1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - x : 3 UNITED STATES, 4 Petitioner : : No. 06-1005 5 v. 6 EFRAIN SANTOS AND : 7 BENEDICTO DIAZ : - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 8 9 Washington, D.C. 10 Wednesday, October, 3, 2007 11 12 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 13 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States 14 at 11:04 a.m. 15 APPEARANCES: MATTHEW D. ROBERTS, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor 16 17 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on 18 behalf of the Petitioner. 19 TODD G. VARE, ESQ., Indianapolis, Ind.; on behalf of 20 Respondents. 21 22 23 24 25

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (11:04 a.m.) CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument 3 4 next in case 06-1005, United States versus Santos. 5 Mr. Roberts. ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW D. ROBERTS 6 7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 8 MR. ROBERTS: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it 9 please the Court: 10 The Seventh Circuit has seriously misconstrued 11 the Federal money laundering statute by interpreting the 12 term "proceeds" to mean profits. The statute prohibits 13 the laundering of all the gross receipts of a crime, not 14 just its profits. The primary meaning of "proceeds" is 15 gross receipts, and the statutory context makes clear 16 that's the meaning Congress intended here. The statute 17 is structured to prevent criminals from using the fruits 18 of their crimes to promote or to conceal their illegal 19 activities. But a profits definition of "proceeds" would 20 constrict the statute in ways that can't be squared with 21 that statutory objective. 22 Because the word "proceeds" appears in 23 the introductory section of the statute, those kinds of restrictions would apply to both concealment and 24 25 promotion cases.

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1	For example, the statute wouldn't cover
2	expense payments that are structured to conceal the
3	unlawful nature and source of the funds involved. That
4	means that if an illegal gambling operator recorded the
5	compensation that he paid his collectors as salary
6	payments by a legitimate business that he owned, that
7	that would not be covered under the statute.
8	JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, I mean so what?
9	MR. ROBERTS: Well, Congress was trying
10	JUSTICE SCALIA: Is there some rule up there
11	that says every criminal statute has to cover as much as
12	possible?
13	MR. ROBERTS: No, Your Honor. That's not
14	what we're arguing. What we're arguing is that there is
15	no reason that Congress wouldn't have covered these
16	transactions and that they implicate the objectives of
17	the statute as revealed by its text, just as much as the
18	transactions that are clearly covered.
19	JUSTICE SCALIA: I think it I think it
20	much more remarkable than that, more extraordinary than
21	that, that Congress would want to make all all
22	betting operations like this a violation automatically
23	of two criminal statutes.
24	MR. ROBERTS: Well, Your Honor
25	JUSTICE SCALIA: I find that sort of, you

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1 know, very strange.

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2 MR. ROBERTS: -- it is certainly true that 3 illegal gambling and money laundering are frequently 4 going to occur together, but that isn't a cause for 5 concern. It just reflects the fact that certain businesses, certain illegal businesses like gambling 6 7 operations, like drug dealing, frequently generate 8 large amounts of cash and they need to launder that 9 cash in order to survive and to prosper. 10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It is hard to see this --11 that, just in the sense of laundering, nothing is being 12 concealed. They're not -- the money that's being paid

13 to the runners and the collectors, it is an ordinary and 14 necessary expense of the illegal business.

So I think Justice Scalia was emphasizing that this is, for the very same conduct two discrete statutes, one with much heavier penalties. That makes it odd, too, that the basic gambling statute has a lower penalty than this money laundering statute, and yet it's the same conduct that's violating both.

21 MR. ROBERTS: Well, it's not the same 22 conduct in that the conduct here, the paying the winners 23 and paying the collectors is not a required element of 24 the gambling offense.

JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh well, I mean -- come on.

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1 Nobody -- nobody runs a gambling operation without 2 paying off the winners. It's not going to last very 3 long. 4 MR. ROBERTS: It's true --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: To make the paying off of the winners a separate crime from running the gambling б 7 operation seems to me guite extraordinary. MR. ROBERTS: It -- it -- it's true, Your 8 9 Honor, that they're not going to last very long. 10 They're not going to survive. They're not going to 11 grow. That's because they need to commit money 12 laundering in different ways to do that. 13 JUSTICE ALITO: Even if --14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Can you tell me what 15 happens if there's a -- two bank robbers, the one's in 16 the getaway car; the other goes in to the bank 17 teller, and the robber that goes into the bank gets 18 \$1,000 and he comes out and gives \$500 to the getaway 19 quy. Is that a violation of the statute? 20 MR. ROBERTS: That is, if the -- if the 21 payment would promote the continuing -- if they've got a 22 continuing robbery operation and by paying him he's 23 going to say -- he's saying, you know, keep on continuing 24 in the operation and let's expand it further. Yes, that 25 would -- that would --

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1	JUSTICE SOUTER: Well, in your theory,
2	wouldn't it I mean, the employee who gets paid shows
3	up for work the next morning; and so, of course, under
4	your theory it would be promotion.
5	MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, your question and
6	a lot of the questions I'm getting, I think express
7	concern about treating these transactions as promotion
8	under the statute. But the question
9	JUSTICE SOUTER: I would have the same
10	concern if we were dealing with concealment.
11	MR. ROBERTS: Well I don't
12	JUSTICE SOUTER: If the robbery takes place
13	in a dark alley, is that automatically concealment?
14	MR. ROBERTS: No, because what needs to be
15	concealed, what there needs to be is a financial
16	transaction that's designed, the transaction itself, to
17	conceal the nature and source of the proceeds.
18	JUSTICE SOUTER: That's going into the alley
19	instead of doing it out on the
20	MR. ROBERTS: I don't think that doing a
21	robbery in the alley would be a financial transaction
22	would be designing a financial transaction to conceal
23	the unlawful nature and source of the proceeds.
24	But if I can give you an example of
25	JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Roberts, isn't it true

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that the problems that are being highlighted are problems that result from expansive interpretations of other concepts that are not before us here, expansive interpretation of promotion, expansive interpretation of concealment?

6 The Seventh Circuit, in the first appeal in 7 this case, interpreted promotion very broadly. And then, 8 I guess it felt that it had boxed itself in and that's 9 what led to this interpretation of proceeds. But if you 10 interpret those other concepts more narrowly, you don't 11 have the same kind of overlap.

12 MR. ROBERTS: I agree with that, Your Honor. 13 I was going to try to say to Justice Souter's question 14 before that if you have concerns that these kind of 15 expense payments should not be treated as promotional 16 money laundering, the way to address those is not by 17 adopting a profit construction of "proceeds", because that 18 would do tremendous violence to the statute in other 19 ways.

And I do think that there are --JUSTICE GINSBURG: What about the qualification that Judge Easterbrook made that he said, at least where the crime is a business-like operation? He gave the example of gambling, he gave the example of selling contraband.

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1	And it seems to me that he was narrowing his
2	definition of "proceeds" to cases where the crime is not
3	robbery or a one-time event, but a business-like
4	operation.
5	MR. ROBERTS: Well, I think it's difficult
6	to interpret the proceeds, the term "proceeds," to mean
7	something different for business operations than for
8	other crimes because it's the same word. But even so,
9	Your Honor, there are other ways
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why don't you
11	continue. I'm sorry. I didn't know you weren't done.
12	MR. ROBERTS: Okay. I'm sorry.
13	Even so, there are other ways in which a
14	profits definition just makes no sense under this
15	statute, besides the numerous concealment transactions
16	that would be excluded that Congress would have no
17	reason not to cover. It also would make no sense as
18	applied to professional money launderers. Those are
19	people who are hiding money for criminals as a matter of
20	their business. Because they wouldn't be guilty of
21	money laundering, even if they knew that they were
22	concealing money that was generated by a Federal felony,
23	unless they also knew that the money was profits.
24	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought your
25	answer to the line of questioning that we've having

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1 is that the problem would still be there, even if you 2 limited this statute to profits. You take the two bank 3 robbers in Justice Kennedy's hypothetical, the one that 4 robs the bank, the other in the getaway car. If before 5 the robber gave the money to the person in the getaway car, he said, now, you know, I'm keeping \$100 because I 6 7 had to buy the gun and that was \$100, so you only get 8 \$400, so it's only the profits that they're splitting, you'd have the same problem, wouldn't you? 9 10 MR. ROBERTS: That's right. That's another 11 point, Your Honor, that a profits definition itself 12 isn't going to solve the problem of where the underlying 13 crime and the money laundering --14 JUSTICE SCALIA: It will solve a lot them. 15 And unless you're willing to come in and say, yes, do it 16 to us, give us a narrower definition of concealment and 17 a narrower definition of what's a transaction, but 18 you're not willing to do that. You're going to stretch 19 that as broadly as you can. 20 MR. ROBERTS: It's not going to -- it's 21 not -- first of all, this case doesn't present the 22 interpretation of promotion and the Court would be free to address that in --23 24 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- the case doesn't present 25 it. Maybe the question presented doesn't present it --

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1 the case doesn't present it. 2 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. 3 JUSTICE STEVENS: -- but the facts of 4 the case do present it. I mean, it seems to me it's 5 theoretically possible we could agree with you on the profits issue, but nevertheless say this doesn't fit 6 7 the promotion. 8 MR. ROBERTS: You certainly could, Your Honor. But that would not be an alternative ground that 9 10 would be appropriate for you to rule on in this case, 11 because that issue was raised on direct appeal. It was 12 decided against Respondents by the --13 JUSTICE STEVENS: I understand all that, but we can still do it if it's perfectly obvious that that's 14 15 the right way to dispose of the case. 16 MR. ROBERTS: You can obviously address any 17 issue that you want to, Your Honor. But the ordinary 18 rule is that issues that have been decided on direct 19 review shouldn't be relitigated on collateral attack. The issue wasn't addressed by either of the courts below 20 21 in these collateral proceedings. 22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Wouldn't it be --23 MR. ROBERTS: We do submit that it was resolved correctly in this case, because, as the Seventh 24 25 Circuit held and as all the other courts of appeals have

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held about promotion, the payments to the winners and
 the payments to the collectors encourage the continued
 participation of the collectors and encourage the
 increased participation by gamblers.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Roberts, the Seventh 6 Circuit in this case was following a precedent in 7 another case and it thought that the defendant would 8 prevail under its theory.

If this Court should say that that theory, 9 10 that it's profits and not gross receipts that matter, 11 wouldn't it be appropriate for us, if we don't decide 12 the question ourselves, to remand and say, Seventh 13 Circuit, your precedent was wrong; but you could 14 consider a question that was not necessary for you to 15 reach because you had your precedent on the profits 16 issue?

17 MR. ROBERTS: You could do that, but the 18 question that I think that is concerning the Court was 19 resolved by the Seventh Circuit in this very case on 20 direct appeal. So on direct appeal, the argument was 21 made by Mr. Santos that these transactions can't count 22 as promotional money laundering because they're 23 essential transactions of the business and that they don't promote the carrying on of the business, and the 24 25 court of appeals rejected those arguments.

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1	JUSTICE SCALIA: You might well reject it if
2	you're going to have a narrow definition of "proceeds." I
3	mean, that rejection was connected with its acceptance
4	of a narrow definition of "proceeds." And if you're
5	asking us to obliterate the latter, I don't know why it
6	isn't reasonable to send it back to the Seventh Circuit
7	and say, well, you still said the same thing if you came
8	out differently on the "proceeds" question.
9	MR. ROBERTS: Well, we certainly would
10	prefer that you did that than that you interpreted
11	proceeds to mean profits because of the violence that it
12	would do to the remainder of the statute, Your Honor.
13	I was talking about professional money
14	launderers before and how they wouldn't be guilty of
15	money laundering if they were concealing money that they
16	knew that was generated by a crime. And Congress
17	there's no reason that Congress would have considered
18	those professional money launderers to be less culpable
19	merely because they might be laundering only illicit
20	receipts.
21	And it would be very difficult for the
22	government to prove that professional money launderers
23	knew that they were laundering profits because they
24	haven't participated in the predicate crime.
25	JUSTICE BREYER: I've got that point, but

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1 what is your suggestion as to how to deal with what is
2 underlying disturbing me and it seems like a lot of
3 others; if prima facie Congress did not intend that you
4 launder money where the activity is an essential part of
5 the underlying crime itself. And there are three ways
6 of dealing with that:

7 One is this gross receipts method, which has8 the defects you mentioned.

9 The second is a definition of "promotion" 10 which says when you promote a crime that's different 11 from engaging in the crime.

And the third is sentencing; because it's a real offense sentencing method and where what you've done is nothing more than the underlying crime, the sentence should be nothing more than the underlying crime. I see three ways to get to the same problem, and you're asking us to decide them piecemeal, yet they're related. What do I do?

MR. ROBERTS: Well, I think you decide the question presented here and you decide that "proceeds" means that -- that "proceeds" means gross receipts, because that's the only meaning that makes sense with the statute.

24 But the sentencing point you make is a very, 25 very good one, Your Honor. And the fact is that the

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Sentencing Guidelines were changed in 2001 to align the
 punishment for money laundering when people participate
 in the underlying crime much more with the punishment
 level for the underlying crime.

5 And -- you know, in addition, as we know, 6 the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, and so courts 7 could certainly take into account concern about 8 overlap --

9 JUSTICE BREYER: But still your answer 10 leaves me -- and I have no answer to this; I want yours. 11 I want you to see that I'm in -- at risk here as a judge 12 of getting whipsawed, that I first decide this case for 13 you; and the next case, all kinds of arguments appear 14 that I hadn't thought of; and then the third case, 15 again. But if I could have them somehow together, I 16 could look at the least evil way or the most efficient 17 way of achieving the congressional objective.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, I think that you can't have all of them together, Your Honor, unfortunately. But I do think that we would say that out of the three that you raised, the best way to deal with concerns about this would be in the sentencing context.

JUSTICE SCALIA: I find that extraordinary. You really come in and say yes, two crimes, assume that Congress meant ordinary gambling crime to carry with it

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1 this other extraordinarily high penalty for the same 2 activity that involves the gambling, but don't worry 3 about it, we'll even it out in the sentencing. 4 I mean -- that's no way to run a railroad. 5 MR. ROBERTS: It's not -- Your Honor, it's just not exactly the same activity, because people can б 7 commit gambling without commit money laundering. They 8 can be quilt of illegal gambling without being guilty of 9 money laundering --10 JUSTICE SCALIA: Straighten that out in the definition of the crime, rather than in the --11 12 MR. ROBERTS: But they can be -- even under 13 this definition, Your Honor. In this very case there 14 were restaurant and tavern owners that permitted the gambling bets to be taken on their premises because it 15 16 increased their -- the patronage of their businesses. 17 And they were convicted of participating in illegal 18 gambling operations. They didn't commit money 19 laundering, because they didn't engage in a financial 20 transaction that's not an element of the gambling 21 offense, that involves the proceeds of the offense, and 22 that's intended either to conceal the proceeds --23 JUSTICE STEVENS: But it is important, is it 24 not, Mr. Roberts that the gambling offense is conducting a gambling business, so it makes it -- it is not just 25

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1 the gambling itself, it's conducting -- really a 2 similarity between the two. 3 MR. ROBERTS: It is -- but the statute 4 defines what the three -- the statue defines what the 5 three elements of the gambling business are, Your Honor. That it's illegal -- gambling that's illegal under State 6 7 law, that involves 5 or more persons, that it has --8 continues for more than 30 days or has more than \$2,000 9 in gross revenues in a day. 10 JUSTICE SCALIA: What continues? The 11 business has to continue. You are not engaging in a 12 gambling business if you're not paying off the winners. 13 That's fraud. That's not a good decent honest gambling 14 business. 15 (Laughter.) 16 The gambling business -- it MR. ROBERTS: 17 might be gambling and fraud, Your Honor. But the 18 gambling business can continue for more than 30 days 19 without having paid the winners if they had a lottery 20 every month, and it was at the end of the month -- they 21 hadn't paid the winners yet, it would have gone for the 22 30 days, in a 31-day month without -- without having 23 paid the winners. 24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And -- if your definition of "proceeds" is problematic, it is something like an 25

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1 abstract question you're asking us to answer. If this 2 -- if we say well, we're not sure this is proceeds but 3 if it is "proceeds", it is defined as gross receipts. 4 That's an artificial context in which to 5 address the issue. 6 MR. ROBERTS: Yes. I think that what 7 they're asking you to do is to interpret -- and what the 8 Seventh Circuit has done, is to interpret proceeds in a way that makes no sense for the statute in order to deal 9 10 with these concerns about promotion cases that can be 11 dealt with in the other ways that Justice Breyer raised. 12 And there are really four --13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Roberts, may I go back 14 to something you said about -- of the options that 15 Justice Breyer mentioned. 16 You said the way to handle it is in 17 sentencing. 18 Santos was sentenced to 60 months on the 19 gambling counts and 210 months on the laundering. You 20 said the statute has been changed. So what would be the 21 sentence under the statute as it now exists? And this 22 is vastly disproportionate. 60 months for gambling, and 23 210 for money laundering. 24 MR. ROBERTS: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Ι 25 probably should know the answer to what the precise

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range would be under the Guidelines. Now, I don't. But
 what I do know is before, the way the Guidelines worked
 was that the base offense level for a money laundering
 crime was not tied to the offense level for the
 underlying offense. So it was set I think starting at
 for promotional money laundering.

But what happened in 2001 is that the Commission changed the rules so that when you -- when the money laundering involves the person who participated in the underlying offense and has also done the money laundering, you start with the offense level for the underlying offense and then you make some minor increases depending upon the type and the --

14 JUSTICE BREYER: I have it in front of me 15 actually. I was looking at it. And it seems to me what 16 it assumes is that the underlying offense is different 17 from the money laundering. And do you have any 18 rationale at all as to why this individual, if it's true 19 that he did nothing more than engage in the underlying 20 offense, why should he receive one day more than 60 21 months?

22 MR. ROBERTS: Well, because he does engage 23 in something more than what he needs to do to be 24 punished for the underlying offense, and that conduct is 25 -- and that conduct is -- promotes ongoing crime or can

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1 conceal ongoing crime in ways that are just what 2 Congress was getting at in the statute. And --3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Because gambling under the 4 definition has the three elements that do not include 5 paying off the winners. That's what it all represents 6 7 MR. ROBERTS: Because -- well, that's one 8 thing, but the other thing is, Your Honor, if I could 9 talk about the ways that the proceeds definition just 10 doesn't make sense here. If these expense payments --11 the expense payments for instance, the payments of the 12 salary that Mr. Santos made to Mr. Diaz -- it happens in 13 this very case, although we didn't prosecute it as 14 concealment money laundering -- that he recorded those 15 payments as salary payments by a printing business that 16 he owned. 17 And he's doing that to conceal the activity, 18 to enable it to keep going. And that's just what 19 Congress was trying to get in the statute. Wouldn't be 20 covered under a profits definition. If criminals 21 concealed the gross receipts temporarily until they pay 22 the expenses -- for instance, if a gambling operator 23 takes the money that -- his illicit receipts from the 24 gambling, and he puts it in the bank account of the 25 printing business. And then later he uses it to pay the

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1 winning betters, he's doing that to hide it so the 2 gambling operation can keep going. That's what Congress 3 was trying to get at here. That wouldn't be covered. 4 That -- that evades detection just as much 5 as transactions that hide profit. 6 JUSTICE STEVENS: But you are saying it would 7 not be covered as money laundering, but nevertheless it would be illegal and be punished as gambling. 8 9 MR. ROBERTS: Yes, it would, Your Honor. 10 But the conduct, the concealment conduct --11 JUSTICE STEVENS: And everything they've 12 done here would be punished as gambling --13 MR. ROBERTS: -- the concealment conduct is additional conduct, and it is what Congress wanted to 14 15 get at here, and a profits definition would mean that it 16 is excluded from the statute. 17 And it would exclude the professional money 18 launderers too. 19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, you see the problem we have is we're not sure that it is within the statute. 20 21 So then you're asking us to say how to make the statute 22 work when we don't think the statute's applicable at 23 all. MR. ROBERTS: Well, I guess if you don't 24 25 think that concealing expense payments should be

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1 covered, that you don't think that concealing money that 2 is --3 JUSTICE STEVENS: Can you imagine running an 4 illegal gambling business and advertising your expenses? 5 I mean, you are going to conceal these things, that's 6 part of what you do. 7 MR. ROBERTS: It's not a question of 8 advertising them, Your Honor. It's not a question of advertising them, but it is a question of taking 9 10 additional conduct to conceal them. 11 JUSTICE STEVENS: But it's not additional 12 conduct. That's the point. 13 MR. ROBERTS: It is additional conduct. He 14 didn't need to record it on the books of the -- on the 15 books of his printing business. 16 JUSTICE SOUTER: What if he puts it in a tin 17 can and buries it in the garden? Is that additional 18 conduct? 19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Of course it is. MR. ROBERTS: It's additional conduct, but 20 21 it's not designed to conceal the unlawful nature --22 JUSTICE SOUTER: Why isn't it? Do you put 23 your salary in tin cans in the garden? 24 MR. ROBERTS: I might like to keep my money 25 in the cookie jar -- and it's perfectly legitimate

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1 money, Your Honor -- because I don't want when someone 2 comes into my house to -- for them to steal the cash. 3 JUSTICE SOUTER: I just don't see how you 4 can make the distinction you're making, and therefore I 5 don't see how you can avoid Justice Stevens's problem. 6 MR. ROBERTS: If he takes the money, Your 7 Honor, and he structures his payments to his employees 8 by making them -- or to his suppliers, by making them in \$9,000 increments in order to evade transaction 9 10 reporting requirements, that wouldn't be covered either 11 under this interpretation of the statute. 12 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Roberts, isn't it true 13 that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "proceeds" 14 doesn't really solve these problems except in the case 15 of an unprofitable business? In the case of a 16 profitable illegal enterprise, all of the same problems 17 exist. 18 MR. ROBERTS: I think that there are many 19 situations, as the Chief Justice pointed out, in which a 20 profits definition isn't going to be enough to solve it. 21 For instance, just a drug dealer accepts payment for the 22 drugs. If that money exceeds the cost of the business, 23 it would presumably be profits and without some other requirement in the statute, it would count as money 24 25 laundering. And for instance, when street-level dealers

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1 that are employed by a drug kingpin turn the receipts 2 over to the kingpin even after they take out their 3 share, let's say -- under a profits definition if those 4 receipts exceeded the costs of the business that would 5 also be covered as money laundering. So I think it's 6 very true that the profits definition isn't going to 7 solve all the problems as well. 8 That's a -- you know -- another point about 9 it. 10 It also means that what we have to prove 11 profits that that's going to be very difficult for us to 12 do even in cases that don't involve these expense 13 payments because criminals often don't keep accounting 14 They certainly don't keep records that are records. accurate and complete and decipherable by law 15 enforcement. And Congress recognized the lack of hard 16 17 evidence of criminal profits, and for that reason 18 Congress provided for the forfeiture of proceeds rather 19 than profits in the RICO and drug forfeiture statutes. 20 And there's no reason to think that Congress took a 21 different approach here in the money laundering statute, 22 two years later, when it used the same term "proceeds." 23 There's also -- there's the issue of the 24 uncertainty that would be created by a profits 25 definition, because it would raise all these questions,

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1 and there are no accounting rules to resolve them. 2 And even the court below acknowledged that 3 it's difficult to determine what is and isn't net 4 income, and that the line between paying expenses and 5 reinvesting that income is murky. 6 And I don't think the Court should lightly 7 assume that Congress intended a definition of an element 8 of the offense that's going to raise these numerous issues about the scope of that essential element of the 9 10 offense. And the Court is going to have to resolve them 11 all without any guidance from Congress. 12 So if I could reserve the reminder of my 13 time for rebuttal. 14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel. MR. ROBERTS: Thank you. 15 16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Vare. 17 ORAL ARGUMENT OF TODD G. VARE 18 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS 19 MR. VARE: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and 20 may it please the Court: 21 Justice Ginsburg, you have suggested 22 correctly that the only conduct in this case was the 23 payment of ordinary and necessary expenses of the 24 business. 25 Justice Scalia, you correctly suggested that

paying off winners is necessary to every gambling
 operation.

3 Justice Breyer, you have correctly suggested 4 that -- and stated that the money laundering statute is 5 intended to punish different conduct, different criminal activity than the underlying criminal activity. 6 7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Didn't Justice Alito 8 correctly suggest that these merger problems would still persist even under your definition of "proceeds"? 9 10 MR. VARE: I think that that is not 11 necessarily true. The merger problems would -- would 12 exist except for the "profits" definition, certainly on 13 the facts of these cases -- on this case. 14 On this case the only facts that were 15 presented by the Government -- and they have conceded 16 that they did not present any evidence of profits. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, but I mean if you have a "profits" definition and the enterprise has 18 19 profits, all of these problems we've been talking about 20 in terms of the merger, as I call it, between the money 21 laundering and the underlying offense would still be 22 there, right?

23 MR. VARE: Yes, Your Honor. There would. 24 There would. And, in fact, Justice Alito also correctly 25 suggested that the reason why the Scialabba panel

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decided the "proceeds" definition is profits was because of the expansive interpretation and application of the other aspects of the statute, and that they were left with essentially no choice.

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: So why are you urging us to 6 create two problems, to drag along all of the problems 7 that you object to with -- with interpreting proceeds to 8 include simply covering your expenses? You acknowledge 9 that the problems you point out would continue to exist 10 if we accept your definition.

On the other hand, I think you have to 11 12 acknowledge that accepting your definition creates other 13 problems of its own, such as the difficulty in every 14 case of showing that an illegal operation made a profit, 15 such as the difficulty of deciding what kind of criteria 16 you use for determining what are the -- what are the 17 ordinary and necessary expenses of a criminal 18 enterprise.

19 Why should we -- why should we choose to get 20 the worst of both worlds? And why isn't the proper way 21 to attack the difficulty to focus in on what constitutes 22 a transaction and what constitutes concealment --23 something other than the "proceeds" definition? 24 MR. VARE: I think you're absolutely 25 correct, Justice Scalia. And, in fact, in our

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1 opposition to the petition for cert in this case, we 2 made this very point as to why this was not the right 3 case to determine all of these issues, and particularly 4 the burdens that have been presented by the government. 5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Did you argue at any point that these were not proceeds? 6 7 MR. VARE: Yes, Your Honor, we did. 8 Justice Kennedy, in the briefing in the opposition to 9 cert and in our response brief, we have set forth 10 distinct arguments that there are not separate 11 transactions distinct and different from the underlying 12 criminal activity. 13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Did you argue that in the 14 court of appeals? 15 MR. VARE: That was presented as -- that was 16 presented as part of the Febus decision as an argument 17 that those transactions did not constitute distinct and 18 separate transactions from gambling. That was presented 19 in the pro se petition and acknowledged by the 20 government in responding to the pro se petition below. 21 The government acknowledged that the 22 question in Febus, the question in Scialabba, the 23 question in this case on habeas are legally and 24 factually indistinguishable. And I think Justice 25 Stevens has suggested that all of this is inherent in

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1 the question presented.

2 A fair -- it is fairly included because to 3 look at the statutory context of the word "proceeds" is 4 necessary for an intelligent resolution of the meaning 5 of that word as well as how it plays throughout the rest of the statute. 6 7 JUSTICE BREYER: The question is can you 8 violate the statute by financial transactions which --9 have you promoted the crime, when those transactions are 10 no more than part of the crime itself? 11 That's basically the question. And I think Justice Kennedy is asking if, in fact, we wanted to 12 13 reach that question, is this a case in which we could do 14 it, through reargument or in some other way? 15 I think that that is a question MR. VARE: 16 that this Court could resolve on the facts of this case, 17 or in a different case --18 JUSTICE BREYER: Was it raised in the 19 court below? It was -- it was raised in the 20 MR. VARE: court below as -- as inherent in the -- well, it was 21 22 certainly raised in the Febus, in the direct appeal. 23 It is inherent in the 2255 petition filed pro se by my client, Mr. Santos. It was acknowledged by 24 25 the government that these issues are not legally or

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1 factually distinguishable.

2 And again, it is inherent in the question 3 that's presented. The money laundering statute requires 4 conducting a financial transaction involving the 5 proceeds of the specified unlawful activity with the б intent to promote the --7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, I think it is a 8 stretch so far as the question presented. The question presented is very clear whether or not it is gross 9 10 receipts or net profits. That's what we're asked to 11 resolve. 12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: That's not your question 13 presented. MR. VARE: Absolutely not, Justice Ginsburg. 14 15 It is not our question presented, but we do feel that, 16 even in answering that question, whether or not it is 17 net or gross does require looking at the term in 18 context. And -- and the context -- and we're not looking at a 19 different statute. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I didn't see that 20 21 you presented a separate question presented in your 22 opposition. 23 MR. VARE: We did, Your Honor. 24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where is that? MR. VARE: In the -- Mr. Chief Justice --25

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1	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Not at page ii
2	not at page I, which is
3	MR. VARE: In Mr. Santos' brief. And the
4	question presented there was
5	JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's not in the BIO.
6	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Brief in opposition
7	
8	MR. VARE: In the brief of the opposition
9	the very first page, i.
10	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, but I am looking
11	at the orange one, not the red one. The orange one is
12	what we have before us when we decide whether or not to
13	grant certiorari. And there you don't have a different
14	question presented.
15	MR. VARE: No, we did not in the
16	opposition to the cert petition we did not present a
17	different question presented as a question presented.
18	But we did present the argument
19	Mr. Santos did and Mr. Diaz did that there were no
20	separate transactions that promoted the carrying on of
21	the specified unlawful activity. Rather, all that the
22	government had presented in this case was merely
23	conducting the illegal gambling business.
24	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: If we adopt your
25	position, we will have to decide a question like, for

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1 example, if the argument is I didn't have any profits 2 because I had to pay \$10,000 for a hit man to kill 3 somebody, we would have to have a judicial decision 4 that, yes, paying hit men is the ordinary and necessary 5 business expense in carrying out an illegal gambling 6 operation, right?

7 MR. VARE: I think, Mr. Chief Justice, in 8 any case you're going to have to look at what the 9 specified unlawful activity is in the context of a money 10 laundering prosecution, because that is part of the 11 context.

12 And so in this case you have to look at what 13 is the ordinary conduct of an illegal gambling business. 14 And I would suggest that paying off a hit man most 15 likely would not fall into that category. But, 16 certainly, as many of the Justices, including Justice 17 Scalia and Justice Stevens and others have suggested, 18 that when a gambling business pays off its winners, that 19 is inherent -- that is integral -- to conducting a 20 gambling business. It is not --21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Let's take two 22 illegal gambling operations that are identical in every 23 way except that the one pays the runners, you know, \$200 a week. The other pays the runners \$500 a week. And 24

25 the one that pays \$500 doesn't make any profits because

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1 he's paying too much to the runners. 2 The first one, the more successful 3 operation, you say, can be prosecuted for money 4 laundering because it has profits. The other one 5 doesn't. Incompetence is rewarded. MR. VARE: No, Mr. Chief Justice. I would 6 7 say that neither one could be prosecuted for money 8 laundering because in both situations --9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But the --MR. VARE: -- when in both situations the 10 11 gambling operator is simply paying off ordinary business 12 expenses. Just the collectors who are part and parcel 13 of running the illegal gambling business, they're one of 14 the participants. And that's part of the illegal 15 gambling statute, is that you have to have five or more 16 participants. 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I'm focusing on 18 the question presented -- that was the only question 19 presented when we considered whether to grant certiorari 20 by either of the parties, and that focuses solely on the question of whether "proceeds" is considered gross 21 22 revenues or profits. 23 MR. VARE: Well, Mr. Chief Justice, what I -- what I believe is the answer to your question is --24 25 is you cannot look at the term "proceeds" in isolation.

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1 And Justice Breyer, you know, suggested that the reason 2 why we're even here today, arguing about what I believe 3 is just absurd and unwarranted results on the facts of 4 this case, is because the courts below -- and the 5 government has proposed expansive interpretations -- the courts below have adopted, in some cases and not in 6 7 others, these expansive interpretations. 8 JUSTICE ALITO: But this doesn't --"proceeds" must mean the same thing in every money 9 10 laundering case, doesn't it? And every money laundering 11 case is not based on a gambling business. There are 12 drug businesses and all sorts of other predicates. 13 MR. VARE: Well --14 JUSTICE ALITO: Can it mean something 15 different in -- depending on the underlying illegal 16 activity? 17 MR. VARE: I think there is certainly a 18 suggestion, but that this Court itself has made recently 19 in the Duke Energy case, that a term can have multiple 20 meanings, multiple shades of meanings, and that will 21 depend upon the context. So you have to look at the 22 context and the specified unlawful activity is context. 23 Now, I'm not suggesting that we adopt a definition of "proceeds" as net profits in one case for 24 25 one unlawful activity or gross profits for another

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1 unlawful activity or gross receipts for another one. 2 But the problem that we have presented to us 3 today is due to the piecemeal construction and 4 application of this statute and --5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Vare, you know, I'm --I'm unwilling to decide the definition of transaction 6 7 question in the present case because, frankly, I think that's a -- in itself, a very difficult question which 8 9 we haven't had adequately argued. For example, while I 10 believe, as I've indicated earlier, that paying off the 11 winners is -- is an essential part of a gambling 12 operation, I don't believe that paying off runners 13 necessarily is. You can have a gambling operation 14 without runners, can't you? You can --15 MR. VARE: You could have --16 JUSTICE SCALIA: You can -- you can view 17 that as something beyond the mere -- the mere gambling 18 crime. I don't -- I don't think you can view that 19 paying off the winners is beyond the gambling crime, but 20 I do think having a bunch of runners and paying off each 21 of them is not necessarily part of gambling. 22 MR. VARE: Well, you can have a gambling

22 MR. VARE: Well, you can have a gambling
23 business without runners per se.

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly.

25 MR. VARE: But you do need, Justice Scalia,

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you do need five or more participants. And the courts
 below have defined participants as -- as owners or
 partners, bartenders, cocktail waitresses, doormen,
 employees of the business.

5 And if those are qualifying participants to 6 even establish the -- the predicate for an illegal 7 gambling business, then those participants are most 8 likely going to get paid, and if they get paid, then 9 that is simply part of conducting the illegal gambling 10 business.

11 I think the fact -- I mean, the fact that 12 the runner in this case, the bet collector, Mr. Diaz, is 13 probably -- you know, illustrates best the unwarranted 14 result in this case. Mr. Diaz did nothing more in this 15 case than collect wages of about \$150 a month or a week, something along those lines, for simply collecting 16 17 bets, and he was convicted of money laundering and 18 sentenced to 9 years in jail.

Mr. Santos, my client, all he did was pay winners and pay those bet collectors to collect bets, and he -- his sentence was nearly quadrupled. CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So someone who simply paid off whoever it is that ships in, you know, a ton of heroin, you'd say is not guilty then? Same

25 thing. I mean, you're just paying off the people who

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1 engage in the activities that are necessary for the 2 continuation and promotion of the illegal enterprise. 3 MR. VARE: Well, I -- I think in that case, 4 Mr. Chief Justice, I would -- I would suggest it might 5 be an incomplete hypothetical, because simply paying the expenses of a crime or simply buying more drugs is not 6 7 in and of itself -- and I think the government has 8 conceded that in their opening -- that's not in and of 9 itself money laundering. There has to be a transaction 10 that is conducted with the intent to promote the 11 carrying on or separately a transaction that is designed 12 to conceal the legitimate or the illegitimate source of -- of the funds received. 13 14 So simply receiving proceeds from an 15 unlawful activity is not enough. And that's clear on 16 the statutory language. You either have to have some 17 promotion element or some concealment element. 18 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, if we go back to the 19 question of the definition of "proceeds." 20 Isn't it very unlikely that Congress would 21 have wanted -- wanted to adopt the net income definition 22 in light of the legal issues and the problems of proof that that would involve? 23 24 Let's take the example of an international 25 drug ring that has assets in a foreign country. They

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1 may have crops. They may have processing plants, 2 warehouses, trucks, airplanes, et cetera. They ship 3 millions of dollars of drugs into the United States. 4 They get millions of dollars in gross revenue here every 5 year. They hire a professional money launderer to launder the money here. Now, the Government wants to 6 7 prosecute the money -- the person they hired plus 8 members of the organization.

9 The person they hired may not know and may 10 not care whether the money that was being laundered was 11 profits or not. And how are you going to prove what --12 whether this enterprise was a profitable enterprise or 13 not? They may have -- and they may have enormous gross 14 revenue, but they may have -- they may have enormous 15 expenses overseas. They may have bought a lot of 16 warehouses and equipment. They may have lost a lot of 17 things because they were raided by the government, 18 destroyed the factory, killed the plants.

It becomes an impossible situation, and why would Congress ever have adopted a definition like that? MR. VARE: Well, Justice Alito, I don't think it's an impossible situation, number one, and I'll get to that in a second. To address your first question, could Congress have intended this to mean profits knowing that the burdens were so difficult?

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1	To answer that question, then you must look
2	at what else Congress intended, and there's no question
3	that Congress intended to punish different conduct than
4	the underlying criminal activity.
5	And then you have to look at what Congress
6	intended to get at when they wanted to fill the gap in
7	criminal law, when they wanted to punish crimes
8	that were not previously punished.
9	They focused on getting at ill-gotten gains
10	of criminal enterprises. They focused and our
11	briefs, you know, set forth the statements that are
12	replete through the debates on the floor, that the
13	Congress was focused on profits of criminal enterprises.
14	Congress was not focused on the unprofitable
15	criminal enterprise because
16	JUSTICE ALITO: I'm sure that's true. They
17	wouldn't be that worried about the unprofitable criminal
18	enterprises because they wouldn't last very long. But
19	there's the there still is the problem of proof
20	MR. VARE: Absolutely, Justice Alito.
21	JUSTICE ALITO: proving that it's
22	profitable.
23	MR. VARE: And the proof problem
24	JUSTICE SCALIA: Not just proving that it's
25	profitable; proving that the person laundering it knew

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that it was profits because that's part of the definition of the crime, that scienter. And how can you prove that the fellow knew that it was profits? He would very rarely know whether it was or wasn't. So he skips off scot-free of the laundering crime. MR. VARE: Well, Justice Scalia, the intent

7 or the knowledge or the scienter requirement is going to 8 be present. It's going to be a burden on the government 9 to prove, no matter what definition of proceeds is.

10 But in terms of proving profits, the 11 government is able to prove profits in other criminal 12 financial transaction-type cases in a number of ways. 13 They're not limited to a particular accounting method. 14 They can choose the accounting method that they want. 15 They're not limited to looking at day after day after 16 day, week after week after week of financial records. 17 They can aggregate records that are selected from 18 particular points in time. And even in --

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, how do they 20 know even what the fiscal year of these enterprises is? 21 I mean let's suppose you have some costs. They have to 22 buy the poppy field wherever, but, you know, over 3 23 years, they're going to make a lot of money. You're 24 saying you can't prosecute them in year 2? 25 MR. VARE: No, I'm not saying that at all,

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Mr. Chief Justice, and I think my point would be the government would not even need to look at a fiscal year to prove profits. They would be able to look at a period of time and through their extensive search and seizure efforts --

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: My point is the 7 profits may not come in immediately, even though the 8 underlying activity is exactly the same.

9 MR. VARE: That may be the case. They may 10 have a difficult burden of proving profits in the early 11 stages, but most of these prosecutions practically occur 12 after a period of time.

JUSTICE SCALIA: And what -- what's the total stage you look at? Suppose it's profitable one month and not profitable the next month, and the loss the second month more than undoes the profits of the first month. Can you still prosecute them for the profits in the first month?

MR. VARE: Certainly, based upon the profits in the first month. They're not limited to that. I mean --

JUSTICE SCALIA: One day they could pick then, they have one good day. And they could --MR. VARE: And they could prosecute on that one good day if there are the transactions involved in the

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1 profits.

2	JUSTICE KENNEDY: What about the bank robber
3	hypo there's just one bank robbery. They spend \$500 to
4	each, to people for their airfare and car rental. They
5	rob the bank. They only get \$800. They lost \$200.
б	They then give the \$800 to the attorney to please or
7	to somebody to please launder the money. No profits?
8	MR. VARE: I don't think that that
9	JUSTICE KENNEDY: That would be a very silly
10	result.
11	MR. VARE: Well, I I don't think that,
12	under that hypothetical, even the government would
13	charge those criminals with money laundering.
14	JUSTICE KENNEDY: No. They gave it to a
15	third person to conceal it, \$800.
16	MR. VARE: Well, if there's
17	JUSTICE KENNEDY: 8,000, 8 million.
18	MR. VARE: Simply giving money to somebody
19	else does not meet the concealment and disguisement
20	element. I mean, there has to be an effort made to
21	disguise the source of the income as being illegitimate.
22	JUSTICE KENNEDY: Assume that it's proceeds.
23	Assume that they have a money launderer. Under your
24	definition there's still no violation.
25	MR. VARE: I suppose I would say no. And

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I'm going to explain why I have to say no, and I'm going
 to give you a mea culpa. The profits construction is
 not perfect. There's no question about that.

But we're here today because it's the only way to resolve the case that came up to this Court based upon the expansive interpretations of the rest of the money laundering statute.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well that's -- but 9 we don't try to solve every case. We look at particular 10 questions presented. And maybe there's going to be 11 another case coming up in which the issue of how broadly 12 you should construe promotion is, or whether you should 13 have a different definition when the offenses are merged 14 or not. And we'll confront that when it gets here.

It seems to me that your argument is -maybe your best argument, but your argument, anyway -- is let's avoid this question because of these other mistakes that have been made, mistakes which are not presented to us on the question on which we granted cert.

21 MR. VARE: I think, Mr. Chief Justice, I'm 22 not asking this Court to avoid any question. What I am 23 saying is that there is a profits construction that if 24 you apply the traditional rules of statutory 25 construction, if you look at the text -- the word

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1	itself, "proceeds," does not have a single plain meaning
2	as gross receipts. It is ambiguous. And it has
3	multiple shades of meaning depending upon the context.
4	If you look at the term "proceeds" in
5	context then, then it will depend upon how one is using
б	it. If I were selling a house, and I asked somebody on
7	the street what would be my proceeds from the sale of my
8	house, in that and only in that context, some would
9	say it is the gross. Some would say it is the net.
10	Some would say it depends.
11	Well, it depends upon what? It depends upon
12	context. That is included in the question presented.
13	JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, let's take this
14	context.
15	There is, if you are going to go with
16	profits, a question of what expenses? That's one of the
17	difficulties of working with a net proceeds, because we
18	don't know what are the expenses that you would deduct,
19	and the hit man was given as one example. You would
20	say, no, not that one. But, the salaries to the runners,
21	yes.
22	To figure out what would count to come up
23	with a net figure is the least difficult, is it not?
24	MR. VARE: Justice Ginsburg, I think that it
25	is slightly more difficult in the case the government

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1 has now, which is really no difficulty at all. I think 2 that it would depend upon the unlawful activity, the 3 specified unlawful activity, what would be the ordinary 4 expenses associated with doing that crime. 5 And lower courts are well equipped and juries are well equipped to hear evidence, direct and 6 7 circumstantial, and make inferences and decide those 8 issues. 9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why does it have to be the 10 ordinary expense of that? I mean, let's assume the 11 charge is murder, and I happen to use a hit man for the 12 murder. That's proven and whatnot. 13 Why -- you mean, that isn't part of the murder conviction, simply because I could have done it 14 15 without a hit man, I could have done it myself? 16 MR. VARE: No, I don't think so at all, 17 Justice Scalia. 18 JUSTICE SCALIA: You think paying the hit 19 man would be part of the murder transaction? 20 MR. VARE: Absolutely. But I don't think 21 that that necessarily parlays into whether or not it 22 is money laundering or not. 23 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, I understand. If, for example, the murderer 24 MR. VARE: 25 paid the hit man with money to kill somebody and then

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1 paid -- you know, used proceeds from the insurance 2 premium that somebody might have been his wife or her 3 husband, and used the proceeds to pay off the money --4 the hit man for the next crime or to reward him or 5 something else, to promote the carrying on of the business or used the insurance proceeds to conceal 6 7 where they came from, then I think you could create a hypothetical situation of money laundering. 8 9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought it would 10 depend on whether or not the insurance proceeds exceeded 11 how much he had to pay the hit man, right? Let's say 12 he's not doing it to get the insurance money. It just 13 so happens he had a \$50,000 policy on the victim, and 14 he had to pay \$100,000 --15 JUSTICE SCALIA: He wanted to kill his wife, 16 right? 17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes. He just wanted 18 to commit the murder, not get the money. And so he pays 19 the hit man \$100,000, he gets the \$50,000, and then uses 20 it for all these other activities, you'd say no money 21 laundering there, because no profits? 22 MR. VARE: If we assume the expansive 23 interpretations of a transaction promoting the 24 underlying crime that have been presented in this case 25 and then we apply the profits definition, that might not

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be money laundering. But, the money laundering statute
 is not designed to cure that evil. That evil is
 punished and punished severely by the murder statute.
 It is punished as the underlying crime.

5 And so in this case, Mr. Santos and 6 Mr. Diaz -- or Mr. Santos was punished up to the maximum 7 of five years for running an illegal gambling business. 8 He didn't do anything else other than run a gambling 9 business.

10 And so I think the point is at the end of 11 the day, there are certainly a lot of hypothetical 12 situations that suggest a profits construction might 13 pose some burdens, might not make sense. But if you're 14 going to look at the burdens on the government in terms 15 of construing the term "proceeds," then you also must 16 look at the consequences of accepting the gross receipts 17 construction. And I think at the outset, nearly every 18 justice up here suggested -- well, that turns every 19 illegal gambling business into a money laundering 20 violation.

The government has no answer to that. Under their interpretation as applied today, then every illegal gambling operator will be guilty of money laundering.

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought their

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1 answer was the money laundering statute covers a whole 2 waterfront of activities besides illegal gambling. And 3 the question is, what did Congress intend when they 4 passed the money laundering statute?

And you're sort of -- this is kind of the tail wagging the dog. The tail is, well, it presents these problems when you're talking about gambling operations, but there's a whole rest of the dog area where it doesn't present a problem.

10 MR. VARE: Well, I think what the money 11 laundering statute was intended to do was punish 12 different conduct, separate and distinct from the 13 underlying crime. And that different conduct is 14 inherent in conducting a financial transaction with the 15 intent to promote the carrying on of the unlawful 16 activity.

I do not think that you can parse the statutory language and only address the term "proceeds" irrespective of its consequences.

In fact, I think the questions directed to me as to the harsh consequences on the government approving profits shows that you have to look at the term "proceeds" in its context. In its context includes not only the burdens on the one hand, but it certainly includes the situation we have here, that every illegal

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1	gambling business is automatic money laundering. And
2	that is not what money laundering statute was enacted,
3	it's not what it was written or intended to address.
4	Thank you.
5	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, Mr. Vare.
6	Mr. Roberts, you have four minutes
7	remaining.
8	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW D. ROBERTS
9	ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
10	MR. ROBERTS: Thank you.
11	If I could first address the reasons why
12	this Court should not decide the separate transaction
13	issue itself in this case.
14	First of all, it's not the question
15	presented here which is limited to the meaning of the
16	statutory term "proceeds." Respondents didn't present
17	any alternative question presented in their briefs in
18	opposition. And, in fact, they don't present an
19	alternative question presented even in their briefs
20	on the merits. They're just using the concern about
21	merger as a reason to decide that "proceeds" means
22	profits.
23	The separate transaction issue was decided
24	against Respondents adversely on direct appeal in the
25	Febus case, as my brother on the other side

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acknowledged. And those kinds of issues that are
 decided adversely on direct appeal shouldn't be
 relitigated.

The issue wasn't raised in the separate transaction issue, it wasn't raised in the Section 2255 issues, and it wasn't addressed by the courts below in these collateral proceedings.

8 At most, we say it should be left open for 9 another case that presents -- that presents the issue. 10 Beyond that, if this Court thought that something should 11 be left open for the court below to address, the court 12 below could address a range of possible ways to deal 13 with ensuring a separation, for example, Justice 14 Stevens's suggestion that an illegal gambling business 15 under the statute itself entails the payment of winners 16 and the payment of employees, although we don't think 17 that it does.

But a profits definition is not the way to address concerns about overlap for the underlying offense, because it makes no sense in the broader context of the statute.

It would create significant uncertainty about the scope of the statute because of the absence of accounting rules. It would make proof very difficult as a general matter because of the absence of those rules

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1	and because criminals often don't keep accounting
2	records. It would exclude numerous concealment
3	transactions that Congress had no reason not to cover,
4	and it would cripple the government's ability to
5	prosecute professional money launderers, which are
6	really a significant part of the problem that Congress
7	was addressing.
8	If the Court has no further questions, we
9	would ask that the judgments of the court of appeals be
10	reversed.
11	CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
12	The case is submitted.
13	(Whereupon at 12:00 p.m., the case in the
14	above-entitled matter was submitted.)
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