

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. <i>Understanding Intelligence Analysis</i>	4
1. Developing Professional Intelligence Analysts	4
2. An Analyst's Daily Taskings	7
3. The Finished Product	7
B. <i>Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities</i>	8
1. What is an NIE?	9
2. The 2002 NIE on Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction	12
3. Overall Conclusions – Weapons of Mass Destruction	14
C. <i>Iraq's Ties to Terrorism</i>	29
1. Overall Conclusions – Terrorism	32
II. NIGER	36
A. <i>The Original Niger Reporting</i>	36
B. <i>Former Ambassador</i>	39
C. <i>Continuing Analysis</i>	47
D. <i>The British White Paper</i>	49
E. <i>The National Intelligence Estimate</i>	51
F. <i>The Cincinnati Speech</i>	55
G. <i>The Niger Documents</i>	57
H. <i>The Fact Sheet</i>	60
I. <i>The State of the Union</i>	64
J. <i>Secretary Powell's UN Speech</i>	66
K. <i>Niger Conclusions</i>	72
III. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM	84
A. <i>Background</i>	84
B. <i>Nuclear Reconstitution</i>	85
1. Aluminum Tubes	87
a. <i>The National Intelligence Estimate</i>	95
b. <i>Other Assessments of the Tubes</i>	115



- 2. Procurement Attempts for Magnets, High-Speed Balancing
Machines and Machine Tools 119
- 3. Iraq's Efforts to Re-Establish and Enhance Its Cadre of Weapons
Personnel as well as Activities at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites . . . 120
 - a. *The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission is Expanding the
Infrastructure – Research Laboratories, Production
Facilities, and Procurement Networks – to Produce
Nuclear Weapons* 121
 - b. *Many of Iraq's Nuclear Scientists Recently Have Been
Reassigned to the IAEC* 121
 - c. *Renewed Regular Contact Between Saddam and the IAEC,
as Well as Enhanced Security, Suggests the IAEC is Again
the Focal Point of Saddam's Nuclear Program* 122
 - d. *Activity at Several Suspect Nuclear Sites* 124
- C. *Niger* 125
- D. *Explaining Uncertainties* 126
- E. *Intelligence Agencies' Analysis on Reconstitution Prior to Publication
of the NIE* 126
- F. *Analysis of Iraq's Currently Accurate, Full and Complete Disclosure* 128
- G. *Nuclear Conclusions* 129

- IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS PROGRAM 143
 - A. *Background* 143
 - B. *Baghdad Has Transportable Facilities for Producing Bacterial and Toxin
BW Agents* 148
 - 1. *Other Sources* 150
 - 2. *CURVE BALL* 152
 - 3. [REDACTED] 157
 - 4. *INC Source* 160
 - 5. [REDACTED] 161
 - 6. *Intelligence Community Mind Set Concerning Mobile BW
Programs* 161
 - C. *Baghdad Has Been Able to Renovate and Expand its Fixed Dual-Use BW
Agent Production Facilities* 162
 - 1. *Amiriyah Serum and Vaccine Institute* 163
 - 2. *Habbaniyah I Castor Oil Plant* 164



3. Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Production Plant	165
D. <i>We Assess That Iraq Has Some BW Agent and Maintains the Capability to Produce a Variety of BW Agents</i>	166
1. Smallpox	166
2. Other Agents	170
E. <i>In the Absence of UN Inspectors, Iraq Probably Has Intensified and Expanded Research and Development in Support of Iraq's BW Program. Baghdad Probably Has Developed Genetically Engineered BW Agents</i>	175
1. Research Activity	176
2. Reported BW Testing Near Qadisiyah Reservoir	177
F. <i>We Assess That Baghdad Also Has Increased the Effectiveness of its BW Arsenal by Mastering the Ability to Produce Dried Agent</i>	178
G. <i>Iraq's Capability to Manufacture Equipment and Materials . . . and to Procure Other Necessary, Dual-use Materials . . . Makes Large-scale BW Agent Production Easily Attainable</i>	179
1. Foreign Procurement	179
2. Indigenous Iraqi Efforts	181
H. <i>The Nature and Amounts of Iraq's Stored BW Material Remain Unresolved by UNSCOM Accounting</i>	182
I. <i>We Judge That We Are Seeing Only a Portion of Iraq's WMD Efforts, Owing to Baghdad's Vigorous Denial and Deception Efforts</i>	183
J. <i>Explaining Uncertainties</i>	184
K. <i>Intelligence Agencies' Analysis of Iraq's Biological Weapons Program Prior to Publication of the NIE</i>	185
L. <i>Biological Conclusions</i>	187
V. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) PROGRAM	195
A. <i>Background</i>	195
B. <i>Baghdad Has Chemical Weapons</i>	199
C. <i>We Judge That Iraq Is Expanding its Chemical Industry Primarily to Support Chemical Weapons (CW) Production</i>	202
D. <i>We Assess That Baghdad Has Begun Renewed Production of Mustard, Sarin, GF (Cyclosarin), and VX</i>	204

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

E. Although We Have Little Specific Information on Iraq’s CW Stockpile, Saddam Probably Has Stocked at Least 100 Metric Tons and Possibly as Much as 500 Metric Tons of CW Agents – Much of it Added in the Last Year 205

F. Iraq Had Experience in Manufacturing CW Bombs, Artillery Rockets, and Projectiles 206

G. Baghdad Probably Is Hiding Small-Scale Agent Production Within Legitimate Research Laboratories 206

H. Baghdad Has Procured Covertly the Types and Quantities of Chemicals and Equipment Sufficient to Allow Limited CW Production Hidden Within Iraq’s Legitimate Chemical Industry 207

I. Chemical Weapons Defensive Posture and Procurements 208

J. Explaining Uncertainties 208

K. Intelligence Agencies’ Analysis of Iraq’s Chemical Weapons (CW) Prior to Publication of the NIE 208

L. Chemical Conclusions 211

VI. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS OF IRAQ’S DELIVERY

SYSTEMS 215

A. Background 215

B. Scud-Type Missiles 217

C. Iraq Was in the Final Stages of Development of the Al Samoud Missile (2000), May Be Preparing to Deploy the Al Samoud (2001), and Was Deploying the Al Samoud and Ababil-100 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, Both Which Exceed the 150-km UN Range Limit (2002) 218

D. Development of Medium-Range Missile Capabilities 220

E. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 221

F. Other Possible Missions for the UAVs 225

G. Using UAVs to Target the U.S. 227

H. [REDACTED] 231

I. Explaining Uncertainties 231

J. Intelligence Agencies’ Analysis of Delivery Systems Prior to Publication of the NIE 232

K. Delivery Conclusions 234

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

VII. IRAQ WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTELLIGENCE IN SECRETARY POWELL’S UNITED NATIONS SPEECH 239

A. Nuclear Program 242

B. Biological Weapons 243

C. Chemical Weapons 251

D. Delivery Systems 253

E. WMD Powell Conclusions 253

VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 258

A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 260

B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 264

C. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) 265

D. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 266

E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis 267

F. Collection Directives 268

G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation 268

H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions 269

IX. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) CAPABILITIES 272

A. Allegations of Influence 277

B. INR Analyst 277

C. Former INR Office Director 279

D. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Analyst 280

E. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Senior Intelligence Officer 282

F. Former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Desk Officer 282

G. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Pressure Conclusions 284

X. WHITE PAPER ON IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROGRAMS 286

A. Differences Between the Classified NIE and Unclassified White Paper 290

1. Nuclear Weapons 290

2. Biological Weapons 291

3. Chemical Weapons 292

4. Delivery Systems 293

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B. Primary Differences in the Key Judgments of the Classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Unclassified White Paper 294

C. White Paper Conclusions 295

XI. THE RAPID PRODUCTION OF THE OCTOBER 2002 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAQ'S CONTINUING PROGRAMS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 298

A. Rapid Production of the National Intelligence Estimate Conclusions 302

XII. IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM 304

A. Intelligence Products Concerning Iraq's Links to Terrorism 304

B. September and October 2001 Papers 304

C. Iraq and al-Qaida: Interpreting a Murky Relationship, June 2002 305

D. Alternate Analysis in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy .. 307

E. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, September 2002 313

F. Iraqi Support for Terrorism, January 2003 314

G. CIA Assessments on Iraq's Links to Terrorism 314

H. Terrorist Activities Conducted by the IIS 315

I. Support for Regional Terrorist Groups 317

J. Iraq's Relationship with al-Qaida 321

K. Leadership Reporting 323

L. Detainee Debriefings – Comments on the Relationship 324

 1. Abu Zubaydah 324

 2. [REDACTED] 325

 3. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad 325

M. Contacts Between the Iraqi Regime and al-Qaida 326

N. Training of al-Qaida by Iraq 329

 1. [REDACTED] 330

 2. Additional Reports from Varying Sources 331

 3. [REDACTED] Reporting about Activity at Salman Pak 332

O. The Use of Iraq as a Safehaven 334

 1. Discussions of Safehaven 335

 2. Iraqi Regime Knowledge of al-Qaida Presence in Northeastern Iraq .. 336

 3. Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad 337

P. Operational Cooperation Between Iraq and al-Qaida 338

 1. 1993 World Trade Center Bombing 339

 2. The September 11th Attacks 340

3. The Foley Assassination	341
<i>Q. Iraq's Use of Terrorist Strikes in the Event of War with the United States</i>	342
1. Saddam Hussein's Past Use of Terrorism	343
2. The Decision-Making Environment in Iraq	344
3. Iraq's Weapons Capabilities	344
<i>R. Iraqi Links to Terrorism Conclusions</i>	345

XIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM	350
<i>A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)</i>	351
<i>B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)</i>	353
<i>C. Terrorism Collection Conclusions</i>	355

XIV. PRESSURE ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS REGARDING IRAQ'S LINKS TO TERRORISM	357
<i>A. Allegations of Influence</i>	359
1. CIA Ombudsman for Politicization	359
2. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and "Alternative Analysis"	361
<i>B. Terrorism Pressure Conclusion</i>	363

XV. POWELL SPEECH – TERRORISM PORTION	366
<i>A. Powell Speech Conclusions – Terrorism Portion</i>	369

XVI. IRAQ'S THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AND SECURITY	371
<i>A. Background</i>	371
<i>B. IC Analysis on the Iraqi Threat</i>	374
<i>C. Agency Level Papers and Current Intelligence Products</i>	375
<i>D. Key Analysis Topics in Agency Level Documents</i>	376
<i>E. Review of IC Level Assessments</i>	377
1. Summary of Assessments 1991 - 1994	378
2. Summary of Assessments 1995 - 1998	381
3. Summary of Assessments 1999 - 2003	386
<i>F. Iraq's Threat to Regional Stability and Security Conclusions</i>	391

XVII. SADDAM HUSSEIN’S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD	394
<i>A. Background</i>	394
<i>B. Highlights of The Intelligence Record</i>	395
<i>C. Collection and Analytical Approaches</i>	400
1. Information Sources	400
2. Collection Issues	401
3. Analysis Processes	401
<i>D. Saddam Hussein’s Human Rights Record Conclusions</i>	402
XVIII. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S SHARING OF INTELLIGENCE ON IRAQI SUSPECT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION SITES WITH UNITED NATIONS INSPECTORS	404
<i>A. Background</i>	404
<i>B. The Lead-up to Renewed Inspections</i>	405
<i>C. The Sharing of Information – the “Pull” Side of the Exchange</i>	406
<i>D. The Sharing of Information – the “Push” Side of the Exchange</i>	407
<i>E. Information Shared Compared to the Intelligence Community’s Master Inspection List</i>	410
<i>F. Multiple Intelligence Community Lists</i>	413
<i>G. Statements Made by Administration Officials about the Sharing of Information</i>	415
<i>H. The Intelligence Community’s Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect Weapons of Mass Destruction Sites with United Nations Inspectors Conclusions</i>	417
APPENDIX A	423
APPENDIX B	429
GLOSSARY	431
ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS	437



ADDITIONAL VIEWS 441

 Chairman Pat Roberts joined by Senator Christopher S. Bond,
 Senator Orrin G. Hatch 441

 Vice Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV, Senator Carl Levin
 and Senator Richard Durbin 449

 Senator Saxby Chambliss with Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Senator Trent Lott,
 Senator Chuck Hagel and Senator Christopher S. Bond 465

 Senator Olympia Snowe 470

 Senator John Warner 476

 Senator Dianne Feinstein 479

 Senator Ron Wyden 489

 Senator Richard Durbin 498

 Senator Barbara A. Mikulski 508

