



AFRICAN VOICES

A NEWSLETTER ON DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

USAID Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development Winter/Spring 2000

Namibian Democracy: A Work in Progress

By Lisa Peterson

In 1990, the world watched as Namibia achieved its hard-won independence from apartheid-era South Africa. A progressive constitution established Namibia as a sovereign, secular, and unitary state founded on the principles of democracy, rule of law, and fundamental human rights and freedoms. Not surprisingly, when given the right to determine their government, the Namibian people voted overwhelmingly for the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) that swept the country to freedom, and for its charismatic leader, Sam Nujoma, who was viewed as the guardian of Namibia's future.

Nearly 10 years later, Namibia has managed to maintain its reputation as a model for peace and democracy in the region. The Southern African Develop-

ment Community's *Regional Human Development Report*, released in July 1999, ranked Namibia as the most democratic country in Southern Africa, over even Botswana and South Africa, both commonly viewed as democratic models in the southern African region.

There is no doubt that Namibia experienced a dramatic and inspiring democratic transition. The consolidation of democracy, however, requires much more than a peaceful transition, free and fair elections, or a progressive constitution. It also requires the establishment of lasting institutions that transcend individual political movements and parties, the existence of an active and vocal opposition, and an active competition of ideas, from the national policy-making level to the local community level. Using these

criteria, Namibia has a considerable distance to go in consolidating its relatively new democratic system.

Limited Competition of Ideas

Since independence, Namibia has held three sets of national elections (1989, 1994, and 1999) and two sets of regional/local elections (1992 and 1998), all of which have been regarded as relatively free and fair by international standards. Despite this electoral competition, however, the Namibian political system is devoid of the free exchange of ideas so critical to a functioning democracy.

At the national policy-making level, this exchange is inhibited by the general lack of a meaningful opposition within the government. The ruling SWAPO

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Continuing the Case Against Corruption

By Donald W. Muncy

There are conferences that bring together interested groups and individuals and there are conferences that accomplish something worthwhile. The 9th International Anti-Corruption Conference, held in Durban, South Africa, last October fell in the latter category. Nearly 1,600 delegates from 135 countries attended the conference whose theme was "Global Integrity: 2000 and Beyond." Along with several plenary sessions, more than 40 workshops on various aspects of corruption, from discussions of political will and procurement integrity, to the role of nongovernmental organizations, whetted the appetite for information of all who attended. South Africa President Thabo Mbeki kicked off the conference calling for an

end to "the unhampered pursuit of self-interest" in society. His opening comments also noted that corruption is a social phenomenon arising from societies' notions of survival of the fittest and the feeling long held by many that "people deserve respect and admiration because they are rich."

A long and distinguished list of speakers and conference attendees included the current World Bank President James Wolfensohn and former Bank President

Robert McNamara, Botswana President Festus Mogae, UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch-Brown, Interpol Secretary-General Designate Ronald K. Noble, Bangladesh Chief Justice Mustafa Kamal, Deputy Secretary General of the World Customs Organization Leonid Lozbenko, and many more. The interaction and sharing of information and experiences on various aspects of fighting corruption provided both food for thought as well

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Party controls the presidency and the cabinet, and, following the December 1999 elections, their majority in Parliament increased from two-thirds to over three-quarters of the seats, its largest victory yet. In addition, the cabinet—the core of the executive branch—is selected from the Parliament and accounts for a majority of seats in the National Assembly, putting a damper on policy debate between the legislature and the executive branches.

The USAID-funded parliamentary strengthening program in Namibia (implemented by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs) has enabled Namibia's Parliament to expand opportunities for citizen participation in the legislative process. Through public hearings, citizens and civil society organizations are now able to provide valuable input on legislation.

Unfortunately, however, public and intra-parliamentary debate occurs only when the president and SWAPO leadership allow it. Critical issues of national importance such as the constitutional amendment to allow Nujoma to run for a third term as president or the sending of

Namibian National Assembly Speaker Mosé Tijtendero in the Parliamentary Research Service, a customized research facility that is part of USAID's parliamentary strengthening program.



National Democratic Institute

Namibian troops to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC) were not even opened to debate within SWAPO, much less within the Parliament or a public forum involving civil society groups.

Ultimately, Namibian Members of Parliament (MPs) cast their votes not based on points raised during public debate, but based on their party affiliation. This is due largely to the fact that MPs are elected on a party-list system, whereby each party submits a list of 72 representatives, all of whom appear on the ballot. Citizens vote for the party itself, rather than a specific representative. This sys-

tem encourages upward accountability of MPs to party leadership, rather than downward accountability to voters. There have been instances where individual SWAPO MPs have voted against amendments they were instrumental in shaping.

Discrediting the Independent Press

In a political environment where the competition of ideas is limited within the legislative branch, the press plays an extremely important role in ensuring that

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USAID's DG Program Strengthens Parliament in Namibia

USAID/Namibia's DG program began in 1995 with a cooperative agreement with the National Democratic Institute. At that time, Parliament was a new institution with limited experience. There were no legislative review committees or formal fora for public discussion on legislative issues. The executive branch controlled budget formulation, for example, and Parliament approved it without debate or public input.

Many of the NGOs existing prior to independence were primarily advocates for democratic change and vehicles for anti-apartheid protest, and lost their purpose under the new political structure. Those that survived or have since been created have sought to play active roles in community development. Decision-making structures are based on tribal traditional authorities and it has taken time for NGOs to realize that new democratic structures were unfamiliar not only to the elected members but also to civil society.

USAID/Namibia's support focuses on strengthening the role of Parliament from both inside and outside by working to enhance the skills of Parliamentarians and staff as well as the advocacy and lobbying capacity of NGOs, community

based organizations, and the media. Due to end in 2002, the DG program builds on previous successes to ensure that not only is Parliament more accountable but that Namibians also know how to exert pressure and raise issues through their elected bodies.

Through USAID's encouragement, the Parliament's National Assembly now has a committee system that promises to become more active. Fourteen public hearings were held in 1998 and nearly all resulted in amendments to pending legislation. Efforts are now being directed at implementing similar reforms for greater public involvement in the upper house, the National Council.

In addition, USAID has supported the collection over time of such key information as exit-poll surveys and studies of voter attitudes in order to build a database that can be used to compare Namibia with other transitional democracies. USAID's DG advisor initiated an International Donors Group for the 15 bilateral and multilateral donor agencies involved in DG issues in Namibia, which has helped to improve the coordination and efficiency of human rights and democracy activities.

Lessons from CLUSA's Civil Society Program in Guinea

By Dr. Lyle E. Brenneman and Jim Alrutz

In late 1995, the Cooperative League of the United States (CLUSA) began implementation of its five-year, USAID-funded Strengthening Civil Society program in the Basse Côte region of Guinea. The program's major objective is to assist rural group-based enterprises to become sustainable, member-owned, and democratically operated businesses. CLUSA's approach focuses on the transfer of business management and analytical skills and cooperative operating principles (democratic values, open membership, and one member—one vote) to the members of the participating rural groups. The project's training promotes member ownership and control, and transparency in all group transactions.

During the early months of the program it became evident that the impact of the program could be significantly broadened by responding to training requests from locally elected decentralized government units. The extension of the program's training to these units over the past two years has provided a unique opportunity to contribute to improved community governance and the process of democratization. Moreover, a dynamic has evolved between rural group businesses and local government institutions, which has significantly contributed to improved governance practices.

As of June 30, 1998, the program was working with 140 *Enterprise Rurale Associative* (ERA), CLUSA's rural group business partners, and 21 *Communauté Rurale de Développement* (CRD), the rural elected units of government.

Some results from the training activities for the ERAs and the CRDs include:

- increased awareness of citizen rights and responsibilities;
- increased level of interest and participation in management of civil affairs;
- more effective articulation of citizen interests to local government;
- growing dialogue among CRDs, ERAs, and others in the local community;

- greater responsiveness to citizen demands for transparency in the management of community resources;
- new levels of collaboration between the CRDs and other civil society organizations in planning for community development and seeking solutions to community problems;
- increased cooperation among community groups to improve the effectiveness of local government;
- increased revenues for local government; and
- increased confidence among local groups so that they can influence local government decisions and priorities.

Lessons Learned

Numerous lessons have been learned from field experience during project implementation. Examples have been drawn from project reports, interviews with field staff, and discussions with members of the ERAs and CRDs. The lessons are applicable to a wide range of results that are anticipated in democracy and governance programs.

If there is an overall lesson to be drawn from the program's experiences it is that viable, democratically managed group enterprises can help insure that local governance units provide goods and services that are wanted and needed by their constituents; that those units operate in an open, transparent manner; and that they can become partners with the private sector to address local development needs. It is also important to note that as decentralization has substantially shifted the burden of financing local public services from central to local authorities, the program has been successful in assisting its clients to significantly increase the amount of revenues available for public services and infrastructure. When one considers that rural producer groups constitute the largest number of civil society organizations in Africa, they must be viewed as major

and essential participants in the process of developing good governance practices at the local level.

Lesson 1: The application of democratic practices in ERAs creates an enabling environment that often results in increased popular demand for the respect of individual rights and responsibilities.

The training for the ERAs includes an awareness of individual rights and responsibilities, the importance and value of democratic decision-making, and the transparent management of resources. Once these values become a part of a group's criteria for its own operations,

...viable, democratically managed group enterprises can have an important impact on insuring that local governance units provide goods and services that are wanted and needed by their constituents...

the group members also begin to apply them to gauge the effectiveness of their governmental institutions. During the field interviews, some ERA members reported that as their groups began to manage their own activities more effectively, they started to look at how their local government operated. Often not liking what they saw, they began to demand greater accountability and transparency of management. As stated by one ERA member, "We want to know how much money our CRD has and how it is used."

For example, in Falésadé (Dubreka), five ERAs, unhappy over the lack of development in their CRD and the failure of the elected councilors to follow through on their promise to build a school, refused to pay 1998 head taxes until they were allowed a voice in how the receipts

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issues of national importance are brought to the public's attention. While independent television is nonexistent and independent radio stations are limited, the independent print media in Namibia provides a lively forum for the exchange of ideas on controversial issues such as the presidential third term, Namibian troops in the DROC, the secessionist movement in the Caprivi Strip, and allegations of human rights violations by SWAPO during the independence struggle. For several years, the Namibian government showed a genuine commitment to media freedom and free expression. Increasingly, however, the government has shown itself less and less tolerant, often by publicly labeling media representatives as "disloyal" or "subversive" if they criticize government policies.

In September 1998, for example, President Nujoma reacted to press reports on Namibia's involvement in the DROC:

... We must be vigilant and refuse to be fooled by the unprincipled media operators and those foreigners who are out to misinform the public. They make the victim look like a devil and the villain like a saint... Africans must rise up in unity and collective self-defense to put an end to these intrigues...¹

While an antagonistic government-media relationship is often a sign of a healthy democracy, the Namibian government's tendency to discredit journalists rather than respond directly to them on the issues dampens rather than encourages a healthy exchange of ideas. The effect this has on the government media outlets is even more pronounced because of its lack of independence from government control. This effort by the government defines its approach not only to the media but to all critics of SWAPO policies, including opposition party representatives.

This trend also points to a paradox that goes to the heart of what impedes

the consolidation of democracy in Namibia: rather than encouraging the free exchange of ideas as a healthy feature of Namibian democracy, the government is sending a message to the average Namibian citizen that openly challenging or disagreeing with government policies is equivalent to subverting the entire liberation struggle out of which Namibian democracy emerged.

Decentralization: A Slow Start

Following independence, the Namibian government took great strides to build the framework for decentralization, another dimension of political competition, and distribute the balance of power among various governmental levels (central, regional, and local). Article 12 of the 1990 Constitution sets out the principle of decentralized government in

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a unitary state; legislation to create regional councils and local authorities was passed in 1992. Elections for regional councils and municipal and town councils were held in 1992 and in 1998. In November 1996, the Namibian Government produced an ambitious decentralization plan. Finally, in principle, the second house of Parliament provides a venue for local and regional levels to have a voice in national laws.

Despite the framework established, however, decentralization is not occurring nearly as quickly as local and regional authorities had anticipated. Real authority and the bulk of the resources remain within the hands of the central government. While the 1992 legislation created regional councils and local authorities, the National Assembly has not yet considered enabling legislation to detail the powers, resources, responsibilities, and duties of regional and local authorities (the "what, how, and when" of decentralization), and the National

Council has no real power to force the issue. The process is impeded by the dominance of the cabinet in Parliament and their vested interest in retaining power within the executive branch.

As a result, meaningful decentralization depends almost entirely on the good will of individual ministers to decentralize their ministries. The Ministry of Regional and Local Government and Housing, charged with the responsibility for implementing decentralization, appears to reflect its minister's will to carry through with decentralization in a meaningful way. Other line ministries' decentralization efforts, however, vary widely.

Civil Society: An Important Role to Play

Given the constraints outlined above, a vibrant civil society has an important role to play in putting Namibia back on track toward democratic consolidation. The USAID-funded parliamentary strengthening activity, for example, is increasingly focusing on the important role of civic advocacy groups in pushing citizens' demands at the national policy-making level. In addition, a strong, vibrant, and well-trained independent media can continue to keep issues of national importance in the public eye. Civil society groups can support the realization of the decentralization process by advocating for the passage and full implementation of an effective enabling law, and can also focus public attention on the importance of bringing government closer to the people. Finally, indigenous NGOs working on civic education (such as the Namibian Institute for Democracy) can target Namibian citizens of all ages to reinforce the message that dissent is not something to be avoided, but rather an essential component of a healthy democracy.

Lisa Peterson is manager of USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance Information Unit. With Stephen Brager of the Center's governance team, she traveled to Namibia in July 1999 to assist the USAID mission with the DG portion of its closeout strategy (2001-2005). The opinions expressed here are hers and not necessarily those of USAID.

¹ *State of the Media in Southern Africa 1998* (Windhoek: Media Institute of Southern Africa, 1999), p. 66.

Civil Society in Guinea

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from the head taxes would be utilized. The ERAs also contacted Radio Rural, which broadcast a report on malfeasance in the CRD.

Lesson 2: Assisting ERA members to understand the role of local government and to examine their own roles and responsibilities in the community can build important partnerships between the private and public sectors.

When ERA members see that their local government has become more accountable to the population, they become more willing to invest group resources in the community.

For instance, ERA members and other citizens of Kouriah (Coyah) collected sand and gravel to assist with the construction of schools in the districts of Kolakhoré and Bangoya. Also, the ERA COPASK of Kigbaly/Benty (Forécariah) took the lead in reroofing the community health center.

Lesson 3: When CRDs perceive that the interest and attention of the local population is focused on them, they become more responsive and transparent in their operations.

During the second and third training sessions, for example, the CRD in Ouassou (Dubreka) was criticized by members of the ERAs, government technical services, and individual citizens for the poor condition of the community's daily market as well as operational problems with the market. Following the sessions, the president of the CRD initiated a review of the income generated by the market. As a result, the CRD contracted out the management, and market fee collections increased by 35,000 FG per week.

Lesson 4: Assisting CRD officials to identify and examine their sources of income can motivate them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their revenue collection operations.

CLUSA developed training modules directed at CRD's particular needs. As a result, CRD councilors have changed their attitudes and now see their roles as representing the people to the government rather than representing the government to the people.

Following a self-analysis guided by the CLUSA field staff, the CRD of Maférinyah (Forécariah) restructured its system for collecting taxes. As a result, head tax collections for 1997 increased by 77 percent from 1996. In addition, the CRD collected 66 percent more in public market user fees, 166 percent more in taxi stand fees, 100 percent more in gravel quarry/sand pit fees, and had a 1,500 percent increase in forest usage fees.

Lesson 5: Assisting locally elected officials to examine their roles and responsibilities can lead them to be more responsive to community needs.

Because of the project's efforts at building ERA-CRD partnerships, most of the CRDs in the project zone have become more open to citizen participation in their planning activities, and more transparent in their handling of public finances.

As a result of criticism by some members of the community during a training session, the president of the CRD of Ouassou (Dubreka) went through the budget line by line to explain to the public the sources of finance and how the CRD planned to use the money.

Lesson 6: As elected CRD officials are better able to understand their roles and responsibilities, they may also become advocates for the rights of the people of their communities.

In Dubreka, a group of six CRD presidents joined together and used legal arguments to oppose the plan of the préfecture to tap into funds from the exploitation of sand and gravel quarries that, according to law, belonged to the local communities.

Lesson 7: Successes in dealing with the CRDs can encourage the ERAs to establish dialogue with other government units, such as the technical services and the préfectures.

In Kouriah (Coyah), the ERAs organized a meeting with representatives of the technical services (agriculture, water and forests, health) to discuss how their activities could be more beneficial to the population.

Lesson 8: Collaborative relationships between the CRDs and ERAs can help the community be more open to the peaceful resolution of disputes.

At the request of officers of the sous-préfecture of Kabak, CLUSA facilitated several sessions aimed at helping the communities identify and prioritize their developmental needs. Following the sessions, which included ERAs, government technical services, CRDs, and local citizens, the participants stated that for the first time in the history of Kabak, the different elements of the population were able to come together and choose between conflicting priorities without resorting to axes and machetes.

For additional information contact Jim Alrutz, director of CLUSA's Africa operations, at P.O. Box 13888, Nairobi, Kenya; telephone: (254) 2 521736; email: jalrutz@africaonline.co.ke

USAID Announces Grant to Amy Biehl Foundation Trust

USAID recently announced a grant of \$1.4 million to the Amy Biehl Foundation Trust. The grant will enable the Trust, established to honor the memory of Amy Biehl, a Fulbright scholar killed in South Africa's Gugulethu Township in 1993, to expand its successful interventions against violence in the Western Cape region of South Africa.

USAID provided a grant to the foundation in September 1997 to support its work to reduce community violence in townships and settlements around Cape Town. The foundation uses a multidisciplinary approach to help disadvantaged youth and their families occupy their lives more productively.

Activities include skills development, recreational opportunities, academic support, and teaching basic health care. A cornerstone for the foundation is the community bakery program, which generates revenues to support its core activities.

The new USAID support will expand the foundation's programs into additional communities, and help them encourage young South Africans to live without the violence.

Case Against Corruption

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as some practical ways to fight the war against corruption. Some of the results of the conference included expanded networks to share information on anti-corruption practices and a commitment to expand regional and international cooperation.

Elements of Corruption

Conference attendees learned that those who are corrupt are indeed resourceful. Leonid Lozbenko of the World Customs Organization noted that many governments do not pay proper attention to their customs departments. Further, he said that many top government officials do not consider customs a priority, yet customs revenues are an easy target for those seeking bribes. In many countries, customs revenues account for upwards of 75 percent of all government revenues. These funds are necessary for infrastructure development as well as health and education programs in many developing countries. He warned, however, that inefficiencies in administration and low salaries fueled temptation of low-level customs agents as well as senior officials. "Corrupt officials will resist changes necessary to protect their opportunities for corruption."

World Bank President James Wolfensohn noted that three years ago when he joined the Bank, that the "C" word could not be uttered. Bank officials talked instead of good governance and transparent and accountable governments. At that time, Bank officials believed corruption was a political issue and a subject that the Bank should not involve itself in. However, said Wolfensohn, corruption was found even in the World Bank. Wolfensohn went on to say that widespread corruption is now affecting levels of development assistance from financial institutions as well as bilateral donors. Voters in developed countries are saying, "We do not want to give money for development assistance if it finishes up in an offshore bank account." Wolfensohn cautioned that the driving force for change must come from within, preferably from the top, and

not be imposed by outside forces. On an upbeat note, he noted that a World Bank study covering 60 countries revealed that poor women and men spoke of corruption and are aware of its implications.

Much of the discussion during the formal sessions, and in the corridors, centered on the role of the private sector in fighting corruption, regardless of geographic region. Robert Wilson, chairman of Rio Tinto, an international mining company, said good governance was imperative but he also recalled lost business opportunities in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union because his company had refused to pay bribes. "For too

While corruption is a serious worldwide phenomenon, it is especially destructive in developing countries...It has hobbled and skewed Africa's development.

long, and in too many countries, corruption has been an accepted way of life." He indicated that investors needed to raise their business standards, which are directly related to the levels of corruption in business transactions.

Speaking on behalf of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, UN Deputy Secretary General Pino Arlacchi noted that corrupt countries registered growth rates of between .5 and 1 percent less than their more honest counterparts. "While corruption is a serious worldwide phenomenon, it is especially destructive in developing countries," said Arlacchi. "It has hobbled and skewed Africa's development."

Mervyn King, chairman of Brait and a former senior officer of other South African businesses, advised business leaders to lead by example, emphasizing that greed is real and that mechanisms to manage it need to be developed from the bottom up. One tool, said King, was to spell out employee responsibilities. Corruption management is a continuing process in business.

Raising the Standards

The conference discussions served to highlight interest in the fight against corruption as well as to identify tactics that work to fight corruption. Cited throughout the conference was the need for political will by governments and the need to establish mechanisms that identify corruption whether within the public or private sector. Without political will, those interested in improving the rules of the game have an uphill battle to wage requiring a triangle of collaboration between civil society, media, and the private sector. A partnership needs to be formed that mutually supports a no corruption policy. Conference organizers Transparency International and the World Bank cited the need for long-term action since eradication of corruption is a slow process. One mechanism launched at the conference by UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch-Brown, was the establishment of the Partnership Fund for Transparency—a multimillion dollar joint initiative with Transparency International and other donors. The fund aims to help civil society organizations and other NGOs design, implement, and monitor anti-corruption programs.

Suggestions made throughout the conference referred to the need to include stakeholders in the anti-corruption process. Many participants called for an African regional strategy involving both the private and public sectors. Further, individual countries need to be assessed in terms of their vulnerability to corruption. Many saw country assessments as a first step in the lengthy process of identifying corrupt practices and working on means to reduce them. As Botswana's president, Festus Mogae, noted, "Fighting corruption is everybody's business." The analysis of a country would, of necessity, involve all the relevant actors.

Other topics that received considerable support include improving the rule of law (developing more forceful legislation); creating effective enforcement mechanisms (government accounting or enabling laws for prosecutors); ferreting out corrupt judges; ensuring that the

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media plays an increasingly important role in bringing corruption to light; strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations in general but especially watchdog type organizations; and developing codes of conduct for public and private sector officials involved in public procurement and other governmental transactions. Indeed, many argued for a regional strategy similar to that of the convention of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Development Assistance Committee. Others suggested that the private sector should adopt sound anti-bribery plans and all levels of supervisory management need to become more aware of what is going on in their own territories.

Next Steps

Despite all that has been said and done, corruption still exists and flourishes throughout the world. But all is not lost. From the former Soviet Union, to Asia, Latin America, and Africa, inroads have been made and actions taken against corrupt officials. Importantly, the international financial institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank, and the bilateral donors are increasingly taking a more active role to ensure that recipient countries use the loan or grant funds for their intended purpose rather than being siphoned off.

In recent years, large numbers of government officials and private sector actors have embraced good governance and transparent actions. Realistically, however, work on this societal condition remains in its infancy and, thus, the work required to make further inroads will take a considerable amount of time to change behavioral and political patterns. In the African context, the development of an African Anti-Corruption Convention may be a positive next step. Currently 11 African countries have endorsed such a convention and steps are

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Media Resources

Videos

California Newsreel

The 2000 Library of African Cinema collection contains 50 titles from 21 countries, including 14 new releases. The films were selected to highlight Africans' perspective on the transition into the 21st century. Included are three new films with themes related to democracy and governance.

For more information, contact California Newsreel, 149 Ninth St., Suite 420, San Francisco CA 94103; 415-621-6196; email contact@newsreel.org; website <http://www.newsreel.org>.

Canadian Human Rights Foundation

Article 1: Defending Human Rights is a new video marking the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is available in NTSC and PAL formats.

For more information, contact CHRF, 1425 René-Lévesque Blvd. West, Suite 307, Montréal, Quebec H3G 1T7, Canada; 514-954-0382; email gsalzman@cineflix.com; website <http://www.cineflix.com>.

Publications

USAID

The following five documents, unless otherwise noted, are available online in full text free of charge at www.dec.org.

The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic Approach. June 1999.

USAID's Political Party Development Assistance. April 1999.

Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development. December 1999. (Advance copy, not yet available online.)

Promoting Democracy in Postconflict Societies: An International Dialog. March 1999.

Promoting Social Reconciliation in Postconflict Societies: Selected Lessons from USAID's Experience. April 1999.

USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening. February 2000.

Article 19

The following documents are available from Article 19, Lancaster House, 33 Islington High St., London N1 9LH, England. Email article19@gn.apc.org. These and others are also available online in full text free of charge at www.article19.org.

Media Law and Practice in Southern Africa: Mozambique. July 1999. (\$5.00)

Media Law and Practice in Southern Africa: Namibia. January 1999. (\$5.00)

Submission to the Law Commissioner on Implementing the Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of Information: Malawi. January 1999. (\$5.00)

Hollow Promises: Freedom of Expression in Cameroon Since 1995. October 1999. Also available in French. (\$11.00)

The Right to Communicate: The Internet in Africa. February 1999. (\$6.00)

Kid's Talk: Freedom of Expression and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. January 1999. (\$6.00)

Other Publishers

Election Observation and Democratization in Africa. Edited by J. Abbink and G. Hesselting. December 1999. Available from St. Martin's Press, Scholarly & Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. 888-330-8477. (\$69.95)

Governance and Democratization in West Africa. Edited by Dele Olowu and Adebayo Williams, et al. 1999. Available from African Books Collective, 27 Park End Street, Oxford, OX1 1HU, England. Email abc@dial.pipex.com. (\$27.95)

The Politics of Economic Restructuring and Democracy in Africa. By Obioma M. Iheduru. 1999. Available from Greenwood Press Group, 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881. 203-226-3571. (\$49.95)

State Building and Democratization in Africa: Faith, Hope, and Realities. Kidane Mengistead and Cyril Daddieh. Available from Praeger Publishing, 88 Post Road West, Westport CT 06881. 203-226-3571. (\$65)

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being taken to expand upon the agreement. These governments have agreed to participate in a Regional Arrangement Against Corruption, building on the Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries agreed to under the Global Coalition for Africa in early 1999.

Many USAID missions in Africa are addressing various aspects of corruption through private sector activities such as USAID's Africa Trade Investment Policy program. Other interventions include supporting the increasing number of Transparency International chapters springing up in African countries, promoting rule of law and legal reform, or strengthening civil society to help deal with corruption at various levels from the executive to local governance. Yet, as revealed during the Durban conference, much more can be done.

A number of recommendations for action include: 1) develop an Africa specific strategy on corruption; 2) establish an African Anti-Corruption Convention; 3) establish a clearinghouse for anti-cor-

ruption materials; 4) help the private sector develop sound anti-corruption plans; 5) establish a donors consultative group; 6) strive to make public procurement more transparent; 7) continue or expand work with civil society and media organizations to help publicize corrupt practices and train media staff on investigative reporting; and, 8) support and use diagnostic tools that determine the "level" or propensity towards corrupt practices. Many of these suggested activities can be done via policy dialogue, others through the judicious use of existing democracy/governance resources at the USAID mission level. Others would require a more substantial investment of already scarce resources. Clearly, however, there is a need for USAID staff concerned about these issues, both in the field and Washington, to help continue the gains made thus far fighting corruption and the inroads extended at the conference in Durban.

Don Muncy is a democracy specialist in the Office of Sustainable Development in USAID's Africa Bureau.

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Editors: Patricia Mantey
Christine Chumblor



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The Editors, **African Voices**
Africa Bureau Information Center
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Suite 1425
Washington, D.C. 20004-1730 USA
Telephone: 202-661-5822
Fax: 202-661-5890
Internet: abic@rrs.cdie.org
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Africa Bureau Information Center
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 1425
Washington, D.C. 20004-1703 USA