DEA
Congressional Testimony [print
friendly page] Statement
of Chairman Chafee and
members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to appear here today
to testify on the narcotics crisis in Colombia. We in DEA believe that
the international trafficking organizations based in Colombia who smuggle
their illegal drugs into our country pose a formidable challenge to the
national security of the United States. DEA is proud to play a key role
in the U.S. Government's long-range strategy to assist Colombia in the
counterdrug effort. DEA is well aware
that Colombia not only faces a drug trafficking crisis, but also is torn
by an economic crisis and a generations-long civil conflict. There are,
to be sure, regional and hemispheric concerns for stability rising from
the current situation in Colombia. There is a wide range of witnesses
here today who can, taken together, give you a broad picture. I am here
to comment on the law enforcement aspects of dealing with international
drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia. We have the highest
confidence in the observations and conclusions we will share with you
today. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems
of our host nations, of course in accord with U.S. law, and in cooperation
with our host nation police agency counterparts. During our investigations,
in partnership with our host nation counterparts, we gather and collect
a wide range of information, including drug intelligence, on the trafficking
organizations, which we target 1. DEA TARGETS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME DEA's mission, in
Colombia as in other foreign postings, is to target the most powerful
international drug syndicates that operate around the world, supplying
drugs to American communities, and employing thousands of individuals
to transport and distribute drugs. The most significant international
drug syndicates operating today are far more powerful and violent than
any organized criminal groups that we have experienced in American law
enforcement. Today's major international organized crime drug syndicates
are simply this new century's versions of traditional organized crime
mobsters U.S. law enforcement officials have fought since the beginning
of the Twentieth Century. Unlike traditional organized crime, however,
these new criminals operate on a global scale. Members of international
groups headquartered in Colombia and Mexico today have at their disposal
the most sophisticated communications technology as well as faxes, internet,
and other communications equipment. Additionally, they have in their arsenal;
aircraft, radar-equipped aircraft, weapons and an army of workers who
oversee the drug business from its raw beginnings in South American jungles
to the urban areas and core city locations within the United States. All
of this modern technology and these vast resources enable the leaders
of international criminal groups to build organizations which - together
with their surrogates operating within the United States -- reach into
the heartland of America. The leaders in Colombia and Mexico, by creating
organizations that carry out the work of transporting drugs into the United
States and franchising others to distribute drugs, themselves try to remain
beyond the reach of American justice. The traffickers also have the financial
resources necessary to corrupt law enforcement, military, and political
officials in order to create a relatively safe haven for themselves in
the countries in which they make their headquarters. As complex as these
communications arrangements of organized crime groups are, U.S. law enforcement
agencies have been able to exploit their communications by using court-approved
telephone interceptions. With the top leadership of these organizations
in hiding beyond the immediate reach of U.S. law enforcement, we have
directed our resources at their organizational structure, and their transportation
and distribution elements in the United States. We have been able
to identify, indict, and in many cases arrest, international drug traffickers
because the very feature of their operations which makes them most formidable
-- the ability to exercise effective command and control over a far-flung
criminal enterprise -- is the feature that law enforcement can use against
them, turning their strength into a weakness. However, it must be noted
that the spread of encryption technology threatens to remove this essential
investigative tool from our arsenal, and poses, in our view, a threat
to the national security of the United States because it will hamper law
enforcement efforts to protect our citizens from drug trafficking organizations
operating abroad. The international
drug syndicates headquartered in Colombia, and operating through Mexico
and the Caribbean, control both the sources and the flow of drugs into
the United States. The vast majority of the cocaine entering the United
States continues to come from the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia,
and Peru. Virtually all of the heroin produced in Colombia is destined
for the U.S. market. In fact, Colombia has over the past five years become
the leading source of heroin in the United States. Recent statistical
data indicate that as much as 75% of the heroin seized and analyzed by
Federal authorities in the United States is of Colombian origin. For the
past two decades - up to recent years - crime groups from Colombia ruled
the drug trade with an iron fist, increasing their profit margin by controlling
the entire continuum of the cocaine market. Their control ranged from
the coca leaf and cocaine base production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia,
to the cocaine hydrochloride (HCl) production and processing centers in
Colombia, to the wholesale distribution of cocaine on the streets of the
United States. Colombian traffickers
continue to import cocaine base from the jungles of Bolivia and Peru,
but in ever decreasing amounts. Coca leaf production has increased dramatically
within Colombia itself, however the traffickers move the cocaine to the
large cocaine HCl conversion laboratories in southern Colombia. The vast
majority of the cocaine base and cocaine HCl destined for the United States
is produced in these laboratories. Many of these activities take place
in the southern rain forests and eastern lowlands of Colombia. Most of
the coca cultivation in Colombia occurs in the Departments of Guaviare,
Caqueta, and Putumayo. This cultivation occurs in areas where there is
limited, if any, government control or presence. Cocaine conversion laboratories
range from smaller "family" operations to much larger facilities, employing
dozens of workers. Once the cocaine HCl is manufactured, it is either
shipped via maritime vessels or aircraft to traffickers in Mexico, or
shipped through the Caribbean corridor, including the Bahamas Island chain,
to U.S. entry points in Puerto Rico, Miami, and New York. Over half of the
cocaine entering the United States continues to come from Colombia through
Mexico and across U.S. border points of entry. Most of this cocaine enters
the United States in privately-owned vehicles and commercial trucks. There
is new evidence that indicates a few traffickers in Mexico have gone directly
to sources of cocaine in Bolivia and Peru in order to circumvent Colombian
middlemen. Drug trafficking
in the Caribbean is overwhelmingly influenced by Colombian organized criminal
groups. The Caribbean had long been a favorite smuggling route used by
the Cali and Medellin crime groups to smuggle cocaine to the United States.
During the late l970s and the l980s, drug lords from Medellin and Cali,
Colombia established a labyrinth of smuggling routes throughout the central
Caribbean, including Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamian Island
chain to South Florida, using a variety of smuggling techniques to transfer
their cocaine to U. S. markets. Smuggling scenarios included airdrops
of 500-700 kilograms in the Bahamian Island chain and off the coast of
Puerto Rico, mid-ocean boat-to-boat transfers of 500 to 2,000 kilograms,
and the commercial shipment of multi-tons of cocaine through the port
of Miami. 2. CURRENT COLOMBIAN DRUG TRAFFICKING GROUPS Colombian drug trafficking
groups are no longer the monolithic organizations they were over most
of the past two decades. After Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and his confederates
in the Cali Cartel were brought to justice by Colombian authorities in
1995, new groups from the North Valle del Cauca began vying for control
of the lucrative markets on the United States East Coast, previously dominated
by Rodriguez Orejuela. Experienced traffickers who have been active for
years--but worked in the shadow of the Cali drug lords-- have proven adept
at seizing opportunities to increase their role in the drug trade.
Many of these organizations began to re-activate traditional trafficking
routes in the Caribbean to move their product to market. DEA's focus on the
Cali organization's command and control functions in the U.S. enabled
us to build formidable cases against the Cali leaders, which allowed our
Colombian counterparts to accomplish the almost unimaginable-- the arrest
and incarceration of the entire infrastructure of the most powerful crime
group in history. Although the incarceration of Cali traffickers may continue
to direct a portion of their operation from prison they are no longer
able to maintain control over this once monolithic giant. Now, the independent
groups of traffickers from the Northern Valle del Cauca have replaced
the highly structured, centrally controlled business operations of the
Cali Cartel. These new groups tend to be smaller and less monolithic,
however, they continue to rely on fear and violence to expand and control
their trafficking empires. DEA has identified
the major organizations based on the northern coast of Colombia that have
deployed command and control cells in the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons
of cocaine to the United States each year. Colombian managers, who have
been dispatched to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, operate these
command and control centers and are responsible for overseeing drug trafficking
in the region. These groups are also directing networks of transporters
that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution
of cocaine destined for the continental United States. In addition to trafficking
their own cocaine, organizations operating out of Colombia supply almost
all of the cocaine to the Mexican crime syndicates. The Mexican organizations
purchase cocaine, as well as accepting cocaine in payment for services,
from Colombian groups. This change in the manner in which business is
conducted is also driven by the new trafficking groups in Colombia, who
have chosen to return to the Caribbean in order to move their cocaine
to the United States. Mexican organized
crime syndicates now control the wholesale distribution of cocaine in
the western half and the Midwest of the United States. Moreover, the Colombians
have franchised to criminals from the Dominican Republic a portion of
the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin trade on the East Coast of
the U.S. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control of the sources
of supply. The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly entrenched
as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger northeastern
cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant role in
this multi-billion-dollar business. The Dominican traffickers
operating in the U.S., and not the Colombians, are now the ones subject
to arrest, while the top level Colombians control the organization with
sophisticated telecommunications. This change in operations reduces profits
somewhat for the syndicate leaders. It succeeds, however, also in reducing
their exposure to U.S. law enforcement. When arrested, the Dominicans
will have little damaging information that can be used against their Colombian
masters. Reducing their exposure, together with sophisticated communications,
puts the Colombian bosses closer to their goal of operating from a political,
legal, and electronic sanctuary. Colombian drug traffickers' efforts to
reduce their exposure is clearly linked to the 1997 change in Colombian
constitutional law which, once again, exposes the Colombians to extradition
to the United States for drug crimes. Colombia has always
been the world's number one producer of finished cocaine HCl. Colombia
now also has the dubious honor of also being the world's largest producer
of cocaine base. These changing dynamics highlight the fact that Colombian
cocaine trafficking organizations continue to dominate the international
cocaine trade. Over the past several years, Colombian coca cultivation
and cocaine production have been increasing dramatically. Net cultivation in
1998 was 101,800 hectares, yielding an estimated 437,500 MT of leaf -
equal to 435 MT of cocaine base. New data obtained from DEA's Operation
BREAKTHROUGH has since been used by the CIA Crime and Narcotics Center
(CNC) to recalculate how much cocaine may have been produced in 1998 from
Colombia's domestic coca crop. Much of the difference is because DEA has
recently provided new data based on re-calculation of alkaloid content,
crop yield, and lab efficiency in Colombia. For the above reasons,
in official figures released earlier this month, the CNC now estimates
Colombia's potential cocaine production in 1998 at 435 metric tons, compared
to the previously announced 1998 estimate of 165 metric tons. As also
announced, using the updated cocaine production formula based on the new
Operation Breakthrough results, the CNC now estimates Colombia's potential
1999 cocaine production from Colombia's domestic coca crop to be 520 metric
tons, based on cultivation of 122,900 hectares of coca. In historical perspective,
in 1989 Colombia had 42,400 hectares net cultivation in coca, after eradicating
640 hectares, and produced 33,900 MT of leaf. Although there was no official
estimate for that year, a comparable amount of leaf would yield slightly
over 65 MT of HCl. It may appear from these statistics that Colombian
production of HCl has increased from 65 MT to over 435 MT in ten years.
We must bear in mind, however, that the 1989 estimate and the 1998 or
1999 numbers are based on different calculations, methodology, and levels
of confidence . We have, so far, worked the new formula backward in time
only as far as 1995. The ten year increase might not, therefore, be quite
as dramatic as it appears. Net Coca cultivation was about 50,000 hectares
in 1995, and has doubled since then - at the same time as net cultivation
decreased in Bolivia and Peru. Interdiction programs like Peru's operation
AIRBRIDGE, which denied Peruvian airspace to traffickers flying cocaine
base into Colombia, forced traffickers to utilize alternative routes and
methods - such as using better communications security during their flights,
flying from closer to the Peruvian border and through Brazilian airspace,
and using riverine routes. The Colombian traffickers also sought to become
more self-sufficient by increasing cocaine base production within Colombia
itself, to offset the decline in base previously brought in from Peru
and Bolivia. 3. COLOMBIAN CRIME GROUPS IN THE U.S. Colombian cocaine
trafficking groups in the U.S. -- consisting of mid-level traffickers
answering to the bosses in Colombia -- continue to be organized around
compartmented "cells" that operate within a given geographic area. Some
cells specialize in a particular facet of the drug trade, such as cocaine
transport, storage, wholesale distribution, or money laundering. Each
cell, which may be comprised of 10 or more employees, operates with little
or no knowledge about the membership in, or drug operations of, other
cells. The head of each
cell reports to a higher manager who is responsible for the overall management
of several cells. The regional director, in turn, reports directly to
one of the drug lords of a particular organization or their designee based
in Colombia. A rigid top-down command and control structure is characteristic
of these groups. Trusted lieutenants of the organization in the U.S. have
discretion in the day-to-day operations, but ultimate authority rests
with the leadership in Colombia. Upper echelon and
management levels of these cells are normally comprised of family members
or long-time close associates who can be trusted by the Colombian drug
lords -- because their family members remain in Colombia as hostages to
the cell members' good behavior -- to handle their day-to-day drug operations
in the United States. The trusted personal nature of these organizations
makes it that much harder to penetrate the organizations with confidential
sources. That difficulty with penetration makes intercepting criminal
telephone calls all the more vital. They report back to Colombia via cell
phone, fax and other communications methods. Colombian drug traffickers
continually employ a variety of counter-surveillance techniques and tactics,
such as fake drug transactions, using telephones they suspect are monitored,
limited-time use of cloned cell phones (frequently a week or less), limited
use of pagers (from 2 to 4 weeks), and use of calling cards. The top level
managers of these Colombian organizations increasingly use sophisticated
communications, posing a severe challenge to law enforcement's ability
to conduct effective investigations. 4. INSURGENTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE DRUG TRADE There continues to
be deep concern in DEA, as in the rest of the Administration and in the
Congress, about the connection between the FARC and other groups in Colombia
and the drug trade. The Colombian government is now engaged in responding
to this challenge. DEA will continue to closely monitor the situation.
An alliance of convenience
between guerillas and traffickers is nothing new. Since the 1970s, drug
traffickers based in Colombia have made temporary alliances of convenience
with leftist guerillas, or with right wing groups. In each case, this
has been done to secure protection for the drug interests. At other times,
the drug traffickers have financed their own private armies to provide
security services. Some insurgent and paramilitary groups have, in fact,
become little more than bands of well-armed thugs selling their services
to drug traffickers. The presence of the
insurgents in Colombia's eastern lowlands and southern rainforest--the
country's primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions--hinders
the Colombian Government's ability to conduct counterdrug operations.
The frequent ground fire sustained by Colombian National Police eradication
aircraft operating in insurgent occupied areas shows the extent to which
some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of their
"local constituents" (i.e., coca farmers and drug traffickers). Likewise,
insurgent attacks continue to pose a threat to CNP personnel, supported
by the DEA conducting operations, against clandestine labs. Some insurgent
units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations.
In return for cash payments, or possibly in exchange for weapons, the
insurgents protect cocaine laboratories in southern Colombia. The most recent DEA
reporting indicates that some FARC units in southern Colombia are indeed
directly involved in drug trafficking activities, such as controlling
local cocaine base markets. Some insurgent units have assisted drug trafficking
groups in transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia.
In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine airstrips in southern
Colombia. There remains, however, no information that any FARC or ELN
units have established international transportation, wholesale distribution,
or drug money laundering networks in the United States or Europe. Northern
and central Colombia continues to be the primary base of operations for
paramilitary groups. Recent reporting, however, indicates that paramilitary
groups have become more active in southern Colombia. Most of these paramilitary groups do not appear to be directly involved in any significant coca, opium poppy, or marijuana cultivation. Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano has recently admitted, however, that his group receives payments - similar to the taxes levied by the FARC -- from coca growers in southern Colombia to protect them from guerrillas, according to press reporting. Several paramilitary
groups also raise funds through extortion, or by protecting laboratory
operations in northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castano organization,
and possibly other paramilitary groups, appear to be directly involved
in processing cocaine. At least one of these paramilitary groups appears
to be involved in exporting cocaine from Colombia. 5. LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCOMPLISHMENTS The Colombian National
Police is a major law enforcement organization with a long and honored
tradition of integrity. Under the direct command of General Rosso Jose
Serrano, the CNP has become recognized for its dedication, patriotism
and commitment to integrity. The CNP has introduced fundamental changes
in the force in order to make it a thoroughly modern and efficient institution
within the context of Colombia and the international community. General Serrano has
been an effective advocate on behalf of the thousands of loyal and dedicated
Colombian National Police officers within the ranks. He has encouraged
their motivation, even in the face of the tragic losses of over 900 fellow
police officers in the last three years alone. The fact that the CNP,
and other members of Colombia's law enforcement community, were able and
willing to pursue operations against the drug underworld is a testament
to their professionalism and dedication. All of the top Cali
drug lords either have been captured by the CNP, have died, were killed,
or have surrendered to Colombian authorities. These unprecedented drug
law enforcement successes were the culmination of years of investigative
efforts by the CNP, with active support from DEA. Unfortunately, Miguel
Rodriguez-Orejuela and his associates, who comprised the most powerful
international organized crime group in history initially received shamefully
short sentences for their crimes. In January 1997, Gilberto Rodriguez-Orejuela
was sentenced to 10 years in prison on drug trafficking charges. As a
result of Colombia's lenient sentencing laws, however, Gilberto may serve
only five years. Miguel, originally sentenced to 9 years, was later sentenced
to 21 years on Colombian charges based on evidence supplied by the United
States Government in the Tampa, Florida, evidence-sharing case. Miguel
is expected to serve less than 13 years in prison. The Colombian judicial
system must be strengthened so that the traffickers, once convicted, are
sentenced to terms commensurate with their crimes. The CNP continues
to pursue significant drug investigations in cooperation with the DEA.
The CNP is also aggressively pursuing significant counterdrug operations
against cocaine processing laboratories, transportation networks, and
trafficker command and control elements. We expect these operations will
result in prosecutions in both Colombia and the United States. On October 13, 1999,
the CNP, the Colombian Prosecutor General's Office, DEA, the U.S. Attorney's
Office and Department of Justice Criminal Division carried out OPERATION
MILLENIUM. MILLENIUM was a long-term, complex investigation targeting
the inner workings of several of the most important international drug
trafficking organizations operating in Colombia and Mexico, and smuggling
their product into the United States. This operation resulted in the indictment
and arrest of one of the former leaders of the Medellin drug cartel, Fabio
Ochoa-Vasquez along with 30 other extremely significant defendants. Operation
MILLENIUM effectively targeted major cocaine suppliers who had been responsible
for shipping vast quantities of cocaine from Colombia through Mexico into
the United States. MILLENIUM targeted drug kingpin Alejandro Bernal-Madrigal,
who, by his own admission, had been smuggling 30 tons, or 500 million
dosage units, of cocaine into the United States every month. U.S. law
enforcement authorities seized more than 13,000 kilograms of cocaine during
the last two weeks of August alone. The U.S. Government
has requested extradition of all 31 defendants. The criminal acts for
which they were arrested all took place after December 17, 1997, the effective
date of Colombian legislation allowing for renewed extradition of Colombian
nationals. It has long been the case that the greatest fear of these major
traffickers is that they could face extradition to the U.S., efficient
trials, and conviction to terms commensurate with the enormity of their
crimes. Once the extraditions
to the United States of the MILLENIUM targets is completed, that operation
will be the most successful and significant drug enforcement event since
the elimination of the Medellin cartel. Operation MILLENIUM would simply
not have been possible without the dedicated cooperation of the CNP and
the Colombian Prosecutor General's Office. 6. OVERVIEW OF PRIORITIES AND PROGRAMS: Due to the precarious
and ever-changing dynamics of the cocaine trade in South America, the
DEA Bogota Country Office (BCO), in conjunction with the United States
Embassy in Colombia, developed strategies to identify, investigate and
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations. The DEA South American
Regional Plan (SARP) and the United States Mission Performance Plan (MPP)
are the primary strategies developed by the BCO and U.S. Embassy in Colombia
to direct and guide DEA and U.S. counter-drug efforts in Colombia. In
essence, the SARP and the MPP prioritize targeting the significant drug
trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia. The SARP and
MPP are the foundation of the BCO Work Plan. Essentially, the BCO Work
Plan is based on the premise that the organizations controlling the manufacture
and transportation of cocaine HCl are the most vulnerable elements of
the drug trafficking organizations. As such, the BCO directs available
resources at these factions in an effort to identify and ultimately immobilize
them. Based upon the BCO
Work Plan, the BCO will enhance resources in the area known as the Colombian
Source Zone. This is an area southeast of the Andes mountains characterized
by few roads, no rail transportation, very little commercial air traffic,
many clandestine airstrips and an extensive river system linking this
area to Peru, Brazil and Venezuela. The BCO and United States Country
Team believe that by augmenting resources in the Colombian Source Zone,
the amount of cocaine HCl available for transportation to the United States
will be significantly reduced. As in the past, the
BCO will continue to direct assets and resources at the command and control
structures of major drug trafficking organizations operating throughout
Colombia. These organizations operate primarily northwest of the Andes
Mountains and throughout major Colombian cities. These organizations also
control transportation of cocaine HCl from the Colombian Transit Zone
(that area adjacent to both Colombian coasts) to the United States, as
well as other countries, for eventual distribution. As alluded to earlier,
the BCO has noted a significant increase in seizures of Colombian heroin,
both in Colombia and the United States. The BCO will strengthen its resources
dedicated to targeting the organizations controlling the manufacture and
transportation of heroin from Colombia to the United States. All BCO programs,
in one form or another, will focus on the identification and immobilization
of major drug trafficking organizations operating throughout Colombia.
To further augment these objectives, programs such as the Andean Initiative,
Sensitive Investigations Unit, and Intelligence Collection will be the
primary support for the BCO's enforcement efforts. These programs will
be further enhanced through the Information Analysis/Operations Center
(IA/OC). All programs targeting major drug trafficking organizations will
be in conjunction with the United States Embassy counterdrug strategy
and the MPP. Furthermore, the
Sensitive Investigation Units, Heroin Task Force, Operation Selva Verde
and other units such as the Commando Especial del Ejercito will be tasked
to initiate significant investigations targeting the command and control
structure of the major drug trafficking organizations. These units will
target organizations operating in the Colombian Source Zone and other
areas of Colombia. The units will be encouraged to work simultaneously
with DEA domestic offices in coordinated transnational investigations
targeting all aspects of these organizations so as to maximize both the
effect and the return on the investment. In addition, the BCO will continue
to enhance and promote host nation and regional counterdrug cooperation
throughout the area. To attain each of
the goals set forth in the 2000 SARP, it is the BCO's conviction that
joint investigations between Colombian and U.S. authorities will garner
the most significant and damaging results against international drug trafficking
organizations. As revealed in Operation Millennium, such endeavors require
extensive coordination among a myriad of agencies, both in Colombia and
the United States, respectively. Given this, the BCO is continuing to
break new ground in this area and believes several significant investigations
will result from this continued cooperation. 7. CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE By way of conclusion,
we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders
of the new criminal groups from Colombia. These criminals have already
moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of
vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors.
A number of initiatives hold particular promise for success:
Other sections of
the Justice Initiative of Plan Colombia can provide indirect support to
DEA, Colombian National Police, DAS and Colombian Prosecutors efforts
to investigate major Colombian Drug Trafficking Organizations. These sections
include support to money laundering and asset forfeiture, training for
police prosecutors and judges, security for victim and witnesses, prison
assistance and procedural and legislative reforms to the Colombian legal
system. The DEA remains committed
to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug
traffickers in the world today. In particular, we will continue to work
with our partners in Colombia -- and throughout the world --- to improve
our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling. The ultimate
test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who
control their vast empires of crime which bring misery to the nations
in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and
sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their
crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face justice
in U.S. courts. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
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