

THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:)
) Investigation Nos.:
 SULFANILIC ACID FROM) 701-TA-318 and
 CHINA AND INDIA) 731-TA-538 and 561
) (Second Review)

Thursday,
 January 26, 2006

Room No. 101
 U.S. International
 Trade Commission
 500 E Street, S.W.
 Washington, D.C.

The hearing commenced, pursuant to notice, at
 9:30 a.m., before the Commissioners of the United States
 International Trade Commission, the Honorable STEPHEN
 KOPLAN, Chairman, presiding.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the International Trade Commission:

Commissioners:

CHAIRMAN STEPHEN KOPLAN
 VICE CHAIRMAN DEANNA TANNER OKUN
 COMMISSIONER JENNIFER A. HILLMAN
 COMMISSIONER CHARLOTTE R. LANE
 COMMISSIONER DANIEL R. PEARSON
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APPEARANCES: (cont'd.)

Staff:

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GEORGE DEYMAN, SUPERVISORY INVESTIGATOR

In Support of the Continuation of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders:

On behalf of Nation Ford Chemical Company (NFC):

JOHN A. DICKSON, Chief Executive Officer, NFC
JAY DICKSON, President, NFC

GREGORY C. DORRIS, Esquire
Pepper Hamilton LLP
Washington, D.C.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(9:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning. On behalf of the United States International Trade Commission I welcome you to this hearing on Investigation Nos. 701-TA-318 and 731-TA-538 and 561 (Second Review), involving Sulfanilic Acid From China and India.

The purpose of these five-year review investigations is to determine whether the revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering sulfanilic acid from China and India would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.

Notices of investigation for this hearing, list of witnesses and transcript order forms are available at the Secretary's desk. I understand that those in support of continuation are aware of the time allocations. Any questions regarding the time allocations should be directed to the Secretary.

As all written material will be entered in full into the record it need not be read to us at this time. The parties are reminded to give any prepared non-confidential testimony and exhibits to the Secretary. Do not place any non-confidential

1 testimony or exhibits directly on the public
2 distribution table. All witnesses must be sworn in by
3 the Secretary before presenting testimony.

4 Finally, if you will be submitting documents
5 that contain information you wish classified as
6 business confidential, your requests should comply
7 with Commission Rule 201.6.

8 Madam Secretary, are there any preliminary
9 matters?

10 MS. ABBOTT: No, Mr. Chairman.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I understand that counsel
12 wishes to go directly to his presentation, as opposed
13 to giving opening remarks, so if the witnesses have
14 been sworn we can proceed.

15 MS. ABBOTT: Mr. Chairman, the witnesses
16 have been sworn.

17 (Witnesses sworn.)

18 MS. ABBOTT: Would the panel members please
19 come forward?

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

21 Good morning, Mr. Dorris.

22 MR. DORRIS: Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

23 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If you're ready, you may
24 begin.

25 MR. DORRIS: Better late than never, I

1 suppose.

2 I am Greg Dorris with the law firm of Pepper
3 Hamilton, counsel to the Nation Ford Chemical Company,
4 or NFC for short. NFC was the Petitioner in the
5 original antidumping and countervailing duty
6 investigations that resulted in the orders now under
7 review. NFC has for many years been the only producer
8 of sulfanilic acid in the United States, and thus
9 alone NFC constitutes the domestic industry.

10 NFC would like to continue to be a U.S.
11 producer of sulfanilic acid, but should the Commission
12 determine to revoke the orders on sulfanilic acid from
13 China and India, NFC legitimately fears that it no
14 longer would be able to afford to produce sulfanilic
15 acid here.

16 In many respects these full second reviews
17 are very similar to the expedited first review.
18 Indeed, there are no new facts in these reviews that
19 would warrant not finding the same like product and
20 domestic industry as that found in the first reviews
21 and in the original investigations.

22 For this reason, NFC supports the
23 determination that the like product is all sulfanilic
24 acid regardless of form or grade and that the domestic
25 industry is all domestic producers of sulfanilic acid,

1 which in these reviews, as I mentioned already,
2 continues to be only NFC.

3 The same facts also are present in these
4 reviews that led the Commission to conclude in the
5 first review that the Chinese and Indian imports
6 should be cumulated for purposes of assessing the
7 volume and effect of these imports on the domestic
8 industry.

9 The China and India sunset reviews of the
10 three orders on sulfanilic acid were initiated on the
11 same day, May 2, 2005. Sulfanilic acid imports from
12 China and India have or would continue to compete
13 directly with each other and the domestic like product
14 in the U.S. market.

15 All four traditional factors evidence the
16 reasonable degree of overlap, and the reasons stated
17 continue to prevail in these second reviews as you
18 found in the first review. There continues to be a
19 reasonable degree of fungibility between the subject
20 imports produced in China and India and between the
21 subject imports and the domestic like product.

22 The subject imports and the domestic like
23 product also would be simultaneously in the market as
24 India would come in to the United States were the
25 orders to be lifted, and China would increase its

1 imports into the United States should the orders be
2 lifted.

3 Sulfanilic acid is sold nationwide, and the
4 imports and the domestic like product would travel
5 through the same channels of distribution, so on
6 balance all the factors necessary to find that the
7 Indian and Chinese imports should be cumulated, as was
8 found in the first review, continue to exist in the
9 second review.

10 The Commission in the first sunset reviews
11 also emphasized the additional facts that the subject
12 imports would likely compete in the U.S. market under
13 similar conditions of competition. Noting
14 specifically the substantial capacity and export
15 orientation of the foreign producers in China and
16 India.

17 That too also continues in these second
18 reviews, as well as the fact that the Commission has
19 discretion whether to cumulate. We still continue to
20 say that the Commission should exercise that
21 discretion and cumulate again in these second reviews.

22 The India company, Kokan, whose response was
23 most likely responsible for the institution of these
24 full sunset reviews, as opposed to an expedited
25 review, has withdrawn without even submitting a

1 questionnaire response.

2 Given that there now is no foreign producer
3 seeking to have the orders revoked, I was tempted just
4 to say ditto in our opening statement and leave it at
5 that, and indeed, as I pointed out earlier, some of
6 the facts are the same in these second reviews as they
7 were in the first review.

8 I will say the Commission again should
9 determine not to revoke these orders. There are some
10 different facts in these second reviews, and they
11 present a stronger case for not revoking the orders
12 than you actually found in the first review.

13 In the first reviews the Commission
14 determined that the number of producers in China and
15 India had increased since the original investigation.
16 This fact remains true, but there also is evidence on
17 the record in these second reviews suggesting that
18 production in China and India continues to increase,
19 and production capacity continues to expand in both
20 countries.

21 The Commission also determined in the first
22 review that the imports from China and India that
23 would flow into the United States were the orders
24 revoked would negatively impact prices. Despite
25 similar limits in the available pricing data on the

1 record in these reviews as you had in the first
2 review, there is information that supports that there
3 would be significant underselling and that that
4 underselling would be at large margins.

5 First, the staff believes, and the record
6 supports, that there is a relatively high degree of
7 substitutability between domestically produced
8 sulfanilic acid and sulfanilic acid imported from
9 China and India.

10 The prehearing staff report documents that
11 even with the orders in place, the average unit values
12 for the subject imports from China undersold the
13 domestic like product at substantial margins of
14 underselling. The staff report states that in five of
15 six available price comparisons during six quarters of
16 1999 and 2000, the Chinese product was priced below
17 the domestic product with margins of underselling
18 ranging from 9.2 to 72.3 percent.

19 The staff report states further that for
20 price comparisons of sodium sulfanilate, one of the
21 other forms of sulfanilic acid, the Chinese product
22 was priced below the domestic product in each of the
23 five quarters from October 1999 through December 2000
24 with margins of underselling ranging from 14.1 to 45.2
25 percent.

1 Perhaps most significantly, the Commission
2 in the first reviews determined that NFC was not
3 vulnerable. This determination in large part was
4 based on the fact that in the first five years after
5 the orders were put into place NFC benefitted
6 considerably and was able to greatly improve its
7 overall health.

8 These past five years, however, have been a
9 somewhat different story. Though the orders at issue
10 have been successful in disciplining the unfairly
11 traded imports from China and India, NFC in 2001 faced
12 increasing volumes of imports from Portugal and
13 Hungary. NFC succeeded in obtaining orders against
14 these imports by late 2002, but continues to recover
15 from the material injury it suffered from those
16 imports.

17 That recovery has been really hamstrung
18 recently because of dramatic increases in NFC's raw
19 material costs for aniline and its energy costs for
20 natural gas used to produce steam in the production of
21 the refined grade of sulfanilic acid.

22 NFC has not been able to pass these cost
23 increases on to its customers in higher prices both
24 because of stiff competition from fairly traded
25 imports from France and Italy and also because it

1 doesn't want to force its customers to move their
2 production offshore.

3 As a result, NFC is very vulnerable to
4 material injury right now because its profits have
5 dropped to an injurious level. The Commission will
6 hear more about this issue and others from NFC's
7 owners and principal management, namely the CEO, John
8 Dickson, and the president, John's son, Jay Dickson.

9 Thank you.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, sir.

11 Either Mr. Dickson can proceed.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Good morning.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I must say that I've been
15 before the ITC on several occasions before. This is
16 the first time in which all the Commissioners have
17 been present, and I'm very honored and appreciate your
18 interest in our case.

19 My name is John Dickson. I am the CEO of
20 Nation Ford Chemical. NFC has been in business since
21 1978 when we started producing a water treatment
22 chemical for Hercules Corporation. In 1985, we
23 acquired sulfanilic acid production equipment from
24 American Cyanamid in Bound Brook, New Jersey, and
25 moved it to our plant in Fort Mill, South Carolina,

1 beginning production that same year. Since that time,
2 we have been the only commercial producer of
3 sulfanilic acid in the United States.

4 In 1992, we filed the original antidumping
5 petition against China and Hungary, and actually
6 followed the next year with India. The Commission
7 gave NFC relief against the unfairly traded imports
8 from China and India, and these orders saved NFC and
9 subsequently allowed it to prosper through the 1990s.

10 This hearing has given me the opportunity to
11 review some old records regarding our sulfanilic acid
12 business. In 1990, we made and sold about two million
13 pounds of sulfanilic acid at an average selling price
14 of about \$1 per pound. Our sales volume today is well
15 over five times that amount, and the average selling
16 price is down more than 20 percent.

17 In spite of increased cost, the antidumping
18 protection against China and India has allowed us to
19 increase volume while decreasing price, and this was
20 the exact opposite of what Respondent consumers argued
21 would happen at the time.

22 During the years 1994 through 1996, we
23 invested over \$1 million in a completely new refined
24 sulfanilic acid plant. Then, in order to keep the
25 plant backed up with feedstock, we purchased the

1 Zeneca Technical sulfanilic acid plant located in
2 France in 1998 and moved it to the United States. We
3 completed the major part of the installation by March
4 1999 and began production.

5 The new Zeneca plant was equipped with a
6 continuous production reactor that allowed us to
7 discontinue the old ball mill batch production and
8 increase our existing capacity by over 60 percent.
9 The combined investment for this move was almost \$2
10 million, which is a very large amount for a company of
11 our size.

12 Since that time we have continued to improve
13 our efficiency and expand capacity to increase overall
14 production. We have changed part of the plant from
15 stainless steel to corrosion-resistant alloy and
16 replaced the automated controls with a new, state-of-
17 the-art computer system.

18 We have improved our infrastructure with a
19 new and larger boiler and have switched from fuel oil
20 to natural gas for steam production. We now pretreat
21 our wastewater and send it by pipeline to a large
22 municipal wastewater plant for further purification.

23 The Commission considered the impact of the
24 original orders in the first sunset reviews that were
25 instituted in October 1999. It correctly concluded

1 that the orders essentially had worked. Nevertheless,
2 the Commission properly concluded that revocation of
3 the orders would be likely to have a significant
4 adverse impact on NFC within a reasonably foreseeable
5 time.

6 This conclusion was based on your findings
7 that revocation of the order would likely result in a
8 significant increase in volume of subject imports at
9 prices significantly lower than NFC's prices and that
10 increased volumes of subject imports would likely
11 depress or suppress the domestic industry's prices
12 significantly.

13 You noted that these volumes and price
14 effects would likely have a significant adverse impact
15 on NFC's production, shipments, sales and revenue.
16 You correctly concluded that such reductions would in
17 turn have a direct adverse impact on NFC's
18 profitability, as well as its ability to raise capital
19 and make and maintain necessary capital investments.

20 These findings and conclusions in the first
21 review hold true today, and indeed, as Jay Dickson
22 will discuss in a moment, are even more likely this
23 time around.

24 I had hoped that after the first sunset
25 reviews that I would not be back before the Commission

1 for another five years. Unfortunately, that was not
2 meant to be as NFC suffered material injury from
3 unfairly low-priced imports from Hungary and Portugal
4 that began to flood the U.S. market in the second half
5 of 2000. I was forced to come back to the Commission
6 again to seek relief from the dumped and subsidized
7 products from Hungary and Portugal.

8 Again the Commission determined that relief
9 was warranted, and antidumping and countervailing duty
10 orders were issued against Hungarian imports and an
11 antidumping order against Portuguese imports in
12 November of 2002. These orders were successful in
13 eliminating the unfairly traded imports from the U.S.
14 market, and NFC began the slow climb back to health.

15 It was surprising how quickly the dumped and
16 subsidized Hungarian and Portuguese imports entered
17 the U.S. market in the second half of 2000, but this
18 demonstrates that sulfanilic acid is sold primarily on
19 price.

20 The imports from Hungary and Portugal were
21 priced so unfairly low that they were able to swiftly
22 capture U.S. market share. Their impact was so
23 negative that it still lingers today in U.S. pricing.
24 The same scenario will play out with respect to
25 imports from China and India were the orders to be

1 revoked.

2 During my 20 years of experience in the
3 sulfanilic acid business, there have been a lot of
4 changes. Prior to 1990, most of the world demand was
5 supplied by producers in North America and Europe.
6 Since then, plants have been closed in Mexico,
7 England, France and Hungary, and the largest share of
8 existing and potential world capacity is now in China
9 and India.

10 I have visited plants in China and have seen
11 the primitive methods they use to make sulfanilic acid
12 and believe similar techniques are used in India.
13 There is no question that it costs must less to make
14 this product in China and India, but no one is
15 accounting for the tradeoff and damage done to the
16 environment and the effect on human health.

17 Coal is used to fire the boilers, with black
18 smoke billowing out the stacks. Aniline and sulfuric
19 acid, two extremely hazardous and toxic chemicals, are
20 crudely mixed together to produce a toxic molten mass
21 of aniline hydrogen sulfate that is then dumped out on
22 the floor to harden. The hardened chemical is then
23 broken up by pickax and shoveled into pans that are
24 put in cold-fired ovens to convert to crude sulfanilic
25 acid.

1 Now, I understand that environmental and
2 safety considerations are not normally a factor in the
3 Commission's deliberations, but I would like for you
4 to understand how important this factor is in
5 providing China and India such a large cost advantage.

6 Textile dyes using sulfanilic acid have
7 shifted production from the United States and Europe
8 to China and India, but a large part of sulfanilic
9 acid demand has remained in the United States, Europe,
10 Brazil and Mexico. There has been moderate growth in
11 the use of sulfanilic acid in the production of
12 optical brighteners for paper and yellow food colors.

13 A new concrete additive using sulfanilic
14 acid was put on the market in 1990, but this has now
15 largely been replaced by additives made by different
16 chemistry.

17 NFC may be the only U.S. producer of
18 sulfanilic acid, but we do not have a monopoly on the
19 U.S. market. Substantial volumes of fairly traded
20 imports continue to enter the U.S. market from France
21 and Italy.

22 While there have been no significant imports
23 from India during the past five years, there were some
24 imports from China. Though these imports have been
25 small due to the presence of the orders, the imports

1 have been at such low prices that NFC has felt the
2 impact on the U.S. market.

3 NFC has worked hard over the last five years
4 to increase its volume of export sales and with some
5 success. The problem is that NFC faces high tariffs
6 in some countries, particularly in India where the
7 duty is over 30 percent. The duty in China is lower,
8 but given the large production capacity and low cost
9 in China there is no way NFC can compete.

10 Most of NFC's export success has been in the
11 European Union. NFC would like to export to other
12 large consuming countries -- Brazil, Mexico and
13 Switzerland -- but cannot compete with the low-priced
14 product from China and India.

15 For example, the price of Chinese and Indian
16 imports of sulfanilic acid in these countries
17 consistently are below NFC's average prices by as much
18 as 25 percent. It is not difficult to understand why
19 NFC simply cannot compete in these countries, nor does
20 it require speculation to see what would happen to
21 U.S. prices and NFC were the orders against China and
22 India revoked.

23 Although NFC is able to export to Europe,
24 these export prices are low and yield very little
25 profit. The European Commission in 2002 imposed

1 antidumping and countervailing duties against imports
2 from China and India, 21 percent for China and a net
3 of over 25 percent for India. In 2004, the duty
4 against China was increased to almost 44 percent. The
5 European Commission found that China was simply
6 absorbing the duty without increasing prices.

7 As expected, these duties have caused
8 sulfanilic acid prices to increase in the European
9 Union and allowed some increase in market share
10 supplied by the domestic producers. Sulfanilic acid
11 is now produced in Portugal, France and Italy. The
12 Hungarian producer is in bankruptcy and may no longer
13 be producing sulfanilic acid.

14 As noted earlier, France and Italy make
15 regular exports to the United States. NFC has been a
16 responsible supplier both to the U.S. market and
17 overseas. We have not sat idly by, hiding behind the
18 protection of the Chinese and Indian orders. Rather,
19 we have consistently, year-after-year improved
20 production efficiency and reduced pricing, offering
21 the best possible value to our customers and the
22 market in general.

23 There is simply no question in my mind what
24 will happen to the domestic industry if the Commission
25 were to revoke the orders. Imports from both China

1 and India would be invited back to become the major,
2 if not only, suppliers to the sulfanilic acid
3 customers.

4 I have read, and painfully, the public
5 version of the prehearing staff report. What struck
6 me most was that almost all of the U.S. importers and
7 purchasers appeared to stress that they would import
8 or buy sulfanilic acid from China or India were the
9 orders to be revoked. In fact, most even suggested
10 that it would be because they believed the Chinese and
11 Indian products would be available at lower prices.

12 Of course, I have to agree with them since I
13 am certain that the Chinese and Indian producers would
14 dump their product in the U.S. market at low prices in
15 order to capture U.S. market share.

16 Indian producers and importers in particular
17 continue to enjoy very lucrative export subsidies that
18 would allow them to offer product at below their full
19 cost of production. Since even their unfairly low
20 U.S. prices are still higher than they can get in
21 other world markets, their shift to the United States
22 is a no-brainer.

23 If these duties are revoked, the Chinese and
24 Indian producers will immediately offer much lower
25 prices to domestic consumers. NFC will be forced to

1 lower its price, at the same time losing market share.
2 The net effect will be disastrous to the domestic
3 industry.

4 On behalf of this industry that I have
5 helped to create, nurture and grow over the past 20
6 years, I respectfully ask that you not revoke these
7 orders and leave NFC unprotected against the sure tide
8 of unfairly traded sulfanilic acid imports from China
9 and India.

10 Thank you. I'll turn it over to Jay.

11 MR. JAY DICKSON: Good morning. My name is
12 Jay Dickson, and I'm the president of Nation Ford
13 Chemical Company. This visit is the second time
14 before the Commission.

15 As NFC president, I currently handle the
16 company's day-to-day operations. I have worked at NFC
17 now for 17 years, first in a capacity as chemical
18 engineer, then later as technical manager and VP of
19 operations. While I have not been with NFC as long as
20 my dad, I have been around long enough to see the
21 injury that can be caused by unfairly traded imports.

22 I saw firsthand the devastation we suffered
23 when the Hungarian and Portuguese imports flooded into
24 the U.S. market back in the second half of 2000. What
25 struck me most was how quickly they entered the U.S.

1 market and consequently how swiftly NFC's financial
2 health deteriorated. The unfairly low-priced
3 Hungarian and Portuguese imports stole market share
4 from NFC and drove prices down. NFC's sales and
5 prices declined such that we were no longer
6 profitable.

7 Before the unfairly traded Hungarian and
8 Portuguese imports entered the U.S. market, NFC was
9 doing well in 1999 and into early 2000 as a direct
10 result of the orders imposed on sulfanilic acid from
11 China and India. NFC's capacity utilization was high,
12 sales and prices were doing well and overall
13 profitability good. It is no wonder, therefore, that
14 the Commission concluded in the 2000 sunset reviews
15 that NFC was not vulnerable to imports.

16 I wish NFC were in the same good shape as it
17 was in those first sunset reviews. That is not the
18 case, however. After almost climbing completely out
19 of the hole we were in due to the impact of the
20 unfairly traded imports from Hungary and Portugal, we
21 now are struggling to cope with the dramatic rise in
22 oil and natural gas prices.

23 NFC, as a U.S. chemical manufacturer, has
24 been hit harder than other U.S. producers of chemicals
25 in two key ways. First, the main raw material for the

1 production of sulfanilic acid is aniline. It accounts
2 for nearly half of the total cost to manufacture
3 sulfanilic acid.

4 Benzene is the primary raw material used to
5 produce aniline. The feedstock for benzene is crude
6 oil, and the price of benzene has risen in line with
7 the increases in crude oil prices. The price of
8 benzene has risen from about \$1 per gallon in 2000 to
9 its present value of \$2.80 per gallon. Consequently,
10 NFC now pays close to double the price for aniline
11 that it paid in 2000.

12 Second, production of the refined grade of
13 sulfanilic acid is extremely energy intensive.
14 Natural gas is used to generate steam for heating that
15 is needed for the purification of the technical grade
16 of sulfanilic acid. During the past five years, our
17 price of natural gas has gone from approximately \$3 to
18 \$4 per decatherm to recently as high as \$15 per
19 decatherm.

20 This dramatic increase has caused the energy
21 component for making refined grade sulfanilic acid to
22 increase almost fourfold during this period, which is
23 close to a one-quarter increase in the selling price
24 of refined sulfanilic acid.

25 NFC would like to pass these increases in

1 raw material and energy costs directly on to its
2 customers. However, NFC faces stiff competition from
3 fairly traded imports from France and Italy. NFC has
4 diligently worked to maintain its prices in order not
5 to force its customers to move their production
6 outside the United States. Thus, NFC must absorb much
7 of these cost increases. This has caused our
8 profitability to suffer considerably.

9 Given the volatility and uncertainty in oil
10 and natural gas prices and the consequent increase in
11 NFC's raw material and energy costs, NFC is extremely
12 vulnerable and would not be able to cope with an
13 influx of unfairly traded imports from China and India
14 were the orders revoked.

15 So even though the record reflects that NFC
16 currently enjoys relatively high capacity utilization
17 and sales, that position would change quickly and
18 drastically were the orders to be lifted. Given its
19 present low profitability due primarily to the
20 dramatic increases in its aniline and energy costs,
21 even small losses in market share and minor declines
22 in capacity utilization would turn NFC unprofitable.

23 NFC is not exaggerating the impact on its
24 future financial health by revocation of the orders.
25 The Commission should keep in mind that even a small

1 difference in the price of sulfanilic acid, as little
2 as one percent per pound, less than a penny, has a big
3 impact on NFC's tenuous profitability.

4 In fact, a one percent change in price is
5 roughly equivalent to a 10 percent change in profits.
6 Revocation of the orders most certainly would lead to
7 a drop in prices that would cause NFC to suffer
8 material injury.

9 As a final comment, I should add one point
10 to this issue of production capacity in China and
11 India that my father discussed. The Commission should
12 understand that NFC produces sulfanilic acid using a
13 continuous process. Continuous production is
14 completely automated and requires equipment
15 specifically designed for the process. It is capital
16 intensive, but requires little direct labor to
17 operate.

18 Almost like the pilot of a plane engaging in
19 auto pilot, the sulfanilic acid operator takes
20 specific actions upon start-up and shutdown, but the
21 computer controlled automation does the rest. The
22 production capacity is fixed by the maximum quantity
23 that can be produced by the equipment, usually
24 expressed in pounds per day. This maximum quantity
25 represents a hard ceiling that cannot be exceeded

1 without investing in a completely new production
2 facility.

3 In sharp contrast, the producers in China
4 and India both use a batch process as opposed to a
5 continuous process. Batch production of sulfanilic
6 acid requires no automation and can be produced with
7 inexpensive equipment routinely used to produce a wide
8 variety of chemicals such as specialty dyes. It is
9 labor intensive because all the steps in the process
10 must be performed manually.

11 Production capacity is controlled by the
12 size of the equipment, number of batches, days in
13 production and the number of production lines that are
14 being operated. Batch chemical operations are
15 extremely versatile in making different chemicals.

16 Both China and India have a very well
17 developed batch chemical industry so their capacity to
18 make sulfanilic acid is almost entirely dependent upon
19 getting customers to buy their product. Thus, there
20 are many Chinese and Indian sulfanilic acid producers
21 listed in the *Directory of World Chemical Producers*,
22 some of which would claim that they are not currently
23 producing sulfanilic acid.

24 In reality, all of them are able and willing
25 to make sulfanilic acid. They just need purchase

1 orders from the United States that most assuredly
2 would come if the orders were to be revoked.

3 I therefore join with my father and
4 respectfully request that you not revoke the orders
5 against sulfanilic acid from China and India.

6 Thank you. This concludes our direct
7 presentation. We welcome any questions that you may
8 have.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you all very much
10 for your direct presentation. It's very much
11 appreciated, and it's helpful.

12 I will begin the questioning. Mr. Dorris, I
13 will I think start with your clients for this first
14 one.

15 On page 3 of your prehearing brief you
16 state, and I quote, "The facts in the present reviews
17 clearly show that the domestic sulfanilic acid
18 industry is very vulnerable to material injury were
19 the orders to be revoked."

20 Later on pages 3 and 4 you state, and I
21 quote again, "NFC currently is able to maintain a
22 fragile market equilibrium that produces for it at
23 present only a very modest profit margin. The U.S.
24 industry is thus highly susceptible to material injury
25 by reason of subsidized and dumped imports, and the

1 orders at issue should not be revoked."

2 You renewed your vulnerability argument in
3 your direct testimony this morning. In your view,
4 what operating profit level would NFC need to attain
5 before you would not consider this firm to be
6 vulnerable?

7 MR. DORRIS: I think I'll leave that to John
8 to answer in terms of where they should be.

9 I have an old adage I think, and maybe I
10 should not let you hear this since it comes from a
11 lawyer's side, but many times in advising clients we
12 talk about how the Commission looks at cases, and we
13 say that any profitability around five percent or less
14 they'll find material injury, and anything between
15 five percent and 15 percent they're likely to find
16 threat of material injury.

17 You know, every industry obviously is
18 different in what they need in terms of profitability.
19 It's different, but I would think that if you're not
20 making much better than a CD right now --

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You're not talking about a
22 compact disc, are you?

23 MR. DORRIS: No, sir. -- or a Treasury note
24 then you're really not that profitable. You're not
25 generating income to sustain yourself and to grow your

1 company and to be able to buy infrastructure and
2 continue the type of improvements they had over the
3 past few years in terms of expanding capacity
4 capabilities.

5 I'll let John talk a little bit more
6 specifically about NFC

7 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It would seem to me that
8 the important thing here is not so much the absolute
9 number -- you have those absolute numbers -- but the
10 trend that we've seen in that number over the past few
11 years and the fact that it has gone down and is at a
12 level that is uncomfortably close to not making a
13 profit at all.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Can you throw a ballpark
15 figure out? I mean, what would please you? There
16 must be a number that would please you.

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Okay. Well, a number
18 that --

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Where you wouldn't
20 consider yourself vulnerable.

21 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The chemical industry, I
22 would say as a general rule, would expect a profit in
23 the neighborhood of 10 percent and would have a gross
24 profit in the range of 30 percent.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Of what?

1 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Thirty percent.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thank you.

3 Mr. Dorris, on page 10 of your prehearing
4 brief you state, and I quote, "NFC is experiencing a
5 dramatic rise in cost for aniline."

6 Later on pages 10 and 11 you state, and I
7 quote, "NFC cannot pass through all this raw material
8 and natural gas cost increase to its customers given
9 the competition it faces from fairly traded imports
10 and the strong desire not to force its customers to
11 move their production outside the United States." You
12 mentioned that in your opening as well today.

13 I'm going to refer you, and the reason I'm
14 calling on you is because it's a bracketed table. I'm
15 going to refer you to Table III-6 at pages III-8 and
16 III-9 of the staff report which contains confidential
17 information that was actually provided by your client.

18 It does not appear to be consistent with the
19 statement that I just read. Now, I can't get into the
20 numbers, but for purposes of a posthearing I'd like
21 you to respond to that. To give you a little bit of
22 guidance without getting into the numbers, on page 8
23 I'm referring to the line item Gross Profit and the
24 line item Operating Income or Loss, and on page 9 I'm
25 referring to the Operating Income or Loss line.

1 I'd like you to concentrate, if you would
2 for me, on the years 2003 and 2004. That's as far as
3 I can go with you though in this public forum, so if
4 you would do that for me and reconcile it with the
5 statement I read from your brief I'd appreciate it.

6 MR. DORRIS: Yes, sir.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Let me stay
8 with you.

9 On page 12 of your prehearing brief you
10 state, and I quote, "The producers in both countries,"
11 meaning China and India, "are export driven because
12 there is little demand for sulfanilic acid in their
13 own countries."

14 Indian producer Kokan, at pages 3 and 4 of
15 its response to the Commission's notice of
16 institution, stated, and I quote, "The demand in India
17 continues to be robust given the consumption by the
18 dye manufacturers. In fact, the Indian market for
19 sulfanilic acid sees large imports from China to meet
20 its requirements."

21 How do you respond to that?

22 MR. DORRIS: I must say that our
23 understanding of the Indian and Chinese markets is
24 certainly developing, but it's also always been sort
25 of nascent. We've never really understood exactly.

1 In fact, having seen now that they've made
2 the telegrams from the Embassies public and I was able
3 to discuss the actual numbers that I had with John, he
4 was quite surprised in terms of some of the domestic
5 consumption in India.

6 We've been struggling trying to determine
7 where that sulfanilic acid is actually going in terms
8 of the end use. We expect that some of that is into
9 the textile industries where the U.S. just doesn't
10 compete now and has lost a lot of those sales
11 offshore, so maybe some of that sulfanilic acid is
12 being turned inward to the textile industries.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So it's possible that the
14 statement I read from their response to our notice of
15 institution is accurate?

16 MR. DORRIS: Well, it's certainly much more
17 consistent with the information from the Embassy,
18 although that again came directly mainly from Kokan.

19 We have no evidence to controvert that. Let
20 me put it that way. Our initial understanding was
21 they were not consuming as much in India. It appears
22 at least from the data that's reported by Kokan, who
23 decided not to show up, that that may not be the case.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate your
25 response. Let me stay with you again.

1 According to Table VI-1 of the staff report,
2 there have been no imports of subject merchandise from
3 India since 1999, but subject imports from China have
4 continued to be present in the market. However, there
5 were no imports of subject merchandise from China in
6 2001 and 2002.

7 It appears that Commerce reviewed and raised
8 the antidumping duty on firm specific Chinese imports
9 in January 2002, and that's Table I-1 on page I-6 of
10 our staff report, which may account for their absence
11 in that year, but do you know what accounts for the
12 absence of Chinese subject imports in 2001?

13 It's my understanding that the Department of
14 Commerce did not apply the 2002 rates to the 2001
15 imports, so I'm curious what you think accounts for
16 them not being there in 2001.

17 MR. DORRIS: Let me just talk with John just
18 a second.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

20 (Pause.)

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: My clock is running.

22 MR. DORRIS: I'm sorry. It's a difficult
23 question because of the timing of when imports come in
24 and when the review process takes place and then what
25 rate is applied.

1 I'm not going to try at least here to
2 explain what rates were in effect at the time, but one
3 issue we had with the Chinese in that period, and
4 that's what I was trying to confirm with John, around
5 2000 and 2001 was they were bringing in product
6 through a circuitous route, in a sense committing a
7 fraud on Customs.

8 Customs was able to find that situation and
9 correct that and so there was a flow of imports in
10 2000, and then once the fraud issue was uncovered it
11 sort of clamped down and shut down any imports coming
12 in at that point because at that point they weren't
13 going to continue the fraud, and certainly importers
14 weren't going to be involved in the sort of
15 speculative type issue that was going on.

16 That's the best I can say now without
17 actually studying that prior record.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If you can expand on that
19 in your posthearing I'd appreciate it.

20 MR. DORRIS: Yes.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

22 I think I can get one more short one in.
23 This is for the Dicksons. I note from Table IV-1 at
24 page IV-2 of our staff report that the unit value of
25 subject imports from China doubled in the interim

1 period.

2 Do you know what might have caused such a
3 dramatic price increase only in that period?

4 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Which period was this?

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's our interim period.
6 That would be January to September 2005.

7 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. That would be
8 almost the entire result of the world increase in
9 benzene, which is used to make aniline, which is the
10 main product.

11 There has definitely been large increases in
12 the world price of sulfanilic acid to account for the
13 huge increase in benzene and related aniline.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you for that.

15 I'll turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

16 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you, Mr.

17 Chairman.

18 Thank you to the panel, and welcome back to
19 the Dicksons. I appreciate you being here. I've had
20 the opportunity to participate in other cases
21 involving sulfanilic acid, but it's always helpful to
22 have you come and update us on what's going on in the
23 business.

24 I think I'll start with a looking forward
25 question for you. I know you've provided some

1 information in the staff report, but in terms of what
2 you see when you look ahead in terms of demand in the
3 U.S. market first, and then we'll turn to the world
4 market, there was discussion in there about perhaps
5 some increase because of the increasing use of
6 sulfanilic acid for optical brighteners. As I
7 understand, that's used in paper.

8 To help me understand what you see in the
9 U.S. market on that side, is that going to be an
10 increasing use for your product? Help me out there.
11 What do you see on demand?

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We've been very happy to
13 find that starting in the second half of last year
14 that the use of sulfanilic acid for paper brighteners
15 reversed a downward trend and started moving upward.

16 We understand it has something to do with
17 the decision by paper manufacturers to match
18 brightness standards that are used in Europe. We've
19 known for years that a greater percentage of optical
20 brighteners was used in paper made in Europe, and it
21 was in fact brighter.

22 The difference in doubling or tripling the
23 amount of brightener that's used in paper if I had
24 examples here and could show you would be quite
25 astounding. You would look at something and say well,

1 yes, this is white, and then you'd look at something
2 that has double the brightener and say boy, what a big
3 difference. That's really bright, but they're both
4 white. That's the way it works.

5 However, we believe that that has reached
6 its peak, but is somewhat higher than before. It
7 represents in total probably 60 to 70 percent of the
8 total business goes into paper brighteners.

9 The other part is the yellow food colors,
10 both Yellow 5 and 6. We understand from our customers
11 that they are under pressure from those same colors
12 being supplied from India and China. This is one of
13 their factors in saying you must keep your price down
14 or we'll end up losing market share, or we may
15 discontinue making the colors and start importing them
16 from India and China just to resell them, which is an
17 action that they definitely do not want to do.
18 Nevertheless, there seems to have been moderate growth
19 in the United States in the use of sulfanilic acid for
20 the food colors.

21 There's been a decline in the use for
22 concrete additives only because the chemistry of that
23 particular concrete additive has changed to let's say
24 a more advanced chemistry that doesn't use sulfanilic
25 acid, so that application has been on the decline.

1 Our projections for business this year -- of
2 course, assuming that there will be no revocation of
3 the order -- indicate probably an overall increase in
4 the neighborhood of five to 10 percent by volume, so
5 it represents over 60 percent of our business is sort
6 of the flywheel that keeps an operation going.

7 We operate seven days a week, 24 hours a
8 day. We have to have full laboratory and maintenance
9 coverage, et cetera, so it takes a certain level of
10 business to get beyond the critical mass of being able
11 to maintain an ongoing chemical operation.

12 The sulfanilic acid is absolutely key to the
13 fact that we can also make smoke dyes for the Army.
14 We're the only producer of smoke dyes for the U.S.
15 Army and the only company that has the capability to
16 perform the organic reactions and meet their highly
17 rigid particle size specifications, so that's become
18 an important part of our business.

19 Were it not for sulfanilic acid, we wouldn't
20 be making smoke dyes for the Army because the business
21 is far too small to sustain an operation just in its
22 own right.

23 I hope that gives you sort of a feel for the
24 company and the importance of where sulfanilic acid
25 falls.

1 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: It's very helpful. In
2 terms of the use in textile dyes, is that something
3 that's completely gone in the United States, or is
4 there still a portion?

5 I mean, I don't know if the last thing you
6 were mentioning with regard to the Army is considered
7 a textile dye or something else, but just so that I
8 understand where the different end uses are going.

9 MR. JOHN DICKSON: An interesting question.
10 I don't think there's a pound of sulfanilic acid that
11 is made today that goes into making a textile dye.

12 We do make a sulfanilic acid look-alike
13 molecule in very small volume that does go to make a
14 textile dye, but I think it's a highly specialized
15 application that for some reason the production of
16 which has been retained in Europe and the United
17 States.

18 It was through my knowledge that sulfanilic
19 acid was never a large part of dye production in the
20 United States that I assumed it was not a large part
21 of production in China and India. Because we've never
22 tried to participate in those markets -- it would be a
23 totally worthless effort -- my assumption has always
24 been that the demand for sulfanilic acid in those
25 countries has been relatively low.

1 Also with the knowledge that these countries
2 are not tree producers -- they don't have large forest
3 and paper mills; they're largely dependent upon
4 imports for paper type products and are not consumers
5 of paper products -- so I'm actually sort of taken
6 aback by the recent findings that apparently there are
7 large domestic requirements in both China and India
8 for sulfanilic acid far beyond what I would have
9 projected, which particularly explains Chairman
10 Koplan's previous question.

11 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. That's helpful.
12 I did want to get your sense of the world demand. I
13 understand what you're saying about China and India
14 and why that would be surprising.

15 What about for the other markets and the
16 markets where you participate as an exporter? Is the
17 trend with the optical brighteners, for example, is
18 that increasing in other markets as well? You I think
19 had indicated in your response that the Europeans had
20 always done more of this I think.

21 Before you answer the question, my consumer
22 question, when I go to buy printer paper for my home
23 printer and you get the labels that say super bright,
24 brighter, and it kind of goes up in price as you go up
25 the brightness. Is that the kind of brightness we're

1 talking about?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: That's exactly the
3 brightness that you're talking about.

4 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. So now looking
5 at not China and India, but looking at other export
6 markets, trends there in terms of end uses or demand
7 or what you see when you look at those?

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Interestingly enough, the
9 use of the concrete additive was invented in Europe,
10 and Europe has always used a lot more sulfanilic acid
11 to make concrete additives than in the United States
12 by factor of probably at least 10 or 20.

13 Most of the technical acid that we sell in
14 Europe today goes into concrete additives. There's
15 also one or two companies that have pharmaceutical
16 molecules that have been invented for specific
17 requirements that use sulfanilic acid, one of which is
18 fairly large also in the EU and the other which is
19 fairly small.

20 Beyond that, that pretty well summarizes the
21 total world demand in terms of where it goes. There's
22 some that obviously goes to textile dyes, apparently
23 more than I thought. The largest percentages goes to
24 brighteners for paper, the next are to make Yellow 5
25 and Yellow 6 and then into the pharmaceutical

1 application -- concrete, dyes and pharmaceutical.

2 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. That's helpful.

3 In terms of prices to the different end use markets,
4 has there been any change in that, and can you tell me
5 a little bit about that? If it's anything
6 proprietary, you can always put it in your posthearing
7 brief.

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The prices are really not
9 use related. They are related more to the form of
10 sulfanilic acid that is required for the end use.

11 As you would imagine, in making food dyes it
12 requires a purified grade of sulfanilic acid or
13 requires that the person that buys it purify it before
14 he uses it.

15 Then on the other extreme you'd go to
16 concrete additives where the technical acid and the
17 purity is not a major consideration. It's lower in
18 price because it has a lower cost of production.

19 This largely holds true for the brightener
20 customers as well, although interestingly enough we
21 have seen one instance, and I think this has been
22 brought about by the EU duties, in which one major
23 brightener producer who said he could only purchase
24 the refined grade brightener, couldn't use the
25 technical, has now converted entirely to using

1 technical.

2 This doesn't mean that he doesn't perform an
3 intermediate operation of purification prior to its
4 use. It's just that it represents a better value,
5 even given the fact that he's taking another step in
6 order to be able to use it.

7 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. My red light has
8 come on, but I'll have a chance to return to that.

9 Thank you very much. It was very helpful.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

11 Commissioner Hillman?

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. I, too,
13 would join my colleagues in welcoming you back to the
14 Commission. We appreciate you taking the time to be
15 with us this morning.

16 If I could follow up a little bit because I
17 had some questions that related to this issue of the
18 different grades of the product. As I understand, our
19 like product definition includes the technical grade,
20 the refined grade, as well as the sodium-based salt
21 product.

22 Help me understand whether there are
23 significantly different processes of production either
24 for you or for the Chinese or the Indians to make the
25 different grades, the different types of product.

1 MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, first we make the
2 technical grade in continuous automated operation, and
3 that becomes the feedstock that makes the other
4 grades. Either we sell the technical grade as is --
5 it has about 99 percent purity. It's got a little bit
6 of gray color. It's maybe off-white to gray. Many of
7 our customers use that because it's the most cost
8 effective.

9 We can purify that in two ways. One is we
10 can add sodium hydroxide, which increases the
11 solubility of sulfanilic acid in water. That forms a
12 product called sodium sulfanilate, which is just the
13 sodium salt of sulfanilic acid.

14 We can sell that in two forms. We can sell
15 that as a solution form in a 30 percent solution, or
16 we can sell that as a dry form where we take that 30
17 percent solution and evaporate the water.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay.

19 MR. JAY DICKSON: So there's the two forms
20 of sodium sulfanilate. The dried form is very energy
21 intensive because you have to evaporate. The 70
22 percent of that solution, which is water, has to be
23 evaporated. That uses a lot of natural gas. It's
24 very energy intensive to make that particular grade as
25 opposed to the salt solution.

1 Moving on to the refined grade, that is made
2 without sodium hydroxide. It's just taking the
3 technical acid, which is very insoluble in water. You
4 have to dissolve it in large pieces of equipment using
5 large amounts of water. You have to heat that water
6 up. Then you have to chill it back down, and during
7 that process you go through a filtration which
8 purifies it.

9 That is probably one of the most energy
10 intensive ways to produce a refined grade of
11 sulfanilic acid versus the salt solution. We've had
12 customers recently switch from our refined grade
13 sulfanilic acid to a salt solution.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. That's
15 extremely helpful.

16 Now help me understand. First, help me
17 understand of the product that you produce what
18 portion if sold in the technical form, the refined
19 form, the solution sodium form and the salt, the dry
20 sodium sulfanilate form? Do you have a sense of where
21 the market is in terms of each one of these types?

22 MR. JAY DICKSON: I'd say roughly -- this is
23 somewhat proprietary, but we sell more of the
24 technical, the refined grade and the salt solution.
25 Those three are our biggest sellers. The poorest

1 seller is the dry form of the salt.

2 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. And then in
3 terms of imports from India or China, are they
4 typically concentrated in any one of these particular
5 forms?

6 Let me start with do you know whether the
7 Chinese can produce all of these forms as well?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: I don't think they're
9 selling the technical grade because their technical
10 grade is not a quality that's good enough to sell, so
11 they have to refine it. Mainly they refine to the
12 pure acid, but I'm sure some companies can make the
13 sodium salt.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. So your
15 understanding is the Chinese are primarily, if not
16 exclusively, in the refined product?

17 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes.

18 MR. JOHN DICKSON: If I can add?

19 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Mr. Dickson?

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Back when I was
21 describing the Chinese process and the crude method in
22 which they produce the material, they end up with
23 something that's really black. It's big chunks, and
24 then they have to grind it into a powder, and then in
25 the powder they put it into boiling water and add

1 activated carbon.

2 Then they filter it out, and amazingly the
3 carbon and everything takes all of the impurity and
4 everything out, and you have a clear solution that
5 then is crystallized that produces refined grade
6 sulfanilic acid.

7 The Chinese, by the very nature of making
8 such a crude technical, are not active in the
9 technical market. They're almost exclusively in the
10 pure grade. That's also true with India.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I was just going to
12 say, and how about the Indians?

13 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. So they're
15 almost entirely in the refined as well? Okay.

16 From a pricing standpoint, help me
17 understand the general difference in price for you for
18 the technical, and again if it's proprietary
19 information I'm happy to have you submit it in a
20 posthearing.

21 I'm just trying to get a relative sense of
22 as I hear you describe this process for you the
23 technical product is your starting point, presumably
24 the least costly of them to produce because everything
25 else requires additional steps and some obviously

1 additional significant expenditures of energy cost to
2 produce.

3 Help me get just a sense of how much more
4 work it is, how much more costly it is to produce each
5 of these different forms. What I'm trying to
6 understand is are you able to fairly recoup all of the
7 additional cost, or from your standpoint is one of
8 these particular grades more profitable just because
9 of the difference between what you can actually charge
10 for it versus what it costs you to do these additional
11 refining, drying, et cetera steps.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We found in doing studies
13 that our technical grade is probably the most
14 profitable to us --

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: -- because it is our
17 lowest cost, and the theory is we can be the most
18 competitive.

19 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The least profitable to
21 us and actually losing money is the refined pure
22 grade.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: This is true now
25 especially because it uses so much natural gas, as Jay

1 described the process. We are making efforts to try
2 to increase our refined grade pricing to account not
3 only for the aniline increases, but also for the big
4 increase in natural gas.

5 If you were to choose a number in terms of
6 relative cost and you were to say that technical
7 sulfanilic acid was 60 cents, then you would say that
8 the refined would be I would say 85 in terms of
9 relative cost.

10 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

11 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's substantially
12 expensive to purify technical sulfanilic acid.

13 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Is it equally
14 expensive to dry the sodium salt?

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Excuse me, Commissioner.
16 I need to interrupt for a second. I'm sorry.

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: It's come to my attention
19 that we have a visitor who I believe has been using a
20 recording device. Am I correct, Mr. Secretary?

21 MR. BISHOP: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I'm afraid that you're
23 precluded from doing that because of the contract that
24 we have with the reporting company, so you are not
25 permitted to record this proceeding.

1 MALE VOICE: Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I've observed that you
3 have been doing that, so --

4 MALE VOICE: (Inaudible.)

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate that, but
6 you're not permitted to record. You're permitted to
7 observe. You can also purchase a transcript, but you
8 cannot record during the proceeding.

9 MALE VOICE: (Inaudible.) I cannot just
10 write something or say something based on my --

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I checked, and what I'm
12 advised is that you're not permitted to record.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Chairman, could I
14 just raise a question?

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Are TV cameras
17 allowed to record in this room?

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: We have had TV cameras in
19 the room, yes.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: And was that an
21 exception to the policy that you've just stated?

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's a good question.
23 Mr. Secretary, can you tell me?

24 MR. BISHOP: Yes, that is an exception with
25 the direct permission from the court reporting

1 service.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So without the direct
3 permission of the court reporting service, that's not
4 permitted either?

5 MR. BISHOP: That is correct. They need to
6 purchase the transcript.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. I guess my question
8 is did you seek permission of the court reporting
9 service before you started?

10 MALE VOICE: I work for the (inaudible), so
11 I didn't know that I needed permission. When we
12 contacted someone (inaudible) if we are not allowed to
13 record something I think we should be made aware of
14 that because (inaudible).

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I will tell you I've been
16 here over seven years, and this is the first time it's
17 occurred to my recollection and so I did not know the
18 answer to the question.

19 Before I asked you to stop, I checked. This
20 is the response that I'm getting, so I need to abide
21 by that certainly.

22 Sorry, Commissioner Hillman. If you would
23 proceed?

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Very helpful.
25 To complete this discussion just to make

1 sure I understand this relative cost versus price, I
2 appreciated all the answers that you've just given me
3 on the technical versus the refined.

4 If we then go to the issue of the salt, the
5 solution first, where does that fall in this continuum
6 of how expensive it is to produce, to take the
7 technical product and make it into the solution? Is
8 that a significant expense, this adding of the sodium
9 hydroxide to it?

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: We have the expense of the
11 sodium hydroxide.

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

13 MR. JAY DICKSON: But the energy cost is
14 relatively insignificant compared to the other
15 purified forms. It's somewhere in between the price
16 of the technical and the price of the refined. I
17 don't think we should get into real specifics.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: No. I was not
19 asking. I'm just trying to understand just generally.

20 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes.

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And then the issue of
22 then drying the solution to produce the solid salt
23 product. Is that the same equipment that you dry it
24 on that you would use after you've purified the
25 technical going to the refined, or is it completely

1 separate equipment?

2 MR. JAY DICKSON: We use separate equipment,
3 but some of that equipment is interchangeable. We
4 have specialized equipment that we're using.

5 In terms of relative cost it's about the
6 same to produce the refined free acid as it is the
7 dried sodium salt or the sulfanilic acid.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

9 MR. JAY DICKSON: There may be subtle
10 differences.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And then generally
12 this equipment, can it be used to produce lots of
13 other chemical products, or is it pretty much confined
14 to producing the sulfanilic acid products?

15 MR. JAY DICKSON: We could use it for other
16 chemical processes, and we have, yes. You know, a
17 certain type of chemistry or processing, but not all.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. But in
19 general, as I heard your testimony, it is much harder
20 for you to switch to making other products than it
21 would be for the Indians or the Chinese that are doing
22 this, putting the whole solution out on the floor?

23 Whatever they put out on the floor can vary
24 fairly easily as I understood it. For you it's
25 harder, as I hear it, to --

1 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes, and especially with
2 the technical grade. That is highly specialized
3 equipment. The purification can be interchanged with
4 other products.

5 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate
6 those responses. Thank you very much.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner
8 Hillman.

9 Just for the record, the person who had been
10 recording has apparently chosen to leave the
11 proceeding, so that's no longer going on.

12 Commissioner Lane?

13 COMMISSIONER LANE: Good. I wouldn't want
14 my questions to be recorded by anybody but an official
15 court reporter.

16 Good morning. Mr. Dickson, Mr. John
17 Dickson, in response to a question by Chairman Koplan
18 you equated profit levels to CD returns. However, in
19 making that comparison I believe you were comparing
20 operating margin or the ratio of operating income to
21 sales to a return on a CD investment.

22 If you are talking about returns on
23 alternate investments, wouldn't the proper comparison
24 be to look at your return on assets, which is quite
25 different than the ratio of net operating income to

1 sales?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'm afraid to admit my
3 ignorance on return on investment and return on
4 assets. Typically when we're looking at profitability
5 or lack of profitability that has not been one of our
6 considerations.

7 The reference to the CD, which I suppose is
8 in the range of three percent or four percent or
9 something like that, is relative to our bottom line
10 profit in sulfanilic acid, which we consider to be
11 low.

12 As I mentioned before, a typical bottom line
13 profit for a chemical operation is 10 percent and
14 typical gross profit is 30 percent, but I'm a
15 little --

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: What do you mean by
17 gross profit? I guess that's the part that had me
18 confused.

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Okay. Gross profit
20 includes the cost of manufacturing. It takes the
21 price and cost of manufacturing, and the difference as
22 a percentage on the sales represents the gross profit.

23 Cost of manufacturing does not include
24 sales, general and administrative costs and interest
25 costs or taxes.

1 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you. This
2 may be a question that you will want to answer in your
3 posthearing because I'm trying to get a handle on your
4 profits also.

5 What is your capital structure overall? In
6 other words, what is your ratio of debt capital and
7 equity capital to total capital, and what is your
8 average cost of debt?

9 MR. JOHN DICKSON: These are questions
10 probably we can best answer in the postconference
11 brief.

12 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

13 Now, in response to Commissioner Hillman you
14 indicated that some of your product is sold in dry
15 form, and some is sold in liquid solution. Have there
16 been changes from year-to-year in the amount of dry
17 product you sell as compared to the solution product?

18 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Sorry. I turned myself
19 off. The solution product.

20 COMMISSIONER LANE: I'm sorry. Say that
21 again.

22 MR. JOHN DICKSON: There has been less --
23 when we're speaking about dry, we think in solution.
24 We think in terms of sodium sulfanilate or the salt of
25 sulfanilic acid that can be sold in two different

1 forms, either a dry powder or the solution.

2 There are substantial uses for the solution
3 for customers that are close enough at hand to bear
4 the freight cost of shipping water to their
5 destination, but it offers an advantage to them
6 because they don't have to put it -- it has to go into
7 water anyway, so in this instance it's already there,
8 and using a liquid in a chemical plant operation is a
9 much easier and safe thing to do than working with a
10 powder.

11 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Now, when you
12 report the quantities of product sold in pounds, have
13 you adjusted the weight of solution product that you
14 sell to the dry weight equivalent?

15 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's always the dry
16 weight equivalent so that you're always comparing a
17 pound per pound.

18 That's even true in the case of sodium
19 sulfanilate. Although it contains a sodium ion and
20 has a higher molecular weight than sulfanilic acid, we
21 report it as equivalent sulfanilic acid, not as its
22 real weight, which is actually higher.

23 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Now, these next
24 two questions may be for the other Mr. Dickson because
25 I heard him say that he was a chemical engineer, so

1 maybe he will be the person to answer this.

2 The raw materials for sulfanilic acid are
3 aniline and sulfuric acid. I would like to know the
4 weight of these raw materials that make up the
5 finished sulfanilic acid. In other words, to produce
6 1,000 pounds of sulfanilic acid, how many pounds of
7 aniline are used and how many pounds of sulfuric acid?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: Did you say 1,000 pounds?

9 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes.

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: Okay. That would be
11 roughly 550 pounds of aniline and 600 pounds of acid,
12 but the aniline costs about 10 times as much as the
13 acid roughly.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Right.

15 MR. JAY DICKSON: Most of the cost comes
16 from the aniline.

17 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Follow-up. Is
18 sodium hydroxide a significant cost component in the
19 production of sulfanilic?

20 MR. JAY DICKSON: It is, and sodium
21 hydroxide prices have been on the rise as well. With
22 some of our customers we've worked an agreement where
23 we can adjust the price based on the changing price of
24 sodium hydroxide.

25 In the case of the optical brightener

1 customers, they're going to use sodium hydroxide
2 anyway so the fact that we add it means that they
3 don't have to add it so they're okay with essentially
4 paying a little bit more because that's one less
5 ingredient that they will not have to add.

6 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

7 Would it be correct to assume that the cost
8 of the basic raw materials, aniline and sulfuric acid,
9 in 1,000 pounds of either crude sulfanilic acid or
10 refined sulfanilic acid would be the same?

11 MR. JAY DICKSON: You have some yield loss
12 going from the technical to the refined, you know, on
13 the order of magnitude of five or seven percent.
14 Therefore, the refined would have an increased cost
15 for raw materials versus the technical grade.

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: The staff report
17 suggests that technical grade sulfanilic acid has the
18 lowest market price, that sodium sulfanilate -- I'm
19 really butchering that -- has a higher value and that
20 refined sulfanilic acid generally has an even higher
21 market value.

22 Do you agree with this evaluation?

23 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. The dry form of the
24 sodium sulfanilate would have a higher value of the
25 solution form though.

1 COMMISSIONER LANE: To follow up, I would
2 like to refer to the pricing data that is reflected in
3 Tables V-1, 2 and 3 of the staff report. This data is
4 BPI so you may have to fully respond in your
5 posthearing brief.

6 I am not sure that the prices reported
7 support the assumed relative value of the three
8 products, particularly in recent years. I would like
9 you to address the relative value as reflected in the
10 pricing tables and give me your views on the relative
11 value of the three products as shown in those tables.

12 Like I said, that would probably be best
13 done posthearing.

14 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. We'll respond in the
15 posthearing brief.

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: Can you briefly explain
17 the basic source and availability of aniline and what
18 companies supply that product in the United States?

19 MR. JAY DICKSON: I'm sorry. Can you repeat
20 the question?

21 COMMISSIONER LANE: What's the basic source
22 and availability of aniline and the companies that
23 produce it in the United States?

24 MR. JAY DICKSON: It is available, and there
25 are two or three companies -- and the reason I say two

1 or three, one has bought one of the other companies.
2 Do you want me to state the companies or not?

3 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes, if you can.

4 MR. JAY DICKSON: DuPont makes it in Texas
5 at two or three different facilities. First Chemical,
6 who was bought by DuPont, makes it in Louisiana, and
7 then there's a joint venture between two companies.
8 Crompton is one of them and another company. They've
9 got a joint venture, and they also produce aniline.

10 We've got a contract with one customer or
11 one vendor, and we are buying from them solely based
12 on the contract so we're not interested in all the
13 other producers.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'd like to add that the
15 aniline market is really controlled by the MDI market.

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: The what market?

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: MDI, methylene
18 diisocyanate. The MDI is used as the primary
19 isocyanate or the primary raw material in rigid
20 urethane foam and also in automotive elastomer
21 systems. This is really big business. We're talking
22 about hundreds of millions of pounds of MDI.

23 Aniline is used to make MDI, so it's not
24 uncommon for the people that make MDI to also make
25 their own aniline or enter into large make or buy

1 contracts with other large companies.

2 This whole business of making aniline and
3 MDI represents large-scale chemical operations with
4 plants on a world scale basis to be productive.
5 DuPont happens to be our supplier, and they are
6 interested in both the internal market of supplying in
7 Dow MDI, but also the external market, the merchant
8 market, which is relatively small compared to what the
9 captive market is.

10 The big names are DuPont, Dow, Bayer, BASF.
11 All are major factors in making aniline MDI.

12 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

14 Commissioner Pearson?

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you, Mr.

16 Chairman. Let me extend my welcome to the panel.

17 Would I be correct to assume that currently
18 all of the audience is related to the Dickson family?

19 FEMALE VOICE: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Welcome to the
21 audience also.

22 This may have been mentioned already, but
23 just so that I understand. Does the Dickson family
24 have an ownership in Nation Ford Chemical?

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It has a 100

1 percent ownership in the company.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. So it's a
3 family company that you have started and grown over
4 time?

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I was not the founder,
6 but I came with it about two years later and became
7 the 100 percent owner over a period of time.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Good.
9 Congratulations on your effort and what you've been
10 able to build.

11 Mr. Dorris, you mentioned in your statement
12 earlier that you thought India and China should be
13 cumulated for purposes of this review and you went
14 quickly through the factors, yet I wasn't sure that
15 the record supported all of your comments.

16 The presence of sales or offers in the same
17 geographic market, which in this case I guess we would
18 define as the United States. Did we have that going
19 on? Simultaneous presence in the market. Did we have
20 that? Then even common channels of distribution. Is
21 there enough on the record so that we can be confident
22 of that?

23 Could you comment, please?

24 MR. DORRIS: Yes, sir. Most of those
25 references were back to the time of the original

1 investigations and the conclusions in the first review
2 that the same would result if the orders were lifted.
3 Certainly you're right --

4 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Which first
5 investigation?

6 MR. DORRIS: I'm talking about the first
7 review.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: The first review.
9 Okay.

10 MR. DORRIS: Yes. You're right. Without
11 actual Indian imports present in the market you can't
12 make those conclusions based on the facts of Indian
13 imports in the market, but you can draw those
14 conclusions from the original investigation.

15 The other issues, such as substitutability,
16 where the customers lie, where the imports came in
17 during the original investigation, I mean those types
18 of factors can help you draw those conclusions.

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: All right. I can see
20 how one could draw those conclusions, but just
21 compared to most records that we look at there's a
22 certain amount of -- what shall we say -- speculation
23 involved in getting to the comfortable conclusion that
24 we are better off cumulating than decumulating in this
25 case.

1 MR. DORRIS: It's true that you don't have
2 the data it's not that it hasn't been supplied either.
3 I mean, the data just doesn't exist in the sense that
4 the Indians have not been in the market and the
5 Chinese have been in the market some, but not that
6 much.

7 Certainly the way the factors are derived
8 you can still draw conclusions based on the historical
9 record and based on the type of product that you're
10 dealing with and where the customers lie.

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: If we were to
12 decumulate, what determination should we make on India
13 and China decumulated as compared to cumulated?

14 MR. DORRIS: Well, obviously I believe the
15 conclusion should be the same with respect to both in
16 the sense that each have a well-developed industry.
17 Each has a market-oriented direction. Each has a
18 significant volume of production that's been at least
19 shown.

20 We unfortunately don't have the actual
21 capacity numbers to know whether there's used or
22 unused capacity. Our feeling is that there's
23 significant unused capacity, and certainly given the
24 fact that you could have batch production going into
25 sulfanilic acid production if needed there's somewhat

1 unlimited capacity in both countries the same.

2 I think the key also is that pricing by both
3 countries into other markets is significantly lower
4 than the prices in the U.S. so that if the opportunity
5 were given to come back into the U.S. market to either
6 country both would enter that market for those higher
7 prices.

8 Now, they may still and would undersell the
9 U.S. producer, but they'd still be getting more money
10 for those products than they're getting in either
11 their home market or in the other world markets.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Could I make it clear
13 that in the market or out of the market, what does
14 that mean? That does not mean that India is not
15 making regular quotes to the United States. It's just
16 that when they add on the deposits that are required
17 those quotes are so high it doesn't make sense for the
18 customer to buy.

19 Believe me, the Indians are active and would
20 be happy to sell in the United States. It's just that
21 their resulting price with the duties is more than
22 what the customer can buy from other sources,
23 including NFC.

24 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. As you meet
25 with your customers they advise you that they're

1 hearing from Indian producers? It was compelling to
2 hear you say that. I'm just wondering how is it that
3 you know that the Indians are doing that?

4 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, the subject of
5 India doesn't usually come up, but we deal with Indian
6 companies, and we know that on all of the chemicals
7 that they are advertising that they make they will
8 happily provide you quotes into the United States and
9 would be happy to sell it.

10 It's not as if they have made a decision
11 we're not going to sell in the United States. It's a
12 matter that their resulting price is too high, and
13 they're not getting business.

14 The simple fact that you don't see sales by
15 India into the United States doesn't mean that they
16 haven't made quotations or that they wouldn't be happy
17 to make quotations or that if they could possibly get
18 the orders they would. They're there in the market.
19 It's just that their price, their resulting price, is
20 too high.

21 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Mr. Dorris,
22 you no doubt have a chance to look at Table 1-3 on
23 page 1-14 of the confidential staff report. The line
24 of particular interest to me the one that shows the
25 value of imports from India over the period of review.

1 Could you for purposes of the post-hearing
2 unless you have anything that you'd want to add now
3 take a look at the value of Indian imports and then if
4 possible cite examples of any other product from any
5 other country that's been in front of us for an anti-
6 dumping countervailing duty case that has had a lower
7 value of imports than we see in this record for
8 sulfanilic acid from India?

9 MR. DORRIS: I will look at that. You're
10 talking about value as opposed to volume?

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Yes. I mean, if
12 there's anything we should know about volume that's
13 fine, too, but if we import widgets it may not be in
14 pounds so the value comparison is probably the easiest
15 to understand in terms of just trying to get a sense
16 of the importance of those imports into the U.S.
17 market.

18 MR. DORRIS: I will try to look at that. I
19 think an issue of course with respect to value is this
20 is a small market, a small industry, and it makes the
21 comparisons very difficult.

22 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Right, but there may
23 be other small markets and small industries. I've
24 been trying to think of one and in my time on the
25 Commission I don't think I can.

1 So if I've missed something let me know or
2 if you have to go back a few years to find it -- if
3 there's something that comes to mind please let me
4 know just because otherwise this may be the low point
5 that I've dealt with in terms of --

6 MR. DORRIS: I'll do my best.

7 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Thanks.
8 Another point. I regret that the Indian producers
9 aren't here. When we made the adequacy determination
10 we expected India to be represented and they're not,
11 so we don't have the benefit of their input. It
12 occurred to me that it may be somewhat costly for an
13 Indian or for any foreign producer to be represented
14 at one of our proceedings.

15 For the post-hearing could you kind of
16 compare for me the costs of representation that might
17 be required and compare that to the value of imports
18 that we have from India in this record? I'm just
19 wondering is their lack of presence explained by what
20 they would see as a poor balancing of outlay for
21 potential benefit?

22 MR. DORRIS: Well, I'm sure John would agree
23 with you in terms of what cost is involved in bringing
24 one of these cases whether you're in the U.S. or
25 coming from India, but one thing I would say is that

1 just completing a questionnaire can't be that costly.
2 I think you'll probably look through all your
3 responses. When someone fills out a questionnaire
4 they indicate how much the cost is.

5 It's usually an insignificant amount. I
6 mean, yes, it might be difficult for them to be
7 involved directly in the case, and to hire attorneys
8 and be involved in the case, but they didn't even
9 complete the questionnaire and those questionnaires
10 are important especially in terms of the capacity.

11 Based on the Indian Embassy data for Kokan
12 specifically you saw a 2,000 metric ton increase from
13 2004 to 2005 in terms of production. What does that
14 indicate in terms of their capacity and their ability?

15 That's what I think they're not wanting to
16 come here and show because I think that will show such
17 unused capacity, and such ability to make product, and
18 such an increase from over what they had from the
19 original investigation and even an increase over from
20 what they had in the first review that the data was
21 just so compelling to them that they just thought it
22 wasn't worth the effort to try.

23 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you. My time
24 has expired.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

1 Commissioner Aranoff?

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
3 Chairman.

4 I'll join all of my colleagues in welcoming
5 you here before the Commission this morning. In
6 responding to the Commission's questionnaire a number
7 of purchasers indicated that they have no other
8 source, that they only buy I assume from your company
9 as the sole domestic producer.

10 Do you have a sense -- and if it's
11 proprietary you can respond in your brief -- of what
12 percentage of your sales or of your customers are
13 single-sourcing from you not considering other price
14 bids before they make a purchase, and do you have a
15 sense of why that would be? Is it someone who is only
16 buying in small quantities for example?

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We can do that in the
18 post-hearing brief.

19 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I appreciate
20 that. If you're able to in your brief give us a sense
21 of how much of your production you think is going to
22 customers who only source from you that would be
23 helpful. I notice in looking through our staff report
24 that your company's capital expenditures and research
25 and development have decreased over the period of

1 review.

2 You've touched on that some in your direct
3 testimony this morning. Can you give me a sense, do
4 you feel that this is now a mature industry and that
5 you probably can't anticipate any major improvements
6 that would require substantial capital or research and
7 development expenditures in the near future?

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. I think it is a
9 mature business for us now. The growth rate is not
10 substantial, there are no big new applications, so we
11 anticipate that there will be no new increased capital
12 expenditures or efforts involved.

13 Actually, looking into the future I would
14 say that within the next five years we'll need to look
15 toward replacing the continuous reactor system with a
16 new unit, but we would essentially duplicate that
17 system just because all of this equipment eventually
18 wears out and needs to be replaced.

19 So that would be our next largest
20 consideration in terms of capital and we'd probably be
21 talking in the neighborhood of \$2 million.

22 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: When you purchase
23 that technology from Zeneca that's patented
24 technology? Did you get all the rights at the time to
25 replicate it or how does that work?

1 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It was not patented
2 technology, but it's within the realm of what Zeneca
3 would call proprietary know-how which was passed on to
4 us under a secrecy agreement so that they are not
5 allowed to sell it again if you will. They have sold
6 the business and the technology to NFC. We could
7 replicate it.

8 We could build a plant in China if it made
9 any sense exactly like that, but it is a unique piece
10 of equipment. Making sulfanilic acid is -- I can make
11 sulfanilic acid easily in my kitchen or you could in
12 yours. You wouldn't want to because it has some odors
13 and there would be some problems associated with it.

14 If you can imagine it's the chemical
15 engineering problem that you're bringing two liquids
16 together that make a molten salt, and then you apply
17 heat to it, and it dries off a mole of water, and then
18 it moves from molten to a dry material in a stirred
19 reactor and then everything wants to break apart
20 because now the viscosity of something that's solid
21 inside is very huge.

22 So it's a significant technical
23 accomplishment to be able to achieve what I've just
24 said and a continuous reactor as I have described and
25 the know-how is substantial. We don't believe that

1 anyone else will be able to invent or duplicate what
2 we have done without the blueprints and the operating
3 manual.

4 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Well, that actually
5 leads me to my next question which is what process are
6 your European competitors using? Are they using a
7 batch process like you described in China and India or
8 are they using something closer to what you do? Are
9 you free to sell technology to them if you wanted to?
10 Are they looking into your technology trying to
11 reinvent it themselves?

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, if it were not for
13 the batch processes that operate in such abundance in
14 India and China there would be a lot more interest on
15 the part of European producers and others in our
16 technology.

17 There would be a lot more interest in the
18 worldwide use of our technology, but as it is with
19 labor and the environment virtually free especially in
20 China this material can be made for much less cost
21 even using 30 times the amount of people.

22 So in answer we don't look at sulfanilic
23 acid as a growth business for which even though we
24 have good and special technology that's going to lead
25 us anywhere other than maintaining our position in the

1 United States.

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. So just to
3 clarify the European producers are using a batch
4 technology --

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: -- albeit it a
7 cleaner one?

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I didn't get to that.
9 All of the European producers are using a batch
10 process, but a much more controlled and automated
11 batch process that does not expose the workers to the
12 chemicals or the atmosphere that happens in China and
13 India, but they are batch processed.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Would you say then
15 that their cost of production is relatively comparable
16 to yours given the comparable level of environmental
17 regulation and that sort of thing or do you think
18 yours is lower?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay points out that our
20 volume of production is such significantly larger than
21 any one of the producers in Europe, probably are
22 almost double that size, it causes our large fixed-
23 cost to be spread over a larger volume and therefore
24 would result in somewhat lower cost in the United
25 States than we would see in Europe.

1 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay, but you would
2 say that's attributable to the hire volume of
3 production as opposed to the nature --

4 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. Absolutely.

5 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: -- of the technology
6 involved.

7 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The share of market that
8 we have in the United States, which is large, and the
9 fact that our business has grown from two million
10 pounds to well over five times that is the reason that
11 we've been able to bring our prices down, become a
12 more efficient producer, et cetera. So I can't
13 emphasize enough how important it is that we maintain
14 the level of production that we have achieved.

15 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Well, going back to
16 my first question on single-source customers and
17 asking you to sort of provide some other information
18 in your brief as you go into that in sales where you
19 are competing against fairly traded imports from
20 France or Italy that you've mentioned are in the
21 market if you could provide us with any information to
22 describe how that bid process works, what your
23 experience has been in terms of competing for sales
24 with producers just so we can understand in a
25 competitive sale how the dynamics of the market work

1 that would be helpful.

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, I can explain
3 exactly one dynamic in one of the food grade accounts.

4 There's not a subject of the fact that
5 you're the only supplier, but typically there's a
6 complaint made that your price is higher than what I
7 can buy it if I'm in Mexico, and can't you do
8 something on price, and if you can't do something and
9 lower the price we may have to move all of our
10 production to Mexico, or we may lose business in the
11 United States to the other dye manufacturers in China
12 and India that are competing against us.

13 So you see that discussion is not just your
14 price is higher or lower than the competitor it has a
15 lot of other facets and is a lot more complex.

16 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I understand that.
17 Certainly it's a factor of the times. Have any of
18 your customers actually moved offshore?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: There have been a lot of
20 threats of moving offshore, but the customers that
21 have actually moved offshore have been the ones that
22 we had 20 years ago that were using sulfanilic acid to
23 make textile dyes.

24 That wasn't caused by sulfanilic acid, that
25 was caused by the fact that (1) the textile market

1 itself moved offshore; and also the textile dyes
2 themselves could be made so much cheaper in China and
3 India than they could in the United States. So that
4 was a natural evolution of things that was not related
5 to the fact that sulfanilic acid was more expensive in
6 the United States.

7 MR. JAY DICKSON: May I add something
8 quickly? There was one case where a global customer
9 shut down an operation in England and they had the
10 option of moving it to the United States or to Mexico
11 and they chose Mexico because they're lower cost.

12 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I assume
13 you're not referring to lower cost just for sulfanilic
14 acid or was that the reason?

15 MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, that's a part of it.
16 Mexico can buy from China without duties and other
17 lower costs, lower cost labor.

18 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much
19 for your answers.

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.
21 I just have a few matters left.

22 Mr. Dickson, at Table 2-3 on page 8 of
23 Chapter 2 of our staff reports it indicates the only
24 purchaser to rate both countries are rated the United
25 States is inferior to China in the category of

1 reliability of supply. Have there been any occasions
2 during the current period of review in which your
3 company was unable to supply sulfanilic acid in
4 response to customer requests?

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Absolutely none.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Next, let me
7 stay with you. Do you hedge your natural gas costs?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: No. We do not.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You do not.

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: We really haven't had that
11 opportunity based on our agreement. We've had one
12 opportunity where our natural gas customer or supplier
13 has come to us and said, you know, do you want to buy
14 at a certain price and it ended up that it would not
15 have been an advantage. We do not play that market I
16 guess.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. On pages 15
18 and 16 of your prehearing brief you state that China
19 and India both have batch chemical producers that
20 could produce sulfanilic acid and you've just been
21 talking about that in the hearing. Are there batch
22 chemical producers in the United States that could
23 easily begin production of sulfanilic acid?

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: No. There are not.
25 Unfortunately the diverse batch chemical industry that

1 did exist in the United States no longer exists.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. How difficult
3 is it to become a domestic producer of sulfanilic
4 acid? I mean, why are you the only domestic producer
5 remaining? I note on page 15 of your prehearing brief
6 you discuss the potential for product shifting in the
7 foreign countries. Does such product shifting occur
8 domestically?

9 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The United States I think
10 is typical and has often been envied by European
11 countries in that there's a substantial market here
12 and substantially few companies supply it. Therefore,
13 they're able to reach volume levels that it makes
14 sense. We need the volume that we have in order to
15 keep our costs down and be competitive with the
16 overall world market.

17 Anyone coming in and looking at sulfanilic
18 acid may or may not conclude that NFC is successful in
19 making a profit, but what they would have to look at
20 is that if we're selling, just pick an arbitrary
21 figure which is not real, 10 million pounds it's
22 likely that their break even point on any sort of
23 plant would at least be five million pounds.

24 So if they come into the market expecting to
25 quickly take five million pounds from NFC it's an

1 unlikely venture that anybody is going to want to pass
2 on. So the economic barrier or capital investment
3 that's required, the environmental considerations,
4 getting the permits and everything else, usually don't
5 lead toward the idea that someone in this specialized
6 business would try to come in and be a competitor.

7 Also, there are higher expectations of
8 investors, more sophisticated expectations of
9 investors in the United States as to what their
10 expected return and intelligence of the investment is.
11 So given our relatively dominant position and the fact
12 that our prices are very competitive really
13 discourages another producer coming into the business.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much for
15 your answer, and to all of your answers to my
16 questions.

17 I'll turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you. I just
19 wanted to go back to the nonsubject imports. I heard
20 some responses, but just a question in terms of what
21 grades they're selling here. Do they sell the same
22 mix of the refined technical that NFC sells in the
23 U.S. market? Again, I think that's primarily France
24 and Italy as I heard you.

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The French are primarily

1 selling technical. They do incidentally make the
2 solution for a large customer in Europe, but usually
3 the solution is not something that makes any sense to
4 ship overseas so they're not competing with us with
5 solution in the United States. The Portuguese make
6 the pure acid only.

7 I believe all of their technical feed stock
8 goes into making the pure acid, but the anti-dumping
9 duties against them prevent them from being a factor
10 in the market now. Hungarians were offering the pure
11 material, but our unconfirmed information is that they
12 have gone bankrupt and are no longer making sulfanilic
13 acid.

14 We believe that there is production in Italy
15 now of technical sulfanilic acid. It is primarily our
16 only forecasted production by one of the major
17 brightener companies and that material is coming into
18 the United States and in that sense we're competing
19 with the Italian technical material.

20 On the refined market because it is
21 primarily supplied by India, and China and the
22 Portuguese and there are anti-dumping duties in effect
23 then NFC is usually the first supplier of choice in
24 terms of relative value to the customer.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: In response a long time

1 ago now my first question you were talking about a
2 European customer who had switched what they were
3 using because of the price advantage, and I wanted to
4 make sure I understood that. That was they would
5 purchase and then further refine it for their uses?

6 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. As a major optical
7 brightener --

8 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: The optical brightener.
9 Okay.

10 MR. JOHN DICKSON: -- customer that had
11 traditionally used refined material purchased
12 primarily from China and India, but once the dumping
13 margins went into affect in 2002 they decided to make
14 -- well, first they switched to technical sulfanilic
15 acid and bought technical acid from the European
16 French supplier and later as far as we can tell
17 they've actually started making technical sulfanilic
18 acid themselves using it in Europe and shipping it to
19 their plant in the United States.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Appreciate that.
21 I needed to understand that.

22 Then just one request, Mr. Dorris, for post-
23 hearing just in terms of I know the Chairman asked you
24 several questions with regard to the vulnerability, if
25 you can also just look at other cases and point me to

1 cases where we've had single producers in the United
2 States and when we have found those vulnerable and
3 under what circumstances? I'd appreciate that.

4 MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am. Do you want it
5 limited to single producers? Is that a key point?

6 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Well, just you know
7 large market -- I mean, understand it's in terms of
8 trying to understand how I would evaluate
9 vulnerability in a market where we talked about the
10 operating income market share in this case where
11 you've got a supplier. I just want a sense of what we
12 looked at if you can.

13 MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am.

14 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Always helpful. With
15 that I have no further questions, but I do want to
16 thank you for appearance here today and your answers
17 to our questions. It's been very helpful. Thank you.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

19 Commissioner Hillman?

20 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. I guess I
21 would love to finish a little bit of this discussion
22 of the different grades and how they play in the
23 market.

24 First let me start with asking a question
25 that I'm sure should be best answered in the post-

1 hearing which is just help me understand the portion
2 of your shipments that are of each of the technical,
3 the refined, the sodium-based solution and the sodium
4 salt solid version of the product.

5 I'm just trying to understand your most
6 recent, you know, so shipments would be what
7 percentage of those? I would be happy to take that in
8 a post-hearing brief. Then help me understand are
9 there end uses that can only use one form or another
10 or can most processes convert themselves, and most of
11 your end users can they change their process to use a
12 different form of sulfanilic acid?

13 MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, each case is
14 different. There are some cases where they can use
15 any product they choose. Some customers just choose
16 not to, but they could if they wanted to, but they
17 just for one particular reason or another they just
18 choose a particular product and they say that's what
19 we want to buy from you.

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Let me say this --

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I'm sorry. I was
22 intrigued, again, by this comment that at least in
23 Europe that there was a purchaser who had been using
24 the refined that moved if you will downstream, or
25 whatever, offstream, to use the technical product

1 because they were able to figure out a way to do a
2 little bit of their own purification somewhere else in
3 the process.

4 I'm just trying to understand how common a
5 phenomenon that is of people switching from one form
6 to another and why they would do it.

7 In other words is there a cost -- once you
8 get to a certain price differential say between the
9 refined and the technical are a lot of customers out
10 there looking to try to make that switch just because
11 your cost differential between the two is such that
12 they would rather try if they could to use the
13 technical grade and do the purification on their end
14 rather than having you do it at a certain amount of
15 additional price?

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's very unusual for a
17 customer to make a switch like that.

18 As a matter of fact it's something that I
19 would have never predicted would have happened
20 anywhere in the world, so I was very surprised to
21 learn that this company (1) did it, but it's also a
22 privately-held company in which the ownership has more
23 of a hands on type management and could clearly see
24 that given the much higher price or the significantly
25 higher price of buying the Chinese refined grade

1 material than they could buy the technical grade
2 supplied by a producer in France that the owner just
3 told his plant to do it.

4 To do it is actually relatively simple
5 because they have to convert it into the salt solution
6 anyway before it goes on to become a brightener. So
7 they take the technical acid, drop it in a caustic
8 solution and dissolve it, throw in some activated
9 carbon, filter it -- this is called clarification --
10 and then it goes directly on into the process.

11 So they've had to add a step that might cost
12 five cents that otherwise would have cost them 20
13 cents or so, but as long as the refined Chinese
14 material was available at such a low price the
15 economic decision was clearly why should we bother
16 doing that operation?

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I
18 understand exactly what you've said in terms of this
19 customer. What I'm trying to understand is how unique
20 is that?

21 From what you've described this process of,
22 again, once it goes into solution and I guess maybe I
23 don't understand what portion of your customers -- I
24 would have assumed from food coloring and paper
25 whiteners that everybody at some level puts this into

1 solution for an end use and those people are not
2 actually using it as a solid.

3 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Right.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: So if everybody is
5 putting it into solution before they're finishing
6 whatever their use is for it why wouldn't you assume
7 that a lot of them would go down this road? Once
8 they've already put it into solution, run it through
9 carbon and do the purification themselves rather than
10 paying you a significant differential to do so.

11 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Here you're a matter of
12 economics scale. We're doing it on a large scale, a
13 customer would be doing it on a much smaller scale.
14 So in most cases the total cost to the customer would
15 be less by us doing it rather than them doing it.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I
17 appreciate that answer. Then help me on the
18 environmental side. Throughout this case we've spent
19 a little bit of time trying to understand the high
20 environmental costs associated with this product. Is
21 the major environmental concerns and costs on the
22 making of the technical?

23 I mean, in other words is it initial
24 chemical reactions or are your environmental costs
25 more incurred on the refined or the solutions end of

1 the process?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Most of our environmental
3 cost is associated with the type of specialized
4 equipment that is used to make the technical acid that
5 protects the workers and the atmosphere from being
6 contaminated with aniline and sulfuric acid. So we
7 have a large investment that makes it in a manner that
8 minimizes the environmental and human exposure to the
9 chemicals and to the sulfanilic acid.

10 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: As you described that
11 that's mostly making the actual crude product to start
12 with? That's where the aniline and the sulfuric acid
13 are reacted is at the beginning part of the process?

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay has --

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Go ahead.

16 MR. JAY DICKSON: When you refine the
17 technical grade from the technical grade to any of the
18 high purity grades you have to do this in water and
19 there's a certain amount of waste water that is
20 generated. We pretreat this water and then we send it
21 to a municipal water treatment facility whereas in
22 China or India that may not be the case.

23 I don't have any evidence that says they're
24 not treating their waste water, but there's certainly
25 anecdotal evidence to that fact.

1 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Then you talked a
2 little bit about your exports. Obviously if we look
3 at the data exports are relatively significant for
4 your company. I think you said earlier in your
5 testimony that they're primarily going to Europe. I'm
6 trying to understand the pricing in the U.S. versus
7 the pricing in Europe and also how comfortable we
8 should be looking at averaging the values.

9 Obviously for all import and export data we
10 can always look at average unit values, but they're
11 only useful if there isn't a big product mix
12 difference between what you're selling in the U.S.
13 versus what you're exporting to Europe.

14 Can you help me understand how you see
15 prices in Europe versus the U.S. and whether what
16 you're shipping over there is the same relative mix of
17 product that you're selling in the U.S. market?

18 I would assume from your earlier testimony
19 about not wanting to ship a lot of water that you're
20 not shipping the solution product over to Europe, but
21 are you selling the same mix of technical and refined
22 in Europe?

23 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I think as I may have
24 mentioned before most of our sales in Europe are the
25 technical product because we're the large producer of

1 the technical material and have generally low cost
2 associated with that and can compete in the technical
3 market in Europe.

4 We have had the pure refined acid sales in
5 Europe, but with the recent increases that we've had
6 in natural gas primarily we backed away from -- well,
7 we quoted.

8 It's like saying before it's not that we're
9 not in the market trying to sell refined grade in
10 Europe, it's that our prices are higher than what they
11 can be and actually, material imported from India even
12 paying the duties in India our price ends up being
13 higher. So the two commodity markets that move across
14 the waters are the technical acid and the refined free
15 acid.

16 There's actually not a large market anymore
17 in Europe or even in the United States for the sodium
18 sulfanilic powder. Most of the market is in the salt
19 solution form. As I mentioned there's a parallel in
20 France to a producer making technical acid, converting
21 it to a salt solution and shipping it to an optical
22 brightener producer similar to the way we do here.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Then just generally
24 on the price side you mentioned that your costs
25 particularly the aniline, and the benzene derivatives

1 and the gas costs are what are going up.

2 Can you readily just pass those costs on
3 and/or is there a time lag in terms of you see a cost
4 increase for your input products to the time in which
5 it gets translated into prices at which you're
6 actually selling your product? I mean, do your
7 customers, you simply go to them and say my aniline
8 went up X therefore you have to take a price increase
9 of the equivalent of X?

10 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The culture has changed
11 over the past two years. The culture that we had been
12 working in was that we would negotiate a price for our
13 customer that was constant for the year and then
14 suddenly find to our consternation that our aniline
15 price had doubled. So Jay made many trips to
16 customers saying we're going to have to get -- it's
17 like a force majeure.

18 No one ever expected aniline to do what it's
19 going to do. Then you get a lot of whining, but we
20 can't bring our prices up, et cetera. So that induces
21 the induction time of actually being able to do
22 something that's very hurtful.

23 As time goes on with the aniline prices and
24 benzene prices remaining where they are and still
25 being very volatile we're trying to educate our

1 customers that we cannot offer a constant price for
2 the year. At best we can offer like quarterly price
3 protection and say depending upon where aniline is at
4 the end of the next quarter our price will adjust up
5 or down.

6 So that's our policy is to try to get the
7 aniline adjustment built into the agreement.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: You've been
9 successful in doing that?

10 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We're maybe 75 percent or
11 80 percent of the way.

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate
13 those answers. Thank you very much.

14 MR. JAY DICKSON: In most cases we have not
15 been able to recoup all of the costs and when we do
16 raise our prices it usually has been delayed.

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Appreciate that.
18 Thank you.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Commissioner Lane?

20 COMMISSIONER LANE: You talked a lot about
21 your natural gas prices. Is electricity a factor in
22 your cost to do business also?

23 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'm glad you asked that
24 question because I have been studying energy costs a
25 lot over the past couple of months or so. Electricity

1 is a factor, but it's not nearly as large a factor as
2 natural gas. It's probably one-third the affect of
3 natural gas.

4 The interesting thing about electricity and
5 I've sort of been away from the day-to-day details of
6 the business is that there have been very
7 insignificant price increases in electricity for us
8 over the past five years or so.

9 I have to attribute that to the fact that
10 Duke Electric, which is the power company, the main
11 supplier to us -- has mostly a nuclear plants in the
12 area, so it's a regulated industry and they have no
13 justification to bring up prices.

14 COMMISSIONER LANE: So you're paying pair
15 rates rather than a negotiated rate with Duke Energy?

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It's definitely a
17 carrier's rate. There's no negotiation, but it's a
18 relatively low rate.

19 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you. Your
20 website advertises that your facilities are available
21 for toll production. What chemicals or products would
22 you be capable of toll producing and have you
23 contracted for any toll production in the last five
24 years?

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay's right on this.

1 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. That's where our
2 business is growing is in the toll manufacturing
3 business. We toll for many different chemical
4 companies in the United States. We've had a lot of
5 growth in the past year or two in this area. Do you
6 want any examples?

7 COMMISSIONER LANE: Well, I'd like to know
8 do you use the same facilities and the same workers
9 that you use for the production of sulfanilic acid?

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: For the most part no, but
11 we have used some of the sulfanilic equipment that is
12 used to make refined grade sulfanilic acid to do a
13 toll project and that was only because one of our
14 customers had switched from refined grade free acid to
15 the salt solution, so that opened up some capacity in
16 our refined grade equipment.

17 The typical answer is no. Our sulfanilic
18 equipment is mainly used for sulfanilic. All of our
19 other equipment is used for toll manufacturing or a
20 few other products that we make and market ourselves.

21 COMMISSIONER LANE: What percentage would
22 you say is the toll production of product as compared
23 to your sulfanilic acid production?

24 MR. JAY DICKSON: I'll let John answer that.
25 He just looked at the year-end financials.

1 COMMISSIONER LANE: Is that what you call
2 him on the job? You call him John rather than dad?

3 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. As a matter of
4 fact. That's always the way it's been.

5 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

6 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Even then at home I'm
7 called by my grandfather's name, so it's not dad.
8 Anyway I've lost my train of thought. The question
9 is?

10 COMMISSIONER LANE: The percentage of toll
11 production to sulfanilic acid?

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Sulfanilic acid
13 production is 60 percent and the toll production is
14 about 40.

15 COMMISSIONER LANE: Now, how difficult would
16 it be for the Chinese and Indian sulfanilic acid
17 producers to enter the United States market with large
18 volumes of subject imports? Where would they enter
19 the United States, and what channels of distribution
20 would be used to ship orders of subject imports?

21 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The channels of
22 distribution would be either direct sales, by this
23 who's doing the selling on the importer.

24 There are a lot of importers that would
25 bring the material in and make the quotations to our

1 customers let's say for the refined sulfanilic acid
2 and those customers would then present us with the
3 facts -- of course by this time we already know what's
4 beginning to happen -- and in all likelihood they
5 would decide to purchase certain quantities from the
6 Chinese and Indians just to show us that they can and
7 then even if we met the price we would lose volume and
8 would run the double jeopardy of lower volume and
9 lower prices all at the same time.

10 Considering our financial status of the
11 business and our low prices already you can see what
12 affect that would have. You might argue the solution
13 that there is something of a barrier that the company
14 has in offering and making the solution because that's
15 the type of service that would be provided.

16 All of the companies that buy the solution
17 from it buy it because it's the best value, not
18 because they can only use solution. For sure they
19 could use the dry salt or they could use the dry
20 material itself.

21 So with the low priced pure acid on the
22 market from China or India either in the form of the
23 dry sodium sulfanilate, the refined pure acid it would
24 still go to the solution accounts and the solution
25 accounts would then say well, we'd like to keep buying

1 from you because you're offering solution, et cetera,
2 but you're going to have to bring the price down
3 because we can do this, or we can have somebody else
4 make the solution.

5 I mean, that's no big deal. So hope that's
6 answered your question.

7 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes. Thank you.

8 Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.
10 Commissioner Pearson?

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Dorris, my lack
12 of training in the law occasionally leads me to ask
13 questions or make observations that cause my
14 colleagues to cringe. Nonetheless I'm going to try it
15 again. There are times when I see the role of the ITC
16 in five year reviews as somewhat like that of a parole
17 board.

18 In the original investigation we lock some
19 people up, and we keep them there, and after five
20 years we look and see if because of good behavior do
21 they deserve to get let out and we do let some of them
22 out, okay? In this case it's complicated further
23 because at least with respect to India yes, they've
24 been locked up, but because it was a threat finding
25 they didn't even commit a crime in the first place.

1 It looked like they were going to do
2 something wrong, they got thrown in the slammer and
3 now we're considering whether they deserve to stay
4 there. Basically all of us are capable of committing
5 crimes, but most of us choose not to.

6 So the reason for my earlier questions about
7 accumulation and about whether there's a basis for
8 keeping India subject to the orders has to do with
9 this whole question of does the record support that
10 they have done inappropriate things, that they're
11 likely to do inappropriate things in the future?

12 I mean, what kind of burden of proof is
13 needed here? I'm really wrestling with this and I
14 frankly don't know what to do with it, so anything
15 that you can provide either now or in the post-hearing
16 would be helpful.

17 Mr. Chairman, I have no further rambling
18 observations to make.

19 MR. DORRIS: Well, if you wanted an answer
20 at all to your rambling observations?

21 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Please.

22 MR. DORRIS: We certainly will provide
23 something in the brief. I understand where you're
24 coming from in a sense that if someone is found in a
25 threat situation 10 years or 15 years later how do you

1 really evaluate that threat situation again? I think
2 two things.

3 One is I would have to disagree with you
4 about being innocent. It's true that perhaps their
5 volumes hadn't reached levels that were causing
6 injury, but they were found dumping and they were
7 found getting export subsidies. I think maybe you
8 could discount the dumping because well, that was way
9 back then and who knows what they might do now, but I
10 don't think you can discount the export subsidies.

11 Those programs still exist and they're still
12 available to them which give them in the range of a 40
13 percent price advantage coming into the U.S. market.
14 So they weren't innocent and they don't continue to be
15 innocent in that sense. So it's not just a
16 propensity, it's an actual.

17 For your latter part in terms of threat I
18 think you have to look at it and I'm going to look at
19 this, too, just as a concept, but I think you have to
20 look at it in terms of well, why were they found to be
21 threatening at that time and what are the basic threat
22 factors because obviously there is a similarity
23 between these determinations and just a general threat
24 case when you think about how the factors are
25 analyzed.

1 I think in this context you have to look at
2 well, if at that time we thought that they were
3 increasing production, increasing capacity, well, did
4 they? The answer here is yes, they did considerably.
5 Much more than we thought they would or be able to.
6 At that time perhaps they weren't as big in the world
7 market and maybe there was a chance that they were
8 going to be just a domestic player.

9 Have they moved into the world market?
10 Well, of course they have. We've talked about that
11 today of how they moved into the market.

12 So I think when you look at this thinking,
13 well, we only found the threat at the time and so
14 maybe they're not such a threat anymore, in my mind
15 they're actually a bigger threat now than they were
16 then mainly because of those production increases and
17 volume increases.

18 Not only that they still have the same
19 ability with the export subsidies and the same ability
20 with just pure dumping because of the cost differences
21 and the eagerness to get into this market whereas we
22 discussed today and there's been no contrary evidence
23 that the prices are better. Why not come to this
24 market?

25 I mean, there have been cases where the

1 Commission looked at it and said well, we don't know
2 whether there's a lot of unused capacity because we've
3 had problems determining that and maybe there wasn't
4 any unused capacity. Maybe there was a significant
5 amount of capacity utilization in the foreign markets.
6 Maybe that's true for India here. We don't know.

7 We could have known, we don't know. We
8 should have known. Even if it weren't true if there
9 was not a lot of unused capacity in India they're
10 going to shift that production here because the prices
11 are better and there's a market to be had if they're
12 allowed back in because of export subsidies and
13 because of their ability to dump and get that product
14 into this market and undersell NFC.

15 I think I will look at this in terms of a
16 legal concept, but I think just from a practical point
17 of view you have to look at why did you make
18 determinations before, did those factors play out,
19 have things changed, did India dry up and they're no
20 longer there? No. They grew. They got bigger.
21 They're much more of a threat now than they were then.
22 Sorry to ramble, too.

23 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: No, no. That's fine.
24 I appreciate those observations. Do what you can in
25 the post-hearing to help me understand the legal

1 ramifications of what we're up to here.

2 With that I'd like to thank the Dicksons for
3 making the trip to Washington.

4 Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner
6 Pearson. I might just ramble for a second with you.
7 For the record you don't cause me to cringe. In fact
8 I would have to say that describing me as, you know,
9 equating me to a member of a parole board is one of
10 the kinder ways that I think I've been described on
11 occasion since I've been here, so I have no problem
12 with that. Thank you.

13 Now, I'll turn to Commissioner Aranoff.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
15 Chairman.

16 A couple of quick follow-ups. Since the
17 original investigation NFC's productivity as reflected
18 in our prehearing report has increased quite a few
19 times over since 1989 and also increased significantly
20 since the first year in the current period of review.

21 The decrease in the number of workers and
22 hours worked wouldn't seem to account for all of this
23 improvement. Can you tell us what else happened
24 during this period that resulted in the productivity
25 numbers that we see?

1 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I guess the single
2 largest thing that's happened in recent times is an
3 increase in the amount of sulfanilic acid that is
4 being used by the customers. Our production of course
5 is just a reflection of what our sales are and what
6 the demand are.

7 We have seen less of China as a competitor
8 because the order keeps their prices high. We haven't
9 seen India as a competitor because the orders keep
10 their prices high. We also have seen significant
11 imports begin to come in from Italy and have been
12 coming in from France.

13 The very nature of our operation is capital
14 intensive, so if we can increase our production from
15 say 10 million pounds to 11 million pounds the
16 marginal profitability is much higher and contributes
17 greatly to the overall overhead of the operation.

18 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I appreciate those
19 answers. I wanted to check and see because there are
20 cases in which either there's been a technological
21 change, which it doesn't sound like there's been here,
22 or sometimes even an accounting change that accounts
23 for those numbers, but it sounds like neither of those
24 is the case here.

25 Let me just ask you to clarify. When you

1 were talking about imports from Italy I thought that I
2 heard you say that the producer in Italy was producing
3 this product captively and using it in a downstream
4 product and it was the downstream product that was
5 being sold in the U.S. Did I hear you wrong?

6 MR. JOHN DICKSON: No. You heard me
7 correctly, but his selling in the U.S. is also
8 captive. In other words he has plants in Italy and in
9 the United States that make optical brighteners and
10 it's believed, or we've been told, or we see and it's
11 hard to confirm these things that sulfanilic acid is
12 in fact coming from Italy.

13 So he has actually begun to captively
14 produce sulfanilic acid for his own requirement.

15 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So in fact it's not
16 the downstream product, the brightener, but the
17 sulfanilic acid being sent to a related facility in
18 the U.S. to be turned into an optical brightener?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It would be like
20 make sulfanilic acid in Italy and ship it to his own
21 plant in Italy that makes brightener and also his
22 plant in the United States that makes brightener.

23 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay.

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We believe this is
25 happening now and accounts for the imports that we see

1 from Italy to the United States.

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: In post-hearing if
3 you can take a look at whatever that are the most
4 recent import statistics that are available and see if
5 there's something that shows us that phenomenon with
6 respect to Italy that would be helpful.

7 In Chapter 2 of the staff report the
8 Commission staff indicates that they believe the
9 demand for sulfanilic acid is inelastic and that
10 customers wouldn't change the amount that they buy
11 very much with the changes in price. Is that
12 consistent with the scenario that you're giving us of
13 your inability to raise your prices to cover your cost
14 increases?

15 Can you show me how you reconcile those or
16 do you think that the staff's assessment of
17 inelasticity is not really right?

18 MR. DORRIS: We can give that some further
19 thought for the post-hearing brief, but I would point
20 out that it's one thing to say that they're going to
21 threaten to go offshore or go offshore because at some
22 point their price for sulfanilic acid gets too high
23 and they just can't purchase it versus whether or not
24 they can find some other physical product that they
25 can use in place of sulfanilic acid.

1 I think the answer to that is there's not
2 one, which is where the inelastic determination comes
3 from which I would agree with. Whether they're there
4 to be sold to, that's a whole different question.

5 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Appreciate that
6 answer. One last one. Throughout your brief you make
7 your vulnerability argument in using the term that we
8 often use around here of a cost price squeeze.

9 Obviously in this case we have some evidence
10 that costs have gone up, prices have also gone up and
11 if you look at the numbers for cost of goods sold as a
12 ratio to net sales they show that in the most recent
13 period that number is within the range within which it
14 has fluctuated over the entire period of review and
15 not really an outlier at this point.

16 Either now or in your post-hearing can you
17 just take a look at that number and reconcile for us
18 how that's consistent with the way that you're
19 describing a cost price squeeze?

20 MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am.

21 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much,
22 and I believe that concludes my questions. Thank you
23 very much to the panel for being here this morning.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.
25 If I've tracked it correctly I'm not sure,

1 Commissioner Hillman, whether you were finished. You
2 had more questions? You don't. Okay. I don't think
3 anyone else does either from the dias.

4 So, Mr. Deyman, does staff have questions?

5 MR. DEYMAN: George Deyman, Office of
6 Investigations. The staff has no questions.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I think we have an
8 amendment to that.

9 MR. ASCIENZO: I have a comment. This is
10 John Ascienzo, Office of Investigations.

11 It's clear from the questions this morning
12 that the Commission is very interested in the detailed
13 cost data of this industry, perhaps more detail than
14 is already on the record, so rather than ask a lot of
15 questions right here, right now I'll just say that
16 I'll be contacting you either today or tomorrow with
17 some follow-up questions so we can get the information
18 the Commission wants.

19 Thank you very much. With that the staff
20 has no more questions.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I want to
22 thank each of the members of this panel for their
23 presentation. You've been I feel very direct and
24 forthright.

25 I can excuse you from the table and ask you,

1 Mr. Dorris, if you have closing remarks you'd like to
2 make.

3 MR. DORRIS: I don't think so. We'll make
4 sure that we make all our remarks in the post-hearing
5 brief.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. I understood you
7 were going to reserve that right depending on how
8 thorough you thought our questions were, so I'll --

9 MR. DORRIS: they were very thorough.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: -- take that as a passing
11 grade. With that, again, I want to compliment all of
12 you for your responses to our questions and your
13 directness. Very much appreciated.

14 Post-hearing briefs, statements responsive
15 to questions and requests to the Commission and
16 corrections to the transcript must be filed by
17 February 6, 2006; closing of the record and the final
18 release of data to parties by March 1, 2006, and final
19 comments are due March 3, 2006. With that this
20 hearing is concluded.

21 (Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m. the hearing in the
22 above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTION

TITLE: Sulfanilic Acid from China and India

INVESTIGATION NO.: 701-TA-318 and 731-TA-538 and 561 (Second Review)

HEARING DATE: January 26, 2006

LOCATION: Washington, D.C.

NATURE OF HEARING: In Support of the Continuation of the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders

I hereby certify that the foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete record of the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission.

DATE: 1/26/06
 SIGNED: LaShonne Robinson
 Signature of the Contractor or the Authorized Contractor's Representative
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 Washington, D.C. 20005

I hereby certify that I am not the Court Reporter and that I have proofread the above-referenced transcript of the proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission, against the aforementioned Court Reporter's notes and recordings, for accuracy in transcription in the spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and speaker-identification, and did not make any changes of a substantive nature. The foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete transcription of the proceeding(s).

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I hereby certify that I reported the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission and caused to be prepared from my tapes and notes of the proceedings a true, correct and complete verbatim recording of the proceeding(s).

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 Signature of Court Reporter0