Appendix C Results from the Security Workshop
The product of this workshop was an unstructured and unprioritized collection of gaps in knowledge, understanding, and technology. This represented the collective thinking of a group of knowledgeable and experienced professionals who have been directly engaged in improving the security of the Nation and its highway systems at the operational and policymaking level.
- Need for a better understanding of the interrelationship and interdependencies of the highway network and other systems.
- The sharing of sensitive information is perceived as a need that will prevent us from achieving our goal of improved security.
- Information, methods, and tools for prioritization are needed.
- Targets need to be identified.
- Network analysis is lacking.
- National network vulnerability analysis is lacking.
- Multi-objective optimization within a vulnerability and security framework is needed.
- Is it possible to do this by simply tying local networks together?
- The threat is unknown and hard to quantify in a probabilistic sense. Traditional risk assessment methods are hard to apply.
- Insider threats and crime also need to be considered. (We have not considered how to reduce the risk of highways being used to help commit crime.)
- Other critical infrastructure needs to be considered, such as transit.
- An explicit definition of what is critical infrastructure is needed.
- Can cargo tracking technology reduce risk?
- Cost-benefit analysis of vulnerability reduction.
- Model elements and test them. There is a need to verify models for testing. There are tools, but no clear models, so we need to verify models (cannot go off of computer assumption).
- Need to contribute to DHS Critical Infrastructure R&D Plan.
- Specific information on connection details is lacking (connection within a bridge, not the columns) (e.g., 100-year-old steel bridge).
- National strategy for spending not in place for security infrastructure.
- Looking at other scenarios other than the common blast scenario (e.g., poison in cargo ship). Other threats need to be considered.
- Military standards are available as a tool, but are not necessary applicable to highway cases.
- There is a need for a National Strategy for spending for security.
- The assumption that a blast is the most likely threat must be challenged.
- Ask: What are realistic damage states for highway infrastructure? How much damage is tolerable? Where are we vulnerable?
- In an ideal world, know what is in the carrier (ship, truck). Cargo tracking technology is needed.
- Risk needs to be considered in the TSL stage.
- Low-cost changes to new structures need to be reviewed and included in overviews.
- National local networks need to be tied together. There is much information floating locally; there is no national tie-in to bring it all together.
- Security threats from inside agencies should be considered.
- Cost-benefit analysis is necessary.
- Risks to be considered in early part of design.
- Ticket checker example. System design for operations strategies. They need to be checked. How often do we check systems in place? Security checks?
- Fire suppression and analysis are necessary.
- Research the application of artificial intelligence or other adaptive computational methods and emerging technologies to this aspect of the problem.
- Information about threats:
- Intelligence ration: Getting information to the right people.
- Validation tools/models for analyzing dynamic failure (blasts, impacts).
- Probability risk assessment methodology:
- Ranking critical infrastructure (assessing it).
- Distribution of funds.
- Strategies to reduce risk.
- Physical vulnerability vs. operational vulnerability.
- Operational vulnerability:
- Power grid systems (cause and effect).
- Design guides/specifications: Ultimate goal is cost-effective measures.
- Creating a tool to make it more cost-effective.
- Cost-effective advanced materials (nanotechnology) design solutions.
- Integrated software tools (integrating different modules for better decisionmaking).
- Alternative power source (off grid for traffic control purposes).
- Handling sensitive security information:
- Getting it to the right person.
- Plans and designs as examples of this information (whether available or not).
- Computation/modeling.
- Goal: Developmental work protected, but final product is open.
- Legislative involvement and impact on changes.
- Final product and availability.
- Biological/radiological sensors.
- Improve surveillance and monitoring capabilities.
- Transportation issues:
- Broaden our focus.
- Transportation funding over model funding.
- Guidance to be included on the Web (e.g., hazardous materials sites, nuclear sites, bridge locations, defense routes).
- Is there sufficient knowledge of surge capacity?
- Smart structures: Can these reduce vulnerability?
- Rapid post-event assessment methodology in place.
- Need literature search on what others have done.
- What are the cross-cutting issues (risk-reduction metrics)?:
- Threat, vulnerability, risk assessment, countermeasures against security (risk-reduction metrics).
- Interdependencies for infrastructure.
- Redundancy (alternative routing/intermodal):
- Other options.
- Redundancy reduces criticality and attractiveness.
- Collaboration, communications, coordination (i.e., intelligence).
- Interoperability.
- Analytical tool required.
- Security cost tradeoffs (e.g., potholes vs. security).
- Detection:
- Intrusion detection.
- Cameras - semi-automated analytical tools to reduce FTE.
- Cheap, easy-to-use alternative to current video systems.
- Biological/radiation/chemical detection - detect at high speeds.
- Institutionalized arrangements for response.
- Analytical support tools - synthesizing systems.
- Create a system that is not highly dependent on electrical sources.
- Broad category of sensing.
- Synthesis of existing technology and practices.
- Communications between these remote sensors.
- Deterrence:
- Effectiveness of surveillance on deterrence.
- Strategies to reduce target value.
- Coordination of security risk vis-a-vis other societal values.
- Scientific risk - society tools (how much to invest on security).
- Effectiveness of physical patterns on deterrence.
- Defend:
- Vulnerabilities:
- Suspension bridge towers.
- Bridge cables.
- Through arches.
- Box girders.
- Thin-shell underwater tunnels.
- Need to identify mitigation strategies and testing methodologies for above.
- Materials for defending:
- Column wrap.
- High-performance material- fiber reinforced concrete.
- Thermal protection.
- Windows - electromagnetic pulse.
- Barrier Effectiveness.
- Biological/chemical strategies and technologies.
- Deny:
- Methods to achieve standoff/enforcement (what works for enforcement).
- Routing restrictions (access or deny in critical infrastructure).
- Strategies to deny access to critical infrastructure.
- Parking restrictions (how effective are they?) - inspect, proximity to critical infrastructure and elements.
- Sensors to detect threat (unauthorized vehicle or cargo).
- Integration of sensors into a system to detect a threat and perhaps respond.
- Include institutional process.
- Technology to deal with data overload.
- Boiling it down to a green light (data mining).
- Chain-of-possession system (identify the possessor of freight).
- Process to share intelligence and data (tied to communications interoperability).
- Simulation tools to develop and evaluate the above.
- Testing of actual systems using simulated attack (exercise or drill) at a large scale at the multi-agency level.
- Sensitivity analysis of frequency of test and exercise.
- National tracking system:
- Integration of State (local) systems at the national level.
- Effects of such systems on mobility or congestion.
- Mobility can spread a biological or radiological agent.
- Deterrence, or denial of access, if a threat is detected through intelligence (pre-screening).
- Lack of knowledge of threat. Access to intelligence.
- Highway ISAC (design and capability analysis).
- Research on deterrence.
- Development of new sensors:
- PPB sensitivity is here.
- MEMS is here.
- Strategy for deployment of sensors.
- Reliability of detection studies.
- Detecting and responding to behavior patterns (pattern recognition).
- Research on the security benefits of law enforcement (presence and visibility).
- Other applications of the benefits of this technology for other law enforcement areas.
- What will public tolerate with regard to infringement on personal liberty?
- Balance with legitimate movement of explosion, radiation, etc.
- Legal research into what is our authority to do such things.
- Tie to permitting systems.
- Must be coordinated with DHS.
- Link to intelligence systems.
- Detect changes in drivers.
- Technology transfer from other industries that may have better ways of dealing with this.
- Scalable to the national level.
- Decision support systems for making investments technologies vs. benefits vs. risk.
- Fitness for duty (dual benefit).
- Eyes-on-the-road program - dealing with the data.
- Reliability of detection study.
- Linkage to law enforcement system is essential.
- Research on efficiency and management of a HISAC
- Proper archiving of data:
- Data aspects of the problem.
- Data management for security.
- Coordination with other systems (e.g., Amber Alert).
- Design of highway to reduce use as a weapon.
- All aspects need to be considered.
- Use traffic control systems to thwart an attack.
- Consider the business interests as well.
- Possible use of TRANSIMS
- Need to better understand how the highway system can be used to deliver an attack.
- Research of targets.
- Data communications:
- Protection at data transmission.
- Any control systems.
- Tracking cargo:
- Origin to destination.
- Screening for weapons of mass destruction.
- Route restriction.
- Managing the flow of hazardous cargo:
- Developing analytical tools.
- Evaluate the impact of strategies.
- Developing better screening techniques.
- Using technology to identify suspiciously operated vehicles.
- Advanced screening/surveillance.
- Identifying overheight/overweight vehicles.
- Establishing rings of security to detect threats.
- Enabling DOT employees to be more alert (training):
- Research to determine the characteristics and attributes of suspicious vehicles/drivers.
- Identifying human factors research (associated with security aspects/actions in chemical/biological/nuclear/radiological event):
- Management.
- Employees sent to establish quarantine barriers (looking at other agencies to support).
- Using bridges as platforms for delivery (study to evaluate citing and design).
- Research to identify critical node points in our transportation network.
- Research to provide redundant transportation systems for critical node points.
- Freight security (applications to borders and tunnels):
- Cargo tracking.
- Cargo identification.
- Anti-hijacking technology (public fleets and private fleets).
- Hazardous materials routing.
- Vehicle tracking.
- Traffic surveillance:
- Non-typical behavior recognition.
- Driver licensing.
- Route deviation alerts.
- Rapid response techniques.
- Remote sensing and tracking (chemical, radiation, biological).
- Evaluation of technical solutions and cost.
- Response and control methodologies.
- Calibration (resolution of false indications).
- Threat definition:
- What are we designing to prevent?
- Physical security:
- Barrier design guides.
- Barrier usage/applications.
- Vehicle inspection (visual, sensing).
- Routing options (vehicle restrictions).
- Rapid threat investigation technology.
- Vehicle restrictions.
- Access denial.
- Rapid removal of vehicles.
- Evaluation of hardening vs. policing.
- Tunnel ventilation control and detection systems.
- Surveillance:
- Effectiveness of highway watch.
- Terrorist screening of driver's license applications.
- TWIC requirements at key construction sites/critical factors.
- Alternatives to standard national security clearance procedure.
- Role of transportation in a biohazard situation? Traffic control paradigm?
- Linkage to modeling and simulation.
- Modeling in advance of an incident.
- Real-time modeling capability.
- Decontamination: How to do it? (biological and radiological).
- Decontaminate vehicles?
- Exploration of how intelligent transportation systems (ITS) get applied in response and recovery.
- Capacity of system under extreme situations (emergencies). Reverse directions, etc.
- Basic highway engineering questions.
- Linkage to other infrastructure systems (e.g., cell phone systems): How do we do it?
- Role playing/people simulation: How bad does a situation have to be before an emergency declaration is made? What types of decisions are people willing to make?
- What other infrastructures could take down the transportation system (e.g., electric grid)?
- Develop studies on how long it would take to evacuate a city: Evacuation modeling is a gap. Basic behavior information is missing. Some behavior is counterintuitive. Some behavior is contrary to governmental guidance.
- Taken off of modeling of hurricane evacuations.
- Dealing with an unplanned evacuation.
- Pass through in medians (guidance, number, etc.) break the barriers.
- Understanding what is involved in decontamination.
- Research into materials that are more tolerant of decontamination.
- Effective communication with people in vehicles.
- Basic research in disaster communication.
- Dealing with pedestrians in an emergency situation.
- Focus on moving people not just vehicles (linkage to other modes).
- Traffic officers might not be available.
- Assumptions need to be changed.
- Public awareness of routes (public education/preparedness).
- Optimal decisionmaking tools:
- War games.
- Simulation.
- Lines of authority (changes in laws needed?) - Federal/State/local.
- Specific roles/responsibility/authority defined and refined through simulation (role playing).
- Research into rapid recovery, repair, etc.
- Sensors for real-time analysis and decisionmaking (is the bridge safe to use or not?).
- Possible need to understand military mobilization needs in today's world.
- Dealing with emergencies in rural areas.
- Modeling of the national system lead - interdependency again
- Research needs to include deployment plan considering the capability of users. Need to train potential users.
- Identify capabilities needed to respond and use tool.
- Ultimate effects/constraints to response and recovery.
- Rapid recovery of ITS infrastructure.
- Standards for redundancy and reliability of ITS/traffic control systems. Possible implications for design. Back in service in a short time.
- Standards for systems redundancy (possible implications for design).
- Dual use must be a basic guiding principle.
- Include response and recovery to routine events.
- Research of technology in support of National Incident Management System.
- Identification processes for key personnel to enter an area in the event of an attack.
- Clearly developed policy and implementation guidelines for agencies in the event of an attack for tool development.
- Communication interoperability (SAFECOM):
- Voice and data communications, standards, and architecture between effective parties as needed for security event.
- Identification of alternative routes:
- Enhancement of the Strategic Highway Network (STRAHNET).
- An all-hazards approach in dealing with security issues.
- Forensics experts (national pool).
- Quick analysis needed to avert other attacks.
- Identification of organization to develop tools, use the developed tools, conduct analysis, and provide results.
- Develop alternative evacuation strategies and plans:
- Local.
- Regional.
- Post-event assessment (consistent data-gathering protocol lessons learned).
- Response planning for an event.
- Rapid recovery (e.g., rapid replacement of structures (short-term, long-term)).
- Enhanced traffic monitoring network.
- Alternative power supply.
- Evacuation rerouting techniques:
- Reversible lanes.
- Movable traffic barriers.
- Medical evacuation planning.
- Identification and isolation of the hazard.
- Planning for multiple attacks.
- Regional coordination through multi-jurisdictional areas.
- Rapid assessment.
- Improvement of system use in response and recovery:
- Need for rapid repair options materials.
- Maximizing short-term lane.
- Emergency lane clearance.
- Proper amount of system redundancy.
- Communications (what?, to whom?).
- Response planning:
- Human factors in emergency situations: What can you expect?
- Ability of current network tools to model human behavior under stress.
- User needs assessment during emergencies (do current models reflect the needs?).
- What are the data needs for modeling response options?
- Chemical/biological/radiation cleanup:
- Structural capacity of damaged critical infrastructure.
- Tools to access roadway incidents in terms of security mplications.
- Response strategies for DOT employees.
- Literature search on response to natural disasters and an evaluation of the implications for response preparedness for State and local DOTs.
- International border implications regarding emergency response and recovery at borders:
- Jurisdictional issues.
- Federal roles in developing possible plans.
- National incident command systems as a requirement for DOT.
- Coordination of the transportation requirements of special response teams (urban search and rescue) (management training) under national response plan (interdependency).
- Special structural load-carrying capabilities (analytical techniques).
- Communications procedures.
- Legal agreements
- Secure communications needs and systems for use in emergency situations. (Federal-Federal, Federal-State, State-State, etc.).
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