



**DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1010**

JUL 14 2005

The Honorable Anthony J. Principi
Chairman
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission
2521 South Clark Street, Suite 600
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Chairman Principi,

In your letter of July 1, 2005, you asked for the Department's comments on a number of installations in advance of the Commission's voting at your hearing on July 19, 2005, to consider these installations for closure or realignment analysis. Your July 12, 2005 letter requested witnesses to address the Commission's concern regarding recommendations impacting the Air National Guard.

The Commission's independent assessment of the Department's recommendations and the subsequent reviews by the President and the Congress are each important steps to ensure that the final recommendations are fair, consistent with the selection criteria and force structure plan and will, in fact, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of our military infrastructure. As such, while the Department stands behind its recommendations, it fully supports the Commission's analysis of alternatives. As you undertake your review, please consider that each of the Department's recommendations is part of a comprehensive, integrated, and interdependent package. The recommendations submitted by the Department of Defense strengthen national security by reshaping the domestic installations at which U.S. military forces and their associated support elements perform their assigned missions.

The Military Departments and Joint Cross-Service Groups have provided the attached responses to the issues you raise. While I appreciate the opportunity to testify on July 18, 2005, Mr. Michael Wynne, Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG), will lead a panel that will include General William Nyland, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Michael Moseley, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and Admiral Robert Willard, Vice Chief of Naval Operations. They are jointly designated to discuss the issues at the hearing. Additionally, we will provide a second panel to deal exclusively with the Commission's concerns regarding recommendations concerning the Air Guard. This panel will be led by Lt Gen Stephen Wood, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and Programs, and will include Maj Gen Gary Heckman, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Plans and



Programs, Maj Gen Scott Mayes, Commander, 1st Air Force, and Commander, Continental U.S. North American Aerospace Defense Command Region, and Brig Gen Anthony Haynes, Air National Guard Assistant for BRAC.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments on these issues. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.



Andrew England
ACTING

Enclosure:
As stated

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

1. Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was Marine Corps Recruit Depot (MCRD) San Diego, CA, not closed and consolidated with Marine Corps recruit training at MCRD Parris Island, SC?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Geo-centric recruiting/shipping/recruit training command and control would be compromised.
- Replication of facilities would require in excess of 100 years to payback.
- Recruit pipeline requirements cannot sustain a single point of failure.

DISCUSSION:

The consolidation of Marine Corps recruit training at a single site was evaluated but not recommended. After extensive analysis, the Department of the Navy (DON) concluded that single-siting recruit training would degrade recruit training command and control, limit surge capability, and require fiscally burdensome duplication of already-existing mission and modern facilities. Also, because significant reductions in overhead have already occurred outside of the BRAC process, single-siting recruit training would not produce significant billet eliminations.

DON analysis of Marine Corps recruit training went through several stages and included a thorough review of the available certified data along with consideration of input from Marine Corps leadership. The review of capacity data showed that, when allowing for surge, there is virtually no excess capacity in Marine Corps recruit training. The scenario to close MCRD San Diego and consolidate at MCRD Parris Island (DON-0066) was developed based on data that showed the availability of buildable acres at MCRD Parris Island. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 27 Sep 2004).

During scenario analysis, the DON considered input from Marine Corps leadership, who identified a number of issues of concern with the proposed Parris Island consolidation, including creating the risk of a single point of failure and limiting the ability to handle unexpected surge requirements, or even normal requirements in the event of future growth in end-strength. These factors would have an adverse effect on an organization that is heavily committed to sourcing three Marine Expeditionary Forces worldwide and waging the Global War on Terrorism. The Marine Corps has aligned its recruiting/shipping/recruit training mission geographically under the command of each of the Recruit Depot Commanding Generals. This unity of command and control allows for the necessary detailed demographic knowledge to effectively recruit, and for the geographic proximity for recruit and follow-on training to efficiently ship new Marines

on that coast. This synergy has supported the Marine Corps' historic success in meeting recruiting mission, and becomes increasingly vital in an era of increasingly competitive recruiting and accelerated operational deployments during the Global War on Terrorism. Restructuring of this command and control relationship could be required if recruit training were single sited at Parris Island. Single-siting the training function would cause a significant increase in the span of control for the Eastern Recruiting Region commander, and likely necessitate organizational changes with increased staffing requirements. The Marine Corps also depends heavily on a sustained pipeline of trained recruits. As a predominantly single enlistment force, any disruption in the recruiting/training continuum would disrupt the pipeline to provide new Marines to the operating forces. Short perturbations can be handled because of the two recruit depot operating construct. Significant concerns were raised with the consideration of single siting, especially in a hurricane prone region. (See DAG Report of Deliberations of 18 Oct 04 and 26 Oct 04, IEG Report of Deliberations of 4 Nov 04).

The COBRA analysis of the MCRD San Diego closure shows one-time costs of \$570.1M and steady state savings of \$14.2M, resulting in a Payback exceeding 100 years. This result was compared to the analysis of this scenario conducted during BRAC 1995. MILCON costs were considerably lower, and the anticipated number of eliminated personnel was significantly higher in BRAC 1995 than for scenario DON-0066. During the course of the past ten years, the Marine Corps has eliminated excess capacity and implemented initiatives to consolidate MCRD-related billets. For that reason, few billets are eliminated (with their associated cost savings) and the great majority of MCRD San Diego billets will need to be relocated to MCRD Parris Island in order to perform the recruit training function. In addition, a complete set of new recruit training facilities would have to be constructed there to accommodate the three additional Recruit Training Battalions in facilities built to hurricane-proof standards. Additional MILCON is required for non-recruit training activities located at MCRD San Diego that would have to be relocated elsewhere. MCRD consolidation on one coast will also increase recruiting related travel costs.

Based upon the cost analysis and concerns about negative impacts on the recruiting/training missions, the DON Infrastructure Evaluation Group decided not to forward DON-0066 for consideration as a candidate recommendation (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05).

2. Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI

Commission issue: Why was the Naval Shipyard Pearl Harbor, HI, not closed and the ship depot repair function realigned to Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA; Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME; and Naval Shipyard Puget Sound, WA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Industrial JCSG found excess capacity sufficient to justify closure of one shipyard.
- Military judgment favors retention of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard because of its strategic location and multi-platform capabilities.

DISCUSSION:

As noted in the minutes and report of the Industrial Joint Cross-Service Group, all four naval shipyards were analyzed to determine if there was sufficient capacity for any three of the shipyards to absorb the workload of the fourth based on the 20-year Force Structure Plan. That evaluation revealed that there is sufficient excess capacity to realign the workload of either Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard or Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG then reviewed military value and COBRA data to determine which closure was the preferred alternative.

The quantitative military value scores for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard were very close. Shipyard total cost and proximity to ship homeports were evaluated as part of the quantitative military value analysis. The total cost attribute favored Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, while the homeport proximity favored Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. The Industrial JCSG also evaluated the differences in drydock and workload capabilities between the two shipyards.

The COBRA analysis indicated that realigning the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard depot function would produce greater net present value savings than realigning the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard depot function. However, the net present value savings associated with the DON fenceline closure of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard produces savings about the same as realigning the depot function at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard.

Although the quantitative military value score for Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard was slightly lower than that of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, it was the military judgment of the Industrial JCSG that Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard's critical geographical location, adjacent to a significant portion of the Fleet and forward positioned in the central Pacific, combined with its capability to dock a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, provided a higher overall military value to the Department. This judgment is supported by the DON, as indicated by its submission of the closure recommendation. Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is strategically located to support DoD's current and future mission capabilities in the Pacific. Loss of this critical asset will have an adverse impact on operational warfighting

capability, training and readiness. Additionally the Combatant Commander expressed operational concerns with a closure of the Pearl Harbor Shipyard in that it would result in reduced theater presence as a result of the associated increased transit times, a loss of emergent CVN drydock capability (the only option west of Washington state) and a general concern with the loss of availability of "logistics, supply and operational support services throughout the Pacific." Finally, the Navy was concerned with the personnel retention implications that would result from a closure of Pearl Harbor in that it would result in a significant increase in dockings being conducted out of homeport.

3. Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME

Commission issue: What considerations were given to a complete closure of Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME, and what were the driving factors in deciding the realignment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Realignment verses closure was extensively debated within DON, and DON ultimately recommended closure.
- The IEC modified closure to realignment because of a desire to retain strategic presence in the Northeast U.S. and for a surge capability.

DISCUSSION:

The Department of the Navy did develop and analyze a scenario to close NAS Brunswick. When combined with other aviation recommendations, the closure of NAS Brunswick would have reduced the excess capacity for the Aviation Operations function from 19 percent to 8 percent. Such a recommendation not only allowed consolidation of Maritime Patrol Operations on the East Coast with attendant increased maintenance and training efficiencies, but it also produced significant steady-state savings of \$94.6M and a 20-year net present value of \$843.2M.

During the review of scenario analysis the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (CFFC), expressed concerns that closing NAS Brunswick could result in diminished strategic flexibility, as well as impact future basing flexibility. (See DAG Reports of Deliberations of 6 Dec 04, 11 Jan 05, 17 Jan 05, and 24 Jan 05). These concerns led to review of the availability of possible detachment sites for Maritime Patrol operations and analysis of additional alternatives to closure so the leadership had full visibility of the various trade-offs in making their decisions. (See IEG Report of Deliberations of 27 Jan 05 and 17 Feb 05, DAG Reports of Deliberations of 8 Feb 05, and 15 Feb 05). After reviewing the additional analyses, the Department of the Navy decided to forward the closure scenario to the Infrastructure Executive Council as a candidate recommendation because of the significant savings associated with the closure, combined with the options available to address operational concerns.

When the candidate recommendations were reviewed in final deliberations, the IEC determined that NAS Brunswick should be realigned instead of closed to retain an active presence in New England for homeland defense and surge capability. (See IEC Minutes of 2 May 05 and 4 May 05). This decision is consistent with the concerns expressed by the Fleet in that it provides strategic flexibility by maintaining an ability to rapidly position aircraft in the Northeast should an increased threat materialize.

4. Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA

Commission issue: Why was the Navy Broadway Complex, San Diego, CA, not considered for closure and realignment of existing functions to Naval Station San Diego, CA?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- All activities/functions located at the Broadway Complex were evaluated by either Department of the Navy or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups.
- DON BRAC analysis did not develop a recommendation to close Broadway Complex because none of the activities on this property were recommended for relocation.

DISCUSSION:

The Broadway Complex in San Diego is property owned by the Navy and located on slightly less than 15 acres of contiguous property in downtown San Diego with 857K square feet (SF) in three separate buildings. It houses several commands; the two largest commands are Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) San Diego and Commander, Navy Region Southwest. All of the functions located on this property were reviewed by either DON or one of the Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs). The BRAC analyses performed by DON and the appropriate JCSGs, including capacity and military value analysis, did not identify any scenarios to realign activities from the Broadway Complex.

Within the DON BRAC process, a fenceline (a distinct parcel of land that supported one or more functional activities undergoing BRAC analysis) was not considered for closure unless sufficient assets were proposed to be removed so as to effectively eliminate all missions aboard the fenceline. Since no mission activities were recommended to be relocated, DON did not issue a recommendation to close this fenceline.

Although DON recognizes the AT/FP concerns and the potential for increased development of the Broadway Complex parcel, scarcity of available DON owned waterfront property in the San Diego area suggests determination of the disposition of the Broadway complex is better addressed through ongoing negotiations between the City of San Diego, local developers and the DON outside the BRAC process.

5. Realignment of Naval Master Jet Base

5a. Commission issue: What consideration was given to the realignment of the Master Jet Base (MJB) located at NAS Oceana, VA, to Moody AFB, GA?

5a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Navy examined several alternatives for an east coast MJB, including Moody AFB.
- While Moody is a feasible alternative to Oceana, it has a number of factors that make it less desirable than retaining Oceana, including significant one-time MILCON costs.
- While Oceana is the most suitable option of all east coast TACAIR bases considered, encroachment at Oceana presents significant challenges to long-term operational requirements.
- The best basing alternative for East Coast tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century Master Jet Base, but such action would occur outside the BRAC window.

DISCUSSION:

The Navy has given extensive consideration to the possible realignment of the Oceana MJB out of concern over likely long-term encroachment issues. Our assessment included Moody AFB as well as a range of other feasible Defense Department air facilities. In the case of realignment to Moody AFB, while it was considered a feasible alternative, it would incur significant one-time costs (almost \$500 million) and result in a long payback period (14 years). We concluded the best long-term basing alternative for East Coast Navy tactical aviation would be to build a new 21st century naval air station able to accommodate legacy and planned high performance aircraft, but such action would optimally occur outside the BRAC window.

Selecting a location and building from the ground up is by far the preferred choice as it gives us the most flexibility to ensure we accommodate future capabilities, while allowing for sufficient “buffers” to preclude potential encroachment issues. This approach, if pursued, would allow for a truly modern air station, with commensurate energy, environmental and community consideration designed into the facility from the very beginning. By contrast, relocating to Moody (built in 1940) or another existing installation within the timeframe of this BRAC would require extensive infrastructure upgrades, take significant time and resources, and still would not attain the operational or quality of life standards expected of this century.

5b. Commission issue: Was movement of the assets assigned to Moody AFB, GA to Cannon AFB, NM, considered and if so, what were the driving considerations not to do so?

5b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Need for Battlefield Airmen Training works at Moody AFB
- Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity
- Cannon AFB Military Capacity Index (MCI) was lower than Moody AFB

DISCUSSION:

Early in the process the Education and Training Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) and the Air Force analyzed scenarios to realign Moody AFB. The JCSG scenario distributed the Moody training aircraft to other Air Education and Training Command (AETC) bases. The Air Force scenario distributed the Special Operations Forces/Combat Search and Rescue (SOF/CSAR) aircraft to Davis Monthan AFB, AZ. Transferring the SOF/CSAR aircraft from Moody to Cannon was not considered because Cannon's SAF/CSAR MCI was lower than Moody.

During the BRAC process, the Air Force identified an emerging need for a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus for the Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) family of specialties such as Combat Rescue, Combat Control, Terminal Attack Control and Special Operations Weather. Moody was identified as a potential site for this purpose. Of all Air Force bases, Moody had the right infrastructure/range complex and proximity to other areas such as the Gulf Range Complex at Eglin and Tyndall. The Air Force decided to leave the CSAR aircraft at Moody and place A-10 aircraft there also (Moody scored 8 points higher than Davis-Monthan for SOF/CSAR). Also, as a part of the BRAC process, the Army proposed the realignment of the Armor Center/School to Fort Benning, GA and the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin (to be in close proximity with the Air Force Special Operations Command). Therefore, the establishment of a Battlefield Airmen Training Campus at Moody can provide a center of excellence for airmen in expeditionary combat support fields and also provide Air Force and joint training opportunities within operational proximity of Moody AFB. A-10/CSAR aircraft collocated at Moody AFB will provide an east coast CSAR training efficiency similar to Davis-Monthan AFB. Moody AFB is rated 11 of 154 in the SOF/CSAR MCI and is also in the top ten of all installations in 4 of the other 7 MCIs. It remains one of the Air Force's most valuable installations.

Cannon AFB has no significant joint training opportunities within operational proximity to the base, and for the A-10 aircraft, that is mandatory. Cannon AFB did not rank well within the SOF/CSAR MCI and therefore, the Air Force did not consider Cannon AFB to beddown the active duty A-10 mission.

6. Galena Airport Forward Operating Location (FOL), AK

Commission issue: Was any consideration given to merging the missions of Galena FOL, AK, and Eielson AFB, AK? Why does the United States need to maintain two FOLs in Alaska, given the current national security environment and 20-year threat assessment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Air Force BRAC analysis did not develop a scenario.
- No force structure to move.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force did not consider moving the operational support mission from Galena Airport to Eielson AFB, which is over 300 miles from Galena. Consistent with the requirement to consider the impact on homeland defense, the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) left Galena open primarily because of its operational role and because it had no day-to-day force structure assigned. Initial BRAC inputs made by the Combatant Commander through the Joint Staff did not include Galena or other FOLs to be considered for closure. However, based on the Commission's July 1, 2005 letter, the Joint Staff contacted the Combatant Commands for their comments concerning the potential operational impact if the Galena FOL is closed and closing the Galena, AK, FOL and moving its missions to Eielson, AFB, AK will not create unacceptable risk to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)/U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) mission accomplishment.

7. Pope Air Force Base, NC

7a. Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, NC under Fort Bragg, NC?

7a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Supports Army plan for relocation of FORSCOM.
- Maintains airfield capability for Army presence and Air Force force structure.
- Allows efficient consolidation of installation management functions.

DISCUSSION:

The Air Force recommendation to realign, rather than close Pope AFB, was made to support the Army recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Forces Command and U.S. Army Reserve Command and allows for closure of Fort McPherson, GA and Atlanta leased space. All Air Force property and facilities will be administratively transferred to the Army. The financial analysis included expected recurring expenses paid by the Air Force to the Army as a result of the Air Force presence that will remain. This

coordination on installation management builds upon and subsumes the H&SA candidate recommendation (H&SA-0009) to combine Installation Management of Fort Bragg and Pope AFB, NC.

7b. Commission issue: Are the joint operational synergies that exist between the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 43rd Airlift Wing/23rd Fighter Group able to be replicated from other locations?

7b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Existing operational relationships will continue.
- Additional operational and training synergies will emerge from new relationships.

DISCUSSION:

As a part of the coordination between the Army regarding a tenant Air Force presence on an expanded Fort Bragg, the Army indicated that it would allow a tenant C-130 unit with a maximum size of 16 PAA (911th Airlift Wing, AFRC). Other Air Force functions that currently exist at Pope AFB, will remain at Fort Bragg to continue the present operational relationships, they include: 3rd Aerial Port Squadron; 18th Air Support Operations Group; 14th Air Support Operations Squadron; Det 1 of the 373rd Training Squadron; and 43rd Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. Additionally, new opportunities for on-going joint operations at Fort Bragg will continue with planned deployment of air assets to Fort Bragg/Pope for joint training with the Army.

The Pope recommendation also includes the transfer of A-10s to Moody AFB, GA. Operational and training synergies will occur with new relationships between the A-10 unit at Moody and Army units at Ft. Benning, GA, the recommended location of the Army's Maneuver Training Center (consolidation of Infantry and Armor schools). Locating Air Force A-10s near this consolidated Army training will lead to new opportunities of realistic close air support training for the Army and the Air Force and potential joint training between the Battlefield Airmen at Moody, the Maneuver Center of Excellence and east coast CSAR training capability with CSAR helicopters and A-10s.

8. Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

Commission issue: What considerations drove the recommendation to realign rather than close Grand Forks AFB, ND? What is the number of UAVs planned for assignment to Grand Forks AFB, ND, and what is the timing of the potential deployment?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Ensures continued strategic presence in the North Central U. S.
- Positioned to accept emerging Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) mission.

DISCUSSION:

The original Air Force candidate recommendation to the Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) was to close Grand Forks, AFB. The IEC reviewed it in context with other Service and Joint Cross-Service Group candidate recommendations. To address an IEC concern over a continued strategic presence in the north central U.S., the Air Force presented an option to realign Grand Forks AFB but maintain the tanker moves out of Grand Forks to support other high-value tanker realignments. The IEC adopted this recommendation.

The justification for the Grand Forks AFB recommendation specifies that the base would be retained for an emerging mission, of which UAVs may be one (in addition to continuing support of the 10th Space Warning Squadron). Specific future plans for UAVs (in terms of numbers and timing) are undefined in BRAC; however, the post-BRAC intent of the Air Force is to dovetail an emerging mission with the departure of the old mission.. The Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force have signed out to the Commission a separate letter to that effect (Reference: Department of Defense recommendation to realign Eielson AFB, AK, and Grand Forks AFB, ND, 7 Jun 05). A portion of that background paper on Grand Forks stated“...Specifically, the Air Force strategic vision for Grand Forks AFB is to become a home to a “family of UAVs,” with associated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance support functions. In cooperation with the North Dakota Air National Guard (ANG), the Air Force would establish a Predator MQ-1 ANG unit with an Active Duty Associate unit to backfill F-16 retirements at Fargo’s Hector Field. Growth of this mission will include transition to the Predator MQ-9, eventually add the Global Hawk UAV with the Grand Forks Tanker realignment and FTF emerging mission and associations at both locations.”

9. Air National Guard

9a. Commission issue: Were the Adjutants General and Governors of the States consulted in the re-allocation of aircraft, personnel, facilities and missions from their states?

9a. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- The State Adjutants General were provided significant briefing during the BRAC process.

DISCUSSION:

Adjutants General (TAGs) were briefed on the force structure, organizational, and military value factors that formed the foundation of the Air Force BRAC analysis. Senior Air Force staff, Guard and active, briefed the TAGs in December 2003 at the TAG meeting in Baltimore. That session included a discussion of the force structure and squadron size assumptions that were eventually included as part of BRAC later that winter. The senior BRAC staff, Guard and active, appeared before the TAGs again in

July 2004 to give them feedback into the senior military value discussion (which included the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) and the Chief, Air Force Reserve) that formed the foundation for the MCI (mission compatibility index) weightings. The BRAC staff did this well prior to the completion of the MCIs and the release of the capacity and military value data calls to the installations. These MCIs provided the starting point for Air Force BRAC deliberations. The Guard representative to the Base Closure Executive Group (BCEG) later provided a comprehensive, personal briefing to the Chief, National Guard Bureau in April 2005 when the Air Force deliberations were entering their final phase.

The Air Force BRAC charge was to accommodate a shrinking force structure in order to ensure we placed right-sized squadrons at the best combination of bases to achieve both homeland and overseas defense objectives. Effectively organized flying squadrons were key to future warfighting effectiveness. To achieve this, we restored our operational squadrons to sizes that would result in more effective and efficient use of a shrinking force structure. Over the past 10 years, the AF reduced the number of squadrons in its active component to ensure effective sized squadrons in an era of declining total force structure. During the same period, the AF retained essentially the same number of squadrons in the reserve component and reduced the number of aircraft in each squadron to ‘maintain flags.’ Consequently, although the Air Force BRAC process maintained the proportionality of the active, Guard, and Reserve components, the combination of a further reduced force structure and the need to restore Guard and Reserve units to effective sizes resulted in a greater reduction in the number of squadron flags in the reserve component than the active duty.

Initially the Air Force considered closing the bases losing flying missions. Following deliberation, however, the Air Force concluded that the expeditionary combat support (ECS) forces that remained after we effectively sized the flyers were themselves quite effective both for Title 10 expeditionary missions and Title 32 state missions. Some believe that these bases should be closed, however, the Air Force strongly believes these ECS forces provide viable expeditionary and state support and their base of operations should not be moved. Any adjustment to the lay down of the ECS forces will need to be re-evaluated for impact on the support to civil authorities.

9b. Commission issue: What impact does the realignment of the ANG have on the homeland defense and homeland security missions?

9b. Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Homeland Security, Air Sovereignty, and Civil Support are adequately addressed.

DISCUSSION:

Balancing the Air Force to meet both the homeland and expeditionary defense needs of the Nation was another key consideration. This was most acute in the C-130 force, where the current average Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO) for active crews is 150 days per year TDY with the Guard and Reserve activated. When the 2-year reserve component activation is complete, Air Mobility Command estimates the average active PERSTEMPO will rise above 200 days per year without the BRAC recommendations. To assist with the assessment of homeland defense, the Air Force consulted with US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and also with the most senior staff members of the Director, Air National Guard (ANG) during the AF BRAC process. The USNORTHCOM favorably reviewed our recommendations and the ANG staff was completely involved as full partners in the BCEG throughout the process. The BCEG focused its Homeland Security deliberations on comprehensive air sovereignty requirements and not on the specific mission of any single unit or location. The support to civil authorities' roles and missions of airlift units in times of crisis are borne by the airlift/transportation system as a whole. For Civil Support missions, the Air Force requires the ability both to proactively plan with civil agencies as well as rapidly respond to man made or natural disasters when tasked. Important capabilities to enable these types of missions include: 1) Crisis Management to prevent and protect (law enforcement support and safeguarding the supply chain), 2) Consequence Management to respond locally (CBRNE/WMD and natural disaster mitigation), and 3) Providing Agile Combat Support (ACS) or Expeditionary Combat Support (ECS) infrastructure to assist civil authorities in the areas of medical support, food deliveries, protection from the elements, etc. at both local and national levels. In an effort to balance warfighting and civil support requirements the AF recommendations retain ECS units in twenty "Enclaves" to continue support of local authorities. We believe both aspects of homeland security, air sovereignty and civil support, are adequately addressed within the Air Force recommendations.

In his letter dated May 4, 2005, Admiral Keating, Commander US NORTHCOM, agreed stating, "Following a thorough review, we find that they (the draft 2005 BRAC recommendations) do not create an unacceptable risk to the accomplishment of our homeland defense or defense support of civil authorities."

10. Defense Finance Accounting Service (DFAS)

Commission issue: Why were keeping DFAS Buckley Annex, CO, DFAS Columbus, OH, and DFAS Indianapolis, IN, open and closing the remaining DFAS sites the only scenario considered? Why did DoD not consider other options, which could have avoided military construction costs and possibly produced a more cost effective option?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Optimization Model was used to develop Best Value solution.
- No Military Construction involved.

DISCUSSION:

The Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA) JCSG followed an iterative process that reviewed all DFAS locations as potential gaining locations. The process considered options and concluded the three-location combination, DFAS-Denver, DFAS-Columbus and DFAS-Indianapolis, represented the best value solution for DFAS by maximizing military value. The Optimization Model was used to develop the best value solution for DFAS, from both facilities and business operations perspectives. Within the optimization model the following constraints were applied against the 26 DFAS locations: (i) Maximize military value, (ii) Minimize number of locations, (iii) Minimum of two locations – to support strategic redundancy, (iv) Minimize military construction, and (v) Retain anchor locations for business operations integrity. The model resulted in the best value solution, and the economics (cost/savings) of the solution were then developed using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model.

The DFAS recommendation does not include costs for new construction. It does include costs associated with the possible reactivation of part of building #11, at Defense Supply Center-Columbus (DSC-C), OH. Because of the lack of detailed costing information associated with a reactivation, renovation equal to 29% of construction costs was used. The cost in COBRA is thus a conservative estimate, as the DSC-C reported that building #11 is in good condition and should only require a lesser expense for reactivation.

11. Professional Development Education

Commission issue: What consideration was given to the closure and realignment of the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at Wright Patterson AFB, OH, and the Defense Language Institute (DLI) at Monterey, CA, with Naval Postgraduate School (NPGS) at Monterey, CA, to create a consolidated professional development education center?

Response:

KEY POINTS:

- Consolidation of the Naval Postgraduate School and Air Force Institute of Technology was considered but did not include the Defense Language Institute (DLI).
- Maintaining graduate education is a core competency of the Department.

DISCUSSION:

The Education & Training (E&T) JCSG analyzed a full set of scenarios for all three institutions, including closure (privatize the functions), consolidations, and realignments. One of the scenarios (E&T-0022) consolidated NPGS and AFIT at Monterey, CA but did not include DLI in that consolidation. This scenario was not recommended in favor of E&T-0003 (the privatization of NPGS and AFIT), which was later integrated with DON-0070 (the closure of the installation housing NPGS). The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) later also deleted this candidate recommendation in recognition of the value provided by having military postgraduate education facilities that (1) recognize the uniqueness of professional military education, (2) acknowledge the importance of sustaining a world class educational facility as a component of our military structure, and (3) recognize the long-term benefits achieved from having a dedicated military campus that attracts future military leaders from other countries.

12. Joint Medical Command Headquarters

Commission issue: What consideration was given to establishing a Joint Medical Command Headquarters, through collocation of disparate Department of Defense Surgeons General, at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, MD?

Response:

KEY ISSUES:

- Joint Medical Command was not considered but co-location was.
- Co-location not cost effective.

DISCUSSION:

The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group determined that consideration of a Joint Medical Command, with its complex command and control ramifications, was outside the scope

of their charter. The Medical JCSG approach, approved by the Infrastructure Steering Group, was to focus on medical capacity and efficiencies. The Headquarters and Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group addressed collocation of the Medical Headquarters functions in the National Capital Region. Due to the complexities of instituting Joint Command and Control structures, no recommendations instituting a Joint Command Structure was developed.

The H&SA JCSG developed several scenarios for collocation of medical headquarters functions within the National Capitol Region. These scenarios included collocation into space made available by the candidate recommendation to close the Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS), as well as building space at Ft Belvoir, VA, and Bethesda, MD. The financial analysis of these scenarios is detailed below. The IEC decision to retain USUHS, the only financially viable receiving location, eliminated further discussion on the collocation of medical headquarters in the National Capitol Region.

	To Ft Belvoir	To Bethesda	To USUHS
One Time Costs	\$94.3M	\$107.3M	\$51.5M
Net Implementation Costs	\$77.1M	\$89.0M	\$29.4M
Annual Recurring Savings	\$6.2M	\$6.6M	\$8.0M
Payback Period	19 Years	20 Years	6 Years
NPV at 2025	\$10.2M (Cost)	\$17.0M (Cost)	\$47.4M (Savings)