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Of
Fort
Henry**

TENNESSEE

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The National Park Service
RESEARCH HISTORIAN
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THE FALL OF FORT HENRY

EDWIN C. BEARSS

It was obvious to Tennessee authorities late in the spring of 1861 that the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers provided an ideal invasion route into the heart of their state. A Union amphibious force using these rivers as the axis of its advance, if unopposed, would be able to drive deeply into Middle Tennessee, cut the vital Memphis and Charleston, and Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville Railroads, and capture Nashville. To shield the state from such an attack, the Tennesseans surveyed and commenced the construction of defenses to guard these two rivers. Since Kentucky seemed determined to remain neutral, Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee ordered the fortifications constructed near the border. Fort Henry was located on the east bank of the Tennessee River, Fort Donelson twelve miles away on the west bank of the Cumberland. The Confederacy subsequently assumed responsibility for the completion and defense of the forts.

In September, 1861, the Confederates violated Kentucky neutrality by seizing and fortifying Columbus on the Mississippi River. In reprisal, the Federals occupied Paducah, Kentucky, at the mouth of the Tennessee River. Shortly thereafter, Kentucky declared for the Union. The security of West Tennessee, Nashville, and the vital railroads now depended on the Confederates' ability to hold Forts Henry and Donelson.

Examining their maps, the Federal leaders could see the tremendous advantages to the Union if they could capture the forts. Besides opening Middle Tennessee to invasion, the fall of the forts would compel the strong Confederate forces at Columbus and Bowling Green, Kentucky, to fall back to avoid being encircled. With the loss of these key posts the Confederate defense line in the West would be shattered. The Confederates would be forced to withdraw into north Alabama and Mississippi.

By February 2, 1862, Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote had concentrated a formidable naval squadron at Paducah.¹ This force consisted

1. Andrew H. Foote was born in Connecticut in 1806. Entering the Navy as a midshipman in 1822, he was promoted to lieutenant in 1830. In 1849 he received his

COVER PICTURE: Bombardment of Fort Henry
Bursting of a rifled 24-pounder.
— From a wartime sketch

of the ironclads *Essex*, *Carondelet*, *Cincinnati*, and *St. Louis* and the timberclads *Tyler*, *Conestoga*, and *Lexington*. The following day the transports carrying Brigadier General John A. McClernand's division left Paducah, escorted by the *Essex* and the *St. Louis*. Foote left with the remainder of his fleet several hours after the convoy. At 4:30 a.m. on the 4th, the convoy hove to off Itra Landing, eight miles below Fort Henry. Covered by the guns of the warships, McClernand's division started to disembark.

While the landing was still in progress, McClernand sent two members of his staff to look for a suitable camp ground. Simultaneously, a mounted reconnaissance patrol led by McClernand himself felt its way cautiously toward Fort Henry, hoping to pinpoint the foe's position.²

Immediately after the troops were put ashore, the expedition commander, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant, decided to take a look at Fort Henry. Upon studying his maps, Grant had noticed that Panther Creek discharged into the Tennessee River about one mile north of the fort. If a reconnaissance should prove it feasible to put troops ashore south of its mouth, the investment of Fort Henry might be facilitated. Boarding the *Essex*, he requested Commander William D. Porter to approach the fort.

The *Essex*, accompanied by two other gunboats, stood cautiously up river. As the vessels chugged along, they shelled the woods on either side to see if they could flush any masked batteries. Passing up the main channel to the east of Panther Island, the gunboats took position near the mouth of Panther Creek. Having reached a point within one mile of Fort Henry, the vessels opened a desultory fire on the Rebel works. The Confederates replied with their 10-inch columbiad and 24-pounder rifle.

As the three gunboats prepared to turn about (their mission completed) and return to Itra Landing, a 62-pound projectile fired from

first command, the brig *Perry*. For the next two years, Foote was engaged in the suppression of the slave trade on the African coast. Seven years later, he was given command of the sloop-of-war *Portsmouth* and sent to China. On August 26, 1861, he had been placed in command of the Union naval forces operating on the "Western Waters."

2. *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 531, 534 (hereafter cited as *O.R.N.*); *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Vol. VII, 126-127, 581 (hereafter cited as *O.R.*). A shortage of transports necessitated the return to Paducah to embark Smith's division.

the Confederates' 24-pounder rifle passed over the *Essex*, cutting a swath through the saplings on the right bank of the river. Moments later, a second projectile passed over the spar-deck, near where Grant and Porter were standing, struck the officers' quarters, ripped through the cabin, the captain's pantry, and the steerage. Erupting from the stern, the shell dropped hissing into the river. Before the greyclads could score another hit, the gunboats had moved out of range.³

Returning to Itra Landing, Grant, taking into account what he had seen, directed McClernand, who had just returned from his reconnaissance, to re-embark his division. By 3 p.m. McClernand's troops had been put ashore again, this time at Bailey's Landing, four miles below Fort Henry. Upon the completion of disembarkation, Grant returned with his transports to Paducah to pick up Brigadier General Charles F. Smith's division. McClernand was left in charge of operations in Grant's absence.⁴

Upon going ashore, McClernand was told by a farmer that there was a small force of mounted greyclads in the vicinity. Presently McClernand sighted several mounted Rebels on the Kentucky shore. One of his aides called the navy's attention to their presence by taking a long-range shot at them with his carbine. A single projectile from one of the big naval guns sent the butternuts scampering. Moments later, the general spotted the Rebel force of whom the farmer had spoken. He ordered his infantry and artillery to occupy the crest of the hills flanking the beachhead and sent his cavalry to deal with it.⁵ After putting the Rebel horsemen to flight, the Union troopers returned to the beachhead.

McClernand dubbed the area within the confines of the perimeter Camp Halleck. Late in the afternoon, he and his staff reconnoitered the road leading from Camp Halleck to Fort Henry. Before retiring for the night, McClernand determined to throw forward a strong combat team to cover the Panther Creek crossing. Two regiments and a battery were charged with this mission. It was some time before the com-

3. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant* (2 vols., New York, 1885-86), I, 236-237; W. Allen Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters: The Story of River Gunboats in the Civil War* (Baton Rouge, 1949), 49; *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 581.

4. Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, I, 237; *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 127.

5. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 127.

bat team could be organized. Consequently, it was almost daybreak before the Federals occupied the ford.⁶

On February 5, McClernand ordered Colonel Richard J. Oklesby, one of his brigade commanders, to send strong combat patrols to scour the countryside between Camp Halleck and Fort Henry. At a place where two trails crossed three miles northeast of Fort Henry, one of the patrols under Captain James J. Dollins encountered a Confederate outpost. Shots were exchanged and the butternuts scattered into the woods. Oglesby, hearing the sound of firing, ordered a detachment of infantry to Dollins' support.

In the meantime, the Confederates had infiltrated the woods. Gaining the rear of Dollins' patrol, the Rebels sought to establish a roadblock. If successful, the Confederates would isolate and destroy the Union force before help arrived. Dollins did not wait for either his supporting infantry or the Rebels to get set. Instead, he ordered his troopers to smash their way through the roadblock. After a brief clash, the greyclads retreated. Each side lost one killed and several wounded.⁷

It was late on the afternoon of the 5th before the first of the transports carrying Smith's division reached Camp Halleck from Paducah. General Grant, who had accompanied Smith's advance contingents, ordered the troops to be disembarked at Pine Bluff on the Kentucky shore. As rapidly as additional transports arrived with other units of Smith's command, they likewise landed their passengers on the left bank.

About dark the 4th Illinois Cavalry reached Camp Halleck. This unit had been disembarked February 3 at Patterson's Ferry, thirteen miles above Paducah, and marched overland to join the main force.⁸

All of Smith's troops had not yet arrived when Grant drafted orders charging his subordinates to be ready to move forward the next morning. McClernand's division, guided by Lieutenant Colonel James B. McPherson, would be on the road at 11 a.m. The 3rd brigade of Smith's division which had accompanied McClernand's command from Paducah was to march in close supporting distance. McClernand's force was charged with the two-fold task of keeping the Fort Donelson Rebels from reinforcing Fort Henry and preventing the garrison's

6. *Ibid.*, 128.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*; Grant, *Personal Memoirs*, 1, 237.

escape. McClernand was also to hold his division ready to take the fort by *coup de main*, should Grant give the word.

At the same time, Smith with two brigades would strike southward from Pine Bluff on the left bank of the Tennessee. His object would be to take the heights (Fort Heiman) opposite and dominating Fort Henry. After occupying this commanding ground, Smith would leave sufficient troops to hold it and see that the remainder of his two brigades returned to Pine Bluff. The troops would then be re-embarked, ferried across the river, and marched to McClernand's support.

Following the naval reconnaissance on the morning of February 4, Foote met with his junior officers. They informed him that heavily wooded Panther Island was located a mile and one-quarter below the fort. It appeared to the officers that the Rebel engineers had built Fort Henry so its guns would cover the main channel, which lay to the east of the island. In the chute to the west of Panther Island (impassable during periods of low water) the Rebels had reportedly planted a number of torpedoes. Foote, taking into consideration the high stage of the river, caused by recent heavy rains, deemed it best to attack up the chute. If he were to do this, the torpedoes would have to be removed.

The next morning, Foote assigned the *Tyler* and the *Conestoga* the mission of removing the "infernal machines" from the chute. Proceeding cautiously up the river, the crews of the two timber-clads succeeded in removing six torpedoes. Other torpedoes they found had been torn from their moorings by a large quantity of driftwood and trees being carried toward the sea by the rising river.⁹

While the two timber-clads were sweeping the torpedoes from the chute, a small river boat popped into view around the lower end of Panther Island. Before the heavy guns could be trained on the little will-o'-the-wisp, she disappeared around a headland.¹⁰

9. Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 49; *Fort Henry and Fort Donelson Campaigns, February, 1862* (Fort Leavenworth, 1923), 327 (hereafter cited as *Source Book*); Henry Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols., New York, 1884-1887), I, 364. Upon examining the "infernal machines," the tars found they were constructed of boiler-iron, measured about five and one-half feet in length, and contained about seventy pounds of powder. They were triggered by an iron lever—three and one-half feet in length, fitted with prongs, which were designed to catch in the gunboats' bottoms. If any of the vessels had run afoul of one of the torpedoes, they would, the naval officers said, have suffered serious damage. Upon disassembling the torpedoes, the Federals found the seals had leaked, and, in all except one, the powder had been so dampened it would not explode.

10. *Source Book*, 383-384.

A joint attack by the army and navy was agreed upon by Grant and Foote. While McClelland's and Smith's divisions moved against Forts Henry and Heiman, the fleet would move up river, pass through the chute, and attack Fort Henry. Foote, well aware that the recent heavy rains would make marching difficult, suggested to Grant that his troops should depart ahead of the boats. Grant was, however, confident that McClelland's and Smith's troops would reach their objectives in plenty of time. Before parting on the morning of February 6, Foote told Grant that he would "take it [Fort Henry] before you [Grant] get there with your forces."¹¹

At the time, McClelland's division went ashore at Itra Landing on February 4, Fort Henry was garrisoned by 1,885 Confederates commanded by Colonel Adolphus Heiman. The fort's armament consisted of ten 32-pounders, two 42-pounders, two 12-pounders, one 24-pounder, one 24-pounder gun (banded and rifled), and one 10-inch columbiad. These seventeen guns, eleven of which covered the river, were mounted *en barbette* on substantial platforms. They were protected by a thick parapet with a superior slope. The heavy ordnance would be fired through embrasures, which had been formed by raising the parapet between the gun positions with sandbags.¹²

The unfinished work on the opposite side of the river, known as Fort Heiman, was occupied by 1,100 Confederates, supported by a section of artillery. At Paris Landing, five miles above Fort Heiman, were two skeleton regiments—the 48th and 51st Tennessee. Like the troops at Fort Henry, the men stationed at Fort Heiman and Paris Landing received their orders from Colonel Heiman.¹³

With the exception of the 4th Mississippi and 10th Tennessee at Fort Henry, Heiman's command was composed of poorly trained and indifferently armed recruits. The standard shoulder weapons were either Tennessee rifles or shotguns. The cavalrymen were equipped with double-barreled shotguns. Sickness had reduced Heiman's effective

11. *Ibid.*, 373-374.

12. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 132, 148; *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records*, Plate XI, fig. 1. Fort Henry's garrison consisted of the 10th Tennessee, the 4th Mississippi, two companies of the 26th Alabama Infantry, and Milton's company of Kentucky Cavalry. Heiman, a resident of Nashville, had entered Confederate service as colonel of the 10th Tennessee Infantry.

13. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 148. Occupying Fort Heiman were the 27th Alabama, the 15th Arkansas Infantry, Houston's and Hubbard's companies of Alabama cavalry, Padgett's company of Kentucky cavalry, and a section of Crain's Battery.

force to 2,600 rank and file. Besides the infantry and artillery there were a number of unarmed steamboats at Fort Henry. Two of these, the *Samuel Orr* and the *Patton*, were used as hospital boats.¹⁴

Before daybreak on the 4th, the Confederate pickets at Bailey's Landing spotted several Union boats approaching through the gloom, and fired a signal rocket. Moments later, the troopers, having made out the silhouettes of three gunboats, fired three more rockets. At Fort Henry the eleven big guns bearing on the river were prepared for action.

Two of the steamers, the *Dunbar* and the *Lynn Boyd*, went to Paris Landing to fetch the 48th and 51st Tennessee. The remainder of the boats were moved up river out of range of the Union gunboats. A courier was sent to Fort Donelson to acquaint the ranking Confederate officer in the area—Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman—with the situation.¹⁵

Shortly after daybreak, the Rebel pickets reported that besides the gunboats, the Federal fleet included several transports. Colonel Heiman sent out two mounted reconnaissance patrols to determine whether the bluecoats were putting infantry ashore. Captain Leslie Ellis' patrol would operate on the river's right bank, Captain John H. Anderson's on the opposite shore.

As soon as the patrols had departed, Heiman began putting his defenses in order. Captain Henry Milner's company of cavalry was ordered to picket the approaches to Bailey's Landing. Two companies of the 4th Mississippi Infantry and a section of Culbertson's Battery were moved into rifle pits guarding the Dover road, three-quarters of a mile northeast of the fort. Two companies of the 26th Alabama established a roadblock on the road to Bailey's Landing. Twelve torpedoes were sunk in the chute near the foot of Panther Island.¹⁶

During the morning, the gunboats commenced shelling Bailey's Landing. Immediately thereafter, Captain Ellis returned to the fort to

14. *Ibid.*, 148-149.

15. *Ibid.*, 149. The outpost at Bailey's Landing was occupied by Milton's Kentucky Cavalry Company. Tilghman, born in Maryland, in 1816, graduated from West Point in 1836 as a brevet 2d Lieutenant in the 1st Dragoons. The same year he resigned from the army to work as an engineer for the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railroad. Upon the outbreak of the Mexican War, Tilghman re-entered service as a captain in the Maryland and District of Columbia Artillery. Returning to civil life after the Mexican War, he was employed by various railroads as an engineer.

16. *Ibid.*

report that he had seen a number of large Union transports escorted by seven gunboats and that the Yankees had commenced landing troops on the east bank of the Tennessee. Heiman forthwith sent another messenger galloping for Fort Donelson to inform Tilghman.¹⁷

Meanwhile, large fatigue parties were kept busy working on epaulements and to keep the water from the rapidly rising river out of the fort. Already, the lower magazine had been flooded to a depth of two feet. The ammunition was removed and stored in a temporary magazine, located above ground. To protect this magazine with sand-bags and a traverse, round-the-clock working parties were instituted.¹⁸

About noon, the Confederate lookouts in the fort spotted three gunboats approaching. In accordance with Heiman's orders all the troops, except the men of Taylor's Battery manning the heavy ordnance, evacuated the fort. After leaving the fort, the troops took up a position calculated to be beyond the maximum range of the Union gunboats. The three warships entered the channel, two miles north of the fort. Since this placed them beyond the 32-pounders' range, Heiman would be compelled to depend on two guns—the 24-pounder rifle and 10-inch columbiad—unless the Federals chose to close with the fort. To make matters worse, the Confederates had been having considerable difficulty with the big columbiad, which was mounted on an iron carriage with an iron chassis. When tested with a 20-charge, the columbiad exhibited too much recoil for the length of its chassis. This was partially remedied by clamping the carriage to the chassis, but even then it recoiled with such tremendous force against the hurters that in almost every instance it disarranged the pintle.¹⁹

One hour after they hove into view, the three Union vessels opened fire on Fort Henry. The Rebels replied with their rifled gun and 10-inch columbiad. After several shots one of the clamps on the columbiad broke. Fearful lest the discharge of another round would upset the giant gun, Heiman directed its crew to cease firing. Observing that the gunboats had moved closer, he ordered the 32-pounders into action. Fortunately for the greyclads, none of the shells fell into the fort. After an engagement lasting about one-half hour the gunboats retired.²⁰

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, 149-150.

20. *Ibid.*, 150. Only one man was wounded during the bombardment.

Satisfied that he would be unable to hold Fort Heiman in the face of a Union advance, Heiman believed it would be wise to transfer the troops to Fort Henry. But he was reluctant to do so in the face of an order from Tilghman that Fort Heiman "must be held." A courier was dispatched to Fort Donelson to secure Tilghman's consent to the projected transfer and to inform Tilghman that his presence was badly needed at Fort Henry.²¹

Before dark, Heiman reinforced the two companies of the 4th Mississippi guarding the Dover road with two companies of the 10th Tennessee, and another gun from Culbertson's battery.²²

At Fort Donelson on February 4, the sound of heavy firing from the direction of Fort Henry became audible at about noon. Some thirty minutes later, the roar of the guns died away. At 4 p.m. the first of Heiman's couriers rode in to inform Tilghman that gunboats were firing on the fort and Yankees landing at Bailey's Landing.

Tilghman decided to hasten to Fort Henry. He asked Colonel Jeremy F. Gilmer, an engineer, to accompany him. Escorted by the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, the two officers arrived at Fort Henry shortly before midnight.²³

A brief conference with Heiman convinced Tilghman that the Yankees had gone ashore in force. He approved Heiman's proposal to transfer the Fort Heiman garrison to Fort Henry. Tilghman knew only too well that Fort Heiman commanded Fort Henry, but he felt the terrible condition of the roads would hinder the bluecoats' efforts to emplace their heavy guns on the heights. Three companies of cavalry would remain on the Kentucky side to annoy the Yankees in case they should try to occupy Fort Heiman.²⁴

At daybreak on the 5th, the Fort Heiman garrison was ferried across the river. Shortly thereafter, the transports *Dunbar* and *Lynn Boyd* arrived at Fort Henry from Paris Landing bringing the men of the 48th and 51st Tennessee. Tilghman organized his force into bri-

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Ibid.*

23. *Ibid.*, 133, 137. Colonel Gilmer was a native of North Carolina. A graduate of West Point, he was commissioned a 2d Lieutenant in the Engineer Corps, took part in the Mexican War, and was promoted to captain in 1853. He entered the Confederate Service on June 29, 1861.

24. *Ibid.*, 137-138.

gades—one commanded by Colonel Heiman, the other by Colonel Joseph Drake.²⁵

Before leaving Fort Donelson the previous afternoon, Tilghman had instructed Colonel John W. Head to hold the 30th and 50th Tennessee and a section of artillery ready to march to his support. The general now sent a messenger to Fort Donelson to tell Head to move his force to Peytona Furnace on the Dover road, midway between the two forts. Head's command moved out the following morning.²⁶

The unsatisfactory location of Fort Henry and the small force at his disposal compelled Tilghman to concentrate his force within the interior line of trenches. Minute instructions were given the units as to the ground each was to defend. The only troops that were to remain within the fort, when the attack came, were those assigned to the gun crews and ammunition details.²⁷

Tilghman had received reports that Union patrols, on the previous afternoon, had been active on the road from Bailey's Landing to Fort Donelson. Believing the Yankees might try a repeat performance, he decided to set a trap. Captain Milner with a company of mounted Rebels moved out of the Fort Henry perimeter hoping to ambush an unwary Union patrol, and collided with Dollins' bluecoats. Learning that a strong infantry column was hastening to Dollins' support, the butternuts retreated.²⁸

When Tilghman learned of this sudden turn of events, he mustered two battalions, one from the 10th Tennessee and the other from the 4th Mississippi. Guided by Milner's troopers, Tilghman led this force to engage the Yankees. By the time the Rebels reached the scene of the skirmish, the Union force had retired into Camp Halleck. Tilghman then returned to Fort Henry, detaching two additional companies of the 4th Mississippi to reinforce Captain Red's combat patrol.²⁹

25. *Ibid.*, 137-138, 150. Heiman's brigade consisted of the 10th, 48th and 51st Tennessee Infantry, the 9th Tennessee Cavalry Battalion, and Culbertson's Battery. In Drake's brigade were the 15th Arkansas, the 27th Alabama, the 4th Mississippi Infantry, two companies of the 26th Alabama, Milton's and Milner's Cavalry Companies, and Crain's Tennessee Battery.

26. *Ibid.*, 138.

27. *Ibid.*, 133, 138.

28. *Ibid.*, 138-139.

29. *Ibid.*, 139, 151.

During the night of the 5th, Tilghman learned from his pickets on the west bank of the river that a strong Union force (Smith's division) had gone ashore at Pine Bluff, three miles north of Fort Heiman. Tilghman issued orders for Captain Hubbard, the ranking Rebel officer on the Kentucky side, to harass the Yankees' advance with his cavalry. A heavy rain that had commenced with the approach of darkness prevented Hubbard from carrying out his instructions.³⁰

Early the next morning Tilghman and Gilmer crossed the river to Fort Heiman. While on the Kentucky side, Tilghman learned that the Union force reported to have been landed at Pine Bluff had been heavily reinforced during the night. Before he could return to Fort Henry, dense clouds of black smoke were observed rising from the river north of Panther Island.

Upon totalling up the number of transports which the scouts reported in the river near Bailey's Landing, the Rebel leaders realized that the Federals had disembarked a formidable host. It was apparent to the Confederate officers that the Union plan of action called for an attack on Forts Henry and Heiman by the infantry and on Fort Henry by the gunboats.

Tilghman and Gilmer recrossed the river to Fort Henry at 10 a.m.³¹ Lieutenant Colonel Milton A. Haynes, Tilghman's chief of artillery, had reached Fort Henry from Fort Donelson several hours before. It was his opinion that

. . . Fort Henry was untenable, and ought to be forthwith abandoned, first, because it was surrounded by water, then cut off from the support of the infantry, and was on the point of being submerged; second, because our whole force . . . amounted to little over 2,000 men, a force wholly inadequate to cope with that of the enemy, even if there had been no extraordinary rise in the river.³²

Tilghman agreed with Haynes and ordered Heiman to remove all troops, except Taylor's Tennessee Battery, from the immediate vicinity of the fort. With the men of Taylor's Battery to man the guns, Tilghman would seek to delay the Yankees' advance, while Heiman with the field force retreated to Fort Donelson.³³

30. *Ibid.*, 139.

31. *Ibid.*, 133, 139.

32. *Ibid.*, 145.

33. *Ibid.*, 140.

By daybreak, February 6, the rain had ceased and the day dawned "mild and cheering." There was a slight breeze blowing, sufficient to clear away the smoke. At 10:20 a.m., Flag Officer Foote, aboard the flagship *Cincinnati* ordered the signal "prepare for battle" hoisted. Thirty minutes later the squadron pulled away from Bailey's Landing and slowly chugged up river.³⁴

Foote had drafted plans for the attack on Fort Henry four days before. The four ironclads were to stay abreast and advance steadily, keeping their bows pointed toward the fort. The three timber-clads would take position astern of the ironclads, and, if practicable, inshore and to their right.³⁵

To avoid the fire of the Confederate guns registered on the main channel, the warships chugged up the chute in single file. Having passed the foot of Panther Island at 11:35 a.m., the ironclads *Essex*, *Cincinnati*, *Carondelet*, and *St. Louis* formed into line and approached the fort. The timber-clads *Tyler*, *Conestoga*, and *Lexington* on debouching from the chute took position to the ironclads' right and rear.³⁶

It was a mile and one-quarter from the foot of the island to the fort. As the ironclads steamed slowly up river, not a sound could be heard nor a moving object seen in the dense woods flanking the river. About noon, the Confederate fort was sighted. Besides the recently erected earthworks and barracks, the sailors could easily distinguish the grim muzzles of the Rebels' heavy ordnance protruding from the embrasures in the parapet.³⁷

When the range had closed to 1,700 yards, Foote told the *Cincinnati's* commanding officer, Commander Roger N. Stembel, to open fire. This would serve as the signal for the rest of the boats to begin the bombardment. At 12:34 p.m. the gun captain pulled the lanyard and a shell was discharged from one of the 8-inch Dahlgrens mounted in the bow of the *Cincinnati*.

34. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 362; *Source Book*, 374.

35. *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 535-536. In a vain effort to enable McClernand's and Smith's Infantry to keep abreast, Foote in moving upstream held down the gunboats' speed.

36. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 362; *Source Book*, 374-375; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 50; *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 540-541.

37. *Source Book*, 374-375; Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 363.

Aboard the *Essex*, Commander Porter had admonished his gun captains to hold their fire until he had "particularly noted the effect of the *Cincinnati's* shots, so as to profit by their mistakes, if they made any in elevation." Porter, after observing the first three projectiles from the *Cincinnati* fall short, gave orders to increase the elevation. The *Essex's* No. 2 port bow gun spoke first, sending a 9-inch projectile whistling toward the fort. The shell was seen to strike the fort's parapet, where it "exploded handsomely, caused a considerable scattering of earth, and called forth a cheer from the fleet. . . ." This was the first hit on the enemy's breastworks.³⁸


Almost immediately after General Tilghman had ordered the troops, except the gun crews, out of the fortified area, he received a distressing message from Lieutenant Colonel Randall W. McGavock, the officer in charge of the Confederate patrols operating near Camp Halleck. McClernand's force was rapidly approaching. The Union spearhead was within one-half mile of the Rebels' advance rifle pits. Simultaneously, reports reached Tilghman from the Kentucky side, indicating that Smith's bluecoats were closing in on Fort Heiman. Moments later, the lookouts posted on the fort's parapets spotted the Union fleet as it debouched from the chute and took position. Tilghman was satisfied he would be unable to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds. He decided to fight a delaying action from the fort, while the troops previously sent beyond the confines of the work escaped to Fort Donelson.³⁹

Tilghman and his staff took position at the center battery. The Rebels kept their guns trained on the approaching warships, but in compliance with Tilghman's instructions, held their fire. Not until several projectiles from the boats had fallen near the fort did the general order his men to reply. At first, only the crews manning the 10-inch columbiad and 24-pounder rifle returned the bluejackets' fire. As soon as the Union gunboats had moved in closer, the 42 and 32-pounders roared into action.⁴⁰


38. *Source Book*, 375; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 50; *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 538. A native of Maryland born in 1810, Stembel entered the Navy as a midshipman in 1832. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he was a lieutenant in charge of the Naval Asylum at Philadelphia. Promoted to commander Stembel was placed in command of the *Cincinnati*.

39. *Ibid.*, 140-141.

40. *Ibid.*, 133-144, 140-141, 146, 151.



Confederates built Fort Henry during the first year of the Civil War on low ground beside the Tennessee River.
From a wartime sketch.



This wartime sketch pictures Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant's Union troops landing below Fort Henry.



Flag Officer Andrew H. Foote commanded the flotilla of four ironclads and three wooden gunboats which bombarded Fort Henry. Courtesy Library of Congress.



Brigadier General Lloyd Tilghman surrendered Fort Henry on February 6, 1862. From *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*.



Fort Henry fell first in the twin river campaign. Then, Union troops and gunboats moved on Fort Donelson. A National Park Service map painted by Sidney King.

To the tars aboard the *Essex*, the fort seemed to blaze fire.⁴¹ Presently, one of the *Essex's* officers told Commander Porter that the officers on the other vessels were leaving the spar-decks and going below. "Oh, yes," Porter replied, "I see; we will go too directly." At that moment a solid shot struck the pilothouse. A shower of deadly wooden splinters was sent flying through the air. "Dirty Bill" (Porter) shouted for everyone to go below. He himself hastened to the gun deck, and complimented the men of the first division on their splendid work.⁴² He now ordered the second division, which had been manning the stern battery, to relieve the first division at the bow guns. The first division then manned the guns formerly served by the second division. Before all the men of the first division had moved aft, a solid shot struck the casement just above a port on the port side. Tearing its way through the iron plating and oak-backing, the projectile entered the casemate and struck the middle boiler, killing Acting Master's Mate Samuel B. Britton and ripping a large hole in the boiler through which steam escaped.⁴³

Second Master James Laning, who had just gone aft, pronounced the scene which followed "almost indescribable." On starting forward to help, Laning was met by Forth Master George W. Walker who admonished him to go back; a shot had carried away the steam pipe. Glancing out the stern port, Laning "saw a number of our brave fellows struggling in the water." The steam and boiling water released into the forward gun deck by the boiler's explosion had forced all that were able to leap overboard, except a few who were fortunate enough to cling to the outside of the casemate. Laning shouted for Walker to have the small boats lowered and manned.⁴⁴

Porter and Britton had been standing in front of the boiler when it blew up. Badly scalded, Porter had dashed for a starboard port, intending to throw himself into the water. A seaman had, however, caught him around the waist. Supporting Porter with one hand, Walker clung to the vessel with the other until another seaman came to his aid. The tars forced Porter onto the narrow guard encircling the vessel, then assisted him to the after port, where they encountered

41. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 364; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 51.

42. *Ibid.*

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Ibid.*; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 52.

Laning. Porter instructed Laning to take command in case First Master Robert K. Riley was disabled. But Laning found Riley unharmed and already performing Porter's duties.⁴⁵

Within a matter of moments following the explosion, the *Essex* was drifting down river, her commander badly wounded and "a number of her officers and crew dead at their posts, whilst many others were writhing in their last agony."⁴⁶

Later, when the crew of the stricken ironclad saw the white flag appear over Fort Henry, Laning informed "Dirty Bill," who promptly raised himself on his elbow and called for three cheers. After two, he collapsed, exhausted.⁴⁷

While in action the *Essex* had fired seventy-two projectiles from her three 9-inch Dahlgrens. Job Phillips, a young powder-monkey, had with a rusty nail registered every shot fired by his gun upon the casemate's bulkhead. In all the *Essex* had been struck by fifteen projectiles. There were 38 casualties — 10 dead, 23 wounded, and 5 missing.⁴⁸

Over one-half the fifty-nine hits registered by the Confederates on the Union gunboats during the attack were scored on the flagship *Cincinnati*. General Tilghman later told Foote that his primary object had been to disable the *Cincinnati*, "and by getting the flag officer out of the way, to disconcert the other boats, and enable him to pursue his firing with better effect." Another reason the Confederates concentrated on the *Cincinnati* was because her fire seemed to be more accurate than that of the other ironclads.⁴⁹

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*; O.R.N., Series I, Vol. XXII, 540. As soon as the team had dissipated, the forward gun compartment was entered by damage control parties. Pilot Marshall H. Ford, who was steering the vessel when the explosion had occurred, was found dead at his post. James McBride, the other pilot, had fallen through the open hatchway to the deck below. He died within a few minutes following his discovery. Seaman James Coffey, the shot-man on the No. 2 gun, had been on his knees, in the act of taking a shell from the box to pass to the loader, when the shot had entered the boiler. The steam had struck him in the face; he met death in a kneeling position. John Matthews and Third Master Theodore P. Perry, both badly scalded, had leaped overboard. They were rescued, but the latter subsequently succumbed to his injuries.

47. Seaman Jasper P. Breas, who was badly scalded, sprang to his feet exclaiming, "Surrendered! I must see that with my own eyes before I die." Before anyone could interpose, Breas clambered up to the spar-deck. Here he saw "Old Glory" floating proudly in the breeze over the fort. Breas shouted, "Glory to God!" and sunk to the deck exhausted. He was dead before morning.

48. *Ibid.*; Gosnell, *Guns on the Western Waters*, 54.

49. *Source Book*, 394; O.R.N., Series I, XXII, 539.

While the Rebel projectiles inflicted only nine casualties upon the *Cincinnati's* crew, they caused extensive damage to the vessel. Several shots struck her armored casemate, and glanced, leaving shallow raking dents. One 8-inch Dahlgren was struck and one 32-pounder smoothbore disabled. Immediately behind the forward port gun, where there was no armor, several shots tore a path through the solid oak. One of these had decapitated a gunner; another had passed through the bulwark, scattering needle-like splinters in all directions, and crashed into the wheel.

The *Cincinnati's* superstructure had been riddled by the Confederates' fire. The spar-deck was swept by destructive missiles. The chimneys, after-cabin, and small boats were torn to shreds. One large caliber projectile had struck the armored pilothouse, leaving an ugly mark, but had bounced off without causing any further damage.⁵⁰

After the explosion of the *Essex's* boiler Foote saw that the vessel was dropping down river disabled. He determined, however, to go on rather than fall back to assist her. The *Cincinnati* continued to close with the fort until the Confederates surrendered.⁵¹ All told, the *Cincinnati* fired 112 projectiles during the engagement.⁵²

After the *Cincinnati's* opening fire, Commander Henry Walke had ordered the crews manning the three 8-inch Dahlgrens mounted in the *Carondelet's* bow to commence firing. Shortly thereafter, the tars aboard the *Carondelet* observed that the fort became ablaze as the Rebel guns growled into action.⁵³ Because of the limited space available in the river, the *Carondelet* and the vessel on her port beam, the *St. Louis*, became interlocked, and remained so during a considerable part of the engagement.⁵⁴

During the fight, the *Carondelet* fired 107 shell and solid shot. She was in turn struck nine or ten times. Five of the Confederates'

50. *Source Book*, 394-395.

51. *Ibid.*, 395.

52. *Ibid.*, 378.

53. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 363. On the *Carondelet* not a word was spoken other than those used in line of duty. One exception was Matthew Arthur, the captain of the starboard bow-gun, who requested and received permission to fire at several Confederate boats escaping up river. His gun at the moment could not be brought to bear on the fort. One shot from Arthur's gun passed through the upper deck of the *Patton* before the Union tars spotted her yellow flag. Realizing he had mistakenly fired on a hospital boat, Arthur ordered his men to shift targets. Fortunately, nobody on the hospital boat was injured.

54. O.R.N., Series I, XXII, 540-41.

projectiles hit within eight inches of the bow ports, leading to the boilers, around which barricades had been built. While causing slight damage to the ironclad, these shots failed to inflict any casualties.⁵⁵

Beyond becoming entangled with her sister boat, and firing the most projectiles (116), the *St. Louis*' role during the attack was routine. Although hit seven times, she suffered little damage and no casualties.⁵⁶

The timber-clads also participated in the bombardment. Since the timber-clads were some distance from Fort Henry, they suffered neither damage nor casualties. At times they were threatened by ricochets glancing off the ironclads, and until it burst, by projectiles from the 24-pounder rifle.⁵⁷

During the bombardment, the fire of the ironclads was rapid, and to the gun pointers it appeared accurate. Great clods of earth were hurled into the air as shells exploded. Neither could the Rebels' fire be despised; their heavy shot broke and scattered the ironclads' plating "as if it had been putty, and often passed completely through the casemates." "But," Commander Walke later recalled, "our old men-of-war's men, captains of the guns, proud to show their worth in battle, infused life and courage into their young comrades. When these experienced gunners saw a shot coming toward a port, they had the coolness and discretion to order their men to bow down, to save their heads."⁵⁸

Sighting the ironclads as they emerged from the chute, Tilghman took position at the center of his eleven guns bearing on the river and refused to allow his men to return the Federals' fire until he was able to evaluate the initial effects of the bombardment. This accomplished, Tilghman told Captain Jesse Taylor to have his men begin firing.⁵⁹

Taylor assigned a target to each gun captain. The gunners were told their pieces must "be kept constantly trained" on that boat. Captain Charles Hayden of the engineers took charge of the 10-inch columbiad, Taylor of the 24-pounder rifle. Until the ironclads had

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*, 539; *Source Book*, 378.

57. *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 541-542.

58. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 363.

59. *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 141.

closed to within 1,200 yards, the Confederates found the Yankees' firing was "very wild." When the *Essex* dropped out of line, the butternuts believed the fleet hesitated.⁶⁰

Disaster struck before the Rebels had ceased cheering their success in disabling the *Essex*. The 24-pounder rifle burst, killing Sergeant W. J. B. Cubine and disabling the remainder of the crew. This explosion had a serious effect on the artilleryists' morale. Great things had been expected from the long-ranged rifled gun. And it made the men doubt the ability of their large guns to resist the shock of a full charge of powder.⁶¹

Shells from the bluejackets' guns kindled fires in and outside the fort. The 8-inch shells tore away the cheeks of several embrasures, hurling sand bags upon the banquette and exposing the gunners. Soon after the rifle burst, the 10-inch columbiad was spiked when the priming wire jammed and broke off in the vent. A blacksmith was unable to remove the broken wire.⁶²

The Federals seemed to realize that the Confederates' two most effective weapons were out of action and pressed relentlessly toward the fort. Two of the 32-pounders were struck at almost the same instant. Flying fragments disabled the crews. Moments later, another 32-pounder was knocked out by a premature discharge which killed two of its gunners. Many of the Confederate artilleryists, under the mistaken impression that the missiles from the 32-pounders were too light to penetrate the gunboats' armor, became discouraged and abandoned their guns. At the same time, the projectiles from the Union vessels tore through the earthworks "as readily as a ball from a navy colt would pierce a pine board."⁶³

After the spiking of the columbiad, Tilghman was confronted by a vexing problem. The time had arrived for him to join the troops retiring toward Fort Donelson. It was apparent that the men manning the fort's heavy ordnance felt his presence was vital. Colonel Heiman now rode into the fort to find out what the general wished him to do.

Colonel Gilmer, having grown desperate, shouted for Heiman to tell Tilghman that "it was useless to hold out longer; to keep up this

60. Jesse Taylor, "The Defense of Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, I, 380.

61. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 134, 141, 146.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*; Taylor, "The Defense of Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 370.

unequal contest would cost the lives of many more, without any possible advantage to the results." Heiman replied that their views coincided, but he "would not like to make any suggestion to the general; that he must be his own judge in regard to this affair."

Tilghman refused to entertain any idea of surrendering. He announced to his chief subordinates "he had as yet lost but few men, and . . . [asked] why some of the guns had ceased firing." The reply was that "several of the men were killed, many wounded, and all the rest exhausted, and that we had no men to relieve them." Tilghman forthwith threw off his coat and sprang on the chassis of a 32-pounder, shouting "he would work it himself." Heiman was directed to fetch fifty men from his regiment. Having no one to send for the reinforcements, the colonel went himself.⁶⁴

After taking charge of the 32-pounder, Tilghman had its crew direct two shots at the *Cincinnati*. At this time, the flagship was endeavoring to get into position from where she could enfilade the four Rebel guns still in operation. These shots caused the *Cincinnati* to alter her course. Nevertheless, the defenders' situation was becoming more desperate by the moment. Three ironclads had closed to within six hundred yards of the fort. From this range the missiles from their 8-inch Dahlgrens ripped the fort's parapet to pieces. Tilghman now concluded that he "could not much longer sustain their fire without an unjustifiable exposure of the valuable lives of the men who had so nobly seconded . . . [him] in this unequal struggle."⁶⁵

Gilmer and others approached the general to suggest that "all was lost, unless he could replace the men at the guns by others who were not exhausted." Tilghman declined, however, to "give up the work." The Federals must be delayed long enough to permit his field force to escape to Fort Donelson. Failing in another effort to secure volunteers to help man the heavy ordnance, Tilghman decided to try to gain time by parleying. Fixing a white flag to a staff, Tilghman mounted the parapet. Because of the dense smoke which enveloped the area, the bluejackets were unable to see the flag. Leaping off the parapet, Tilghman sought to keep his few remaining guns in action.⁶⁶

64. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 134, 141, 146.

65. *Ibid.*, 141-142.

66. Taylor, "The Defense of Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 371.

About five minutes later, the general again conferred with Gilmer and other officers. It was decided "that any further resistance would only entail a useless loss of life." Tilghman ordered Captain Taylor to strike the colors. Taylor found this duty unpleasant but beckoned to Orderly Sergeant John Jones to come to his assistance. The two men dashed across the parade ground to the flagstaff, and clambered up the lower rigging to the crosstrees. Through the efforts of Taylor and Jones the flag was lowered.⁶⁷

Colonel Haynes was at the *pan coupé* battery when he heard the command, "Cease firing!" Not realizing the fort had surrendered, Haynes countermanded the order. Forthwith one of the crew exclaimed, "Look, some one has raised a white flag!" Haynes promptly ordered the gunner "to go and tear it down and shoot the man who raised it." The soldier soon returned, however, with the information that "General Tilghman had ordered the flag to be raised."

Haynes now directed the men to stand by their guns, while he went to talk with the general, who was at the middle battery. There Tilghman told him of his decision to surrender. Haynes replied that he would "not surrender, and you have no right to include me in the capitulation as an officer of this garrison, I being here only for consultation with you." Leaving the fort, the hard-bitten colonel made his way to Fort Donelson.⁶⁸

Colonel Heiman was en route to his command, when the big guns fell silent. Glancing in the direction of the fort, he saw that the flag had been lowered. Returning to the work for instructions, Heiman was greeted by Tilghman who told him that he was not included in the capitulation. Heiman rejoined his command and conducted it to Fort Donelson.⁶⁹

The bombardment had been in progress for about seventy-five minutes when the fort's flag was hauled down. Suspecting some ruse, Foote ordered his vessels to cease firing and remain where they were. Within a few minutes, a small white yawl put out from the fort carrying a captain of engineers and Tilghman's adjutant. Approaching the *Cincinnati*, the two Rebel officers were hailed by Master William R. Hoel. The Confederates told Hoel that Tilghman wished to com-

67. *Ibid.*

68. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 146-147.

69. *Ibid.*, 152.

municate with the flag officer. Foote informed the officers it would be permissible for the general to come aboard the *Cincinnati*. At the same time, Foote dispatched Commander Stembel and Lieutenant S. Ledyard Phelps to take possession of Fort Henry.⁷⁰

Disembarking, the two men entered the fort, Stembel, in Foote's name, accepted the surrender. The naval officers found the fort's surgeon, his coat off, administering to the wounded. On every side the blood of the dead and wounded was intermingled with the earth and the implements of war.⁷¹

The only term which Foote had authorized Stembel to grant was for the officers to retain their side-arms. This Tilghman accepted, once he had secured the Federals' promise that his officers and men would be treated with highest consideration due prisoners of war. After raising the Union Flag, Stembel escorted Tilghman aboard the *Cincinnati*. Encountering Foote, Tilghman is reported to have said, "I am glad to surrender to so gallant an officer." Foote replied, "You do perfectly right, sir, in surrendering, but you should have blown my boat out of the water before I would have surrendered, to you."⁷²

The delaying action at Fort Henry had cost the Confederates 17 pieces of heavy ordnance and 99 casualties—5 dead, 11 wounded, 5 missing, and 78 prisoners. In addition, the bluejackets captured the hospital boat *Patton* and a considerable quantity of supplies.⁷³

General Grant reached the fort about an hour after the surrender, having ridden ahead after the firing ceased to find out what had happened. Foote turned the fort over to the army. Grant complimented the captors in the "highest terms for the gallant manner" in which they had taken the fort.⁷⁴

McClelland's division, the unit with which Grant traveled, had marched from Camp Halleck at 11 a.m. The narrow road it followed twisted and turned through the high wooded hills. A storm the previous night "soaked the soft alluvial soil of the bottoms, until under the tread of the troops it speedily became reduced to the consistency

70. *Source Book*, 397; *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 538.

71. *Ibid.*; Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 367.

72. *O.R.N.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 538; Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 366.

73. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 142; *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. XXII, 538.

74. Walke, "The Gunboats at Belmont and Fort Henry," *Battles and Leaders*, I, 367.

of soft porridge of almost immeasurable depth, rendering marching very difficult for the infantry, and for the artillery almost impassable." At the time the gunboats opened on Fort Henry, the column had covered four miles—about half of the distance from the camp to the fort.⁷⁵

Some two hours later, McClelland received a report from one of his scouts that the Confederates were evacuating Fort Henry. The general promptly ordered his cavalry to ride ahead and, if the report was true, to go in pursuit. A detachment of the 4th Illinois Cavalry led by Lieutenant Colonel William McCullough and Stewart's Independent Company of Illinois Cavalry moved out.⁷⁶

Reaching the area near the Confederate rifle pits, the troopers saw that the fort had been surrendered to the navy and went in pursuit of the retreating Rebels. Three miles southeast of Fort Henry, they launched a vigorous attack on Heiman's rear guard composed of men from the 26th Alabama and 15th Arkansas. Though beaten off in the brisk clash, the Unionists continued trailing the Rebels as they fell back toward Fort Donelson.

During the retreat, the Confederates forded Standing Rock Creek five times. Unable to drag cannon through the muddy bottoms, they were compelled to abandon six guns and one caisson. It was 2 a.m. on the 7th before the Rebels, after an exhausting twenty-two mile march, reached Fort Donelson.

The Union cavalry returned, after following the greyclads for a considerable distance, to Fort Henry, bringing with them, besides the abandoned field pieces and caisson, a considerable quantity of discarded Rebel arms and accoutrements. In addition, the troopers bagged thirty-eight stragglers from Heiman's command.⁷⁷

The head of McClelland's column, the 18th Illinois, reached Fort Henry at 3:30 p.m., about one half hour after Grant's arrival. All of McClelland's command, including Cook's attached brigade, reached the fort before dark.⁷⁸

C. F. Smith's division, spearheaded by Brigadier General Lewis Wallace's brigade, encountered no opposition as it marched from Pine

75. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 129; *Source Book*, 385-386.

76. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. VII, 129.

77. *Ibid.*, 129, 142, 147, 152.

78. *Ibid.*, 129-130.

Bluff to Fort Heiman. The three companies of Rebel cavalry, which Tilghman had given the task of slowing the Union advance, faded away without offering resistance. Smith, like McClelland, found his march slowed by the muddy road. Consequently, his division did not reach Fort Heiman until after the surrender of Fort Henry. The advent of darkness found Smith's troops camped in and around Fort Heiman.⁷⁹

With Fort Henry in his possession, Grant prepared to "take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th." If the general were to have adequate naval support in this operation, several of the damaged iron-clads would have to be replaced. Grant had to postpone his attack while Flag Officer Foote returned to Cairo, Illinois, to obtain additional vessels. Consequently, it was the afternoon of the 11th before preparations were completed. McClelland's division started for Fort Donelson immediately; C. F. Smith's marched on the following morning.

79. *O.R.*, Series I, Vol. LII, pt. I, 12.