

DEPUTY DIRECTOR

10 Aug

General B

May Anne made this
note last Thursday 6 Aug
For your info

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These two were pointing
to use COMINT
to prove the attack

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-15-2006 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended

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Mr. Sheldon, CIA: Mr. McCone asked me to inform you that Amb Stevenson in N.Y. had wanted to use some COMINT in connection with the Maddox incident in open presentation before U.N. in N.Y. and Mr. McCone contacted the SecDef and SecState and told them that in his capacity as guardian of this type of material he would not permit it.

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~~NOFORN~~

31 August 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BLAKE
GENERAL CARROLL

P.L. 86-36

SUBJECT: Post Mortem of Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Pursuant to your desire that a joint NSA/DIA Post Mortem of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents be undertaken, such a project will commence approximately 31 August 1964. The following is a brief resume' of how this will be accomplished, including a tentative outline of the resultant report.

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this effort is to conduct a detailed review of Communist surveillance of and reaction to the recent Gulf of Tonkin incident, particularly the 4 August U.S. Air Strikes against selected North Vietnamese targets. The results of this review will be documented in the form of an assessment of demonstrated Communist defense capabilities, gaps, etc., and a discussion of possible Communist actions in the event of future U.S. moves of this nature.

II. OUTLINE

- A. Introduction
- B. Scenario: a discussion of overall developments to put the more technical aspects of the surveillance and reaction in proper perspective. In short, set the stage.
- C. Surveillance: a discussion of Communist surveillance as reflected by intercepted tracking, etc. including comparison with previously accepted estimates of their capabilities.
- D. Reaction: a discussion of Communist moves subsequent to the strike, including world diplomatic reaction. If possible appraise whether these are normal, abnormal, contingency plans, or just immediate ad hoc actions.
- E. Summary: in addition to summarizing noted developments, give an appraisal as to what effect this might have on any future U.S. actions of this nature.

III. PROCEDURES

B2 will serve as executive agent for NSA on this project. Appropriate elements will refine and review available SIGINT and compile the results. DIA will supply all relevant information regarding U.S. forces involved for

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inclusion in this report or in the analysis of SIGINT reflections. The report will be reviewed by DIA to ensure proper treatment of the information supplied by them and more importantly to incorporate their views in such areas as capabilities, etc.


IV. TIME FRAME

This effort is scheduled to commence 31 August. It is anticipated that approximately 30-45 days will be required for completion.

V. COORDINATION

The extent, outline and concept of operations discussed herein have been coordinated with DIAAP-2F, Col. Haberer and Lt. Col. Sen. Lt. Col. Sen and Mr. Grant, will serve as action officers for DIA and NSA, respectively.

FOR THE CHIEF, B2:


DELMAR C. LANG
Lt. Col., USAF
Chief, B205

cc: Maj. Gen. Davis



P.L. 86-36

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