier 18 specific statute. These courts' decisions were based on 19 a general remedy provision and, more importantly, this 20 statute encompassed what this Court held because it 21 provided that you can remove your child once in the 22 system and the notice provision provides that you don't 23 have to be in the system very long.

JUSTICE ALITO: Is there any suggestion in the reasoning in the Burlington case that it was limited

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1 to a situation in which the student had been receiving 2 public school special education?

3 MR. KOERNER: No. But it was a holding 4 where the student was in fact receiving special 5 education. The next case, of course, would have been one where the -- now, a more interesting question would 6 7 have been raised if you had (iii) and not (ii). If you 8 only had the notice provision where Congress 9 contemplates you have to be in the system to give 10 notice, and I came to this Court and I said, under 11 (iii), Congress has clearly contemplated you have to at 12 least be in the system for a short amount of time. You 13 didn't have (ii), which clarifies exactly what Congress 14 said, and this Court would have to then consider whether 15 or not (iii), by itself, would be -- would create enough 16 of an ambiguity in its prior decisions or whether or not 17 (iii) could be enforced without referring to (ii) 18 because why do you give notice?

19 Think about the result in this case. For 20 someone in the system, they have to give notice and an 21 opportunity to cure, and the IEP can be modified. Ιf 22 you're not in the system and you never had any interest 23 in the system and you sought tuition reimbursement, you would have less of a bureaucratic process. 24 There would 25 be a perverse incentive to stay outside the system. You

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1 wouldn't have to give notice. You would just have to --2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, I don't think 3 that's true, because the problem would be you would go 4 to the hearing to see if you were getting the adequate 5 education and you would have -- you would essentially have to make a facial challenge rather than an 6 7 as-applied one, and the school would say, well, you 8 didn't even give us a chance; we were going to do this and we were going to do that. So it would be a heavier 9 10 burden to carry. The parents would have a heavier 11 burden --12 MR. KOERNER: But that would --13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- if they did --14 MR. KOERNER: But that would be an 15 individual determination, Chief Judge. What I'm saying 16 though, for everybody in the system, it doesn't depend 17 on an impartial hearing. You have to give notice 18 before you get to the next step. If you're outside the 19 system, you don't have to participate in any process 20 other than to seek at an impartial hearing the right to 21 get reimbursement. So that actually there's less 22 bureaucratic process if you're outside the system, and 23 there's and incentive (1) not to cooperate and (2) just to marshal all your arguments in the impartial hearing 24 25 and hopefully you're going to prevail and get the

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payment for the private education; whereas, if you're already in the system --

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, my suggestion is 4 still that it would be easier to prevail at the 5 impartial hearing, if you can say, look, we tried, it didn't work, as opposed to saying, we never even tried. 6 7 MR. KOERNER: Except for --8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If I were the impartial hearing examiner, I would think that that's a 9 10 harder burden for the parents to carry if they didn't 11 even try. The school's going to come in and say, here's 12 what we would have done if you'd given us a chance and 13 you didn't give us a chance.

14 MR. KOERNER: But there is a dynamic at 15 these hearings that, if you come in and that you're in a 16 private school and you show that your child is doing 17 well in the private school, and we come in with a 18 theoretical plan that has never been implemented, there 19 is going to be a dynamic with the impartial hearing 20 officer who will tilt towards keeping the child --21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What is the basis for 22 saying that, when the one thing that the statute is very 23 clear on is that the starting premise of any reimbursement claim is that an appropriate public 24 25 education is not available? That wouldn't

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concentrate -- testing that wouldn't concentrate on what
 the private school is doing but what the public school
 could do.

MR. KOERNER: You're right, Justice Ginsburg. I was only commenting on the dynamic. Of course, we would try to show it, but we can't show it based on -- any actual interaction with the child. We can't show we observed the child in the school and tried to make the following modifications.

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But you don't have the 11 burden; the parents do.

MR. KOERNER: Yes. That is the technical 12 13 relationship. That's right. I'm talking more about --14 JUSTICE SCALIA: The parents would presumably come in to say, look it, he's getting X, Y --15 16 X, Y, and Z in the private school and you're going to 17 give him Z; Z is not going to be enough. And the burden 18 on you would be upon you to say, oh, we think Z is 19 enough. 20 MR. KOERNER: That's correct. But, of

21 course, what we're saying has no actual practice.

But all this is separate and distinct from the language of Congress. And unless that language is absurd, it does require that you have to previously receive special education related services.

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JUSTICE BREYER: What about an exception if, in fact, the school district admits that they can't even do anything for this child?

4 MR. KOERNER: Well, then, Your Honor, that 5 comes under section B of the same section, 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(10)(B), where the school district does not 6 7 believe it can provide the service, then it will consent 8 to a private school and will give reimbursement because that will be the equivalent of the free appropriate 9 10 public education. We are just talking about cases where 11 there has not yet been -- where the school believes they 12 can provide it. The parent and the child disagree.

13 Now, there are two other arguments that I 14 want to address. One, recognizing that the language 15 seems to support the Petitioner's position. They argue 16 that, in fact, they did get special education and 17 related services because for the years 1997-1998 and 18 1998-1999, we settled with them and we did pay the 19 tuition. But Paragraph 17 of each of those agreements 20 specifically provided that the settlement was not to 21 create any admission for future applications.

And as this Court is aware, both under the Federal Rules of Evidence in its decisions in Arizona v. Colorado and the U.S. First International Building Company, if you settle, it has no probative value. All

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1 you do is settle the specific claim. You don't settle 2 the legal issue.

3 The second argument they make is, well, we 4 qot an IEP. An IEP is a proposal of how we would service the child. And that IEP would constitute a 5 special education and related service. But an IEP which 6 7 the parent rejects could never be a special education related service. You have to be in the system receiving 8 9 it. 10 And indeed, in section 1414 of U.S.C., it 11 specifically provides if you reject the IEP, you've 12 waived any right to a free appropriate public education. 13 So once you do that, it ends the discussion. 14 I have a few more minutes and I'm going to 15 reserve that time for a possible reply. 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 17 Mr. Koerner. 18 Mr. Gardephe. 19 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL G. GARDEPHE, ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT 20 21 MR. GARDEPHE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, 22 and may it please the Court: 23 When a child with a learning disability has been denied a free and appropriate public education, 24 25 which is what happened here, IDEA authorizes an award of

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1	private school tuition reimbursement, whether or not the	
2	child previously receives special education related	
3	services under the authority of a public agency. The	
4	Board's argument that it can both deny FAPE and remain	
5	not liable for private school tuition reimbursement is	
6	not compatible with the statute or with this Court's	
7	jurisprudence. 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did not overrule	
8	Burlington and did not impose the Hobson's choice	
9	denounced in that case.	
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: What did it do, then? What	
11	meaning do you give to that?	
12	MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, Congress was	
13	focused on the public school context. And the language	
14	in (C)(ii), which refers to previously received, is	
15	intended as a setup for (C)(iii). When you get to	
16	(C)(iii), you get the notice requirements. That's what	
17	Congress had in mind. That's why the reference is	
18	there.	
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't understand that.	
20	It makes it very clear it is it is (ii) which	
21	authorizes the enrollment in a private school and	
22	payment for that. And it is prefaced with a condition:	
23	"If the parents of a child with a disability, who	
24	previously received special education and related	
25	services under the authority of the public agency,	

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1 enroll the child in a private" -- the implication is if 2 there are parents of a child who was not so enrolled, 3 this provision does not apply. So then you fall back on 4 the fact that the old provision covered in our cases 5 would have applied but that makes this meaningless. 6 I mean if you say that our prior cases 7 overrode that limitation, then what purpose does the 8 limitation serve? 9 MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, the first question is whether that is intended to be exclusive. 10

And I don't think it was, because the "only if" language is not there. And the "only if" language is actually used in IDEA in multiple places. And Congress knew how to say "only if" it intended -- if it intended --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Where else does it say that the city will pay for the cost of a private education except there? That's the only place it says it. And part of the requirements for getting it is that the child was receiving service at a public institution.

20 MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, Congress did not 21 intend that exclusive language. If it had, it would 22 have used the "only if" language.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Then why didn't Congress adequately give the equivalent of what you call the "only if" language when it began (iii) by saying the

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cost of reimbursement described in clause two? The
 reimbursement described in clause two is described in
 terms of the clause that Justice Scalia is zeroing in
 on.

5 MR. GARDEPHE: Because, Your Honor, the 6 context is public school. That is the situation that 7 Congress was seeking to address, and that's why you 8 have --

9 JUSTICE SOUTER: I'm sorry. I'm just not 10 getting this. Can you rephrase that?

11 MR. GARDEPHE: Yes. If you look at 12 (C)(iii), Your Honor, it obviously repeatedly refers to 13 "prior to the removal of a child from the public 14 school." So Congress was clearly focused on and it was 15 intending to give guidance to the courts in their 16 equitable -- in exercising their equitable powers. So 17 in the context of a child who was in public school, 18 these are the types of notice and cooperation things 19 the court should take into consideration.

The question, Your Honor, is whether they intended this to be the exclusive vehicle by which tuition reimbursement could be obtained? And the answer to that, Your Honor, is no. And the reason why the answer is no is because there is no "only if" language. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you read --

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1 hypothesize two statutes: One, the statute before the 2 phrase "who previously received special education" was 3 added and the statute after. You read both of those 4 statutes the same way; right?

5 MR. GARDEPHE: No, Your Honor, I don't. 6 Because the question is, does that language serve any 7 purpose? And my answer to that, the language in 8 (C)(ii), "previously had received," yes, it serves a 9 purpose. The purpose is it gives factual context for 10 what comes in (C)(iii).

11 The other thing I would like to say --12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't understand. 13 You read "who previously received special education 14 services," and you say that includes who previously did 15 not receive special education services.

MR. GARDEPHE: No. What I'm saying is that that provides the context for what follows in (C)(iii). The context it provides is --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There would be no
20 reason for Congress to put that language in if the same
21 right to reimbursement existed if the child had not
22 previously received special education services.
23 MR. GARDEPHE: No, Your Honor. The point of

24 that language is to provide the backdrop for (C)(iii) 25 where Congress did intend to give guidance to courts in

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1 the exercise of the equitable --2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Of course, your 3 friend reads that the exact opposite way and says, since 4 (C)(iii) only makes sense if the child is in the public 5 school, that that's a limitation on how you should read 6 (C)(ii). 7 MR. GARDEPHE: I understand that, Your 8 Honor. But the question is whether -- it really boils 9 down to did Congress intend to address the full 10 waterfront. And my answer to that --11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In that case, isn't 12 it pertinent that the title to (C)(ii) says "Reimbursement for Private School Placement"? 13 It 14 doesn't say reimbursement for private school placement 15 when the child previously attended public school. 16 MR. GARDEPHE: But, Your Honor, (C)(ii) is 17 not exhaustive. Let me give an example. 18 I'm sure this Court would agree that the 19 requirement, the second requirement in Burlington that 20 the private placement has to be appropriate is the law 21 in this land. And (C)(ii) doesn't set forth that 22 requirement. (C)(ii) does not set forth that 23 requirement. And what that says to me is that (C)(ii) 24 was never intended by Congress to be exhaustive. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: That just means that 25

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(C)(ii) doesn't address the entire universe of issues
 that might arise. But that doesn't mean it doesn't
 address exactly what its title says, "Reimbursement for
 Private School Placement."

5 MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, I believe it's 6 probative on the issue of whether Congress intended 7 (C)(ii) to set forth the requirements for private school 8 tuition reimbursement and all the factual context in 9 which that could be rendered.

10 I do want to address one point, which is 11 that did Congress deal with this issue later? That is 12 to say, in terms of the notice factors that it set forth 13 in (C)(iii), which I have argued to you applied to 14 parents whose children have been in public school. The 15 answer to that question, Your Honors, is yes, they did. 16 They addressed it in 1415(f)(1)(B), which require the 17 2004 amendments to IDEA.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where is that set 19 forth?

20 MR. GARDEPHE: 1415(f)(1)(B) -- I'm sorry, 21 Your Honor, it's not reflected in the appendix to the 22 Solicitor General's brief. But it's 1415(f)(1)(B), and 23 Your Honors, what that provision requires is that 24 parents, prior to a due process hearing, must meet with 25 the IEP team, they must meet with the school district,

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1	they must lay out their complaints about the IEP, and	
2	the statute provides give the school district an	
3	opportunity to resolve the complaint.	
4	So Congress did not deal with the full	
5	waterfront in the 1997 amendments. It returned to this	
6	issue in 2004 and imposed those notice and cooperation	
7	requirements that, as I've argued to you	
8	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Were those	
9	provisions at issue when this dispute arose? They are	
10	the 2004 amendments	
11	MR. GARDEPHE: These were 2004 amendments,	
12	Your Honor. And this dispute actually goes back to the	
13	1999-2000 school year.	
14	JUSTICE STEVENS: You haven't identified the	
15	statutory provision that you think provides the	
16	authority for the payment in this case.	
17	MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, I believe it	
18	begins with 1400(d)(1)(A) and 1412(a)(1); both of which	
19	impose the requirement on school districts to make	
20	available a free and appropriate public education to the	
21	child. So I believe it begins there. It then continues	
22	to 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which is the provision that	
23	grants courts to sorry, grants such relief as the	
24	court determines is appropriate. There is no evidence	
25	either in the 1997 amendments or in its legislative	

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history that there was an intent to repeal or override
 that remedy.

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose it's how 4 broadly you read legislative history. I thought there 5 was a statement by Representative Castle that this would limit the payments that school districts had to make. 6 7 MR. GARDEPHE: Yes, Your Honor, and I think 8 with respect to the children in the public school 9 system, if you read (C)(iii) -- and again these are 10 permissive -- but if (C)(iii) is applied, then I think 11 Representative Castle's comments make perfect sense 12 because they provide for certain notice obligations. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So when it comes to 14 reimbursement of tuition, the parents who never place 15 their child in the public school are in better shape 16 than the parents who place their child in public school 17 and then want to remove him. 18 MR. GARDEPHE: No, Your Honor. And the

19 reason for that is, there was case law preceding the 20 1997 amendments that imposed reasonableness and 21 cooperation requirements on parents even before the 1997 22 amendments came into effect. As I did mention, after 23 2004 those requirements are now statutory, but the 24 reality is as a matter of case law, it was already very 25 clear in 1997 that if you didn't give notice to the

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1 school district, if you didn't cooperate in the 2 formation of an IEP, you were not going to get tuition 3 reimbursement. And of course that flows directly from, 4 in particular, Carter's statement that the reimbursement 5 remedy is subject to equitable considerations. б So it has always been the law that if a 7 parent does not cooperate, does not give notice, does 8 not cooperate in the formation of an IEP, that they will not get -- or that the court has the discretion to deny 9 10 the tuition reimbursement remedy. 11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But cooperation does 12 not require sending the child to the public school. 13 MR. GARDEPHE: No, Your Honor. I think it's 14 clear that Congress never intended, to quote Justice 15 Scalia, that parents would be required to place their child in a patently inappropriate placement in order to 16 17 qualify for tuition reimbursement. And to address 18 Justice Alito's points, Your Honor, we don't know --19 whether it's 10 days or 11 days or 1 day -- we don't 20 know. We can draw some quidance, I suppose, from the 21 ten-day requirement in (C)(iii), but that's by no means 22 clear. The parents could give notice ten days before 23 the school day began -- a school year began -- that they 24 find the placement inappropriate. So this --25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but in that

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case, they would not have received any benefits, under
 the terms of the statute.

3 MR. GARDEPHE: But Your Honor, it highlights 4 that if they can place the child in for one day, this is 5 an utterly meaningless provision that Congress never 6 could have intended to require because it serves no 7 purpose. And that's why --

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Your friend says it 9 serves the purpose of helping to make clear that the 10 public school is -- whether it is or is not able to 11 provide the appropriate public education. Why would 12 Congress have put the phrase in there -- even if it was 13 just describing as you say the most common situation --14 why would it put the phrase in there if it doesn't serve 15 that purpose at least?

16 MR. GARDEPHE: Let me give an example that 17 highlights my point. I place my child in the 18 kindergarten in public school for one day. I then 19 satisfy the statute, previously have received special 20 education related services. Five years later I can 21 still rely on that. Ten years later, I can still rely 22 on that. It's a talisman. It can't be what Congress 23 intended.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What you're saying 25 is it's not a very significant hurdle, but it is going

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1 to be a hurdle in some cases.

2 MR. GARDEPHE: It doesn't serve any useful 3 purpose, Your Honor, and if it doesn't serve any useful 4 purpose there is no reason to believe that Congress 5 intended it to have that effect.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The useful purpose 6 7 it serves is allowing the school district to show what 8 it can do in ten days, as opposed to a mere theoretical 9 statement, it allows some actual concrete practice to 10 see if the plan that the public school has offered is 11 going to work or is not going to work, that the 12 impartial hearing examiner can evaluate in a more 13 concrete setting.

MR. GARDEPHE: This Court addressed that balance in Burlington, and the answer was no, the statute does not require that parents place their child in an inappropriate place.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but the whole 19 point is then the statute was amended after Burlington. 20 So to say what Burlington interpreted, it don't seem to 21 me to be very compelling on the question of what the 22 amended statute provided.

23 MR. GARDEPHE: But again, Your Honor, there 24 is no evidence in that amendment that it was intended to 25 be exclusive or that it was intended to be exhaustive of

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1	the circumstances and factual context.
2	JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not sure I'm not
3	sure I would agree with you that you could get special
4	services in third grade and then come back 10 years
5	later and get private school tuition. I would really
6	read this as saying if the parents of a child who
7	previously received special education under the
8	authority, enroll the child in a public elementary
9	school I think that there has to be a temporal
10	connection between the prior receipt and the enrollment.
11	I don't think you can go back 10 years.
12	MR. GARDEPHE: Let me address
13	JUSTICE SCALIA: You don't have to read it
14	that way, anyway.
15	MR. GARDEPHE: Let me address that, Your Honor.
16	What that would mean, then, I suppose, is that parents
17	would be required each year to put their child in a
18	public school for some period of time to qualify, and
19	then place their kid in private school if they didn't
20	and then you're talking about a disruption
21	JUSTICE SCALIA: Once you're in the private
22	school reimbursement you're in the private school
23	reimbursement, but you can't get into it 10 years later.
24	Anyway, that issue is not not before us today.
25	I don't understand your assertion that

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1 somehow this would amount to repeal by implication. The 2 provision of 1415 -- what is it, (b), (b)(3) -- it seems 3 to me is just like a provision for, for a court's 4 exercise of its equitable powers. "Shall grant such 5 relief as the court determines is appropriate" -- if a court had granted some equitable relief in one case, and б 7 then there is a statute that's passed which renders that 8 equitable relief no longer appropriate, I wouldn't say 9 that that -- that that amounts to a repeal by 10 implication. It's just that what is appropriate depends 11 upon the remainder of the statute, and as it exists at 12 the time that the relief is sought.

MR. GARDEPHE: The point we are trying to make, Your Honor, is that in light of Burlington, which obviously Congress had knowledge of when it enacted the 1997 amendments, is it credible to believe that they would have restricted, limited, overruled the holding of Burlington, and never said a word about it?

19 JUSTICE BREYER: But they have (b). What
20 about (b)?

See look, there are two situations. Situation (a) is that the school district thinks they can give them a good education, adequate. Then he should go and try it out, and if by the way the school district just can't do it, then (b). So what's wrong

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1 with that scheme? Why doesn't that cover the 2 waterfront? 3 MR. GARDEPHE: There is no evidence that 4 Congress intended a tryout period. There is no 5 reference --6 JUSTICE BREYER: Just the language -- the 7 language. 8 MR. GARDEPHE: It's not just the language. 9 JUSTICE BREYER: The language plus the fact 10 that nobody can think of a reason for putting that in 11 there, unless that's the --MR. GARDEPHE: And it's the context which 12 13 flows from Burlington, where the Congress was aware that 14 this Court said very, very clearly --15 JUSTICE BREYER: But my question was what 16 about (b)? My question was not to argue with you. My 17 question was, why doesn't (b) take care of the examples 18 of absurd situations, law situations that you've 19 mentioned? 20 MR. GARDEPHE: I'm sorry, I'm not 21 understanding (b), Your Honor. 2.2 JUSTICE BREYER: The case where the school 23 district just can't do it. 24 MR. GARDEPHE: Right. JUSTICE BREYER: Where they just can't do 25

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1	it then their job is to put the kid in a district
2	MR. GARDEPHE: Right.
3	JUSTICE BREYER: in a place that can do
4	it. And if their argument, which is like your case, is
5	it they object to the facility, then have an argument
6	about that, about whether it should be this private
7	school or that private school. That's what it seems to
8	me your case is about, and that's why I think (b).
9	MR. GARDEPHE: In a perfect world, Your
10	Honor, school districts who are confronted with a
11	situation would always make the decision to place the
12	child into private school at public expense, but
13	unfortunately there are disagreements between school
14	districts and parents about what is appropriate, and
15	then sometimes school districts don't do what they are
16	supposed to do under the statute. And, in fact, the
17	city's interpretation here would actually incentivize
18	school districts not to provide services because if they
19	never provided services they wouldn't be liable for the
20	reimbursement. Again, this can't be what Congress
21	intended.
22	I did want to back up my assertion about the
23	"only if" language in
24	JUSTICE BREYER: (b), that's my question,
25	(b). It's not I thought you were right, until I

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heard that. Then I suddenly hear no, that don't worry about it, judge, is what I heard, because in the situation where the school district has not provided there is another section of the statute that takes care of the child. That's what I want to hear your response to.

7 MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, that relies on the good faith of the school district. (b) relies on --8 (a)(10)(B) relies on the good faith of the school 9 10 district to make a determination that they can't provide 11 the services. That's not always going to happen. There 12 may be -- there may be a disagreement about whether they 13 can provide the services or not between the school 14 district and the parents.

15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have review
16 before the impartial hearing examiner about that alleged
17 bad faith, correct?

18 MR. GARDEPHE: Pardon me?

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You have review
20 before the Hearing Examiner of that alleged bad faith on
21 the part of the school district?

22 MR. GARDEPHE: Yes, Your Honor. Obviously, 23 the parents contend both that the plan is not 24 appropriate, and that it wasn't offered in good faith. 25 But I -- I did want to back up my assertion on the "only

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1 if " language and -- and recite some statutory 2 references. Because I believe it stems very clearly 3 from the statute when you go through the provisions. 4 "Only if" or "only" is used in many, many 5 places: 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), 1414(a)(1)(C)ii, 1411(b)(1)(A), 1401(19)(C), 1415(k)(4)(C) in the '98 6 7 version of the statute, 1413 --8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Bingo. You got me on that. 9 MR. GARDEPHE: The point is, Your Honor, 10 that Congress knew how to say "only if." They didn't do 11 that here, because they had no intention of creating an 12 exclusive remedy. 13 And this Court said in Winkelman that courts 14 should be cautious in reading into the statute an 15 implicit limitation, and this limitation goes to what 16 this Court also said in Winkelman is the primary mandate. 17 Finally, Your Honor --18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And what was that 19 primary mandate? 20 MR. GARDEPHE: The primary mandate was to 21 provide or -- or make available a free and appropriate 22 public education to every child with learning 23 disabilities. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: There is no issue of 25 mainstreaming in this case at all; right?

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1	MR. GARDEPHE: There is not, Your Honor.
2	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Neither of the
3	options are not mainstream options?
4	MR. GARDEPHE: That's correct, Your Honor,
5	and that's at Second Circuit Appendix 168.
6	The school district here said that the
7	child's disabilities could not be addressed in a
8	mainstream setting, so there is no mainstreaming issue
9	here.
10	Finally, Your Honors, when Congress here
11	chose to carve out populations of children, it did that
12	in a very, very direct way. It did that in
13	1412(a)(1)(B) where it lays out very limited exceptions
14	for children who do not receive the guarantee with
15	respect to a free and appropriate public education.
16	The limitation is very, very clear. It's
17	very, very limited to certain age groups where it would
18	be inconsistent with State law, or there is an
19	incarcerated child. But there is no other place that
20	Congress carved out populations of children other than
21	in 1412(a)(1)(B), and there is no reason to believe
22	that Congress intended in a backdoor fashion to carve
23	out the populations of children, some of which were
24	mentioned in the argument of my adversary.
25	Congress was aware

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1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You know, it -- I'm 2 sorry. 3 MR. GARDEPHE: Your Honor, my time is up. 4 Thank you very much. 5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So is mine. Thank 6 you, Mr. Gardephe. 7 MR. GARDEPHE: Thank you. 8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Garre. 9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE, 10 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, 11 AS AMICUS CURIAE, 12 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENT 13 MR. GARRE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 14 15 Petitioner takes the position that a school 16 district may both refuse to provide a child with a 17 disability with an appropriate public placement and 18 refuse to pay for an appropriate private placement. 19 This Court has twice before considered and twice before unanimously rejected --20 21 JUSTICE SCALIA: We didn't -- he hasn't said that. I don't think so. He hasn't 22 23 said that. MR. GARRE: I think he does in the sense, 24 Your Honor, Justice Scalia, that the -- the school 25

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district can take the position, even if the IEP that is proposed is inadequate and it's adjudicated to be inadequate, because the Schaffer presumption that was brought up earlier does not apply in this case. Because

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5 we are talking about situations where a parent can prove 6 that the placement is inadequate. In that situation 7 the parent cannot qualify for reimbursement unless it 8 subjects his child to the inappropriate placement.

9 This Court rejected that rationale in clear 10 and unambiguous terms in the Burlington case. Justice 11 Rehnquist put it in that case --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Under a different statute. MR. GARRE: Under a different statute but interpreting the fundamental requirement of the statute that all children with disabilities are entitled to a free and appropriate public education. And that requirement didn't change, and this is what Justice Rehnquist --

JUSTICE SCALIA: You are interpreting some very general language: "Shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."

22 MR. GARRE: The -- the part of the 23 Burlington case I'm referring to Justice Scalia is the 24 interpretation of the fundamental requirement of 25 providing a free and appropriate public education. And

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what Justice Rehnquist said there -- and a unanimous Court agreed -- is forcing a parent to choose between subjecting his child to inadequate public placement or paying for private placement deprives the parent of his right to a free and appropriate public education.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So does the 7 10-business-days notice requirement for people who are 8 in public schools also violate Burlington, because for 9 10 business days they are going to be subject to an 10 inappropriate education?

11 MR. GARRE: The way the 10-business-days 12 requirement works in practice is that all of the IEPs 13 are proposed -- virtually all of them are proposed 14 towards the end of the school year; and, typically, the 15 parent is submitted the proposed IEP during the summer. 16 And it's at that point that they have to make a decision 17 whether to litigate that, put their child in a private 18 school, or put them into a public school.

19 So the 10 business days in practice is not 20 going to require the child to go into the inadequate 21 placement. That was true in the fact pattern --22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So in a situation

23 where it's not in the summer, where they say, well, 24 let's see how it works, and then they go to the public 25 school, I would have thought your argument also would

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1 say not -- they don't have to give notice of 10 2 business days because in Burlington you said you don't 3 -- you have to make available the tuition reimbursement. 4 They passed a statute imposing a limitation on that, 10 5 business days. 6 MR. GARRE: And we don't -- we don't dispute 7 that --8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't dispute 9 that limitation. You dispute the other one, though, 10 which says they have to have previously received 11 special education services. 12 MR. GARRE: In order -- in order to qualify 13 for reimbursement in that provision which is -- which is 14 followed by provisions describing in more details the 15 circumstances that courts ought to take into account in 16 determining whether reimbursement is appropriate. 17 And if I can explain our -- the way that we 18 read section 1412(a)(10)(C), the first part of that 19 subsection is subsection (C)(i). That hasn't come up 20 during the argument today. It is barely mentioned in 21 Petitioner's brief. That subsection -- it is on page 5a 22 of the appendix to the gray brief -- lays down the 23 general rule -- the rule that tells school districts 24 when they don't have to worry about paying 25 reimbursement. And that is when they provide a free, a

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public -- an appropriate public education in the first
 place.

That -- that is consistent with Burlington and Carter, and that lays down the general rule. School districts that provide an appropriate placement don't have to worry about reimbursement.

7 Subsection (C)(ii) then goes on to identify 8 a particular fact pattern which also happens to be the most common situation in which reimbursement claims are 9 10 presented to the courts. And Congress in that 11 situation, along with subsections (3) and (4), provided 12 the courts with more concrete guidance in determining 13 how to exercise their equitable discretion in that 14 situation.

15 The legislative history supports that 16 interpretation. At pages 25 to 29 of the National 17 Disability Rights Network brief they explain how 18 Congress in the legislative history indicates that they 19 were focused on case law applying this Court's decision 20 in Burlington and Carter where the students were already 21 enrolled in public school.

There is no indication whatsoever at all in the legislative record that anybody had in mind scaling back the fundamental mandate of the statute for school districts to provide a free and appropriate public

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1 education for every child.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Anywhere? I thought 3 Representative Castle said that this would result in 4 easing the burden on the school districts to pay 5 tuitions.

6 MR. GARRE: And it would, Your Honor, 7 insofar as we are dealing with flushing out the 8 requirements for students enrolled in public school. 9 But there is no indication that Congress meant to scale 10 back this Court's interpretation of the Act's 11 fundamental mandate to provide a free and appropriate 12 public education.

13 Petitioner's give-it-a-try rationale just 14 doesn't fit to advance its argument before this Court. 15 It doesn't fit to the extent that Petitioner is 16 suggesting that you have to give public school a try, 17 because it's clear that the -- their interpretation 18 would apply to students in public school, as well as 19 private school. It would apply to all students entering 20 the special education system, including the student 21 who's been enrolled in public school from kindergarten 22 to 11th grade.

If he hasn't previously received special education or related services, then, under Petitioner's view, if he's offered a grossly inadequate

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plan, he has to be subjected to that plan in order for his parents to qualify. And Petitioner's interpretation doesn't require the parents to give the proposed placement at issue a try. All it requires is that they show that they received previous special education

6 services at some point in the past.

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7 And that's the way it worked in Burlington; 8 that's the way it worked in Carter; and that's the way 9 it works in most of the cases. Students are already in 10 the special education system, and they are proposed an 11 IEP at some point typically during the summer. And the 12 parents at that time say this IEP is inadequate for my 13 child, and I want to --

JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, that's no problem. I mean both sides agree that you can move to a private school if that's so; right?

17 MR. GARRE: If you have previously received 18 special education services. But my point, Justice 19 Scalia, is under Petitioner's -- the way they read the 20 statute, you don't have to give the proposed placement 21 at issue a try. So to the extent that this Court 22 thinks, or Petitioner is arguing, that Congress wanted 23 to make sure that we could better evaluate whether or 24 not this proposed placement is going to work for this 25 child. That doesn't fit with the statutory language

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1 because in practice the students -- all they have to 2 show is that they received services at some point in the 3 past and if they have they can go into private school 4 and seek reimbursement. It doesn't require a student to 5 be subjected to the inadequate plan unless you happen to be the student who is enrolled in public school or 6 7 enrolled in private school and you're entering the 8 special education system. At that point then, 9 Petitioner's interpretation requires the parents to 10 enroll their child who has already been determined to 11 have a learning disability in a plan that is inadequate, and we think that that is an untenable result. 12

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But the whole point 14 is you don't necessarily know it's inadequate until 15 later in time. Right? The school board thinks it is 16 adequate.

17 MR. GARRE: That's true, Your Honor. But 18 two points about that -- first, parents who do enroll 19 their children in private school do so at their own 20 financial risk. And as Justice Scalia pointed out in 21 his concurring and dissenting opinion in Winkelman, 22 there are particular incentives against bringing frivolous reimbursement claims in this context. 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Except those -- there are a 24 25 lot of parents who are going to send their kids to

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private school, no matter what. They are well-heeled and this is just an opportunity to have New York City pay \$30,000 of it.

4 MR. GARRE: And Justice Scalia -- two points 5 on that, first the statute provides in clear and 6 unambiguous terms that all children with disabilities 7 are entitled to a free and appropriate education. The 8 child find requirement, in section 1412 --

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Even the child who would 10 turn down the adequate education provided by the public 11 schools. I don't think that was the intent of the 12 statute.

13 MR. GARRE: And I agree with you on that, 14 Justice Scalia, and that's why the way that school 15 districts can avoid reimbursement is to offer an adequate placement in the first place. That's what 16 17 section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) provides. It lays down the 18 general rule. School district today talks about we need 19 to have collaboration, we need to have cooperation 20 during the IEP process. They hold all the cards during 21 that process. And if they want to avoid reimbursement 22 they should do what this Court said in the Carter case, 23 that's provide the student with a free appropriate 24 public education.

JUSTICE SCALIA: If they don't have an

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1 adequate placement, they should not have to pay the 2 freight for people who would not be coming to public 3 school any way. That's what this provision prevents. 4 MR. GARRE: I disagree with that, Your 5 Honor. I think that's inconsistent with the statutory mandate to provide a free and appropriate education for 6 7 all children with disabilities. I would say though, and 8 I want to be clear on this -- even though parents of students in private school or in public school who 9 10 haven't previously received special education or related 11 services qualify for reimbursement under our 12 interpretation of the statute. It doesn't mean that 13 they are entitled to reimbursement. In the situations 14 Your Honor may have in mind, where the parents genuinely 15 aren't complying in good faith or genuinely aren't 16 interested in sending their kids to public school, they 17 only want to try to gain the system -- in those 18 hypothetical situations, courts have equitable 19 discretion to deny reimbursement claims, and they have 20 denied those reimbursement claims. 21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 22 Mr. Garre. Mr. Koerner, you have three minutes 23 remaining. 24 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF LEONARD J. KOERNER 25 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

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1	MR. KOERNER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
2	First, this particular provision, as the Chief Justice
3	noted, is called payment for private school placements
4	where they don't have the consent of the local
5	education. Any reasonable reading of that is that it's
6	all encompassing. And any person who has to apply has
7	to satisfy those provisions. Second, this statute did
8	not overrule Burlington or Carter. In those cases the
9	children were already receiving special education and
10	related services. Now it could be in a future case
11	someone would seek to extend those cases, but Congress
12	has now spoken to make sure that Burlington and Carter
13	go no further than you have previously held. Third,
14	there is an assumption that the program is going to be
15	defective from day one. But that's contrary to this
16	Court's decision in Schaffer which presumes the good
17	faith of the individuals who are proposing the program.
18	And that is the heart of the entire case. Fourth, let's
19	assume, for example, that someone can create an
20	ambiguity in this case. Citing the Arlington case, in
21	which you placed yourself in the position of the local
22	education officer, when you look at this particular
23	section and particularly C double 2 (ii) and
24	(iii). Would you, in that position, understand that it
25	doesn't really mean what it says, that previously

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1 received special education services was only meant to 2 cover the people already in the system and was not 3 intended to cover people outside the system. That isn't 4 what it says. More importantly, the ambiguity is 5 clearly not obvious. So how would a local officer who has to understand whether or not to place the funds at 6 7 risk know whether or not in complying with this particular situation, it was explicit or implicit? 8 9 JUSTICE ALITO: During the period between 10 Burlington and the enactment of this statute, would you 11 have any doubt about your potential obligation to 12 reimburse a parent who had --13 MR. KOENER: I didn't hear the first part. 14 JUSTICE ALITO: During the period between Burlington and the enactment of the statute, would the 15 16 school board have had doubt about its potential 17 liability for reimbursement, in a situation like this? 18 MR. KOERNER: I think so. I think, because 19 of Burlington and Carter, where the children were 20 already in the system, this would be the next step. 21 Would we have presented to you the fact that you 22 shouldn't expand it? Probably. Would I know what you 23 would conclude? No, but the statute eliminated that entire discussion. It is clear. But again, there is a 24 25 very big spending clause -- as I mentioned in my earlier

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1 presentation, if it's so ambiguous that you can read out 2 a specific provision, how can that ambiguity not redound 3 to the benefit of the city through its local 4 education --5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that this 6 statute was also premised on section 5 of the 14th 7 Amendment, in which case it wouldn't have your spending 8 clause notice argument. 9 MR. KOERNER: No, the -- this is just a 10 grant provision, Your Honor. It's not premised on any 11 constitutional provision. It's a grant where funds are provided to the local education district, and in return 12 13 they agree to comply with all the conditions set forth 14 in the IDEA. There are no constitutional limitations. 15 Thank you very much. 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, 17 Mr. Koerner. The case is submitted. 18 (Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m. the case in the 19 above-entitled matter was submitted.) 20 21 22 23 24 25

Official

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