

Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/20 1

Security Policy Concerning Travel and Assignment of Personnel with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)

(Effective 20 July 1987)

¹This directive supersedes DCID 1/20, effective 11 March 1985.

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, minimum-security policy is herewith established for assignment and travel of U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants, and employees of government contractors who have access to SCI.

1. Purpose

This policy is based on the need to protect SCI from possible compromise resulting from the capture, interrogation, exploitation, or entrapment of SCI-knowledgeable personnel by hostile nations or groups or as a result of terrorist actions.

2. Definitions

a. **Defensive Security Briefings**--formal advisories that alert traveling personnel to the potential for harassment, exploitation, provocation, or entrapment. These briefings, based on actual experience when available, include information on courses of action helpful in mitigating adverse security and personal consequences, and advise of passive and active measures that personnel should take to avoid becoming targets or inadvertent victims of terrorism.

b. **Hazardous Activities**--assignments or visits to, and travel through, countries listed in the annex to this directive. Hazardous activities also include assignment or travel in combat zones or other areas in which the threat to US personnel from opposition intelligence services, terrorism, or insurgency is such that the physical safety and security of personnel cannot be reasonably ensured. The use of transportation carriers owned or controlled by a country named in the annex is also included in this definition.

c. **Terrorism**--premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents.

d. **Risk of Capture Briefings**--advisories that alert personnel as to what may be expected in the way of attempts to force or trick them to divulge classified information if captured or detained and that offer suggested courses of action they should follow to avoid or limit such divulgence. These advisories include

instructions /advice for advance preparation of innocuous, alternate explanations of duties and background.

e. Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community (SOICs)--for the purposes of this policy statement, SOICs are defined as the heads of organizations within the Intelligence Community, as defined by Executive Order 12333, or their designated representatives.

f. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)--is classified information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, methods, or analytical processes that is required to be handled exclusively within formal access control systems established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. Policy

Persons granted access to information about the sensitive aspects of sources, methods, and analytical procedures of foreign intelligence incur a special security obligation and are to be alerted to the risks associated with travel to, through, or within, or with other activities involving the countries listed in the annex and areas or countries subject to substantial risk of terrorism.

a. Official Travel. No person with access to SCI will be assigned or directed to participate in a hazardous activity, as defined herein, until he or she has been afforded a defensive security briefing and/or risk of capture briefing by an official specified by the cognizant SOIC. (Consideration will be given to the relative protection enjoyed by U.S. personnel having diplomatic status except for circumstances in which there is a substantial risk of terrorist acts.)

b. Unofficial Travel. All persons having access to SCI who plan unofficial travel to, through, or within countries listed in the annex must:

(1) give prior notification of all such planned travel;

(2) receive a defensive security briefing from their cognizant security officials for travel to countries listed in the annex;

(3) immediately contact the nearest U.S. Consul, Attache, or Embassy Regional Security Officer or Post Duty Officer if detained or subjected to significant harassment or provocation while traveling; and

(4) report to the cognizant security official, on return from travel, any unusual incidents, including incidents of potential security concern encountered during such travel.

Failure to comply with the above provisions may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI.

c. Specific and Extensive Knowledge. Persons with specific and extensive knowledge of the following aspects of foreign intelligence shall be advised that unofficial travel without the approval of the cognizant SOIC may result in the withdrawal of approval for continued access to SCI:

- (1) technological structure, function, and techniques of sensitive intelligence collection or exploitation systems methods;
- (2) designated system targets or sources;
- (3) method and purpose of target selection;
- (4) degree of success of collection or exploitation systems/methods; or
- (5) collection of exploitation system/method capabilities and vulnerabilities.

d. Previous Access. Persons whose access to SCI is being terminated will be officially reminded of their continuing obligation to protect SCI and will be afforded advisories on the risks associated with participation in hazardous activities.

4. Responsibilities

a. The DCI will cause to be prepared and disseminated to the SOICs a list of countries identified as posing a security risk bearing on this policy (see annex). The Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office, Intelligence Community Staff (CCISMO/ICS) shall coordinate required support including source material concerning these risks.

b. SOICs shall issue implementing directives concerning travel and assignment of personnel of their departments or agencies. Such directives shall include the overall policy, definitions, and criteria set forth herein and provide for:

- (1) an annual reminder of the policy set forth in paragraph 3 above;
- (2) defensive security briefings or risk of capture briefings to personnel of their departments or agencies;
- (3) institution of positive programs for the collection of information reported under the provisions of paragraph 3b(4) above;
- (4) assurance that new information obtained by their departments or agencies on incidents of security concern (e.g., harassments, provocations, or terrorist actions) or on risk of capture situations, is provided to CCISMO/ICS and to other interested NFIB agencies; and

(5) ensurance that recommendations for changes to the annex are made to CCISMO/ICS with justification for addition or deletion of countries.

5. Classification

The identification of any country in the annex as having been designated by the DCI as potentially dangerous for travelers in protection of SCI is classified SECRET.

Annex:

Countries and Areas in Which Visits, Travel, and Assignment are considered to be a Hazardous Activity [Annex Not Declassified]

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