UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. LUCILLE MITZI BOSCO RODGERS, ET AL. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER v. JOERENE INGRAM, ET AL. No. 81-1476 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1981 On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the fifth Circuit Brief for the United States TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Statue and regulation involved Statement Summary of argument Argument: I. A state homestead law in a community property state does not exempt real property from forced sale under the Internal Revenue Code to satisfy the delinquent federal tax liability of one spouse, where the other spouse occupying the homestead is not a delinquent taxpayer and where state law characterizes a homestead interest as an estate in land A. Congress has vested the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with broad power to collect delinquent tax liabilities B. State homestead laws do not insulate a taxpayer's property from collection and forced sale to satisfy his federal tax liability II. A federal court in a foreclosure action brought by the United States under Section 7403(c) of the Internal Revenue Code is empowered to order the sale of homestead real property to enforce a federal tax lien that attaches to a delinquent taxpayer's interest in the property, where the spouse occupying the homestead does not have outstanding tax liabilities Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The district court did not issue an opinion in either case. The opinion of the court of appeals in Rodgers (Pet. App. 1a-24a) is reported at 649 F.2d 1117. The court's opinion in Ingram (Pet. App. 25a-32a) is reported at 649 F.2d 1128. JURISDICTION The judgments of the court of appeals in both cases were entered on July 6, 1981 (Pet. App. 33a-36a). On September 28, 1981, the court of appeals denied the government's petitions for rehearing with suggestions for rehearing en banc (Pet. App. 37a-40a). By orders dated December 18 and January 18, 1982, Justice White extended the time within which a petition for writs of certiorari could be filed in these cases to February 5, 1982. The petition was filed on February 5, 1982, and granted on March 29, 1982. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. 1254(1). STATUTES AND REGULATION INVOLVED The pertinent provisions of Sections 6334 and 7403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.) and Section 301.6334-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations on Procedure and Administration (26 C.F.R.) are set forth in the appendix to the petition at 41a-45a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the existence of a state homestead law in a community property state exempts real property from forced sale under the Internal Revenue Code to satisfy the delinquent federal tax liability of one spouse, where the other spouse occupying the homestead is not a delinquent taxpayer and where state law characterizes a homestead interest as an estate in land. 2. Whether, in a foreclosure action brought by the United States under Section 7403(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, a federal court is empowered to order the sale of homestead real property to enforce a federal tax lien that attaches to a delinquent taxpayer's interest in the property, where the delinquent taxpayer's spouse occupying the homestead does not have outstanding tax liabilities. STATEMENT 1. Rodgers. On October 24, 1937, Philip S. Bosco and respondent Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers /1/ were married (R. 39). /2/ In 1955, they obtained as community property the residential real property involved in this suit, which they occupied with their children as their homestead (Pet. App. 1a-2a). In 1971 and 1972, the Internal Revenue Service issued assessments totalling $927,284.79 for federal wagering taxes, penalties and interest, against Philip for the taxable years 1966 through 1971 (id. at 2a). These taxes remained unpaid at the time of Philip's death on November 6, 1974 (ibid.; R. 39). After Philip's death, respondent continued to occupy the property as her homestead. The couple's children have married and left their parents' home. Respondent thereafter remarried and now occupies the homestead property with her present husband. At the time this suit was filed, respondent held no property belonging to Philip other than the homestead property and certain personal property having value less than $500 (ibid.). The government instituted this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against respondent and Philip's son, daughter and executor, for the purposes of reducing to judgment the assessments against Philip, enforcing the tax liens against any property belonging to him, and obtaining a deficiency judgment in the amount of any unsatisfied part of the liability (Pet. App. 2a). In response, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that they held no property belonging to Philip other than certain personal property of limited value and the real property which respondent claimed as a homestead (id. at 2a-3a). /3/ The government filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment asserting, inter alia, that the defendants' homestead claim did not insulate the property from enforcement of the federal tax liens and forced sale (id. at 3a). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondents (ibid.). /4/ The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 1a-24a). In so ruling, the court agreed that non-homestead community property may be reached in its entirety by the government in order to satisfy the tax debts of either spouse, and that homestead property may be reached by the government when both spouses are delinquent taxpayers (id. at 6a-8a). It further acknowledged that under Section 6334(a) and (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which enumerate particular items of property that are exempt from levy, "the homestead interest of a taxpayer spouse, i.e., that of one who himself has tax liability, clearly cannot by itself defeat a federal tax lien" (Pet. App. 7a; emphasis in original). The court therefore concluded that "federal tax liens in this case clearly attached to the deceased taxpayer spouse's interest in the realty claimed as a homestead" (id. at 8a). As a result, the court acknowledged that the tax liens "could be executed against that interest if his was the only interest in the homestead, or if both spouses were delinquent taxpayers and the liens had attached to each spouse's interest in the homestead" (ibid., emphasis in original). The court, however, resisted the conclusion that the tax liens may be foreclosed or enforced against the taxpayer spouse's interest in realty claimed as a homestead when the other spouse having an equal interest in the homestead property, has no outstanding tax liability. It noted that the authorities were divided on the question whether the government may foreclose its tax lien on a taxpayer spouse's interest in property, if a nontaxpayer spouse had a homestead interest in the property (Pet. App. 9a-10a). As the court below observed, the Ninth /5/ and Eighth /6/ Circuits had held that the government could foreclose its tax lien in these circumstances. But the court followed the opposite conclusion reached in United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973). There, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that if a homestead is merely an exemption from general creditors under state law, the nontaxpayer spouse's interest will not prevent execution of a federal tax lien on the taxpayer spouse's interest. If, on the other hand, state law characterizes a homestead interest as an estate in land, as the court found it did in Hershberger, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal tax lien may not be foreclosed against the homestead as long as the nontaxpayer spouse's interest exists under state law (Pet. App. 9a-11a). Since the court below determined that a Texas homestead interest confers an undivided, vested estate in land, it ruled that the government could not foreclose its federal tax liens on the interest of Philip as long as respondent, the nontaxpayer spouse, maintained a homestead interest in the property (id. at 19a-23a). In support of its holding, the court below also relied on its prior decision holding that in a foreclosure action brought by the government under Section 7403 of the Code, the federal courts cannot require the sale of property to foreclose a valid federal tax lien that attaches to the interest of only one of the owners of the property (Pet. App. 14a-17a). The court, however, acknowledged that four other circuits have taken the opposite view, holding that the courts should, at the behest of the government, order the sale of jointly held property and distribute the proceeds attributable to a taxpayer's interest in it to the government in order to satisfy his tax liability (id. at 16a n.12). 2. Ingram. During their marriage, Donald Ingram and respondent Joerene Ingram acquired, as community property, a residence located in Dallas, Texas, and claimed this property as their homestead under Texas law. In 1972 and 1973, the Internal Revenue Service issued assessments against Donald Ingram under Section 6672 of the Code relating to unpaid taxes withheld from wages of employees of the Dallas Auto Damage Appraisers, Inc., of which Donald Ingram was president. The tax liabilities related to the period from the first quarter of 1971 through the second quarter of 1972. After payments on account of these liabilities were made, there remained unpaid $9,330.51, plus interest. In addition, in 1973, an assessment was made in the amount of $283.33, plus interest, against Donald and Joerene Ingram relating to their joint income tax liability for 1971. These amounts remain unpaid (Pet. App. 26a). On March 19, 1975, at which time the Ingrams were seeking a divorce, their residence was destroyed by fire (Pet. App. 26a). /7/ In connection with their divorce proceedings, they entered into a property settlement agreement in which they agreed that Donald would convey his interest in the real property to respondent. After the property was conveyed to Laurel Bates, as trustee for respondent, attempts to sell the property failed. Respondent also received notice from the City of Dallas Department of Housing and Urban Rehabilitation that unless she complied with local ordinances, the remains of the residence would be demolished. Following a hearing, notice requiring demolition was given. Respondent and Laurel Bates thereupon instituted this action in state court to quiet title to the property, to remove the liens that encumbered it, and to enjoin demolition of the improvements located on the property (Pet. App. 27a). The suit was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Pet. App. 27a). Thereafter, the United States filed a counterclaim against respondent and Donald Ingram, who was added as a defendant, seeking foreclosure of its tax liens for the sole liability of Donald Ingram for unpaid withholding taxes and for the joint liability of Donald and Joerene Ingram for unpaid income taxes. Respondent sought summary judgment urging that the propety was insulated from creditors' claims because it was her homestead. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the property was sold and the proceeds (approximately $16,250) were deposited into the registry of the district court, pending the outcome of the suit. /8/ The government opposed respondent's motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was a material question of fact concerning whether she had abandoned the homestead. In addition, the government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim on the ground that the state homestead exemption was ineffective against the federal tax liens. /9/ The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment (Pet. App. 28a-29a). On the authority of its decision in Rodgers, /10/ the court of appeals reversed. It held that if respondent maintained her homestead interest in the property, the government was not entitled to enforce its tax lien based on Donald Ingram's withholding tax liability. The court, however, affirmed the judgment insofar as the district court had permitted the government to satisfy its claim relating to the joint income tax liability from the proceeds of sale. An issue of fact remained as to whether respondent continued to maintain her interest in the property as a homestead. If that were the case, she could assert her homestead interest as a defense against foreclosure by the Internal Revenue Service for the purpose of satisfying her former husband's federal withholding tax liability. The court therefore remanded the case for that determination (Pet. App. 31a-32a). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I Congress has prescribed that if any person neglects or refuses to pay federal taxes, after assessment, notice and demand, the amount of the unpaid taxes "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person" (26 U.S.C. 6321). A lien, however, is not self-executing but requires enforcement if the tax assessment which it secures is to be collected. Congress has therefore conferred broad powers upon the Secretary of the Tresasury to take whatever administrative actions are necessary to insure the collection of taxes from persons whose accounts are delinquent. Thus, Section 7403 of the Code authorizes the Attorney General, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, to bring actions to enforce liens. Moreover, Section 6331(a) of the Code authorizes the Secretary to collect unpaid taxes by "levy upon all property and rights to property * * * belonging to such person or on which there is a lien * * *." Section 6331(b) defines "levy" to include "the power of distraint and seizure by any means." There are nine enumerated exemptions set forth in Section 6334(a) for property exempt from levy. The list of exemptions is extremely narrow and is intended to be exclusive. Accordingly, Section 6334(c) explicitly provides that "(n) otwithstanding any other law of the United States, no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a)." Section 6334 of the Code has its roots in comparable statutory provisions dating back more than a century. See Rev. Stat. 3187, 3188 (1878 ed.); Sections 3691 and 3692 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. (1940 ed.)). Although the list of enumerated exemptions from levy has been modernized in the 1954 codification and in the Tax Reform Acts of 1969 and 1976, Congress reaffirmed in 1954 the fundamental principle that "(p)rovisions of State law cannot grant an exemption from levy, and this subsection makes it clear that no other provision of Federal law shall exempt property from levy." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 578 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A409 (1954). This Court has accordingly interpreted the Internal Revenue Service's statutory authority to levy upon the property of a delinquent taxpayer in the light of Congress's intention that the enumerated list in Section 6334(a) shall constitute the sole source of exemptions from levy. As a unanimous Court observed in United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 205 (1971), with respect to Section 6334(c), "(t)his language is specific and it is clear and there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens to be exempt from state levy under state law. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958); Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (C.A. 5 1942); United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (C.A. 9), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947); Treas. Reg. Section 301.6334-1(c). See Birch v. Dodt, 2 Ariz. App. 228, 407 P.2d 417 (1965)." Accord: Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 276 (1882). The Court's approving citations of the Ninth Circuit's Heffron decision (both in Mitchell and previously in United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958) and of the Treasury Regulation are significant. In Heffron, the court upheld our submission, rejected by the court below, that a state homestead law cannot insulate a delinquent federal taxpayer's interest in real property from forced sale, even where another owner occupying the homestead has no outstanding tax liabilities. The Treasury Regulation cited by the Court is similarly explicit on the question presented here. It states that "(n)o provision of a State law may exempt property or rights to property from levy for the collection of any Federal tax. Thus, property exempt from execution under State personal or homestead exemption laws is, nevertheless, subject to levy by the United States for collection of its taxes" (26 C.F.R. 301.6334-1(c); emphasis supplied). Accord: United States v. Heasley, supra; Herndon v. United States, supra. Despite the foregoing authorities, the court below permitted the Texas homestead law to insulate respondents from the Internal Revenue Service's statutory authority to seize, sell, or foreclose its lien upon property to satisfy the unpaid liabilities of delinquent taxpayers. Its rationale rests upon a two-step analysis. First, the court held that the Texas homestead law created a present undivided property interest in each spouse, of the real property, and was not merely an exemption from creditors. Second, the court held that respondents' interest in the properties could not be reached by the government's liens because they had no outstanding tax liabilities. Rather, the delinquent taxpayers were their deceased or former husbands and only the husbands' interests were subject to foreclosure. However, since respondents had a right of occupancy and use in the properties, the court concluded that the district court could not order a sale of the property in order to enforce the government's tax lien that admittedly attached to the husbands' interests in the properties. In relying upon the purported distinction between those homestead laws that create a present interest and those that merely provide an exemption from creditors, the court below, and the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (1973), erroneously focused on respondents' interests in the properties rather than those of the delinquent taxpayers. It is, however, the interests of the delinquent taxpayers, and not respondents' interests, that are subject to collection under federal law for satisfaction of the unpaid tax liabilities. The only relevant question to be asked under state law is whether the taxpayers had interests in the property to which the liens attached. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960). Here, it is undisputed that both taxpayers had community property interests in the real properties to which the government's liens attached. Accordingly, the tax lien attached to and became enforceable against their interests, no matter how extensive or limited their interests were. These interests were extensive and, as community property, was fully liable for the debts of either spouse. See United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971). The fact that respondents likewise had interests in the properties did not serve to divest the delinquent taxpayers of their interests or put the properties beyond the reach of the tax collector. "To hold otherwise would allow states to create statutorily or otherwise present property interests in homesteads so as to allow a homestead to be exempt from a federal tax levy." Herndon v. United States, supra, 501 F.2d at 1223. II In holding that the government could not foreclose its liens on the real properties at issue by seeking an order of sale of the property, the decision below erroneously rests on the further ground that respondents had no outstanding tax liabilities. As the court saw the matter, a federal court in a foreclosure action brought by the United States under 26 U.S.C. 7403 cannot enforce a federal tax lien by ordering the sale of the property where there are joint owners of the property who are not delinquent taxpayers. Thus, the court concluded that the government was prohibited from enforcing its lien even against the taxpayers' admitted interests in the properties. But this conclusion -- first adopted by the court below in Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (1962) -- is expressly refuted by the language of Section 7403(a), which broadly authorizes the Attorney General to direct a civil action to be filed in a federal district court "to enforce the lien of the United States * * * with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, o(f) whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability" (emphasis supplied). Moreover, Section 7403(b) requires that "(a)ll persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property" be made parties to the action. Finally, Section 7403(c) empowers the court to order "a sale of such property" -- not the sale of an "interest" in the property -- and direct "distribution of the proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States." Thus, the statute plainly authorizes the district court to subject the interests of persons other than the taxpayer (such as respondents) to an involuntary sale in the course of enforcing the government's lien on the taxpayer's interest in the property. It is therefore clear that Congress has authorized the sale of property in which a delinquent taxpayer has any interest, not simply property in which he has the sole interest. The enforcement of federal tax liens cannot, as the decision below erroneously concluded, be confined to the sale of the delinquent taxpayer's interest in jointly held property. Indeed, four other circuits have uniformly held that a federal district court can order the sale of property to enforce a federal tax lien upon a delinquent taxpayer's partial interest in the property. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-703 (7th Cir. 1964); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 978 (1971); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 506-507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); see also United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869, 870-871 (10th Cir. 1974). As the court below acknowledged (Pet. App. 16a n.12), "(i)n those circuits the government therefore is entitled to sell the entire joint tenancy property rather than just the taxpayer's interest therein." If the government were forced to acquire a delinquent taxpayer's interest in jointly held property, and then seek partition under state law, it might well require separate lawsuits, which would undoubtedly reduce the financial recovery of the government and also injure the taxpayer, insofar as the sale of his property interests would yield a lesser amount. See United States v. Kocher, supra, 468 F.2d at 507. Congress did not intend the tax collector to suffer delay by having to await the termination of occupancy of a homestead, or having to assume partnership or other partial interests in property together with a delinquent taxpayer's spouse or co-owners in order to garner the uncertain yields of partition. Instead, to provide for prompt and efficient collection of the revenues, Congress authorized the forced sale of the entire property in which a delinquent taxpayer has an interest. ARGUMENT I A STATE HOMESTEAD LAW IN A COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE DOES NOT EXEMPT REAL PROPERTY FROM FORCED SALE UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE TO SATISFY THE DELINQUENT FEDERAL TAX LIABILITY OF ONE SPOUSE, WHERE THE OTHER SPOUSE OCCUPYING THE HOMESTEAD IS NOT A DELINQUENT TAXPAYER AND WHERE STATE LAW CHARACTERIZES A HOMESTEAD INTEREST AS AN ESTATE IN LAND A. Congress Has Vested The Commissioner Of Internal Revenue With Broad Power To Collect Delinquent Tax Liabilities 1. These cases present two important questions relating to the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to enforce the collection of valid and delinquent tax liabilities, pursuant to uniform rules of nationwide application, without regard to the provisions of state law governing the rights of private creditors. Congress has prescribed that if any person who is liable for federal taxes neglects or refuses to pay them after assessment, notice and demand, the amount of the unpaid taxes "shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person" (26 U.S.C. 6321). Generally, the lien "shall arise at the time the assessment is made and shall continue until the liability for the amount so assessed (or a judgment against the taxpayer arising out of such liability) is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time" (26 U.S.C. 6322). Thus, the statutory tax lien is broadly cast to reach every interest in property owned by the delinquent taxpayer. Examination of the present provisions, and their similar statutory predecessors (Sections 3670 and 3671 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. (1940 ed.)), establishes that "(s)tronger language could hardly have been selected to reveal a purpose to assure the collection of taxes." Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945). After the lien created by Congress attaches to a delinquent taxpayer's interests in property, in encumbers his rights to the property and, in general, subsequently arising interest do not affect the lien. /11/ (I)t is of the very nature and essence of a lien, that no matter into whose hands the property goes, it passes cum onere * * *." Burton v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 464, 483 (1839); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 57 (1958). A federal tax lien, however, is not self-executing. Rather, it requires enforcement if the unpaid taxes it secures are to be collected. Accordingly, Congress has conferred broad powers upon the Secretary of the Treasury to take affirmative action to enforce collection of tax liens in aid of federal revenues. Section 7403(a) of the Code therefore authorizes the Attorney General, at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, to institute a civil action in federal district court "to enforce the lien of the United States * * * or to subject any property, o(f) whatever nature, of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability." Furthermore, in Section 6331(a), Congress has authorized the Secretary "to collect such tax * * * by levy upon all property and rights to property (except such property as is exempt under Section 6334) belonging to such person or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter for the payment of such tax." Section 6331(b) defines "levy" to include "the power of distraint and seizure by any means." Congress also has made explicit in this regard that "(i) n any case in which the Secretary may levy upon property or rights to property, he may seize and sell such property or rights to property (whether real or personal, tangible or intangible)." Section 6334(c) explicitly provides that the only exemptions from federal collection procedures are those enumerated in Section 6334(a). In this respect, Section 6334(c) provides that "(n)otwithstanding any other law of the United States, no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a)." The list of exemptions has always been extremely narrow and is intended to be exclusive. Indeed, there is no doubt that Congress regarded the exemptions enumerated in Section 6334(a) as the exclusive exemptions from federal tax collection procedures. In enacting the present provision in 1954, Congress reaffirmed the fundamental principle that "(p)rovisions of State law cannot grant an exemption from levy, and this subsection (6334(c)) makes it clear that no other provision of Federal law shall exempt property from levy." S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 578 (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A409 (1954). Moreover, Treasury Regulations on Procedure and Administration, Section 301.6334-1(c), specifies that property made exempt by state personal property or homestead exemptions is nevertheless subject to levy for collection of federal taxes. See also Treasury Regulations Part 69, Article 1204 (1926 Revenue Act). The present version of Section 6334(a) exempts nine categories of property from collection procedures. /12/ The statute, however, has its roots in comparable early revenue measures enacted by Congress. See, e.g., Act of July 14, 1978, ch. 75, Sections 8, 9, 13, I Stat. 597, 600, 601, exempting from distress to satisfy taxes which were imposed on land, dwelling houses and slaves, "tools or implements of a trade or profession, beasts of the plough necessary for the cultivation of improved lands, arms, or the household utensils, or apparel necessary for a family" and providing for collection of the tax first from "goods, chattels or effects" and, if that source were insufficient, from the land, or dwelling house that was encumbered by the tax lien. One of the stated purposes for these provisions was to provide for a "mode of assessment and collection to be uniform wthroughout the United States." 8 Annals of Cong. 1564 (1851). Subsequent early statutes altered the items exempt from collection only in minor respects. In the Act of Jan. 9, 1815, ch. 21, Section 26, 3 Stat. 173, 174, Congress substituted household furniture for the previously exempt household utensils, otherwise leaving unchanged the list of exemptions. The exemptions recognized in 1815 continued in the Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 68, Section 31, 12 Stat. 197, and the Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, Section 35, 12 Stat. 303, 304. In 1864 (Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, Section 28, 13 Stat. 232, 233-234), however, Congress modified the list, exempting "tools or implements of a trade or profession, one cow, arms, and provisions, and household furniture kept for use, and apparel necessary for a family." In 1865, Congress added school books to the 1864 list of exemptions. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 78, 13 Stat. 469, 471; see 67 Cong. Globe (Pt. I) 700 (1865). The list of exempt property was revised again in the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, Section 9, 14 Stat. 101, 108), which provided in relevant part: That there shall be exempt from distraint and sale, if belonging to the head of a family, the school-books and wearing apparel necessary for such family; also arms for personal use, one cow, two hogs, five sheep and the wool thereof, provided the aggregate market value of said sheep shall not exceed fifty dollars; the necessary food for such cow, hogs, and sheep for a period not exceeding thirty days; fuel to an amount not greater in value than twenty-five dollars; provisions to an amount not greater than fifty dollars; household furniture kept for use to an amount not greater than three hundred dollars; and the books, tools, or implements of a trade or profession to an amount not greater than one hundred dollars shall also be exempt * * *. These exemptions continued virtually unchanged for more than 80 years. See Sections 3187 and 3188 of the Rev. Stat. (1878 ed.) and Sections 3691 and 3692 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 (26 U.S.C. (1940 ed.)). In 1954, Congress modernized the exemptions from federal tax collection procedures. The new provision exempted necessary wearing apparel and school books, fuel, provisions, personal effects, furniture, arms, livestock and poultry to the extent of $500; and necessary books and tools for the taxpayer's trade or profession up to $250 in value. Continuing its longstanding policy that the list of available exemptions from levy should be extremely narrow, Congress thereafter amended Section 6334 on five occasions and added the remaining provisions that now appear in the Code. /13/ See H.R. Rep. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 304-305 (1975); S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1976); H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1966); S. Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1966). 2. Here, the court of appeals held that a state homestead law in a community property state exempts real property from forced sale under the Internal Revenue Code to satisfy the delinquent federal tax liability of one spouse, where the other spouse occupying the homestead is not a delinquent taxpayer and where state law characterizes a homestead interest as an estate in land. Hence, the court below permitted the Texas homestead law to circumscribe the Internal Revenue Service's statutory authority to seize, sell, or foreclose its lien upon property to satisfy the unpaid liabilities of delinquent taxpayers. Its rationale rests upon a two-step analysis. First, the court held that the Texas homestead law created a present undivided interest in each spouse, and was not merely an exemption from creditors. Second, the court held that respondents' interests in the properties could not be reached by the government's liens because they had no outstanding tax liabilities. Rather, the delinquent taxpayers were their deceased or former husbands and only the husbands' interests were subject to foreclosure. However, since respondents had a right of occupancy and use in the properties, the court concluded that the district court could not order a sale of the property in order to enforce the government's tax lien that admittedly attached to the husbands' interests in the properties. But given the exclusive and narrow list of exemptions from forced sale set forth in the Internal Revenue Code (page 17 and note 12, supra), the particular characterization of a state homestead law can hardly be controlling. Congress has simply not seen fit to insulate homesteads from forced sale and foreclosure under the internal revenue laws, whether the statutes granting such homestead rights are cast as exemptions from creditors or estates in land. Indeed, as we shall show, the decisions of this Court have uniformly established the broader principle that encompasses this case: that state laws do not affect the collection remedies available to the Treasury under the Internal Revenue Code. "Such state laws 'are not laws for the United States * * * unless they have been made such by Congress itself.'" United States v. Bess, supra, 357 U.S. at 57, quoting Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 276 (1882). Moreover, in relying upon the purported distinction between those homestead laws that create a present interest and those that merely provide an exemption from creditors, the decision below erroneously focused on respondents' interests in the properties rather than those of the delinquent taxpayers. It is, however, the interests of the delinquent taxpayers, and not respondents' interests, that are subject to collection under federal law for satisfaction of the unpaid tax liabilities. The only relevant question to be asked under state law is whether the taxpayers had interests in the property to which the liens attached. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960). And it is undisputed that both delinquent taxpayers had community property interests in the real properties to which the government's liens attached. The fact that respondents likewise had interests in the properties did not serve to divest the delinquent taxpayers of their interests or put the properties beyond the reach of the tax collector. B. State Homestead Laws Do Not Insulate A Taxpayer's Property From Collection And Forced Sale To Satisfy His Federal Tax Liability 1. a. As the Court recently observed in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979), "(t)hat collection of taxes is vital to the functioning, indeed existence, of government cannot be denied. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425, 428, 431 (1819); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1881). Congress recognized as much over 100 years ago when it authorized creation of federal tax liens. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, Section 9, 14 Stat. 107, recodified as amended in 26 U.S.C. Sections 6321-6323. The importance of securing adequate revenues to discharge national obligations justifies the extraordinary priority accorded federal tax liens * * *." Accordingly, an unbroken line of decisions of this Court has established that federal tax collection does not depend upon the law of the particular state in which the delinquent taxpayer or his property is located. In Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881), an ejectment action brought by the United States against a delinquent taxpayer whose property was distrained and sold to the government, the Court rejected the claim that the single sale of the entire property was invalid because the property was separately assessed as two lots under the state tax statute. As the Court concluded, "(t)he statute of Illinois had no application to the point whether the premises should be sold by the collector en masse or in two or more parcels" (id. at 594). Accord: Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 21-22 (1825); Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53-54 (1825). The correctness of the Court's conclusion in Springer follows from the fact that in the exercise of its constitutional power "To lay and collect Taxes" (Art. I, Sec. 8), Congress has chosen to establish uniform federal rules rather than to bind the federal tax collector to the nuances of state law. "The exertion of that power is not subject to state control. * * * State law may control only when the federal taxing act, by express language or necessary implication, makes its own operation dependent upon state law." Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932). See also United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214 (1893). Accordingly, state law barriers against private creditors' collection efforts against certain property interests do not prevent the collection of concededly valid tax claims. For example, in United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), the government sought to recover from the beneficiary of life insurance policies the amount of federal income taxes owed by the insured at the time of his death, to the extent of the cash surrender value of the policies. Although tax liens had attached to all of the insured's property before his death, the beneficiary claimed that under state law the insured's property right represented by the cash surrender value was not subject to creditor's liens, whether such liens were asserted by a private creditor or by a state agency. This Court, however, rejected the claim that state law insulates a delinquent taxpayer's property from collection to satisfy his federal tax liability. The pertinent part of the opinion stated (357 U.S. at 56-57; footnote omitted): (O)nce it has been determined that state law creates sufficient interests in the insured to satisfy the requirements of Section 3670, state law is inoperative to prevent the attachment of liens created by federal statutes in favor of the United States. Such state laws "are not laws for the United States* * * unless they have been made such by Congress itself." Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U.S. 272, 276; cf. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Act creating liens upon taxpayer's property for unpaid income taxes, unlike Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat, 548, as amended, 11 U.S.C. Section 24, do not specifically provide for recognition of such state laws. The fact that in Section 3691 Congress provided specific exemptions from distraint is evidence that Congress did not intend to recognize further exemptions which would prevent attachment of liens under Section 3670. Knox v. Great West Life Assurance Co., (212 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1954)); United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 ((9th Cir. 1947)); Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 ((5th Cir. 1942)); Smith v. Donnelly, (65 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. La. 1946)). Accord: Kyle v. McGuirk, 82 F.2d 212, 213 (3d Cir. 1936); Kieferdorf v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 733 (1944). Subsequently, in United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190 (1971), a unanimous Court reaffirmed the inapplicability of state exemption laws to federal tax collection proceedings. There, the taxpayers were respectively a widow and divorcee domiciled in the community property state of Louisiana. Because their husbands had failed to file tax returns, the government moved to collect the outstanding tax delinquencies from life insurance proceeds and property inherited from one of the women's parents, on the ground that each taxpayer possessed an immediate vested ownership interest in half of the community property income and was personally responsible for the tax on her share. The taxpayers argued, inter alia, that their subsequent renunciation of the community under Louisiana law exonerated them from paying their share of the tax liabilities of the community. But this Court recognized no such defense, even though it "conceded that these cases are 'hard' cases and exceedingly unfortunate for the two women taxpayers" (id. at 205; footnote omitted). Their renunciations of the community did not relieve them of their obligation to pay federal taxes because "an exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector. Federal law governs what is exempt from federal levy" (id. at 204). As a result, the divorced woman lost the benefit of an inheritance that arose after the dissolution of her marriage, and the widow lost her beneficiary interest in her husband's life insurance policy. The Court further elaborated upon the primacy of federal law with respect to the collection of federal tax liabilities in the following terms (403 U.S. at 204-205): Section 6321 of the 1954 Code imposes a lien for the income tax "upon all property and rights to property * * * belonging to" the person liable for the tax. Section 6331(a) authorizes levy "upon all property and rights to property * * * belonging to such person * * *." What is exempt from levy is specified in Section 6334(a). Section 6334(c) provides, "Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, no property or rights to property shall be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made exempt by subsection (a)." This language is specific and it is clear that there is no room in it for automatic exemption of property that happens to be exempt from state levy under state law. United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1958); Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (C.A. 5 1942); United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (C.A. 9), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1957); Treas. Reg. Section 301.6334-1(c). See Birch v. Dodt, 2 Ariz. App. 228, 407 P.2d 417 (1965). Both in Mitchell and previously in United States v. Bess, supra, 357 U.S. at 57, the Court's approving citations of Shambaugh v. Scofield, 132 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1942), and United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 331 U.S. 831 (1947), and of the pertinent Treasury Regulation, are significant. In Shambaugh v. Scofield, supra, the court below previously uphold the Commissioner's right to sell homestead real estate to satisfy the unpaid federal tax liabilities of both spouses. There, as here, the taxpayers invoked the Texas homestead exemption law and urged that their homestead realty was immune from forced sale to satisfy an income tax lien. But the court dismissed the contention as "untenable" (132 F.2d at 346) because the federal tax statutes authorizing the seizure and sale of property were "enacted to effectuate a constitutional power" as "the supreme law of the land" (ibid.) and these statutes did not exempt homesteads. As the court below subsequently observed in characterizing the effect of its decision in Shambaugh, "the Texas homestead exemption does not erect a barrier around a taxpayer's home sturdy enough to keep out the Commissioner of Internal Revenue." United States v. Estes, 450 F.2d 62, 65 (1971). b. These considerations concerning the supremacy of the federal taxing statutes with respect to collection proceedings are equally applicable to these cases where respondents likewise invoke the Texas homestead law as a bar to the Commissioner's efforts at collection. To be sure, the court below sought to distinguish its prior decision in Shambaugh on the ground that the forced sale of the homestead in that case was to satisfy the joint federal tax liability of both spouses (see Pet. App. 7a-8a, 12a). But if, as we submit, the Texas homestead law does not exempt realty from seizure and sale by the Internal Revenue Service, it should not matter that only one of the spouses in each of the instant cases had outstanding tax liabilities. Under a proper analysis, once the homestead realty is treated as any other type of jointly held property that is fully subject to levy and sale, the attachment of the lien to the taxpayer-spouse's interests authorizes the government to enforce the lien upon the delinquent taxpayer's community property interests in the properties by selling the entire joint tenancy property and reducing the taxpayer's interests to money. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-703 (7th Cir. 1964); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 978 (1971); United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 506-507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). /14/ In sum, if state homestead laws do not insulate a taxpayer's property from collection to satisfy his federal tax liability, homestead properties must yield to the federal tax collector whether one or both spouses are delinquent taxpayers. If the result were otherwise, the homestead interest of a non-taxpayer spouse would serve to protect the interest of a delinquent taxpayer spouse even though the homestead laws themselves do not protect the delinquent taxpayer. The peculiarity of such a result exposes the fallacy of the decision below. One cannot accept the primacy of federal law in federal tax collection proceedings and nevertheless permit state homestead exemptions to have any limiting effect upon the Commissioner's statutory authority to collect delinquent taxes. Since properties characterized as homesteads under state law are not exempt from federal tax collection as a matter of federal law, the policy underlying that broad rule of federal supremacy therefore cannot admit any exception for jointly held homesteads where only one of the spouses is a delinquent taxpayer. Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Heffron, supra, which, as we have noted (pages 23-25, supra), this Court cited with approval in Mitchell and Bess. In Heffron, the court upheld our submission, rejected by the decision below, that a state homestead law cannot insulate a delinquent federal taxpayer's interest in real property from forced sale, even where another owner occupying the homestead has no outstanding tax liabilities. In these circumstances, the court ordered the entire proceeds of the bankruptcy sale of the delinquent taxpayer's interest distributed to the Internal Revenue Service, without regard to the state statutory homestead exemption. As the court below acknowledged (Pet. App. 9a-10a), this result was followed by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Heasley, supra, and Herndon v. United States, supra, both of which reaffirmed that homestead exemptions prescribed by state law are of no effect as against federal tax liens. Accord: United States v. Musselman, 48 A.F.T.R.2D (P-H) Paragraph 81-5331 (S.D. Iowa Oct. 16, 1981). /15/ c. The elaboration of the Eighth Circuit's rationale in favor of our position in these cases is set forth in Herndon. There, the court offered three reasons in support of the proposition that state homestead exemption laws do not preclude the United States from levying upon and selling the taxpayer's interest in homestead property even where a nontaxpayer spouse has an interest in the property (501 F.2d at 1223). First, Section 301.6334-1(c) of the Treasury Regulations, which this Court cited with approval in Mitchell (403 U.S. at 205), explicitly provides that state exemption statutes, including homestead laws, have no validity in relation to the federal tax levying statute. Section 301.6334-1(c) states as follows: No provision of a State law may exempt property or rights to property from levy for the collection of any Federal tax. Thus, property exempt from execution under State personal or homestead exemption laws is, nevertheless, subject to levy by the United States for collection of its taxes. This Regulation implements Congress' clearly stated intent at the time of the 1954 codification that state law exemptions cannot grant an exemption from federal tax levy (see pages 16-17, supra). Moreover, it furthers the congressional purpose to establish a mode of assessment and collection that is uniform throughout the nation (see page 17, supra). Second, the court in Herndon observed that to the extent that the federal taxing statutes conflicted with state law exemptions, the federal provisions necessarily had to prevail. As the court stated (501 F.2d at 1223), in terms that decisively refute that basis of the decision below -- Scofield properly recognizes that the federal levying statute should be considered the "supreme law of the land" in relation to state exemption statutes. To hold otherwise would allow states to create statutorily or otherwise present property interests in homesteads so as to allow a homestead to be exempt from a federal tax levy. The collection of federal taxes in this instance should be prior to any rights of the state to exempt its citizens from federal taxing power. Third, the court in Herndon relied upon the fact that the federal tax law has provided for a narrow and exclusive set of exemptions from federal levy and has not provided for a homestead exemption. "Congress, but not this court, may, if it wishes, determine that citizens of all states should possess a homestead exemption free from federal tax levy" (ibid.). Indeed, to the extent that Congress has addressed the broader question of the applicability of state law since the 1954 codification, it has adhered to the fundamental principle, to which the private tax bar likewise subscribes, that provisions of state law should not exempt property from tax levy. Thus, in 1959, in the Final Report of the Committee on Federal Liens of the American Bar Association, reprinted in House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 at 118 (1966), which contained its suggestions relative to modernization of the tax lien laws, the ABA committee indicated to Congress that it had considered whether to recommend that the collection of federal taxes be made subject to the exemption laws of the states. The committee, however, rejected the basic notion as inappropriate, and Congress thereafter refrained from implementing it. In this regard, the ABA committee stated (id. at 175-176): It would mean that, depending entirely on each State's concept of the relative equities of debtors and creditors, the tax lien would be unenforceable in some States against life insurance policies, spendthrift trust income, and homesteads (ranging in value from $1,000 in New York to unlimited in Minnesota), while like property of taxpayers in other states would be subject to the tax lien. It seems preferable, therefore, for Congress to give consideration to whether additional exemptions are warranted, on a uniform national basis. 2. The opinion below acknowledged that "(o)nce it has been determined under state law that the taxpayer owns property or rights to property * * *, federal law controls for the purpose of determining whether a lien will attach to and be enforceable against such property or rights to property" (Pet. App. 4a). What is more, the court below acknowledged that the federal tax liens attached to the delinquent taxpayer spouses' community property interests in the realty claimed as a homestead because homestead property is not listed in Section 6334(a) of the Internal Revenue Code as exempt property (Pet. App. 7a-8a). In the court's view, however, the attachment of the tax liens was not sufficient to vindicate the government's unquestionably valid claims. The court put the matter as follows: "That the liens attached to the taxpayer spouse's homestead interest, however, does not necessarily mean that they may be foreclosed or otherwise enforced in a particular manner" (Pet. App. 9a; emphasis in original; footnote omitted). /16/ But surely allowing any creditor, much less the government, to attach its lien without permitting foreclosure or enforcement of the lien, accords but the hollowest of rights. It reduces the "right" of attachment to a mere abstraction insofar as there is no concrete remedy to vindicate that right. It hardly requires citation of authority that when the law creates rights, it creates corresponding legal remedies to enforce those rights. The right of a creditor to secure payment of a debt by enforcement of a lien against his debtor's property requires no less a corresponding remedy to enforce collection of the debt. For without an effective means of collection, a creditor's lien does little more than prevent the debtor from disposing of the property. It does not, however, prevent the debtor's enjoyment of the property at the expense of his creditor. Thus, possession of a lien without the ability to enforce it mocks the rights of the creditor and unjustly rewards the debtor who does not discharge his obligations as they become due. 3. In ruling that the government had a valid tax lien that attached to the property but no right to enforce its lien, the court of appeals sought to draw a distinction between homestead rights that create a present property right and those that create an exemption from general creditors. Under this distinction, if a homestead simply provides an exemption from general creditors under state law, the court believed that the existence of the non-taxpayer spouse's interest will not prevent execution of a federal tax lien upon the taxpayer spouse's interest in the homestead. If, onthe other hand, state law confers more than a mere exemption and instead establishes a homestead interest as a present property right, /17/ a federal tax lien may not be foreclosed against the homestead property as long as the nontaxpayer spouse has a property interest under state law. /18/ See Pet. App. 10a-11a. Thus, since respondents had the right of occupancy and use in the properties, the court below concluded that the government could not enforce the government's tax lien that admittedly attached to the husbands' interests in the properties. /19/ In so holding, the decision below followed United States v. Hershberger, 475 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1973). Accord: Tillery v. Parks, 630 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1980). There, the Tenth Circuit employed the selfsame distinction between exemption homesteads and property right homesteads. After finding that the Kansas homestead law confers a present property right rather than an exemption from creditors, the court held that the government could not enforce its tax lien against the Kansas homestead interest of the delinquent taxpayer spouse as long as the nontaxpayer spouse maintained the property as her homestead, due to the nontaxpayer spouse's undivided one-half property interest in the homestead. /20/ We submit that, in relying on the purported distinction between those homestead laws that create a present interest and those that merely provide an exemption from creditors, /21/ the court below, and the Tenth Circuit in Hershberger, erroneously focused on respondents' interests in the properties, rather than those of the delinquent taxpayers. The pertinent inquiry under Sections 6321, 6331 and 7403 of the Code is whether the taxpayer has property or rights to property to which the liens attached. As this Court stated in Aquilino v. United States, supra, 363 U.S. at 513-514, "once the tax lien has attached to the taxpayer's state-created interests, we enter the province of federal law, which we have consistently held determines the priority of competing liens asserted against the taxpayer's 'property' or 'rights to property'" (footnote omitted). As we have pointed out (pages 26-30, supra), the "province of federal law" that governs this case necessarily excludes the applicability of the Texas homestead law. If a delinquent taxpayer has property or rights to property, a lien attaches to his property pursuant to Section 6321 and is enforceable by levy under Section 6331 (unless the property is exempted by federal law) or by foreclosure under Section 7403. The terms of the pertinent federal statutes explicitly support the Service's authority to levy upon property in which a delinquent taxpayer has only a partial interest. Section 6331(a) authorizes levy upon "all property and rights to property" belonging to a taxpayer, except such property as is made exempt by Section 6334, and Section 7403 authorizes a suit to enforce a tax lien against property "in which (the taxpayer) has any right, title, or interest." In short, the enforcement of a federal tax lien raises a question of federal law that is governed by federal statute; it is not a quesiton of state law. The characterization of respondents' homestead interests under state law is therefore entirely irrelevant to the question whether a tax lien against taxpayers' admitted interests in the property can be enforced. The federal tax collection statutes contemplate that a taxpayer's interests in property may be less than fee ownership. As a result, a lien attaches, not only to the taxpayer's property, but also to his "rights to property," and the lien may be enforced by levy against his property and "rights to property" or by foreclosure against property "in which he has any right, title, or interest." Thus, the fact that a taxpayer is not the sole owner of property does not insulate his interest, however extensive or limited, from federal tax collection procedures. Indeed, the fact that other parties share rights of possession, ownership and control over property with a delinquent taxpayer does not automatically prevent the United States from enforcing its tax lien against such property. For example, in the case of community property, such as the real property involved here, not only may the government's tax lien be enforced, but the entire property may be subjected to the payment of either spouse's federal tax liability. Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1100-1101 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying to Texas community property the rule in United States v. Mitchell, supra); /22/ see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. tit. 1, Section 5.61(c) (Vernon 1975); Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2D 162, 171 (Tex. 1975); Mulcahy v. United States, 388 F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1968); compare United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1970); In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1970). Moreover, since Congress has not provided an exemption for homesteads in the exclusive enumeration of exemptions from levy set forth in Section 6334(a) of the Code and the exclusion of homesteads generally from the list of exemptions, the particular characterization given a homestead exemption under state law can not be controlling for federal tax collection purposes. It therefore makes no difference that homestead rights which prevent a creditor from reaching the interests of a spouse are characterized as property rights, or as an exemption under Texas law. In either case, the property rights of a taxpayer, however extensive or limited, may be reached to satisfy his federal tax liabilities. While the state's characterization of its homestead provisions may be effective for purposes of state law, it is ineffective in matters of federal taxes and federal tax collection. /23/ Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1940); United States v. Mitchell, supra; see United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211, 213 (1955); Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 268 (1945). Once it has been determined that a taxpayer possesses homestead property or rights to such property under state law, the fact that his spouse likewise possesses an interest in the property that qualifies as a homestead under state law cannot insulate the taxpayer's interest in such property from federal tax collection procedures. The role of the state homestead law is necessarily limited to affording protection against private creditors' claims. "This approach strikes a proper balance between the legitimate and traditional interest which the State has in creating and defining the property interest of its citizens, and the necessity for a uniform administration of the federal revenue statutes." Aquilino v. United States, supra, 363 U.S. at 514. II A FEDERAL COURT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION BROUGHT BY THE UNITED STATES UNDER SECTION 7403(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS EMPOWERED TO ORDER THE SALE OF HOMESTEAD REAL PROPERTY TO ENFORCE A FEDERAL TAX LIEN THAT ATTACHES TO A DELINQUENT TAXPAYER'S INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY, WHERE THE SPOUSE OCCUPYING THE HOMESTEAD DOES NOT HAVE OUTSTANDING TAX LIABILITIES A. In refusing to enforce admittedly valid tax liens that attached to a taxpayer's interest in a homestead property, the court below, in the second step of its analysis, relied upon the additional ground that a federal court is not authorized in a foreclosure action pursuant to Section 7403(c) of the Code to order the sale of jointly owned property where the remaining joint owners are not delinquent taxpayers. In so holding, the court followed its earlier decision in Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (1962), that a federal tax lien attaches only to the delinquent taxpayer's interest in property, and that Section 7403 authorizes enforcement of that lien only by action against the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the property (see Pet. App. 16a). /24/ The terms of Section 7403, however, plainly authorize the sale of the property in which persons other than the delinquent taxpayers have an interest. Section 7403(a) broadly authorizes the Attorney General to direct a civil action to be filed in a federal district court "to enforce the lien of the United States * * * with respect to such tax or liability or to subject any property, o(f) whatever nature of the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title, or interest, to the payment of such tax or liability" (emphasis supplied). Section 7403(b) is equally explicit with respect to the application of foreclosure proceedings on property in which the taxpayer does not have the sole interest. It requires that "(a)ll persons having liens upon or claiming any interest in the property" be made parties to the action. Finally, Section 7403(c) empowers the court to order "a sale of such property" -- not the sale of only taxpayer's interest in it -- and directs the court to distribute "the proceeds of such sale according to the findingings of the court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the United States." Thus, the statute expressly authorizes a district court to subject the interests of persons other than the taxpayer to an involuntary sale in the course of enforcing the government's lien on the taxpayer's interest in the property. United States v. Overman, 424 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1970). /25/ As the court below acknowledged (Pet. App. 16a & n.12), it stands alone in its restrictive interpretation of Section 7403. Four other courts of appeals -- the Second, Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits -- have upheld the authority of the federal courts to order the sale of jointly held property to satisfy the tax liabilities of one of the joint owners as consistent with the terms of Section 7403. United States v. Trilling, 328 F.2d 699, 702-703 (7th Cir. 1964); Washington v. United States, 402 F.2d 3, 6-7 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 978 (1971); United States v. Overman, supra; United States v. Kocher, 468 F.2d 503, 506-507 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); see also In re Ackerman, 424 F.2d 1148, 1149-1150 (9th Cir. 1970). See United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869, 870-871 (10th Cir. 1974). Furthermore, under the decision below, the remedies available to the government in a Section 7403 action are dependent upon the rights the taxpayer has against the joint owners under state law. Thus, in Folsom, the court below held that the government was required first to acquire the taxpayer's interest in the jointly held property and then seek partition. If the government were accordingly forced to acquire a delinquent taxpayer's interest in jointly held property, and then seek partition under state law, it might well require separate law suits, which would undoubtedly reduce the financial recovery of the government and also injure the taxpayer, insofar as the sale of his property interests would yield a lesser amount. Surely Congress did not intend the tax collector to suffer delay by having to await the termination of the occupancy of a homestead, or having to assume partnership or other partial interests in property together with a delinquent taxpayer's spouse or co-owners, in order to garner the uncertain yields of partition. The plain language of Section 7403 authorizes the forced sale of "property" in which a delinquent taxpayer has an interest; it does not restrict the federal courts to the granting of remedies available under state law. B. United States v. Boyd, 246 F.2d 477, 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 889 (1957), and United States v. Morrison, 247 F.2d 285, 289-290 (5th Cir. 1957), upon which the court below relied (Pet. App. 16a-17a), do not support the broad proposition that a federal court has equitable discretion to refuse to enforce a valid and valuable /26/ federal tax lien against an interest in property admittedly belonging to the taxpayer. In Boyd, the court simply indicated that the district court had discretion not to order foreclosure if the tax lien did not exist, or was junior to other liens that would exhaust the value of the property, or if the property did not belong to the taxpayer. In those circumstances, "a decree of foreclosure would be neither appropriate nor effective" (246 F.2d at 481). Similarly, the reference to equitable discretion in Morrison was to the district court's ability in quiet title actions under 28 U.S.C. 2410 to take appropriate action in the event the government's lien against the property involved did not entitle it to relief. /27/ In this regard, the court correctly stated (247 F.2d at 291): There is no hazard to the revenues in the course which we approve. If the Court on sufficient evidence under controlling legal principles concludes that the Government has no lien, a foreclosure is unnecessary to remove the cloud of the asserted lien from the title, and the Government, in fact, had lost nothing. It will not be different if, on the other hand, the Court were to find that the Government lien does exist and has not been, by valid action prior to the Section 2410 suit, extinguished by a valid foreclosure. As to such lien, whether superior, equal to, or inferior to the competing lien, the Court, if the posture of the controversy is such that the legal determination of the priorities itself is not a full solution, can, under its traditional flexibility as well as that specified in paragraph (c), Section 2410, * * * take whatever action is necessary to assure that the Government's lien is fully and effectually respected in accordance with its established rank. This might take the form of the judicial ascertainment of values to determine whether there was any real equity over and above the prior lien, whether Government or private. For if it is established to a judicial certainty that nought would be gained by a judicial sale, nought would be lost by declining to compel a needless unproductive act. (Emphasis supplied.) Far from sanctioning the refusal to enforce a valid and valuable federal tax lien, the court in Morrison limited its holding to situations in which enforcement of the lien would have been futile. The ruling below goes well beyond the court's prior observations in Boyd and Morrison. Here, the court below, as an exercise of its equitable powers, refused to enforce a valid federal tax lien against the taxpayer's admitted interest in a homestead, in order to vindicate the nontaxpayer spouse's rights under the state homestead laws. /28/ But such a decision undermines the uniform rules that Congress sought to establish for the exemption of property from federal tax collection, and necessarily invites further judicial incursions against the Treasury's tax collection authority. Although case in terms of "equitable discretion," the decision below creates a new exemption for certain state homestead interests and thereby frustrates Congress's intent to provide a limited and narrow set of exemptions from federal tax collection procedures. /29/ Whether valid federal tax liens are to be enforced in foreclosure actions brought by the government under Section 7403 against property that is not exempt under federal law is a statutory question, not a question consigned to the equitable discretion of the district court. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906); Pan American Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456, 506 (1927); Scaife Co. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 459, 462 (1941); see also, United States v. Stutsman County Implement Co., 274 F.2d 733, 735-736 (8th Cir. 1960); United States v. Second National Bank of North Miami, 502 F.2d 535, 548 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 912 (1975). The federal tax collection rules established by Congress demand fair and predictably uniform application without regard to the unrelated requirements of state law. CONCLUSION The judgments of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General GLENN L. ARCHER, JR. Assistant Attorney General STUART A. SMITH Assistant to the Solicitor General WILLIAM S. ESTABROOK WYNETTE J. HEWETT Attorneys JUNE 1982 /1/ Respondent's middle name and surname were inadvertently misspelled in the caption of the case in the courts below. We employ the correct spelling -- Lucille Mitzi Bosco Rodgers. /2/ "R." references are to the original record on appeal in the court of appeals in each case. By order dated April 19, 1982, the Court granted the motions of the parties to dispense with printing of joint appendices. /3/ Respondents also sought attorney's fees and the district court awarded them such fees of $3,000 (Pet. App. 3a, 23a-24a). The court of appeals, however, reversed this aspect of the district court's judgment, concluding "that the district court acted outside of its discretion in awarding attorney's fees to (respondents)" (id. at 24a). Respondents have not sought review in this Court of the attorney's fee question. /4/ The district court did not dispose of the government's claim for judgment based on the assessments against Philip, but directed the entry of a final judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (R. 102). /5/ United States v. Heffron, 158 F.2d 657 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 831 (1947). /6/ United States v. Heasley, 283 F.2d 422 (8th Cir. 1960); Herndon v. United States, 501 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1974). /7/ The home was insured and the proceeds of the fire insurance policy, approximately $50,000, were deposited into the registry of the Domestic Relations Court where their divorce proceedings were pending. Joerene and Donald Ingram entered into a property settlement agreement, which provided, inter alia, that the parties would divide the proceeds equally and that Donald would convey his interest in the real property to Joerene in exchange for $1,500 to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the property (Pet. App. 26a-27a). In addition, Joerene and Donald agreed that they would file separate income tax returns for 1974, that Donald would pay any income tax on joint income for 1974, and that he would "hold (his) Wife harmless for any deficiencies or assessments for the years 1971 through 1973" (Pet. App. 27a). /8/ The parties agreed that their rights, claims, and priorities would be determined as if the sale had not taken place, and that the proceeds would be divided according to their respective interests (Pet. App. 28a; R. 75). /9/ The government also sought summary judgment on its cross claims against the competing creditors on the ground that the tax liens had priority over their interests (Pet. App. 28a-29a). /10/ The court of appeals consolidated the case for oral argument with Rodgers (Pet. App. 3a n.3). /11/ Congress has chosen to subordinate a federal tax lien to certain other enumerated interests that arise before notice of the tax lien is filed. A few specified interests (e.g., mechanic's liens) are entitled to priority over a federal tax lien even where notice has been filed. See 26 U.S.C. 6323. /12/ Section 6334(a) now exempts: (1) certain wearing apparel and school books, (2) fuel, provisions, furniture and personal effects not exceeding $500 in value, (3) books and tools of trade not exceeding $250 in value, (4) unemployment benefits, (5) undelivered mail, (6) certain annuity and pension payments, (7) workmen's compensation, (8) amounts of income necessary for a delinquent taxpayer to comply with a judgment against him for child support, and (9) a minimum amount of salary, wages and other income. /13/ The five additional exemptions are as follows: Exemption for unemployment benefits (Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, Section 406, 72 Stat. 1047); exemption for undelivered mail (Excise Tax Reduction Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-44, Section 812, 79 Stat. 170); exemption for pension payments and workmen's compensation (Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, Section 104(c)(2), 80 Stat. 1137); exemption of amounts for the support of minor children (Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, Section 945(a), 83 Stat. 729); exemption for a minimum amount of wages, salary and other income (Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Section 1209(a), 90 Stat. 1709). /14/ In Point II (pages 40-45, infra), we discuss the authority of the federal courts to order the sale of such property in actions brought by the United States under 26 U.S.C. 7403(c). /15/ Cf. Shaw v. United States, 331 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1964) (federal tax lien enforceable against homestead property where homestead law confers privileges and exemptions rather than creating present property interest). /16/ It is not at all clear what, if any, significance the court of appeals assigned to its holding that a federal tax lien attaches to a taxpayer's interest in jointly owned property claimed as a Texas homestead. Although the court recognized that a tax lien attaches to the taxpayer's interest in the property, it ruled that the lien is not enforceable as long as the nontaxpayer maintains her homestead interest under Texas law (Pet. App. 9a). The court cited, as examples of maintaining a homestead interest, the exchanging of the original homestead for a new homestead or the holding of the proceeds of a fire insurance policy (received on the destruction of the homestead) for a period of six months during which the proceeds may be invested in a new homestead (Pet. App. 22a n.17, 31a-32a n.6). See Ellis v. Light, 73 S.W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903); Lee v. Honea, 349 S.W.2D 110, 111 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961); Johnson v. Hall, 163 S.W. 399, 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914); Walter Connally & Co. v. Hopkins, 195 S.W. 656, 661 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) aff'd, 221 S.W. 1082 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920). The court's holding in this regard creates substantial difficulties for the taxpayer, his spouse, the new owner of the original homestead property, and the government as well. As we have indicated (pages 15-16, supra), the essence of a lien is that after it attaches to property it continues to encumber the property in the hands of those to whom it is subsequently passed. United States v. Bess, supra, 357 U.S. at 57. Accordingly, if Mrs. Rodgers were to exchange her homestead, it would be encumbered in the hands of the new owner. Under the literal terms of the court's holding, however, the lien would not be enforceable against the original homestead property held by the new owner, until Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest in the new property she acquired (or any subsequent replacements) terminated under local law. This result would be unfortunate for Mrs. Rodgers, as well as for the person who acquires the old homestead property, and the government. If the new owner understands that the homestead property he is acquiring from Mrs. Rodgers is encumbered, he would be willing to exchange property with her only after reducing the value of her old homestead to reflect the fact that it is encumbered. Furthermore, not only will the government's collection of the unpaid taxes be delayed until Mrs. Rodgers' homestead interest in subsequently acquired property terminates, but, in the interim, the government will also bear the additional administrative burdens of monitoring the taxpayer's account, and keeping its notice of lien current and the underlying tax liability viable. See 26 U.S.C. 6323(g). The new owner of the old homestead property hardly occupies an enviable position, since the tax lien may become enforceable at any time Mrs. Rodgers terminates her homestead interest under local law (for example, by death or abandonment), an event he cannot reasonably predict. The prospects are even bleaker from the government's perspective in the event a nontaxpayer spouse relies upon state law protection of the proceeds of an insurance policy to continue her homestead interest. In such circumstances, there is no assurance that the proceeds will not be dissipated during the protected six month period. In that event, the government's tax lien may well become worthless. Moreover, state law also protects the proceeds of sale of a homestead for a period of six months during which they may be invested in a new homestead. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3834 (Vernon 1966). The same infirmity also affects the exercise of that right. There is no assurance that the tax lien will remain valuable, since the proceeds could be dissipated. These problems are exacerbated in Ingram, since, as part of the divorce proceedings, the taxpayer has purported to convey his interest in the property to Mrs. Ingram without satisfying the tax lien. /17/ As the court below explained (Pet. App. 17a n.14), the tax lien is not enforceable when the nontaxpayer has a "present property interest," i.e., a property right at the time the tax lien attached to the taxpayer spouse's interest in the homestead property. /18/ The protection afforded respondents from foreclosure by the decision below is not limited to the particular properties at issue. Rather, the court below suggested that respondents could exchange their homesteads for new homesteads without having to satisfy the government's lien (Pet. App. 22a n.17). /19/ Although the court of appeals had previously held that the Louisiana homestead exemption laws were not effective against federal tax levies (Carter v. United States, 399 F.2d 340, 342 (1968), the decision below interpreted Carter to hold that the Louisiana homestead exemption did not affect the validity of the government's tax lien, but refused to permit foreclosure of that lien. See Pet. App. 14a-15a & n.11. But a careful reading of Carter indicates that the court refused to enjoin the government from seizing real property jointly owned by a delinquent taxpayer-husband and his wife, on the ground that the Louisiana homestead exemption was not effective against a federal tax levy. The court further held, however, that the wife had an undivided one-half interest in the property that was immune from seizure and sale. If the government had sought foreclosure of its lien, the court would have presumably denied relief under its earlier ruling in Folsom v. United States, 306 F.2d 361 (1962), which held that a federal court in a foreclosure action brought by the United States under Section 7403 of the Code cannot enforce a federal tax lien by ordering the sale of property where there are joint owners of the property who are not delinquent taxpayers. As we shall show (at Point II, infra, page 41), this conclusion is expressly refuted by the plain language of Section 7403. /20/ Earlier, the Tenth Circuit had stated, in dicta in Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478, 480 (1944), that a nontaxpayer spouse has an indivisible, vested interest in a homestead. If the marriage is valid the nontaxpayer spouse can claim a homestead interest which cannot be subject to levy and sale for the federal tax liability of the taxpayer spouse. The court in Jones permitted foreclosure, however, because the marriage in question was invalid so that the nontaxpayer spouse could not claim a homestead interest under Oklahoma law. /21/ It was on this basis that the court below distinguished its prior decision in Weitzner v. United States, 309 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 913 (1963) (Florida homestead law that provides an exemption from creditors does not insulate property from federal tax collection despite occupancy of nontaxpayer spouse) (see Pet. App. 12a-14a & n.10). /22/ The court below sought to distinguish the community property principle set forth in Broday on the ground that it did not involve property claimed as a homestead (Pet. App. 18a n.15). But there is no basis for that distinction. As the Fifth Circuit properly recognized in Broday (455 F.2d at 1101), this Court's decision in Mitchell makes clear that the right of the government to enforce its tax lien is not dependent upon state laws that regulate the rights of creditors and does not depend upon whether the "exemption" label is applied. The property involved in these cases was admittedly community property and state homestead law does not insulate such property from the enforcement of a federal tax lien. /23/ Moreover, the court's reading of the Texas case law with respect to homesteads is not free from doubt. The Texas homestead provision protects the business and home of the urban homestead claimant from forced sale (to the extent the lot or lots on which it is located do not exceed a stated value) and imposes a joint consent requirement for alienation. As the court of appeals noted (Pet. App. 5a), Section 50 of the Constitution of the State of Texas, Article 16, provides in relevant part that "(t)he homestead of a family * * * shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof * * *" and other specified obligations. In addition, Section 50 prohibits the conveyance of the homestead without the consent of both spouses. Section 51 defines the extent of homestead protection, specifying that in the case of an urban homestead the "lot or lots" which comprise it are "not to exceed in value Ten Thousand Dollars, at the time of their designation as the homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements thereon," and must be used "for the purpose of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the homestead claimant." Furthermore, Section 52 provides that upon the death of one spouse "the homestead shall descend and vest in like manner as other real property of the deceased, and shall be governed by the same laws of descent and distribution," but that the property shall not be partitioned among the heirs during the lifetime of the surviving spouse or as long as the survivor elects "to use or occupy the same as a homestead." Section 52 provides also for protection of the homestead as long as the guardian of minor children is permitted by a court to use and occupy the property. Since the characterization of homestead rights applied by the Supreme Court of Texas appears to depend upon the context in which the issue arises, it would appear to be an uncertain basis upon which to premise the federal government's authority to collect tax assessments. In describing the nature of homestead rights in cases involving a creditor's enforcement of liens against the excess value of a homestead, the Supreme Court of Texas has characterized the homestead right involved as an exemption. See, e.g., Love v. Hoffman, 499 S.W.2D 295 (Tex.), aff'g per curiam 494 S.W.2D 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); see also Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2D 566, 567 (Tex. 1972) (characterizing the homestead right involved as an exemption in circumstances in which divorce had terminated homestead interests); Bank of Texas v. Laguarta, 565 S.W.2D 363 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). Where the division of marital property in divorce proceedings is concerned, the Supreme Court of Texas has made it clear that homestead rights do not disturb the ownership of property. Title to separate property remains vested in the spouse who owns the property. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2D 137, 141 (Tex. 1977); see also Buchan v. Buchan, 592 S.W.2D 367, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); compare Evans v. Mills, 67 F.2d 840 (5th Cir. 1933) (stating that a homestead interest in Texas is not a mere exemption, but rather it is "title in the land"). In describing a survivor's right to avoid partition of homestead property, sometimes called the probate homestead, the Supreme Court of Texas has stated that the right involved is one in the nature of a life estate. Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2D 867, 869 (Tex. 1978). In holding that a husband, who after divorce provided for two minor children, was entitled to avoid creditor's claims even after the children were grown, the Supreme Court of Texas described the homestead right as "an estate in land." Woods v. Alvarado State Bank, 118 Tex. 586, 594, 19 S.W.2D 35 (1929); compare O'Neil v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2D 112, 114 (Tex. 1976) (stating that "the homestead right, when fixed, is an estate in land exempt from execution"). Here, the tax liens in Rodgers attached to the realty while respondent and her first husband (the taxpayer husband) were living on the property. Thus, respondent's survivorship rights were then contingent, not vested. See Shambaugh v. Scofield, supra, 132 F.2d at 346. The property was encumbered by the tax lien before the taxpayer's death and her survivorship rights were necessarily subordinate to it. United States v. Bess, supra, 357 U.S. at 57; Randall v. H. Nakashima & Co., 542 F.2d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 1976); see also, L. Simpkins, Texas Family Law with Forms Section 36:6 at 44-45 (5th ed. 1977). Accordingly, the rights of the survivor under the Texas provision, which are often described in Texas cases as an estate in land, are irrelevant to the enforceability of the tax lien. See Williams v. Williams, supra, 569 S.W.2D at 869; Sparks v. Robertson, 203 S.W.2D 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). Similarly, in Ingram, the tax liens attached to the realty while respondent and her ex-husband (the taxpayer) were living on the property during their marriage. Thus, Donald Ingram's transfer of the realty to respondent pursuant to the divorce settlement and the fire insurance proceeds for the loss of the realty did not defeat the government's tax liens. /24/ In United States v. Raudry, 82-1 U.S.T.C. Paragraph 9231 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 1981), appeal pending, No. 82-1080 (filed Feb. 10, 1982 5th Cir.), the court refused to permit foreclosure against real property held by taxpayer and his former wife as joint tenants, citing Folsom and interpreting it, as the court below did here, to authorize judicial judicial refusal to enforce a tax lien. /25/ Of course, the interests established by parties other than the government will be given due regard in the order of distribution of the proceeds of sale. 26 U.S.C. 7403(c); United States v. Overman, supra, 424 F.2d at 1147. /26/ The term "valuable lien" refers to a lien on property which has sufficient value to satisfy it and any other creditors' interests that are senior to it. /27/ Under 28 U.S.C. 2410, a private party who brings an action that affects property on which the United States has or claims a lien may name the United States as a party. /28/ Ironically, in the only case in which the issue has been presented to it, the Supreme Court of Texas barred enforcement of a federal tax lien only as against the nontaxpayer's community interest in a homestead. Paddock v. Siemoneit, 147 Tex. 571, 218 S.W.2D 428 (1949). /29/ The explicit terms of Section 6331(a) make it clear that there are no exemptions from levy other than those recognized by Congress in Section 6334. Barring foreclosure as a remedy where state homestead exemptions are involved, may well inure to the detriment of both taxpayer and the government by discouraging purchasers, who wish to avoid litigation regarding the nontaxpayer's interest in the property as well as the interests of any creditors, and by diminishing the amount realized from the sale of taxpayer's interest pursuant to a levy. See Herndon v. United States, supra, 501 F.2d at 1223-1224 (Ross, J., concurring).