1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x 3 KLEIN & CO. FUTURES, INC. : 4 Petitioner : 5 v. : No. 06-1265 6 BOARD OF TRADE OF THE : 7 CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL. : - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Monday, October 29, 2007 11 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 12 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 10:04 a.m. 15 **APPEARANCES:** DREW S. DAYS, III, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 16 17 the Petitioner. 18 MALCOLM L. STEWART, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 19 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 20 behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, 21 supporting the Petitioner. ANDREW J. PINCUS, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of 22 23 the Respondents. 24 25

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| 1 | PROCEEDINGS |
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| 2 | (10:04 a.m.) |
| 3 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument |
| 4 | first this morning in case 06-1265, Klein & Co. Futures |
| 5 | versus the Board of Trade of the City of New York. |
| 6 | Mr. Days. |
| 7 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF DREW S. DAYS III |
| 8 | ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER |
| 9 | MR. DAYS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it |
| 10 | please the Court: |
| 11 | A clearing futures commodity merchant, an |
| 12 | FCM, such as Petitioner, has standing to sue contract |
| 13 | markets and clearing organizations of contract markets |
| 14 | under section 25(b)(1) of the Act for their bad faith |
| 15 | failure to enforce rules that are required by the Act |
| 16 | and by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. |
| 17 | The court of appeal's contrary ruling should |
| 18 | be reversed for three reasons, because it's contrary to |
| 19 | the text of 25(b)(1); it ignores the essential rule of |
| 20 | clearing FCMs, such as Petitioner, recognized by the |
| 21 | Commodity Exchange Act, as well as long-standing |
| 22 | industry rules and practices an assessment with which |
| 23 | the expert Federal agency, the Commodity Futures Trading |
| 24 | Commission, concurs and it's in cross-purposes with |
| 25 | the goal that Congress sought to achieve in enacting an |
| | |

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express private right of action under 25(b)(1) against
 contract markets, mainly to ensure the existence of fair
 and orderly markets through a system of effective
 self-regulation.

5 The plain language of the Commodity Exchange Act confers statutory standing on Petitioner to bring б 7 this private right of action against Respondents. 8 25(b)(1) makes no reference to buyer or seller, but instead confers standing on any person who engaged -- a 9 10 person who engaged in any transaction on or subject to 11 the rules of a contract market or licensed board of 12 trade.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Days, can I interrupt you there, and ask if you would --

15 MR. DAYS: Yes, Justice Ginsburg.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- if you would define the transactions -- the particular transactions on which you rely -- to come within that provision, and what rules of the exchange or the clearinghouse do you say have been violated?

21 MR. DAYS: Justice Ginsburg, we view this as 22 several subsidiary transactions that ultimately end in 23 the consummation of the contract, but with respect to 24 the rules that we have in mind -- first of all, rule 25 6(a) talks about -- that can be found in the blue brief

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1 at 1a -- that such contract is executed or consummated 2 by or through a member of such contract market. This is 3 a clearing FCM that does this. And 6(a), along with the 4 NYFE rule, that is the contract market's rule 121(f) and 5 306(i)(2), essentially indicate the following arrangement: No contract can be dealt with or entered 6 7 into on a contract market without a guarantee from the 8 clearing FCM. The FCM becomes the buyer and seller with respect to that particular contract. It assumes that 9 10 contract and then, after assuming that contract, has to 11 clear it immediately, indeed, within one hour. So that's -- those are the rules under the statute and with 12 13 respect to the contract market. 14 With respect to the clearing 15 organization, rule 401(a) -- which is found at the red 16 brief at 6a -- indicates that the clearing point, the 17 clearing FCM is the party that deals with the clearing 18 organization. And at that point, there's no 19 communication, no contact -- no contract between the 20 investor and the clearing organization. The clearing 21 organization becomes the buyer and seller. In other 22 words, the contract is between a clearing FCM on one 23 side of the contract and a clearing FCM on the other 24 side of the contract. The clearing organization becomes 25 the buyer and seller, but before that happens, it's

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clear that the clearing organization views the clearing
 FCM as the party to the contract. It is not the
 investor. It is not any other party.

4 The important thing also about this 5 process is that the clearing FCM is always financially liable from the very beginning of this transaction, this 6 7 process, to the very end; that is, from the executing of 8 the contract to the consummation of the contract. For the court of appeals to talk about buyer or seller and 9 10 treat a clearing FCM as a mere creditor or agent really 11 misses entirely the role that clearing FCMs play in this 12 process.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: I think you --CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Days --JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- you've talked about the transactions, but I also asked you, what were the rules that the Defendants violated, the rules of the statute?

MR. DAYS: Well, it's -- it is clear, as I indicated with respect to the rule of the contract market, that the clearing FCM is required to clear that particular order or contract. And, therefore, at that point, the clearing requires some information about the settlement price. Here the allegation is that there was fraud at the point where the settlement price was set.

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1 That then created a problem with the clearinghouse. And 2 at the clearing process, there was also a continuing 3 violation because at both points, the contract market 4 and the clearing organization should have been applying 5 their rules effectively and carefully, and we suggest here that that was done in bad faith. 6 7 JUSTICE SOUTER: I think --In other words, the cause of 8 MR. DAYS: 9 action, we understand, requires that there be a showing 10 of bad faith. 11 JUSTICE SOUTER: Is -- I don't want to 12 reduce the issue down to something too simplistic, but 13 is there a rule that says, don't lie, don't commit 14 fraud? 15 In fact, the -- in order to MR. DAYS: Yes. 16 be a contract market designated by the CFTC and by the 17 statute, there has to be a commitment to avoiding price 18 manipulation and cornering the market or various other 19 things of that kind. So that's in the statute, and it's 20 also subject to the rules of the CFTC. That's a basic 21 understanding. That's a given. 22 Indeed, with respect to the whole question 23 of settlement prices and margins, the understanding of those who participate in a commodity futures market is 24 25 that they will establish their margins with the

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1 expectation that those rules will be applied fairly and 2 firmly and in good faith. 3 JUSTICE SOUTER: Am I -- am I right that we 4 really do not have to --5 MR. DAYS: Excuse me? 6 JUSTICE SOUTER: Am I correct that we really 7 do not have to determine that issue this morning? 8 MR. DAYS: What --JUSTICE SOUTER: All we have to determine is 9 10 whether it is possible for the Petitioner here to be 11 within the class of those with standing? 12 MR. DAYS: Absolutely. 13 JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes. 14 MR. DAYS: This is a standing case, sir. 15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Days, suppose 16 that the exchange has a standard sort of 17 nondiscrimination provision with respect to employment 18 practices, and it -- an employee asserts that she was 19 discriminated against in the promotion review. Would 20 she be covered by this provision? 21 MR. DAYS: No, Your Honor. I think that 22 Congress had in mind a limitation of the standing 23 position -- that is standing -- a right to those who 24 participate in the process, when it talks about a person 25 who engaged in a transaction on or subject to the rules

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1 of the contract market --

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I suppose the 3 transaction would be her annual employment review that 4 she alleges violated the exchange rule saying the 5 exchange would not discriminate on the basis of sex. 6 MR. DAYS: I don't believe that that would 7 be a transaction on or subject to the rules of a 8 contract market. She would not or he would not be a 9 person whose transaction, that is the employment 10 contract, would be carried out on or subject to the 11 rules of the contract market. 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But suppose, to narrow 13 that hypothetical, that there's a rule that you can't be 14 an employee of the clearinghouse or the exchange if you have a conviction for fraud, and they don't -- they're 15 16 negligent and careless about enforcing that rule, and 17 that fraud causes the loss. Under either your theory or 18 the Government's theory, would there be liability, and 19 is there a difference between those two theories? 20 MR. DAYS: Well, the statute itself talks 21 about the responsibilities of the contract market or the 22 clearing organization. And it describes transactions, 23 and transactions are described broadly, but not in a way 24 that would encompass the examples that you gave, Justice 25 Kennedy.

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1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- so, "transaction" has some substantive limitation that is 2 3 derived from where? 4 MR. DAYS: Well, it's derived from the 5 statute, if one looks at rule 2(i) in the statute. That describes transactions in a variety of ways. It's not б 7 in any of the appendices, but it can be located, I believe, on page 5 of the yellow brief, where we talk 8 9 about that. And indeed it's an interpretation that was 10 given by the Second Circuit in the Ken Roberts case, 11 which we also cite at that page in the yellow brief. 12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But in my hypothetical, 13 there is a transaction and actual damage -- I'm reading 14 from -- from (b)(1)(C). There's been a transaction and 15 the liabilities for damages sustained by a person who 16 engaged in the transaction or subject to the rules of 17 the market. 18 MR. DAYS: Well, Justice Kennedy, I want to 19 focus on "transaction." There's nothing that I've been 20 able to find, nothing that the CFTC has indicated in 21 this respect that would cover the hypothetical that you and Chief Justice Roberts had mentioned. 22 23 Theoretically, yes, but I don't think that -- in fact, not theoretically, yes. I would say that 24

25 "transaction" does not incorporate those ancillary rules

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1 of an operation of a contract market.

| 2 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, why aren't |
|----|--|
| 3 | these ancillary rules? When I think of a futures |
| 4 | exchange market and the transaction, I think of the |
| 5 | buyers and the sellers, you know, the longs and the |
| 6 | shorts. And this strikes me as just kind of the |
| 7 | paperwork in the back office. Why is that why should |
| 8 | we assume that's covered by the term "transaction"? |
| 9 | MR. DAYS: Well, it is a broad definition, |
| 10 | but it focuses on the process of the execution and |
| 11 | consummation of the contract, not matters that are |
| 12 | unrelated. I would view, as was indicated in the |
| 13 | American Agricultural Movement case, these people as |
| 14 | nonparticipants in the operation of the core function of |
| 15 | a contract market. |
| 16 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: These people you |
| 17 | mean the ones in our hypotheticals? |
| 18 | MR. DAYS: That's correct. |
| 19 | JUSTICE BREYER: Can I ask you I'm |
| 20 | slightly difficult I'm finding it difficult to |
| 21 | follow the exact language on page 4a of the appendix, of |
| 22 | (b)(1)(C). To you, that's probably the key provision, |
| 23 | right? And that's in the blue brief. And catch me when |
| 24 | I read it wrong, if I do. As I as I see it, it says |
| 25 | and here it says "a clearing organization." That's |

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1 what we are interested in here, the clearing 2 organization. 3 MR. DAYS: Right. 4 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, a clearing 5 organization that doesn't enforce a bylaw properly or a rule or reg properly, which is what you're saying 6 7 happened? 8 MR. DAYS: Yes, sir. 9 JUSTICE BREYER: The clearing organization 10 got all mixed and it all --11 MR. DAYS: Correct. JUSTICE BREYER: Now, they're liable for 12 13 actual damages to a person who engaged in a transaction 14 in a contract market. That's what it says. And the 15 contract market is the futures exchange. 16 MR. DAYS: Yes. 17 JUSTICE BREYER: Not the clearing 18 organization. 19 MR. DAYS: Yes. 20 JUSTICE BREYER: And they're liable to that 21 person for the actual losses that resulted from his transaction in the futures exchange. It's a --22 23 transaction. 24 MR. DAYS: Yes. 25 JUSTICE BREYER: So what your claim -- they

1 were caused by the failure of the clearinghouse to 2 follow its rules. 3 MR. DAYS: Yes. 4 JUSTICE BREYER: And you say just read that 5 -- we have a case where the clearing organization didn't follow its rules, the -- my client engaged in a 6 7 transaction over the futures exchange. 8 MR. DAYS: Yes. 9 JUSTICE BREYER: And it was caused harm 10 because the clearing organization didn't follow its 11 rules. You say that's what it says. 12 MR. DAYS: Yes, sir. 13 JUSTICE BREYER: And that's what happened? 14 MR. DAYS: Correct. 15 JUSTICE BREYER: Did I understand that 16 correctly? 17 MR. DAYS: Yes. I don't know, Justice 18 Breyer, whether you're heading toward the concern that's 19 expressed by the Respondents, namely that 25(b)(1) does 20 not contain in that second part of the statute a 21 reference to a --22 JUSTICE BREYER: Clearing organization. 23 MR. DAYS: -- clearing organization. JUSTICE BREYER: I know, but then the 24 25 response I'm going to ask them is, so what?

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| 1 | MR. DAYS: Well, I think that is "so |
|----|---|
| 2 | what" is a proper response. I'm glad you said it rather |
| 3 | than I, that |
| 4 | JUSTICE BREYER: I know you're going to |
| 5 | but I |
| 6 | MR. DAYS: We have we have, we think, |
| 7 | standing with respect to a transaction that occurred on |
| 8 | the contract market, even if the Respondents' argument |
| 9 | is persuasive that it didn't happen on the clearing |
| 10 | organization or subject to the rules of the clearing |
| 11 | organization. |
| 12 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: It would be an argument |
| 13 | for this case because that absence has been cured. |
| 14 | Wasn't that in the 2000 amendment that that they |
| 15 | changed the |
| 16 | MR. DAYS: That's correct. |
| 17 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: the list to registered |
| 18 | entity, which does include clearinghouse? |
| 19 | MR. DAYS: Yes. Well |
| 20 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The there's |
| 21 | concern on the other side, I take it, is that it's not |
| 22 | just limited to transactions on the exchange, but |
| 23 | transactions subject to the rules of a contract market. |
| 24 | And I understood you, in response to the hypothetical |
| 25 | that Justice Kennedy posed, that you indicated that |

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1 "transaction" has some substantive limit to it. And if 2 that's the case, which seems to me an awfully large 3 concession, then we have to figure out what the limit 4 And it seems to me that it could just as easily be is. 5 limited to the transaction between buyers and sellers of futures contracts as between all these subsidiary, 6 7 ancillary, collateral, whatever transactions that simply 8 implement that broader transaction.

9 MR. DAYS: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, there 10 are limitations with respect to 25(b)(1). As I 11 indicated, nonparticipants in the market are not 12 explicitly covered by this. But also one has to 13 understand that there has to be a showing of bad faith. 14 And there are no punitive damages; there are actual 15 damages. And, therefore, this limits the extent to 16 which this provision could be used by someone who is not 17 within the category that I described.

18 JUSTICE BREYER: Correct me if I'm wrong, 19 but you're going to be more favorable to this than, I 20 expect, your opponent. There's nothing really 21 linguistically or otherwise wrong if you had a statute 22 that said people in the badminton court have to play 23 carefully, and if they hurt somebody on the 24 merry-go-round, they're liable. And so people in the 25 contract market have to play carefully, and if they have

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1 hurt somebody over at the futures exchange, they're 2 liable. 3 But it says those people in the futures 4 exchange are people who engage in a transaction on the 5 futures exchange. 6 MR. DAYS: Yes, sir. 7 JUSTICE BREYER: And so they said, well, by 8 an odd fluke of fate, your clients didn't. It was the -- rather, their client who actually went into the 9 10 futures exchange and bought the commodity. 11 Your point, I take it, is, well, that's 12 true, but my client did something -- he guaranteed that 13 commodity transaction in accordance with the rules of 14 the futures exchange, and that's what makes him a player 15 in the futures exchange. 16 MR. DAYS: Yes. The clearing FCM --17 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. That's right. 18 MR. DAYS: He --19 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm sorry. He guaranteed through the clearinghouse the payment of the contract 20 21 made on the futures exchange --22 MR. DAYS: That's correct. 23 JUSTICE BREYER: -- which he didn't make, 24 but he guaranteed it. 25 MR. DAYS: Well, that's not correct.

1 JUSTICE BREYER: He made it in a sense --2 MR. DAYS: Well, that's not correct, Justice 3 Brever. The clearing --4 JUSTICE BREYER: He didn't walk onto the floor and make it. It was his client who walked onto 5 6 the floor and said whatever. Is that right? 7 MR. DAYS: Well, it's hard to know who walks 8 on what floor. I think what's clear about this industry is that it's the clearing FCM who is always at the 9 10 center of this, the essential participant in this entire 11 process. 12 The FCMs may not know who the customer is. 13 They certainly don't know who the customer is on the 14 other side. The clearinghouse doesn't know who the 15 customer is, or the investor is. So the investor 16 actually plays a very small role, other than putting up 17 his or her money at the beginning of the process. 18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No. I mean, the -the market is about investors. It's about buyers and 19 20 sellers. Now, you're -- the clearinghouse and these 21 FCMs may or may not be covered by the language of the 22 statute, but it's an awful big stretch to say they are central to the market. 23 24 What's central to the market are the

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investors. That's why they have these. They wouldn't

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1 have this market for -- for your clients, I mean, for 2 the clearinghouse or anything else. The market is there 3 for the buyers and the sellers. That's the central 4 transaction. 5 MR. DAYS: We don't argue that investors are barred from bringing suits under 25(b)(1). They would 6 7 be persons who engaged in transactions on or subject to 8 the rules of the contract market. 9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Didn't Judge Friendly 10 refer to the FCM as a central player or a principal in 11 _ _ 12 MR. DAYS: Yes. That -- that's certainly 13 been the case in Leist, where Judge Friendly wrote the 14 opinion. And also --JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the transaction --15 16 MR. DAYS: -- also the current --17 JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the single 18 transaction that you think brings your client within 19 this language? 20 MR. DAYS: Well, I mentioned --JUSTICE SCALIA: What is the transaction --21 22 the quarantee? 23 MR. DAYS: The one -- the contract market requires that the clearing FCM clear a contract with one 24 25 hour -- assume the contract. So the assuming of the

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1 contract and the clearing required by the rules of the 2 contract market is a violation of the CEA. 3 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not talking about what 4 the rule is that was violated. It says, "who engaged in 5 any transaction on or subject to the rules of such contract market." What is, in brief, "the transaction" 6 7 you're relying upon? MR. DAYS: Well, Your Honor, as indicated, 8 "transaction" is the process of assuming this contract 9 10 and then going toward the clearing -- clearing 11 organization to clear it, and it's the clearing 12 organization, setting the settlement price, which really 13 dictates what happens on the clearing organization. So 14 it's the setting of the settlement price, which is a key 15 point. 16 JUSTICE SCALIA: A transaction does not 17 require two parties? 18 MR. DAYS: Well, there are two parties here. 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can you have a one-party 20 transaction? 21 MR. DAYS: There's a -- we can view this as 22 one sole transaction, as one transaction with a number 23 of subsidiary activities along the process between execution and consummation, or one can view various 24 25 transactions that ultimately end up with the

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| 1 | consummation of the contract. |
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| 2 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why isn't it just |
| 3 | MR. DAYS: I don't think it makes any |
| 4 | difference one way or another. |
| 5 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: the guarantee, the |
| 6 | relationship between the clearing organization and the |
| 7 | clearinghouse? The clearing organization has to give a |
| 8 | guarantee and has to put up margin. |
| 9 | MR. DAYS: That's correct. |
| 10 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: So there is a transaction |
| 11 | between the clearinghouse and the clearing organization. |
| 12 | MR. DAYS: Oh, absolutely. Well, they're |
| 13 | same thing. |
| 14 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: And I thought that was |
| 15 | MR. DAYS: You mean the clearing FCM |
| 16 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes. |
| 17 | MR. DAYS: and the organization. |
| 18 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you. Mr. Days, |
| 19 | we'll give you a minute for rebuttal. |
| 20 | Mr. Stewart. |
| 21 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART, |
| 22 | ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES, |
| 23 | AS AMICUS CURIAE, |
| 24 | SUPPORTING THE PETITIONER |
| 25 | MR. STEWART: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it |
| | |

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1 please the Court:

For purposes of this case, the Court may assume that the word "transaction" in section 25(b)(1) is limited to the purchase and sale of futures and options contracts.

6 The Court may also assume that, in order to 7 engage in such a transaction, a person must be a 8 necessary and direct participant in the transaction. 9 Even under those --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where -- where do 11 all of those assumptions come from? I would have 12 thought the limitation of "transaction" beyond the plain 13 language would be a significant concession in this case.

14 I mean -- when I say "assume," MR. STEWART: 15 I am saying that the Court need not decide at this point 16 how far, if at all, beyond the core transactions that 17 occur on contract markets, the statute reaches. That 18 is, with respect to the hypothetical case of an exchange or a clearinghouse that has an anti-discrimination rule 19 20 and is alleged to have violated that rule.

Yes, on the one hand, you could say that in literal terms, that is a transaction subject to the rules of the exchange. On the other hand, I think there is significant force to Respondents' contention that that seems very far afield from what was the core of

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1 Congress's concern. And with respect to the 2 anti-discrimination hypothetical, there would also be 3 the argument that there is a different Federal statute. 4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So we have to figure 5 out what was the core of Congress's concern and limit "transaction" in that way? б 7 MR. STEWART: I think the Court can at least 8 start from the assumption that Congress referred to 9 transactions on or subject to the rules of the contract 10 market. And none of the things that have been posited 11 in the hypotheticals, the anti-discrimination, would be 12 transactions on a contract market. 13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But they would be subject to the rules. 14 15 MR. STEWART: They would be subject to the 16 rules, but our point here is that the United States and 17 the CFTC have not had occasion to decide how far, if at 18 all, beyond the core transactions on the contract market 19 the statute extends. But our point is, even if we look at the 20 21 core of what Congress was driving at, the buying and 22 selling of futures and options contracts, the clearing 23 FCM is a proper plaintiff because it assumes direct contractual liability to the clearinghouse. Even before 24 25 the clearing process is completed, it was defined as the

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buyer or seller of the contracts in the NYFE rules, and
 its participation is essential.

3 Now -- now, we have a somewhat different 4 conception of the relevant transaction than does the 5 Petitioner. In our view, when Eisler executed his trades on the floor of the exchange, he set in motion a 6 7 process that would quickly and inevitably culminate in 8 the clearing of the trades by the clearing organization, and at the end of the day, there would be an array of 9 10 contractual relationships.

Klein would have a contractual obligation to 11 12 the clearinghouse. The clearing FCM on the other side 13 of the trade would have its own obligation to the 14 clearinghouse. Klein would have an agreement with its customer, First West, that would entail rights and 15 16 obligations running between them. And there would be a 17 similar set of rights and obligations on the other side 18 of the trade. And --

JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about the argument that if we accept your view of it, allowing the FCM to sue, then there could be multiple liability? MR. STEWART: I think that's incorrect. I think the customer would also be an appropriate plaintiff, that is, the customer would have his own rights and obligations arising out of the -- the

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contract with the clearing FCM. But the fact that they
 might both be conceivable plaintiffs wouldn't mean that
 they could both recover in the same case.

4 Remember that the statute limits recovery to 5 actual losses. So if the customer here, Eisler and First West, had paid the required additional margin to 6 7 Klein, and Klein had discharged its obligation to the clearinghouse, Klein would still be a person who had 8 engaged in a transaction. But Klein wouldn't be able to 9 10 recover because he would have suffered no actual losses. 11 So it's the person who bears the actual loss 12 at the end of the day who would be the appropriate 13 plaintiff. 14

And the fact that in some cases that might be the customer, and in other cases it might be the clearing FCM, doesn't mean that there would be duplicative recovery in a single case.

JUSTICE ALITO: Well, when you began by saying we could begin -- we could assume certain things, was it included in the things that we could assume -was it the proposition that the transaction was limited to a purchase or sale?

23 MR. STEWART: A purchase or sale, although 24 we would extend -- I mean, we would interpret the 25 clearing process as part of the purchase or sale. And

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the reason we would do that is that clearing occurs inevitably by operation of law, as it were. That is, once Eisler executes his trades, Klein had no discretion as to whether to discharge its obligation to clear the trades.

6 Klein had previously entered into a 7 commitment to quarantee the trades that Eisler made. 8 And, therefore, what -- Klein's obligations to the clearinghouse followed directly and inevitably from the 9 initial trade on the floor of the exchange. In his --10 11 JUSTICE ALITO: Is that different from 12 saying under the exchange rule, the FCM is actually the 13 party that enters into the trade? Is that --14 MR. STEWART: I think it is a different 15 thing, and that there are two different bases on which 16 the Court could rule in our favor, that is, rule 17 306(i)(2) of the rules of the exchange that were in 18 effect at the time of these trades specified that -- and 19 that's reproduced, I quess, at page 14a of the blue brief. And it said -- the second sentence of rule 20 21 306(i)(2) says, every such contract when made by a 22 trading member shall be made on behalf of a clearing 23 member, who shall be the buyer or seller of said 24 contract on the terms set forth therein. 25 So one way to rule for Klein in this case is

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1 to simply say, even if we focus entirely on the moment 2 at which the trade was executed, under the rules of the 3 exchange, Klein was deemed to be the buyer or seller. 4 But we are also making the different argument and in a 5 sense, we think the more important practical argument, that regardless of where the contract ran during the 6 7 brief period before the clearing process was 8 consummated, the salient factor is that at the conclusion of the clearing process, the clearinghouse 9 10 would look directly and only to Klein for satisfaction 11 of any obligations arising out of unsuccessful trades. 12 In a sense the clearinghouse could be 13 analogized to a department store in which only the 14 clearing members have charge accounts. And in order for 15 anyone else to make a purchase, he has to make prearrangements with a charge account holder to have 16 17 permission to charge things to his accounts. And that's 18 essentially what was done here. In order for Eisler to 19 execute trades on the floor of the exchange, he had to have the prior commitment from Klein that Eisler would 20 21 be allowed to charge trades to Klein's account. And in that situation, we think it's 22 23 entirely natural to say that Klein engaged in the transaction, even though Eisler was making the decisions 24 25 as to exactly what trades to execute.

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1 JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Stewart --2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is that why the Second 3 Circuit was wrong in saying it's just like a securities 4 broker?

5 MR. STEWART: Yes. I think the Second 6 Circuit's error was not really that it had a 7 misconception of how narrow or broad the private right 8 of action is. The Second Circuit's error was that it misunderstood the role that a clearing FCM plays in the 9 process. The clearing FCM doesn't simply facilitate the 10 11 formation of contracts between other people. The clearinghouse assumes direct contractual -- I mean, I'm 12 13 sorry, the clearing FCM assumes direct contractual 14 liability to the clearinghouse.

And that's fundamental to the operation of the contract markets. That is, the point of the clearinghouse is to give investors assurance that if their trades are successful, they will get paid. And in order for the clearinghouse to pay the winners, it has to have confidence that it will be able to collect from the losers.

And the way that it has that confidence is by identifying a small number of people, clearing FCMs, who have demonstrated financial wherewithal and integrity, and saying, we're going to look only to you

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to satisfy these obligations; we're not going to put ourselves in the business of going after large, large numbers of individual investors to ensure that losing trades will be paid.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Mr. Stewart, may I go back to the question of multiple recoveries? And by that term, as I understand it, the term does not mean "duplicative recoveries." And I don't understand -- and this is what I want you to explain -- why there couldn't be a recovery in a case analogous to this both by the FCM and by the ultimate customer.

12 Let's assume that the settlement price is, 13 in fact, rigged. The FCM cannot meet the resulting 14 margin call and folds, and is in hence a situation like 15 this. And this happens quickly enough so that the 16 ultimate transaction is never consummated. So that the 17 -- the contracting party on the FCM side of the trade 18 doesn't get the benefit of what would have been a 19 favorable contract. Couldn't you have recovery in that 20 case both by the customer and the FCM? 21 MR. STEWART: I'm not sure if I -- if I 22 fully understand the hypothetical to --23 JUSTICE SOUTER: It may be that I don't understand how it works. 24

MR. STEWART: To answer a variant of it, I

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think there could be cases in which both the customer and the clearing FCM recovered something. That is, say there is a loss of a million dollars that's attributable to malfeasance by the exchange, and the customer comes up with half of that money, \$500,000. And the clearing FCM uses that to discharge half of its own obligation to the clearinghouse.

8 Now, in that case, both the customer and the 9 clearing FCM might have a cause of action for \$500,000. 10 So there would be -- there could be multiple recoveries 11 in the sense that you're describing.

JUSTICE SOUTER: But in my hypo, the FCM is claiming damages because his business folds. So the damages are not limited simply to those flowing from this transaction itself. The customer is claiming damages for failure to consummate a contract that would have been favorable to him.

18 MR. STEWART: If you assume that 19 consequential damages arising out of the loss of the 20 business --

JUSTICE SOUTER: Right. And I am assuming --MR. STEWART: -- could be part of actual losses, then there would be no barrier to each party,

25 the clearing FCM and the customer, recovering what it

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1 actually lost.

| 2 | Our point is that there is no danger that |
|----|--|
| 3 | because the clearing FCM is there is no danger that |
| 4 | because the clearing FCM is liable for a million dollars |
| 5 | to the clearinghouse, and the customer is liable to the |
| б | clearing FCM, each for a million dollars, that they'll |
| 7 | both get a million dollars. It's only the person who |
| 8 | bears the actual loss. |
| 9 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, |
| 10 | Mr. Stewart. |
| 11 | Mr. Pincus. |
| 12 | ORAL ARGUMENT OF ANDREW J. PINCUS |
| 13 | ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS |
| 14 | MR. PINCUS: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, |
| 15 | and may it please the Court: |
| 16 | I'd like to return to the language of the |
| 17 | statute, because I think it explains why the comments |
| 18 | that Mr. Stewart started with are, in fact, compelled by |
| 19 | the language of the statute. 25(a) talks about a person |
| 20 | who engages in any transaction on or subject to the |
| 21 | rules of a contract market. And I'm focusing on the "on |
| 22 | or subject to the rules." |
| 23 | If, as Petitioners claimed in their opening |
| 24 | brief, any the fact that a any transaction was |
| | |

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1 hypotheticals, was enough, then the "on" would be 2 superfluous. There wouldn't be a need for "on" because 3 surely a transaction on a contract market has to be 4 governed by the rules of the contract market. 5 So I think that shows why "on or subject to 6 the rules of " is a term of art. It has a special 7 meaning here. And the only kinds of transactions that 8 are either on or subject --JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but under that 9 10 reading, they should have used the word "and" rather 11 than "or." 12 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor. 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Any transaction or which 14 is -- which is subject to. MR. PINCUS: Well, Justice Kennedy, I think 15 16 what Congress was explaining there is it wasn't saying 17 any transaction subject to the rules of a contract 18 market, because that would be all of the Court's 19 hypotheticals about discrimination and everything else, 20 and the word "on" wouldn't be there. And so by using "on," which -- by definition "on" has to be subsumed in 21 22 the rules, because if a transaction is on a contract 23 market, surely it is in some way governed by a rule. 24 So if Congress meant to cover every 25 transaction that is in any way governed by the rule, it

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1 wouldn't have had to include "on."

2 So the reason -- the fact that "on" is there 3 means, as we discussed in our brief, that this is a 4 specialist transaction on or subject to the rules 5 singles out a very special category of transactions. 6 And that --7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry. I'm not 8 following you. I think Justice Kennedy's question still 9 applies. Your argument assumes that the "or" is an 10 "and." I mean, you don't need to have a transaction 11 "on" at all. It can be simply one subject to the rules. 12 MR. PINCUS: Yes. But the fact that 13 Congress put "on" in there means that it was trying to 14 capture something other --15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The fact that Congress put "on" in there and then followed it with 16 17 "or" means you don't have to worry what "on" means if 18 you're subject to the rules of the contract market. 19 MR. PINCUS: Yes, Mr. Chief Justice. But I 20 think the reason that "on" is there is that Congress was 21 signaling that it wasn't -- that the second part of the 22 clause "or subject to the rules" didn't literally mean 23 "or subject to any rule," because if it literally meant 24 that, there would have been no reason to include "on." 25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So this is like a

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1 ejusdem generis argument? You're saying, we should 2 interpret "subject to the rules" in the same light that 3 we interpret "transaction"?

4 MR. PINCUS: No. This is an argument that 5 on or subject to the rules -- that a transaction on or 6 subject to the rules is a special kind of transaction. 7 It's a term of art in the statute, and a term of art 8 that refers to trades.

9 JUSTICE STEVENS: But even if it's a term of 10 art, do you contend that Klein has not engaged in a 11 transaction subject to the rules?

MR. PINCUS: Yes, we do. Your Honor, we -our view is that the transaction that is referred to there are the transactions that include, either at the trading pit or a small category of off-pit trades that are permitted by section C of the Commodities Exchange Act.

JUSTICE STEVENS: What is the full scope of the term "transaction" in your view? What does it cover?

21 MR. PINCUS: It covers the trade that -- the 22 contract that occurs at the pit the moment that --23 during open outcry --

JUSTICE STEVENS: Between either the buyer
 or the seller and the clearinghouse -- not the

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| 1 | clearinghouse the FCM or what do you call it? |
|----|--|
| 2 | MR. PINCUS: Well, FCMs may or may not be |
| 3 | involved. In this case, Klein wasn't involved, because |
| 4 | Eisler was a floor had floor privileges and he |
| 5 | actually he was the person who was at the pit |
| б | engaging in these transactions. So our our view is |
| 7 | that the transaction, to start with that, either occurs |
| 8 | at the pit when an offer is made in open outcry, and |
| 9 | it's accepted. At that moment, that transaction |
| 10 | JUSTICE STEVENS: And who are the parties to |
| 11 | the transaction? |
| 12 | MR. PINCUS: The parties to that transaction |
| 13 | are the buyer and seller, the customers, the people that |
| 14 | the |
| 15 | JUSTICE STEVENS: And the intermediaries are |
| 16 | not party to the transaction even though they are liable |
| 17 | for the either the purchase price or the sale price? |
| 18 | MR. PINCUS: Yes. |
| 19 | JUSTICE STEVENS: They are not parties to a |
| 20 | transaction? |
| 21 | MR. PINCUS: They are not parties to the |
| 22 | transaction. |
| 23 | JUSTICE STEVENS: But you expose them to |
| 24 | millions of dollars in liability. |
| 25 | MR. PINCUS: At the moment, Your Honor, they |

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1 may not even be identified. At the moment that 2 transaction occurs --3 JUSTICE STEVENS: But they are subject to 4 liability if the transaction doesn't -- isn't 5 consummated? 6 MR. PINCUS: Under the rules of the clearing 7 organization. Yes. 8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But the -- the buy and the sell contract will be worth nothing if it isn't cleared. 9 MR. PINCUS: Well, it could -- what the 10 11 clearing process does after the -- after that contract 12 is formed is to eliminate -- to provide a way to strip 13 out the credit risk that ordinarily wouldn't be there. JUSTICE KENNEDY: I know. But you want --14 you want us to say that the clearing is not part of the 15 16 transaction, but the clearing is necessary to make a 17 transaction qo forward. Otherwise the contract is just 18 a nullity. 19 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, we don't believe that the contract is a nullity. And in fact, 20 21 if, for example, a contract was made at the pit, and for 22 some reason the -- the clearing member who was to clear 23 the transaction went bankrupt that day and didn't exist, 24 and therefore that transaction was not cleared, that transaction would still be enforceable as between the 25

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| 1 | buyer and the seller. |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUSTICE BREYER: I thought they had to pick |
| 3 | it up in an hour. |
| 4 | MR. PINCUS: Well, it has to be cleared in |
| 5 | an hour to go through the clearing process. |
| 6 | JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. |
| 7 | MR. PINCUS: But it's not |
| 8 | JUSTICE BREYER: So, therefore, any |
| 9 | transaction wouldn't happen in your hypothetical, |
| 10 | because, if I understand it correctly, the buyer and the |
| 11 | seller who by the way, are normally represented by |
| 12 | clearinghouses by Klein, or by brokers like Klein, but |
| 13 | in this case, apparently they weren't they make the |
| 14 | transaction in the pit, and then the rules of the |
| 15 | exchange say that the clearinghouse has to pick it up, a |
| 16 | clearing member, within one hour. And at that point, |
| 17 | that person the clearing member, the broker, I guess, |
| 18 | this Klein type person becomes legally responsible |
| 19 | for seeing that the money is put up. |
| 20 | Now, it doesn't require a big stretch in |
| 21 | fact, zero stretch of the word "transaction" to think |
| 22 | that word "transaction" covers that entire process. |
| 23 | From the moment and by the way, the whole process is |
| 24 | governed by the rules of the futures exchange. So there |
| 25 | are rules in there. |

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| 1 | So, why do you what reason is there for |
|----|--|
| 2 | taking that word "transaction," cutting out about |
| 3 | two-thirds of the important event, ignoring the fact |
| 4 | that it is covered by the rules of the futures exchange, |
| 5 | and limiting it to the physical moment when somebody |
| 6 | enters the pit in an unusual case and says "I buy |
| 7 | for" and then another person says "I sell for"? |
| 8 | MR. PINCUS: Well, let me first point out, |
| 9 | Your Honor, it's not an unusual case. There frequently |
| 10 | may be a case even where either where even where |
| 11 | both sides are represented by floor brokers, where the |
| 12 | floor broker who is who is representing the party in |
| 13 | the trade is not the clearing member. That happens all |
| 14 | the time, and that's why the rules say that the clearing |
| 15 | member doesn't have to even be designated until one hour |
| 16 | after the trade. So hard to say that the clearing |
| 17 | member engages in that transaction on the floor when |
| 18 | he when it may not be designated. |
| 19 | The reason for the division is that Congress |
| 20 | set out a clear rule here. The transaction it referred |
| 21 | to it used the language that it used elsewhere, as we |
| 22 | discuss in our brief, particularly in defining the |
| 23 | functions of floor trader and floor broker. |
| 24 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus, if your view |
| 25 | were correct, it would have been so easy for Congress to |

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1 say "buyers and sellers" or even "trade," but it used a 2 word, "transaction," that you say has a special meaning 3 in this context, but "transaction" appears all through 4 the law. And usually it's a term that has encompassing 5 meaning, like in the Federal Rules' "any transaction or 6 occurrence," and you would say that Congress has given 7 it here this very constrained meaning.

8 MR. PINCUS: We do say that, Your Honor, because -- let me address first your question about why 9 10 Congress couldn't use "buyer or seller." Here Congress 11 had to -- needed a construction that would link the --12 the transaction that was being targeted with the rules 13 of the -- of the contract market, because that was going 14 to be the test here. It's all about whether or not the 15 contract market violated its rules. And so it needed a 16 construction that referred to a transaction because 17 those are the things that are governed by the rules of 18 the contract market, that might be misapplied in the 19 work -- in the way that A, B, and C talk about.

20 So it would have had to -- even if it had 21 used the phrase, you know, "purchased" or "sold" a 22 commodity for future delivery or an option on a contract 23 for future delivery, it would still have to say "on or 24 subject to the rules of a contract market" in order to 25 link back to what it was doing, which was creating a

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1 cause of action for the violation of the contract 2 market's own rules with respect to a transaction that 3 was subject to those rules. 4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why couldn't it have just 5 said "sustained by a buyer or seller"? "Shall be liable for actual damages sustained by a buyer or seller." Why 6 7 -- why would it need to be any more complicated than 8 that? MR. PINCUS: Well, because it -- it would 9 10 have to talk about --11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: When everything else is 12 the same, instead of "a person," just "buyer and 13 seller"? 14 MR. PINCUS: Well, because then in the --15 several lines down, it talks about actual loss, and it 16 would have to say "buyers and sellers" there as well. 17 And --18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I don't know why. 19 MR. PINCUS: Well, because it was referring 20 back to -- it would be referring back to "buyer or 21 seller." 22 But I think the key here is for Congress, 23 given the structure of the Act, "any transaction on or subject to the rules of the contract market" is -- are 24 25 these transactions. Those are the only transactions

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1 that -- that meet that test. Those are the transactions 2 -- the very same phrase is used in defining the 3 functions of the floor broker and the floor trader who 4 execute the transactions on the floor. And so by using 5 that phrase, Congress was tying back to something that 6 it had a clear definition of. Let me --7 JUSTICE ALITO: Where is the clear -there's no clear definition. There's no definition 8 9 whatsoever, anywhere, of "transaction." 10 MR. PINCUS: Well, there's no definition of 11 "transaction," Your Honor, but in the definitions of 12 "floor trader" and "floor broker," the phrase "on or 13 subject to the rules of a contract market" appears again 14 in defining what they do. And so those are the people 15 who are at the pit, either executing for their own 16 account or for a customer's account the trades. And so 17 by using that very phrase in defining what they do --18 which appears, by the way, on -- in the discussion on 19 pages 5 and 6 our brief --20 JUSTICE STEVENS: Are they persons engaged 21 in contracts subject to the rules? Are they persons 22 engaged in transactions subject to the rules? 23 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, we don't -- we 24 don't think they are, because they're acting as --25 JUSTICE STEVENS: Who are subject to the

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rules, in your view? It doesn't include the FCM; it
 doesn't include the broker; it doesn't include the
 trader.

MR. PINCUS: Well, certainly a floor trader is, because that's someone who is trading for his own account. A floor broker who's merely representing a customer is just like someone who, at a house closing -if you can't make the house closing, you may appoint someone to close the house. They're not the person who engages in the transaction; you do.

JUSTICE SOUTER: Neither are they the people who are going to end up personally liable. And -- I mean, they don't have -- they are not subject to margin calls. There's something very different about this set of relationships from the broker/seller relationship in buying and selling a house.

MR. PINCUS: Well, those people also have -well, the -- the floor broker is not subject to a margin call. He's subject to liability for other things that he may do wrong, but for his role as a floor broker, he's not subject to margin responsibility.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you recognize that the Second Circuit was wrong when it said that this FCM is just like a securities broker? He's just making a deal for a commission. It seems to me that that -- that was

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Official 1 not proper --2 MR. PINCUS: Well, Your Honor, if that was 3 all the Second Circuit said, I would agree with you, 4 that would be wrong. But the Second Circuit recognized 5 that the -- Klein here had a risk, a credit risk, because it had backed up the credit of its customer, 6 7 Eisler, and that's why in the lessons learned report that the CFTC --8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it's not just Klein. 9 10 It's every FCM. That's the job of an FCM. 11 MR. PINCUS: That is the job of the clearing 12 member part of what an FCM does. 13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So that's -- that's not comparable to just a broker who executes my order for 14 15 shares and gets a commission for it. 16 MR. PINCUS: No, Your Honor, but as the 17 Second Circuit went on to note, the fact that there is a 18 credit risk here, that Klein is taking a risk based on 19 the credit of its customer, Eisler -- as the CFTC noted, 20 there's nothing in the rules that require clearing 21 members to only accept minimum margin, and it's the job 22 of a clearing member to -- to look into both the creditworthiness of its customers and the risks of the 23 24 various transactions that are open --25 JUSTICE STEVENS: Mr. Pincus --

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| 1 | MR. PINCUS: and demand more margin. |
|----|--|
| 2 | JUSTICE STEVENS: I was under the impression |
| 3 | from the briefs, and maybe I'm wrong, that you did not |
| 4 | defend the reasoning of the Second Circuit. Am I right |
| 5 | or wrong? |
| 6 | |
| | MR. PINCUS: Well, we don't to the extent |
| 7 | Petitioners claim that the Second Circuit based its |
| 8 | reasoning on on the imputation into 25(b) of the |
| 9 | limitations in 25(a), we don't agree with that. |
| 10 | JUSTICE STEVENS: Which was the principal |
| 11 | basis for its decision. |
| 12 | MR. PINCUS: But there was a second basis to |
| 13 | its decision, which talked about the fact that Klein |
| 14 | didn't engage in trading, and we agree with that basis |
| 15 | because that's that's what we're arguing here. |
| 16 | JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, on that subject and |
| 17 | you your client obviously has an institutional |
| 18 | interest in the case, assuming you don't prevail, is the |
| 19 | Government's theory much broader and more undesirable in |
| 20 | your view than that offered in Klein's brief? I didn't |
| 21 | have an opportunity to ask Mr. Days if he accepted the |
| 22 | Government's position. |
| 23 | MR. PINCUS: Well, it it certainly would |
| 24 | be better if the phrase "transaction on or subject to |
| 25 | the rules of the contract market" meant "trade" and we |

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were only discussing how expansive, how elastic the
definition of "trade" was.

3 We would still take the position that it's 4 not elastic enough, obviously, to include clearing 5 members, but we think that, given the language that Congress used and the fact that that language is used to б 7 refer to -- that "on or subject to" formulation is repeatedly used to refer to trades, we think it's very 8 clear that trades have to be what it is. Otherwise, 9 10 when the statute talks about the fact that a floor 11 broker engages in activities on or subject to the rules of a contract market, it could be talking about 12 13 discrimination and all kinds of other activities.

14 But even with respect to the narrower 15 formulation urged by the Solicitor General, we think 16 that it is not right for several reasons. First of all, 17 the language of the statute, as I said, but there's a 18 clarity problem. If once you move beyond that contract 19 that is executed and becomes complete on the pit, how 20 far do you go? There's clearing before the contract is 21 executed on the pit -- at the pit. There may be 22 antecedent activities -- for example, someone who 23 doesn't have floor privileges has to go through an FCM. There may be an introducing broker that introduces that 24 25 customer to the FCM. Are all of those activities --

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1 which are specified in the statute, just like the 2 subsequent clearing activity is specified in the 3 statute -- are they also shoe-horned into the definition 4 of trade? 5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus --6 MR. PINCUS: And that's where --7 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Justice Kennedy was 8 asking you about the Government's position. One of the positions -- one aspect of the government's position is 9 10 that -- that you would not dispute that a person who 11 engaged in a transaction subject to the rules of a 12 clearinghouse would be a proper plaintiff under the 13 current law. Well, certainly the FCM is a person 14 subject to the rules of a clearinghouse. MR. PINCUS: Yes, although obviously the 15 16 parties haven't briefed the current law. We would take 17 the position that the current law doesn't change the 18 equation and --19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's what I thought 20 your position was. So that's not an accurate --21 MR. PINCUS: No. 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: -- characterization. 23 MR. PINCUS: No. Our position is, again, 24 the "on or subject to" language, we believe, quite 25 clearly refers to trades, and that Congress's

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technically correct substitution of registered entities
 doesn't change that.

3 JUSTICE SOUTER: But you're saying that 4 because a trade is on or subject to, the only thing that 5 can be on or subject to is a trade. And it seems to me that that -- that's the point at which we have 6 7 difficulty following your argument. Why -- what is your reason, textual or otherwise, for saying that because a 8 trade is on or subject to, no other subtransaction can 9 10 be on or subject to? 11 MR. PINCUS: Because -- because trades are 12 the only thing that fit those two criteria. Only trades 13 are -- can be under the statute either on the contract 14 market, either because -- because they are executed at 15 the pit or so-called off-market trades as referred to in 16 section 6(c), very small categories of off-market 17 transactions --18 JUSTICE STEVENS: But even if the --19 MR. PINCUS: -- that are the equivalent of 20 trades, but can occur off-market. 21 JUSTICE STEVENS: But, Mr. Pincus, even if 22 you limit it to the word "trades," it does not 23 necessarily follow that the only parties to the trade are the original buyer and the original seller. 24 There 25 are two intermediates who participate in the execution

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1 of the trade.

2 MR. PINCUS: I agree, Your Honor, and that's 3 the second part of our argument. Once we reach the 4 point where it's "trade," then the question is what does 5 "trade" mean? And --

6 JUSTICE STEVENS: Does it include this
7 transaction?

8 MR. PINCUS: Well, we believe that it --9 there are -- at the pit, again, that the transaction --10 the on transaction, the transaction that occurs on, is 11 the open outcry transaction where, in this case, Eisler 12 made an offer and some other floor trader accepted it. And that was complete there. Klein had no role in that 13 14 transaction, and clearing members do not have a role in 15 that transaction.

16 JUSTICE STEVENS: Why do you say Klein had 17 no --

18 MR. PINCUS: They come in later.

JUSTICE STEVENS: Why do you say that Klein had no role in it? It was an indispensable party to the transaction.

MR. PINCUS: It was a subsequent party. Ithad a subsequent role --

JUSTICE STEVENS: Before it was completed,
he participated. He was -- he functioned as a

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1 guarantor.

2 MR. PINCUS: Well, it was not -- it need not 3 be clear, at the moment that the trade is executed at 4 the pit, who the clearing member will be. Often it 5 won't be. 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: It was cleared by the time 7 it was over. 8 MR. PINCUS: No -- well, it depends what you mean by "over," Your Honor. What happens in the 9 process, if I can just lay it out for one minute, is the 10 11 transaction occurs at the pit. It's recorded. The 12 clearing member --13 JUSTICE STEVENS: There's a transaction 14 between A and D, but before it can be consummated, B and 15 C have to play a role. MR. PINCUS: Well, that activity is over. 16 17 I'll try to use neutral words. That activity at the pit 18 is over. The next -- that data, who bought, who sold, 19 and maybe the clearing members for those two parties are 20 identified. Maybe they're not. They might not be 21 identified for an hour according to the rules. So 22 something happened at the pit. It's then entered into 23 the computers, and at some subsequent point, yes, the 24 clearing members will be identified and the trade will 25 be cleared.

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| 1 | Our point is that is subsequent activity. |
|----|--|
| 2 | That is activity that's the clearing process. It's |
| 3 | important, but there is an enforceable contract before |
| 4 | the clearing event occurs. Nothing in the rules say |
| 5 | that the contract is unenforceable |
| 6 | JUSTICE BREYER: That's true, but is there |
| 7 | any reason that the word "transaction" would have |
| 8 | serves a purpose by being so limited? |
| 9 | MR. PINCUS: It does, Your Honor. |
| 10 | JUSTICE BREYER: Why would what reason |
| 11 | would Congress have wanted to do that? |
| 12 | MR. PINCUS: Well, because of in the |
| 13 | environment that Congress was operating just following |
| 14 | this Court's decision in Curran, the focus entirely was |
| 15 | on protecting investors. |
| 16 | JUSTICE BREYER: That's not a reason. I |
| 17 | want to know what reason what harm will be done if, |
| 18 | in fact, we take the word "transaction" and say the word |
| 19 | "transaction," while it's capable of the interpretation |
| 20 | you give, is also capable of an interpretation that |
| 21 | includes all the near contemporaneous events, including |
| 22 | the financing and guarantees? Like a mortgage in |
| 23 | selling a house. |
| 24 | MR. PINCUS: Because |
| 25 | JUSTICE BREYER: And that also is |

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1 linguistically possible. What harm will be done --2 MR. PINCUS: The harm that will be --3 JUSTICE BREYER: -- if the second is chosen, 4 and not the first? 5 MR. PINCUS: The harm -- two categories of harm. First, a lack of clarity. We don't know, as I б 7 said, how far back are we going. The statute requires, for customers that are not trade -- not exchange 8 members, they have to go to an introducing broker. They 9 10 have to go then to an FCM. 11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the only one that has 12 this relationship that's different from an ordinary 13 broker, the only one is the FCM. 14 MR. PINCUS: But that's true, Your Honor, 15 but if the Court were to adopt a rule that says we're going to read "transaction" broadly, and so anyone who 16 17 has anything to do with any aspect of the trade, either 18 before it or afterward, is covered, all of these 19 antecedent people, just in terms of the statutory 20 language, are people who have a role. 21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But they're not people who are at risk. I mean, if there -- if it's -- a 22 23 broker who was just executing a trade for a commission 24 is not at risk, but this FCM is at risk, in this transaction, series of transactions. 25

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| 1 | MR. PINCUS: But it's hard to see in the |
|----|--|
| 2 | language where Congress would have drawn the line. I |
| 3 | think the problem is the lack of clarity. We certainly |
| 4 | won't know, if the Court says we're going to move beyond |
| 5 | this core transaction and encompass some of the |
| 6 | ancillary activities |
| 7 | JUSTICE BREYER: I've got that. |
| 8 | MR. PINCUS: Okay. |
| 9 | JUSTICE BREYER: I got that when you said |
| 10 | there were two. What's the second? |
| 11 | MR. PINCUS: Well, let me just add to the |
| 12 | to the first, that there are subsequent activities. |
| 13 | There also are arrangements set up with banks that |
| 14 | automatically supply margin, that facilitate |
| 15 | transactions. And so the question will be, aren't those |
| 16 | banks, who play an important liquidity role, aren't they |
| 17 | also part of the transaction? |
| 18 | The second reason is the reason involved |
| 19 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The answer would be |
| 20 | that those transactions are not subject to the rules of |
| 21 | the exchange. |
| 22 | MR. PINCUS: Well, they are, but they |
| 23 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They don't care what |
| 24 | kind of arrangement the FCM might have with its bank. |
| 25 | That's up to the FCM. There's no exchange |

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| 1 | MR. PINCUS: But it has to have an |
|----|--|
| 2 | arrangement, and that fact is a rule of the exchange. |
| 3 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Isn't it some |
| 4 | MR. PINCUS: So it depends what rule. |
| 5 | Again, we're we're embarking |
| 6 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Pincus |
| 7 | MR. PINCUS: on a rule where we're not |
| 8 | going to know what the answer is. |
| 9 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: The the agency that's |
| 10 | supposed to be the supervisor of this area, the CFTC, is |
| 11 | taking the position that the Government presented to us |
| 12 | today. Apparently, it doesn't have the concern that you |
| 13 | have just expressed about reaching people who are not |
| 14 | themselves subject to the regulation of the exchange, of |
| 15 | the clearinghouse. |
| 16 | MR. PINCUS: Well, I think it does have that |
| 17 | concern, Justice Ginsburg, which is why Mr. Stewart said |
| 18 | that the Court should sort of take this case on certain |
| 19 | assumptions because, as he recognized, the theory that |
| 20 | even the Government put forward in its brief |
| 21 | JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that what he |
| 22 | was telling us was that, even if you assume that Klein |
| 23 | has that even if you've assumed that. |
| 24 | MR. PINCUS: Well, it's certainly their |
| 25 | position that Klein has standing, but in terms of the |
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1 consequences of a ruling by the Court that the statute 2 goes beyond the core activity, I think the Government's 3 suggestion sort of shows that even the Government is not 4 sure, once you embarked on that exercise, where the 5 boundary line is. And I would point out the Government is not asking for deference in this case, nor could it. 6 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I think you're still 8 on Justice Breyer, his second reason. 9 MR. PINCUS: I do, Your Honor, and the 10 second reason is involved in the Government's response 11 to Justice Souter's question about multiple recoveries. 12 If all of these various people can assert claims, then 13 there is certainly a risk, and a significant risk, that 14 all of these various people will assert different kinds 15 of monetary harm that they will claim is actual loss. 16 In this case, the principal, actual loss, as 17 we discuss in the second argument in our brief, is 18 claimed as the loss from the destruction alleged --19 allegedly caused to the destruction of Klein's business. 20 If there was a bad-enough event on an 21 exchange, all of the people in the -- in the row from 22 the introducing broker down to the end, down to the 23 bank, could claim that because there was a foul-up in the electronic reporting system and trades were 24 25 misreported for a week and, when they were unwound, the

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| 1 | consequences of that where lots of bankruptcies in the |
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| 2 | futures industry, that all of those liabilities get |
| 3 | pegged to the contract market. As as the FIA |
| 4 | JUSTICE STEVENS: Aren't there lots of |
| 5 | situations in which a very serious run harms a whole |
| 6 | bunch of people, and they all recover? |
| 7 | MR. PINCUS: There are, Justice Stevens, but |
| 8 | as the this is a particular kind of industry. As the |
| 9 | as the Futures Industry Association notes in its |
| 10 | brief, every day more than \$5 trillion worth of |
| 11 | contracts are traded on futures exchanges. There's a |
| 12 | huge amount of concentrated risk in contract markets. |
| 13 | If the contract markets are going to be made |
| 14 | liable to a vast array of people, there is a very |
| 15 | serious risk |
| 16 | JUSTICE STEVENS: You have it in this very |
| 17 | case. |
| 18 | MR. PINCUS: that puts them in financial |
| 19 | jeopardy. |
| 20 | JUSTICE STEVENS: You would agree, if the |
| 21 | Klein had been trading on its own account with a risk |
| 22 | helper, it would have may have recovered for the |
| 23 | for its loss to itself, right? |
| 24 | MR. PINCUS: Yes, if it had been trading for |
| 25 | its own account. |

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JUSTICE STEVENS: If it has some trades for itself and some for other customers, it only can recover half of those. Does that make sense?

MR. PINCUS: It does, because Klein is a
market insider. It has ways to protect itself other
than suing the contract market.

7 It can certainly sue its customer. It has 8 ways of protecting itself, as the CFTC report said, in 9 terms of demanding more margin, in terms of watching the 10 risk in its customer's portfolio, in terms of -- of 11 hedging its own risk. It's an insider, and it can do 12 that.

13 What Congress was concerned with here -- and 14 the reason our construction of the statute makes sense -- is that it protects the outsiders, the PB investors 15 16 who are at the core of the concern here, without 17 imposing a broad array of liability on the contract 18 markets, who are in the middle of a huge, huge amount of 19 financial risk, which really puts them in a position of shouldering risk that's intolerable. 20

JUSTICE KENNEDY: Are there instances where multiple parties who are injured sue under State law, or is this generally deemed preemptive, or it just doesn't happen?

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MR. PINCUS: Well, there are other options.

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Alderson Reporting Company

| 1 | I mean, one of the things that Klein says here is that |
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| 2 | this is its only option. It can go to the FTC. |
| 3 | In this case, for example, the FTC order |
| 4 | against Eisler assessed a civil penalty, but then said |
| 5 | the order could be for that obligation could be |
| б | fulfilled by paying the injured parties. Klein to |
| 7 | the extent Klein has an injury, the FTC the CFTC in a |
| 8 | similar case could do the same thing. There are State |
| 9 | law claims. There are |
| 10 | JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Pincus, will you |
| 11 | satisfy me on one point? I I understand your |
| 12 | argument about what "transaction" means. But even if I |
| 13 | accept that argument, explain to me again why "or |
| 14 | subject to the rules of doesn't add anything? |
| 15 | MR. PINCUS: Well, it does. It adds in |
| 16 | our construction "the transactions that are on" are the |
| 17 | transactions that occur on the floor. The transactions |
| 18 | that are "subject to the rules" are the ex-pit |
| 19 | transactions. |
| 20 | Once you say "or subject to the rules" |
| 21 | involves more than ex-pit trades, off-exchange trades, |
| 22 | then you're into the world of the Court's hypotheticals |
| 23 | to Mr. Days of anti-discrimination rules. |
| 24 | So it has to have a limited meaning. And, |
| 25 | by coupling it with "on," we think that Congress made |

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1 clear it was referring to trades.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Why wouldn't it have been enough to just say "transactions on," if that was their meaning?

5 MR. PINCUS: Then --

б JUSTICE SCALIA: Why did -- did they --7 MR. PINCUS: Because then you wouldn't capture 8 a category -- because then Congress would have left out 9 a category of trades. Congress meant to capture 10 investors who trade. There are two categories of 11 transactions that meet that test. Those that occur on 12 the exchange, on the -- physically on the pit, and those 13 that are, within the industry, called "off-exchange" or 14 "off-pit" transactions defined in section 6(c) of the 15 Act -- of the -- of the statute.

And so by -- the second phrase is meant to capture those trades that may involve investors, but don't occur at the pit.

JUSTICE SOUTER: But, I take it, your ultimate, let's say, policy reason for confining it to that is the -- is the policy against multiple recovery. MR. PINCUS: Yes. The policy reason is the risk of multiple recoveries in an area where there is a huge amount of risk. The contract market is at the center of things, of these \$5 trillion a day. And so

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Congress wrote very carefully, and Congress's focus was,
 in the wake of Curran -- and given what it said -- was
 investors.

Because the -- the implied cause of action
that the Court recognized in Curran was all about
investors. The rationale --

JUSTICE SOUTER: Yes, but the rationale given is, basically, that's probably all Congress was thinking about.

10 MR. PINCUS: Yes.

11 JUSTICE SOUTER: But, as I understand your 12 position, it's something more. Congress was also 13 thinking, probably, about multiple recovery, and it 14 didn't want that. And we will impute that intent to 15 Congress because multiple recovery would be a very bad 16 thing for the industry. That's basically your argument. 17 MR. PINCUS: Yes. That is our argument. 18 JUSTICE SOUTER: Okay. 19 MR. PINCUS: Let me say a word about the 20 rules and whether the rules are relevant here. It seems 21 to us that Congress used a phrase in the statute, and

that it -- that that cannot be changed by a rule that says -- if an exchange adopted a rule that said some transaction was on or subject to the rules of it, that wouldn't be enough to put it into the statutory

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| 1 | language. The test is what Congress meant. Thank you. |
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| 2 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, |
| 3 | Mr. Pincus. |
| 4 | Mr. Days, you have a minute. |
| 5 | REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DREW S. DAYS III |
| 6 | ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER |
| 7 | MR. DAYS: Your Honors, Mr. Pincus has |
| 8 | identified what he views as some temporal gap between |
| 9 | the entering into a contract and the involvement of the |
| 10 | the clearing FCM. That simply is not the case. |
| 11 | Klein had a prior commitment to clear |
| 12 | Eisler's trade. So even at the time that Eisler was |
| 13 | trading, that had to be done with the understanding that |
| 14 | Klein was going to back him up. |
| 15 | If one looks at the gray brief at page 21, |
| 16 | at references to the rule of NTYE rules of NYFE 116 |
| 17 | and 118 that make this very clear. The story is, as |
| 18 | we've indicated, that throughout this process, the |
| 19 | clearing FCM is financially liable and, therefore, is on |
| 20 | the hook. |
| 21 | When Congress enacted the statute, it was |
| 22 | concerned with protecting the public and maintaining |
| 23 | credibility. We think that this cause of action, this |
| 24 | express cause of action for allowing FCMs to sue, is |
| 25 | most reliant to the objectives of Congress the |

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| 1 | faithful execution by an FCM that deals directly with |
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| 2 | these entities, the clearinghouse and the commodity |
| 3 | contract market. Thank you very much. |
| 4 | CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Days. |
| 5 | The case is submitted. |
| 6 | (Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m. the case in the |
| 7 | above-entitled matter was submitted.) |
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