2 Complainant contends that the
action to discharge him is in violation of the Act since his refusal to make the trip was grounded
upon his belief that the vehicle he was asked to drive (No. 232, which was not his regularly
assigned vehicle) was unsafe.
3 Complainant's position was
briefed and submitted on behalf of the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and
Health by the Regional Solicitor of Labor (Atlanta).
4 "Complainant's counsel
had at least some 5 months to identify the proper forum viz., August through December
1983." ALJ's Decision at 3, fn.3.
5See also Mohasco Corp. v.
Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825-826 (1980) (upholding a "statutory scheme in which
Congress carefully prescribed a series of deadlines measured by number of days -- rather than
months or years...").
6 The October 31 letter had the
word "IMPORTANT" typed above the text.
7 Whether these letters which do
not identify Respondent or provide any information about the claim of "wrongful
dismissal" could constitute a "complaint" under STAR is problematical. As the
Supreme Court noted in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines 455 U.S. 385 (1982), a case
holding the time constraints in Tile VII non-jurisdictional and thus subject to tolling, 'the
particular purpose of the filing requirement [is] to give prompt notice to the
employer." 455 U.S. at 1135 (emphasis supplied).
8 The December 27 letter does not
refer to STAA but does reference a "six month limitation" which Chrisanthis thought
would expire on January 6. However, the basic discrimination statutes administered by EEOC,
42 U.S.C. §5 2000e-2, -3, -5 (1982), also have a 180 day limit for filing. The record is
ambiguous on whether Complaints counsel was, indeed, raising the "precise
statutory claim." 657 F.2d at 20.
9 The regulations at 29 C.F.R
§ 24.3 (1985) which are applicable to the administration of other employee protection
statutes that have only a 30 day period to file a complaint and which provide that "a
complaint filed by mail shall be deemed filed as of the date of mailing," § 24.3(b),
have not been extended to STAA cases. § 24.1(a).
10 This regulation reads, in
pertinent part, as follows: [T]here may be circumstances which would justify tolling of the 30-
day period on recognized equitable principles or because of strongly extenuating circumstances,
e.g., where the employee has, within the 30-day period, resorted in good faith to grievance-
arbitration proceedings under a collective bargaining agreement or filed a complaint
regarding the same general subject with another agency; where the discrimination is in the
nature of a continuing violation. In the absence of circumstances justifying a tolling of the 30-day
period, untimely complaints will not be processed. (emphasis supplied)