

\* SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT never used in report. Only "communications intelligence, intercepts, and radar information" used.

<u>PAGE</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
166	Closed door discussion of SIGINT	Content missing. Do not know what form or how much SIGINT was shown to committee members.
19, 20, 80, 83	Mc's descriptions of SIGINT	Mc systematically used overkill language with SIGINT (highly classified, unimpeachable, incontrovertible, conclusive). All SIGINT surrounding Ton Kin flexible for interpretation, but Mc took extreme stance on its use as proof.
136	Mc refers to 9 intercepts	Cannot further identify
39-41, 141	Mc lists items of info leading to retaliation	Of 11 items cited, 8 are operations, 3 SIGINT: 1. attack warning message - equatable 2. involved in attack message - non-equatable 3. 2 boats lost message - equatable (see p. 37 below)
203-205	Best description of SIGINT shown to committee	Mc here paraphrases FOUR messages 1. warning message - equatable 2. IRV preparations for attack - equatable 3. and 4. two boats lost and downing two U.S. aircraft equatable to just one message (see p. 37 below)
21, 22, 37, 114	Separate references to attack warning message	Equatable to available SIGINT
147	Mc overstates warning message	In replying to leading question from SEN MORSE, Mc lends greater strength to this message than is contained therein.
23, 37	under attack message	Cannot equate - Mc's interpretation of whatever this message contained was severely criticized by SEN GORE
37	2 a/c, 2 PTs lost message	Can equate to message A.J. Austin claimed belonged to 2 Aug evidence. Later, page 203-205, Mc seemed either to split this message into two, or group several into just two (see p. 136 - "9 messages")

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